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'The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 26 Feb 2020

King's Authors


Recently, the content/force distinction has had a bad press. It has been argued that the distinction is not properly motivated and that it makes the problem of the unity of the proposition intractable. I will argue that Frege’s version of the content/force distinction is immune to these objections. In order to do so I will reconstruct his argument that ‘the nature of a question’ requires a distinction between force and content. I will answer the concern about the unity of the proposition by outlining how the distinction can be combined with a Fregean account of the unity of thought.

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