“Fixing Intel” or Fixing the Force? US Military Adaptation for Intelligence Requirements in Afghanistan

Abstract

In the American intelligence community, customer requirements drive intelligence production. This study argues that the US military failed to successfully adapt for counterinsurgency intelligence requirements about the people of Afghanistan, in Operation Enduring Freedom, because the US fielded force took two simultaneous approaches to adaptation for counterinsurgency, which limited customer requirements for such intelligence. Much of the fielded force in Afghanistan adapted its core institutions for a nondoctrinal approach to counterinsurgency that pursued traditional, kinetic military operations against insurgent forces, alongside governance and development operations, to build a new Afghanistan, modeled in the western image. This “organic” approach to adaptation had limited use for granular detail about the Afghan populace, beyond the minimum required for informing operations in support of implementing this predetermined model.

In contrast to the organic approach, the US military mostly adapted to meet intelligence requirements for counterinsurgency through various nontraditional initiatives that resided outside the core institutions of the fielded force. These nonorganic adaptations were meant to augment and bolster the capabilities of a force pursuing a more doctrinal approach, that sought to leverage intelligence about the people of Afghanistan to first evaluate the operational environment on its own merits, and then inform the design of enduring political solutions that made sense for the local context. When the personnel who staffed the nonorganic initiatives arrived in theater, they often found the units they supported were pursuing a nondoctrinal approach to counterinsurgency that did not value such intelligence. Thus, the fielded force was often an un wanting, unreceptive customer for the intelligence the initiatives were meant to provide. The resulting friction that occurred when attempting to integrate the nonorganic initiatives into a fielded force that was mostly postured for a different mission was highly disruptive, and ultimately caused the US military to underperform in its efforts to meet counterinsurgency intelligence requirements in Afghanistan.

Date of Award	1 May 2024
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	King's College London
Supervisor	Christian Tripodi (Supervisor)