Abstract
In the first part of the paper I try to explain why the disjunctive theory of perception can seem so counterintuitive by focusing on two of the standard arguments against the view—the argument from subjective indiscriminability and the causal argument. I suggest that by focusing on these arguments, and in particular the intuitions that lie behind them, we gain a clearer view of what the disjunctive theory is committed to and why. In light of this understanding, I then present an argument for the disjunctive theory based on the claim that the content of experience is particular and not general.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 177-190 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |
Volume | 105 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2005 |