What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism

Alexander Golob

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198859918.003.0004

What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism

Alexander Golob

Philosophy

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Abstract

This chapter addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? The aim here is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. The chapter first disambiguates various non-equivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: It then looks closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of intentionality. Ultimately it is argued that, given the relevant disambiguations, the answers to all three questions will likely be positive. These results both support what has become known as the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, and make clearer the price that the conceptualist must pay to sustain his or her position.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Kant and Animals
Editors	John J. Callanan, Lucy Allais
Publisher	Oxford Univerity Press; Oxford
Chapter	3
ISBN (Print)	9780198859918
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859918.003.0004
Publication status	Published - 2020

Keywords

Kant
Intentionality
Animals
Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Perception
Objectivity

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10.1093/oso/9780198859918.003.0004

Golob - Kant, Self-Consciousness and Animals - Allais Callanan UPLOADAccepted author manuscript, 344 KB

Cite this

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title = "What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism",

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AB - This chapter addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? The aim here is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. The chapter first disambiguates various non-equivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: It then looks closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of intentionality. Ultimately it is argued that, given the relevant disambiguations, the answers to all three questions will likely be positive. These results both support what has become known as the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, and make clearer the price that the conceptualist must pay to sustain his or her position.

KW - Kant

KW - Intentionality

KW - Animals

KW - Philosophy

KW - Philosophy of Mind

KW - Philosophy of Perception

KW - Objectivity

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DO - 10.1093/oso/9780198859918.003.0004

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780198859918

BT - Kant and Animals

A2 - Callanan, John J.

A2 - Allais, Lucy

PB - Oxford Univerity Press; Oxford

ER -

What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism

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