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What is wrong with Classical Negation?

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What is wrong with Classical Negation? / Kürbis, Nils.

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 92, 2015, p. 51-86.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Kürbis, N 2015, 'What is wrong with Classical Negation?', Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 92, pp. 51-86. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004310841_004

APA

Kürbis, N. (2015). What is wrong with Classical Negation? Grazer Philosophische Studien, 92, 51-86. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004310841_004

Vancouver

Kürbis N. What is wrong with Classical Negation? Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2015;92:51-86. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004310841_004

Author

Kürbis, Nils. / What is wrong with Classical Negation?. In: Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2015 ; Vol. 92. pp. 51-86.

Bibtex Download

@article{c3828be5f22e47b0a5661e705ab8f512,
title = "What is wrong with Classical Negation?",
abstract = "The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I shall grant Dummett his general bias towards verificationism, encapsulated in the slogan 'meaning is use'. The second general assumption I see no need to question is Dummett's particular breed of molecularism. Some of Dummett's assumptions will have to be given up, if classical logic is to be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. A major result of this paper will be that the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference in the Dummettian framework.",
keywords = "Proof-theoretic semantics, Harmony, Negation, Falsity, ex falso quodlibet, molecular theories of meaning, Compositionally",
author = "Nils K{\"u}rbis",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1163/9789004310841_004",
language = "English",
volume = "92",
pages = "51--86",
journal = "Grazer Philosophische Studien",
issn = "0165-9227",
publisher = "Editions Rodopi B.V.",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - What is wrong with Classical Negation?

AU - Kürbis, Nils

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I shall grant Dummett his general bias towards verificationism, encapsulated in the slogan 'meaning is use'. The second general assumption I see no need to question is Dummett's particular breed of molecularism. Some of Dummett's assumptions will have to be given up, if classical logic is to be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. A major result of this paper will be that the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference in the Dummettian framework.

AB - The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I shall grant Dummett his general bias towards verificationism, encapsulated in the slogan 'meaning is use'. The second general assumption I see no need to question is Dummett's particular breed of molecularism. Some of Dummett's assumptions will have to be given up, if classical logic is to be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. A major result of this paper will be that the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference in the Dummettian framework.

KW - Proof-theoretic semantics

KW - Harmony

KW - Negation

KW - Falsity

KW - ex falso quodlibet

KW - molecular theories of meaning

KW - Compositionally

UR - https://brill.com/view/journals/gps/92/1/article-p51_4.xml

UR - https://nilskurbis.weebly.com/publications.html

U2 - 10.1163/9789004310841_004

DO - 10.1163/9789004310841_004

M3 - Article

VL - 92

SP - 51

EP - 86

JO - Grazer Philosophische Studien

JF - Grazer Philosophische Studien

SN - 0165-9227

ER -

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