Abstract
One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this article, I argue that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, I discuss in detail how and why my reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. I suggest ultimately that it is only by embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the Critique sets for Hume.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Kantian Nonconceptualism |
Editors | Dennis Schulting |
Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
ISBN (Print) | 9781137535160 |
Publication status | Published - 12 Nov 2016 |
Keywords
- Kant
- Conceptualism
- Nonconceptualism
- Non-conceptualism
- Transcendental Deduction