Abstract
The question of toleration, of whether we should express disapproval at wrongdoing, is distinguished from the question of accommodation, of whether we should interfere with such wrongdoing. Liberal doctrines of accommodation invoke the value of autonomy. A doctrine of toleration is proposed that is based instead on the value of civility, on the (non-instrumental) value of suppressing the public expression of disapproval. Civility is of value within various relationships, a point illustrated by an examination of friendship. This doctrine of tolerance as civility is needed to explain practices of toleration among illiberal peoples and it suggests a way of extending such practices to others who do not value personal autonomy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-13 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Philosophers Imprint |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 20 |
| Early online date | 31 Aug 2015 |
| Publication status | Published - 31 Aug 2015 |