The role of encoded information in explanation - Reply to Griffin and Clune on Bolton and Hill on mental disorder

TY - JOUR

T1 - The role of encoded information in explanation - Reply to Griffin and Clune on Bolton and Hill on mental disorder

AU - Bolton, D

AU - Hill, J

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - In their reviews of Bolton and Hill (1996) (MMMD) Griffin (2002) and Clune (2002) identify some potential problems. Griffin points out that some aspects of folk psychology may turn out to be unsupported by the science. Generally, however, MMMD does not rely on folk psychology, and indeed its theory of intentionality is explicitly applied to biological systems not only psychological, where folk or any other psychological concepts would be out of place. Clune suggests that the evolutionary analysis together with advancing knowledge and technology may make the concept of intentionality redundant. We reply that the case for intentional causality is embedded in an evolutionary perspective and that the case for intentionality in biological systems does not depend on inadequate knowledge.

AB - In their reviews of Bolton and Hill (1996) (MMMD) Griffin (2002) and Clune (2002) identify some potential problems. Griffin points out that some aspects of folk psychology may turn out to be unsupported by the science. Generally, however, MMMD does not rely on folk psychology, and indeed its theory of intentionality is explicitly applied to biological systems not only psychological, where folk or any other psychological concepts would be out of place. Clune suggests that the evolutionary analysis together with advancing knowledge and technology may make the concept of intentionality redundant. We reply that the case for intentional causality is embedded in an evolutionary perspective and that the case for intentionality in biological systems does not depend on inadequate knowledge.

M3 - Article

VL - 13

SP - 1

EP - 4

JO - PSYCOLOQUY

JF - PSYCOLOQUY

IS - 25

ER -