King's College London

Research portal

Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Standard

Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents. / Garson, Justin; Papineau, David.

In: BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 34, No. 3, 36, 01.06.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Garson, J & Papineau, D 2019, 'Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents', BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, vol. 34, no. 3, 36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9689-8

APA

Garson, J., & Papineau, D. (2019). Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents. BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, 34(3), [36]. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9689-8

Vancouver

Garson J, Papineau D. Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents. BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. 2019 Jun 1;34(3). 36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9689-8

Author

Garson, Justin ; Papineau, David. / Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents. In: BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. 2019 ; Vol. 34, No. 3.

Bibtex Download

@article{42666cf350ac4c419d7dbbba0ecc1d15,
title = "Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents",
abstract = "Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural selection that underlies it, we can resolve this problem. Here, we do four things: we develop this suggestion in a rigorous way through a simple example, we draw on recent neurobiological research to support its empirical plausibility, we defend the move from a host of objections in the literature, and we sketch how the picture can be extended to help us think about more complex “conceptual” representations and not just perceptual ones.",
keywords = "Biological functions, Neural selection, Novel representations, Selected effects theory, Teleosemantics",
author = "Justin Garson and David Papineau",
year = "2019",
month = jun,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s10539-019-9689-8",
language = "English",
volume = "34",
journal = "BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY",
issn = "0169-3867",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "3",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents

AU - Garson, Justin

AU - Papineau, David

PY - 2019/6/1

Y1 - 2019/6/1

N2 - Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural selection that underlies it, we can resolve this problem. Here, we do four things: we develop this suggestion in a rigorous way through a simple example, we draw on recent neurobiological research to support its empirical plausibility, we defend the move from a host of objections in the literature, and we sketch how the picture can be extended to help us think about more complex “conceptual” representations and not just perceptual ones.

AB - Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural selection that underlies it, we can resolve this problem. Here, we do four things: we develop this suggestion in a rigorous way through a simple example, we draw on recent neurobiological research to support its empirical plausibility, we defend the move from a host of objections in the literature, and we sketch how the picture can be extended to help us think about more complex “conceptual” representations and not just perceptual ones.

KW - Biological functions

KW - Neural selection

KW - Novel representations

KW - Selected effects theory

KW - Teleosemantics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064916051&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10539-019-9689-8

DO - 10.1007/s10539-019-9689-8

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85064916051

VL - 34

JO - BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

JF - BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

SN - 0169-3867

IS - 3

M1 - 36

ER -

View graph of relations

© 2020 King's College London | Strand | London WC2R 2LS | England | United Kingdom | Tel +44 (0)20 7836 5454