King's College London

Research portal

Using Defaults to Understand Token Causation

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5-26
Number of pages22
JournalJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume113
Issue number1
DOIs
PublishedJan 2016

Documents

King's Authors

Abstract

Recent literature on causation invokes a distinction between deviant and default behavior to account for token causation. Critical examination of two prominent attempts to employ a distinction between deviants and defaults reveals that the distinction is far from clear. I clarify and develop the distinction by appeal to the notion of a modally robust process, and show how the distinction can be employed by causal process theorists to respond to cases of causation by omission. This shows that the default/deviant distinction is not so much a tool for counterfactual accounts of causation, but rather for causal process theory.

Download statistics

No data available

View graph of relations

© 2020 King's College London | Strand | London WC2R 2LS | England | United Kingdom | Tel +44 (0)20 7836 5454