King's College London

Research portal

When Banks Lobby: The Effects of National Banking Regulations on International Bank Lobbying

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-134
Number of pages28
JournalBusiness and Politics
Issue number1
Early online date1 Feb 2017
Accepted/In press31 Aug 2016
E-pub ahead of print1 Feb 2017
PublishedMar 2017


King's Authors


This article examines bank lobbying in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). While excessive bank lobbying is routinely linked to weakened banking regulations, we still know little about bank mobilization patterns. In particular, when and why do some banks lobby the BCBS while others do not? I argue that the decision to lobby is a function of two factors: banks’ organizational characteristics and domestic banking regulations. I test my argument using a unique dataset of over 33,000 banks worldwide during the period in which the Basel III Accord was negotiated. My findings confirm a pronounced bias in bank mobilization patterns toward wealthy, internationally active banks. I also find that banks facing more stringent banking regulations at home tend to lobby the BCBS in an effort to level the playing field with international competitors. This effect is particularly salient for stringent regulations on banking activities as well as higher capital adequacy requirements.

Download statistics

No data available

View graph of relations

© 2020 King's College London | Strand | London WC2R 2LS | England | United Kingdom | Tel +44 (0)20 7836 5454