Strategic Candidacy Games with Lazy Candidates

Svetlana Obraztsova, Edith Elkind, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of candidates, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the outcome according to their preferences. In this work, we extend the standard model of strategic candidacy games by observing that candidates may ?nd it costly to run an electoral campaign and may therefore prefer to withdraw if their presence has no effect on the election outcome. We study the Nash equilibria and outcomes of natural best-response dynamics in the resulting class of games, both from a normative and from a computational perspective, and compare them with the Nash equilibria of the standard model.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015)
Publication statusPublished - 31 Jul 2015

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