Abstract
This thesis argues that Kant is too imprecise about his metaethics for it to be possible to settle whether or not he is a constitutivist. The first chapter argues for a definition of constitutivism, and distinguishes constitutivism from a position dubbed “agentialism.” Constitutivism rejects the ontology of robust forms of metanormative realism, but still seeks to secure the objectivity and categoricity of its norms. It does so by claiming that conforming to those norms is the only or the best way of pursuing an aim which agents cannot help but have.This definition is motivated by appeals to the literature, and by an appeal specifically to an argument of Christine Korsgaard’s against a rationalist conception of normative facts as knowledge to be applied. For assistance in defining agentialism, a parallel is explored between the metaethical literature and the literature on the normativity of logical laws.
Agentialism is defined as a family of views which, like constitutivist ones, reject a robust realist ontology but still seek to secure the objectivity and categoricity of their norms. However, instead of the authority of those norms’ being grounded in an inescapable aim, some other explanation is offered which ties together being an agent and being subject to those norms. Henry Allison, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann are suggested to be advocates of agentialist readings of Kant.
The second chapter collects a range of passages from Kant’s corpus which could be taken to be evidence of his constitutivism. Most of these are loaned from the work of Korsgaard, Barbara Herman, Andrews Reath, and Stephen Engstrom. The readings of those four authors are compared, so as to illustrate the ways in which one can disagree about Kant’s theory while agreeing that it should be read as constitutivist.
The third chapter argues that all of the passages collected in the second are equally consistent with an agentialist, and so nonconstitutivist, interpretation of Kant’s metaethics. Constitutivist readings of Kant are, however, defended against objections. The conclusion is ultimately drawn that there is insufficient evidence to settle the question of whether Kant is a constitutivist or an agentialist.
Date of Award | 1 Jan 2024 |
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Original language | English |
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Supervisor | John Callanan (Supervisor) & Eliot Michaelson (Supervisor) |