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Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve Coordination Failure: A Quasi-Field Experiment in India's Manufacturing Sector.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Farzana Afridi, Amrita Dhillon, Sherry Xin Li, Swati Sharma

Original languageEnglish
Article number102445
JournalJOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Volume144
Early online date6 Feb 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2020

King's Authors

Abstract

Production processes are often organized in teams, yet there is limited evidence on whether and how social connections and financial incentives affect productivity in tasks that require coordination among workers. We simulate assembly line production in a lab-in-the-field experiment in which workers exert real effort in a minimum-effort game in teams whose members are either socially connected or unconnected and are paid according to the group output. We find that group output increases by 18%, and coordination improves by 30-39% when workers are socially connected with their co-workers. These findings can plausibly be explained by the higher levels of pro-social motivation between co-workers in socially connected teams.

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