Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 144-170 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES |
Volume | 53 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Published | 2020 |
Additional links |
Inclusive institutions play an important role in development. But how do inclusive institutions emerge? Inclusion is always the product of a tradeoff. The existing literature focuses on the tradeoffs that yield an extension of the franchise, which requires costly power-sharing agreements. This article uses evidence from ancient Athens to show that meaningful forms of welfare-enhancing inclusion need not await the historically infrequent and high-stakes conditions that compel dominant elites to share power. In the 4th century BCE, the Athenians extended access to economic, social, and legal institutions to selected categories of non-citizens. They did not, however, extend the franchise. The Athenian tradeoff between political and other forms of inclusion was a response to the conflicting demands of social order and growth. While falling short of full political inclusion, the tradeoff was nonetheless conducive to political and economic development.
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