What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism

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Abstract

This chapter addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? The aim here is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. The chapter first disambiguates various non-equivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: It then looks closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of intentionality. Ultimately it is argued that, given the relevant disambiguations, the answers to all three questions will likely be positive. These results both support what has become known as the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, and make clearer the price that the conceptualist must pay to sustain his or her position.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationKant and Animals
EditorsJohn J. Callanan, Lucy Allais
PublisherOxford Univerity Press; Oxford
Chapter3
ISBN (Print)9780198859918
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Keywords

  • Kant
  • Intentionality
  • Animals
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Philosophy of Perception
  • Objectivity

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