Abstract
This article revisits the role of foreign fighters in the Chechen war and its aftermath, looking particularly at their impact on Islamic developments in Chechnya and Dagestan during the 1990s–2010s. The article challenges the argument, which is predominant in the literature, that foreign jihadists were primarily responsible for transforming the Chechen insurgency from
a secular movement into a religious one. Instead, it argues that Islamist tendencies and Salafi circles were present in the North Caucasus before the outbreak of the First Chechen war. Secondly, this article contends that local Salafi jamaats, in conjunction with foreign jihadist fighters, provided the mobilization structures and the ideological framing for the radicalization of the Chechen/
North Caucasus rebel movement. By examining the Salafi -jihadist discourse of both foreign and local Salafi s operating in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s and 2000s, the article shows how foreign Salafi s influenced and helped shape the ideological framing of local Salafi politicians and rebel jihadist groups. Yet, this article also shows that many of these Salafi -jihadist projects failed
to gain broader societal support. They did not resonate with the local populations in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s–2000s. A final section of this article looks at events in the past decade, particularly at developments since the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In this context, the article explains why many young Muslims in Dagestan became themselves foreign fighters and travelled to Syria/Iraq to fight for and live in the Islamic State. It concludes that Salafi projects, although not indigenous to the region, prospered as a result of the interaction between local Salafi s and foreign jihadist fighters and recruiters.
a secular movement into a religious one. Instead, it argues that Islamist tendencies and Salafi circles were present in the North Caucasus before the outbreak of the First Chechen war. Secondly, this article contends that local Salafi jamaats, in conjunction with foreign jihadist fighters, provided the mobilization structures and the ideological framing for the radicalization of the Chechen/
North Caucasus rebel movement. By examining the Salafi -jihadist discourse of both foreign and local Salafi s operating in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s and 2000s, the article shows how foreign Salafi s influenced and helped shape the ideological framing of local Salafi politicians and rebel jihadist groups. Yet, this article also shows that many of these Salafi -jihadist projects failed
to gain broader societal support. They did not resonate with the local populations in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s–2000s. A final section of this article looks at events in the past decade, particularly at developments since the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In this context, the article explains why many young Muslims in Dagestan became themselves foreign fighters and travelled to Syria/Iraq to fight for and live in the Islamic State. It concludes that Salafi projects, although not indigenous to the region, prospered as a result of the interaction between local Salafi s and foreign jihadist fighters and recruiters.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 28-49 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of International Analytics _ Mezhdunarodnaya analitika |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2021 |
Keywords
- foreign fighters, Salafi-jihadism, Chechnya, Dagestan, ISIS, Islam, North Caucasus