The Subjective View of Experience and Its Objective Commitments

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25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the first part of the paper I try to explain why the disjunctive theory of perception can seem so counterintuitive by focusing on two of the standard arguments against the view—the argument from subjective indiscriminability and the causal argument. I suggest that by focusing on these arguments, and in particular the intuitions that lie behind them, we gain a clearer view of what the disjunctive theory is committed to and why. In light of this understanding, I then present an argument for the disjunctive theory based on the claim that the content of experience is particular and not general.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)177-190
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Volume105
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2005

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