Trusting a Promise and other things

TY - CHAP

T1 - Trusting a Promise and other things

AU - Owens, David John

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - Many writers assume that trust is a specific psychological attitude, one of special value to human social life. I argue that there is no specific attitude that constitutes trusting something. Rather for X to trust Y is for X to engage with Y in a way that will realize the distinctive value of Y. Thus the psychological nature of trust will depend on the nature of the object trusted and the value of trust will depend on the distinctive value of the object trusted. Trust as such has no psychological nature and no distinctive form of value. Taking the example of trust in a promise, I show how different views about the nature and value of a promise generate different views about what it is involved in trusting a promise.

AB - Many writers assume that trust is a specific psychological attitude, one of special value to human social life. I argue that there is no specific attitude that constitutes trusting something. Rather for X to trust Y is for X to engage with Y in a way that will realize the distinctive value of Y. Thus the psychological nature of trust will depend on the nature of the object trusted and the value of trust will depend on the distinctive value of the object trusted. Trust as such has no psychological nature and no distinctive form of value. Taking the example of trust in a promise, I show how different views about the nature and value of a promise generate different views about what it is involved in trusting a promise.

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780198732549

SP - 214

EP - 229

BT - New Philosophical Perspectives on Trust

A2 - Faulkner, Paul

PB - Oxford Univerity Press; Oxford

ER -