Researchers have previously claimed that mirror neurons are the neurocognitive substrate of action understanding. This assumption, however, leaves two important issues remaining: whether action understanding is a distinct psychological process, and if so, whether this process is subserved by mirror neurons. By reconceptualising action understanding and conducting a series of neuroscientific experiments investigating whether brain regions containing mirror neurons subserve such a process, this thesis adds empirical evidence to the debate regarding whether mirror neuron brain regions enable us to understand other people’s actions. This thesis takes three main foci in its investigation of mirror neurons as the neurocognitive substrate of action understanding. Firstly, this thesis reconceptualises action understanding and investigates whether the resulting processes can be considered social cognitive abilities. A novel experimental task is created, providing a behavioural index of the outlined action understanding processes, and is used throughout all experiments within the thesis. Secondly, the potential automaticity of these action understanding processes is explored by investigating the impact of reducing available controlled processing resources on performance on the action understanding task. Thirdly, neurostimulation and neuroimaging techniques are used to investigate the claim that mirror neuron brain regions subserve these action understanding processes. Based on the findings of this thesis, it will be established that action understanding is not a unitary psychological process but consists of three distinct social cognitive processes; and that mirror neuron brain regions subserve only one of these processes, the identification of others’ actions.
Mirroring intentions? Establishing the contribution of mirror neurons to action understanding
Thompson, E. (Author). 1 Mar 2020
Student thesis: Doctoral Thesis › Doctor of Philosophy