Why are international regulatory standards not set? While most of the literature focuses on explaining positive cases of standard-setting where international rules are agreed, weak or negative cases remain prevalent and yet surprisingly under-explored. To explain these cases in the area of financial services, we integrate an inter-state explanation, which focuses on competition between major jurisdictions, with a transgovernmental explanation, which relates to conflict between different regulatory bodies at the international level. We also consider how these dimensions interact with financial industry lobbying. This allows us to construct a typology differentiating between distinct types of cases concerning international standard setting: 1) absent standards, 2) non-agreed standards, 3) symbolic standards, and 4) agreed standards. The explanatory leverage of our approach is illustrated through a systematic structured focused comparison of four post-crisis cases related to ‘shadow banking’. The article makes an important contribution to public policy scholarship by generating new insights into regulatory conflicts and the scope conditions for international agreement.
|Number of pages
|Journal Of Public Policy
|Accepted/In press - 23 Oct 2023