Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections

Niall Hughes

Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections

Niall Hughes

Economics

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Abstract

I study multi-district legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	4292-4327
Number of pages	36
Journal	AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume	115
Issue number	12
Publication status	Published - Dec 2025

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title = "Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections",

abstract = "I study multi-district legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections.",

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AB - I study multi-district legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections.

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Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections

Abstract

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