Theoretical limitations on mindreading measures: Commentary on Wendt et al. (2024)

Jane R Conway; Emily L Long; Leora Sevi; Caroline Catmur; Geoffrey Bird

doi:10.1037/pas0001349

Theoretical limitations on mindreading measures: Commentary on Wendt et al. (2024)

Jane R Conway, Emily L Long, Leora Sevi, Caroline Catmur, Geoffrey Bird

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this Commentary article, we expand on issues in the theory of mind literature raised by Wendt et al. (2024) that limit progress in our understanding of how people read other minds. We critically assess how they categorized tasks in their study and, in so doing, raise deeper questions that need addressing: What exactly are mental states; how can we accurately measure mindreading when the "correct" answer lacks ground truth; and what are the contributions to individual differences in mindreading of general cognitive ability and specific experience in the kinds of minds being read? We conclude that developing a psychological theory of how people read other minds would advance ways in which we can better measure and explain what it means to be better or worse at mindreading and how general cognitive ability relates to this sociocognitive skill.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	129-132
Number of pages	4
Journal	Psychological Assessment
Volume	37
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0001349
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 5 Sept 2024

Keywords

Humans
Theory of Mind
Psychological Theory
Social Perception

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10.1037/pas0001349

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KW - Theory of Mind

KW - Psychological Theory

KW - Social Perception

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JF - Psychological Assessment

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ER -

Theoretical limitations on mindreading measures: Commentary on Wendt et al. (2024)

Abstract

Keywords

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