Abstract
Spinoza’s account of acquiescentia has been obscured by inconsistent
translations of acquiescentia, and forms of the verb acquiescere, in the standard English
edition of the Ethics. For Spinoza, acquiescentia is an inherently cognitive affect, since
it involves an idea of oneself (as the cause of one’s joy). As such, the affect is closely
correlated to the three kinds of cognition identified by Spinoza in Ethics II. Just as
there are three kinds of cognition, so too are there three kinds of acquiescentia. Two
qualities—stillness and obedience—provide the criteria for distinguishing between
these. This illuminates Spinoza’s positive account of acquiescentia, and also clarifies
how it responds critically to the equivalent Cartesian passion, la satisfaction de soimême,
which is translated as acquiescentia in se ipso in the relevant Latin edition of Les
passions de l’âme.
translations of acquiescentia, and forms of the verb acquiescere, in the standard English
edition of the Ethics. For Spinoza, acquiescentia is an inherently cognitive affect, since
it involves an idea of oneself (as the cause of one’s joy). As such, the affect is closely
correlated to the three kinds of cognition identified by Spinoza in Ethics II. Just as
there are three kinds of cognition, so too are there three kinds of acquiescentia. Two
qualities—stillness and obedience—provide the criteria for distinguishing between
these. This illuminates Spinoza’s positive account of acquiescentia, and also clarifies
how it responds critically to the equivalent Cartesian passion, la satisfaction de soimême,
which is translated as acquiescentia in se ipso in the relevant Latin edition of Les
passions de l’âme.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 209-236 |
| Journal | JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 17 Apr 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 30 Apr 2017 |