Lobbying in the European Union (EU) is defined by an exchange of information: well-informed interest groups supply understaffed and pressed-for-time decision-makers with policy-relevant information for legitimate ‘access’ to the EU policy-making process. While we know quite a bit about the informational needs of decision-makers, an interest group's capacity to meet these needs remains relatively uncharted territory. This analysis examines the informational determinants of interest group access to the EU from a supply-side perspective; namely, how do different types of information and different tactics used to provide this information buy access to different EU decision-makers? Results from an empirical analysis indicate that information tactics are, on balance, more significant determinants of access than information types. The medium, in other words, is more important than the message. I also find that largely discredited ‘outside’ tactics, like organizing public events and launching media campaigns, are very important in granting interest groups access to EU decision-makers.