Abstract
In the study of British naval policy between World War I and World War II, there is a significant lack of analysis of the major policy concepts formulated from 1919 up to the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22, as relevant research was rare. Naval historians believe that the main determining factor of British post-war naval policy that drove the United Kingdom to the Washington Naval Conference was the debate over whether to pursue the most optimal naval size suitable for the given international environment or the minimum naval size needed to maintain functional efficiency within that environment. However, few researchers have paid attention to the motivational aspects of naval policymaking.Taking into consideration the economic and global constraints after World War I, Great Britain has since observed the growing discrepancy between the aspirations of politicians to take control over the Navy and the accretion of bureaucratic autonomy within the Navy. In this context, the naval policy was debated among the paralleled logical structures towards different orientations. Accordingly, policymaking did not simply mean the choice between the competing claims of naval limitation vs. the One-Power Standard, capital ships vs. submarines, but rather the ideational confrontations apropos the most secure way of protecting national interests and the roles of the naval professions in planning it. Consequently, beyond the calculation of the comparative advantage of policy options on the common logical and ideational foundation, policy debate was about the struggle towards the political hegemony that enabled the specification of the conceptual dispositions that determine policy requirements.
With this perspective, this study seeks to revisit the controversies of British naval policy encompassing the Washington Naval Conference. To examine the British naval policy debates, this study employs two questions as lenses: Firstly, how the way Britain faced the structural limitations amid the shift in the international environment made the political leadership recognise the inner efforts of the Navy to respond to the changing technological condition; secondly, how the differences in perception towards naval issues between the political leadership and the naval planners were expressed as the main topic for debate towards naval policy.
Under the stance of the leading British naval planners concerning the 10-year holiday, the construction of the 16-inch gunships, and the restriction of submarines were their calculated minimal condition for the sustainable retention of the command of the sea. Political interpretations and restrictions on the claims of the naval planners shaped the outcomes of the Washington Naval Conference.
| Date of Award | 1 Mar 2024 |
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| Original language | English |
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| Supervisor | Greg Kennedy (Supervisor) & Tim Benbow (Supervisor) |