Sybil Attack Vulnerability Trilemma

Moritz Platt; Daniel Platt; Peter McBurney

doi:10.1080/17445760.2024.2352740

Sybil Attack Vulnerability Trilemma

Moritz Platt, Daniel Platt, Peter McBurney

Informatics

Imperial College London

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

Public and permissionless blockchain systems are challenged by Sybil attacks, in which attackers use multiple identities to gain control. Traditionally, such attacks are prevented by consensus mechanisms relying on resource expenditure. However, such mechanisms (e.g. proof of work) face criticism for being wasteful. To address this and other concerns, novel blockchain systems backed by new consensus mechanisms have recently emerged. We formalise three key characteristics pursued by these systems: permissionlessness, Sybil attack resistance, and freeness. We demonstrate that no blockchain protocol can simultaneously achieve all three characteristics within the paradigm established by our formalisation. Thus, a trilemma emerges for distributed ledger technology designers, who must balance these characteristics thoughtfully.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	446-460
Number of pages	15
Journal	International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems
Volume	39
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/17445760.2024.2352740
Publication status	Published - 4 May 2024

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Sybil Attack Vulnerability Trilemma

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