The objective of this research is to contribute to the field of strategic security studies by developing a theory for understanding strategic deterrence in relation to gray zone warfare and by contributing to the discourse where there exists a void in contemporary literature on strategic gray zone warfare. Specifically, this study examines and tests the hypothesis that North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) broad deterrence activities cannot deter able actors from undertaking strategic competitive activities in the gray zone. In addition to testing the hypothesis, the work proposes a heuristic spectrum of conflict framework for understanding gray zone activities through a triadic qualitative research methodology comprised of war gaming,case-study vignettes, and NATO senior leader and strategist interviews and surveys. The case-study vignettes include: Russia’s annexation of Crimea (2014 to present); the South China Sea disputes (1995 to present); and the Soviet-Afghan War (1979 to 1989).
Deterrence in the gray zone: evaluating NATO's strategic sufficiency
Stuckenberg, D. (Author). 27 May 2020
Student thesis: Doctoral Thesis › Doctor of Philosophy