Varieties of Insider Corporate Governance: the determinants of business preferences and governance reform in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland

TY - JOUR

T1 - Varieties of Insider Corporate Governance

T2 - the determinants of business preferences and governance reform in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland

AU - Schnyder, Gerhard

PY - 2012/12

Y1 - 2012/12

N2 - Recent studies investigating the politics of corporate governance reforms have drawn attention to the importance of corporate ownership structures for the outcome of reforms. This is owing to the impact aggregate ownership structures have on centre-right parties’ electoral strategies. In this article, I challenge electoral strategy explanations by underscoring the importance of completing it with an interest group power explanation of corporate governance reforms. Based on the cases of the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, I show that opening up the black box of insider-orientated corporate governance systems is crucial in order to understand how ownership structures influence corporate governance reforms across different ‘insider systems’. My findings suggest that the extent to which insider control relies on legal control enhancing mechanisms strongly influences insider preferences in the political struggles over corporate governance and may influence the outcomes of these reforms.

AB - Recent studies investigating the politics of corporate governance reforms have drawn attention to the importance of corporate ownership structures for the outcome of reforms. This is owing to the impact aggregate ownership structures have on centre-right parties’ electoral strategies. In this article, I challenge electoral strategy explanations by underscoring the importance of completing it with an interest group power explanation of corporate governance reforms. Based on the cases of the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, I show that opening up the black box of insider-orientated corporate governance systems is crucial in order to understand how ownership structures influence corporate governance reforms across different ‘insider systems’. My findings suggest that the extent to which insider control relies on legal control enhancing mechanisms strongly influences insider preferences in the political struggles over corporate governance and may influence the outcomes of these reforms.

KW - Corporate Governance

KW - Political Economy

KW - Switzerland

KW - Sweden

KW - Netherlands

KW - Politics

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2012.672109

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2012.672109

M3 - Article

SN - 1350-1763

VL - 19

SP - 1434

EP - 1451

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

IS - 9

ER -