King's College London

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Boundary Conditions for Regulation

T2 - Welfare Systems, State Traditions and the Varied Governance of Work Safety in Europe

AU - Rothstein, Henry

AU - Paul, Regine

AU - Demeritt, David

PY - 2020/1

Y1 - 2020/1

N2 - Studies of the relationship between the welfare and regulatory state have hitherto either focused on the latter displacing the former (Majone,1997), or presented regulation as an alternative means for achieving welfare goals (Levi-Faur,2014). Little is known, however, about their varied mutual interactions. This paper addresses that gap by examining the co-evolution of workers’ compensation and occupational safety regulation in Germany, France, U.K. and Netherlands. Drawing on an extensive international analysis of primary documents, secondary literature and interviews with regulator, insurance, business and labor representatives, the paper identifies strikingly varied but stable national preferences for: a) the use of financial vs. regulatory instruments; and b) the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between state and nonstate actors. The paper presents a novel explanation of that variation as dependent on the relative coherence of interactions between the particular cost-control logics of welfare provision and wider norms and traditions of state action in each country.

AB - Studies of the relationship between the welfare and regulatory state have hitherto either focused on the latter displacing the former (Majone,1997), or presented regulation as an alternative means for achieving welfare goals (Levi-Faur,2014). Little is known, however, about their varied mutual interactions. This paper addresses that gap by examining the co-evolution of workers’ compensation and occupational safety regulation in Germany, France, U.K. and Netherlands. Drawing on an extensive international analysis of primary documents, secondary literature and interviews with regulator, insurance, business and labor representatives, the paper identifies strikingly varied but stable national preferences for: a) the use of financial vs. regulatory instruments; and b) the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between state and nonstate actors. The paper presents a novel explanation of that variation as dependent on the relative coherence of interactions between the particular cost-control logics of welfare provision and wider norms and traditions of state action in each country.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85074596576&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/gove.12411

DO - 10.1111/gove.12411

M3 - Article

VL - 33

SP - 21

EP - 39

JO - Governance

JF - Governance

SN - 1468-0491

IS - 1

ER -