Social Deliberation vs. Social Contracts in Self-Governing Voluntary Organisations

Matthew Scott, Asimina Mertzani, Ciske Smitt, Stefan Sarkadi, Jeremy Pitt

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review

Abstract

Self-organising multi-agent systems regulate their components' behaviour voluntarily, according to a set of socially-constructed, mutually-agreed, and mutable social arrangements. In some systems, these arrangements may be applied with a frequency, at a scale and within implicit cost constraints such that performance becomes a pressing issue. This paper introduces the \textit{Megabike Scenario}, which consists of a negotiated agreement on a relatively 'large' set of conventional rules, 'frequent' 'democratic' decision-making according to those rules, and a resource-bounded imperative to reach 'correct' decisions. A formalism is defined for effective rule representation and processing in the scenario, and is evaluated against five interleaved socio-functional requirements. System performance is also evaluated empirically through simulation. We conclude that to self-organise their social arrangements, agents need some awareness of their own limitations and the value of compromise.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of International Wolrkshop on Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, Norms, and Ethics for Governance of Multi-Agent Systems (COINE 2024)
PublisherSpringer
Publication statusAccepted/In press - Mar 2025

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
PublisherSpringer
Volume15398

Keywords

  • self-organising multi-agent systems
  • social cohesion
  • social deliberation

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