Soviet intelligence and the 1957 Syrian Crisis

TY - JOUR

T1 - Soviet intelligence and the 1957 Syrian Crisis

AU - Easter, David

PY - 2017/8/22

Y1 - 2017/8/22

N2 - This article assesses a claim by Khrushchev that warnings from the Soviet intelligence services enabled to him to deter a Turkish invasion of Syria in 1957. The article shows that the United States and Turkey did aim to overthrow the Syrian government, with the Turks massing an invasion force on Syria’s border. Soviet intelligence detected this threat and was able to alert Khrushchev, who took diplomatic and military countermeasures. However, while the Soviet intelligence services did provide advance warning, Khrushchev overestimated the extent to which the United States was committed to a Turkish invasion.

AB - This article assesses a claim by Khrushchev that warnings from the Soviet intelligence services enabled to him to deter a Turkish invasion of Syria in 1957. The article shows that the United States and Turkey did aim to overthrow the Syrian government, with the Turks massing an invasion force on Syria’s border. Soviet intelligence detected this threat and was able to alert Khrushchev, who took diplomatic and military countermeasures. However, while the Soviet intelligence services did provide advance warning, Khrushchev overestimated the extent to which the United States was committed to a Turkish invasion.

KW - Khrushchev, Syria, KGB, Turkey, deterrence

U2 - 10.1080/02684527.2017.1370072

DO - 10.1080/02684527.2017.1370072

M3 - Article

SN - 0268-4527

SP - 1

EP - 14

JO - Intelligence and National Security

JF - Intelligence and National Security

ER -