King's College London

Research portal

The Look of Another Mind

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Standard

The Look of Another Mind. / Parrott, Matthew Thomas.

In: MIND, Vol. 126, No. 504, 10.2017, p. 1023–1061.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Parrott, MT 2017, 'The Look of Another Mind', MIND, vol. 126, no. 504, pp. 1023–1061. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw001

APA

Parrott, M. T. (2017). The Look of Another Mind. MIND, 126(504), 1023–1061. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw001

Vancouver

Parrott MT. The Look of Another Mind. MIND. 2017 Oct;126(504):1023–1061. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw001

Author

Parrott, Matthew Thomas. / The Look of Another Mind. In: MIND. 2017 ; Vol. 126, No. 504. pp. 1023–1061.

Bibtex Download

@article{6c34500174be44618d671947d7afc0e6,
title = "The Look of Another Mind",
abstract = "According to the perceptual model, our knowledge of others' minds is a form of perceptual knowledge. We know, for example, that Jones is angry because we can literally see that he is. In this essay, I argue that mental states do not have the kind of distinctive looks that could sufficiently justify perceptual knowledge of others’ mentality. I present a puzzle that can arise with respect to mental states that I claim does not arise for non-mental properties like being an apple and argue that this is explained by the fact that the looks of non-mental properties adhere to a certain explanatory principle that does not hold for mental states. This shows, I argue, that, even if we think mental states do have looks, these cannot offer sufficient grounds for perceptual knowledge of others' minds. In the final section of the essay, I suggest an alternative way of thinking about our knowledge of others' minds and about the sorts of looks or appearances that might be associated with mental states.",
author = "Parrott, {Matthew Thomas}",
year = "2017",
month = "10",
doi = "10.1093/mind/fzw001",
language = "English",
volume = "126",
pages = "1023–1061",
journal = "MIND",
issn = "0026-4423",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "504",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Look of Another Mind

AU - Parrott, Matthew Thomas

PY - 2017/10

Y1 - 2017/10

N2 - According to the perceptual model, our knowledge of others' minds is a form of perceptual knowledge. We know, for example, that Jones is angry because we can literally see that he is. In this essay, I argue that mental states do not have the kind of distinctive looks that could sufficiently justify perceptual knowledge of others’ mentality. I present a puzzle that can arise with respect to mental states that I claim does not arise for non-mental properties like being an apple and argue that this is explained by the fact that the looks of non-mental properties adhere to a certain explanatory principle that does not hold for mental states. This shows, I argue, that, even if we think mental states do have looks, these cannot offer sufficient grounds for perceptual knowledge of others' minds. In the final section of the essay, I suggest an alternative way of thinking about our knowledge of others' minds and about the sorts of looks or appearances that might be associated with mental states.

AB - According to the perceptual model, our knowledge of others' minds is a form of perceptual knowledge. We know, for example, that Jones is angry because we can literally see that he is. In this essay, I argue that mental states do not have the kind of distinctive looks that could sufficiently justify perceptual knowledge of others’ mentality. I present a puzzle that can arise with respect to mental states that I claim does not arise for non-mental properties like being an apple and argue that this is explained by the fact that the looks of non-mental properties adhere to a certain explanatory principle that does not hold for mental states. This shows, I argue, that, even if we think mental states do have looks, these cannot offer sufficient grounds for perceptual knowledge of others' minds. In the final section of the essay, I suggest an alternative way of thinking about our knowledge of others' minds and about the sorts of looks or appearances that might be associated with mental states.

U2 - 10.1093/mind/fzw001

DO - 10.1093/mind/fzw001

M3 - Article

VL - 126

SP - 1023

EP - 1061

JO - MIND

JF - MIND

SN - 0026-4423

IS - 504

ER -

View graph of relations

© 2018 King's College London | Strand | London WC2R 2LS | England | United Kingdom | Tel +44 (0)20 7836 5454