Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism

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One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this article, I argue that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, I discuss in detail how and why my reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. I suggest ultimately that it is only by embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the Critique sets for Hume.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationKantian Nonconceptualism
EditorsDennis Schulting
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
ISBN (Print)9781137535160
Publication statusPublished - 12 Nov 2016


  • Kant
  • Conceptualism
  • Nonconceptualism
  • Non-conceptualism
  • Transcendental Deduction


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