Abstract
This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one’s own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one’s own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of an experience of thought insertion consists of two distinct elements: a state of ordinary first-person awareness and a sense that this state of awareness is highly unusual. In addition to modeling the experience of thought insertion, I also explain how a delusional pattern of thinking could lead someone who has this kind of experience to adopt a belief that some other entity is inserting thoughts into her mind. Finally, I briefly sketch a neurocomputational framework that could be developed to explain the sense that one’s state of first-person awareness is highly irregular.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 39-64 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Mind & Language |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 6 Feb 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 6 Feb 2017 |