Super‐Nash Performance

Mehmet S. Ismail

doi:10.1111/iere.12764

Super‐Nash Performance

Mehmet S. Ismail^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Political Economy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super-Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super-Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Furthermore, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in (Formula presented.) -person constant-sum games and coincides with it when n = 2. Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1487-1503
Number of pages	17
Journal	INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume	66
Issue number	4
Early online date	26 Mar 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12764
Publication status	Published - 15 Oct 2025

Keywords

Maximin criterion
Nash equilibrium
noncooperative games
repeated prisoner’s dilemma
solution concepts
traveler’s dilemma

Access to Document

10.1111/iere.12764Licence: CC BY

Super-Nash Performance_Version of RecordFinal published version, 7.93 MBLicence: CC BY

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12764Licence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{a342b47e2c2b4b3d9fba98195b3951f2,

title = "Super‐Nash Performance",

abstract = "In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super-Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super-Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Furthermore, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in (Formula presented.) -person constant-sum games and coincides with it when n = 2. Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied.",

keywords = "Maximin criterion, Nash equilibrium, noncooperative games, repeated prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma, solution concepts, traveler{\textquoteright}s dilemma",

author = "Ismail, \{Mehmet S.\}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2025 The Author(s). International Economic Review published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.",

year = "2025",

month = oct,

day = "15",

doi = "10.1111/iere.12764",

language = "English",

volume = "66",

pages = "1487--1503",

journal = "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW",

issn = "0020-6598",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Super‐Nash Performance

AU - Ismail, Mehmet S.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2025 The Author(s). International Economic Review published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

PY - 2025/10/15

Y1 - 2025/10/15

N2 - In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super-Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super-Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Furthermore, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in (Formula presented.) -person constant-sum games and coincides with it when n = 2. Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied.

AB - In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super-Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super-Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Furthermore, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in (Formula presented.) -person constant-sum games and coincides with it when n = 2. Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied.

KW - Maximin criterion

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - noncooperative games

KW - repeated prisoner’s dilemma

KW - solution concepts

KW - traveler’s dilemma

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105001562445

U2 - 10.1111/iere.12764

DO - 10.1111/iere.12764

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-6598

VL - 66

SP - 1487

EP - 1503

JO - INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW

JF - INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW

IS - 4

ER -

Super‐Nash Performance

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this