Two dogmas of analytic historiography

Michael Beaney*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Starting from an analogy with Quine’s two dogmas of empiricism, I offer a (neo-Kantian) critique of two dogmas of analytic historiography: the belief in a cleavage between the justification of a philosophical claim and an account of its genesis and the belief in rational reconstructionism. I take Russell’s rational reconstruction of Leibniz’s philosophy as my detailed example.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)594-614
Number of pages21
JournalBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume28
Issue number3
Early online date20 Jan 2020
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 20 Jan 2020

Keywords

  • Justification and genesis
  • Kant
  • Leibniz
  • rational reconstruction
  • Russell

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