Vagueness-Induced Counterexamples to Modus Tollens

TY - JOUR

T1 - Vagueness-Induced Counterexamples to Modus Tollens

AU - Beevers, Tom David

PY - 2020/1/3

Y1 - 2020/1/3

N2 - I argue that vagueness produces counterexamples to modus tollens. I begin by outlining cases where indicative and counterfactual conditionals (henceforth: natural conditionals) seem intuitively to be determinate even when their antecedents are borderline and their consequents are determinately false. Accepting these intuitions has some revisionary implications; however, rejecting them leads to unacceptable consequences for our knowledge of conditionals. I thus take it that we should accept that our intuitions are reliable. I show it follows that modus tollens fails. I conclude by defending this consequence from some objections

AB - I argue that vagueness produces counterexamples to modus tollens. I begin by outlining cases where indicative and counterfactual conditionals (henceforth: natural conditionals) seem intuitively to be determinate even when their antecedents are borderline and their consequents are determinately false. Accepting these intuitions has some revisionary implications; however, rejecting them leads to unacceptable consequences for our knowledge of conditionals. I thus take it that we should accept that our intuitions are reliable. I show it follows that modus tollens fails. I conclude by defending this consequence from some objections

M3 - Article

SN - 0066-7374

JO - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

JF - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

ER -