The probable and the nonarbitrary: Evidential foundations for a finding of guilt

Liat Levanon

doi:10.1017/lst.2020.45

The probable and the nonarbitrary: Evidential foundations for a finding of guilt

Liat Levanon^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Laws

King's College London

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The paper explores the use of statistical data and statistical assumptions as evidence in criminal trials. It is suggested that a finding of guilt includes not only its main factual proposition but also additional propositions that support and affirm it. Specifically, it includes not only the proposition that the defendant committed the offence but also the additional affirming proposition that it is this defendant rather than any other potential defendant who committed the offence (the ‘D rather than A’ proposition). Some statistical generalisations provide reasons in defence of the main proposition but not in defence of the affirming proposition, which then remains random or arbitrary. Yet since criminal convictions include a moral judgement, they cannot be justified where some of their propositions are arbitrary. Accordingly, such statistical generalisations cannot justify a criminal conviction.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	294-310
Number of pages	17
Journal	Legal Studies
Volume	41
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2020.45
Publication status	Published - Jun 2021

Keywords

Evidence law
Factfinding
Generalisations
Inferences
Probabilistic reasoning
Statistical evidence

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10.1017/lst.2020.45

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abstract = "The paper explores the use of statistical data and statistical assumptions as evidence in criminal trials. It is suggested that a finding of guilt includes not only its main factual proposition but also additional propositions that support and affirm it. Specifically, it includes not only the proposition that the defendant committed the offence but also the additional affirming proposition that it is this defendant rather than any other potential defendant who committed the offence (the {\textquoteleft}D rather than A{\textquoteright} proposition). Some statistical generalisations provide reasons in defence of the main proposition but not in defence of the affirming proposition, which then remains random or arbitrary. Yet since criminal convictions include a moral judgement, they cannot be justified where some of their propositions are arbitrary. Accordingly, such statistical generalisations cannot justify a criminal conviction.",

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KW - Generalisations

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The probable and the nonarbitrary: Evidential foundations for a finding of guilt

Abstract

Keywords

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