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Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism

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Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism. / Peters, Uwe.

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 90, No. 1, 2014, p. 273-288.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Peters, U 2014, 'Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism', Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 273-288. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004298767_017

APA

Peters, U. (2014). Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 90(1), 273-288. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004298767_017

Vancouver

Peters U. Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2014;90(1):273-288. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004298767_017

Author

Peters, Uwe. / Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism. In: Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2014 ; Vol. 90, No. 1. pp. 273-288.

Bibtex Download

@article{5389417628d84086946f76638558909a,
title = "Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism",
abstract = "Teleosemantics explains mental representation in terms of biological functionand selection history. One of the main objections to the account is the so-called{\textquoteleft}Swampman argument{\textquoteright} (Davidson 1987), which holds that there could be acreature with mental representation even though it lacks a selection history. Anumber of teleosemanticists reject the argument by emphasising that it dependson assuming a creature that is fi ctitious and hence irrelevant for teleosemanticsbecause the theory is only concerned with representations in real-world organisms(Millikan 1996, Neander 1996, 2006, Papineau 2001, 2006). I contendthat this strategy doesn{\textquoteright}t succeed. I off er an argument that captures the spiritof the original Swampman objection but relies only on organisms found in theactual world. Th e argument undermines the just mentioned response to theSwampman objection, and furthermore leads to a particular challenge to strongrepresentationalist theories of consciousness that endorse teleosemantics such as,e.g., Dretske{\textquoteright}s (1995) and Tye{\textquoteright}s (1995, 2000) accounts. On these theories, thecausal effi cacy of consciousness in actual creatures will be undermined.",
author = "Uwe Peters",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1163/9789004298767_017",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
pages = "273--288",
journal = "Grazer Philosophische Studien",
issn = "0165-9227",
publisher = "Editions Rodopi B.V.",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism

AU - Peters, Uwe

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Teleosemantics explains mental representation in terms of biological functionand selection history. One of the main objections to the account is the so-called‘Swampman argument’ (Davidson 1987), which holds that there could be acreature with mental representation even though it lacks a selection history. Anumber of teleosemanticists reject the argument by emphasising that it dependson assuming a creature that is fi ctitious and hence irrelevant for teleosemanticsbecause the theory is only concerned with representations in real-world organisms(Millikan 1996, Neander 1996, 2006, Papineau 2001, 2006). I contendthat this strategy doesn’t succeed. I off er an argument that captures the spiritof the original Swampman objection but relies only on organisms found in theactual world. Th e argument undermines the just mentioned response to theSwampman objection, and furthermore leads to a particular challenge to strongrepresentationalist theories of consciousness that endorse teleosemantics such as,e.g., Dretske’s (1995) and Tye’s (1995, 2000) accounts. On these theories, thecausal effi cacy of consciousness in actual creatures will be undermined.

AB - Teleosemantics explains mental representation in terms of biological functionand selection history. One of the main objections to the account is the so-called‘Swampman argument’ (Davidson 1987), which holds that there could be acreature with mental representation even though it lacks a selection history. Anumber of teleosemanticists reject the argument by emphasising that it dependson assuming a creature that is fi ctitious and hence irrelevant for teleosemanticsbecause the theory is only concerned with representations in real-world organisms(Millikan 1996, Neander 1996, 2006, Papineau 2001, 2006). I contendthat this strategy doesn’t succeed. I off er an argument that captures the spiritof the original Swampman objection but relies only on organisms found in theactual world. Th e argument undermines the just mentioned response to theSwampman objection, and furthermore leads to a particular challenge to strongrepresentationalist theories of consciousness that endorse teleosemantics such as,e.g., Dretske’s (1995) and Tye’s (1995, 2000) accounts. On these theories, thecausal effi cacy of consciousness in actual creatures will be undermined.

U2 - 10.1163/9789004298767_017

DO - 10.1163/9789004298767_017

M3 - Article

VL - 90

SP - 273

EP - 288

JO - Grazer Philosophische Studien

JF - Grazer Philosophische Studien

SN - 0165-9227

IS - 1

ER -

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