When strategy is ‘hybrid’ and not ‘grey’: reviewing Chinese military and constabulary coercion at sea

TY - JOUR

T1 - When strategy is ‘hybrid’ and not ‘grey’

T2 - reviewing Chinese military and constabulary coercion at sea

AU - Patalano, Alessio

PY - 2019/1/9

Y1 - 2019/1/9

N2 - The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas (ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The ‘grey zone’ notion raises two issues. Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing’s strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to control ‘rights and interests’ are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and is therefore better described as part of a ‘hybrid’ strategy.

AB - The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas (ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The ‘grey zone’ notion raises two issues. Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing’s strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to control ‘rights and interests’ are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and is therefore better described as part of a ‘hybrid’ strategy.

KW - Chinese maritime power

KW - East China Sea

KW - grey zone strategy

KW - hybrid strategy

KW - Maritime coercion

KW - South China Sea

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85059917811&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/09512748.2018.1513546

DO - 10.1080/09512748.2018.1513546

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85059917811

SN - 0951-2748

VL - 31

SP - 811

EP - 839

JO - PACIFIC REVIEW

JF - PACIFIC REVIEW

IS - 6

ER -