Two Conceptions of International Practice: Aristotelean Praxis or Wittgensteinian Language-Games?

TY - JOUR

T1 - Two Conceptions of International Practice

T2 - Aristotelean Praxis or Wittgensteinian Language-Games?

AU - Frost, Mervyn Lowne

AU - Lechner, Silviya

PY - 2016/4

Y1 - 2016/4

N2 - Scholars from the recent ‘practice turn’ in International Relations have urged us to rethink the international realm in terms of practices. The principal exponents of the turn, Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, have refurbished Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice to produce their own account of international practices. In a review of the practice turn, Chris Brown has argued that Bourdieu’s notion of practice shares basic affinities with Aristotle’s concept of praxis. While practice turn scholars may not adhere to a rigid canon of thought, they seem to share an Aristotelian conception of praxis. This reading of the turn to practice, though plausible, captures one part of the story. The central thesis of the present article is that instead of one there are two, distinctive conceptions of practice – Aristotelian and Wittgensteinian – and therefore two distinctive ways in which the character of international practices might be understood. More concretely, the aim is to show that the conception of international practices, rooted in Wittgenstein’s view of practices as language-games, can be particularly illuminating to all those who seek to understand international relations.

AB - Scholars from the recent ‘practice turn’ in International Relations have urged us to rethink the international realm in terms of practices. The principal exponents of the turn, Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, have refurbished Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice to produce their own account of international practices. In a review of the practice turn, Chris Brown has argued that Bourdieu’s notion of practice shares basic affinities with Aristotle’s concept of praxis. While practice turn scholars may not adhere to a rigid canon of thought, they seem to share an Aristotelian conception of praxis. This reading of the turn to practice, though plausible, captures one part of the story. The central thesis of the present article is that instead of one there are two, distinctive conceptions of practice – Aristotelian and Wittgensteinian – and therefore two distinctive ways in which the character of international practices might be understood. More concretely, the aim is to show that the conception of international practices, rooted in Wittgenstein’s view of practices as language-games, can be particularly illuminating to all those who seek to understand international relations.

KW - Practice turn, practice, praxis, Aristotle, Wittgenstein, language-games, international relations theory

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84960405787&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/S0260210515000169

DO - 10.1017/S0260210515000169

M3 - Article

SN - 0260-2105

VL - 42

SP - 334

EP - 350

JO - Review of International Studies

JF - Review of International Studies

IS - 2

ER -