Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents

Justin Garson*, David Papineau

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural selection that underlies it, we can resolve this problem. Here, we do four things: we develop this suggestion in a rigorous way through a simple example, we draw on recent neurobiological research to support its empirical plausibility, we defend the move from a host of objections in the literature, and we sketch how the picture can be extended to help us think about more complex “conceptual” representations and not just perceptual ones.

Original languageEnglish
Article number36
JournalBIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
Volume34
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2019

Keywords

  • Biological functions
  • Neural selection
  • Novel representations
  • Selected effects theory
  • Teleosemantics

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