Supporting Cooperation via Agreement Equilibrium

Mehmet Ismail; Ronald Peeters

Supporting Cooperation via Agreement Equilibrium

Mehmet Ismail, Ronald Peeters

Political Economy

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Abstract

We introduce 'agreement equilibrium' as a novel solution concept that can explain the abundance of cooperative behavior that is often observed in laboratory experiments in various contexts. The main idea of the agreement equilibrium is to identify behaviors that individuals can (tacitly) agree on while being ambiguous about their opponents' intentions to respect or to betray this (tacit) agreement. We investigate properties of the agreement equilibrium and illustrate the agreement equilibrium in a series of famous applications.

Original language	English
Journal	MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 14 Oct 2019

Keywords

noncooperative games
tacit cooperation
agreement equilibrium
social dilemmas

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agreement_equilibriumAccepted author manuscript, 289 KB

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title = "Supporting Cooperation via Agreement Equilibrium",

abstract = "We introduce 'agreement equilibrium' as a novel solution concept that can explain the abundance of cooperative behavior that is often observed in laboratory experiments in various contexts. The main idea of the agreement equilibrium is to identify behaviors that individuals can (tacitly) agree on while being ambiguous about their opponents' intentions to respect or to betray this (tacit) agreement. We investigate properties of the agreement equilibrium and illustrate the agreement equilibrium in a series of famous applications.",

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AU - Peeters, Ronald

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N2 - We introduce 'agreement equilibrium' as a novel solution concept that can explain the abundance of cooperative behavior that is often observed in laboratory experiments in various contexts. The main idea of the agreement equilibrium is to identify behaviors that individuals can (tacitly) agree on while being ambiguous about their opponents' intentions to respect or to betray this (tacit) agreement. We investigate properties of the agreement equilibrium and illustrate the agreement equilibrium in a series of famous applications.

AB - We introduce 'agreement equilibrium' as a novel solution concept that can explain the abundance of cooperative behavior that is often observed in laboratory experiments in various contexts. The main idea of the agreement equilibrium is to identify behaviors that individuals can (tacitly) agree on while being ambiguous about their opponents' intentions to respect or to betray this (tacit) agreement. We investigate properties of the agreement equilibrium and illustrate the agreement equilibrium in a series of famous applications.

KW - noncooperative games

KW - tacit cooperation

KW - agreement equilibrium

KW - social dilemmas

M3 - Article

SN - 0025-1909

JO - MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

JF - MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

ER -

Supporting Cooperation via Agreement Equilibrium

Abstract

Keywords

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