Abstract
This thesis critically evaluates some of the main arguments for, and mainchallenges to, the claim that free will and moral responsibility are compatible
with determinism. In the first two chapters I undertake a detailed
examination of the so called ‘leeway’ problem. In chapter one I examine
the issue of whether alternative possibilities are required for morally responsible
agency by evaluating the Frankfurt example literature. In the
second chapter I consider whether the compatibilist can offer an account
of alternative possibilities consistent with determinism. Chapter one concludes
that the Frankfurt example strategy fails to establish that alternatives
are not required. Furthermore, we have good reason to think alternatives
are necessary for responsibility. The arguments of chapter two
conclude that none of the main compatibilist attempts to capture the alternative
possibilities condition are successful.
In chapter three I consider a challenge any compatibilist theory must
face independently of the issue of alternative possibilities: the ‘source’
problem. This is the issue concerning whether we could be the source of
our actions in the way necessary for moral responsibility if determinism
were true. To this end I will examine Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation
argument in detail here. I conclude that, as things stand, compatibilism
is unable to adequately respond to the manipulation argument
strategy. Hence we have good reason to think that determinism would
mean that we couldn’t be the source of our actions in the way required
for free and responsible agency. In summary, compatibilism has not given
us satisfactory answers to either the ‘leeway’ or ‘source’ worries. Consequently,
in chapter 4 I endorse a position in light of this, concluding
that although diagnostic incompatibilism may be true, we nevertheless
can and should be prescriptive compatibilists. This is to say, despite the
fact that our concepts and practices associated with responsible agency
are inconsistent with determinism as they stand, we nevertheless have
good reasons to revise and maintain a compatibilist concept of moral responsibility.
Date of Award | 2016 |
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Original language | English |
Awarding Institution |
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Supervisor | Andrea Sangiovanni (Supervisor), John Callanan (Supervisor) & Maria Alvarez (Supervisor) |