Western Intelligence and Covert Soviet Military Aid to Indonesia During the 1962 West New Guinea Crisis.

David Easter

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8

Western Intelligence and Covert Soviet Military Aid to Indonesia During the 1962 West New Guinea Crisis.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

This chapter assesses the performance of Western intelligence services against the Soviet target in the 1962 West New Guinea Crisis. During this crisis the Soviet Union secretly supplied Indonesia with Soviet-manned submarines and bombers and was prepared for these units to participate in an Indonesian attack against the Dutch military in West New Guinea. American and British intelligence managed to detect the deployment of the Soviet force and obtained some indications that they would be used in support of an Indonesian attack. However, while the Americans and British had good military intelligence they had insufficient political and diplomatic intelligence and therefore could not discover the motivations behind the Soviet deployment.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali
Editors	Floribert Baudet, Eleni Braat, Jeoffrey Van Woensel, Aad Wever
Place of Publication	The Hague
Publisher	Springer
Pages	77-95
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Print)	978-94-6265-182-1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8
Publication status	Published - 10 Jul 2017

Keywords

West New Guinea, West Irian, Sukarno, Khrushchev, Sigint, Cuban Missile Crisis

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8

Cite this

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Western Intelligence and Covert Soviet Military Aid to Indonesia During the 1962 West New Guinea Crisis. / Easter, David.
Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali. ed. / Floribert Baudet; Eleni Braat; Jeoffrey Van Woensel; Aad Wever. The Hague: Springer, 2017. p. 77-95.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

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Western Intelligence and Covert Soviet Military Aid to Indonesia During the 1962 West New Guinea Crisis.

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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