China's Pragmatic Foreign Policy
International Socialization and Pariah States

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King's College London

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China's Pragmatic Foreign Policy:

International Socialization and Pariah States

Daniel Johanson
March 2017
PhD International Relations and Chinese Studies
# Table of Contents

**China’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy: International Socialization and Pariah States** ................................................. 1  
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................................ 4  
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................. 5  
Preface ............................................................................................................................................................................... 8  
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 9  
Where this research sits in scholarship ..................................................................................................................... 11  
Methodology, Limitations, and Case Studies ............................................................................................................. 17

**Chapter One Theoretical Framework** ..................................................................................................................... 22  
Socialization in Revolutionary States ......................................................................................................................... 22  
Foreign Policy Analysis ............................................................................................................................................... 41  
Rosenau and Adaptation .............................................................................................................................................. 55  
Situational Logic .......................................................................................................................................................... 57  
Analytical Framework .................................................................................................................................................. 59

**Chapter Two Values and Ethics in International Relations** .................................................................................... 63  
Ethics in International Relations ................................................................................................................................... 63  
The Use of Ethics in the Study of Pariah and Rogue States .......................................................................................... 68  
Review of the Usage of ‘Pariah’ in English and Chinese Academic Literature: ..................................................... 71  
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................. 92

**Chapter Three Socialization, Chinese Foreign Policy Actors, and International Norms** ..................................... 95  
Chinese Socialization to International Order ............................................................................................................. 96  
Foreign Policy Actors .................................................................................................................................................... 109  
Socialization and Norms ............................................................................................................................................. 125  
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................. 134

**Chapter Four Sudan: China’s Foreign Policy Experimentation** ............................................................................. 137  
Overview and Analysis of Changes ............................................................................................................................ 138  
Sino-Sudanese Relations – A Brief Historical Review ............................................................................................... 141  
Basepoint - China’s Solidarity with a Terrorist-Supporting State ............................................................................ 145  
Turning Point One – Darfur ......................................................................................................................................... 148  
Turning Point Two – Referendum ............................................................................................................................... 162  
Turning Point Three – South Sudan Peacekeepers ................................................................................................. 169
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusion</th>
<th>..........................................................</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five  Iran: Too Revolutionary for a Socializing China?</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview and Analysis of Changes</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Iranian Relations – A Brief Historical Review</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basepoint - Reducing Arms Sales to Iran to Improve US Relations</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning Point One – 2006 Sanctions</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning Point Two - Unilateral US Sanctions</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning Point Three - The JCPOA</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six  North Korea: No Other Choice but Change</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of Changes</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-DPRK Relations – A Brief Historical Review</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basepoint – A Baseline of Inactivity</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning Point One - The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Test</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning Point Two - Kim Jong Un, Continuing Tests, and Harsher Sanctions</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven  Socialization and Adaptation: Normative Adaptation and Policy Decision-making</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-socialization Baselines</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Jintao’s Slow but Significant Changes</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi Jinping’s Active Foreign Policy</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-making</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative changes</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values versus Interest</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisiting the Research Question, Hypothesis and Main Arguments:</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: Note on Chinese sources regarding North Korea</td>
<td>..................................................................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

Attempts to understand China’s role in the international community have often revolved around questioning whether it is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of the system – specifically, does it share the principles of a liberal international world order or seek to create an alternative? Where China was once excluded, or even self-excluded, from active participation in the international community, reformist China is now truly enmeshed in it. Doubts, however, remain in some circles about the character of China’s engagement. Is it really ‘in’, and fully open to negotiation and compromise on all issues, or is it somehow just playing us all and waiting for the right opportunity to bare its teeth, and come back at us in a classical neo-realist fashion? Does it share the basic values that underpin the liberal international order?

Doubts like these have been exacerbated by China’s attitude and official statements toward states that the West has viewed to be outside the international order – frequently referred to as ‘pariah’ or ‘rogue’ states. Some view China’s strong relations with these ‘outcast’ states to be evidence that China itself is somehow tainted. China’s continued involvement with these ‘pariahs’ requires that China have a role in solving the potential international security challenges. How exactly China does this will show where China’s values lie.

This dissertation reviews China’s diplomacy toward three such pariah states to see what it might say on this bigger question. Did China identify closely with these states? Has its policy remained constant over time? Does China view these states as pariah states in western terms? Has it actually internalized such a definition? Is there any evidence of a shift toward acceptance of the label “pariah state” and the normative values this represents? If so, what would that tell us about how Chinese foreign policy has developed? The dissertation offers a comprehensive look at how and why China has interacted with these nations and the ways in which its policies have changed. It concludes that China did in fact shift towards the Western position and in so doing, revealed that - in these areas at least – it is more ‘in’ than ‘out’ the international system.
Abbreviations

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile (treaty)
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CD Conference on Disarmament
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CCTV China Central Television
CISAD Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
CMC Central Military Commission
CNPC China National Petroleum Company
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CR Cultural Revolution
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DPOC Dar Petroleum Operating Company
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EU European Union
EU-3 EU and China, Russia, and the United States
FALSG Foreign Affairs Leading Group/Leading Small Group
FM Foreign Minister
FPA Foreign Policy Analysis
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNPOC Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
GNU Government of National Unity (Sudan)
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ID International Department of the Central Committee of the CCP
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO  International Labor Organization
IO  International Organization
IGO  Intergovernmental Organizations
INGO  International Non-governmental Organization
JCPOA  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LSG  Leading Small Group
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFTEC  Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
MTCR  Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA  Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
NCP  National Congress Party
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NIF  National Islamic Front
NPT  Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
P5+1  China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States plus Germany.
PKO  Peace Keeping Operations
PLA  People’s Liberation Army
PRC  People’s Republic of China
PS  Presidential Statement
PSC  Politburo Standing Committee
ROC  Republic of China (Taiwan)
R2P  Responsibility to Protect
SDI  Strategic Defense Initiative
6PT  Six-Party Talks
SOE  State Owned Enterprise
SPLM  Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (System)</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

During my first year in Beijing, just over 10 years ago, I began my research into China’s relationship with Sudan for a Chinese Foreign Policy course. The topic and the gap in the literature actually covering the changes in Chinese foreign policy really interested me and convinced me to continue researching the topic when I continued my studies in a Master’s program. As I was finishing my Master’s thesis in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, I saw similar changes occurring in China’s relationship with Libya – meeting with rebel leaders in Beijing as Gaddafi was still in power. This encouraged me to expand my research into a PhD – questioning whether China’s approach to other ‘pariah’ states had evolved in a similar manner.

To conduct this research, I am thankful for the support of a research fellowship at Renmin University, as well as a partner grant from King’s, that helped further fund my research while in Beijing. In China, my research focused on speaking with academics and policymakers that could comment on the cases. Obtaining extensive anonymous interviews with numerous experts was difficult as issues became sensitive at varying times and there were few experts on each country – most simply had a regional focus. I was able to speak to experts on each case, but not as many as I had initially hoped for. The transcripts for these interviews are available upon request. To supplement this, I was able to follow Chinese sources in country and continue to further my research.

That being said, my friends and colleagues throughout Beijing were instrumental in furthering my research. In particular, Renmin University, Peking University, Tsinghua University, and the Central Party School as well as the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, and the China Institute of International Studies were all instrumental in assisting my studies.

Conducting the research for this PhD has definitely been an interesting journey. Throughout it I’ve received feedback and assistance from a number of people, to whom I am extremely grateful. Special thanks to Tania Ziegler, who’s help throughout the process has been essential. From my time in Beijing, I would like to thank Aniruddha Mukherjee, Dan Mock, Lian Danliang, Lin Wei, Monique Bolli, and Alena Kozina. I’d also like to thank my family - David Johanson, Kathy Harty, Dennis Johanson and Mary Johanson for all of their support. Additionally, I would also like to thank my supervisor, Greg Austin, my second supervisor, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, and the Director of the Institute, Kerry Brown, for helping me along the way.

Daniel Johanson
March 2017
Introduction

Views of China’s relationship with the international community have often revolved around the question of whether the country is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ – specifically, does it share the principles and values of a liberal international world order? This question was captured well in David Armstrong’s work Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society. The argument stressed by Armstrong is convincing. Where China was once excluded, or self-excluded, from active participation in the international community, reformist China is now truly enmeshed in it. Doubts, however, remain in some circles about the character of China’s engagement. Is it really “in”, and fully open to negotiation and compromise on all issues, or is it somehow playing us all and waiting for the right opportunity to bare its teeth, and come back at us in a classical neo-realist fashion?

Doubts like these have been exacerbated by China’s attitude and official statements toward states that the West has viewed to be outside the international order – frequently referred to as pariah or rogue states. Some view China’s strong relations with these “outcast” states to be evidence that China itself is somehow tainted. This dissertation analyzes China’s diplomacy toward three such pariah states – Sudan, Iran, and North Korea – in an effort to see what it might say on this bigger question. While China maintained relations with these states, was it out of convenience or did China actually closely identify with these states? Has its policy remained constant over time? Why has China not accepted the definition of pariah states used by the West, or has it actually internalized such a definition?

The international environment in which China began to play a stronger role was one still adapting to the new structure of a post-Cold War world. The Cold War allowed for a relatively easy categorization of states – capitalist, communist, or non-aligned. In the years directly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States began to refocus and categorize states that could cause international instability as ‘rogues’ or ‘pariahs’. Initially, China’s interaction with states that fell into this category did not seem to address these states any differently than it had in past interactions. Essentially, China conducted business as usual. China, at that point in time, was understandably more focused on its own economic growth and
utilizing markets wherever it could. However, more recent relations have seemingly acknowledged inherent humanitarian or security concerns in these ‘pariah’ states, and exhibited Chinese attempts to help address these issues – at least on a base level – in direct coordination with the international community. It is therefore important to understand exactly what these changes are, and how/why they have come about.

In order to examine these changes, I utilize a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach to guide my analytical research. Foreign Policy Analysis is a particularly helpful analytical tool in that it recognizes that foreign policy is not just the actions of one unitary actor. All policy decisions logically result from a multitude of factors throughout the international and domestic environment. FPA acknowledges that these interactions all have a role in influencing a nation’s foreign policy. In general, a FPA framework allows for the identification of who plays a role in foreign policymaking, why they have interests in the process, as well as what other internal or external factors influence the process.

FPA seeks to understand the role actors within the state play in influencing a nation’s foreign policy. Traditionally, the state is the basic level of analysis in international relations – and all actions that happen within the state are locked in a ‘black box’ that is not seen. FPA attempts to break through this barrier and understand how various actors influence the state’s policies. FPA is a useful tool as it recognizes that actions in international relations are not solely black and white, but are a messy amalgamation of interests. In particular, ‘foreign policy actions … incorporate[e] a multitude of influences – structural and agential, as well as international, societal and individual – that continually impinge on them and on their decision makers.’¹

Additionally, to understand how and why actors make the choices they do, this thesis also employs situational analysis.² Using this type of analysis reconstructs situations and examines the possible options that an actor has – in an effort to comprehend why a certain choice was selected over others. This type of analysis is also referred to as ‘the logic of the

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situation’ as it seeks to logically explain why a particular action was determined to be the best option.

Examining Chinese foreign policy through the analytical tools of FPA and Situational Analysis provide a good basic framework. In an effort to be able to understand the changes in Chinese foreign policy on these cases, my work is also informed by Rosenau’s conception of adaptation, as well as Armstrong’s views regarding the socialization of states to international norms. These combine to provide a stronger framework through which to understand change in the behavior of states, and underscore that change is a somewhat piecemeal process that takes place through numerous actors on various levels – in response to external and internal stimuli.

Where this research sits in scholarship

This research combines and expands several areas of study in international relations. The basis of my research builds upon David Armstrong’s work on socialization – testing to see if as China has taken a larger position in world affairs it has also become socialized to international norms and values – especially with regard to issues of international security. These issues of international security focus on China’s actions towards states deemed as ‘rogues’, and examine how China has adapted to international standards relating to international security issues that interact with norms involving sovereignty/non-interference, terrorism, and nuclear non-proliferation among others. I am building upon past work on Chinese Foreign Policy, combined with bilateral studies on Sino-Sudanese, Sino-Iranian, and Sino-North Korean relations. Additionally, my work is also informed by previous studies on international norms in general, as well as those relating to sovereignty/non-interference, terrorism, and nuclear non-proliferation.

3 It must be noted, however, that the norms relating to the role of terrorism in these three cases predominantly is used to underscore their status as a ‘pariah’ in the 1990s and early 2000s, but increasingly seems to play a smaller role after the mid-2000s, with the exception of Iran’s links to Hezbollah etc.
Main Sources

To understand how China’s interaction with these nations has evolved, it is first necessary to create a foundation that utilizes prior academic research. To complete my research, I have primarily used traditional research – first utilizing older academic reports to inform a base level of relations between China and these nations and then expanding my scope to include journal articles, newspaper reports, as well as UN, NGO, and IGO reports and documents to analyze interactions until 2017. These have allowed me to analyze current Chinese policies and evaluate them in comparison to past practices and actions. In doing so, I have utilized applicable Chinese language resources, when possible.

I have also utilized available primary documents where available. In general, these are official statements and papers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), resolutions and comments on resolutions from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), statements from the governments of the case study nations, and other applicable documents from the Western governments.

Finally, I have supplemented my research with anonymous interviews, to gain insight on various potential viewpoints. These have been used to supplement and verify my arguments. Interviews have been conducted predominantly with senior Chinese academics, and others able to directly comment on the relationship between China and the case study nations. Interviews are not meant to be the sole focus of this research – because of the difficulty of a) obtaining quality interviews, and b) a result of the shifting political climate in China with regard to certain topics. Due to the possible sensitive nature of the topic, party officials would ‘toe the party line’ and collected comments would not reflect an accurate picture of their sentiments or situation. As a result, any such interviews have been viewed within that context and include this caveat within my analysis.

4 These include journal articles up until the completion of the thesis in 2017.
5 As the concept of a ‘rogue’ is predominantly a western/US conception, views and statements on how China interacts with these nations in official US documents can also shed light on China’s role.
Research Question

The overarching question that guides my research is:

*Has China’s foreign policy with regard to ‘pariah states’ changed in accordance to its increasing role in international affairs, as would be expected via socialization?*

Throughout this thesis, I examine China’s actions in each of the case studies with regard to international norms to see if there has been a clear shift in how China approaches issues of international security. I seek to understand what drives these relationships, as well as if changes in behavior follow a general trend in China’s actions throughout the case studies.

In addition to this primary question, I also seek to address the following questions throughout the course of my research:

1) Has this followed a general trend in Chinese foreign policymaking or international behavior?

2) Is there a particular defining moment or event when policies clearly shifted in all cases? Does each case show different changes in different time frames?

3) Has Chinese diplomatic rhetoric changed? If so, how and what does this imply? If not, have actions changed or stayed the same?

Answering these questions will enable a greater understanding of Chinese foreign policy on the whole and allow policymakers to see the extent to which China has been contributing to international order or facilitating instability.

Hypothesis and Main Argument

Throughout this thesis I argue that there has been a notable shift in China’s actions with regard to these types of states, as well as how China has approached international security issues like those in the case studies. Either through China’s interaction with these states or through an across the board adjustment to policy, China has become increasingly socialized to the applicable international norms. This has been exhibited by change in how China has
addressed and reacted to international issues. Overall, in each of the case studies on Sudan, Iran, and North Korea, my research suggests that China’s approach changed markedly.

In my research, I look at key turning points as the focus of analysis rather than review the entire historical relationship between China and each nation over twenty or thirty years. Each turning point can be explained by probable shifts in relationships and interactions between institutions within China rather than solely as a result of its changing international circumstances. Of course, the changing environment does play a role – as it interacts with the domestic actors - enabling them to adapt to new situations. As a result, the changes that occur in China’s international behavior have been influenced and allowed by its own domestic environment first. Once an action or norm has been internalized within the Chinese system, only then can its actions on the international stage change. To exhibit socialization, these changes do not have to mirror international norms exactly. Socialization is an understanding and realization of the utility of the rules of the international system, and a willingness to work within this system to ensure stability.

On the whole, this research shows that China has begun to adapt to its role as a greater stakeholder in the international community – especially as its interests have spread throughout the globe. I believe I can make several preliminary hypotheses which apply to China’s interactions with these states.

Overall, China’s actions show a nation that is adapting to geopolitical realities while balancing a full complement of interests. As its role increases, China is continuing to adapt to the problems and priorities of being a greater international power and will continue to adjust its policies as new issues arise. However, China is still learning how to balance its priorities and initiatives, both domestically and internationally – and how these priorities interact – so its actions in some situations will not necessarily mirror other states. Timing will also vary based on how an issue is perceived.

As a result, China will continue to prefer negotiations, consensus building, and mediation on the international level, and pursue roles within that framework. Through this framework, China will push to address international security issues in multilateral forums seeking to create agreement among multiple nations on an issue’s resolution – while including
the target nation in the talks in an effort to ensure overall compliance. In these formats, China may seek more leadership roles in these multilateral forums as time goes on.

Additionally, China will continue to voice old policy points and support them - at the very least for consistency’s sake, as well as to appease certain domestic factions. However, China will continue to act in a way that is more than a strict adherence to old policies would have allowed them. This is particularly so with regard to sovereignty and non-interference. Most importantly, China has, is, and will adapt to international situations and crises. It may not be the exact response that the west wants, or at the same pace, but it will address the concerns of the west.

The only caveat to this is if an issue is viewed as a ‘core national interest’, such as with Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and now the South China Sea. In these cases, anything questioning China’s approach will not be tolerated. Also, depending on the circumstances surrounding an issue, and China’s current definition of a ‘core national interest’, anything on China’s periphery may fall into this category if it threatens Chinese security. China’s response here may be unpredictable – either with heightened action or complete disregard of whatever is seen as a problem. North Korea in some situations may become more of a ‘core issue’ if China views it to threaten its borders or regional security.

My research depicts a China that is continually evolving and changing to fit its international role. As China has continued to grow economically, Chinese foreign policy, especially with regard the international security issues that come from ‘pariah’ states, has undergone constant evolution – sometimes altering prior dogmas. In the past, China’s actions in the international arena were fairly subdued, generally making note of a nation’s sovereignty or the principle of non-interference. Now, while some may view Chinese actions in certain forums as obstructionist, China’s goals are ultimately strongly supportive of stability in the regions in which it interacts. China’s conduct in the UNSC can and has made China seem obstructionist, but China’s actions bilaterally and behind the scenes show a compelling contrast in behavior that supports the argument that China’s end goals are similar to that of the West.

The thorough examination in the case studies clearly depict these changes, and show that while the extent of changes have been different due to numerous reasons, shifts in
approach occurred on roughly similar timeframes. With multiple interests at play in each case, unilateral shifts were unlikely, but changes in approach via multilateral forums indicate consistent change.
Methodology, Limitations, and Case Studies

For this research, I have taken a case study methodological approach to analyze Chinese foreign policy with respect to three case studies (Sudan, Iran and North Korea). These nations have been selected because they all exhibit key components that make up the definition of a ‘pariah’ in that they are: 1) members of the Global South; 2) have contributed to regional or international instability; and finally, 3) have the potential to cause greater instability.

While the selected cases all share these components, each of them are sufficiently different so that conclusions are not be solely nation specific, but rather applicable to future scenarios regarding similar types of states. I focus each case study around a series of turning points in a specified time frame, so as to clearly create a comprehensive look at policies over a defined period. This time frame covers roughly from 1989 to early 2017.

By doing this, I am able to explicitly show how China's relationships have changed throughout this time. Using the cases of Sudan, Iran and North Korea allow me to verify changes in three very different circumstances. All of these studies cover roughly the same period of time. This type of examination forms a clear picture of how Chinese foreign policy has evolved in various cases.

Case Studies

For my case studies, I use three nations that deal extensively with China, and are considered international ‘pariahs’. They have been selected as they represent some of the most extreme examples of a rogue state. For both Armstrong and Rosenau, the best way to test their conceptions of change is to use the most extreme and clear examples of an ‘outcast’ – as this will give the clearest example of potential change, and offer stronger rationale as to what could have made Chinese policy shift.

Each of the case studies was also chosen to represent different geographical areas of focus in Chinese foreign policy. In particular an African, Middle Eastern, and East Asian actor are
all represented. Utilizing these different types of states also allows for an analysis of whether proximity or location of a state might have a role in influencing decision-making.

As stated previously, these states are Sudan/South Sudan⁶, Iran, and North Korea. Each of these nations represents a slightly different but similar problem to the international community. All three represent a different aspect of China’s diplomatic approach and history. China has had political relations in some form since the creation of modern Sudan and North Korea, and has had diplomatic relations with Iran through both the Pahlavi dynasty as well as the Islamic Republic. Sudan has had a succession of Coups, Iran has had one, and North Korea has been governed by the same family since its creation.

All three of these nations are viewed by the international community as a source of, or a potential source of international instability. For Sudan and now South Sudan, it is internal fighting that threatens to spill over into other nations and potential support of terrorist groups. For Iran and North Korea, their continued steps towards developing nuclear programs and the potential issues extending from this have been a main factor in their pariah status. I use these nations to examine how China reacts, both towards the international community, as well as towards each case study nation. Overall, there should be a string of similarities in how China approaches these nations. China tends to be very pragmatic in its policies, and towards these nations I would expect nothing less.

In each of the case study nations, there are roughly three key time periods that reveal changes in policy or approach by the Chinese government in dealing with issues of international concern. The actual periods are slightly different, due to the differences in each country and for the issues in each – but for all three relationships there appears to be a clear turning point that occurred in the mid-2000s. It was at these decisive moments that actions were taken that visibly separated past policy from future actions.

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⁶ I include a combined Sudan/South Sudan as the issues are intertwined throughout much of the 1990s and 2000s, and shift predominantly to the South after independence in 2011.
Thesis Structure

The basic structure of this thesis is straightforward. After this introduction, the first Chapter focuses on the theory that builds the framework behind this study. Here I discuss the key components that form the theoretical basis for this research as well as why they were selected for this work, including socialization and foreign policy analysis. In brief, while there are a number of scholars that study socialization, Armstrong’s conception of socialization in particular fit China and its adaptation to a ‘pariah’ state the best. Additionally, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) was utilized to inform this thesis over competing concepts in constructivism, liberalism or neoclassical realism. This, in part, was because FPA allows for a more comprehensive look at all of the actors at play, the ability to examine both agential and structural elements, as well as tools to attempt to open up the ‘black box’ at the center of the state’s decision-making process.

The second Chapter then moves on to an overview of the terminology of this topic, underscoring that these types of states are charged with a particular ethical judgement that affects how they are addressed in the international community. While the words ‘pariah’ or ‘rogue’ themselves are not traditionally used in academic work – both are charged terms that are readily understood to mean abnormal – and are instantly able to depict that a state has done something to move away from the norms of the international community. To understand the use of these terms, we must understand the role of ethics in international relations – and how rogue/pariah states embody this way of examining international relations. Following this, it is necessary to understand how the terminology is utilized in both English and Chinese language literature. Chapter Three provides a literature review and necessary background to the study of China’s socialization to international norms and the actors involved in China’s foreign policymaking process.

The fourth, fifth and sixth Chapters each are case studies focusing on Sudan, Iran, and North Korea, respectively. While each case is different, the structure will remain similar for each Chapter. First, each nation’s historical relationship is briefly discussed so that any potential historical implications are clear from the beginning. Next, a basepoint and two/three
turning points are explored to demonstrate China’s interaction with that nation over the two decades. Overall trends in each relationship are then examined, in addition to any perceived changes in China’s approach to international norms.

Finally, this dissertation concludes with an examination of the overarching themes and lessons that can be gleaned from the three cases. This is important to further understand the process in which China socialized to certain norms, and how its actions displayed this. Comparisons allow for a clear analysis of how change was enacted – and whether the process was across the board or piecemeal on a case by case basis.

**Predicted Conclusions**

At the completion of this thesis, several things should become clear. First of all, as China has grown in both economic and political power, its policies with regard to these pariahs have encountered constant evolution. Throughout this constant change, China’s official public rhetoric has remained somewhat similar – to China’s detriment. This had made China appear unchanging or obstructionist, when in reality it was making strides towards dealing with a given issue. Additionally, actions that are generally viewed as obstructionist, while certainly stopping some sort of action can also be seen as a means to strengthen the UN’s legitimacy. China has become more invested in the current order, and in these cases, China supports actions that it believes are enforceable and/or realistic. In being enforceable, China may be considering what it can or cannot control with its own state actors.

China will still hold the acquiescence of the host nation’s government as a key requirement to any UN action, especially peacekeeping. Any action without this support will likely be threatened with a veto – or in the case of a ‘watered’ down version – abstained. Also, while China is a strong supporter of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal matters of a state in public, in private they will push a ‘pariah’ to agree to certain conditions to further international security.

Much of China’s interactions do support the same end goals and results as that of the US and the UK, however its public comments and actions in the UNSC make it seem that it does
not. When China is really proactive in attempting to address these issues, it is not very likely that it is done solely in forums like the UN, or multilateral talks. Instead, it is done on a direct bilateral basis, in direct contact with the specific nation. This may not solely be at a bilateral meeting – it could occur on the sidelines of a multilateral meeting. Additionally, as a result of China’s evolution, it is much more likely that China will directly talk to all parties in a conflict (even civil war / insurrection) if it deems it necessary. Regardless of whether the issue requires a multilateral solution, China will try to push for talks and peaceful settlement in all cases except those that directly impact what it views to be its own national security interests.

China’s interests in these countries are not likely to decrease, with the only exception being in the event that North Korea continues to ignore China’s warnings. Historically, China has shut off energy supplies, and could move to do more should North Korea continue to ‘misbehave’.

On the whole, China’s foreign policy has undergone continual changes since reform. As shall be seen in the Chapters that follow, the first change, coinciding with the beginning of reform, was to become more involved in multilateral institutions. This lasted throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with China increasingly becoming more active in a number of these international institutions. However, China would not break out of its long-held views on sovereignty, and generally would vote to abstain from any resolutions that it did not completely agree with in the UNSC. Around 2005, China’s approach would change again, and allow for more proactive approaches as well as a more liberal definition of sovereignty and non-interference. While China’s approach may not always be viewed by the international community to be the best route, their goal is the same. China has firmly become entrenched as a key member of these institutions, and as a result views addressing international security issues to be important for both domestic and international stability. China still views stability as key in maintaining both growth and power – so will work to ensure a stable external environment.

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Chapter One
Theoretical Framework

The theoretical approach followed in this thesis utilizes an understanding of David Armstrong’s conception of socialization as a main reference point and is informed by Foreign Policy Analysis, James Rosenau’s adaptation, and Karl Popper’s situational logic. Within that framework, the thesis is also informed by Agent and Structure theory from the school of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), with an eye to identifying the predominant actors in Chinese foreign policy. As discussed in the Introduction above, the lack of comprehensive sources of evidence regarding the internal dynamics of government decision-making within China prevent an overly elaborate reliance on agent/structure perspectives.

This Chapter discusses each of these key approaches - socialization, FPA, agent/structure, adaptation, and situational logic. Since socialization is the central element informing this thesis, it receives the most attention. The Chapter concludes with a brief section tying these concepts together into an analytical framework.

Socialization in Revolutionary States

David Armstrong’s work, Revolution and World Order, a seminal work on Chinese foreign policy behavior, addresses the impact on revolutionary states of the socialization effects of the international society of states. This approach is ideal for understanding how international norms have played out in China’s interaction with rogue states. The terms “rogue state” and “pariah state” are the subject of much closer examination in Chapter Two, but it is a very close, if not perfect match, with what Armstrong’s work refers to as revolutionary states – states at odds with fundamental international norms who seek to overthrow them. Relying on Armstrong’s argument, this thesis predicts that the once-revolutionary state China, now more or less socialized in its interactions with international order, will continue to be influenced by
the same process of socialization in interacting with other revolutionary states\textsuperscript{1} and that China will increasingly expect them to begin to adapt more and conform to international order.

Armstrong defines ‘society’ as ‘an association based upon certain common interests which accepts and maintains such rules and practices as its members deem necessary to achieve their common interests’.\textsuperscript{2} This forms an important aspect of how he views the international community\textsuperscript{3} and their behavior, as he uses Hedley Bull’s conception of ‘international society’. Bull viewed this ‘international society’ to be a ‘society of states’, that hold multiple ‘interests, rules, and practices ... in common’.\textsuperscript{4} Armstrong also refers to the international community as ‘the Westphalian conception of international society’ as a means to express ‘the particular set of rules and practices that defined the society of states as it emerged in the seventeenth century[,] which revolved around the concept of sovereignty’, and continue to define the international system.\textsuperscript{5}

Generally, the concept of a ‘revolutionary state’ is ‘used to describe a state undergoing a revolution,’ and refers solely to the internal affairs of the state.\textsuperscript{6} Armstrong’s work, however, focuses on ‘revolutionary states’ whose internal revolution can have an impact on the external international environment and who seek a ‘fundamental change in the’ international order.\textsuperscript{7} As a result, these states are generally alienated, in some way, from the international community. A nation like this can be defined:

‘as one that deliberately adopts a posture of confrontation with the society of states, or is objectively involved in such a confrontation by virtue of the external implications of its revolution, or is perceived by significant numbers of other states to be in such a posture of confrontation.’\textsuperscript{8}

Revolutionary states seek to jeopardize not only ‘stability and regularity in the pattern of assumptions, rules, and practices’ but also incite revolution inside of other states.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{1} These are Revolutionary States in so much as that they are outside of the international order and/or stand outside and against international norms to a certain extent.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.,3.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.7.
A revolutionary state is a state that begins their existence as an outsider and continues as somewhat of an aberration to international order. Armstrong cites Halliday to the effect that within the study of international relations, investigation of these types of states has frequently been marginalized, since “they have been seen as ‘breakdowns of otherwise regular processes in national and international society’.”

To describe how the international system changes the behavior of these outsider states, Armstrong uses the conception of ‘socialization’ found in anthropology, describing it as the process:

‘whereby men consciously or unconsciously conform to the conventions of the society in which they live in order to function more effectively within it [and] whereby an increasing entanglement within an existing structure of relationships brings about an increasing degree of adaptation to the normal behaviour patterns of that structure’

The units being examined by Armstrong are ‘the state and the society of states’ rather than, as in anthropology, an ‘individual and his family or tribe’. While the focus of the two fields of study (anthropology and international relations) is different, the concept of socialization as applied by Armstrong is useful. The analogy holds quite well as both types of society (a local community of individuals and the international community of states) feel a pressure to conform. For a revolutionary state, the international order encourages them ‘to behave ‘responsibly’, to accept rules and norms that are acknowledged by other states, and in short to be states rather than revolutionary movements’. Either way, “[s]ocialization is a process in which a potential entrant to a society internalizes the norms and values of that society’ in order to successfully join it.

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10 Armstrong, Revolution, 9-10.
11 Ibid., 7-8.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 184.
For Armstrong, in any system or society, ‘order’ denotes ‘stability and regularity in the pattern of assumptions, rules, and practices that are accepted as legitimate among the members of a given society and that concern the mechanisms of and limits to the process of change within that society.’ Revolutionary states are, by nature, at odds with this order. Within the revolutionary state there is an ongoing dispute between its own ‘revolutionary identity’ and its potential place as a state in the international community.

In the nineteenth century, as Armstrong notes, states collaborated to support ‘interventions against revolution’. These states ‘implicitly acknowledge[d] that membership [in] international society entailed responsibilities and duties as well as rights, and also that some measure of direct and deliberate involvement in the processes of rule formation in international society’. As international society progressed, new institutions appeared that would ‘direct regulation of numerous functional areas of international intercourse’. These institutions dealt with issues that would create the least amount of controversy – particularly ‘postal services, telecommunication, and the control of epidemic diseases’.

The elaboration by Armstrong of the historical evolution of international order is directly relevant to the subjects captured by China’s relations with developing countries. As he notes, following World War II and the creation of the United Nations (UN), more sensitive issues began to be addressed in international forums, relating to ‘monetary relations, refugees, and, to a very limited degree, human rights’. One of the factors that led to an expansion of the role that the international community had was the influx of new members and nations that appeared in the years following World War II. The entry of these states allowed for ‘[i]ssues such as colonialism, racism, and Third World poverty [to be] placed on the international agenda, and new international norms emerged which made imperialistic or racialistic practices internationally reprehensible.’

The League of Nations and the UN both represent key stages of the institutionalization (advanced socialization) of the modern international community. As the Cold War was ending,
international society continued to evolve to address new issues and include an expanded set of international norms. For Armstrong, these new rules have expanded to include ‘increasingly demanding norms of internal governance, including the ‘standard of civilization’, the protection of human rights, and the rule of law’.22

Armstrong’s study of the socialization process of revolutionary states in the international system addresses the changes in the system until just after the end of the Cold War. It is this author’s view that Armstrong’s theory that former revolutionary states socialize to international society’s norms continues to be correct.

Armstrong on China

One of Armstrong’s examples of a revolutionary state was the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It began its existence as a revolutionary state, matching Armstrong’s definition. After winning the Chinese civil war in 1949, the PRC existed outside of the accepted international order, understood as defined by membership in the UN. The Republic of China (ROC) government, forced by military defeat to retreat to the island of Taiwan in 1949, still maintained the Chinese seat at the UN until 1971 even though it had lost control of most of the country. The PRC also initially supported revolutionary movements in other nations until 1974. By definition, it was outside of the international system – and stayed there. In the 1960s China viewed the international environment and international law to be ‘the superstructure of an economic base’ and as such was a ‘tool of oppression used by big capitalist powers against weak and small countries’, and that a universal ‘world law’ was impossible because there was no unified economic system in the modern world’.23 While it would seem that such beliefs would stop China from ‘appealing to rights deriving from earlier treaties, and to established legal norms’, China still used these cases in boundary disputes ‘with India and its claim to Taiwan.’24

The international relationships that China initially cultivated were generally tied to this revolutionary image. The ‘extreme militancy of the Cultural Revolution [CR]’, however, strained

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22 Armstrong, Revolution, 304
23 Ibid. 241.
24 Ibid. This also showed that, to some level, the international norms that fit a states needs are the first to be adopted.
and damaged these relations.\textsuperscript{25} While at one point, China’s relationship with the Soviet Union was strong, it deteriorated over time. Throughout the 1960s, China was increasingly ‘threatened by the United States and, to an even greater extent, the Soviet Union.’ In this environment, China quickly realized that ‘its capacity to enjoy the benefits of normal interstate relations were hindered by its apparent unwillingness to abide by the rules governing such relations’ and that ‘the pursuit of a revolutionary foreign policy would have to take second place to ensuring China’s security’.\textsuperscript{26} To do this, China would have to begin to approach its external relations differently and create a relationship with the United States.

Once China changed its outlook, its interactions with the international community began to change as well. As the US and China began to thaw their relationship, ‘China was formally recognized by many states and assumed the membership of the [UN] that had previously been held by Taiwan’.\textsuperscript{27} China’s re-entrance into the international community was not simply a re-engagement with the United States. China began to change both how it spoke about international issues, as well as its ‘external behaviour’.\textsuperscript{28} The process was gradual, and its previous support for revolutionary movements in the third world declined throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, ‘China began to make increasing use of the conventional diplomatic means for pursuing its objectives’.\textsuperscript{29} As Deng Xiaoping rose to power, China focused on modernization and stepped away from its revolutionary foreign policy.

Internally, China’s policies were still somewhat repressive. Calls for political reforms were ignored and catalyzed with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. The fallout from this event caused China to again be ostracized from the international order – albeit briefly. This time, however, ‘Beijing's response was quietly to seek to regain its status as a ‘respectable’ member of the international community by [...] acquiescing to UN action against Iraq and giving comparatively short prison sentences to some of the Tiananmen demonstrators’\textsuperscript{30} Through these actions, China was trying to rejoin international society and prove that its ‘socialization’ to and acceptance of international norms was sincere.

\textsuperscript{25} Armstrong, Revolution, 181.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 181-2.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 183.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 184.
The combination of economic needs and the benefits that international norms provide can and do entice states to become ‘socialized’. China is a perfect example when it rejoined the international order in the 1970s. By the 1980s even the conception of international law taught within China had evolved to be defined as ‘the sum total of principles, rules, regulations and systems which are binding and which mainly regulate interstate relations’, and claim that ‘in international society there is no ruling class nor is it possible to have such a class’ – something that twenty years earlier was the exact opposite.31

Armstrong’s conception of socialization and his example of China’s return to the international community exemplify the idea of how revolutionary states will socialize to international norms. It was not an automatic process, and even when China was a part of the international community, it was not completely socialized into all norms. China initially adapted to the norms that it could, at the time. These were norms that it did not view would encroach on its sovereignty or interfere in its internal affairs. Essentially, by first allowing what fit domestically, China’s socialization began. However, based on Armstrong’s ideas, China - when dealing with other revolutionary states - will also eventually conform to these norms in one way or another. As will be seen in the case studies, through examining China’s relationship with other pariahs we can confirm that China’s socialization process is progressively developing, but is still a work in progress.

**Critical Examination of Armstrong**

While Armstrong’s interpretation of socialization is the most fitting approach for this research, it is not without its shortcomings. Armstrong developed his idea of socialization in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the Cold War was still a very fresh memory, and therefore could be a strong influence.32 At the time he was writing, he could see that the world was changing, but it was still unclear how.33 However, its ‘flaws’ strengthen the case for its use in this research. While his examination ends in the 1990s – this offers the opportunity for his work

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32 Ibid., vii.
33 Ibid., 304.
to be tested and updated, as he viewed the ‘dialectic between revolutionary states and international society [to be] not yet concluded.’

To create a strong set of cases with a historical record, much of his work focuses on the American, French and Russian revolutionary states and their entrance into world affairs in different eras. These cases, while different from those in this study, create a strong framework of individual socialization. Through these, Armstrong examines historical outsiders that eventually become key members of the international community. Each also demonstrates a message about the nature of socialization – it isn’t a clean or uniform process. It is constantly changing as circumstances, individuals, states, and organizations interact.

Armstrong focuses on socialization via joining the international community of states – but does not delve into what a former/evolving revolutionary state interacting with another revolutionary state would do. While this can be seen as an issue – I view it to be an extension and test of the very premise of Armstrong’s socialization theory. A revolutionary state, once inculcated in the norms and standards of the international community will adopt those regarding rogue/pariah states as well. Working to address the issues of international security that emerge from the actions of these states are clearly problems that must be resolved by the international community. As a state is more integrated into the system, it will approach international security issues in a similar way. It may even begin to adapt quicker – showing frustration that another ‘revolutionary’ state cannot make the same changes they did in the past to become a greater part of the world. So, as China continues in a socialization process it will begin to increasingly address the issues of instability caused by these states in similar manner.

Armstrong’s examination of China is also somewhat constrained by the time period in which he wrote his theories. The very nature of the Chinese state has changed dramatically over the past 30 years as China has grown and changed significantly. Most of Armstrong’s research looks at the internal dynamics of the Chinese state, as the early components that would be allowed to socialize were those that ‘would promote the welfare of the Chinese

34 Armstrong, Revolution,311.
36 Ibid.,302.
people ‘rather than how it would act internationally.’ If China’s socialization were be an ongoing process, more norms would continue be internalized as China’s role in the international community grew. This, as will be seen in the case studies, is indeed what transpired.

Additionally, Armstrong’s work focuses on ‘revolutionary states’ rather than ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ states. In the next chapter, there will be an expanded examination of what a ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ is, but suffice it to say that like a ‘revolutionary’ state, these types of states shun the international community and seek to change international order. Armstrong defines ‘revolutionary states’ to have begun ‘their international life outside [the international system].’ They can be understood as complementary terms from different eras.

Armstrong does include some examples of revolutionary states that have not re-joined the international community. For instance, Iran is one example of a state that is both seen as ‘revolutionary’ and a ‘rogue’. Armstrong briefly examines its ‘revolt against the west,’ but as his work was completed merely 14 years after the revolution there is little evidence of socialization. This, in itself, fails to highlight anything other than Iran’s fundamentalist nature following the revolution. He mentions Rafsanjani’s attempts to mend Iran’s international ties, but these, as it worked out, were mostly unsuccessful. Interestingly, this case is picked up by Terhalle, and then Jervis twenty years later, to essentially underscore one of Armstrong’s points – that socialization begins with what is acceptable domestically and evolves from there.

Armstrong’s shortcomings allow for me to test a concept developed in the last years of the Cold War towards China’s interaction with actors that would become a key part of the post-Cold War world. I will be able to show that, while the approach may have been developed in the past, its insight into the role of a revolutionary state still holds true in the modern world. Armstrong showed us how revolutionary states can join the international order as that international order was shifting. With this research, we can now examine what happened after his examination ended – and further Armstrong’s concept of China’s socialization.

37 Armstrong, Revolution, 176, 184.
38 Ibid., 3.
39 Ibid., 10.
40 Ibid., 188.
Defining Socialization in International Relations Literature

While this thesis is based upon Armstrong’s work on socialization as it relates to revolutionary states, the concept of socialization and adaptation to international norms has been discussed by a number of other international relations scholars. Dessler, while summarizing Waltz, states that ‘actors are socialized to a fixed system of norms, or they are ejected from the system’.42 Waltz uses the example of the Bolsheviks accepting the norms of the international community – rather than turning its back, as its revolutionary ideology would imply.43 Ann Kent defines international socialization to be ‘the process that is directed toward a state's internalization of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in its international environment.’44 As it is the international community that creates and upholds these norms, it is the institutions and states at their core that have the ability to propagate them. Nations that seek to join these organizations determine if the norms fit into their view, or how to make them work.

According to Alastair Johnston, international institutions have three potential effects on the socialization of a state – mimicking, social influence and/or persuasion.45 Mimicking allows for a state to essentially copy how other nations approach a norm prior to thoroughly analyzing the implications for that state’s policies. Social Influence, then, ‘connotes the evaluation of state behavior by co-members of a social group, which may range from status appreciation through the public expression of support to status devaluation through naming and shaming’.46 Finally, persuasion ‘convinc[es a state] through a process of cognition that particular norms, values, and causal understandings are correct and ought to be operative in their own behavior’.47

Amitav Acharya discusses how norms are adopted into a country’s way of thinking about the international world through a process called ‘norm localization’. Norm localization is

43 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979),127-8.
47 Johnston, Social,25.
‘the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices’ rather than being adopted completely.\textsuperscript{48} Acharya sees four key factors that play into whether or not a foreign norm will be successfully localized. First, if the norm can ‘be used to enhance the legitimacy and authority of their extant institutions and practices, [...] without fundamentally altering their existing social identity’ it will increase the likelihood of it being adopted quickly.\textsuperscript{49} The second factor depends on how strong prior norms are within a nation, as ‘they may derive from deeply ingrained cultural beliefs and practices or from international legal norms that had, at an earlier stage, been borrowed and enshrined in the constitutional documents of a group’.\textsuperscript{50} In this case, if a similar or conflicting norm exists, it is more likely to ‘be localized rather than accepted wholesale’.\textsuperscript{51} The third factor depends on the strength and credibility of local actors – as their credibility helps determine how strongly a norm will be adopted. Finally, the fourth factor in a localization process is the extent of the nation’s sense of identity – the stronger ‘they possess a well-developed sense of being unique in terms of their values and interactions’ the more likely that this identity will facilitate localization of a norm.\textsuperscript{52}

Finnemore and Sikkink have shown that the process for internalizing a norm, or the norm’s ‘life-cycle’, consists of three stages: norm emergence, cascade, and finally internalization.\textsuperscript{53} In the first stage, ‘[n]orm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norm’ through persuasion.\textsuperscript{54} The second stage is when norm recognition begins and ‘“cascades” through the rest of the population (in this case, of states)’.\textsuperscript{55} The third, and final stage is internalization – when the states internalize the norm and

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.,248.
  \item\textsuperscript{50} Acharya, ‘How Ideas’,248.
  \item\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.,249.
  \item\textsuperscript{53} Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, \textit{International Organization}, Vol. 52, No. 4,(1998),895.
  \item\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. They note that this may happen through ‘a combination of pressure for conformity, [or a] desire to enhance international legitimation’.
\end{itemize}
they ‘acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate’. A norm completing all three stages is not a given.

Wendt reasons why states internalize norms, which includes three degrees of internalization: coercion, self-interest and legitimacy. The first degree, coercion, implies that states take up a norm not because it is in their best interest – but rather they have no choice but to adopt the norm. In the second degree, the states internalize the norm because the norm is in their self-interest and ‘advanc[es] an exogenously given interest’, that can be used to their benefit. For the final level of internalization, the state views the norm to be legitimate and ‘therefore want to follow them’. Here the state identifies with the stipulations of the Norm, and views them to be integral views to their own nation.

Nations become initially introduced and eventually socialize to international norms through their participation and activities in international organizations (IOs) and multilateral agreements. Interactions in these forums allow for the transmission of norms, which nations then internalize to accept or reject. Engagement in the world system is important to the spread of these norms, and in the case of China – many see active involvement as a way to socialize ‘China into the norms of international cooperation.’ In her book, National Interests in International Society, Martha Finnemore notes that ‘perceptions of the world and [the state’s] role in the world’ are influenced and shaped by their international interactions.

Both multilateralism and participation in IOs play an important role in how some see China socializing and adapting to international order. Multilateralism, in particular, has been seen as a key ‘foundation for a new cooperative world order’. China, however, has long viewed multilateral agreements and organizations with skepticism. This stems from its history as a frequent ‘target of such organizations during the Cold War.’ There has, however, been a notable shift in their opinion on the matter.

56 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International’,895. The example of this being: ‘whether women should be allowed to vote, whether slavery is useful, or whether medical personnel should be granted immunity during war.’
57 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),269-271
58 Ibid.,271.
59 Ibid., Social,272.
60 Ibid.,273.
63 Wang, ’Multilateralism’,476.
64 Ibid.,482-3.
In the mid-1990s, ‘an article in a leading government-sponsored international relations journal expressed strong skepticism toward multilateralism’, and argued that multilateralism was merely a US trick to ‘realize its own strategic designs’ and minimize China's regional power.\(^65\) However, sentiment from that same journal has become ‘increasingly positive toward multilateral diplomacy’, believing that this sort of policy would help ensure stability in the Asia Pacific region.\(^66\) This follows the trend that throughout the 1990s, China increasingly took part in various multilateral initiatives – while doing its best to ‘preserve national sovereignty’.\(^67\)

Overall, though, this does not mean that China had become completely ‘socializ[ed] into [all] norms of multilateralism’.\(^68\) While China has increasingly been open to multilateralism, socialization may not have been the sole reason – it may have been joining out of the necessity of the interconnectedness of the international system.\(^69\) As a result of these connections, it is likely that some level of socialization may have occurred, whether on purpose or not. Exposure to new concepts and interactions with the international community can assist in the socialization process.

According to Ann Kent, the roles of IOs, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the United Nations (UN), however, are seen to ‘contribute significantly to the socialization of participating states’.\(^70\) The implications of both ‘[IOs] and their treaties not only ensure transparency, cut transaction costs, build capacity, and enhance dispute settlement, …[and] …persuade states parties to "explore, redefine and sometimes discover" their own, and mutual, interests.’\(^71\) IOs – especially ones that focus on less political issues - allow for the development of certain processes and norms without ‘the sharp edges of nationalistic stances’ that can derail integration or change. These organizations, as long as they don’t override any existing state concerns\(^72\), allow for international interdependence in addressing issues of mutual concern.

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\(^{65}\) Ibid.
\(^{66}\) Ibid.,483.
\(^{67}\) Ibid.,484. China’s attempts at Multilateralism is said to be ‘constrained by the government's determination to preserve national sovereignty, its insistence on policy flexibility, and its lingering anxiety that multilateralism may be an instrument serving American interests in the region’.
\(^{68}\) Ibid.,485.
\(^{69}\) Wang, ‘Multilateralism’,490-1.
\(^{70}\) Kent, ‘China’s International’,343.
\(^{71}\) Ibid.
\(^{72}\) For China’s case, impact their sovereignty or the legitimacy of the Communist Party.
The number of Intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations (IGO and INGOs, respectively) has grown significantly in the past 50 years. China’s membership is quite illuminating as well. In 1966, China belonged to only ‘one [IGO] and fifty-eight [INGOs]’, yet by the year ‘2000 it had become a member of as many as fifty IGOs and 1,275 INGOs.’\(^{73}\) Becoming a part of this much of the international community would, at least on some level, encourage the transfer of norms and ideas.

In Kent’s view, the way that China approaches the international world by and large is influenced by ‘the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the rights to national self-determination and independence’.\(^{74}\) Among these ideals exists a rigid concept of sovereignty that heavily influences how China views international cooperation. China’s conception of ‘sovereignty is an absolute one, [] far from the restrictive concept [currently] articulated by the UN secretary-general.’\(^{75}\) In some cases, if China perceives that a topic under discussion could become a potential issue regarding sovereignty it will tend to protect and uphold sovereignty. Above all else, the Chinese government views domestic stability to be the most important objective. If anything threatens to disturb this stability, even conceptually, China’s representative will advocate whatever they believe would uphold stability.\(^{76}\)

While this would seem to make China’s views somewhat immutable by focusing only on its internal affairs, its interactions in IO/IGOs have shown China’s ability to change and adapt what it considers to be in its self-interest. Kent noted that, in particular, ‘China's participation in organizations like the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and [other] UN human rights bodies ha[ve] led [China] to redefine its self-interest’.\(^{77}\)

China’s actions concerning the CD are particularly enlightening. Initially, China maintained that all states, including developing ones, have a right to develop nuclear technology. Chinese policy makers gradually came to realize that continuing to hold this belief and ‘supporting proliferation was not good for global security’.\(^{78}\) This step was a key turning

\(^{73}\) Ibid.,344-5.
\(^{74}\) Ibid.,346-7.
\(^{75}\) Kent, ‘China’s International’,346-7.
\(^{76}\) Ibid.,247.
\(^{77}\) Ibid.,250.
\(^{78}\) Ibid.
point in how China perceived international arms control, and allowed for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to advance.

China’s membership in these IOs also affected China’s domestic mentality – at least on a legalistic basis. Kent also mentions that China passed a number of domestic laws that corresponded with ‘the norms and rules of the [IOs] and treaties to which it is a party.’ Implementing these laws, however, is not always successful due to a combination of a weak legal system, corruption, or ‘the sheer scope of legislative change’. China has also been able to institutionalize its international commitments through the ‘establishment of bureaucracies corresponding to the areas of its new international obligations’ and ‘communities of experts within China that interact with their counterparts in the West’.

While this all suggests a great openness to change, for much of China’s international activity, a strong conception of sovereignty as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of a state is still maintained. China’s international behavior has long been constrained ‘by an extremely rigid understanding of state sovereignty and non-intervention’. It is generally out of these views, and actions taken to uphold them, that China is criticized for watering down, blocking or delaying international action or resolutions. This conception has, and does impact China’s views of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as a strong conception of a state’s absolute authority in its territory is not always conducive to intervention in crisis.

As a result of China’s principals regarding sovereignty, it was the state that ‘most frequently invoke[ed] a veto threat in the Security Council’ in the decade following the Cold War. The threat alone is generally enough to modify the final resolution, although China still frequently abstains – particularly regarding international humanitarian law. China, like all

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80 Ibid.,352.


82 Prantl and Nakano, ‘Global Norm’,212; Jing Tao, ‘China’s Socialization in the International Human Rights Regime: why did China reject the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?’ Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 24, No. 96,2015,1102. This conception has been cemented by ‘historical experiences such as the Opium Wars’, the ‘subsequent semi-colonialization’, and Cold War ‘border disputes with Russia and India’. Any international move for intervention brings up a caution for setting a precedent that could jeopardize Chinese territory – particularly Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.

83 Kent, ‘China’s International’,352.
members of the international community, understands that in addition to pursuing its own interests, it must be prepared to occasionally ‘redefine those interests, to accept costs, and to renegotiate its sovereignty’.  

As will be exemplified in the case studies – particularly in Sudan’s case – a key exception to this is any issue that verges on either humanitarian intervention or self-determination. Whenever an issue arises that seems to breach China’s view of sovereignty, the Chinese representative will tend to issue a statement referring to the absolute nature of a state’s sovereignty. While China ‘strongly support[s] IOs and multilateralism and has acknowledged the inevitability of global interdependence’, China’s focus on and concerns regarding sovereignty and ‘interference’ do draw attention to China’s international behavior and cause outside observers to view Chinese actions as purely obstructionist. Though the conception of sovereignty and non-interference that China holds are still strict, there are cases that show its increasing malleability. Actions, particularly regarding areas of high interest like Sudan, increasingly have signified that China’s strict view and enforcement of state sovereignty can be eased when necessary.

Even with its conception of sovereignty, China’s evolution regarding the concept of the R2P does show a positive shift in addressing international issues. The original conception and utility of R2P ‘was to provide a code of conduct in case of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, when states manifestly failed to protect their own citizens’. Understandably, in many situations where this concept would be utilized - the state violating international law would have actions taken against it that breached its absolute sovereignty over its territory by interfering in its affairs. A tension between this view of sovereignty and a view to prevent future atrocities is unavoidable. This tension is not only applicable to China, as governments having ‘an inherent ‘responsibility to protect’ their citizens in ways that conform to norms defined by an ‘international community’ [is] distinctly alien to many Asian nationalists’. Such views are seen as ‘a direct challenge to their own authority to

84 Ibid., 358.
85 Much of the time, China’s actions with regard to sovereignty underline its view of how it would react if a similar incident occurred within its own territory.
exercise national sovereignty under the pretext of ‘correcting’ perceived atrocities and aggression – a subjective and contested notion’.88

Chinese forces have become a key component of many UN peace operations, and have had ‘constructive engagement with sovereignty and intervention [] in its counterterrorism strategies in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[SCO], ASEAN[Association of Southeast Asian Nations], APEC[Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] and [with] the European Union[EU]’.89 There has been a progression in how the issue sovereignty in humanitarian intervention has been approached – for example China criticized NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo, but ‘explicitly supported Security Council Resolutions 1264 and 1272 that authorized international intervention in East Timor only shortly afterwards.’90 A stark example of China’s changes with regard to humanitarian operations can be seen in its rhetoric in the 1980s – where it was highly critical of them, to the present – where it is actively participating in many operations.91

China did initially reject the concept of R2P in 2001, but eventually endorsed it ‘first at the World Summit, and subsequently in Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict’ and in the General Assembly in 2009.92 To enable this, China, on the one hand, allowed for a more malleable internal concept of sovereignty and non-intervention to be created through a socialization process.93 On the other, China helped shape the end concept of R2P so that it fit with their conception of international relations. China’s key contribution to R2P, was in support of its views of sovereignty – and ensured that ‘states have the primary responsibility to protect their civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ and that the international community required ‘approval by the Security Council and the consent of the host country concerned’ in order to intervene in the name of R2P.94 A UN report in 2009 confirmed that the state had a central role in R2P, and that

90 Ibid.
91 Tao, ‘China’s Socialization’,1092-3.
93 Ibid.,213-4.
94 Ibid.,214.
this ‘essentially re-confirm[ed] rather than weaken[ed] Articles 2.1\textsuperscript{95} and 2.7\textsuperscript{96} of the UN Charter’ which both focus on the sovereignty of member states.\textsuperscript{97}

**Why Armstrong Over Other Socialization Scholars**

We have just discussed how other international relations scholars view socialization – yet it is best to establish why I have not utilized their work in a greater fashion. All of these academics have influenced my view of socialization as I have continued my research and helped further anchor my definition, but in comparison to Armstrong, their work is not as applicable in further defining my cases.

First, one of the most prominent researchers – especially with regard to Chinese socialization – is Alastair Iain Johnston. One of his primary contributions was through his book *Social States*. He shows convincing evidence that ‘Chinese diplomats, strategists, and analysts’ have, at least partially, been socialized to some international norms as a result of their interaction with international institutions.\textsuperscript{98} While his work was very useful in helping define socialization, as it focuses on one discreet area – arms control treaties,\textsuperscript{99} the ASEAN Regional Forum and China’s increasing membership in similar institutions – it is too limited for this particular study.\textsuperscript{100}

Johnston is right in criticizing other examinations of socialization as overly focused on the state as the primary unit of analysis – especially since states are rarely unitary actors.\textsuperscript{101} FPA’s agential focus, in combination with Armstrong’s socialization, helps rectify this issue for this research.

Similarly, Ann Kent wrote about China’s socialization via institutions – particularly the WTO and UN. Her scholarship suggests that increased membership and interaction in IOs

\textsuperscript{95} United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html, 24/October/1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Article 2.1 States: ‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’

\textsuperscript{96} Article 2.7 states: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the [UN] to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’

\textsuperscript{97}Prantl and Nakano, ‘Global Norm’,214.

\textsuperscript{98} Johnston, *Social*, xvii.

\textsuperscript{99} Including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and The Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines.


\textsuperscript{101} Johnston, ‘Social’,27
increases socialization, and that some of China’s long held norms have and will have a lasting impact on its actions. Though important for framing this research, it is as applicable in dissecting Chinese actions towards ‘rogue’ states, as much of Kent’s focus is at an institutional level.  

Fred Halliday also examined revolutionary states and socialization – in *Revolution and world politics*. His take is indeed interesting, as his view is that socialization and revolutionary states are incompatible. He argues that, until a revolutionary states internal system abandons its revolutionary agenda, it cannot be socialized. As China has maintained aspects of its revolutionary heritage at times, his approach is not suited for my cases.

Martha Finnemore’s work on socialization focuses on the adoption of norms through ‘teaching’ – basically how a new normative concept is brought to a state. After this, the state is then persuaded and internalizes the norm. This leaves out many intermediary steps, and relies on the premise that the state was successfully persuaded to accept the new concepts. If socialization were instantaneous, China’s actions would not slowly evolve, as will be seen in the cases that follow. Johnston also criticizes this issue, highlighting that this is an issue with much of the constructivist approach to socialization.

Another constructivist, Jeffrey Checkel, however, not only looks at the role agency plays in socialization- but recognizes the constructivist problem of skipping ‘how norms actually reach the domestic arena’ and underscores that this area too needs to be examined. While this is an improvement – the predominant focus of his cases are Europe and the EU, all essentially established elements of the international community. Checkel does try to account for a variety of states, through a model that addresses Liberal, Corporatist, Statist, and State above Society

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103 Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 139.
state types. However, even in this case China does not appear to fit in with any of the categories completely.

Amitav Archaya has also looked at socialization, but his work tends to focus more on the process of how norms are integrated into a given state. Themes in his work generally involve the socializing potential of Asian regional institutions, the norm making potential of non-western actors, and regional norms. While this is certainly interesting, with the exception of providing a greater understanding of how a state internalizes a norm, its applicability is limited given its focus on regional bodies and states as the primary actor.

Overall, while there is a wide variety of thought on socialization and its processes, Armstrong fits the scope and the needs of this thesis best. These other scholars help define what socialization is and how it has developed in various cases, but Armstrong still remains the most applicable theorization.

**Foreign Policy Analysis**

This thesis approaches its work through Foreign Policy analysis (FPA) approach, and its ability to develop mid-range theories. FPA is a sub-field of international relations, that focuses on ‘foreign policy decision-making and implementation by individuals and collectives of individuals’ and is ‘characterized [its] actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups’. In general, IR theory focuses on the role of the state in international relations as a base – framing its actions as a ‘unitary rational actor’. FPA moves the level of analysis down to decision-makers within the state – that are not always unitary or rational. This takes decision-makers outside of the ‘black box’ of the state, and underscores that a multitude

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107 Checkel, ‘Norms’, 476.  
108 Acharya, ‘How Ideas’.  
113 Hudson, ‘Actor-Specific,’ 2.
of domestic and international factors impact a state’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{114} If the human element of decision-makers is not a part of IR theory, the resultant research will ‘erroneously paint for us a world of no change, no creativity, no persuasion, [and] no accountability’.\textsuperscript{115} FPA ‘looks at the interface between institutions, agents, and rules with the aim of showing how these led to the foreign policy choices made by the collective agents known as states.’\textsuperscript{116}

One of the key elements of FPA that is essential to this study is its focus on ‘more than one level of analysis’, and the integration of ‘insights from many intellectual disciplines.’\textsuperscript{117} As a result, we are able to compare the different cases in the context of socialization, adaptation, and situational logic, as well as understanding the agential and structural components inherent in foreign policy. As a result, FPA allows us to understand foreign policy behavior more completely than ‘rival theor[ies]’.\textsuperscript{118} FPA in its earliest stages sought to create a sort of scientific explanation of the ‘why’ in international relations. With this legacy in mind, I utilize FPA to frame my work – not, of course, as an end-all explanation, but as a stage in which to attempt to understand the mechanisms that cause China to adapt to external situations on an international stage. This evolution takes place slowly, and is informed by domestic and international factors.

**Other Theoretical Conceptions**

Within IR theory, a number of approaches can be used to examine the domestic drivers of foreign policy including realism, liberalism, and constructivism. However, for the purposes of this study, FPA is the best fit to complement socialization. FPA ‘attempts to understand foreign policy by treating states as members of a class of phenomena and seeks to generalize [] the sources, and nature, of their behaviour, focusing on the decision-making process in its varying aspects in order to produce explanations.’\textsuperscript{119} As will be seen, the other mainstream theoretical

\textsuperscript{115} Hudson, ‘Actor-Specific,’3.
\textsuperscript{119} Smith, ‘Theories’,27.
approaches do not start at the decision-making process, or offer as much flexibility in approach as FPA.

First, in realism/neorealism, states are seen to be rational actors while the international system is defined by its anarchy and an absence of all external structure.\(^\text{120}\) Mearsheimer set the view of realism to include an ever-present fear for survival that ‘even if domestic interests, strategic culture, or commitment to a set of national ideals would dictate more benevolent or cooperative international goals, the anarchy of the international system requires that States constantly ensure that they have sufficient power to defend themselves and advance their material interests necessary for survival.’\(^\text{121}\) These factors show its unsuitability for this research – as socialization by its very nature is a set of ideals and norms that act as a sort of background unifying force on the international stage. Additionally, a key criticism of neorealism is its inability to account for specific policy decisions. Christensen and Snyder went as far to say that ‘any foreign policy and its opposite can sometimes be deduced’.\(^\text{122}\)

Neoclassical realism attempted to update realism, but continued to emphasize the importance of a nation’s relative power in determining its foreign policy, stressing it above all else.\(^\text{123}\) As Rose underlines, neoclassical realism starts from ‘the systemic level’ and follows how ‘relative power is translated and operationalized into the behavior of state actors’.\(^\text{124}\) While neoclassical realism draws from both ‘external and internal variables’, its focus is on material power and its primary influence on a state’s actions.\(^\text{125}\) In its view, other factors may influence the process but cannot directly determine a state’s behavior.\(^\text{126}\) For my research, the relative role of power is not a focus. While in some circumstances, changes in Chinese policy can be described through examining power – but others, including situations that offer no material benefits, or even prestige, would be left unexplainable.


\(^{121}\) Ibid.


\(^{124}\) Ibid., 166.

\(^{125}\) Ibid., 146, 161.

\(^{126}\) Ibid., 177
Next, Liberalism at first glance appears to be applicable - as it emphasizes domestic components in explaining international relations, and does not ‘black box’ the state to simplify analysis. This could work as a way to look at how China, a former rogue, interacts with current pariahs. However, liberalism mainly emphasizes that the type of state determines foreign policy, and focuses on the ‘unique behaviour of liberal states’ and their interests, so it would likely not apply to a state adapting to new norms.127

A key framing for a liberal approach would likely involve utilizing Putnam’s two-level game theory. Examples such as this are interesting128, but not entirely applicable. His study was one of the first to clearly show that foreign policy is a result of both domestic and international factors, but while Putnam acknowledges the complexity of international actions and places importance on both the international and domestic aspects – this theory is best applied to clear instances of bilateral international negotiation where a resultant treaty must be ratified by a domestic body of government. Echoing realism, this also focuses primarily on who has power in negotiations due to a given states domestic constraints. Even more, some argue that Putnam’s concept is best suited for economic negotiations, rather than security.129 Still, Putnam also fails to distinguish differing negotiation formats – particularly those involving issues that supersede national/international boundaries. These sorts of issues are exactly what are involved when considering ‘rogue’ states.130

Additionally, in assuming that negotiations are bilateral, Putnam fails to include other states/international actors/non-governmental actors into negotiations.131 This, in effect, removes the role of socialization as well – instead having the concept of change being relegated to the states ‘win-set’ or a concession. National interest naturally plays a role in decision-making. However, international security issues are highlighted in the cases that follow – making the concept of a national ‘win-set’ difficult to define. While the concept of including domestic concerns in international decision-making is laudable and perfectly applicable to this study,

Putnam does not fit in in these cases primarily because of its focus on a sort of balance of power between two states in a bilateral negotiation.

Finally, constructivism could have been applicable – as the role of norms, non-state actors, belief and ideology all play a key role in its understanding of the international system. Smith highlights that there are two ‘styles’ of constructivism, stemming from Wendt and Onuf. Kaarbo expands on this, showing that Wendt’s conception ‘offers little room for domestic political influences on foreign policy’ as it is mostly structural, while Onuf ‘requires examination of domestic influence because of how it sees collective social actors gaining agency’. Through this an understanding of agential elements following socially constructed rules is created.

This strong focus on ideas both helps and hinders the study of a state’s foreign policy. The stress on ideas emphasizes that ‘the perception of friends and enemies, in-groups and outgroups, fairness and justice’ define a state’s actions. This also shapes how international norms develop and are understood. However, while the focus on ideas and identity may be useful in some contexts, Barnett argues that constructivism does not allow for the strategic adaptation of an identity to an institutional context. This for example, is key to understanding why a state would say one thing in an international forum, but do something else outside of that venue. Additionally, Banchoff noted that Constructivism lacked history of cases to suitably frame and specify a state’s identity and how it effects actions.

While components of realism, liberalism, and constructivism at face value may seem to be applicable to this research, each has constraints that impact their suitability. Upon closer examination only FPA offers an approach that appreciates the role of ideas, enables both agency and structure to impact decision-making, and allows for us to examine the components of the state outside of the ‘black box’. Additionally, utilizing a FPA approach allows us to utilize

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concepts like socialization, adaptation, and situational logic in understanding why a particular policy choice was made.

**Agent and Structure**

The role of agents and structures (actors and institutions) is an important aspect both of normal international relations discourse and the school of FPA, even if the latter is seen as a predominantly ‘agent-oriented’ discipline.\(^{139}\) Agency and Structure have been called a number of things – including "parts-whole," "actor-system," and "micro-macro" – but the predominant concept remains the same.\(^{140}\) Whatever it is called, agency and structure are used as a means to explain behavior, and to provide a form of ‘conceptualization of the ontological and explanatory relationship between social actors or agents (in this case, states) and societal structures (in this case, the international system).’\(^ {141}\)

On a basic level, an agent is any person or organization that can influence a process. A structure, on the other hand, is the framework or arena under which this action is taken. Both agents and structures are necessary parts of a whole system – and should not be viewed as independent. Logically, ‘any social action is the product of both structural and agential forces, and therefore a strictly structural explanation of action … [or agential] … will necessarily be incomplete.’\(^ {142}\)

Structure, generally, refers to an understanding of the overall international system in which international interactions take place. Structures can be the system that things occur in, or they can be more non-observable concepts like the idea of an international norm. In this case, because ‘they have observable effects or are manipulable by human agents, we can, in principle, speak meaningfully about the "reality" of unobservable social structure’.\(^ {143}\) Essentially, ‘international and domestic structures generate the "rules of the game" … within which states interact.’\(^ {144}\) Structures, then, are made up of Agents or the actions of numerous

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\(^{142}\) Dessler, “What’s at Stake”, 444.

\(^{143}\) Wendt, ‘Agent-Structure’, 352.

\(^{144}\) Ibid., 360.
agents. Within structures, there are ‘two distinct kinds: external, or social, structures; and internal, or organizational, structures’.\textsuperscript{145}

Structure as a concept is more amorphous than that of an agent/actor. David Dessler has one of the best visualization for both conceptions of structure. First, in the more grounded conception of structure as essentially a physical location:

‘... structure is an environment in which action takes place. Structure means the "setting" or "context" in which action unfolds. [Here], international structure stands in relation to state action much as an office building stands in relation to the workday activities that take place within its walls: it is a fixed, enduring set of conditions that constrains and disposes, shapes and shoves behavior. Knowledge of structure allows us to explain broad patterns of behavior. ... Structure constrains and disposes behavior but does not determine it’.\textsuperscript{146}

The second conceptualization of structure that Dressler discusses is one that allows for or enables action, rather than being simply a location. In this way of thinking about structure, ‘structure consists of materials for action. Rather than being an environment or "container" in which behavior takes place, it is a medium, a means to social action.’ Here, structure is not a setting for action – rather it enables actors to address issues.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 359.
\textsuperscript{146} Dessler, "What's at Stake", 466. He uses an excellent example of an Office Building to underline the function of Structure: In an office building, we do not find people attempting to walk through walls, crawl through air-conditioning ducts, or leave via upper-story windows. Rationality dictates the use of hallways, staircases and elevators, and ground-floor exits; those who are not rational will be "selected out" of the system (they will lose either their jobs for traveling from one office to another through air-conditioning ducts or their lives for exiting from top-floor windows). ... The actual paths taken by workers will be determined by the nature of the job, the requirements of interoffice communication, and so on-considerations properly the focus of "unit-level" theory. Structure, a physical, environmental constraint on action, explains only broad patterns and persistent regularities of conduct. In such a theoretical approach, rules are, like the walls, floors, and ceilings of a building, fixed features of the environment, molding action to its dictates.
\textsuperscript{147} Dessler, "What's at Stake", 467. The Office metaphor is used here again - An office building, in this view, is not so much a setting for the activities of workers as it is an enabling structure that workers make use of to get their jobs done. Certainly, structure is a constraint on action; the insights of the positional model are not sacrificed in the scientific realist approach. Travel through air-conditioning ducts and out of upper-story windows will be sanctioned, either by the rules of the workplace or by the law of gravitation. But by configuring structure as a means to action, rather than as an environment in which action takes place, a more powerful and comprehensive treatment of the conditions of action becomes possible. Rules are not concrete girders constraining action but, instead, are media through which action becomes possible and which action itself reproduces and transforms. Action is constrained and enabled by rules; the rules are the outcome as well as the medium of that action.
The concept of an Agent is more familiar, as they are entities that are able to act and react to stimuli. Agents can be individuals, departments, organizations, or even states.\textsuperscript{148} Agents all act within the parameters of a structure and are all able:

‘1) to have a theoretical understanding (however inaccurate) of its activities, in the sense that it could supply reasons for its behavior;

2) to reflexively monitor and potentially adapt its behavior; and

3) to make decisions’\textsuperscript{149}

It is worth noting that some Agents/actors can also be considered structures. For example, a state can be a structural element, made up of a number of bureaucratic and organizational actors that act and shape the environment within the structure. One of the strengths of a FPA approach is that it incorporates ‘a more robust concept of agency into IR theory’.\textsuperscript{150}

While it is possible to look at either the structure or agent side, looking at one without the other only allows for a partial understanding of the subject matter that is being examined. Structural analysis can offer a ‘complete explanation of actual events, however, they do not explain those events directly; they only answer the question of how they are possible, of what combinations or transformations of a structure's elements are consistent with its organizing principles’.\textsuperscript{151} One can create ‘tendencies’, but such generalizations ‘risk overextending them beyond their proper explanatory domain’.\textsuperscript{152} Analysis focusing solely on the agential side also risks ignoring large issues that would only be visible from a structural point of view. A complete analysis must incorporate both agency and structure.

Agency and Structure are key conceptual components used to define and understand a nation’s foreign policy. Many scholars have explained the behavior of states using an ‘either or approach’ – ‘either domestic-level variables or the international system’.\textsuperscript{153} This, in effect, takes

\textsuperscript{148} Some scholars in FPA do not think that the state is an agential actor, only a structural one. Hudson, \textit{Foreign}, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Hudson, \textit{Foreign}, 8.
\textsuperscript{151} Wendt, ‘Agent-Structure’, 363.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
either a structural or agential point of view, rather than utilizing both. A nation’s foreign policy and behavior in the international environment cannot be viewed as being solely created domestically or internationally. To do so is an oversimplification, as both external and internal circumstances matter. While either internal or external issues may take priority in shaping behavior, both have a role to play. It is a complex interplay of influences and circumstances both from the internal and external environment that results in the policies and actions that are observed. A complete understanding, by necessity, ‘integrates both domestic and international levels of analysis’.\(^\text{154}\) While decision-makers are domestic actors, they do not ‘operate in a vacuum’.\(^\text{155}\) They are affected by both international concerns as well as institutional and political realities in their own nation.

International events and external relationships are important, but still only explain one set of influences on a state’s behavior and ‘do not explain the essential characteristics of the states themselves’.\(^\text{156}\) To take all of this into account, ‘is to understand the state as an effect of its internal relations to other states and social formations in the world political-economy, rather than purely as an un-theorized cause of international events’.\(^\text{157}\) Even if the exact linkages that connect the domestic to the international are unclear, understanding both is essential to explain a state’s action.\(^\text{158}\) Developing a ‘theoretically and empirically grounded understanding of the causally significant properties (such as powers, interests, practices) of the state as an organizational agent or entity’ that constitutes all of the potential variables of a state is a key way to comprehend the actions of a state.\(^\text{159}\) While these variables can include many different components, generally they will include ‘domestic-economic, domestic-political, international-economic, and international-political structures’.\(^\text{160}\)

International norms can be viewed as important structural elements in the international arena, as they play an organizational role.\(^\text{161}\) These rules themselves do not have to be ‘stated

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\(^{155}\) Ibid., 273.
\(^{156}\) Ibid., 272.
\(^{157}\) Ibid., 346.
\(^{158}\) Ibid., 365.
\(^{159}\) Ibid., 366.
\(^{160}\) Ibid., 357, 366. When looking specifically at the international political level fundamental organizing elements of the state system are ‘sovereignty, the balance of power, and hegemonic domination for the conceptualization of the state and explanation of state action.’

\(^{161}\) Dessler, “What’s at Stake”, 461.
explicitly’ – they can be arrived at by ‘Tacit Agreement’ and not directly negotiated in writing or by word of mouth or through ‘formal, binding agreement’.\textsuperscript{162}

There are states that do not follow these rules, and as a result are sidelined as a rogue. History shows us that, in general, states tend to ‘socialize’ to these rules, and adapt to them. For example, “the Bolsheviks in the early years of their power preached international revolution and flouted the conventions of diplomacy. They were saying, in effect, “we will not be socialized to this system.”\textsuperscript{163} They soon found that it was necessary to take part in the international system, or risk destruction. This is seen to highlight one aspect of the international system: that ‘states will display characteristics common to competitors: namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system’.\textsuperscript{164} Socialization plays the role of ensuring conformity in a group of states, but ‘some members of the group will find this repressive and [exhibit] deviant behavior’.\textsuperscript{165} When one is in breach of these norms, the international community can respond and ‘may bring deviants into line or cause them to leave the group’.\textsuperscript{166}

International events can and do create policy windows and opportunities in both the international and domestic realms. Jeff Checkel clearly showed that numerous international events – including ‘the technological challenge of [Strategic Defense Initiative]SDI, the crisis in Poland, and the failure of the Afghan intervention’ all combined to create the necessary climate for ‘a revolutionary redefinition of Soviet state interests in the international arena’.\textsuperscript{167} These changes, in this instance, says Checkel, ‘occurred through an interaction among individual/cognitive, institutional, and leadership variables’ in addition to the opportunities that were opened up by international realities.\textsuperscript{168} It is clear, then, that ‘international factors play a role in shaping state interests’, when combined with domestic factors.\textsuperscript{169}

Utilizing a framework that engages with both agential and structural elements begins to address one of the main issues in the study of foreign policy: the black box. Using these

\textsuperscript{163} Waltz, \textit{Theory},127.
\textsuperscript{164} Waltz, \textit{Theory},127.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.,76.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} Checkel, ‘Ideas’,280.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.,295,298.
methods reveal portions of what was ‘hidden’ inside the black box, but there will still be components that are unobservable. It is worth noting that since most are not privy to the discussions and meetings of the top policymakers, that evaluations of the international realm and ‘measurements of influence are indirect’.\textsuperscript{170} However, it is possible to attempt to overcome this limitation ‘by controlling for several likely alternative explanations and wherever possible supplementing [] analysis with’ interviews.\textsuperscript{171}

Over the past 30 years, there has been an ongoing debate on how to best conceptualize and utilize agency and structure in the study of international relations - particularly foreign policy analysis. The main problem that surrounds agency and structure is that some scholars approach and conceptualize the issue differently. While there is ‘increasingly widespread recognition that, instead of being antagonistic partners in a zero-sum relationship, human agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense interrelated entities, and [therefore] we cannot account fully for the one without invoking the other’.\textsuperscript{172}

There are two concurrent conceptual ways that the ‘problem’ is viewed.\textsuperscript{173} The first is discussed as a sort of ‘micro-macro linkage’ – essentially concerned with the issues of levels of analysis.\textsuperscript{174} The second looks at ‘the relationship between "agency"(or "actors") and "structure"’ trying to understand exactly how they are related, and how they interact.\textsuperscript{175} For both, the main concern is how the various parts interact with the whole, and vise-versa. Colin Wight defines the problem to be ‘an ontological problem concerned with the nature of agents and structures and their interrelationships’.\textsuperscript{176}

The main concern, therefore, is that scholars do not agree - or know how to agree - on how to approach ‘these entities and their relationship’, or which aspect has more of an influence.\textsuperscript{177} Carlsnaes describes it best: ‘In short, the creature facing us seems to remain inveterately Janus-faced, presenting an "action" side to some and a "structure" side to

\textsuperscript{170} Checkel, ‘Ideas’,296.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Both conceptions seem to overlap in how academics attempt to resolve them.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.,246.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Colin Wight,‘They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They?: Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure Problematique’, \textit{European Journal of International Relations}, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999,125.
others’.178 Roxanne Lynn Doty further defines this, claiming one side views agents as the only instigator of change (in themselves and for structures), while the other views structure to be able to ‘enable, constrain and make possible the practices of agents’.179

Dessler outlined that the problem comes from two truisms in ‘social life: first, that human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and outcomes of the social world; and second, that human agency can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the possibilities for action and influence its course’.180 These two truths also require that all explanations first ‘acknowledge and account for the powers of agents; and second, [...] recognize the causal relevance of “structural factors,” that is, the conditions of action’.181 Wight echoes these statements and says that, while agents do not act in a vacuum, ‘human beings are the only moving forces in a social world’ and without this action ‘nothing happens’.182 The issue at the heart of the ‘agent structure problem’ is in meeting both demands. As all social action is a ‘product of both structural and agential forces’, it is impossible to look at only structural or agential components and have a complete examination.183

Alexander Wendt views the Agent-structure problem to be based on two somewhat different truisms: ‘1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors’.184 Together, these ‘suggest that human agents and social structures are ... theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities’.185 His conclusion, however, is virtually the same. The main problem then, seems to be that ‘we lack a self-evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship’.186 Wendt criticizes the attempts of both world system and neorealist theorists in addressing the issue— as both try to ‘make either agents or structures into primitive

180 Dessler, ‘What’s at Stake’, 443.
181 Ibid.
183 Dessler, ‘What’s at Stake’, 444.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid., 338.
units, which leaves each equally unable to explain the properties of those units, and therefore to justify it’s theoretical and explanatory claims about state action’.187

The only useful resolution to this problem would ‘be capable of providing explanatory leverage on both’ agent and structural levels.188 Wendt claims that a solution to the problem is when researchers ‘objectif[y] social structures without recognizing that only human action instantiates, reproduces, and transforms those structures’.189 Here Wendt190 is trying to prove that rather than try to define the interrelationship of Agent and Structure, both should be treated as both entities and as part of a whole. Just as international structure comes about as a result of state agents, ‘state agents are [the] effects of the structure of the world system.’191 He refers to this as structuration theory – ‘a relational solution to the agent-structure problem that conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constituted or co-determined entities’.192 As some structural elements, especially social structure, will not have a physical form, Wendt is sure to clarify that ‘As long as they have observable effects or are manipulable by human agents, we can, in principle, speak meaningfully about the "reality" of unobservable social structure’.193

Overall, purely agential or ‘systems-level explanations are inherently limited’.194 Either way, the resultant information will only ‘define the universe of possible outcomes but [will] not explain why particular ones occur’ because the available information cannot cover all potentials. It is important to link ‘domestic and international levels of analysis’, as well both agential and structural, and that of the individual and institutional.195 Through understanding all possible levels at play, a more comprehensive picture of behavior will form. All agents are formed and influenced by their ‘institutional context’, as the institutions too are influenced by the constituent agents.196 Circumstances in the international realm can affect potential policy decisions, just as domestic realities play a role as well.197

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187 Ibid., 348-9.
188 Ibid., 349.
189 Ibid., 345.
190 Ibid. Through quoting Althusser and Wallerstein: ‘both scholars accept the concept and discourse of “totality,”20 of social wholes that are irreducible, even by composition laws, to their constituent elements. As a result, Wallerstein, like Althusser, conceptualizes "structure" in structuralist or generative terms rather than in terms of the observable relations between, or properties of, primitive individuals’.
191 Ibid,346.
193 Ibid., 352.
195 Ibid., 275-6.
196 Ibid., 277.
197 Ibid., 278, 280.
Walter Carlsnaes quoted Karl Popper to emphasize that ‘all social phenomena, and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc. of human individuals . . . we should never be satisfied by an explanation in terms of so-called ‘collectives’’.\footnote{Carlsnaes, ‘Agency’, 249.} This quote emphasizes that the best way to study something in the social sciences is not to just look at one aspect of an issue or actor in an issue, but to look at all possible realms combined. The concept of agency and structure is a somewhat ‘Janus-faced’ concept, meaning that is essentially a ‘single medallion consisting of an agency side and a structure side’.\footnote{Ibid, 257.} This is a helpful concept going forward – that agent or structure by themselves are insufficient to define international behavior. Carlsnaes further underlined this concept in quoting Giddens ‘Power...is instantiated in action’, but at the same time, an agent’s 'powers cannot be understood or explained without an analysis of social structure'.\footnote{Ibid.}

The social structure can and does affect what actions an actor will take. Robert Keohane further emphasized this concept when he said: ‘the way in which leaders of states conceptualize their situations is strongly affected by the institutions of international relations: states not only form the international system; they are also shaped by its conventions, particularly by its practices’.\footnote{Robert O. Keohane, \textit{International Institutions and State Power}, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 6; Carlsnaes, ‘Agency’, 61.} A thorough understanding of structure and agency is important in any study of foreign policy. The starting points of any research ‘cannot be treated as given, static, or equally applicable to all foreign policy actors.’\footnote{Ibid.} They must take into account all of the possible actors, structures and their interplay. Within the context of this study, an understanding of the concept of agency and structure in international relations and foreign policy analysis help define and inform my research.

In the Chinese system, there are a multitude of people, state owned companies (SOE), ministries, and other organizations that influence the overall foreign policy goals and strategies of the country. Additionally, since China is increasingly an active member of the international community, it has not developed in a void. The nature of the international system, other
players, and the role of international norms can all influence how situations are viewed and
dealt with. While the system itself may not play a central role in changing Chinese policy – the
continued interaction between the system and individual actors can drive changes in thought
and approach. Both actors in the Chinese system and the role of the international system on
China will be explored further in Chapter 3.

Sometimes realities in the external environment can open new avenues for policy
initiatives that were impossible at any earlier point in time. Understanding the role of both the
actor and the structure allow for a better interpretation of what aspects engendered a change,
and how best to analyze change. As a result of the nature of China’s political system there is a
distinct scarcity of strong evidence denoting which actor decides on what issue. This is where
Agent and Structure comes into play, because through this lens it is possible to see that Chinese
policy has changed over time – and that change isn’t solely a response to external pressures.

**Rosenau and Adaptation**

James Rosenau offers an additional lens with which to view change in Chinese foreign
policy. Armstrong’s conceptualization of socialization is one of a unidirectional outcome:
socialization will happen. Armstrong enlists the idea that when an actor is a member of a
community (or hopes to be) it internalizes and adapts to the norms that form the basis of that
society. Rosenau’s view on adaptation suggests that states will react to both the internal and
external stimuli that they face, and act how they see best at a given time. This action takes
place in both the international and national level – so that it is not fully the study of national
policy or of the international system, but that of ‘national adaptation’.

In his discussion on adaptation, Rosenau shows that when examining a political actor
within the international system, it is, in effect looking at how ‘an actor adapts to its
environment’. He argues that while ‘national systems may collapse for ... internal reasons,
they cannot persist without coping with their environment and this never-ending effort to

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204 Ibid., 987.
achieve an accommodation with the environment’. For any actor in the international system, the external world is a constantly shifting dilemma – at any point things can drastically change. So, therefore, ‘at no point can an actor assume that a permanent accommodation has been attained’. The process of adapting to this external environment, then, is never complete – but a continual process, and arguably a reversible one. Foreign policy itself is ‘all the attitudes and activities through which organized national societies seek to cope with and benefit from their international environments’ – which is, in effect, how to best adapt to their situations. Traditional approaches to analyzing foreign policy have sought explanations for behavior from the conditioning that historical reasoning and strategic considerations create. This, is a part of an adaptive perspective – that the state adapts to the current state of affairs, while still informed by its past.

In general, adaptation is seen ‘when [a government] copes or stimulates changes in the external environment of the society that contribute to keeping the essential structures of the society within acceptable limits’. Of course, some reactions will result in changes in the state’s internal structures – this Rosenau refers to as maladaptive. States, therefore, will vary between adaptive and maladaptive foreign policies as a result of ‘developments in their environments, or because of changes at home and abroad.’ These distinctions all offer an assessment for ‘how societies preserve and enhance their values by adapting to a changing international environment’. Without any change, there is no necessity to adapt – so ‘only when developments at home give rise to new needs and wants with respect to their environments, or when developments abroad give rise to potential threats to their essential structures, are societies faced with adaptive problems.’ Clearly, adaptation is a reaction and a response to change. What happens internally will impact what the state does externally – for example, during China’s CR, external relations were similarly revolutionary.

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205 Ibid.
206 Ibid., 988.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid., 367.
210 Ibid., 370.
211 Ibid., 371.
212 Ibid., 372.
213 Ibid., 377.
Rosenau describes four modes of adaptation – habitual, deliberative, spirited, and convulsive. For the purposes of this thesis, the deliberative and convulsive modes apply most to China’s responses to the external world. Deliberative adaptation is a response to an environment in which the internal realm is not changing and the external is rapidly shifting – as a result officials in a state are able to focus more specifically on adapting to external issues. Convulsive change, on the other hand, comes when both external and internal changes are rapidly occurring, and leaders must quickly address both domestic and international concerns. This type of adaptation is more focused on self-sustenance, so the concentration on internal issues may cause tensions on the international level.

Adaptation, on the whole, is an imperfect process. It is the reaction of actors within a state to the external environment. Rosenau gives a good parallel – ‘Societies are not like cats which automatically adjust their distance from a blazing fireplace in such a way as to stay warm without getting burned. Some do get too close to the fires of world politics and wither, while others remain too remote from them and freeze.’ Therefore, ‘human choice’ plays a part, and states attempt to make the correct decision. This brings about questions related to the central question of this thesis: specifically do China’s foreign policy decisions imply a reaction to external stimuli or socialization? Both involve certain levels of adaptation, but one implies additional adaptation to international norms. Socialization requires more than merely reacting to change, a certain level of internalization must occur.

### Situational Logic

The concept of situational logic as espoused by Popper is an especially useful supplement to a general foreign policy analysis framework. Situational analysis is a method to understand how actors conduct themselves in a given situation – even when their exact thought pattern is not known or knowable. To do this one must create a ‘situational model [that] consists of elements representing the actors’ decision-making environments as well as

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214 Ibid., 379-80.
215 Ibid., 381.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid., 386.
their aims and beliefs.’ This allows for an analysis to determine what actions are logical given an actor and a situation.

For this to work, the actor must be understood to be rational – which would make the action understandable, at least in the context of the situation as the actor perceived it. While, admittedly, it is not possible to ‘enter the mind of’ an actor, it is possible to understand them through their ‘actions and products of actions (tools, buildings, letters, etc.)’. When recreating the situation, it is possible to more fully understand the decisions that were made. Popper does acknowledge that humans do not always act in a rational way – but this does not contradict rationality in situational logic. Some incidents cannot be rationally explained – but in reconstructing a situation, there can be additional elements that do explain it – an actor might have ‘different interests,… different aims,… different information about the situation, [or] different skills’. All of these, built in the situational model, can help to explain why a rational actor acted somewhat irrationally.

In an analysis of Popper’s ideas, Leech provides a good outline of how to conceptualize and use the logic of the situation as shown in Box 1.

1) Agent A was in situational circumstances of type C (psychological and physical) at time T.
2) A was a rational agent at T.
3) Any rational agent, when in circumstances of kind C, will with high probability do X.
4) Therefore, A did X at T.

Box 1

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Therefore, situational logic shows us that ‘concrete actions are explained by analyzing how hypothetical actors would act in a situation like the one described in the situational model.’

Popper’s overall goal was to ‘forget the verbal fireworks and ... tackle the practical problems of our time’ through methods that are the same in all sciences – ‘trial and error, of inventing hypotheses which can be practically tested, and of submitting them to practical tests.’

In setting up a situational logic construct, ‘we need to itemize the institutions, traditions, agents, and onlookers that constitute the social setup’ so that we can attempt to view the actor’s situation. Utilizing the logic of the situation allows us to understand the world of the actor and realize the social context in which they exist. In the case study chapters, we will utilize this approach by describing the evolution of action, and interpreting what change has occurred.

**Analytical Framework**

Armstrong’s discussion on socialization provides the central foundation for this study. For Armstrong, all societies, of which the international community is one example, have a set of inherent rules that its members follow. In the international community, states that reject these rules are deemed outlaws and states seeking to change fundamentals of the international order are considered ‘revolutionary states’. When these ‘revolutionary states’ seek to join or rejoin the international society for whatever reason – they tend to adapt and use the system’s rules in a piecemeal fashion. They start outside the system, but as they enter they gradually accept the rules that they once spurned. Socialization, then, is this process of conforming in order to function more efficiently within the international society of states.

FPA allows us to see what ‘is otherwise left obscure’ in other disciplines of International Relations. Here we can examine how foreign policy is made through individuals, ‘groups, organizations, and national cultures subjectively interpreting situations’ and the influences on

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225 Hedstrom, Swedberg, and Udehn, ‘Popper’s’, 349.
226 Popper, The Open Society, 222.
228 Hudson, ‘Actor-Specific,’ 3.
this process by both domestic and external actors.\textsuperscript{229} It is the ‘study of how states, or the individuals that lead them, make foreign policy, execute foreign policy, and react to the foreign policies of other states’\textsuperscript{230} as well as ‘the study of the process, effects, causes or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific manner.’\textsuperscript{231} The ability of FPA to look into the ‘black box’ of the state and see the impact on decision-making from a multitude of actors is one of the key factors in its utility to this study.\textsuperscript{232} Additionally, its nature allows for ‘a variety of questions and levels of analysis, and a correspondingly diverse set of methodological approaches’\textsuperscript{233}

Throughout the case studies that follow, the insights derived from FPA will allow us to see the multitude of actors and influences at play in a given scenario. This is particularly important when considering the role that socialization and China’s adaptation play in each case. No action is done in a vacuum, and with the tools provided by FPA, we will be able to interpret how China has reacted to a situation in order to attempt to determine who was involved in the process.

Rosenau’s adaptation adds more nuance to this examination. In particular, his concept shows that a state, like any other type of actor, reacts to the stimuli that they face in their environment. How they act in each case is a result of what they view to be the best or most logical course of action at a given time.

Situational analysis enables us to surmise how an actor will react in a situation – given that their thoughts are not completely known. To do this, we must understand the environment and possible decisions an actor may take – allowing for a logical understanding of an actor’s response to a situation. The idea of situational logic fits comfortably with the notion of Agency and Structure because it helps us conceptualize who makes changes, and what level of analysis to focus on. Agency is about key actors, while structure represents the institutional system that the actor takes part in. Both components have a great deal of influence on the whole – an Agent influences the system that it is a part of, but is also influenced by the conditions and

\textsuperscript{233} Potter, ‘Methods’, 1.
circumstances inherent in this system. Neither is completely separate, but rather an essential component to understanding what happens.

For this thesis, understanding which actors and which institutions are most influential in the Chinese foreign policy system is essential. While the Chinese state may at times appear to be a cohesive and unitary actor, it is not. Like all states, China is full of competing actors all trying to influence policy. Some have more sway than others, and it is still a relatively hierarchical system, but there are multiple components involved. Overall, one of the key characteristics in Chinese foreign policy - most notably since the beginning of its reform period in 1979 - is that it has moved away from its earlier strict adherence to a communist ideology and pretensions to be a revolutionary actor in favor of espousing a generally more pragmatic strategy of supporting national interests.

In summary, utilizing FPA’s agent-oriented approach in tandem with Armstrong’s socialization and Rosenau’s adaptation make up the key components of this thesis in evaluating whether Chinese policy toward pariah states has changed under the influence of international norms. Armstrong clearly showed the evolution of Chinese policies from a revolutionary state to its re-entrance to international society, but if his thesis is correct China should have continued to adapt after that time and adopt even more characteristics of the international society of states. This, at its core, is the hypothesis that is examined in this dissertation using the issue of its relations with the pariah states, a concept that became more prominent through the 1990s.

In each of the three case studies in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, the aim is to find evidence of socialization and/or adaptation. In this search, we identify a key turning point in China’s interactions with the states in question that could be explained by the socialization or adaptation hypotheses. Each case study then uses situational logic and agent/structure considerations to try to explain the probable causes for the evidence of socialization and/or adaptation.

The basic proposition is this: Although as Armstrong and others have noted that China began to socialize to certain international norms beginning at some point in the 1970s in a process that has continued with newer norms like R2P, there are still important questions
about why it has maintained an appearance of ‘revolutionary solidarity’ with the three pariah states that make up the case studies Sudan, Iran, and North Korea. By ‘revolutionary solidarity’, I mean the tendency for China to continue to defend the pariah states against accusations of breaches of fundamental norms of international society. This occurred even though China in its own behavior had, in the preceding two decades, moved away from being a revolutionary state and did not accept the rejectionist approach that three pariah states seemed to be taking to some parts of the fundamental order of the international society of states.

Each of the three case study Chapters is structured in an identical fashion to facilitate analysis against the analytical framework. First, in each case I look at the nature of the pre-socialization relationship between China and the target country – the time before there was any evidence of socialization or adaptation. This allows for a baseline snapshot of the revolutionary solidarity between China and the target country against which subsequent moves by China towards international society’s view of the particular pariah state can be mapped out and evaluated. In all cases, China seems to have shown no weakening of its revolutionary solidarity with these states until the late-1990s. Next, each case is split into two-to-three phases: representing emerging signs of socialization and the consolidation of socialization. The timing of these phases correspond roughly in all three cases: with early signs of socialization appearing in roughly 2006, and further socialization becoming more evident after 2011.

Within each of these three sections (pre-socialization, emerging signs, and consolidation) there is an examination of China’s actions, the norms at play, as well as China’s values with regard to these norms. As Armstrong’s hypothesis suggests, the three distinct phases should show a progression from non-socialized, to partially-socialized, to more fully socialized.

Before moving to the case studies, Chapter Two looks at the context in which the three case-study states came to be viewed as pariah states and how that played a key role in how the international community, including China, has interacted with these states. Chapter Three provides a review of relevant scholarly literature on China’s foreign policy, actors in Chinese foreign policy, as well as the its socialization to IOs and norms.
Chapter Two

Values and Ethics in International Relations

Alongside the analytical framework developed in Chapter One, another component that deserves attention is the concept of a pariah, which has an inevitable moral quality. While Chapter One discussed the political science aspect of this dissertation, Chapter Two addresses a necessary and complementary perspective, that of the value-laden discourse that surrounds this type of state. This Chapter discusses why the term “rogue state”, and others like it, became regular references for particular types of states in the 1990s.

Rogues and pariahs, as a type of state, do not have a prominent place in most International relations theories though the concept is well understood by international ethicists. This Chapter relies primarily on the ideas of ethics in international relations as discussed by Mervyn Frost.¹ His approach perfectly frames the place that these states, and those that interact with them, play in the international realm. In its analysis of the ethical perspective this Chapter also includes the value connotations at a linguistic and semantic level associated with these terms. For the purposes of this research, however, we are more interested in political connotations rather than linguistic ones.

Ethics in International Relations

In international relations analysis from a political or social science, ethical approaches are not often considered. Mervyn Frost, in his book Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations, examines the role that ethics play in international relations, and creates a theory of international relations that includes and endorses the role of ethics. In particular, he sets out a theory that:

• Is holist in that it assumes that we, the people of the world, are already participants in two major global social practices: global civil society and the society of sovereign states.

• Analyses these from the internal point of view, from the point of view, that is, of ourselves who are participating in them.

• Makes the case that, as participants, we can only understand our own actions and those of others insofar as we understand their ethical dimensions.

• Demonstrates this with reference to a range of contemporary international problems to do with migrants, humanitarian intervention, globalization, torture and global terrorism.

• Shows that at their core these have to be understood as presenting us with ethical problems. ²

According to Frost, in participating in international relations ‘ethical considerations manifest themselves in all [...] phases of [...] involvement’. ³ Ethical considerations play a part in how international situations are viewed, how potential decisions and actions are selected, and even how actions are justified in comparison to other courses of action. Naturally, then, ethics play an important role in how we perceive the international community – as well as what actions are seen to be justifiable for a given set of circumstances. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, it is important to understand the role that ethics play in viewing these actions and how decision-making is affected by ethical considerations.

Even though ‘everyday engagement in the international domain’ as well as ‘our interactions with it’, are framed in an ethical context – it is common to think ‘that the ethical dimension of international politics is in some general sense ‘thin’’. ⁴ Ethics are generally viewed to be ‘less important in the international sphere than they are in other spheres of our lives, including those to do with domestic politics within states; families; tribes; clans and nations’. ⁵

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² Frost, Global Ethics ix.
³ Ibid., 2.
⁴ Ibid., 11.
⁵ Ibid.
Realistically, if ethics play a role in other spheres of life, the realm of international affairs would be just as affected.

When considering the role of ethics in international relations theory, a number of factors are brought up to discredit its relevance. First, critics generally comment that ‘realm of international affairs is governed by power relations’, and ethical reasoning would contribute little to decision-making. Second, they say that ‘there are many different ethical systems’, and within these many are ‘in conflict with one another’ – moreover ‘there is no agreed-upon overarching ethic that may be used to sort out the differences between them’. Finally, ethical decisions are often viewed as ‘a personal matter’ rather than something openly discussed in an international forum. Overarching all of these is a view that ethics can be different for different people – and while to a certain extent this is true, ethics are part of the conversation and logic of why and how decisions are made.

Actions on an international level are similar to those on state or local levels - in that it is a social practice made up of actors. As with other practices, actors involved implicitly 'acknowledge[...] a complex set of rules which specify, amongst other things':

- who is qualified to be a participant
- what would count as disqualifying behaviour by a participant that would result in his/her exclusion from the practice
- what range of actions are available to qualified participants
- what actions are specifically disallowed to participants within the practice
- what procedures are appropriate for changing the rules of the practice
- what is to be done to those who flout the rules

All of the actors in a given social practice inherently understand what the ‘the ethical underpinnings of the practice are – these specify what the point and purpose of the practice

6 Frost, Global Ethics,14.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.,20.
are and what values are made possible within it.'\textsuperscript{10} These ‘specify what values are so fundamental to the participants in the practice that the flouting of these rules would result in the exclusion (excommunication, expulsion, ostracization) of actors who flout them.’\textsuperscript{11} Ethics, then, play an integral role that sets the tone and rules within any system with multiple actors. This also highlights the value of socialization, as states that act against the given norms will be excluded.

Frost refers to this understanding of actors in a social practice as ‘practice theory’.\textsuperscript{12} In whatever type of social practice, all participants innately acknowledge ‘some underlying ethic which justifies the ‘rules of the game’’.\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, ‘it is this internal ethic which enables them to make sense of what they do within the practice’.\textsuperscript{14} This type of thought applies to all groups of actors that combine to work together towards one or a series of goals – be it a ‘family, a church, a sport or a corporation’.\textsuperscript{15} In joining whatever group, all of the participants join with full knowledge of what the rules and regulations of partaking in the institution are – as well as what the punishments could be in the event of a breach of conduct.

This conceptualization is applicable when considering bigger units – including the international community. For each component of the international community ‘we acknowledge a body of settled rules, norms and maxims, which together establish who is to count as a participant, what array of permissible actions are available to participants, what actions are prohibited, what countermeasures are appropriate in the face of transgressions, how new rules may come into being and so on.’\textsuperscript{16} These rules create a base set of concrete norms that help actors in international society ‘grant one another valued standing as actors of a certain kind, to act in certain permitted ways, to justify their actions in well-known terms, to criticize wrong action on the part of other actors and to defend their own actions in the light of the criticism of others’.\textsuperscript{17} The values that anchor these norms are known, understood, and defended by those actors that play a role within the system. As a result, these players ‘criticize

\textsuperscript{10} Frost, *Global Ethics*, 21.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
those who seek to undermine’ the norms and rules that define their system. Implicitly these actors also show that they too are vulnerable to ‘criticism coming from other actors in the practice’, mutually reinforcing the basis of the system in which they participate.

Most importantly, understanding what is ‘ethically appropriate conduct is a prerequisite for participation in social practices’. If an actor joins either without understanding or openly opposing the ethics or norms that form a basis for a social group, they ‘risk acting inappropriately and thus risk exclusion, ridicule, punishment and often laughter from the other participants.’ Ignoring or opposing the foundational elements of a social practice negates the benefits that stem from joining the group.

Frost also uses constitutive theory as a way to ‘brings to light that actors within a given social practice (or set of social practices) are constituted not just as actors but as ethical actors subject to ethical conditionalities’. In being subject to these conditions, all actions that they take within the social practice must follow its preconditions, or face penalties. In this case, ‘such a state would no longer be deemed a sovereign state in good standing within the international community of states. It might be termed a pariah or a rogue state’.

In certain cases, however, there can be ethically ambiguous issues where various participants within the social practice disagree on the correct course of action. Issues such as this ‘often emerge where there is a political dispute, that is, where there is a dispute about [one of the] fundamental rule(s) [of] the practice in question.’ A particular example that Frost refers to is when ‘there is a dispute about whether to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state’. In this case, the heart of the argument revolves around the concept of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. This is a political dispute, but the arguments that will be utilized by either side will be ethical in nature – about the ‘ethical appropriateness of an interventionist action’.

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19 Ibid., 26.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 27.
22 Ibid., 28.
23 Ibid., 34.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
Overall, Frost’s conception of ethics in international relations illuminates the system in which international actions and practices take place as well as the clear role that ethics play within it. To be a part of this system, actors implicitly acknowledge and understand the rules that form the basis of the system, and agree to abide by them. If a participant acts in opposition to these rules or openly flaunts them they – by their membership and participation in the group – have acknowledged that they may face penalties. Continued action against the norms of the group will further distance them from their collective social practice and cast them as a rogue or pariah state – acting against the interests of the international community. For the purpose of my research, it is from this point that Frost’s conception of ethics comes into play.

The Use of Ethics in the Study of Pariah and Rogue States

Simply by their description, ‘pariah’ and ‘rogue’ states are assigned an ethical character – a clear designation that something about these states is seen to be morally deviant from some aspect of the international order. For the most part, actors that participate in the international community ‘are generally concerned to act ethically and they take pains to point out the ethical flaws in the actions of others’. Additionally, ‘they are sensitive to and concerned about’ criticism from others about ethical issues. Frost argues that ‘that international interactions are always ethically informed, but that this aspect is often hidden and not made apparent.’ Viewing the international system in such a way allows for a clear evaluation of actors in terms of values and their adherence to norms, rather than in terms of simply power.

Rogue states, by their very name, are seen by those using the terms against them as seeking to disrupt or act outside of this order. A normative position, therefore, is used to label a state as abhorrent, as well as enable quick judgement and justification of action in dealing with the country in question. They have, at some point acted against an internationally held norm.

26 Frost, Global Ethics, 1.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
and risked ‘exclusion, ridicule, punishment’ or all of the above.\(^{30}\) A state’s standing in an international institution ‘depends on their adherence to a given set of ethical preconditions,’\(^ {31}\) and all of the case study countries in this research have been viewed as moving outside of these preconditions at some point in time. The context and conditions behind each case may not be the same, but the ethical evaluation maintains a similar strength – whether its issues lie in human rights problems, non-proliferation violations, or connections to terrorist networks. Regardless, being branded a rogue denotes wrongdoing and elicits both ethically based arguments and responses. In most cases, the rogue moniker brings with it verbal disapproval, sanctions, and urgent appeals to conform to international norms. When examining these types of states, ethics and ethical judgement are clearly an integral aspect of how each state is viewed and what options are available in dealing with them.

A key example Frost used to describe ethics’ use is with regard to the dispute on intervention in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2002. Bush and his advisors argued the case for intervention in Iraq based on ethical arguments, some explicit, others implied. These included that ‘Iraq was in breach of its Security Council commitments in’ UNSC Resolution 687 and 1441.\(^ {32}\) UNSCR 687 mandated that Iraq had to destroy all WMD and allow for verification by weapons inspectors. After Iraq did not meet the requirements of UNSCR 687, Resolution 1441 ‘spelled out the consequences that would follow a further delay in completing these requirements’.\(^ {33}\) Surrounding Bush’s actions and the UNSC resolutions are several ethical arguments that support these actions:

‘First, it rests on the requirement that states ought to keep their agreements …and especially those taken in accordance with international law. Second, the agreement itself was built on a number of ethical assumptions (many of which are embodied in international law) such as, states ought to desist from war and that entering into agreements to do this is, from an ethical point of view, a good thing. Also, underlying the assessment was the view that the UN itself is founded on a number of fundamental

\(^{30}\) Ibid. 26.
\(^{31}\) Ibid. 27-28.
\(^{32}\) Frost, Global Ethics,4.
\(^{31}\) Ibid.
ethical principles and that the agreements it puts in place are good insofar as they promote these.\textsuperscript{34}

Additionally, Bush named Iraq to the ‘axis of evil’, referred to Iraq’s ‘history of human rights abuses’ and insisted that ‘Iraq harboured and supported international terrorists and that the international community of states had an ethical duty to oppose this – with force if necessary’.\textsuperscript{35} All of these arguments are, at their core, ethically based arguments. In participating ‘in international affairs, either as an individual or as part of a collective actor ... one has to have some understanding about what is happening around one and why.’ \textsuperscript{36} The case of Iraq exemplifies this and ‘requires that one understands the ethical dimensions of what has gone before, the ethical dimensions of the present state of affairs, the ethical aspects of various policy options and the ethical dimensions of the means whose use is under consideration.’\textsuperscript{37} By understanding all of these, it is made clear what states can and cannot do, and what the potential repercussions may be if they flout the rules.

Rogue states and those that criticize and sanction them in the international community are a part of the same international social practice –whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not. For example, North Korea still plays a part in the UN and was a signatory of the NPT – and knows that its actions can be punished.\textsuperscript{38} As Frost says, ‘[u]sually these fundamental ethical commitments are valued forms of mutual recognition that can only be had through participation in the practice in question’.\textsuperscript{39} By being a part of the International Community, ignoring its rules or seeking to violently change them inherently opposes order and threatens consequences. Doing so goes against the established ‘rules of the game’ that participants inherently internalize as an effect of being part of the community.\textsuperscript{40} When actors in the ‘society of sovereign states’ act against the set of rules and norms that support the institution, the other

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Frost, Global Ethics, 4.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. 7.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} This, some say, is the reason why its 4th nuclear test and ‘satellite launch’ were so close together in Early 2016 – In launching a satellite before being punished for the nuclear test, its overall punishment would be lessened.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 23.
\end{flushleft}
states will attempt to criticize and sanction to maintain the status quo. The language of this criticism will likely be ethical in nature, as their actions have been seen to have brought instability and disorder.

When thinking about China and its relationship with these types of states, several things are clear. First, China, as an active member of the international community, and itself a former rogue, understands the normative obligations and risks of being a member of the international community. Second, as it understands what is needed, it also understands what can happen if a state breaches this agreement. As a member of the UNSC, China plays an important role in issuing judgements to those that act against these norms.

Review of the Usage of ‘Pariah’ in English and Chinese Academic Literature:

While Armstrong looked at ‘Revolutionary’ states, the concept has seemingly shifted to that of a ‘pariah’ or a ‘rogue’ in contemporary international relations. This section examines the usage of the terms in both English and Chinese academic literature. In general, both are charged with a clear meaning in both languages and usage implies deviation from an established norm. Ethics, while not directly spoken of, are clearly an element in the background – defining and giving the terms power.

I first discuss the usage of the terms in English, seeking to create the base definition for use throughout the remainder of the study. Examining how the terms are used with respect to particular nations allows me to highlight certain aspects of what each means. In the following section, I evaluate similar terminology in Chinese. There are no exact cognate terms that match the English words, but several share close similarities in meaning to the meaning of a rogue or pariah state.

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41 Frost, Global Ethics, 25.
Usage in English

When phrases like ‘pariah nation’, ‘rogue state’ or even ‘the axis of evil’ are used, they are rarely defined or elaborated. Instinctively, however, most recognize the types of countries that are being described. For the most part, these terms are all used in the popular media\(^{42}\) and, to a lesser extent, in scholarly literature to describe a general sort of state in a word, rather than to clearly delineate a concept or form a greater understanding of what exactly these nations are. Much research merely mentions that a state is viewed as a pariah, before moving onto other elements that may or may not contribute to this title. From the words themselves, there is an obvious connection with being an outcast, or being an abnormality in the international community.

Due to the lack of a clear definition, these words have been used interchangeably for nations that all fall under similar concepts. The terms themselves are utilized for how they describe and typify the state under discussion in a single word. This is part of the problem, however, in that the words sound exotic and catch the reader’s attention – but are rarely accompanied by deeper analysis. There has been very little scholarly discussion of what exactly defines a ‘pariah nation’, or what makes a state a ‘rogue state’, in comparison to simply being an ordinary country. Nations that are described in this way generally share a number of characteristics. In particular, these are seen to include:

1) The country can or has been a regional or international cause of instability, conflict, or other problems.

2) The state has been targeted at least once with a UNSC resolution, and/or sanction.

3) The state has had problems with its own people, resulting in international censure over its behavior. This is generally connected to the first or second characteristic.

4) The state is a member of the Global South, and is considered to be a developing country.

5) The state generally has an actual or a de-facto authoritarian ruler. In some circumstances, these can be a group of rulers at the very top of the governmental hierarchy.

6) Are included in the United States’ State Sponsors of Terror list.

In general, the above characteristics all describe aspects of the types of nations that are called ‘pariahs’ or ‘rogues’. As with any definition, there are exceptions to the rule, but the most important factor is that the nation’s pose a regional or international threat either to their people, their neighbors, or the world at large. These states have all taken actions that endanger international security or have the potential to do so in the future.

**Important distinctions between Pariahs, Rogues, Weak and Failed States**

As discussions have continued about these states, a few trends have become clear that define distinct differences among pariahs, rogues, weak and failed states. Occasionally, some ‘pariah’ nations are called ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states. However, in general, these states are identified this way for completely different circumstances. Weak states are nations in which the central government does not have enough power to provide basic services for their citizens. In particular, weak states are not able to completely ‘provide security to its citizens (security gap), provide basic services to its citizens (capacity gap), and have limited legitimacy among its people.’

Failed states are those whose governments have virtually lost the ability to govern. In these cases, states are generally embroiled in a seemingly unending civil war, under the power of a series of warlords, or have dangerous and insecure borders. Robert Rotberg states the following characteristics of a ‘failed state’:

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43 Certain states may have some sort of a democratic system, but have been ruled by the same individual for decades.
44 This is not always a factor, but something that is a defining factor to have a nation be both a Pariah nation and a rogue state.
“a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of [Gross Domestic Product] GDP per capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation.”

In some cases individual components of these criteria are selectively seen in weak, pariah, and rogue states. However, together they come to firmly define a failed state.

A pariah state, then, while it can have similar elements to that of a weak or failed state is seen to be unique on certain other elements. The term ‘pariah nation’ first appeared in the mid to late 1970s to describe a ‘seemingly entirely new type of international actor’. The first attempt at a definition was by Robert E. Harkavy in 1981. Here he stipulated that the new actors seem to share the following traits:

1. A rather small and weak nation, actually or potentially outnumbered by its surrounding adversaries, in an exposed position due to weak, waning, or nonexistent support from its big-power benefactor(s) to which it may be-or is-a liability.

2. A nation whose national origins and legitimacy-or present constitutional status-is widely questioned, variously on grounds of borders, the splitting of a "nation," or a conflict over self-determination, racism, ethnic minorities, etc.; that is, its present national status, within its own defined borders, is at issue.

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3. A nation with objectively poor diplomatic leverage and, therefore, not considered a good alliance partner by major powers (to the contrary, a liability). It relies primarily on the momentum or credibility of relationships formed earlier, on mere sentimentality, on fears by a big power that its (the pariahs) demise might lessen its overall credibility, or perhaps weakly on some objective factor such as the availability of strategic bases.

4. A nation with precarious, perhaps sole, sources of conventional arms supply and which is too small or underdeveloped to provide a significant portion of its arms needs through indigenous production; also, very vulnerable in a crisis to cutoffs of spare parts or to denial of weapons resupply.

5. A nation faced with adversaries having solid support from a major power, whose support it cannot match.\(^{48}\)

While this is a good initial definition, it is clearly set in a Cold War mindset. As a result, the terms and actors described have continued to evolve. This description too, accurately describes a rogue state.

It appears, then, that a main distinction between a rogue state and a pariah nation is that a rogue state has been included on at least one international watch list or state sanction list at one point in time. Much of the time, inclusion in the United States State Department’s ‘State Sponsors of Terror’ list automatically qualifies a state as a ‘rogue’.

Still, between the two types of states, the definition is still significantly muddled to create a definition in which all rogue states are pariahs, but not all pariahs are rogues. It seems that the main distinction here is not only the inclusion on sanction lists, but also a difference in how destabilizing the country is or could be to the region or the world. Nations that are destabilizing to more than their own country and region are generally classified as rogues. Along with this status generally comes international isolation.

\(^{48}\) Harkavy, ‘Pariah’,135.
Why is this distinction important?

Distinguishing exactly what these types of nations are is useful because it begins to categorize nations that can cause complicated international security issues. Being able to classify and study these types of nations as a whole will enable a greater understanding of how to interact, effectively approach and negotiate with these states.

For the most part, these states are typically nations that the West, in general, and the United States, in particular, has had little to no relationship with. These nations have been heavily sanctioned and trade has been restricted - at least with the west. However, many of the applicable sanctions have not been approved through the UNSC – rather they have been put in place by the respective Western nation’s governments. These bilateral sanctions still have impact on most issues of trade, investment, and political relations. China and India, however, generally do not enact such sanctions. As a result, China and India have taken advantage of the lack of investment and have become increasingly involved with ‘pariah’ nations.

In the years directly following the Cold War, the United States logically began to re-focus their foreign policy objectives. These objectives went from containing and dealing with one obvious threat, the USSR, to a number of smaller threats to international security which generally fell into the category of pariah or rogue. The subsequent actions undertaken by the US to deal with these actors largely involved initial attempts at diplomacy and ultimately resulted in economic sanctions when the targeted nations did not comply. As a result, many nations and western corporations were forced to divest from a number of pariah nations, either by political pressure from other countries, from corporate shareholders, or from popular pressure from their own citizens. Most of this divestment occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, right around the time that China was beginning their search for new markets and natural resources to fuel their own growing economy. For example, starting in 1998, a Canadian oil firm was lobbied by a series of NGOs, churches, and the United States government to cease operations in Sudan. By 2003, it did, and sold its 25% share of an oil concession to India’s

national oil company. In this absence of major western corporations and governments, China’s involvement with nations like Sudan increased.

It is this involvement that makes a study of the political relationship of those still involved in these nations important. Out of isolation and sanction, several countries have continued to invest support into these regimes. Understanding how, why and to what extent these relationships exist, and what actual sway they hold over these nations is extremely important. As a result of understanding these foreign policies, economic interactions, and multilateral behavior, a picture will emerge of how others have actively engaged nations that the West has blacklisted. Trends will also be revealed showing what type of engagement works, ultimately offering novel ways to interact and diffuse/prevent future issues with these ‘pariahs’.

Which nations are generally described as ‘Pariahs’?

The actual categorization of nations deemed to be pariahs can change relatively quickly, however at the moment a number of nations are viewed to be pariah nations. In particular, these nations include: Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe. The exact factors that make these nations pariahs are not entirely uniform but they all have certain similarities. All of these nations are considered to be developing nations. Additionally, all of them contribute in some way to regional or international instability. They have also all been sanctioned by one or more institutions.

First, Belarus is currently considered a pariah as a result of its crackdown against opposition party members following its 2010 election. This particular event started as a result

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of a protest that became violent, that then became an excuse for the government to ‘clean house’. Protesters viewed this election to have been altered to favor the incumbent President Alexander Lukashenko. Since his election in 1994, President Lukashenko has changed the national constitution to essentially give himself unlimited power. In addition, in the early 2000s allegations began to appear that connected Belarus to supplying arms to international terrorists. Since that time, however, Belarus’s domestic situation has been the predominant reason for censure by the UK, the US, and the EU.

Eritrea is also viewed as a pariah state as it is seen to fund terrorist groups that operate in neighboring countries. Predominantly, Eritrea has been linked with an Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabaab. As of 2011, Eritrea was seen to be involved in planning attacks in Ethiopia, funding ‘Somalia’s pro-al-Qa’eda Islamists and using British bank accounts to fund an increase in clandestine aggression across East Africa’. In 2013, Eritrea was suspected of funding Ethiopian rebels. Eritrea is an authoritarian regime that has not had elections since its independence from Ethiopia in 1993. As a result of these ties to terrorism, Eritrea has been sanctioned by the UK, the US, Canada, the EU and the UN.

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66 North Korea is virtually unanimously viewed to be an international instigator and problematic state. This is a result of its dictatorship, nuclear program, and disregarding of international law.
North Korea was taken off of the US state sponsors of terrorism list in 2008, as a component of part of a Six Party Talks (6PT) agreement. North Korea’s behavior in since then, however, including its missile and nuclear tests, aggression towards S. Korea, and ‘abduct[ing] more than 180,000 people from 12 countries’ has led to renewed calls to rename the country a state sponsor of terrorism. North Korea is still sanctioned by the US, the UK, the EU, the UN and a number of other nations.

Iran, too, is seen as a pariah as a result of its nuclear program, and its purported support of terrorist groups throughout the Middle East. Iran is seen by the US government as ‘the most active state sponsor of terrorism’. In particular, Iran is said to support Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran is currently sanctioned by the US, the UK, the EU, and the UN.

Sudan has been run by Omar al Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) since a military coup d’état in 1989. Currently even though the longstanding civil war between the north and the south has come to an end, fighting still occurs on Sudan’s border. Attacks in Darfur province also have brought international attention and sanction to the Regime. Sudan has also long been seen as a state sponsor of terrorism, stemming from its well-known harboring of Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s. Sudan has appeared to move past such an extensive support of terrorist groups, but still is sanctioned – as a number of areas are still

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unstable and can spread this instability to neighboring nations. 78 Sudan is currently sanctioned by the US, the UK, the EU and the UN. 79

Syria has been viewed as a threat to regional security since roughly 2005. 80 This sentiment has only grown stronger as a result of the Syrian civil war. The harsh military response to the Arab Spring uprising, 81 coupled with sponsorship of militant organizations in other countries, has further solidified international opinion. 82 The Washington Post, in its coverage of the Syrian civil war has said that Syria’s President Assad has ‘embraced pariah status’. 83 Syria is currently sanctioned by the US, the UK, Canada, and the EU. 84

Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe has also long been viewed as a pariah, thanks to his ‘fraudulent elections’ and usage of ‘state-organized violence’. 85 One of the often criticized programs of the Mugabe government has been his move to redistribute land – often through violence. 86 Zimbabwe is currently sanctioned by the US and Canada. 87

These examples show clearly why these nations are shunned or sanctioned by certain parts of the world and validate the criteria introduced previously. Every country that has been viewed as a pariah or a rogue has traditionally been viewed as part of the developing world. All of them exhibit some form or authoritarian rule, even among the ones that have had some form of ‘elections’. In some cases, elections are present but rarely viewed to be reliable. Each

85 Sparrow, ‘Mugabe’.
example also displays harsh tactics toward their own people – either in response to protests, or in response to unrest in some portion of their country. For many of these nations, connections to terrorism or the funding of terrorist groups are also frequently cited.

As is seen in the above examples, each state illustrates its potential as a destabilizing element to international stability – either through its support of terrorism, or through its own actions towards other nations or its own people. All of these nations have also been sanctioned by at least one country, or targeted by the UN. One unifying factor is that all of these nations have been sanctioned by the United States Government. Some, but not all are included on the US State sponsors of terrorism list, however, this list is limited.

A nuclear program or the possession of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a factor in determining if a nation’s status as a pariah or a rogue. Only when combined with a state that is already viewed as an unstable or dangerous state is this a factor. At the moment, only Iran and North Korea have continued the development of a nuclear program. If any of the states commonly seen as pariahs begin a nuclear program, it will be seen as another example of why it is a pariah, and an even greater threat to international stability. These nations are already viewed to be outcasts, but the addition of nuclear weapons makes them an even greater potential threat. The weapons all breed fear about the state’s intentions, the weapon’s possible use, or the potential fallout if the weapon is subsequently provided to a terrorist group. These are all legitimate fears based on the states’ prior actions and statements.

**What made these definitions necessary?**

As was stated earlier, Western nations have shunned pariah nations and restricted or prohibited dealings with them for some time. Most economic sanctions are imposed to coerce the target state into accepting certain conditions, or to cease unsavory actions. The efficacy of this is debated, but it does make a clear statement.

Much of the discussion and subsequent sanctions with regard to rogue states began in the early 1990s. At this time, Western nations were trying to adapt to the post-USSR world, and

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anticipate how to deal with future threats. Thinking in the United States and Western Europe began to shift towards a more ‘uncertain security environment’ one where international threats were ‘characterized by their aggressive tendencies, threatening posture toward regional neighbors, as well as the international community in general, sponsorship of international terrorism, and most notably, the pursuit of ...WMDs’.  

So, as a result of this new distinction in security threats and resultant sanctions, by the end of the 1990s political and economic relations with pariah nations was reduced in most of the major western countries. These actions, of course, were not instantaneous or homogenous. There has been, however, a significant move away from interacting with these rogue nations, leaving a relatively open field for whoever could, or wanted to get involved.

**How was China involved?**

At the same time during the 1990s, China’s economy was experiencing massive amounts of growth, requiring additional markets for their products, and, perhaps more importantly, increased access to resources to ensure their respective continued growth. With the absence of major western corporations and governments, there were opportunities for developing nations that were willing to take a risk in potentially unstable nations.

China’s role with these insecure nations is important for several reasons. As conflict and disagreement between pariah states and the international community have increased, so too has China’s involvement with these nations. This is often criticized, but regardless, it is important and an undeniable reality.

As will be exemplified in the case studies, China’s political and economic ties to countries like Sudan, Iran, and North Korea give it a type of access and bargaining power that is not available to the United States or much of Europe. When the US or individual countries have sanctioned a rogue, they themselves have had little economic interest. Past UNSC sanctions have mostly targeted industries, individuals, and bank accounts in a very selective manner.

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90 These investments were at times quite risky. For example, during the end of the Sudanese civil war, groups frequently targeted a sabotaged oil pipeline that was under construction to take oil from the south of the country to the country’s major port city Port Sudan.
As a result, when attempting to address new issues with already sanctioned states, the U.S and Europe have very little to offer, other than lifting certain sanctions or offering specific types of aid. In either case, China, already involved in the country’s economy, would have more ground to stand on. To ensure an agreement, or compromise, China could: cancel an upcoming project/infrastructure project; restrict/sanction certain industries; postpone upcoming trade deals or negotiations; or refuse to meet with government leaders. These are only an example of what options China has obtained for itself, as they are already active in the country. So, understanding China’s role then becomes a study in how to effectively engage and deal with these types of actors in the international community.

**Chinese Usage**

In addition to understanding the English utilization of the terms, it is also imperative to understand to what extent the term exists in Chinese. Undeniably, when researching Chinese foreign policy it is also important to understand both sides of the discussion through Chinese language journals and policy papers. Utilizing these types of sources can reveal key information about how the topic is perceived in China and how the Chinese government may view nations deemed ‘pariahs’ by the international community. As a result, understanding how the discussion about pariah states has developed in China helps shape this research.

In this case, with regard to ‘pariah’ or ‘rogue’ states, the closest term would be ‘Liúmángguójiā’ which literally means ‘rogue nation’. One other terms with a close meanings/similar connotation was also discovered - Páichiguójiā/bèipáichideguójiā -, meaning ‘excluded nations’.

To ensure as complete of a study as possible, I have conducted an extensive search of these terms in Chinese language academic literature. These terms seem to have been used from the mid-to-late 1990s to the present. Interestingly, there does not appear to be a discussion using this terminology prior to the 1990s. Overall, the discussion on rogue nations, has been fairly limited in Chinese and the definitions are almost exclusively tied to the concepts surrounding the English equivalent.
Rogue State (Liúmángguójíá)

‘Liúmángguójíá’ is a term generally associated with rogue nations. Overall, no concrete discussion was discovered as the term appears to be adapted directly from English and used in the same manner. It should be noted that this term also has a generally negative connotation in Chinese, and as a result may not be frequently used. However, even with the limited usage of the terminology, the discussions and usages of the term Liúmángguójíá were as expected. It is important to note, that although the term was used, it was almost always solely as a passing reference rather than a key component of the work.

The use of the term can be broken down into four main categories that show the term carries a similar meaning as the English word. In particular, a majority of the references focused on the term’s link to terrorism – or WMD in general. On top of that, if they did not specifically mention terrorism or WMD, the articles referenced a particular type of state – generally referring to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Sudan. In a number of other cases, the terms were used in reference to United States foreign policy, predominantly focusing on George W Bush and his definition of the ‘axis of evil’, and with some moving on into discussions on Obama era foreign policy. These cases generally used the meaning already established via the Bush Administration – some critiquing the use of the terminology, others exclusively examining US Policy.

It is worth noting that there was a fourth usage of Liúmángguójíá. This usage generally follows the works of Jacques Derrida, Noam Chomsky, and William Blum.91 These discussions are characterized by their criticisms of the United States’ behavior with regard to Iraq, and as a result call the US ‘the real rogue state’.92 While their discussions are interesting, it is not quite applicable to the study at hand, as US – China relations are a completely different sort of relationship – that of two economic powers.

91 In particular, with reference to Jaques Derrida’s Rogues, Noam Chomsky’s Rogue States, and William Blum’s Rogue State.
As this study seeks to understand China’s relationship with particular states - states that can contribute to international instability through terrorism or other means, it is best to first understand the various ways the term is utilized.

**Synonym for Terrorism**

One of the key components of the English definition of a rogue or pariah state hinges upon its connection, or potential connection to that of terrorists and/or terrorism. It is this connection that links these nations with potential international instability. It is not surprising that many of the references to a rogue state in Chinese also have direct or indirect links to terrorism. In general, usage of the term with reference to terrorism fell into one of two categorizations: terrorist states with regard to WMD; or broadly a general connection to terrorism and / or Islamic extremism. Of these, the vast majority tie the concept to WMD.

Of note, one article specifically stated that Liúmángguójìā were connected to a US governmental response in 2009 to hacking, banning Microsoft’s instant messaging servers from operating in ‘Cuba, Iran, Syria, Sudan and North Korea.’ 93 This, in effect, helps show that those five nations are at the core of what a pariah/rogue/Liúmáng state is.

**Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Most of the references to Liúmángguójìā in Chinese are directly related to WMD, or missiles in general. These articles range from the early 2000s to the present, showing a consistent connection to the idea that a rogue state is one that tries to illicitly obtain these WMD, already has obtained these weapons, or that concerned nations, particularly the United States, view as a potential threat when armed.

In 2000, two articles from different publications referred to US policy and its changes with regard to international missile treaties, particularly the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.

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One article linked rogue nations to terrorism and missiles to heighten domestic support of a National Missile defense plan. The other referenced US changes to the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty according to Russian documents, here briefly mentioning the potential missile/terrorist threat of a ‘rogue’. Other articles are more specific in their link, stating that rogue states and terrorist states are allied in a search for WMD. In a 2004 article on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) plan to create an international nuclear waste repository, the repository is said to be created as a measure to prevent terrorists and rogue states from accessing sources of nuclear fuel. Another reference directly states that rogue states are those with WMD, particularly Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

Other references continue to connect the idea of a terrorist state to that of a rogue. In particular, the article focuses on the Obama administration’s strategy with these types of nations – essentially preventing them from obtaining WMD, and therefore preventing any potential problems to international security.

**General Terrorism**

A number of references mention 'Liúmángguójì' in passing in connection to terrorism in general, without any elaboration. In particular, a short article in a 2002 issue of ‘Biweekly Person’, mentions Libya as a rogue state, specifically because of its ties to terrorism and Islamic extremism. In *World Economics and Politics*, an article discusses a book by Chalmers Johnson—stating that as a result of US policy, ‘rogue’ states and terrorists will attempt to attack

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98 Fang Ning, 'Large Changes in the world Situation and China’s Strategic Choice', (Shìjiègéjúdàbiàndòngyǔzhōngguózhànlüèxuǎnzé) *World Strategy* (móuliètiāndì), No. 1, 2008.
100 Southern Wind, 'Fortnightly Newsmakers,' (Shuāngzhōuxìnwénrénwù), *Southern Wind* (nánfēnghuāng), 1-15 September 2002.
the US. An article on U.S policy with regard to Israel also mentions a connection between rogue states and terrorism in passing.

All of these references to a rogue state and its connection to terrorism mention the subject in passing, without elaboration. The term seems to be viewed as a commonly understood concept that is mentioned in the same breath as terrorism, therefore adding to its definition. As seen previously, this is consistent with what is understood by the English usage of pariah or rogue.

Usage in relation to US Policy

The second most common reference to Liúmángguójìa is with relation to US foreign policy – particularly with regard to the George W. Bush administration’s ‘axis of evil’. Here the term is used almost exclusively as a reference to the English version. The word is used to reference instances in policies and speeches when the term ‘rogue’ was used to exemplify either a member of the ‘Axis’ or a state that had been identified as a state sponsor of terrorism. Some of the references that were found were critiques or critical analysis of US policies, but others simply repeated events in the news.

Critiques

A number of references to rogue states uses the term in the context of a US created and defined term. Many of these references focus on critiquing George W Bush’s War on Terror strategies on the whole, but especially his policies with regard to Iraq. Other articles tend to focus on the US’s classification of these states as a double standard fueled by ‘imperialistic self-interest’.

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included Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and those seeking WMD. However, references were still solely in passing with very little discussion.

One particular article focuses on the frustration experienced by Iranian and American scientists with sanctions and its detrimental effects on their research. This article, ‘Scientists say no to rogue states’ highlights that the term is a US designed concept with ‘no clear basis’. Other than critiquing the idea, the article offers no alternative explanation or ideas for improvement – only that the sanctions that often accompany the label limit scientific progress and transference of ideas.

Events

This term has often been used in addition to a discussion of a certain event, or set of actions. Predominantly, ‘rogue state’ has been used with direct reference to George W. Bush and his administration’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

References occur much less so with regard to Afghanistan, but there are a number of references to US policy connecting terrorism/terrorist states with rogue states with regard to Iraq. One article in ‘World and Chongqing’ used three scholars’ thoughts in a discussion regarding possible reasoning and the plausibility for going to war with Iraq. One of these scholars mentioned Iraq’s status as a rogue state as part of his argument. One other reference states that the Bush administration’s strategy towards Iraq and Afghanistan was used as testing ground for ‘spreading democracy to rogue nations.’

There does not appear to have been extensive use of the term rogue state with regard to the Obama Administration. However, one article, an ‘Evaluation of Obama’s Foreign Policy’ did speak to the administration’s views and policies regarding rogue nations. In particular,

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108 Yan Jianying, "A strategic analysis of the Bush Administration's Democratic Reform policy' (Būshízhèngfǔ"minzhūgúizáo"zhǎnlùétánxí), Journal of Henan Normal University, (hénánshīfàndàxuébào), Issue No 33, No. 4, 2006.
109 Zhao Tianyi, ‘Comments on Obama’s Foreign Policy’ (Àobāmǎwàijiāozhèngcèpíngshuō), American Studies (měiguóyǎnyì), No. 2, 2012.
in contrast to Bush, Obama was willing to have a dialogue with these ‘rogues’. Occasionally, Obama was seen to follow a similar policy line as Bush with regards to non-proliferation with Iran and North Korea. In general, the concept of a rogue is used as a US defined term, especially with regard to US policy towards a specific set of nations.

Usage to describe particular nations

The final way Liúmángguójìà is referenced in Chinese is with direct reference to a specific state or set of states. These, in general, match those outlined previously – mentioning Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Myanmar, and North Korea. Some of these nations are no longer described as rogues, but, at some point in their history have been. At times these articles reference a number of nations, at others, only referencing a particular case – but the general view that a rogue carries a negative implication is clear. A 2004 article mentions in passing Gaddafi’s dislike of his nation being called a ‘rogue’, and his desire to no longer be considered as such.110

Discussions about Myanmar too, have shown the negative connotation of the term, yet also show that it is not a static condition. As Myanmar has reformed and sought democratization, it has increasingly been seen not to be in the same category of nations that it once was.111

Here too, much of the discussion is shaped by how the US has interacted and described the situation. An article on the Bush administration’s strategy in the Journal of Henan Normal University112 describes these states as follows:

These states have a lot in common. In particular, these countries share a lack of democracy in these countries, have rulers with a history of cruelty to their own people, and have rulers that use the nation’s resources for their own benefit. They do not show any respect for international law,

110 Yu, ‘Gaddafi’.
111 Ma Yanbing, ‘The United States shows Myanmar how to pursue Democratization’, (Mǐándìànminzhǔhuádòngzhēngé, měiguózuòérmbàn), World Knowledge, (shìjiézhīshì), April 2012, 23.
112 Yan, ‘A Strategic’, 45.
threaten the use of force against its neighbors, and deliberately try to obtain [WMD]. They also are seen to support terrorism, deny basic human values, and hate everything that represents the United States. These countries include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea and Sudan.\textsuperscript{113}

Other articles critique US policy as imperialistic, but still qualify that rogue states are those seeking WMD – in particular Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.\textsuperscript{114}

It is clear that while there are different usages of the term in Chinese, the overall usage is consistent with usage in English, even if it is not as fully developed as it is in English. On the whole, rogues/liúmángguójiā, are connected with terrorism or WMD in some way, and are generally seen as potential problems. Views on the accuracy and intent of term’s usage do vary, but the same nations are referenced again and again – matching that in English.

\textbf{Excluded Nations (Páichiguójiā/bèipáichideguójiā)}

With respect to the term ‘excluded nation’, usage in Chinese is extremely limited especially in academic literature. There are multiple academic references to Páichiguójiā (excluded nations), but these references tend to refer to different concepts entirely. In particular, ‘Páichiguójiā/bèipáichideguójiāzhǔyì’ occurs more frequently, meaning either an exclusion or rejection of nationalism\textsuperscript{115}, or not ceding control of state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{116} In Economics articles there is a frequent use of ‘Páichiguójiātiáokòng’ or ‘the exclusion of state regulations’. In all, the characters in ‘Páichiguójiā’ are often found mentioned in academic literature, yet was not identified to denote a particular type of nation.

It is important to note that the phrase ‘bèipáichideguójiā’, however, is often used in popular media to denote an excluded state/pariah nation. In fact, bèipáichideguójiā is the term

\textsuperscript{113} Original Chinese: ‘Bùshí zhèngfǔ rènwéi, “liúmáng guójiā” jùyǒu xǔduō gòngtóng zhī chù, rú zhěxiē guójiā mínzhǔ kuìfá, tǒngzhì zhě cānku duidài běnguó rénmín, wéi gérén lǐ yì dàshí huìhuò guójiā zìyǔ, háo bù zuò zhǒng chóng guójì fā, dui lín jìng ài wéi wěi, xū yǔ huò qǔ dà guìmó shāshāng xíng wòqí, zhìchī kǒngbù zhǔyì, fǒu rén rénlèi de jìběn jiāzhìguànwéi, chōushì méiguó hé méiguó suǒ jīdìbiǎo de yíjiè, děng děng. Zhěxiē guójiā zhúyào bāokuò yílǎng, yīlǎkè, xǔlíyī, lǐbīyì, gūbá, chǎoxiǎn yú sūdān’

\textsuperscript{114} Fang, ‘Large Changes’.

\textsuperscript{115}Wang Yong, ‘Global economic interdependence and the Cold War(Cóngjīngjílêngzhándàoxiànghúyúcúnshēngquánzhúyì)’, Studies of International Politics(Guójìzhèngzhìyánjiū), 2002, No. 1, No.83, 2002, 98-104.

used on the Baidu Baike\textsuperscript{117} and Chinese version of Wikipedia\textsuperscript{118} entries for pariah nation. Although these are not academic sources, they are essential in that they denote a popular definition that is severely lacking in academia. This phrase is almost non-existent in academic literature, yet it appears to be used relatively frequently in popular media and news articles including forums and blogs. Only two brief references were found in academic literature. Of these, one was a translated article on Asymmetric International Law by Ulrich K. Preuss that mentioned in passing ‘an insider and outsider distinction’ in international law, whereas the outsider often found itself with exclusions – like sanctions.\textsuperscript{119} The second article, focusing on the Arab world, briefly stated that bèipáichideguójīā were often countries that had been marginalized and vulnerable.\textsuperscript{120}

While admittedly non-authoritative, it must be noted that both Baidu and Wikipedia offer the most extensive definition of a pariah state available in Chinese. In fact, both have the same definition for ‘bèipáichideguójīā’. This translated definition states that a pariah state:

> refers to the thinking of the international community (via a body such as the UN) or a collection of large countries. In particular, this term expresses that the group views a state’s activities to be in breach of social norms of international behavior. These nations may face exclusion through international isolation, sanctions, and in some extreme cases be invaded.\textsuperscript{121}

Importantly, the Wikipedia page also notes that ‘this word has not yet been formally established, but has been used for different countries at different times, often for political purposes.’\textsuperscript{122} The site also mentions nations that are currently\textsuperscript{123} and have previously\textsuperscript{124} been

\textsuperscript{117} Baidu Baike, ‘Excluded Nations,’ (Bèipáichideguójīā). Baidu Baike, (Bǎidùbǎikē), http://www.baike.com/wiki/%E8%A2%AB%E6%8E%92%E6%96%A5%E7%9A%84%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6, 2016.
\textsuperscript{118} Wikipedia, ‘Excluded Nations,’ (Bèipáichideguójīā), Wikipedia, http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%A2%AB%E6%8E%92%E6%96%A5%E7%9A%84%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6, 2016.
\textsuperscript{121} Chinese: Bèi páichì de guójīā shì bì zhè guójī shèhuì (rú liánhéguó) huòzhě yǐxiē dāguó rènwéi qí yǐxiē guójī xíngwéi de shèhuì guīfàn yǔ língwáng wéi de guójī tuōjí. Yīgè bèi páichì de guójī jiēnèng huí miánlìn guójī gūlǐ, zhícái, shènhuí bì bì yǐxiē guójī jiā yǐ qí zhèngcè huò xíngdòng bù kě jùshòu cóng’ér fādòng rúqīn. Wikipedia, ‘Excluded’.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
considered ‘pariahs’. The fact that sources like Wikipedia or Baidu have more comprehensive information than academic literature shows that there is truly a gap in both the literature and the study of pariah nations in Chinese. The definition may be made on a non-academic site— but that does not make it incorrect or any less useful.

In news articles and other media, the word is often used when specifying that a particular state used to be considered a pariah. Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, South Africa under Apartheid, Burma, and even China directly following 1989 are all mentioned to be former pariahs. Postings on forums too, use the term, referring to ‘China, North Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan’ as pariahs – ‘A backward country to be bullied into (sometimes self-inflicted) exclusion.’ Although the term, on the whole, is not used frequently, it is clear that it carries a very similar meaning as pariah state does in English.

Conclusion

The concept of a rogue or a pariah state, while relatively understudied in most academic literature, offers a clear and easily recognizable concept of a state. The word itself brings with it an undeniable ethical judgement, and makes it clear that something is out of order. The idea of this type of state existed during the Cold War, but was not a clear priority. Other issues prevailed during the Cold War, but after the fall of the Soviet Union smaller security issues moved in to fill the void.

123 Among these: Belarus, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
124 Among these: Afghanistan under the Taliban, Khmer Rouge’s Cambodia, Augusto Pinochet’s Chile, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
128 Xinhua, Chilean newspaper said China would become one of the main elements and symbols of the 21st century, (Zhǐhùàbào‘xǐwàngguó’ wùángshānshāngtǎojiānjīngjìtèqū), Xinhua, (Xīnhuà), 25 December 2000.
When examining how the term is translated and used in Chinese, it is evident that the concept behind the term is clear and utilized in the same fashion as the English word. There are several phrases that mean roughly the same thing, but it is clear that the concept and usage follows a similar thought pattern. This is important because it shows that there are no issues in translation or conceptual meaning that would impede the study. Unfortunately, all of the terms suffer a similar issue as the words in English – that of being understudied and under-theorized. While the words are used, they are only utilized in passing as a term that will be universally understood. Luckily, the concepts are the used similarly – generally describing a particular set of nations that can have connections to terrorism and are sanctioned by the international community.

Drawing on what we have seen in this and the previous Chapter, it should now be clear that we should be able to evaluate when and if China’s approach changed and hypothesize how this came about. Armstrong has shown us that China had been on a path of socialization albeit slowly, while Rosenau has built on that in a way to show that adaptation is a step-by-step process that can lead to socialization. FPA adds an important understanding of the numerous actors that can impact foreign policy – on both a domestic and international level. These steps combined with the ethical and linguistic framework outlined in this Chapter, create a vital starting point to understanding China’s approach to these cases and how they developed.

So far, Chapter One creates a theoretical construct, and Chapter Two then set a theoretical construct against an analytical problem. Chapter Three’s literature review examines how the foreign policy literature on China equips us to document the process of adaptation in Chinese relations. This is then used to inform and evaluate adaptation in China’s interaction with the three case studies in the following Chapters. There is a clear trend in the literature showing that China’s roles within the international community have become increasingly enmeshed in that system – in most cases. China has also exhibited a willingness to learn and play a larger role.

Moving forward, the linguistic and ethical understanding outlined in this Chapter will form a basis for understanding the states that are be examined in each case study, and why they are viewed in such a way by the international community. The theoretical components in
the first Chapter will then be used to create an understanding as to why and how Chinese policy has changed with regard to these states – and what this means for future policy.

The case studies look at evidence of adaptation, rather than viewing the process as a sudden instance that caused Chinese policymakers to move away from past policy doctrine. Through utilizing Armstrong’s socialization, Rosenau’s adaptation, and FPA’s ability to look at the various actors influencing foreign policy - we can begin to understand the process that China went through to get to where it is now. In such a context, we would know that we should not expect the China of the early 1990s to accept the concept of a pariah state. In the not too distant past, China had been viewed as one itself – and in turn viewed that classification as a tool of great powers or imperialists. China at that point was still learning how to interact in the international community and deal with its increasing role. What we can do is hypothesize a point in the future when their views might be expected to change.
Chapter Three
Socialization, Chinese Foreign Policy Actors, and International Norms

As the first two Chapters discuss the theoretical and ethical framing for this research, this Chapter reviews scholarly research on related issues under three broad headings: socialization, Chinese foreign policy actors, and international norms.

First, what does the literature say about China’s socialization to the international order? There are a number of key books and streams of thought on the development of Chinese foreign policy. Chapter one gave an overview of David Armstrong’s views on socialization, but there are still other works that describe this evolution, either from an explicit view of socialization, or through descriptions of changes in Chinese policy through a Foreign Policy Analysis approach. In general, though, there has been a clear evolutionary trend toward the acceptance of international norms as the phenomenon has revealed itself from the Mao era to the Deng era, as well as from the Deng Era to the more recent past.

Second, in respect to institutional actors in Chinese foreign policy, a considerable amount of scholarship has been dedicated to this subject – thanks to the work of Ezra Vogel, Doak Barnett, Carol Hamrin, and Lu Ning. Unfortunately, these studies have not been updated or revisited by many scholars. Third, we can see an exploding volume of scholarship on China’s interaction with the international community and its evolving thought on specific international norms.

A review of the state of the literature suggests that while a number of scholars have addressed the theme of China’s socialization, few appear to have surpassed or updated the work of Armstrong. Johnston has come the closest – looking at China’s evolving approach to a number of multilateral groups and agreements – but there appear to be no comparative studies

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of China’s approach towards ‘revolutionary states,’ let alone the group of ‘pariah states’ analyzed in this dissertation.³

As mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, there is an abiding scholarly controversy about the motivations of China in the conduct of its diplomacy: is it in or out? This was restated in 2017 by Evan Feigenbaum in Foreign Affairs. His conclusion is notable: China "does not seek to overturn the current international order wholesale", indeed "China is a disruptive power but not a revolutionary one".⁴ Overall, he views China as "a reluctant stakeholder--inside the tent, but still ambivalent and often dissatisfied".⁵ He also warned, as if to contradict his key conclusions, that it is up to China to choose between supporting or undermining regional and global governance.

**Chinese Socialization to International Order**

Since the foundation of the PRC, the country’s foreign policy has gone through a number of evolutions – all resulting from either internal or external stimuli. Throughout this time, though official language and rhetoric has remained somewhat similar, policies have continued to adapt. David Lampton wrote that as Chinese foreign policy moved through each of its successive leaders, it ‘witnesse[d] a gradual and important change’.⁶ Understanding and exploring this change is key. Discussions on China’s role and actions in international society show a clear trend towards acknowledgement, if not acceptance, of the rules inherent in the system. China is now, more than ever, active in world affairs. Its government and bureaucracy have evolved to interact better with the international community, ‘in terms familiar to the rest of the world’ – and that it’s ‘decisions tend towards global and professional norms’.⁷

It is not surprising that the scholarship has evolved in parallel with that evolution, so this section reviews the literature accordingly in terms of the successive ‘paramount leaders’ – Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. For the Mao and Deng periods

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³ Johnston, Social.
⁵ Ibid. 34
⁷ Ibid. 2.
especially, there are shifts within their leadership periods that were stimulated mainly by domestic drivers.\(^8\) This is understandable, given that it was during this period that China was still a ‘revolutionary’ actor and slowly entered the international community. By following a chronological treatment, this section of the Chapter provides the necessary historical background on the evolution of Chinese foreign policy for understanding China’s relations with three case study countries: Iran, Sudan and North Korea. So, this Chapter is part literature review and part essential background.

**Ideological to Increasingly Pragmatic**

For the Mao period, scholarship unsurprisingly reveals that most, if not all, decision-making power rested with him.\(^9\) For much of this time, ‘the strategic dimensions of policy [were] decided only by a very few men within the Politburo’.\(^10\) Inclusion in decision-making ‘rarely reached far down the party hierarchy’.\(^11\) The first few years after the revolution diplomatically slow, focusing on establishing ties.

In 1953, Zhou Enlai categorized the world into three groups that would create a starting point for Chinese foreign policy. In particular, these were: ‘(1) jingoistic countries [i.e. the US], (2) “status quo” countries [i.e. Britain and France], and (3) “peaceful and neutral” countries represented by the majority of newly independent countries’.\(^12\) Initially, China planned to ally with the third group, have friendly relations with the second, and ‘isolate the first’.\(^13\)

Additionally, as a ‘revolutionary state’ China wanted to exploit the ‘long range revolutionary possibilities’ of these Third World nations.\(^14\) This mentality set the stage for Chinese policy towards the developing world in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with continued


\(^{11}\) Ibid.


\(^{13}\) Ibid.

support for ‘revolutionary “national liberation” struggles’. This support, by definition, made China an outlier in the international order, seeking to disrupt it from the outside. However, while Beijing claimed to support revolutionary agendas in Africa an ‘apparent coexistence of pragmatism and realism alongside these “revolutionary aims”’ existed. China created ties with any nation that would be able to help it in some way, including nations with ideologies completely different from those of China.

Focus of the scholarship on Chinese foreign policy shifted during the CR, as the country underwent a massive domestic convulsion that directly impacted the conduct of diplomacy, with diplomats being recalled for ideological rectification and embassies reduced to skeleton staff, just enough to keep them running at a bare minimum. Instead of stressing Chinese-style revolution, ‘self-reliant development’ was promoted to its allies. During these years, foreign policy stalled around a strident and rigidly ideological framework.

It was only as the CR cooled down in the 1970s that relations began to normalize. China emerged from its internal turmoil, and re-engaged the international community in a way that it had not been able to before. China resumed and intensified a pattern of international engagement it had been developing in the 1950s, but with ground-breaking changes. For the purposes of this dissertation, the most earth shattering and fundamental event was that of the admission in 1971 of the PRC to the China seat in the UN, and the expulsion of its Civil War rival, the Republic of China. The 1970s saw China normalize diplomatic relations with the United States and other Western countries. China was rejoining the world and moving from a revolutionary state that acted against the international system to one that needed to learn how to play by the rules of that same international system. Ikenberry best described the world that China joined as one in which order was ‘built around multilateralism, alliance partnership,

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16 Armstrong, Revolutionary, 217.
17 Liu, Chinese Ambassadors, 58.
18 International support in the UN, or isolation of Taiwan.
19 Yahuda, Towards, 30.
20 Liu, Chinese Ambassadors, 112, 115-117.
21 Armstrong, Revolutionary, 221; Van Ness, ‘China’, 152.
strategic restraint, and institutional and rule-based relationships’ –through the Breton Woods institutions.22

When China joined these institutions, it was – as Johnston calls it – ‘a “novice” state’.23 This is exactly the type of state that can be socialized into a system – as it is essentially a blank slate. Logically, when an actor joins a new system or institution, it changes. Johnston says specifically that ‘actors’ behavior that prior to social interaction tended to diverge may converge as a result of this social interaction.’24 Christensen, in his book *The China Challenge* depicts exactly this – China going from an outsider with one ambassador abroad at the height of the CR to one actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy.25

Clark, like Johnston, depicts China as a ‘“revisionist’ state that had once been in ‘revolt’ against its dominant norms’ when it rejoined the system in the 1970s.26 He also questions whether the norms will shape China, or whether China will be able to shape the norms. For the most part, he sees China as ‘largely supportive of the existing order’27 but may seek to change some norms. One thing is clear though, either way ‘both China and international society can be expected to remake each other in this process’.28

Doak Barnett best describes the change from Mao to Deng as a transformation ‘from individual to collective decision-making’29. The years of Mao’s near unitary control of foreign policy made way for a time where – while Deng still would maintain the last word, especially on major issues – policy decisions became increasingly collaborative.30 Where Mao had preferred ‘“revolutionary” spontaneity and skepticism regarding institutions’, Deng Xiaoping emphasized ‘governing and modernization’.31 This trend would continue, as Deng consolidated more power than either of his next two successors Jiang or Hu.

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24 Ibid. xi.
27 Ibid. 340.
28 Ibid.
30 Bachman, ‘Structure’, 37.
During Deng’s era, China’s role in the international community continued to grow. In order to modernize, China would have to increase contact and learn from what had worked in the West. By 1984, China’s diplomatic relationships had expanded to include 130 countries.\textsuperscript{32} Although China maintained its relationships with developing nations, the overall level of support and aid decreased as China refocused its priorities. While there was an emphasis on improved international relationships and foreign knowledge\textsuperscript{33} throughout the 1980s, China’s main priority after 1978 was domestic economic reform.\textsuperscript{34} Compared to the previous period of ideologically-based relations, foreign policy during the era of reform became increasingly pragmatic and focused on supporting economic development.\textsuperscript{35}

However, directly following the events on Tiananmen Square on June 4\textsuperscript{th}, 1989, China again found itself diplomatically isolated, and in a situation similar to where it was during the CR. As Liu noted, China was censured by ‘international political boycotts and economic embargoes,’ and as in the 1960s embassies were attacked – but now it was by ‘angry Chinese students and their supporters’.\textsuperscript{36} Again viewed as an international pariah, China would begin the 1990s trying to repair its diplomatic relationships. Some of China’s previous relationships, particularly those with the developing world remained, and would grow stronger.\textsuperscript{37}

It is also in the aftermath of 1989 that Deng Xiaoping’s strongest foreign policy legacy would come to fruition – the concept of taoguang yanghui.\textsuperscript{38} The phrase is generally dated to September 1989 in an attempt to push forward with reform and ‘avoid ideological battles’.\textsuperscript{39} Its meaning is usually translated to mean ‘concealing one’s capabilities and biding one’s time’;\textsuperscript{40} essentially saying that China ‘should keep modest and prudent, not serve as others leader or a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Liu, \textit{Chinese Ambassadors}, 124.
\item Saferworld, \textit{China’s Growing}, 5.
\item Liu, \textit{Chinese Ambassadors}, 164.
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
standard bearer and not seek expansion or hegemony’.\textsuperscript{41} The first official public usage was in 1992, when speaking about the problems China faced.\textsuperscript{42} In particular, Deng said China ‘will only become a big political power if we keep a low profile and work hard for some years; and we will then have more weight in international affairs.’\textsuperscript{43}

This describes a China that works in the background rather than taking a leading position.\textsuperscript{44} At that time, China needed to prioritize its own development, so Deng called for China to play a ‘positive and expanding role’ and to ‘promote pragmatic cooperation’.\textsuperscript{45} Scholars have since become mired in controversy about the meaning of the Deng statement on the new principles of Chinese foreign policy. One interpretation has the entire formulation rendered in English as: ‘observe and analyze (developments) calmly; secure (our own) position; deal (with changes) patiently and confidently; conceal (our) capabilities and avoid the limelight; be good at keeping a low profile; never become a leader; strive to make achievements.’\textsuperscript{46}

Yet, as Greg Austin reminds us, Deng’s biographer Ezra Vogel, used the last page of his monumental work to issue a softly worded challenge “to those who mis-translate and mis-represent Deng’s famous phrase…, and then hang so much distorted analysis off the mis-translation”.\textsuperscript{47} Austin cites Vogel as translating the phrase as “avoid the limelight, never take the lead, try to accomplish something.” The difference in the translations, and the various reformulations of the phrase in Chinese, is fundamental to debates about China’s attitude to international order.

The main issue is about ‘concealment’ of capabilities which carries the clear implication of deception in order to one day emerge and mount a surprise take-over, as opposed to a softer interpretation of not boasting about power or not throwing one’s weight around. Breslin

\textsuperscript{41} Dai Bingguo, ‘Adhere to the Path of Peaceful Development’ USC US-China Institute, http://china.usc.edu/[X]Aj2ibbUlAh0AEkAAAAAM2USNhINDU1MTQvNy0YJMB1MWFYdDctNTZhdMrdjNlBmMzO3S-porph7-V7Gg0ZB7eU58cJX815s4bc30q3q3q155gyuux22yj)/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2325&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1, 6 December 2010.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. 196.
notes that taoguang yanghui ‘was also informed by the desire to allay fears in the global community about the consequences of China’s rise—not to deceive, but to explain China’s pacific nature and intentions.’\textsuperscript{48} Scholars who take a view of China as less socialized to international order prefer the “conceal” interpretation, while those more inclined to see China as firmly socialized favor the Vogel interpretation of never taking the limelight.\textsuperscript{49}

This Deng concept broadly matches China’s behavior in the post-1989 world. It was biding its time, watching what was occurring internationally and learning how to interact and act in the international community. China’s learning process for the international community began basically when it rejoined the UN system in 1971 – but it took a while for the norms and protocol to be internalized. As China developed through the 1980s and 1990s, it began to acquire the experts needed to deal with international issues. This evolution is well illustrated with respect to the law of the sea by Greenfield\textsuperscript{50} in 1979 and Austin\textsuperscript{51} in 1998. China’s process is also reflected through its ‘learning by doing’, as Morton described regarding Chinese participation in international food security efforts.\textsuperscript{52}

By 1991, scholarly consensus was that a new foreign policy had emerged, one that emphasized ‘renewed diplomatic engagement, support of IOs, cooperation in addressing international issues’ and a further support for investment and trade.\textsuperscript{53} Deng’s foreign policy, as demonstrated by his steering the country through the diplomatic fallout from Tiananmen Square, was a stable, consistent and pragmatic approach to international affairs.

Although Jiang Zemin rose to power in 1989, he had been installed by Deng and would not reach the level of influence his patron had held. Prior to his promotion, Jiang had actually expected to retire after he completed his term as Communist Party Secretary of Shanghai. As Jiang did not have the revolutionary background of either Mao or Deng, his leadership by necessity needed to be more collaborative. Jiang could make ‘drastic changes in policy’, it was

\textsuperscript{49} For example, scholars like Michael Pillsbury who take the view of a less socialized China tend to view the statement as ‘bide one’s time’. But, establishing linguistic origin is difficult, as we can’t know the exact original meaning. Michael Pillsbury, \textit{The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower}, (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 2015), 32-3.
\textsuperscript{53} Robinson, ‘Chinese Foreign’, 588.
just more difficult – and he needed allies.\textsuperscript{54} Rather than revolutionary politicians, the
generation immediately following Deng was technocratic and ruled by consensus.\textsuperscript{55} The
Tiananmen crisis had arisen because of sharp differences in leadership over the previous
decade, characterized by the battle between more experimental reformist leaders, such as Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang on the one hand and more conservative and ideologically oriented
forces, represented by Li Peng.

Jiang helped further integrate China into the international economy, and in the process,
continue to socialize it into the international community. One key policy that Jiang supported in
the late 1990s, and well into the 2000s, was the ‘go out’ policy.\textsuperscript{56} This was government
approval for the expansion of Chinese companies and their interests (mainly SOEs), to go into
the international marketplace. Here they would acquire resources, gain experience, and earn
revenue. This strategy was encouraged particularly because it would help China meet its
growing demand for oil, and allow for extra economic outputs needed to ensure domestic
stability.\textsuperscript{57}

In the early 2000s, Jiang also ushered in a revolutionary change to the Communist
Party’s membership criteria – he allowed businessmen/capitalists entry. This was revolutionary
as it went against the Party’s foundational values. Lampton argues that this move both
increased the knowledge base of the CCP and continued the professionalization trend that was
already being seen in the foreign affairs community.\textsuperscript{58} In part, this was intended to further party
legitimacy, but also to ensure the party’s relevance in the role of Chinese business abroad –
especially after they joined the WTO. This professionalism was seen in the MFA, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) – basically any ministry that had a
connection to the international community.\textsuperscript{59} In part, this was an after-effect of building the
infrastructure needed to join the WTO.\textsuperscript{60} Further integration into the international system ‘[was]
a necessary condition for the trade and investment that [would] propel Chinese economic

\textsuperscript{54} Lampton, ‘China’s Foreign’, 2.
\textsuperscript{56} ‘Zǒuchūqù’, Medeiros, China’s International Behavior, 66.
\textsuperscript{58} Lampton, ‘China’s Foreign’, 7.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. 8, 11. MOFTEC, in fact, has become one of ‘the strongest advocates’...‘for China’ s adoption of international practices’.
\textsuperscript{60} Cabestan, ‘Introduction’, 2.
growth’.

Breslin notes that this was ‘not just a ‘passive’ acceptance of existing norms and processes’- China joined the WTO for its own benefit. It was precisely this shift in membership of the party – a massive shift in political values – that underpins the subsequent socialization of China in the international system.

In addition to the internationalization of Chinese economic interests, China’s foreign policy also began to make some visible shifts throughout the mid-to-late 1990s. Heginbotham states that a new emphasis on ‘multilateralism and confidence-building measures to mitigate security concerns’ appeared, and with this also came a renewed emphasis on ‘bilateral relationships’. In part, these new elements appeared to be designed to alleviate any fears stemming from China’s growth while still ensuring that China had a key role in international institutions. With the growth of China’s economy, China’s role on the international level continued to rise commensurably.

One of the key works on Chinese socialization has been Alastair Iain Johnston’s Social States. Johnston focuses on socialization via institutional interaction and predominantly focuses on international agreements. His work examines Chinese activity from 1980-2000, and concludes ‘that there is considerable, if subtle, evidence of the socialization of Chinese diplomats, strategists, and analysts in certain counter-realpolitik norms and practices as a result of participation in these institutions’. While his research is an important building block, it predominantly focuses on the how – examining the potential ‘micro-processes’ that can cause socialization via several cases through ‘mimicking, social influence, and persuasion’.

The US policy of ‘engaging’ China is viewed as an attempt to socialize it through becoming more involved and a part of international society. This seemed to work, at least to a certain extent. It was both what China needed to continually grow its economy, and what the US wanted in fostering another potential power in the international system. Pu contends that ‘the first two decades of China’s reform era’ were characterized by China’s attempts to ‘learn

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64 Johnston, Social, xvii.
65 Ibid. xii.
66 Ibid. Xxv-xxvi
67 Johnston, Social, 2.
Throughout this time, China’s goal was to become ‘a normal state in international society’, which in part shows its willingness to be a part of existing norms as it emerges as a greater power.69

**Pragmatically evolving into a greater power**

Similarly to Jiang, Hu Jintao did not have a revolutionary background and generally made decisions through consensus.70 Hu has been seen as a pragmatist that recognized the value of understanding the international community, especially the West.71 One of the key undertakings that fell to Hu’s administration was to attempt to dispel the idea that China was in any way a threat to international stability. Policymakers saw that they had to reassure the international community that their interests were not hegemonic.

To accomplish this task, a group of Chinese elites represented by Zheng Bijian ‘began to develop and disseminate the concept of “peaceful rise”’ starting around 2002.72 It was officially introduced into the national policy dialogue at the 2003 Boao Forum, and endorsed by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao ‘as a national development strategy particularly relating to China’s link to the international arena’.73 Zheng made it clear that ‘China [would] take a brand new route of peaceful rise that [was] totally different from either Germany and Japan or the former Soviet Union. This new path [was] characterized by China’s connection with rather than detachment from the process of economic globalization’.74

In 2005, Zheng published an article in support of this ‘peaceful rise’ policy in *Foreign Affairs*.75 China’s usage of this journal as the vehicle to deliver its idea was itself an indication of the socialization of China to a global community of ideas. Zheng stressed that China would rise peacefully, not only for international stability, but also because ‘China’s development depends

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69 Ibid.
70 Lampton, ‘How China’, 78.
71 He’s held numerous Politburo study session featuring academics specializing on the west, and a number of his key aids have studied in the west. Sharif Shuja, ‘Pragmatism in Chinese Foreign Policy’, *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 289 Issue 1684, 2007, 64.
74 Ibid.
on world peace -- a peace that its development will in turn reinforce.'\textsuperscript{76} The name was eventually changed to ‘peaceful development’, as rise was viewed as ‘too strong’ a term.\textsuperscript{77} It was released as an official policy paper by the State Council in 2005, and again in 2011.\textsuperscript{78} The idea behind this argument is that because China is a major actor in a globalized world and is economically interdependent with the rest of the international community, China will not and cannot react in an aggressive manner. To do so would not only threaten China’s links to the outside world, but also China’s own internal development. China wants to underscore ‘that a rising China is a force for global stability, peace and prosperity’.\textsuperscript{79} Much of the Party’s legitimacy hinges on ensuring continued economic development, sacrificing this development would likely lead to political turmoil within China – something that the Party wants to avoid at all costs. This underscores that China views itself to be a part of the international order – and that it clearly recognizes at least some of the norms of conduct to ensure its stability. Basically, China – by being a member - has been socialized to understand appropriate actions in certain circumstances, and wants to ensure that it can continue to do so. Johnston argues that Chinese leaders have also wanted to be seen as being a more responsible actor – and as a result have become ‘more sensitive to China’s [portrayal] as an isolated obstructionist player’.\textsuperscript{80} Breslin agrees that this is more than ‘simply a desire to be liked’.\textsuperscript{81} It is a recognition that the ‘world is watching’ and that by ‘project[ing] an image of responsibility and trustworthiness’ concerns about the nature of China’s rise can be allayed.\textsuperscript{82} China wants to be an increasingly vital part of the international community. Gang argued that during the Hu period, being a more active member also meant increasingly relying on international institutions.\textsuperscript{83} Simply being a member allows for a learning process to begin.
China already was a signatory of numerous international agreements, and as a result, China was both strengthened and constrained. Gang essentially said that China can benefit from its positions of leadership – but if it goes back or seems to delay issues that were covered by an agreement, China’s public image would be damaged.84 Yet, even then – acknowledgement of these sorts of issues shows learning and a willingness to address issues. For example, Morton highlighted that throughout the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, China consistently said that the developed world should take the lion’s share of the burden dealing with pollution.85 This echoed its general policy in the early 1990s. However, Gang argued that China realized that as the largest developing world polluter they too might have to act – and instead pushed ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ as a solution.86 This shows that China knew it would be an issue if it continued to shirk all burden – and instead offered a different approach that was more suitable to their status. This clearly shows that China understood the applicable norms and utilized the international system to both their benefit and the world’s.

In his first five years, Xi Jinping quickly consolidated power and likely had the most power over decision-making since Deng Xiaoping.87 He restructured the military, putting the CMC – led by him – above the now defunct General Staff department. He created and sits on a number of Leading Small Groups, and holds titles for head of state, party and military.88 It also appears that he consolidated power in both domestic and foreign affairs, so it is likely his role in all policy decisions is greater than previous leaders and their consensus-driven decisions. Reports have also said that Xi ‘prefers centralised decision-making by a small circle of top leaders and trusted advisory staff’, which is indeed different than the previous trend towards collective decision-making by Deng, Jiang and Hu.89

One of Xi’s main ideas has been the concept of the ‘China Dream’. However, Horsburgh notes that the China Dream’s impact on foreign policy has not yet completely been determined

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84 Gang, ‘China’s Climate’, 227-8.
86 Gang, ‘China’s Climate’, 229-30.
87 Lampton, ‘How China’, 78.
as, in general, it is ‘weakly defined’. Official statements, however, have shown that Xi believes that its result ‘would benefit the world and that ‘as its strength increases, it will assume more international responsibilities’.

Recent actions, particularly in the South China Sea, have brought China’s commitment to Taoguang Yanghui into question, and concerns that a new policy has taken its place. In a visit to France, Xi Jinping referenced China as a ‘Lion that has awakened’, something some scholars view to mean that Xi has shifted China’s international approach and ‘wants China to be more assertive without appearing aggressive’. In part, this is seen to be a component of the China Dream, in ‘requesting and requiring the outside world to pay due respect to China under Xi’s leadership’.

In contrast, Christensen has noted, it is a passive China that we should worry about. If China is not interested in its international role, it may be more concerned about stability and its own energy security rather than helping the international community to resolve issues like the North Korean or Iranian nuclear crisis. China additionally does not seem to have any alternative plans to change the international order it has increasingly played a larger role in. Overall, Christensen views China to be a strong supporter of the rules that guided the 20th century international order, and a more reluctant supporter of newer norms like the R2P. There are, however, still fears that China will seek to change things. As Breslin notes, some view China’s relationship with rogue states to be ‘evidence that a China challenge to the global liberal order is already under way’.

During Xi’s time in office so far, China has continued to play a larger role in international affairs and has an even greater amount of economic interest abroad. While China’s economy is not growing as fast as it once was, the country is still expanding its role in the international

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94 Beng, ‘Xi’.
95 Christensen, China Challenge, 7.
96 Ibid. 56-7. They have created the AIIB, but this has yet to show if it is an alternative or supplementary institution.
97 Ibid. 59-60.
community. Li Keqiang and Wang Yi have both underscored that China will continue to act as ‘a responsible big country regarding major international and regional affairs and flashpoints’.99

While its role regionally has become somewhat controversial with concern to what China views to be ‘core issues’, its international role and role towards international security issues appears to have become more proactive.100 Under Xi, China has expressed an intent to “share the burden” in regional and [IO]s.101 Zhang has argued that China’s policy orientation can best be described as ensuring the ‘pursuit of China’s national interests whilst vigorously seeking to maintain a peaceful external environment’.102

Foreign Policy Actors

China’s rise is regularly portrayed as having a long term strategic plan waiting for the perfect conditions to strike, a plan that is supported by consensus in the top levels of the country’s leadership. Chinese scholars reject this view of China as a unitary state with a singular set of coherent policy objectives.103 As with all nations, the creation of foreign policy in China involves numerous actors.104 All of these actors compete to ensure that their interests are met and policies are enacted. There was a time when China could be viewed as a more cohesive system under a powerful leader, but as China has grown and continued to reform its economy, numerous other actors have gained influence in the process. Among them, policy motivations are just as varied – from a need to support governmental initiatives and goals, to promoting the expansion of Chinese influence and trade abroad.

Harris and Cheng both argue that Chinese diplomacy has moved away from a foreign policy driven by communist ideology, and has become much more pragmatic in defining its national interests.105 Much of the time, these international motivations have a basis in domestic

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100 Jian, ‘China’s’, 6.
104 Bachman, ‘Structure’, 35.
policy concerns – at least at some level. Overall, Chinese foreign policy is made through a number of actors and is ‘heavily influenced by ... the party elites, the senior party leadership, and subordinate government and military leaders and institutions.’

Armstrong would say that China’s approach towards pariah states, like any foreign policy decision, is the ‘result of complex interplay between forces’. Within the Chinese political system, actors from different factions in the government, military, and Communist Party lobby for varying goals. For example: actors affiliated with the military may want to facilitate weapons sales abroad; executives representing the state owned energy companies will continue to explore ways to expand their international portfolios; representatives for businesses will push for enhanced trade opportunities with fewer restrictions; and other government bureaucracies will try to further their own policy agendas and pet projects. There will, of course, be disagreements about which policy track will receive precedence – but in China this happens behind closed doors to ensure the appearance of unity. This makes it more difficult to deduce who exactly make the decisions that make policy.

Lampton tells us that the actors that influence Chinese foreign policy are a complex and ever increasing web of interests – with, at times, one or more interests taking priority over others. Shambaugh says that even then, these actors may sometimes promote and advocate interests that run counter to the official policies of the central government, leading to ‘diverse and contradictory emphases’. These actors’ intentions are shaped by their individual power, connections, as well as the standing of their institution. Exemplifying the diverse nature of the sources of Chinese policy, David Lampton quoted a Chinese economic official saying ‘policies are created not by the whole government, but by parts in the government. We often don’t know what the other side is doing’.

In attempting to understand Chinese foreign policy, finding a constant or coherent policy can be difficult at times. While the processes surrounding its policymaking have become

107 Armstrong, Revolutionary, 63.
112 Lampton, ‘China’s Foreign’, 1.
somewhat ‘more regularized in recent years’, it still is not completely understood. Hui notes that this is generally a result of the ‘opacity of the state’ as well as the multiple actors involved in policy-making. As a result, it is difficult to ‘propose an accurate description of the power loci where decisions are actually made and approved’. Information about policies and other reports, however, do flow up to the top leadership for approval, as only then can reports be ‘circulated outside the departments that originated them’.

Scholars have worked to create a greater understanding of how the Chinese policymaking system works, and most build upon the work of Doak Barnett from the mid-1980s. His work was then built upon by Lu Ning and Carol Lee Hamrin – greatly expanding and fine tuning what is generally conceived of as the make-up of China’s foreign policy-making process. As a result, while most of the work is historical in respect to understanding the system - there is general agreement about who is involved in the current policymaking process. The most recent overviews of the process, from a bureaucratic politics perspective – particularly Lai and Kang in 2014, and Zhang Qingming in 2016 both arrive at the same conclusions. Jakobson and Manuel in 2016 added a slight caveat – that Foreign Policy decision-making under Xi Jinping has become slightly more ‘personified’ as Xi has become ‘ultimate decision-maker’. Concrete data on modern Chinese decision-making is hard to obtain, so there are few scholars that specialize in this field. While it is difficult to look into the ‘black box’ that is Chinese decision-making, there is general consensus among scholars concerning which official groups in the state hold the decision-making power for issues of foreign policy. Through understanding these actors, we will be able to begin these cases with a strong understanding of the agential actors at hand, and fully utilize a FPA approach.

118 Ning, Dynamics; Ning, ‘Central Leadership’, 39.
119 Hamrin, ‘Elite’, 70.
120 Bachman, ‘Structure’, 37.
Overall, these actors can be categorized into three groups: top-level actors, military actors, and ministerial actors. All of these actors ‘are subordinate to the [Communist Party]’.\textsuperscript{123} Top-level actors are the most influential actors in the process of making Chinese foreign policy – the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as the top-leadership of the Party. The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) ‘retains the ultimate decision-making power’ and sits at the top of all decisions – but scholars believe the top leadership and the FALSG make most key decisions.\textsuperscript{124} In general, the top-level actors revolve around the General Secretary and a handful of other powerful officials. Military actors are considered to be either a part of the Central Military Commission (CMC), or a member/former member of the military. The largest category of actors is the governmental, or ministerial, actor. These actors include ministries such as the Foreign Ministry, State-Owned Enterprises, as well as think-tanks. Admittedly, ministerial actors can have less of an influence than would be expected – especially the MFA. Even within these groups, there are a number of factors that influence foreign policy decisions.\textsuperscript{125}

**Top-level actors**

Much of the decision-making in China – especially at the highest levels – is cloaked in secrecy. Almost nothing is known, and this has continued or even gotten worse. Scholars, however, generally believe that Xi is more influential in the decision-making process than past leaders. In the 30 years since Doak Barnett’s in-depth look at the policymaking process, the relationship individuals and institutions play within the Chinese system have changed so significantly that scholarship has not really been able to keep up.

\textsuperscript{123} Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, ‘New Foreign Policy Actors in China’, *SIPRI Policy Paper*, No. 26, 2.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. 1.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid. vii.
Leadership

Scholars are unanimous in thinking that that the top-level group of actors in Chinese foreign policy is composed of those at the top of the CCP. These actors logically represent the most influential components of the Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-making space. Mao Zedong undeniably was a major force in Chinese policy up until his death. However, Deng Xiaoping was and still remains, as Vogel reminds us, one of the most influential forces in formulating Chinese policy since the advent of the Reform period. Deng brought a very pragmatic foreign policy conceptualization to the forefront of Chinese actions, particularly through his concept of Taoguang Yanghui. Deng, while he still had significant power over foreign affairs, also began to move from ‘individual to collective decision-making’. Since Mao, Chinese leadership has continued to move away from strict ideological motivations, and into a more pragmatic mindset that allows for international cooperation.

The ‘paramount leader’ has traditionally sat at the top of the chain of command in Chinese policymaking – and still does - predominantly because, as “General Secretary-President-Commander-in-Chief”, he is the head of the Party, State, and Military at the same time. This ‘three-in-one’ leadership role is relatively new – only ‘since 1989, [has] the CCP General Secretary [] held the CMC chairmanship and – since 1993 – the PRC presidency.’ As of 2016, Xi Jinping reorganized the military, allowing for the CMC – with him as chair – to lead it, rather than the old General Staff Department. Roderick MacFarquhar described Mao and Deng as ‘Chairmen’ that ‘put their stamp on China’, while Jiang and Hu were ‘CEOs’ that kept

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126 Vogel, Deng, 575.
131 Ibid. 69-70. Although Jiang Zemin did retain his CMC post after relinquishing his state and Party positions, Hu Jintao did become CMC chairman, as did Xi Jinping when power was handed to him. (Although Hu likely had the constitution amended to ‘declar[e] that the “president conducts state affairs”.’)
'the country running.\textsuperscript{133} Xi on the other hand, is a mix of both. So, he is arguably the most powerful General Secretary since Mao, at least in terms of official positions.\textsuperscript{134}

Official policy decisions are made in the PSC, and it is there that ‘most senior political elite, headed by [the] General Secretary…… play the decisive role in establishing broad national strategy.’\textsuperscript{135} The PSC is the ‘highest foreign policy decision-making institution’.\textsuperscript{136} Not every foreign policy decision is made by the General Secretary – but as head of state they enjoy ‘maneuver room in orienting the debate’ and generally have the last word on any new policy actions.\textsuperscript{137} In general, decisions are said to be ‘reached through consensus building’ in the PSC, but the general secretary’s support is essential for ‘any major decision’.\textsuperscript{138}

**Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group\textsuperscript{139}**

In China, major decisions relating to policy are generally first discussed and decided in the applicable Leading Small Group. These groups are made up of PSC members as well as other top members of the Party\textsuperscript{140}, and act as ‘interagency coordination groups’.\textsuperscript{141} Therefore, the most powerful and influential group with regards to making decisions on foreign policy in China is the FALSG.\textsuperscript{142} Bachman notes that the group does not have an official place in the ‘bureaucratic chain of command’ as it is a ‘line organization’ – this means that ‘it is a staff organization that may provide options, coordinate policies, or otherwise serve the interests of the top leader’.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{133} Roderick MacFarquhar, ‘Leadership styles at the Party centre: From Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping’ In Sebastian Heilmann and Matthias Stepman, eds., China’s Core Executive, (Berlin: MERICS, 2016), 14.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. 17.
\textsuperscript{135} Lampton, ‘China’s Foreign’, 2.
\textsuperscript{136} Ning, ‘Central Leadership’, 42.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} This is referred to by several names, including ‘Foreign Affairs Leading Group’, ‘Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group’, and the ‘Foreign Affairs Work Leading Small Group’.
\textsuperscript{140} Not necessarily with an explicit state role.
\textsuperscript{141} Lampton, ‘China’s Foreign’, 13.
\textsuperscript{143} Bachman, ‘Structure’, 38.
Membership for each Leading Small Group (LSG) is not generally made public, but ‘official media occasionally mention leaders in connection with their LSG activities’. Historically, scholarship has identified that the FALSG is usually led by a senior member of the PSC or the Politburo, and includes high ranking officials from the International Department, and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Defense, and State Security.

From its creation in 1958 until 1998, the FALSG was headed by a member of the Standing Committee – but not necessarily the President/General Secretary. It also tended to have ‘second-echelon leaders’ representing various groups, rather than the top leadership. Starting in 1998, however, the General Secretary led the Leading Group. Since Xi Jinping became General Secretary, he has named himself Chair of around seven foreign policy, economic and national security LSGs, increasing his influence on a number of key interests. This has also generally been viewed to have increased Xi’s decision-making power.

The FALSG group itself does not officially decide policy, as its formal role is as ‘decision-making consulting body’ that then passes its thoughts up to the Standing Committee. In practice though, it is viewed to hold the final decision on a policy before passing it up to the PSC for formal approval. The body also has an important coordination role ‘between political, military and economic decision-makers’. Basically, a foreign policy decision cannot occur without the approval or acquiescence of the FALSG.

**International Department of the CCP**

As a result of its position in the CCP’s hierarchy, the actual highest authority, above the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has traditionally been the director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (ID). The Minister of Foreign Affairs

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144 Jakobson and Knox, ‘Foreign Policy Actors’, 5
147 The FALSG was initially founded with the mandate of ‘leading all aspects of foreign affairs work’. Hamrin, ‘Elite’, 110.
149 Harris, ‘Globalisation’, 7; Cabestan, ‘China’s’, 64-5.
151 Barry Naughton, ‘Shifting structures and processes in economic policy-making at the centre,’ In Sebastian Heilmann and Matthias Stepan, eds., China’s Core Executive, (Berlin: MERICS, 2016), 40, 44-5.
152 Harris, ‘Globalisation’, 8.
153 Ibid.
actually reports to the director of the International Department. The ID was initially formed in 1951 as the International Liaison Department, and focused on ‘developing and managing relations with other communist parties and third-world liberation movements but was severely weakened by the Sino-Soviet rift and the [CR]’.$^{153}$ Once Reform began in 1978, the ID took on a new role – forging relations with political parties throughout the world. Currently the ID ‘manages the CPC’s ties to virtually all foreign political parties and movements’. $^{154}$

The ID has been viewed as the Party’s ‘more direct approach to diplomacy’. $^{155}$ In the past, the ID simply ‘exchanged views and built relationships’ with various other political parties, but now they meet face-to-face with foreign government officials’. $^{156}$ One potential factor in its increase in influence could be the longevity of its last director – Wang Jiarui was the director of the ID from 2003-2015 – and FALSG since at least 2008.$^{157}$ His successor, Song Tao, also has strong foreign affairs links – he has served in various MFA roles since 2001, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs in 2011, as well as deputy head and executive deputy chief of the Foreign Affairs Office – the office that executes FALSG orders.$^{158}$ The International Department also maintains an important role dealing with North Korea (as a communist state), as well as with delicate issues and states like ‘the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, $^{159}$ ‘and, to a certain extent, [nations like] Iran and Myanmar.’$^{160}$ While much of its actions and roles are not completely clear, it is clear that the ID exerts significant influence in the outcomes of policy in the Foreign Affairs Small Group.

**Military actors**

In China, the role of military actors in the foreign policy process is every bit as secretive, if not more so, than top level. Scholars generally agree on the institutional makeup – as this information is more or less public, but few if any actual case studies exist discussing its modern

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$^{153}$ Cabestan, ‘China’s’, 83-4.  
$^{154}$ Jakobson and Knox, ‘Foreign Policy Actors’, 6-7. This includes both major US Political Parties.  
$^{156}$ Ibid.  
$^{157}$ Cabestan, ‘China’s’, 83-4.  
$^{159}$ Ibid.  
role. Essentially, information about military actors in China is fragmented because scholars simply do not know. The most recent work discussing military actors for this was in early 2016 about the new Central National Security Commission – a body that seemingly disappeared for much of 2016\(^{161}\) only to reappear in December 2016 and early 2017.\(^{162}\) Even still, apart from Xi having a greater influence, the institutional role appears to be similar.\(^{163}\)

**Central Military Commission**

Scholarly research on the makeup and role of the CMC is relatively sparse when compared to other bodies. However, most scholars agree that the military in China does not ‘not dictate policy in any one arena’, but instead offers a general consultative and collaborative role.\(^{164}\) It is important to note that on defense or security issues the military, and the CMC in particular sets the tone. When it comes down to it, the CMC’s statements on issues of security affairs ‘often come close to directives’.\(^{165}\) Basically, the CMC is not involved in the day to day development of foreign policy, but it sets the general strategic policy for China which will influence some policy outcomes.

The CMC itself is ‘an eleven-member body ... that, although chaired by the General Secretary, is comprised – exclusively – of military leaders’ that represent the various components of China’s military.\(^{166}\) Overall, the CMC is tasked to act as a ‘unified command of the Chinese armed forces’, and represents a key forum for interaction between the PLA and the General Secretary.\(^{167}\) It is the top institution in China for military and defense affairs.\(^{168}\) Its foreign policy influence was once greater but as ideology gave way to pragmatism, its influence


\(^{164}\) Counterintelligence Campaign, ‘Analysis’, xiii.

\(^{165}\) Ibid.

\(^{166}\) Cabestan, ‘China’s’, 68.


diminished, except with regard to issues that have a strong military or security component. Overall, the CMC is said to be in charge of military strategies and handling ‘contingencies and vital issues concerning defense building; as well as a ‘comprehensive coordination of military economic, political and diplomatic strategies’ in addition to being able to quickly call up the army in a time of war.\footnote{Cheung, ‘The Influence’, 68; Tang Yan, ‘Trends and theories in the system of Army Organization’ in Research in the development strategy of National Defense Modernization (Guófángxiànduìhuàfǎzhìhánlíuyèyánjú), General Staff Department, Training Department eds., (Beijing: Military Literature Publishing House, 1987), 261.}

While the overall role it plays in everyday affairs is unclear, it does have significant influence with security concerns. These issues, in particular, deal with ‘land and maritime border issues, the United States of America, Taiwan, Japan, Russia, India, non-proliferation, and space.’\footnote{Cabestan, ‘China’s’},\footnote{CNR News, ‘The Ministry of Defense Information Affairs Bureau’s official release of the English translation of the Central Military Commission Organizational Chart’ (Guófángbíxùnshìjūgǔnèǐfúbúzhòngyǎngjūnèǐgǔnèǐyuánwényímíng), CNRNews, http://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/20160115/z20160115_S21144381.shtml, 15 January 2016.} This means that in the case of North Korea the CMC would likely be more influential, and its influence would likely proportionally decrease for Iran and even more for Sudan. The CMC was, until 2016\footnote{Bachman, ‘Structure’, 40.} under the General Staff department.\footnote{You Ji, ‘Military reform: The politics of PLA reorganisation under Xi Jinping’ In Sebastian Heilmann and Matthias Stepan, eds., China’s Core Executive, (Berlin: MERICS, 2016), 46-7.} At that time, it was replaced with a CMC subordinate body, the Joint Staff Department. Xi’s reorganization of the military and the CMC has enhanced the authority of both Xi and the CMC ‘to an unprecedented level’.\footnote{Presumably by 1998. Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Analyzing Chinese Military Expenditures’, in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti (eds.), The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2003), 183.}

**People’s Liberation Army/Former Members**

The exact role that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and former PLA members play in the creation of foreign policy is harder to define. In the early years of reform, members of the PLA were permitted and encouraged to create and run enterprises. Later, the Chinese government was said to have forced all members of the PLA to divest their interest in these enterprises. However, it is not known exactly how many PLA-tied companies were closed, or if their ties were completely severed from the PLA. It is possible that these entrepreneurs
resigned or retired from the PLA and continued their business separately while taking advantage of their PLA colleagues.

Historically, the PLA has been a ‘player in Chinese foreign policymaking’.175 As the Chinese government moved away from ideology, the military has been reformed to focus on ‘professionalization of the armed forces and the distancing of military leaders from civilian decision-making’.176 Where military officers once held roles in both the PLA and the CCP, they now only hold military positions. Additionally, even though China is a signatory of numerous arms export control regimes (via the MFA), PLA connected weapons manufacturers tend to follow their own interests rather than official policy.177 This can affect what happens in all three of the case studies, particularly with regard to Sudan and reports of Chinese weapons going around an arms embargo.

The PLA does have significant interest in the direction of China’s foreign policy. Among its roles: it assists in determining the international sales of weapons,178 and is increasingly involved with China’s presence in the UN via Chinese contributions to the United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs).179 The precise role that the PLA plays in the making of policy is still relatively vague, but is likely to have expanded as the role of the military in international engagements has increased. Essentially, the PLA has developed its own sort of international relations via ‘arms transfers (acquisitions and sales), joint military exercises with an increased number of nations, and a growing participation in [PKOs].’180 The most recent assessment of the PLA’s role underscores that it also includes ‘relay[ing] information, either between the military and civilian foreign policy establishments or within the PLA’.181

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176 Ibid.
177 As seen in Sudan, and numerous other countries. Cabestan, ‘China’s’, 74-5.
178 Medeiros, China’s International Behavior, 91-2.
180 Cabestan, ‘China’s’, 74-5.
181 Jakobson and Manuel, ‘Foreign Policy’, 104.
Governmental Actors

In addition to the top-level and military actors, there are a number of other governmental actors that play a role in the policy process. These are the ministries – particularly the MFA, state-owned enterprises, as well as the predominantly government connected think tanks. Both of these actors are generally viewed to play more of an informative (think tanks) or logistic role (the MFA). The role of SOEs is harder to define – as many follow commercial, rather than political, interests.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The role of the MFA in China’s foreign relations has traditionally been viewed as a key component – but as more ministries and actors have become involved in the process, its role has declined significantly.\(^{182}\) Also, Jakobson states that as China’s Foreign policy obligations increased ‘the rank and status given to foreign policy professionals [has] \textit{diminished}."\(^{183}\) The MFA does run international meetings and forums, like the Forum for China and Africa Cooperation. At these meetings, however, the MFA currently either share responsibility or plays a secondary role. The MFA has increasingly had to share its policy portfolio with other ministries, like Commerce and Finance, as they now have important roles managing international aid, debt relief, and ‘work with Chinese corporations’ internationally.\(^{184}\) The ministries of Agriculture and Health also have roles and interests abroad that bring them into the policymaking fold.

Understandably, this distribution of authority and interests in Chinese foreign affairs over various ministries makes it quite difficult to decipher the position of a Ministry’s policy in China’s overall priorities. Some initiatives that one department issues may be only for that ministry – or may be accepted across multiple government offices.


\(^{183}\) Jakobson and Manuel, ‘Foreign Policy’, 106.

\(^{184}\) Ibid. Key example of this is that the MFA now has to share the role of developing the yearly aid plan for Africa with the Ministry of Commerce.
The Foreign Ministry, however, is currently not a key decision-maker in Chinese foreign policy. Organizationally, the MFA sits below the FALSG. The MFA’s predominant role has now become overseeing the ‘management of China’s diplomatic, bilateral, and multilateral relations’. For the most part, the MFA does not make policy, they manage its implementation. It is seen as ‘the most important … institution in the formulation and implementation of China’s foreign policy’. In general, it ‘is responsible for making statements on overarching policy and strategy, hosting foreign guests and international cooperation meetings, and, through diplomatic agencies overseas, providing the political environment required to facilitate economic exchanges’.

As China’s participation in international and regional groups has increased, the MFA’s management role has increased and diversified. In its role as a manager it also serves ‘to communicate with foreign governments and to uphold and maintain China’s international image’. The MFA’s role in international negotiation is also generally secondary. For example, when China attended the 2009 Climate Summit in Copenhagen, the MFA participated as members of the delegation – but the group was led by representatives of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).

While the MFA alone is not a key decision-maker, it is, instead, important in other ways. As the Foreign Ministry is the official representative of China abroad – they act as a medium between the values of the international system and the values of Chinese institutions. As a result, the Foreign Ministry and its officials ‘test the waters’ of the Chinese political climate, to determine what policies might be conceivable at any given time. Through this role, they bring a persistent pragmatizing influence to Chinese foreign policy. The MFA, therefore, acts as a socializing force through its pragmatism and introduction of new, potentially beneficial ideas from the international realm.

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186 Cabestan, ‘China’s’, 82.
188 Ning, ‘Central Leadership’, 50.
190 Particularly including ‘the … (UN) system, the … (WTO), the …(APEC) and the …(SCO)’. Cabestan, ‘China’s’, 82.
State-owned Enterprises:

In addition to Ministerial actors, the number of state-owned corporations that have interests and affect foreign policy has only grown since the beginning of the ‘go out’ policy. Many executives of SOE’s still outrank the Ministry officials that are supposed to monitor them, and can have more influence over policy than the ministries themselves. This further muddies who actually influences policy the most.

Most importantly for the Sudan case, it appears that for Chinese national oil companies (NOC), the government does not direct all actions. The state does own a majority share, but is not seen to decide what the company does. For the most part, commercial interest drives Chinese oil companies. Even then, subsidiary companies of these NOCs vary in interest and action.

It is important to note that China also has not had an official energy ministry since 1993. There have been several attempts to create one, but these attempts have usually filled leadership positions with current NOC executives. Energy policymaking, in essence, has been controlled by the state owned oil companies. Stemming from the increasing role of SOE’s abroad, both the Ministries of Commerce and Finance are seen to have larger roles as they have departments that assist SOEs.

Think Tanks

As China liberalized throughout the 1990s, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and other foreign policy think tanks became more informed about the world. At the same time, they were increasingly able to interact with, and introduce new ideas into the Chinese foreign policy arena. Theoretically, this would allow them to escape the strongly ideological positions of the past for more pragmatic ones. This did, in fact, lead to less ideological control over policy thinking and more open-mindedness. As the system has become

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196 Ibid.
more pragmatic ‘ministerial-level officials [have] increasingly turn to their affiliated think tanks for policy research and advice.’

Think tanks in China were initially created ‘to provide analytical support to ministries involved in the formulation of national security and foreign policy positions.’ However, during the CR, most were closed until the early years of the reform era. A majority of these think tanks sit directly below a sponsoring institution – predominantly ‘to a ministry under the State Council, the Central Committee, or the PLA’. There were no real ‘independent’ think tanks on international relations and foreign policy until relatively recently. Independent think tanks are generally viewed as external to the ‘policy process’. The way the think tanks are structured with regards to the government is viewed to be a directly vertical relationship – the sponsoring ministry requests information, and the think tank provides it to them.

One of the major constraints on research in these institutes was the impact of ideology on all of its products. For much of the 1950s to the 1980s most of the work produced by these think tanks ‘clearly reflected a Marxist-Leninist view of the world’ in order to ‘support China’s ideologically motivated foreign policy positions’. For the most part, these included ‘analysts interpret[ing] information and events through the thick lenses of Mao’s three worlds theory, the inevitability of great power war thesis, and the belief that China was a revolutionary power combating the “imperialism” and “revisionism” of the United States and the Soviet Union’. As a result, many of the resultant reports were ‘useless given the strong ideological bias, absence of analysis, and lack of quality information.’

The end of the 1980s and the 1990s brought changes to think tank methodology – particularly by moving ‘away from interpreting global events using Marxist syllogisms’ and utilizing tools and techniques from Western academia. Members of various think tanks

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198 Shambaugh, ‘Think Tanks’, 575.
200 For example: ‘The China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)...are supervised by the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively.’ Medeiros, ‘Assessing’, 282.
201 Shambaugh, ‘Think Tanks’, 579. (Shambaugh, however adds: ‘with the possible exception of the China Society for Strategy and Management’)
203 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
began to interact more with other academics and government officials from different sections of the bureaucratic system – which allowed for a foreign policy think tank community to form, and increased the competition between think tanks to provide better research.\textsuperscript{208} The types of interactions between members of these think tanks and the various parts of the government greatly improved the availability of information.

Shambaugh saw that moving away from ideology allowed for think tanks to become a more important and influential actor in informing Chinese foreign policymaking.\textsuperscript{209} By the early 2000s scholars viewed them to ‘serve as ‘as a central source for the collection and formulation of information, analysis, and intelligence on foreign policy issues.’\textsuperscript{210} Researchers were then able to address more issues, and have more public debates on potential policy pathways.\textsuperscript{211} In fact, there has potentially been a connection ‘between Chinese writings about the value of multilateralism and changes in China’s participation in Asian multilateral forums.’\textsuperscript{212} As a result, Chinese think tanks can serve as a useful and pragmatic way to address foreign policy concerns. In this way, they add their research expertise to the other actors in the production of Chinese foreign policy.

In the Xi Jinping era, however, there must be one caveat. While he has encouraged the growth of think tanks in China, many scholars view the academic climate in China to be too restrictive to engender quality research to inform the government and generally tend to stick to the official line.\textsuperscript{213} The anti-corruption campaign has also affected what Chinese scholars can and cannot say.\textsuperscript{214} As a result, it is unclear the extent that think tanks will continue to inform the policy process.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[208] Ibid. 284.
\item[209] Shambaugh, ‘Think Tanks’, 581.
\item[212] Medeiros, ‘Assessing’, 293.
\item[214] Pascal Abb, ‘China’s new think tank diplomacy’, \textit{China Analysis}, No. 184, August 2016, 7.
\end{footnotes}
Socialization and Norms

As has been seen above, China’s interaction with the international community has gone through immense change since the foundation of the PRC. Throughout this time, as Zhang and Austin note, China has ‘often been stigmatized as an irresponsible power and ‘rogue state’’. 215 Robinson concurred that China basically went ‘from near-total international isolation and pariah status back to reasonable and partially responsible participation in world affairs’. 216 To get to the place China occupies in the international community today, China had to integrate itself into the ways of international society – and internalize or at least acknowledge the norms within the system. Three of the areas that impact China’s interaction with the case studies greatly are China’s role in IOs, as well as the norms surrounding the concept of sovereignty/non-interference, and non-proliferation. For each, there has been a clear progression from an outsider to recognizing the importance of the norm.

International Organizations

When China joined the UN in 1971, it entered with basically no other international organization experience or memberships. Slowly, this would change. Throughout the 1970s, while relatively quiet in these institutions, China began to learn the rules of the new system and the proper ways to interact. Scholars have noted that its participation at this time ‘remained highly selective and symbolic’217, and was best described as ‘passive’.218 China expanded its IO involvement in 1980 by joining the remaining Bretton Woods institutions, allowing for further learning of the international norms that lie at the center of these organizations.219

219 Ibid.
By the late 1980s, China’s membership in international institutions had ballooned from just one in 1971 to 37 by 1989.\(^{220}\) Chan also notes that most of the international treaties signed by China occurred after Reform – ‘some 231 out of 266’\(^{221}\). Still, while its role was somewhat passive, membership allowed China to gain the knowledge and experts that would help professionalize the Chinese diplomatic community. In fact – simply being a part of the UN system has deepened the level of Chinese involvement ‘eroding and blurring the boundary between externally conditioned and internally determined policies’.\(^{222}\) This, according to Kim, has also been viewed as a ‘cost-effective’ way to bridge ‘China’s information knowledge, capital, and technology gaps’.\(^{223}\) Kim, on the whole, describes China’s changing approaches to move from ‘system transforming’ from 1949-1970, ‘system reforming’ in the 1970s, to ‘system-maintaining and system exploiting’ in the 1980s and 1990s.\(^{224}\) Arguably, this role of maintaining and exploiting is still key – but with the addition of a role engaging and protecting.

While 1989 dealt a blow to China’s international prestige, it would recover relatively quickly and have an increasing amount of activity in the international community in the 1990s. It would also continue to join further IGOs, and by 1996 was a member of 51.\(^{225}\) Chan updates this figure and says that by 2004, China was a member of 304 IGOs.\(^{226}\) By 1992, China would authorize and ‘for the first time sen[d] forty-seven military observers and four hundred military engineers’ for Cambodia’s PKO.\(^{227}\)

At home, China began to push the ‘go out’ strategy, increasing its interests across the world. Its role in IOs, likewise, continued to shift and bring new roles and opportunities. Realistically, becoming a larger part of the international system ‘is a necessary condition for the trade and investment that propel Chinese economic growth.’\(^{228}\) Johnston and Ross concur in

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\(^{223}\) Ibid.

\(^{224}\) Kim, ‘China’s International’, 431.

\(^{225}\) Kim, ‘UN’, 46.

\(^{226}\) Chan, *Compliance*, 74. Though Rosemary Foot says in 2000, China was a member of ‘over 50’. Foot, ‘Chinese Power’, 133.


\(^{228}\) Ikenberry, ‘The Rise’, 107.
that ‘initial Chinese involvement [...] reflected the regime’s drive to maintain legitimacy through rapid economic growth’.  

China had, by the late 1990s, joined roughly 90% of the IO/IGO’s that included the US as a member. Similarly, they had signed a similar proportion of treaties. China would continue to experience profound shifts in the level of involvement and commitment to IOs – especially the UN – and support increasingly harsh sanctions on regimes that threatened international order and even sending military peacekeepers to keep the peace in unstable regions of the world. China has increasingly transitioned its actions in IOs so as to be seen as a ‘responsible major power’, a role in which isolationist or obstructionist actions increasingly clash with. Kent notes that Chinese leaders understand that IOs are essential to China’s modernization – and as a result, Jiang Zemin even ‘acknowledged the responsibility that interdependence places on China’. Even still, as multiple scholars acknowledge, China is increasingly a part of the international community, it is often a reluctant participant. Its roles within these institutions are important in each of the case studies that follow, as the international security problems inherent in these cases are addressed in a multilateral format.

**Non-intervention/Sovereignty**

The concepts of non-interference and sovereignty were cemented as key tenants of Chinese Foreign Policy well before they re-joined international institutions. They are enshrined in the ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ codified at the Bandung conference in 1955. According to Kim, ‘of all the international norms, state sovereignty is the most basic and deeply

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231 Rather than abstain, as it had before.
233 Foot, ‘Chinese Power’, 134.
internalized principle of Chinese foreign policy’. This both empowers and constrains Chinese foreign policy. Foot notes that while at one point, many states in the international community followed a similar view of sovereignty, the post-Cold War world brought about a focus on individual sovereign rights over national sovereignty.

Carlson underscores that for years to follow, especially directly after 1989, China’s official line and rhetoric remained the same – a strong support for the sovereignty of nation-states and a refusal to support any action that would interfere in another state’s internal affairs. Johnston argues that China’s view ‘of sovereignty comes closer than most to the Westphalian ideal’. Carlson has a number of articles that track the evolution of China’s view on sovereignty and states that while the official rhetoric ‘on intervention seems to have been defined by ... rigid, unyielding principles’ China has been able to shift its position in practice. This is particularly evident in the case of Sudan, when Chinese officials clearly influenced the Sudanese government into accepting UN Peacekeepers. Official statements tend to cause ‘many observers to reach the premature conclusion that Beijing opposes all forms of intervention’, which, in general, is not the case.

Still, China has very rarely vetoed actions in the UN Security Council that threatened to infringe on a state’s sovereignty – and if it came to it, would abstain. Very strongly worded statements against the action would be issued should a vote come to pass. On numerous occasions ‘China has invoked the sovereignty norm to oppose interference in the internal affairs of states in the name of human rights’ and ‘has not been particularly supportive of the evolving practice of humanitarian intervention’. Wu Xinbo says that often China invokes this norm as a way to protect itself from potential interference – believing that if it makes a precedent by approving intervention in a sovereign nation – this could later be used against China with

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236 Kim, ‘Foreign Policy’, 21.
regard to Tibet, Xinjiang, or Taiwan.\textsuperscript{243} Kent agrees, saying that China’s view has been ‘primarily related to the protection of its own sovereignty’.\textsuperscript{244} A key example of this was Beijing’s view of the Kosovo crisis – China criticized it not only because it was not UN authorized, but also to avoid ‘a dangerous precedent’ for intervention.\textsuperscript{245}

While there were some slight changes, the overall policy and rhetoric remained similar. UN Peacekeeping Operations represent one of the strongest challenges to the norms of sovereignty and non-interference. Wu notes that Beijing, however, has participated in aspects of PKOs – but was ‘very cautious in endorsing... efforts, stressing that [they] should abide by the principles in the UN Charter regarding state sovereignty and non-interference’.\textsuperscript{246} Suzuki outlines that from its entrance into the UN until the late 1980s, China was reluctant to approve any PKOs, and viewed them to be ‘superpower “power politics”’.\textsuperscript{247}

From 1990 to 1998, China moved from ‘limited approval to tentative involvement in multilateral intervention’.\textsuperscript{248} Additionally, Chinese leaders have viewed PKOs to reinforce its desired image as an ‘increasingly responsible, benign, and cooperative’ actor in the international community.\textsuperscript{249} China would actively participate in two PKOs in the 1990s – in Cambodia and East Timor\textsuperscript{250}, and in 2003 would also send additional engineers and medical personnel from the PLA to the ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo to support that UN PKO’.\textsuperscript{251}

Beginning in the mid-2000s, however, a number of scholars have seen China’s view of sovereignty/non-interference become somewhat more flexible\textsuperscript{252}. One of the first examples of this is with regard to the US’s actions in Afghanistan after September 11. Kuhn comments that China not only did not object ‘to the arrival of US Forces in Central Asia’ – they ‘moved listening stations to the Afghanistan border’, ‘closed its borders with Afghanistan and... Pakistan’, and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Kent00} Kent, ‘China’s participation’, 144
\bibitem{Kent01} Kent, ‘China’s’, 144
\bibitem{Wu02} Wu, ‘Four Contradictions’, 60.
\bibitem{Carlson07} Carlson, ‘More’, 221.
\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid. 218.
\bibitem{Lanteigne08} Marc Lanteigne has a great overview of this case – Marc Lanteigne, ‘A Change in Perspective: China’s Engagement in the East Timor UN Peacekeeping Operations’, \textit{International Peacekeeping}, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2011, 313-327.
\bibitem{Ibid} However it is worth noting that the Chinese Ambassador to the UN in 1981 said that China would ‘adopt a flexible attitude towards UN Peacekeeping’. Kim, ‘China’s International’, 421.
\end{thebibliography}
‘encouraged Pakistan and Central Asian nations’ to help.\textsuperscript{253} Since then, China’s role in peacekeeping has only increased, especially when regional multilateral institutions support an action.\textsuperscript{254} When describing the changes in China’s role in PKOs, Lampton says it best: ‘Almost by stealth, of all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China has become the largest contributor of military observers, peacekeepers, and police to UN operations around the world.’\textsuperscript{255} From 2000 to 2010, the number of Chinese non-military peacekeepers rose ‘twenty-fold’ to over 2100.\textsuperscript{256} The case of Sudan also highlights the role of Chinese peacekeepers – as numerous non-military and even military troops have been dispatched to assist in conflict zones.

There has also been somewhat of an internal Chinese debate as to whether the policy of sovereignty and non-interference still holds. The policy is often verbally reaffirmed, even when in the end the result is not a direct conception of sovereignty or non-interference. Kim, however, does note that China ‘has been remarkably willing to compromise or shelve sovereignty-bound issues in the pursuit of national economic interests’.\textsuperscript{257} Breslin comments though, that the one area where there will not be any concessions is that of what China considers to be a ‘Core Interest’.\textsuperscript{258} Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin quote Chinese scholar Shi Yinhong to highlight that while China will not compromise on its ‘core interests’, issues that fall outside this have some flexibility.\textsuperscript{259}

**Non-Proliferation**

China’s position on non-proliferation is an interesting case that partially explains the growth of China’s role in the international community. Progress was slow – as Horsburgh described Chinese nuclear doctrine as ‘belligerent’ during the Maoist era, ‘irresponsible’ for much of the 1980s and 90s – due to ‘supposedly proliferating sensitive dual use technology to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{253} Kuhn, *How China’s*, 375.
\item \textsuperscript{256} Huang, ‘Principals’, 257.
\item \textsuperscript{257} Kim, ‘Chinese Foreign’, 298.
\item \textsuperscript{258} Breslin, ‘Global Order’, 616.
\end{itemize}
countries like Pakistan’, and ‘recently, a slow and reluctant student of global nuclear norms’.260 This mirrors what will be seen in the cases of Iran and North Korea – as China’s involvement and criticism increased over time.

Yuan notes in his evaluation of Chinese non-proliferation policy that, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, China actively supported the rights of states to create nuclear weapons and in a number of cases helped with various nuclear projects.261 At that time, Barnett viewed any prospect of an arms agreement with China to be highly unlikely – and if one were reached China would have demanded a high political cost. 262 Mao was ‘dismissive’ of any arms control processes, viewing them as institutionalized hegemony.263 It is worth noting that China has had a ‘no-first-use’ of nuclear weapons policy in place since 1964. 264 They did, however, continue nuclear testing into the 1990s.265 China in the 1980s was also viewed as ‘one of the leading suppliers of arms and dual-use technologies’ – and by 1989 was connected to weapons transfers throughout ‘the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia’.266

It was not until well after it joined the UN that China began to view arms control differently. It gradually began to realize that the tide in the international community was towards non-proliferation, so China too began signing an increasing number of arms control treaties and supporting non-proliferation.267 Additionally, Zhao noted that in trying to preserve relations with ‘the United States and other Western Countries’, in 1991 Beijing reassured the US Secretary of State that ‘China would abide by international agreements banning nuclear proliferation and the export of missile technology.’268 By the end of that year, the NPC signed off on the NPT and by 1992 it was a signatory. It also then approved the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Scholars have commented that its participation here, as well as through the CD in Geneva, has helped further professionalize and train arms control policy

263 Johnston, ‘Learning’, 34.
265 Bachman, ‘Structure’, 46.
266 Yuan, ‘Pragmatic’, 152.
268 Zhao, ‘Beijing’s’, 147.
experts in China. Garrett and Glaser, through their discussions with arms control experts in China, found that experts began to view arms control differently after China joined the NPT.

During the 1990s, Yuan identified that China also ‘signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)’, agreed to bilateral commitments with the US, and pledged to follow ‘the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)’. In addition, a number of new domestic laws were also created that restricted the export of ‘nuclear, chemical and dual-use materials’. In 1998, China worked with the US to ‘demand [] that India and Pakistan sign the CTBT and NPT and refrain from weaponization’. Pressure like this also was evident with Iran – with China agreeing to reduce weapons sales and technology transfers in order to strengthen ties with the US.

Additionally, China began to see that – from a security perspective – it was at a disadvantage if more nations had nuclear weapons. Yuan noted that China assisted with the North Korean nuclear talks, at first through trying to push alternatives to sanctions – so that the worst-case scenario – ‘a nuclearized Northeast Asia with South Korea and Japan’ developing weapons would not come to fruition.

Before the Reform era, China had signed on to only 34 international NP agreements. Chung saw that between 1979 and 1999 this ‘figure skyrocketed to 185’. Johnston and Evans comment on this – showing that participation in the arms control regime increased across the board – from 1982-1996, China’s signed treaties increased by 500%, Chinese arms control working papers went ‘from zero in 1983 to three in 1988 and to seventeen by 1994’. Similarly – arms control studies within China ‘went from zero in 1986 to ten in 1988 to over a hundred by 1994.’ Overall, in 1970 China had only signed between 10-20% of arms agreements but by 1996, this number had increased to somewhere between ‘85 to 90%’. While occurrence does

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271 Yuan, ‘Pragmatic’, 151.
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
not necessarily show compliance, it does show an understanding of the importance of these agreements.\textsuperscript{279}

Scholars agree that there are still enforcement issues and continuing controversies that remain in ‘transfers of nuclear, chemical and missile components’.\textsuperscript{280} Some of this is driven by a commercial interest in making profits internationally, as well as confusion over the extent of control the state has over military weapons manufacturers.\textsuperscript{281} Arguably, some of these issues would best be resolved with better export controls and enforcement when dealing with the state’s arms companies.\textsuperscript{282}

This all clearly shows an acceptance and accession to international norms surrounding arms control and non-proliferation. Gill remarks that Chinese policy ‘has shifted remarkably’, bringing them much closer to ‘international norms and practices’.\textsuperscript{283} Johnston and Evans argue that ‘decision-makers appear to have been more sensitive to social incentives – fear of appearing to be the pariah, the saboteur of processes that were highly legitimate for a large number of states in the system; and a desire to maximize a diffuse image as a responsible major player’.\textsuperscript{284} Swaine and Johnston also argue, that while China has been seen to breach certain non-proliferation sales agreements – the increasing professionalization of the Chinese arms control community could help address the issue, and ‘integrate China even further’ into the process.\textsuperscript{285} Vice-Foreign Minister\textsuperscript{(FM)} Zhang Yesui also has said that ‘China was in favor of “resolutely maintaining”, “continually pushing forward”, and “constantly improving”’ the international non-proliferation regime.\textsuperscript{286} Klintworth observed that China had moved away from its 1960s view of ‘disinterest and opposition’ to ‘a strong commitment to arms control and nonproliferation... by the 1990s.’\textsuperscript{287}
Conclusion

As early as 2001, scholars began to see that China had, with fits and starts, become a greater player in the international community. As a result it has become increasingly integrated into the international system and its rules. By 2004, Chinese scholars were seeing the same evolution, with Zhao concluded that as the country has become more integrated, it has taken a more role with multilateral and intergovernmental institutions, and further attempted to ‘establish an image as an independent and responsible partner in the community of nations’.

Throughout this time, it is clear from the literature that there has been a sort of socialization process that evolved throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China. Mao’s China was a clear outsider to international order – supporting revolutionaries abroad, and for much of its history allied with neither the US nor the USSR. Once China rejoined the broader international community in the 1970s, it joined as a pariah coming into society. The literature then shows that China in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s joined an increasing number of international institutions and agreements. In terms of being a party to and playing an increasing role in international institutions – China by the early 2000s was roughly equivalent to any other member of the P5. If Armstrong’s conception of socialization is correct, being a member of these institutions would result in gradually accepting the norms at the centers of these institutions and internalizing them.

Most studies on Chinese socialization focus on earlier periods, generally ending around the time of China’s WTO accession. The three case studies of China’s relations with pariah states in this dissertation test the limits of this socialization and possibly expose some of the institutional drivers of that process inside China, not least the increasing professionalization of the foreign policy establishment. One thing, however, is clear – there has been large scale transformation of Chinese foreign policy since Deng Xiaoping stepped aside in 1992. That

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288 Lampton, ‘China’s Foreign’, 36.
289 Zhao, ‘Beijing’s’, 145.
290 In particular Johnston’s work in Social States, as well as numerous studies on China’s joining non-proliferation groups and treaties.
degree of change is predictable given China’s influence and power. This research, through the case studies of Sudan, Iran and North Korea, has sought to illuminate the ethical character of these radical foreign policy changes. Has there been a transformation of the values of Chinese foreign policy (i.e. has it been socialized) or are we seeing something different, a more piecemeal and fragmented, albeit pragmatic, interest-based evolution that does not necessarily reflect any socialization to a different set of foreign policy values?

Key reference points for this analysis include an understanding of the actors involved in Chinese foreign policy, knowing which actors have the greatest influence, and tracing (to the extent possible) how their actions help shape it. FPA gives us the tools to understand these changes. While it is hard to look inside the ‘black box’ of Chinese foreign policy, the makeup and institutional interests of the many players within the Chinese Foreign Policy community now seem to be far more visible than in the Mao period. Within this community, power and decision-making is still, and perhaps increasingly so under Xi, limited to a handful of individuals. In particular, the most prominent actors are top Communist Party leadership and it’s FALSG. There are, however, lapses when issues fall through the cracks, and actors that are normally not as influential affect the process.291

Within each case study, there are several international norms at play (such as those involving terrorism and WMD) and China’s response to each of them has shown their ability to change and adapt to new situations. On some of these issues, China’s policies have more obviously shifted – as with nuclear non-proliferation and participation in IGOs. There are clear changes even to norms like sovereignty and non-interference. The case studies in subsequent Chapters allow some insight into the degree of adaptation to these norms and the ethical foundation for it.

Iran, Sudan, and North Korea are all very distinct cases. The focus on each case is different, and rarely are all three viewed in the same light by China. All three, however, occupy or have occupied a similar space in the international community – that of an outcast – a ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’. As a result, understanding how China’s policies, actions and values have shifted

291 Or simply ignore the process and push things ahead – for instance NORINCO weapons sales that the government didn’t explicitly know about until an external report informed them – or sales of dual use materials to North Korea – which even the US government saw as being done without the central government’s approval.
when dealing with pariah states is important to understanding Chinese foreign policy as a whole.
Chapter Four
Sudan: China’s Foreign Policy Experimentation

Of all of the case studies, China’s relationship with Sudan is perhaps the strongest example of adaptation and socialization. Chinese interaction with Sudan has shown constant evolution from an initial “strictly business” approach, based on China’s previously unshakeable position of non-interference in domestic affairs, to sustained involvement in multilateral efforts to resolve the civil war, a position which moved China more deeply into the international community of states. Although the Chinese government tends to tie the origins of the nation’s diplomatic ties to the period shortly after Sudan gained independence from Great Britain, the bonds throughout this time were relatively superficial. Sudan did receive modest weaponry from China between 1967 and 1976 (including tanks and fighter jets), and about 200 Sudanese military personnel trained in China.\(^1\) The Sudanese Communist Party, influential in Sudanese politics prior to 1971 also received Chinese attention and in 1967 the party split into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions.\(^2\) It was not until after Omar al-Bashir took power in a 1989 coup that the ties between the two countries really began to expand.

The longer China has been active in Sudan, the more involved and proactive it has become with regards to potential issues affecting international normative standards—like Darfur, the Referendum, and the Civil Wars. China is now able to engage with these problems in ways that weren’t possible twenty years ago.

China’s engagement with Sudan has shown a constant and consistent evolution. In particular, China slowly progressed from little to no involvement in the North-South Sudanese civil war to active encouragement and cooperative mediation during the height of the Darfur crisis, and finally to maintaining its calls for diplomatic solutions while sending military peacekeepers to help resolve the new civil war in South Sudan.

Four phases of the relationship are examined. The first phase (from 1989 to around 2000) sets a baseline against which subsequent changes can be calibrated. Phase two looks at

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how China responded to the Darfur crisis especially from 2003-2008. The third phase revolves around referendum for South Sudan’s independence. In 2011, the south voted for independence fulfilling the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the second Sudanese civil war. China’s recognition of South Sudan was the first-time China recognized a secessionary state. Fourth, South Sudan’s first few years as a nation involved several growing pains, which returned the territory to civil war. In this period, China made a key step of sending military peacekeepers – not medical or engineering – a first for them.

This chapter highlights the impact that socialization has had in driving Chinese policy towards Sudan. Through looking at the actions of Chinese actors over the span of roughly twenty years, it is clear that China has gone from a pre-socialized baseline to an increasing understanding of the norms at play with regard to the Darfur crisis, to more proactive actions attempting to aid in the resolution of the South Sudanese civil war. By utilizing the tools provided by FPA and Rosenau’s adaptation and examining the actors and their statements during a given situation, Sudan not only challenges prior conceptions of sovereignty and non-intervention, but also set the groundwork for new approaches in international action including military peacekeeping troops. In each subsequent example, China adapted in a quicker fashion and surpassed previous milestones.

Before examining the four phases that exemplify Chinese adaptation and socialization as they relate to the hypothesis of the dissertation, this Chapter begins with a short and broad-brush survey of the evolution of changes exhibited in China’s actions towards Sudan. Following that will be a section briefly reviewing China’s historical relationship with Sudan to ground the case before moving on to examine each of the stages of China’s socialization.

Overview and Analysis of Changes

China’s relationship with Sudan highlights the changes and adaptations that have occurred in Chinese foreign policy. Twenty years ago, China would never have been capable of dealing with an international crisis as it had with Darfur – or with South Sudan. This caused long held conceptions of sovereignty, non-interference, and international action to be called into
question, re-evaluated and amended. Even if these were not official policy changes, they are key shifts in practice and approach.

**Novel Conception of Sovereignty**

China’s interaction with Sudan and South Sudan has clearly shown China’s ability to adapt to new and often uncomfortable diplomatic situations, especially relative to the concept of sovereignty. Initially, China vocally observed a very strict view of sovereignty, and utilized this reasoning to justify why it did not react to the Sudanese civil war and was slow in responding to Darfur.

This interpretation would gradually give way to more flexibility when external pressure encouraged China to act. Overall, this expanded view of sovereignty enabled China to act more directly through mediation and apply pressure on Khartoum when the situation continued to worsen. During Darfur, China strongly emphasized the need of a host government to approve the dispatch of peacekeeping troops to their sovereign territory. When Khartoum dragged their feet, China convinced them to comply. Darfur was the first of several incidents that caused China to review and change its policies.³

China’s concept of sovereignty was further challenged as South Sudan approached a referendum on its independence. As the result became almost inevitable, China had to choose to be flexible in principle, or potentially lose access to a most of Sudan’s oil. China’s view went from virtual non-acknowledgement while stressing unity, to being open to all outcomes, and finally congratulating the South on their new statehood.

Even more, China sent a battalion of military peacekeepers to South Sudan—intervening in the affairs of a newly sovereign state. This does fit into China’s slightly modified interpretation of sovereignty and peacekeeping—through requiring the consent of the host government. Still, sending armed military troops with a combat and protection mandate is a new role for China, one that would not have been feasible in the past.

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³ Interview, Chinese Scholar, 9 November 2016.
China’s conceptualization of sovereignty does not completely match the version that developed with the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the early 2000s, but it shows a flexibility that is reassuring. It also shows that China is able to adapt to situations and pragmatically address issues. This evolution also clearly shows that China has been socialized to the older concept of sovereignty, but has not completely internalized the newer version. Adding requirements like host consent actually support the presence of socialization – as while China may not completely agree with the norm, it recognizes it and wants to work within the international system to develop the norm and address the issues at hand in whatever ways it can.

**Increasing International Action**

China’s approach to international action, in general, has shown an increasing trend towards participation. Sudan offers a perfect example of this. China has progressed from viewing Sudan’s issues in the 1990s and early 2000s as merely internal Sudanese affairs that Beijing should not be involved with solving – like its second civil war and the early years of the Darfur Crisis – to being issues that clearly benefit from international multilateral mediation, and in some cases peacekeeping operations.

With each step, from Darfur, to the referendum, to South Sudan’s civil war – the time needed to evaluate the problem and proceed to addressing the situation became progressively quicker and China’s response became more pragmatically proactive. Its actions were not perfect, but were clearly adapting to the situations at hand while attempting to resolve them.

The most recent precedent China set has been to allow deployment of its own military peacekeepers. This showed that China viewed its role in the UN – not just as a financial supporter or as a member of the UNSC – to be one of the primary system maintainers. It clearly had an interest in the system’s continued stability and utility. China’s role here does not require that it agrees with all of the other P5 nations on every point. The actions China takes show that they are clearly involved, have a stake in the issue, and to ensure that international stability and peace is maintained.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.
Socialization and International Values

China’s evolution in its conceptualization of sovereignty and international action showed that it went through a relatively rapid progression in its socialization - learning and adapting quickly to new roles and responsibilities as it became a greater power. Initially, China started out as a UNSC member, but one that was relatively inactive and hesitant to intervene in affairs that did not directly concern it.

Then, when tested, China became increasingly pragmatic in dealing with each situation. Its responses became quicker and more flexible. While China’s material interests may have played a part in motivating Beijing’s responses, they would not entirely explain China’s continued interest and sustained involvement. When China’s approaches met with problems, their solutions utilized previously unused methods – like special envoys, direct pressure, and sanctions.

China’s relationship with Sudan has required China to be innovative with its foreign policy. It represented the first-time China used its influence to persuade a foreign government to allow the dispatch of peacekeeping troops, as well as the first time China nominated a diplomat to be focused on one issue – the Special Representative for Africa. Finally, when the civil war broke out, China became even more involved. At first with further mediation – and when that appeared to fail – sending their first contingent of military peacekeepers.

Sino-Sudanese Relations – A Brief Historical Review

For much of the twentieth century, Sudan was managed by the British as northern and southern zones, with most development focused on the North. Following its independence in 1956, Sudan experienced a number of internal challenges. Even before Sudan became a state, a

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Civil War between the country’s north and south began that would last until the 1972. Throughout this time Sudan’s central government did not enjoy much stability. Since independence, Sudan has had numerous coups. The most recent of these was on June 30, 1989 that created the current Sudanese government led by Omar Al-Bashir.

Although official diplomatic relations between China and Sudan began in 1959, it was a limited relationship for some time. Sudan was the fourth African state to officially recognize the Chinese government in Beijing. As a result of this recognition, China allowed ‘trade, aid, cultural, political and military links with Sudan’. However, China’s role in Sudan would really intensify after al-Bashir and his National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in the 1989 coup. For at least the first year, ‘Beijing was uncertain about its relations with the [NIF]’. This hesitation was short lived. Al-Bashir visited Beijing in 1990, and by 1991 –and with support from Iranian funding - China again provided weapons to Sudan.

The Beginning of the Sino-Sudanese Oil Relationship

Natural resources, and oil in particular, make up a major component of China’s interests in Sudan. Various companies had participated in oil exploration projects in Sudan since the discovery of oil in 1979, but no significant amount was extracted. Chevron first entered Sudan after the first civil war ended in 1972, and found oil deposits in 1979 and 1982. A new civil war started in 1983, making it hard to continue, as oil infrastructure was been targeted to disrupt the government’s supply of cash. Chevron left in 1984, after three of its workers were

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10 This later became known as the National Congress Party(NCP).
11 There were some arms sales and some political connections via the Sudanese Communist Party, but compared to modern relations were minimal. Daniel Large, ‘China’s Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War’, The China Quarterly, Vol. 199, Sept 2009, 613; Daniel Large, ‘China’s Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa: Sudan in Comparative Context’, DIS Report, Vol. 2007b, No. 8, 58.
12 Daniel Large, ‘Contradictions’, 95.
13 Large, ‘Contradictions’, 95.
14 Human Rights Watch, Sudan Oil and Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 92.
killed.\textsuperscript{15} Development of the oil sector ground to a halt until the 1990s, when Total and others suspended operations as well.\textsuperscript{16}

China and Sudan entered the 1990s needing each other, and their respective circumstances allowed for mutual benefits. In the ten years between 1993 and 2002, China’s energy requirements grew 90%, highlighting Sudan’s utility.\textsuperscript{17} In accessing this oil, infrastructural and corporate investments increasingly tied Chinese interests to Sudan’s success and stability.

Al-Bashir ‘made an official request for Chinese participation in the Sudanese oil industry’ in 1995, after initial invitations from the Government of Sudan in 1994.\textsuperscript{18} Sudanese President al-Bashir then traveled to Beijing and signed two agreements with the Chinese government – the first granting a ‘low interest loan’ and the second ‘financ[ed] oil development’.\textsuperscript{19} In 1997, the companies still active in Sudan’s oil industry formed a consortium, ‘the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC)’. This consortium was made up of the ‘Chinese, Malaysian and Sudanese para-statal oil companies (China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Petronas and Sudapet, respectively)\textsuperscript{20} and Canada’s Arakis Oil\textsuperscript{21}. In this group, China retained the largest percentage of ownership, and controlled a total of 40% of the shares. With GNPOC’s approval CNPC built the infrastructure necessary to export oil – a refinery in Khartoum, as well as a pipeline from the refinery to Port Sudan.\textsuperscript{22}

A major impetus that intensified relations between China and Sudan was the enactment of sanctions, first by the UN\textsuperscript{23} in 1996, followed by more comprehensive sanctions by the United States in 1997.\textsuperscript{24} The EU had also placed an arms embargo on Sudan in 1994, which still

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\item Arakis later became Talisman Oil.
\item US Treasury Department, ‘Sudan Sanctions’.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
appears to be in force. It is worth noting, with regard to the UN Security Council resolution that created the sanctions against Sudan, China abstained from the vote. These sanctions did not call for any cessation in trade. Instead, it called on states to reduce diplomatic staff, restrict the travel of Sudanese officials, and not convene conferences in Sudan.

While the United States designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993 and cut off diplomatic ties, they did not sanction them until late 1997. The US sanctions in November 1997 ‘imposed a trade embargo against [...] Sudan and a total asset freeze against the Government of Sudan’. The designation as a terrorist state had started to force out American corporations and foreign companies listed on the US stock markets, but the sanctions effectively stopped it altogether. These restrictions were particularly strong towards Sudan’s nascent oil sector – explicitly stating that ‘US persons [were] prohibited from engaging in any transactions or activities related to the petroleum or petrochemical industries in Sudan without authorization... The prohibition also include[d] facilitation by US persons of such transactions or activities undertaken by non-US persons.’

In the years that followed, China became an active partner in the development of the Sudanese oil sector. Thanks to China, by 1999 Sudan was a net exporter of petroleum and had built a 1600 kilometer pipeline to bring unrefined oil from the south to a refinery near Khartoum, then on to Port Sudan to be sold on the international market. After Sudan opened its export pipeline in 1998, overall oil exports skyrocketed to roughly 350,000 barrels per day in

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30 US Treasury Department, ‘US Sanctions’.
31 In this role, China focused both on exploration and infrastructural development.
2004\(^{33}\) and continued to increase to 520,000 bpd in 2007\(^{34}\). Overall, there is an estimated five billion barrels of petroleum in Sudan.\(^{35}\)

**Basepoint - China’s Solidarity with a Terrorist-Supporting State**

By 1991, just as China/Sudan relations began to gather steam, Sudan was becoming embroiled in activities that later branded it a “pariah” state. These included reports in 1991 that it supported the chemical weapons activities of Iraq\(^{36}\) and its 1993 inclusion on the US State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. The decision was made “on the basis of convincing evidence from multiple sources that Sudan provide[d] assistance to international terrorist groups.”\(^{37}\)

**Business is Business**

Chinese actions throughout this timeframe clearly set a basepoint for China’s approach to Sudan. China regarded its role in Sudan as solely business. Their focus was to build up the needed internal infrastructure so that they could successfully export oil. The Sudanese civil war, while disruptive to China’s projects, was not China’s issue – nor was solving the conflict. The same went for any connection Sudan had to Islamic terrorism; it was not their issue, so they had no need to address the situation. Basically, China only did what it had to, and nothing more. Zhou Wenzhong, China’s deputy FM, aptly summed up China’s approach in an interview when he said:

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‘Business is business. We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them.’  

As China’s interests in Sudan continued to grow, and as China continued to play a greater international role, this sentiment would increasingly come under scrutiny – especially in regard to Darfur.

**Initiation of Oil deal**

China’s willingness to do business with Sudan in spite of that country’s increasingly unacceptable international behavior in the 1990s was best illustrated by the evolution of the oil relationship between the two. Directly after the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, China was isolated from the international community. Similarly, post-coup Sudan was increasingly isolated from the West, in part due to its ideology and links to terrorism. Only after China entered the market did Sudan become a net exporter of oil. China’s involvement in Sudan’s oil industry started with, and still is through CNPC, one of China’s three major state owned oil companies. Of the 5 operating consortiums in Sudan, CNPC has maintained majority ownership of Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC), and Petro Energy E&P, at 40%, 41%, and 95%, respectively.

It should be noted, however, that although CNPC is a State-owned enterprise (SOE), the actual power for decision-making has not been viewed to come from the government. SOEs are ‘state-invested but not state-run’. In fact, ‘when CNPC first invested in Sudan, it was despite the Chinese government’s focus, at that time, on self-reliance and... increasing domestic oil production.... CNPC’s early investments in Sudan in 1996 did not have government approval.’ As a result, actual state involvement in the early years of CNPC’s activity in Sudan was virtually non-existent. The ‘Go Out’ policy officially began in 1999, so in the early years of the

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40 EIA, ‘Sudan’.
41 Bettina Gransow, ‘China’s South-South Relations’, *Lit Verlag*, 2013, 25.
42 Ibid.
relationship there was no state incentive.\textsuperscript{43} CNPC had gone to Sudan in search of profit, rather than with any sort of agenda. On this basis, Chinese involvement in Sudan had had nothing to do with values or solidarity – it was driven solely by corporate interest. This is important, as a shift to a proactive approach would be clearly identifiable – as shall be seen with Darfur, the referendum and South Sudanese civil war.

**Civil War / Terrorism Links**

During the 1990s and early 2000s international attention simply did not fall on Sudan as it would for the Darfur crisis.\textsuperscript{44} Throughout this time, Sudan was still embroiled in their second civil war. The US and the UK worked to negotiate an end to this war, however international priorities tended to avoid the second Sudanese civil war and instead focused on the links that the government in Khartoum had to terrorism. Even with this, the only real actions in IGOs were the sanctions placed on Sudan and Sudanese officials.

Understandably, China’s role with regard to Sudan in multilateral organizations at this point in time was limited to its capacity as a permanent member of the UNSC. From 1996 to 2003, there were a total of four Security Council resolutions regarding Sudan. All of them relate to Sudan’s role in the assassination attempt on Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in June 1995. This attempt was said to be connected to Hassan al-Turabi\textsuperscript{45}, a key figure in the 1989 coup and the early years of al-Bashir’s government – particularly by pushing a hardline Islamic agenda, and allowing for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to stay in Sudan from 1990-1996.\textsuperscript{46} This resulted in the U.S adding Sudan to the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, and the imposition of

\textsuperscript{43} In interviews in 2016 he stated neither he nor Bashir were involved, but rather the VP at the time. Sudan Tribune, ’Sudan’s ex-VP was behind assassination attempt on Egypt president: Turabi’, Sudan Tribune, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article59510, 3 July 2016.
sanctions. These sanctions, however, caused most nations to exit Sudan’s oil industry, creating opportunity for China.\footnote{Interview, Chinese Scholar, 9 November 2016.}


Throughout this time, China’s actions were very hands off, either abstaining in the UNSC or focusing on its economic interests in Sudan. Even as the environment was increasingly volatile, China persisted – reportedly bringing in troops, prisoners or even local militias to act as protection for their oil infrastructure investments.\footnote{Christina Lamb, 'China puts 700,000 troops on Sudan alert', The Telegraph, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/1367896/China-puts-700000-troops-on-Sudan-alert.html, 27 August 2000; Laura M. James, Fields of Control: Oil and (In)security in Sudan and South Sudan, (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, 2015), 30.} Other reports said that the Sudanese army had to protect Chinese workers, as the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) began targeting them in the latter stages of the Civil War.\footnote{Human Rights Watch, 'Sudan', 456.}

### Turning Point One – Darfur

Darfur was a key turning point for China’s foreign policy and highlights the beginning of shifts in China’s approach to international affairs. A number of scholars identified the crisis to
be the main turning point in China’s relationship with Sudan. Fighting occurred in the region intermittently since the 1980s, but in the early 2000s the violence peaked and attracted international attention. As most oil concessions are in South Sudan, this violence in the West generally did not affect oil production, so China initially did not change its approach to the situation.

China’s actions with relation to Darfur within Sudan, as well as its actions in the UN Security Council clearly illuminate how China’s role changed. At a glance, China’s response to Darfur seemed similar to previous humanitarian issues. At the UNSC, these actions can actually look obstructionist in nature. However, while on the surface China’s behavior might have seemed counterproductive and obstructionist, it is in reality much more constructive. Throughout the key years of the Darfur crisis, China’s approach clearly shifted. Initially, China was not involved, and deferred action to regional and local bodies. As pressure built, it eventually negotiated directly with the Sudanese government in Khartoum to make the presence of peacekeeping troops an acceptable option, all the while continuing to push Khartoum to accept intervention as a possible solution.

Increasingly Involved

Throughout the course of the Darfur crisis, China’s approach evolved from clear inaction to a pivotal role that ensured the compliance of the Sudanese government. Initially it went from a role as a ‘messenger’, seeking improvement of the situation through predominantly inquisitive tactics – to ‘active persuasion’ in late 2006. When the Sudanese government appeared to balk at the prospect of any additional intervention, China – behind the scenes – ensured that the Sudanese government understood that it was in their best interest to cooperate.

China initially viewed the issue as external to their interaction with Sudan – as an implicitly internal Sudanese issue, or at most an African Union issue. As the situation wore on,
China gradually began to act, in part to ensure that their international image would not suffer. Later, China moved on to interact with Sudan in ways previously viewed as impossible and combined economic incentives with direct pressure and active persuasion.60 Even US officials acknowledged that China had played a ‘critical’ role in allowing the PKO.61 In comparison to other problems, Darfur made the Chinese government take a lead in engaging with the issue and work to persuade Sudan to accept the conditions of the UNSC.62 China’s experiences with Darfur evolved from its ‘business is business’ approach prior to the crisis to actively engaging and coherently commenting on the situation – and acting as a ‘bridge’ between the Arab League, the AU, and the UN.63 This change moved from passive transmission of intentions, to active lobbying, to actual negotiation of what could be a successful plan.64 China’s actions in the case of Darfur represent the first time the PRC has ‘actively interfered’ in ‘an internal conflict’.65 In tandem with this, talks also included investments and grants meant to ensure that the government in Khartoum would pragmatically approach talks. Overall, China’s approach to Darfur visibly underscored its continued integration into international norms and a willingness to work to maintain stability. As expected, the learning process was piecemeal – but emphasized a greater understanding of the rules of the international community.66

Initial Inaction

When the Darfur conflict started to make headlines in 2004, China expressed little to no reaction to the issue. When the US moved to use the UNSC to sanction the Sudanese government for the attacks of the Janjaweed in Darfur, China worked to remove the threat of sanctions and instead release a presidential statement (PS).67 In July and September 2004

61 Wuthnow, Beyond, 259
64 Holslag, ‘Diplomatic’, 83.
65 Holslag, ‘Commerce’, 337.
66 Loke, ‘Between’, 209
67 Wuthnow, Beyond, 226
Resolutions 1556 and 1564 were passed, respectively, actions that the stage for sanctions down the line. In both cases, China abstained.68

From 2003 until 2006, Beijing did little to address issues in Darfur — save ‘shield the regime in Khartoum against pressure from the international community, especially at the [UNSC]’.69 In part, this was a response to the African Union (AU) and the government in Khartoum wanting to handle the issue locally.70

Chinese leadership and representatives at this point frequently stated that the crisis was caused by environmental and ethnic reasons — which were part of the standard line of al-Bashir’s government.71 Initially, the Chinese also did not believe the West’s description of the Janjaweed as a pro-government militia — though later acknowledged it had been lied to by the Sudanese government.72 China maintained that it was an internal matter that the international community should allow the Sudanese people to resolve. Instead of pushing intervention or sanctions, the Chinese government emphasized infrastructural and developmental aid.73 Essentially, it was a sovereignty issue that Sudan needed to resolve on its own. China would allow for weaker resolutions to pass the UNSC, but would abstain, rather than vote for them.74

A good portion of China’s observable actions occurred with regard to the UNSC’s discussions over Darfur. From the beginning, China appeared to support ending the conflict but did not support sanctions nor would they allow for peacekeeping troops to be stationed in Sudan without the explicit approval of the Sudanese government. During these discussions, China’s representative vocally supported the actions of the African Union and the role of regional IGOs. China supported the idea of AU peacekeepers in Sudan, while also supporting

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69 Christensen, China Challenge, 234.
71 Liu Hongwu and Li Xinfeng, Darfur Issue Under the Global Perspective (quánqíshíyìxiǎoděrfuérwéngéyìjì), (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2008), 41-54.
74 Shinn, ‘Conflict’, 91.
the overall strategy that the AU espoused towards the Darfur crisis. Overall, China’s approach to the issue at the UN reflected the African Union’s plans. An example of how China viewed the situation can be seen first in March 2005 when China ‘voted in favour of the establishment of the UN Mission in Sudan in Southern Sudan’ to ensure that the CPA would be upheld, but then abstained when the mandate’ was stretched so that it would also include Darfur. 

The Chinese government stated objections and abstained because it viewed the resolution to be ill-advised as ‘the consent of the Sudanese leadership had not been obtained’. Basically, by allowing the scope of the resolution to encompass Darfur as well without the consent of Khartoum, China viewed the action as a slight to Sudanese sovereignty one that would not succeed without Khartoum’s consent.

There was a clear change though, starting in late 2006. Christensen noted that he could ‘sense a change in China’s tone’ at the November 2006 Strategic Dialogue in Beijing. At this point, international pressure was building on China. Partially, the work of celebrity human rights activists helped draw large amounts of international media attention. International pressure had already forced out most western companies from operating in Sudan. This in turn created the appropriate pressure that eventually turned into international governmental action towards Sudan, and finally UN sanctions.

**UN Action**

A peace agreement brokered by the African Union, the Abuja agreement, was signed on May 5th 2006. The agreement was signed by the Sudanese government and one of the rebel groups, but not the remaining two groups. As a result of this agreement, the UNSC endorsed the AU’s Peace and Security Council’s idea to merge the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a new UN group of peacekeepers specifically for Darfur. The Security Council passed this

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77 Stähle, ‘Shifting’, 652.
78 Christensen, *China Challenge*, 234.
measure unanimously through Resolution 1679, though China only agreed to it with a caveat.\textsuperscript{81} China’s representative agreed with the utility of peacekeepers, but stated that it would not agree to future actions without the ‘agreement and cooperation of the Sudanese Government’ as the ‘basic condition and precondition for all peacekeeping operations.’\textsuperscript{82}

Stemming from UNSCR 1679, the Security Council passed Resolution 1706 in August 2006 to expand the mandate of UNMIS to include the deployment of peacekeeping troops to Darfur in support of the Abuja agreement.\textsuperscript{83} The Sudanese government ‘vehemently rejected’ the resolution, viewing it as an attack on its sovereignty.\textsuperscript{84} As a result, China, Qatar, and Russia abstained. All three nations supported the resolution, but as it did not have the consent of the host government, they could not fully support it. China’s representative reiterated similar sentiment.\textsuperscript{85}

The resultant deployment of peacekeeping troops did not actually stem from Resolution 1706.\textsuperscript{86} Instead, it was Resolution 1769 in July 2007 that created the African Union – UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).\textsuperscript{87} This time, the Security Council worked with Sudan in order to obtain consent for the operation.\textsuperscript{88} While the first version of the resolution was rejected by Khartoum, as it included a threat of further sanctions, the second version without these threats was agreed to.\textsuperscript{89}

As can be seen, China’s actions and votes in the UNSC did not exemplify much change. It still emphasized similar rhetoric on sanctions and sovereignty, without vetoing resolutions. Yet, when its comments and actions are taken into consideration, China’s actions were purely obstructionist. When abstaining for Resolution 1706, China made it clear that it was abstaining because the host government had not supported the deployment of troops. Without this support, it would be impossible to implement anything. As a result, this measure – even though

it passed – failed to create a new set of peacekeeping troops in Darfur. It was only with the next Resolution 1769, done in consultation with Khartoum, that UNAMID was created. China sought workable solutions to problems, rather than sending peacekeepers or condemning with sanctions. Even so, when compared to the earliest references to Darfur in the civil war resolutions, China appeared to become more proactive in addressing the problem.

**Quiet Changes**

From the start, China’s public rhetoric with regard to Sudan was brimming with references to sovereignty and non-intervention – a way to vocally support their disagreement with sanctions/peacekeeping or possibly ‘watering down’ UNSC resolutions. China held that in all possible cases of humanitarian intervention, sovereignty of the host state must ‘be respected’. Generally speaking, this type of thinking is understandable – both for the institution intervening as well as the state needing assistance. For instance, if the government did not want to have peacekeeping troops there, it would be very easy for that nation to make their job much more difficult. Liu Guijin stressed this in an effort to a) get peacekeepers in and b) make every effort to ensure that they succeeded.

When Sudan responded to requests from the UN for expanded peacekeeping troop numbers, China’s thoughts on sovereignty began to play a larger role, and increasingly were questioned. Khartoum publicly rejected even the possibility of accepting any more peacekeepers, stating that allowing them would inhibit their own sovereignty. As Sudan’s tone on peacekeepers continued to be defiant, it seems that China started to view the situation in a different light and attempted to persuade Sudan. Above all else, China would ensure that

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91 Saferworld, China’s Growing.
95 Fung, Courtney J, ‘What explains China’s deployment to UN peacekeeping operations?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 16, 2015, 422.
96 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.
Sudan’s sovereignty would continue to be respected, but the methods China used to approach issues would begin to shift.97 China’s role became much more active and started to include pressure and mediation behind the scenes, and an envoy to Africa that was focused almost solely on the Darfur issue.

China had abstained on numerous UNSC resolutions surrounding the Darfur issue, most notably UNSCR 1706 – authorizing UN peacekeeping troops. While externally, China’s abstentions were viewed as proof of China’s ambivalence and inaction, there was more logic to their actions. Within China, these abstentions were seen as a way to both support its long held principles of sovereignty and non-interference, while still playing a ‘responsible’ role in an emerging conflict without hurting its image either as a rising power or a third world supporter.98 For example, Wen Jiabao highlighted Chinese support of the resolution – but that to work it would need Khartoum’s support.99 It continued to balance the support of its traditional norms with this responsibility through its actions behind the scenes – sending envoys to ‘persuade ...al-Bashir to accept UN peacekeeping forces’.100 Beijing openly reprimanded the Sudanese FM to accept peacekeeping troops at a private UN meeting – further indicating its displeasure with Khartoum’s actions.101

China’s efforts were notably successful and resulted in Khartoum’s approval.102 During China’s UNSC Presidency in 2007, Resolution 1769 was passed ‘authorizing the establishment of a 26,000-troop hybrid operation by the ...UNAMID’.103 When Sudan tried to delay the arrival of peacekeepers, China continued to pressure them so as ‘to guarantee that the mission would go ahead’.104 To do this, China hinted that more sanctions may be considered if the PKO did not go through.

104 Wuthnow, Beyond, 271.
Behind the scenes

Beijing’s true efforts to resolve the problems in Darfur did not involve the UN. For the most part, these actions were conducted behind closed doors outside of any official body. Eventually, Chinese representatives would even mention Sudan’s agreement to Chinese terms – one particular instance occurred during a state visit to Sudan.105 From start to finish, China’s method evolved from a strategy of inaction “to taking a clear position, and finally, to active persuasion and mediation”.106 While from 2003 to 2006 there was not much of a change in policy or behavior, China would continue to evolve in how it addressed issues.107

Political mediation was the first area that received a greater emphasis as China’s methods evolved. For example, China ‘actively lobbied the Sudanese government to allow a foreign intervention in Darfur’, something that they had not done before.108 Using its knowledge of the situation in Khartoum, China began using its connections to ensure that any potential resolution meet a ‘feasible consensus’ between Khartoum and the UN.109

Through their permanent representative to the UN China ‘work[ed] behind the scenes to help broker a deal on the Annan plan’.110 China used its influence with the Sudanese government to help ensure that everyone benefitted. In particular, Sudanese sovereignty was reassured that peacekeepers would be no threat to the government in Khartoum’s rule; the African Union would be assured that any possible regional destabilization would be dealt with; and the UN would have done something to relieve a major humanitarian issue.

The next tactic that the Chinese government used entailed pressuring members of the Sudanese government directly. China simply ‘express[ed] a more public, if guarded, criticism of the NCP’ and how the ruling party had chosen to address the situation in Darfur.111 One striking example of this tactic was best seen when Hu Jintao visited Khartoum in 2007. This visit highlighted the importance China was placing on the issue.112 During the visit he made an
announcement of his own ‘four principles for resolving Darfur’ stating that ‘it is imperative to improve the situation in Darfur and living conditions of the people’. This message was then repeated when the Assistant FM Zhai Jun visited Sudan. Combined with public pressure, Zhai Jun is said to have privately told al-Bashir ‘to accept Annan’s plan’. In another statement Zhai Jun remarked that China had ‘exercised all possible efforts, political, economic and others’ to encourage al-Bashir’s government to accept a solution.

To secure consent, the Chinese government actively engaged with Sudanese leaders. When Hu Jintao traveled to Sudan in February 2007, it is said that Hu and al-Bashir ‘took a long car ride’ to view the oil fields in the south. During this ride, Hu reportedly told al-Bashir that it was in ‘Sudan’s best interest, and the interests of China-Sudan Relations for al-Bashir to cooperate actively with the [UN] to promote peace in Darfur’. By March 2007, the Foreign Ministry ‘spokesperson was calling publicly for a UN peacekeeping force to supplement the [AU] forces already in Darfur’. Again, in April, the Chinese Assistant FM visited Darfur and urged acceptance of a UNPKO. Wang Guangya openly said that ‘Usually China doesn’t send messages, but this time they did. It was a clear strong message that the proposal from Kofi Annan is a good one and Sudan has to accept it.’ This is a strong acknowledgement of China’s use of influence on Sudan.

While China was beginning to influence Sudan in 2007, international pressure on China was also increasing. As this pressure threatened to cause boycotts of China’s 2008 Olympic Games, China was in a bind. It needed the Olympics to go off without a problem – and the fallout from Darfur was receiving a lot of press. Talk of boycotts by US and French officials, and an activist group calling the Beijing Olympics the ‘Genocide Olympics’ – did begin to have public results – with Steven Spielberg dropping out as an artistic advisor because of Beijing’s

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113 Ibid.; Loke, ‘Between’, 207
116 Huang, ‘Principles’, 266.
117 Christensen, China Challenge, 234.
119 Ibid.
120 Large, ‘Non-Interference’, 275-76.
perceived inaction. As Sudan had continued to delay full implementation of the PKO, Liu Guijin attempted to further convince Sudan to allow deployment. In part, as the Olympics were a more important issue to China, threats to their success were a strong motivating force for China to encourage action in Sudan.

Combined with these methods, Beijing also appointed ‘the first Special Representative of China to Africa and [in particular was] assigned the Darfur crisis’, Liu Guijin. Both Zhai Jun and Liu Guijin have repeatedly traveled to Sudan in an effort to mediate any potential disputes and offer consultative help to the government.

Liu Guijin was a sign that Beijing ‘was going to work with Sudan to secure its consent’, and highlighted the concern that Darfur was ‘harm[ing] its image’. He acknowledged that Sudan had ‘probably listened to the advice of China’ in accepting the PKO, and also that this decision ‘could not be separated from Chinese efforts’.

**Sovereignty and Non-interference:**

It became clear that the Chinese government moved away from its traditional methods of dealing with international issues by how it dealt with the Darfur crisis. China actively and somewhat openly lobbied to obtain Khartoum’s acceptance of terms to ensure the presence of peacekeeping troops. Through these changes, it has became clear that there were certain aspects of China’s foreign policy that were flexible, when required. China has shown that it believes that it views a nation’s sovereignty, when it comes to controlling what happens within that nation’s borders, is absolute. Yet, China’s definition of non-interference was clearly, if slowly, changing. China’s role went from viewing the issue as an internal Sudanese affair to

123 Lee, Chan, and Chan, ‘Darfur’, 440.
‘steering a foreign government’s decisions and [...] actively broker[ing] the UNAMID mandate’.128

The actions China displayed with regard to Darfur have shown that China is slowly changing how it reacts to its new-found responsibility as it increasingly becomes a greater international power. As it grows, what was once an ironclad policy for non-interference in the affairs of other states became much more fluid. Its stance, however, on sovereignty seems to have remained constant and even strengthened in definition.

Sovereignty over a nation is the absolute control over a territory exercised by a government or a leader. The idea of ‘military intervention challenges the very core’ of this concept.129 Such a concept, at first, was hard to change on an international level. In order to allow for some sort of action when a nation seemingly lost control of internal conflicts, the UN started to consider peacekeeping missions. As a way to allow the UN to create the first peacekeeping mission, then Secretary General of the UN Dag Hammarskjöld defined three principles that would help guide intervention while respecting sovereignty:

‘the consent of all conflicting parties to the activities of the mission; the impartiality of the peacekeepers in their relationship with the conflicting parties; and the minimum use of force, only as a last resort and only in self-defence’.130

Consent, for China, became a defining factor in protecting a state’s sovereignty. In order for a humanitarian intervention to proceed, the host state’s acquiescence was an absolute necessity.131 China’s voting record in the Security Council reflected this way of thinking, showing that their concept of sovereignty in humanitarian intervention to be one of ‘based on consent’.132 China refused to support UNSC resolutions that did not include host government consent.133 This allowed the recognized government to have total authority of what goes on within its borders. China ensured that the UNSC resolutions on Darfur required consent – and

129 Stähle, ‘Shifting’, 634.
130 Ibid.
131 Beijing, perhaps, feels strongly about this because it felt the results of the intervention in Korea in 1951. Ibid. 639.
133 Holslag, ‘Diplomatic’, 76.
when Khartoum refused to support intervention, China used political pressure and its influence to obtain approval.¹³⁴

Some change, however, was also perceived with regard to how China views non-interference.¹³⁵ Officially, through speeches, interviews, and other official correspondence, the Chinese government still states that non-interference is an undeniable and unchanged principle.¹³⁶ From this rhetoric ‘Beijing is widely regarded as one of the strongest defenders of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states’.¹³⁷ Yet, the ways that China responded to the Darfur crisis have shown that its views on non-interference, particularly for humanitarian intervention, have started to change – or at least are not set in stone.

Previously, when the Chinese government spoke of non-interference, it meant exactly that – to not interfere in other states affairs or tell that state what to do. Yet, with Sudan’s crisis in Darfur, China ‘face[d] the challenge of accommodating its established policy of non-interference with the more substantive and growing complexity of Chinese involvement developed over the past decade in Sudan, amidst ongoing conflict’.¹³⁸ In the process, China’s policies have evolved to allow it to be somewhat more open to international opinion and allowed for certain actions.

China’s belief in non-interference allows China to avoid being ‘involved in international crises that are not matters of Chinese national interest or in cases where it simply opposes international intervention on principled grounds’.¹³⁹ Before Darfur, China had not had extensive relations in a country that would require UN Peacekeepers. With China’s national and commercial interests throughout Sudan, the change in viewpoint was not unthinkable. Policymakers and academics in China also contended that non-interference was still officially strongly adhered to – but any apparent changes were best described as ‘creative involvement’ – a term coined by Wang Yizhou to describe China’s international adaptation.

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¹³⁶ Wen Jiabao repeated essentially what Zhou Enlai had said at the Bandung Conference in regards to non-interference. Large, ‘Contradictions’, 94.
¹³⁸ Large, ‘Contradictions’, 93.
Easily, a majority of what China did in order to address the crisis in Darfur could be construed as a form of interference in Sudan’s internal affairs, although China referred to its actions as ‘influence without interference’. Obviously, nudging or outright pushing another government to accept a particular policy is a type of interference. By acting as mediators in search of a ‘feasible consensus’ or to broker a deal, China’s representatives were still directly trying to influence a nations’ affairs, even if it was just a slight nudge. Similarly, by appointing Lin Guijin as a special envoy for Africa - focusing on Darfur - is by its very nature interference. The envoy’s focus makes it clear that he was to ensure that the problems in Darfur were suitably resolved. Then, obviously, his job dictated that he try to influence and guide the discussion. Liu Guijin has also publicly spoken about his role in attempting to persuade the Sudanese government ‘to be more flexible and to accept the UN plan’ for peacekeepers.

Some of the other methods were more overt. Direct statements that called for a quick resolution of the problem, or announcing, as Hu Jintao did, an outline for his preferred solution, were clearly attempts aimed at directly influencing the decisions of the Sudanese government. It was also possible that more pressure was applied behind closed doors, which would have definitely been interference. When Zhai Jun commented that China had ‘exercised all possible efforts, political, economic and others’ in order to persuade the Sudanese government’, he was saying that on some level, China wanted, or needed to adjust and move Sudanese policy in what they viewed to be the right direction. Obviously, this was interference as it is an overt play aimed at changing and guiding another nation’s policy.

These actions have highlighted China’s ability to adapt. China can and will shift its policies so that it can appropriately react to international situations. China’s actions do indeed show a shift in how China it interference, and clearly show that China is responding as any responsible international actor would. Policies have shifted when necessary, and China has

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allowed for multiple interests to help dictate how these shifts would happen. Darfur underscored that China could and would alter its policies if needed.

### Turning Point Two – Referendum

China’s relationship with Sudan continued to evolve, even after the intense changes made during the Darfur conflict. Their relationship would continue to be characterized by change and transition. In this period of time, much of China’s interaction with Sudan was political and accomplished through direct bilateral contact. Prior to the referendum, during the actual vote, and the resultant buildup to an independent South Sudan, China revealed that its approaches and methods of responding to crisis were open to change.

### Gradual Change

China’s response to the South Sudanese referendum, is a classic socialization example: China was confronted with a process and a case that it was not comfortable with, a part of a state seceding in order to create a new state. In the past, China would never have acknowledged this, let alone continued an economic relationship. This strikes too much fear of potentially giving internal Chinese regions a precedent (Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan) – or at the very least hope.

China gradually accepted that it was an inevitable event – either way a vote would happen, and South Sudan might become a new nation. In either event, China would have no say in the outcome, so by necessity had to hedge its bets and have good relations with both sides. It helped that the Government of National Unity (GNU) allowed both to be recognized parts of the government – though it was still a key precedent.¹⁴⁴

Instead of ignoring, not recognizing, or denying the vote, China was proactive and worked with the democratic decision. Prior instances of secessionist states had not been recognized –

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China simply continued recognition of the initial government. China was slow to come to this point, but in the end, they acknowledged the will of the Sudanese people. This is significant and represents an important diplomatic transition.

Against the Referendum

Directly following the signing of the CPA, China’s relationship with Sudan continued similarly to how it had been in previous years. Essentially, China dealt solely with the Northern government in Khartoum. A few months after the CPA had been signed, Salva Kiir traveled to Beijing on a diplomatic ‘friendship mission’. Mr. Kiir, at the time of the visit was the second highest ranking official in the Southern government. Following Kiir’s visit to Beijing, the Chinese government continued to emphasize unification, and stressed provisions from the CPA that sought to preserve the Sudanese unity. While there was early contact between the Chinese and South Sudanese governments after the CPA, ‘significant relations’ would not develop for some time.

The official view of the situation was made quite clear when the Chinese ambassador to Sudan commented in 2007 that “any talk of separation was “premature””. In early 2007 Southern Sudan began to ‘face financial difficulty’, and as a result the Chinese government ‘subsequently offered a loan’. That same summer, Salva Kiir returned on a second diplomatic visit to China – this time as the first vice president of Sudan, and president of Southern Sudan. During his visit to China, Kiir reassured the Chinese government that their ‘oil investments were secure’ and called for continued Chinese investment in South Sudan. Shortly after Kiir’s visit, a Chinese delegation was sent to the South Sudanese capital in Juba. Here they announced the creation of a new infrastructure aid package solely for South Sudan.

145 Large, ‘Sudan’s Foreign’, 13.
146 Large and Patey, ‘Caught’, 15.
147 Large, ‘Sudan’s Foreign’, 12.
149 Ibid. He was of a different position because the former leader of the SPLM during the signing of the CPA died in a helicopter crash in July 2005.
150 Ibid.
Before the CPA, China’s involvement in South Sudan was insignificant. Throughout the civil war the Chinese government had only officially dealt with the central government in Khartoum. This relationship had, at that time, put the Chinese oil interests at odds with the SPLM – as the oil funded the North. Virtually all of the revenue from Khartoum’s trade with China as well as aid money for infrastructure projects, went to the northern parts of the country. As a result, if South Sudan did vote to secede in the referendum, it would have very limited infrastructure. As China’s involvement with the central government throughout the civil war was well known, future relations between China and South Sudan were understandably uncertain.

China had difficulties dealing with South Sudan, as it did not fit into their interpretation of a sovereign nation before the CPA. However, once the CPA was signed, the SPLM government in the south was integrated into the governmental structure in Khartoum, creating the Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU allowed for South Sudanese officials to hold official governmental roles both in the south as well as in the North – essentially it was a Sudanese equivalent of China’s ‘one country, two systems’. As a result, when Salva Kiir returned to Beijing in 2007, he was recognized as both the First Vice President of Sudan, as well as the president of South Sudan. After China began to have political relations with South Sudan, it was only a matter of time until greater cooperation would follow. Once this started, China was essentially hedging its bets by interacting with both governments in Khartoum, and the potential government in South Sudan’s Juba.

Open to All Possibilities

Throughout the buildup to the referendum in 2011, China continued to develop its relationships with both the North and the South, but any relationship with the South was grounded within the Government of National Unity Framework. Both a Chinese consulate


\[152\] Large, ‘Engagement’, 622.

\[153\] Shinn and Eisenman, ‘China and Africa’, 80-82
and a CNPC office were built in Juba by 2008, showing China’s commitment. The Chinese government repeatedly stated that regardless of the outcome of the referendum, it would continue to deal with both nations equally. The government in South Sudan frequently stated that no matter what the outcome was, Chinese oil interests would be protected. China continuously called for a peaceful and fair process throughout the buildup to the actual referendum. China also commented on any potential disputes or problems that could derail the peace process, stressing ‘dialogue and consultation’.

For some time before the referendum, all signs clearly indicated that the vote would be overwhelmingly for separation. China’s rhetoric regarding the situation came to accept the inevitability of separation and openly supported whatever result prevailed. Overall, China’s sentiment was ‘no matter what the outcome of the referendum is, it is imperative to ensure[...] long-term peace and stability in Sudan’. Provided that the transition period following the referendum was peaceful and followed the CPA, China would fully ‘respect the will of the Sudanese people’. Importantly, China’s official statements changed from a hope for continued unity to recognition of the two states that were to come. China saw the signs, and accepted the most likely outcome. China remained uncertain about the transition, and saw the potential for destabilization – so statements about Sudan around this time generally included a call for unity and peace.

In addition to mere calls, China offered additional measures to ensure that the referendum was fair, open, and transpired without any problems. First, to guarantee that the process would have adequate funds, China gave South Sudan a USD 3 million grant’. They then later ‘donated [a further] 500,000 US dollars’ to the commission managing the

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154 Although China opened a consulate in Juba, one was not opened in China. However, there are open ones in the US and UK. Saferworld, China’s Growing, 33; Sarah Raine, ‘China’s African Challenges’, The Adelphi Papers, Vol. 49, Issue 404-405, 2009, 152-3.
158 Large and Patey, ‘Caught’, 18.
159 Large and Patey, ‘Caught’, 18.
Finally, the Chinese government also deployed a group of observers tasked with ensuring that fair practices were used by all involved in the referendum.

By the time of the January 2011 referendum, a total of ‘more than 10,000 Chinese people working in over 100 companies’ were spread throughout Sudan. China had ‘provided assistance worth [over] 9.1 million US dollars’ since the CPA, and had planned and promised numerous other projects for both the North and South. Even CNPC became involved in the push for further ties in South Sudan. CNPC built a computer lab in a university in Juba, and sent ‘several dozen [South Sudanese] political leaders … to China to visit CNPC’. Throughout the buildup, China essentially held a charm offensive to ensure that whatever the outcome, both sides viewed China favorably. If the successive announcements proclaiming that China’s interests would be protected are anything to judge this by, their plan worked.

The actual referendum outlined in the CPA took place between January 9th and 15th, 2011. The entire process seemed to go very well and without incident. Within a month, the results were announced. A total of 98.83% voted for secession. As a result, South Sudan would become an independent nation on July 9th, 2011. Shortly after the announcement, China issued a congratulatory note, and quickly declared its support of the referendum’s results. Although at some point in the past China may have wanted another outcome, as the results of the referendum should end in peace, they supported it. Just two weeks after the results of the referendum were announced, the Vice FM of China visited Khartoum and released a press release thanking President al-Bashir for ensuring that the referendum was carried out in a peaceful manner.

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160 Xinhua, ‘Urges (2011a)’.
161 Large and Patey, ‘Caught’, 18.
163 Ibid.
165 Manson, ‘Sudan’.
167 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Zhai Jun’.
Open Support of the Result

China vocally supported the results of the referendum and in the months following encouraged both parties to work towards a peaceful transition into two states. Throughout this transition, the Chinese government continued to openly support both Sudan and South Sudan, while also promoting peaceful relations between the two parties. There were even attempts at creating a historical linkage between China and South Sudan dating as far back as the early 1970s. These efforts were meant to deflect anti-Chinese views in South Sudan and attempt to convince detractors that China was there to help.

Regardless of the outcome of these efforts, China has continued to intensify its involvement and investment in South Sudan granting at the very least ‘assistance worth...more than 60 million Yuan ($9.1 million US)’ after the signing of the CPA. As the date for separation grew closer, China’s assistance and aid continued to grow. During this time, this assistance included items ranging from the donation of sporting goods to the South Sudanese ‘Ministry of Youth, Sports, and Recreation’ to investment in and construction of hospitals. It is clear that China went to great lengths to attempt to ensure continued engagement with both North and South Sudan. For the most part, these attempts appear to have worked.

China did not diminish its interaction with the North as it redoubled engagement with the South. Overall, Chinese interest in both regions appears to have been equal. Both Khartoum and Juba continued to receive promises from the Chinese government for further investment and aid. Actual discussion about these packages have been predominantly geared towards the North, promising over 160 million Yuan offered in loans and aid. Concerning the South, however, while the amounts at the time were not openly discussed, the Chinese government and its representatives consistently offered assistance for ‘education, health, [water], and the oil industry. China also has stated that it plans to help in all sectors necessary, to help build

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169 Li, ‘China Still’.
the South Sudanese nation.\textsuperscript{173} While definitive plans were not announced, China’s rhetoric and current involvement showed that increased involvement and investment was only a matter of when.

During the transition period, formal diplomatic relations between the Chinese and South Sudanese government continued to develop. Following the referendum, representatives from both North and South Sudan met with high level Chinese officials in Beijing on April 29\textsuperscript{th} 2011.\textsuperscript{174} China was among the first to diplomatically recognize the South after it celebrated its independence. China’s FM Yang Jiechi also traveled to both the North and the South in early August 2011.\textsuperscript{175} All of these actions combined show that China continued to expand engagement and mutual support.

Throughout this period of engaging and developing relations with both Sudans, China has consistently encouraged mutual cooperation between both nations. China has repeatedly urged that the states continue to maintain peace, and vocally ‘appreciate[d] the unremitting efforts made by Northern and Southern Sudan’ in moving forward with the successful implementation of the CPA.\textsuperscript{176} Official rhetoric has constantly repeated that the two nations are ‘inextricably interdependent’, and both nations’ stability is reliant on their collaboration.\textsuperscript{177} When disputes occurred after the referendum, China frequently issued statements calling for Khartoum and Juba to work together through mediation and political solutions to ensure a resolution.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} Interestingly enough, Sudan’s representative met with Zhou Yongkang, the lowest ranking member of the Politburo. South Sudan, however, met with Xi Jinping, who became president in 2012. Xinhua, ‘China expresses Willingness to boost Cooperation with Southern Sudan, Promises further Aid’, Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/29/c_13852331.htm, 29 April 2011b.
Turning Point Three – South Sudan Peacekeepers

Problems began soon after South Sudan gained independence and China was intimately involved. In the interim period between the signing of the CPA and the Referendum, Oil revenue in Sudan was split equally between the north and the south. The CPA, however, did not stipulate what would happen to the oil revenue when the south became independent. This was an issue which was left to be decided sometime before a referendum— but never was. While most of Sudan’s Oil is in the south, it was not refined there. The South is landlocked and the infrastructure required to refine oil was built in the North. All the South could do was send it north to the refineries near Khartoum, and then to port in Port Sudan.

Shortly after gaining independence, South Sudan successfully shipped its first delivery of oil without issue. However, later shipments would not be so simple. Following the first shipment from South Sudan, Sudan began a policy to tax each barrel of oil $32 in transport fees. Naturally, South Sudan did not want to pay such a levy, so they refused to pay and eventually ceased exports. This dispute continued for much of 2011 and into 2012, but throughout the dispute, the nations’ relationship with China was highlighted.

Early on in the dispute, oil had been held at port in Port Sudan, waiting to have its customs duties paid. By all accounts, it appeared that the oil was destined to stay there. Unexpectedly, only a day before the Chinese FM was due to visit, the entire shipment was released from the port. While this may be merely a coincidence, official Chinese statements with regard to the situation have continually urged for an amicable resolution. While both Sudan’s agreed to have a mutually beneficial solution by September 2011, there would not be one until 2012.

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179 Reuters, ‘Blocked Oil’; Reuters ‘Independence’.
181 AFP, ‘Sudan, South to finalize talks ‘by end-Sept’, AFP, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jaX2g5yZXxLkG4HjOPqnr8SZbEvug?docId=CNG.ca9856a55a66273f7b0e121b91f0fa92.621, 30 July 2011b.
Regardless of how lasting the solution would be, all parties began developing alternative plans – both in consultation with China. At the time of the Chinese FM’s visit in August 2011, one of the main announcements was Khartoum’s granting of three ‘promising petroleum blocks’ to China, at the same time China gave Sudan a $15.5 million USD interest free loan.\(^{183}\) Throughout the disagreement, China continued to maintain support for both of the Sudans. Strangely, any discussion of oil was not made public during the FM’s visit to South Sudan. China continued to maintain a fairly consistent level of cooperation as it developed ties with the new nation. For example, the week prior to the Minister’s visit, CNPC and South Sudan’s Energy and Mining Ministry signed a Memorandum of understanding.\(^{184}\)

China initially did not want to take part in the ‘AU-US-Ethiopia mediation to settle post-secession issues’, but by the end of 2012 found itself deeply involved and ‘instrumental... in bringing’ both parties ‘back to the negotiating table’.\(^{185}\) China helped resolve the oil fees impasse by suggesting various possible fees. Again, as in the case of resuming the 6PT with North Korea, China had to utilize ‘shuttle diplomacy’ with its special envoy to ensure that a deal was made.\(^{186}\) This allowed for oil production to restart in April 2013.\(^{187}\) However, production stopped again once South Sudan’s civil war began in December 2013.

**Breaking Precedent**

Throughout the oil fees issue and especially the South Sudanese civil war China proactively attempted to address the situation through mediation. It is important to compare this to China’s reaction to the Sudanese civil war – essentially inaction versus action. The Sudanese civil war was viewed by China as an internal issue, and not one for China to be involved with. After the Darfur Crisis and the Sudanese referendum changed China’s calculus, however, China’s significant involvement in the South Sudanese civil war makes sense. They actively mediated and tried to negotiate a resolution between the parties.

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\(^{185}\) Verhoeven, ‘Non-Interference’, 64.


Notably, when that did not work, they moved on to another tactic – and completely broke their past precedents of involvement in international conflicts. China, for the first time, authorized Chinese military peacekeepers – which alone is a huge step away from a strict interpretation on non-intervention. They were dispatched in December 2015.\textsuperscript{188} This is an enormous step in China’s views of its role in the international community. This is a clear shift from previous periods – as China ‘abstained from voting on peacekeeping resolutions or contributing peacekeeping funds or personnel’ until 1981.\textsuperscript{189} Yes, China had sent engineering, medical, and logistics specialists in previous missions, but not overt combat personnel. In Mali, China had sent small numbers of ‘comprehensive security forces’, which were the first armed Chinese troops – but these were smaller in number and had more of a protection mandate.\textsuperscript{190} China’s contribution for South Sudan was actually a battalion of Chinese soldiers.\textsuperscript{191}

This clearly showed that China had internalized aspects of international peace and security norms – especially with a state that they have a substantial material interest in. Regardless of this interest, however, China’s actions show that they are trying to behave in a way that resolves conflict – a conflict that they are clearly not a direct party of, but have a vested interest in. China was not required to have a role, but its interests in South Sudan and in the international system helped encouraged it. While on the surface, this may be a form of interference, Chinese scholars will refer to it as constructive engagement to both support continued engagement as well as a traditional conception of non-interference.\textsuperscript{192}

\textbf{New Civil War}

The South Sudanese Civil war broke out on December 15, 2013 between President Salva Kiir and then vice president Riek Machar. Machar had split with the SPLA previously in the

\textsuperscript{189} Fung [2016b].
\textsuperscript{192} Wang Yizhou, Creative Involvement: A New Direction in China’s Diplomacy (Chuàngzàoxìng jièrù: Zhōngguó wàijiāo xīn qǔxiàng), (Beijing, Peking University Press, 2011); Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 17 July 2016.
1990s during the civil war with the North. In 2013, it was alleged that Machar was attempting to carry out a coup against Kiir – though it is unclear exactly what occurred – either way a power struggle broke out that resulted in an open war for power. Shortly afterwards, China stated that it would ‘work with all relevant parties to promote the conflicting sides in solving their disputes through dialogue and negotiation’. Again, China was involved in the middle of a conflict that would traditionally be viewed as an internal affair, and became an essential part of attempts to resolve the issue.

Mediation

As before – China was quick to stress the importance of mediation as a method of resolving the civil war. In the past, China has consistently emphasized mediation. This time, however, China began to play more of a ‘hands-on’ role.

From the beginning, China ‘also engaged with Uganda and other states neighboring South Sudan, giving a regional diplomatic aspect to China’s diplomacy over the conflict’. While China was more engaged, it continued the ‘quasi-mediation role’ it had played during the oil fees impasse. China continued to stress the need for mediation, negotiation, and a ceasefire to end the conflict – as ‘military means’ were not the solution. Throughout the war a number of cease-fires and agreements were reached, only to be broken soon after. Officially China acted as a conflict mediator during peace-talks, however while some components may have been mediation, China’s approach ‘represented a diplomatic-political intervention to try to assist negotiated settlement and assist the formal mediation processes’. In December, the FM spokesperson Hua Chunying said that China’s role was limited because of China’s ‘long-

196 Ibid. 44.
198 Large, ‘Civil War’, 41-2.
199 Ibid. 44.
standing insistence on non-interference in other countries’ internal affair’. So, while formally, China upheld its views on non-interference, it actually recognized that a more active form of engagement was needed to address this problem.

FM Wang Yi met with the leaders of the civil war factions in Addis Ababa in an effort to begin negotiations to resolve the issue. At these talks, Wang Yi urged an immediate end to the conflict and promised to do what China could to address the problem. China actively monitored negotiations at Addis Ababa, and had its special envoy Zhong Jianhua ‘regularly travel[] between Juba, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Beijing’ to ensure that it was a party to all facets of the negotiation.

In contrast to previous mediation, China actually proposed its own ideas to resolve the conflict, which by itself is remarkable. China suggested a four-point plan after talks with the South Sudanese FM:

1) an immediate ceasefire,
2) continue political dialogue so as to ‘realize national reconciliation’,
3) have the mediation be handled by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) so that an African issue can be solved by an African IGO
4) Address the humanitarian concerns caused by the war.

For the most part, China worked with IGAD and the AU in addressing the situation. China did, however, proactively ‘convene [...] a meeting in Khartoum with the conflict parties’ entitled the ‘Special Consultation in Support of the IGAD-led South Sudan Peace Process.’

The meeting concluded with ‘a Five-Point plan expressing support for implementation of signed agreements, negotiations to form a transitional government, measures to enhance

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203 Large, ‘Civil War’, 45.
205 Large, ‘Civil War’, 45.
humanitarian response, and support for the IGAD peace process, and “ensure the safety of all personnel and assets of all countries and international entities [] in South Sudan’. This was a first for Chinese diplomacy – to create and hold a diplomatic meeting like this. Wang Yi also highlighted the importance China placed on the region as well as its role by saying – ‘China is an active promoter of peace in South Sudan’. An agreement would be reached and signed in August 2015, ending the conflict and putting in place a ceasefire and power sharing plan. This for a time stopped the fighting, and Machar returned to Juba as Vice President in April 2016 to form a new transitional government.

Sanctions

China also supported limited sanctions on South Sudan in 2015. Resolution 2206 was passed unanimously on March 3, 2015 instituting a travel ban and asset freezes on a number of connected individuals. As has been seen in the past in this case, but more broadly in the Iran and North Korea cases, China generally opposes sanctions. However, for this resolution ‘its attitude appeared to become more flexible’. The resolution specifically mentioned the ‘China-mediated ‘Five-Point Plan’ and encouraged its implementation. Again, this shows that China was much more active in attempting to resolve the issue and all potential elements were on the table.

Unfortunately, mediation did not completely resolve the problem, as fighting broke out again in July 2016. China, however, has invested an increasing amount of time and effort –
without the prompting needed for Darfur. China from the start was involved and active in the peace talks, and remained in continued contact with all parties.\textsuperscript{213}

Compared to past conflicts, even with Sudan, China was more active. For example, ‘Chinese diplomats took unprecedented steps in publicly pressuring belligerents Salva Kiir and his former vice president, Riek Machar, to sign a ceasefire agreement.’\textsuperscript{214} Even Zhong Jianhua, China’s special envoy for African affairs acknowledged that China is increasingly involved – and that this is the beginning of ‘a new chapter for Chinese foreign affairs’. \textsuperscript{215}

**Military Peacekeeping Troops**

While China continued to stress mediation and negotiation in resolving the issue, nothing seemed to be working. The parties agreed to ceasefires that were broken within days or weeks. So, the UNSC had to come up with an additional solution to address the crisis – and also attempted to deal with humanitarian concerns. Peacekeepers would have to be sent. China had been ‘the only power that has not sent troops to interfere in intrastate wars’, because of its strong traditional view of sovereignty and non-interference.\textsuperscript{216}

Merely sending the military peacekeeping troops broke past policy trends for China. China’s role in earlier missions had been exclusively as medics, engineers, and non-military personnel.\textsuperscript{217} China had sent peacekeepers to Sudan in the past – in 2007 ‘more than 300 Chinese military engineers [were sent] to Darfur’ to participate in the UNAMID.\textsuperscript{218} China’s offer to send the PKO engineers was partially an incentive to the government in Khartoum to view the PKO as legitimate, and not a US ploy for regime change.

Most notably, China would further break past precedent in 2014, when it authorized the dispatch of a Chinese military infantry battalion as peacekeepers to South Sudan to aid the UN

\textsuperscript{213}Tiezzi (2014c).

\textsuperscript{214}Verhoeven, ‘Non-Interference’,64.

\textsuperscript{215}Michael Martina ‘South Sudan marks new foreign policy Chapter for China - official’, Reuters, uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-southsudan-idUKK8REA1A0HQ20140211, 11 February 2014.

\textsuperscript{216}Chaziza and Goldman, ‘Revisiting’, 89-90.


Mission in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{219} The peacekeeper’s mandate included protecting and preventing violence on civilians – including foreigners – as well as ‘monitoring and investigating human rights’.\textsuperscript{220} The mandate’s ‘inclusion of a clause to protect foreign oil workers’ was reportedly at China’s request – further expanding China’s role while protecting their interests at the same time.\textsuperscript{221}

These soldiers began arriving in Sudan in December 2015, and continued throughout 2016.\textsuperscript{222} A resurgence of fighting in Juba on July 10\textsuperscript{th} and 11th, 2016 spilled over into two UN bases and a compound with mostly foreigners.\textsuperscript{223} This was just after Riek Machar had returned to Juba. The UN peacekeeping soldiers – from Ethiopia, China and Nepal – refused to assist the compounds under attack. In the end, South Sudanese Security forces terminated the fighting – but in the process two of China’s peacekeepers had been killed and five injured.\textsuperscript{224} This brought additional attention to the conflict and threatened to ‘complicate [China’s] commitment’.\textsuperscript{225} China continued, however, and dispatched additional peacekeepers in December 2016.\textsuperscript{226} As before, South Sudan became a place for China to experiment and innovate with its foreign policy in a difficult situation.

This is a clear difference from China’s ‘business is business’ and that ‘[the] internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair’.\textsuperscript{227} China’s continued presence in PKOs is also a key

\textsuperscript{219} James, Fields, 30.
\textsuperscript{226} South Sudan News Agency (2016).
way for China to learn from the international community and continue to further a socialization process.\textsuperscript{228}

**Conclusion**

China’s relationship with Sudan and South Sudan demonstrates that when China is engaged in a rapidly evolving issue it has the ability to increasingly adapt to change. For an established power, the situation was difficult enough, but China had to shift and adapt to meet the quickly changing realities on the ground. China was faced with increasingly difficult diplomatic and humanitarian situations, and adapted as best it could, improving in the process.

China’s role in the resolution of the second Sudanese civil war was virtually non-existent, save applicable UNSC resolutions that addressed it. The conflict was solely that of the internal actors – and it was not China’s place to address. China did have burgeoning oil interests in the country, but that did not require them to have a role.

Darfur began to change China’s normative position, albeit slowly. China initially refused to get involved, saying again that it was an internal issue that needed to be dealt with by Sudan. As the situation got progressively worse, China’s hand was forced. It had to act more pragmatically and proactively with the crisis – so it created its Special Representative. It influenced the Sudanese government behind closed doors, and actively mediated for a resolution of the issue. In multiple instances, agents in the form of the Special Representative, Chinese actors at the UN, Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao all clearly influenced the development of policy.

The referendum on South Sudan’s independence was a further challenge – challenging China’s long held dislike of secessionary states. At first, China would not acknowledge the possibility, but as the vote approached – all signs pointed to a new South Sudan. At this point, China began to say that that would be admissible as well – as long as it occurred peacefully.

As the South fell into problems soon after independence, China had a role in each successive problem. First, China helped negotiate the oil fees between Sudan and South Sudan.

Next, when the South fell into civil war, China stepped in to help negotiate. China further expanded its international skills by holding multilateral meetings bent on resolving the crisis—and finally authorizing Chinese infantry battalions to be sent as peacekeepers.

After examining the four phases of China/Sudan relations, we can confidently conclude that China’s method of addressing potential problems shifted from non-interference to interventionism characteristic of the Western-led international community of states. Sudan acts as an ideal case to underscore China’s socialization into the international community. Through Sudan, we can clearly see that China has been increasingly integrated into the norms of international action for humanitarian crises. As Loke said, China is clearly ‘learning and forming opinions about the appropriate behavior of a responsible great power.’ Sudan shows an evolution from unconcerned inaction in China’s ‘business is business’ mentality to openly working to resolve a civil war. This is a clear shift, and strongly supports Armstrong’s view of socialization.

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229 Loke, ‘Between’, 211.
Chapter Five

Iran: Too Revolutionary for a Socializing China?

China’s revolution was victorious in 1949 and Iran’s followed only 30 years later. In one sense, the affinity between the two countries as revolutionary states after 1979 could have played out with ever-deepening solidarity against the US-dominated world order. The reality was otherwise. Just as Iran stepped onto the world stage in 1979, China was making the first moves away from its revolutionary past. Moreover, Iran’s revolution was premised on religion and outraged hostility toward the United States (the ‘great Satan’), while China’s remained atheistic and in 1979, China normalized diplomatic relations with the United States.

This Chapter reviews China’s relations with Iran after 1979 to test the hypothesis implied by the theoretical analysis in Chapters One and Two. While multiple factors played a role in how relations developed - such as China’s economic interests, its desire for energy security and its desire for regional stability in the Middle East - the Chapter teases out the argument that the primary driver was China’s growing need to be viewed as a ‘responsible’ power, in line with an increasing socialization to the rules of the international community.

Iran is a valuable case study for examining China’s socialization, particularly because it allows a much sharper contrast between interest and values driven changes in Chinese policy. Strategically, politically, and economically the Chinese relationship with Iran had been premised on a modicum of solidarity. However, when China’s higher level interests and emerging international values were engaged around the turn of the century, we can see that China was forced closer to normative positions even when it viewed the particular challenges as problems that other actors— particularly the United States – had to resolve.

While Chinese arms sales and Iran’s connections to terrorism are both key components of this narrative, Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons became the paramount concern and an essential part of China’s changing priorities. As was seen in Johnston’s work, Chinese actors
were increasingly socialized into international arms control organizations throughout the 1980s and 1990s. China’s policy paper for non-proliferation in 2003 recognized the potential problem of a state claiming to want to create peaceful nuclear technology, but China’s policy actions did not acknowledge this until years later. Throughout this Chapter, we will witness a gradual evolution of Chinese actions, showing China’s increasing role in resolving the nuclear issue. China, in concert with its internalization of non-proliferation norms and growing role in the UN, would begin to realize the importance of its role in the crisis.

Much of the material in this Chapter might be taken as evidence that changes in Chinese policy were motivated by naked interest, not the values of the international system. One could argue that even as China pursued closer relations with the US, Chinese interests would benefit from Iran challenging US views over WMD issues. Instead, this thesis argues that China did not make that calculation. Changes in China’s approach to Iran appeared virtually in tandem to the shifts seen in other cases: for instance allowing for action in Darfur and sanctions in North Korea, both in 2006; and later military peacekeepers in South Sudan and harsher sanctions in North Korea. China’s approach to Iran had shifted from any hint of solidarity based on revolutionary opposition to US dominated world order, to one where China came to see that nuclear non-proliferation was a moral value that it would support and enforce.

That said, the role of the case studies is not to solely support the hypothesis as if it were beyond any doubt. Its purpose is to examine what evidence there is for or against the hypothesis. This Chapter suggests that the case of Iran makes it hard to distinguish the balance between interest and socialization as the primary driver of changes in Chinese policy. The agential focus of FPA and Rosenau’s view of adaptation will enable us to examine how this case evolved and tease out changes that were clearly socialization.

This Chapter reviews three turning points in China’s relations with Iran to test the socialization hypothesis: the reduction of arms and nuclear technology sales in 1997; its role with the UN sanctions in 2006; and its actions regarding US unilateral sanctions after 2010. Before examining these turning points, this Chapter begins with an examination of the overall

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changes to expect throughout this period as well as a brief historical overview of Sino-Iranian relations to provide some baseline of the relationship.

Overview and Analysis of Changes

China’s relationship with Iran up until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) shows a clear evolution of China’s approach to a state of international concern. Throughout this time, China has balanced multiple interests and values in attempting to satisfactorily approach the issue. Among these, economic relations, ‘regional stability, a secure supply of oil, securing China’s northwest border..., the development of Sino-American relations, the development of Sino-Iranian relations, and the positions of Europe and Russia.’ While interests have played a key role, the evolution of China’s actions towards Iran shows an inherent understanding of the values of the international system – and a desire to work within it not outside of it. This in itself shows an increasing level of socialization inherent in the development of its actions.

In particular, China’s actions and policies have gradually shifted with regard to sovereignty, non-proliferation and international action. While supporting Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology, China has moved from being an arms dealer and passive member of international community efforts to a defender of non-proliferation and an active participant. In international attempts to address the issue, China has also progressed from delaying and weakening sanctions to observing sanctions it was not a direct party to. Clearly, these are notable changes and speak to China’s evolving position in the international community as well as its further integration into the international order and its norms.

Sovereignty and Non-Proliferation

Throughout the Iranian nuclear issue, China consistently maintained that Iran had the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the NPT. However, while this may initially have been stated earlier to express a belief that Iran’s program was peaceful – China did not support a nuclear-armed Iran. This would have supported the dilution of China’s own

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nuclear status, shifted the international balance of power, and undermined the values of non-proliferation that China had increasingly become a party to.\textsuperscript{5}

China’s modern relationship with Iran started in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, and at that point much of China’s trade with Iran centered around weapons sales. Of course, the US saw this as an issue and as the US-China relationship thawed after 1989, China began to reduce weapons sales, transfer of technology, and nuclear assistance. China at this point did not view Iran to be a threat or its assistance to be of much value - instead it preferred to prioritize relations with the US. Its acknowledgement of the US’s concern, though, occurred as China was increasingly a member of international arms agreements. This arguably could be early stages of China acting on its partially internalized non-proliferation norms.

As the situation refused to improve in the 2000s, China agreed to sanctions on Iran. While China has long opposed sanctions publicly, this opposition did not mean that it would never allow them. As China had been sanctioned in the past, it frequently denounced the use of sanctions as a punitive measure. It has, however, gradually accepted their value as a final resort before military action. In the UN, China allowed sanctions as Iran continually failed to meet deadlines and appeared to ignore international concern. Sanctions were weakened to target only those directly connected, but widened as the issue failed to resolve.

China still traded with Iran, and became one of few trading partners. As sanctions became increasingly severe, Iran became more reliant on China. The last sanctions to be placed on Iran were US and EU unilateral – which to a certain extent, China observed, even though it was not required to. This action further forced Iran’s hand and aided a return to negotiations.

China’s role evolved into promoting direct mediation and ‘understanding’ in the JCPOA agreement. This was done in an effort to ensure that it would be a successful first step to an agreement and a lasting resolution of the problem. This is a clear shift from non-involvement to a key role steeped in the normative value of resolving the crisis. This employed existing mechanisms within the international community and used them to address an issue of concern, showing a keen understanding of the underlying rules of the international system.

The way China interacted with and allowed for action in the international community also evolved. Initially, China delayed international action, at least in terms of referrals from the IAEA to the UNSC. When it was no longer possible to delay, or defer, China voted in favor. As Iran continued to ignore external concerns, China was not able or willing to work against the will of the international community.

Regardless of China’s view on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s unwillingness to address the concerns of the international community via the IAEA’s mechanisms gave Beijing little choice but to approve a referral to the Security Council. As Iran continued to openly defy requests, China could not continue to support Iran. China’s leanings on the issue were less important than opposing a clear majority position. As China had continued to be integrated into the international system and the rules, it understood that ignoring it required consequences. It continued to support Iran’s right to peaceful use, but as Iran failed to acquiesce there was little to prove the program was solely peaceful.

Once Iran’s case was referred to the UNSC, China’s actions were similar. China tried to delay sanctions. At first, China pushed to have the first action be a Presidential Statement (PS). As with the referral from the IAEA to the UNSC, when Iran did not respond there was little for China to do but allow a stronger resolution to pass. Again, in a familiar pattern, the resolution was not an authorization for sanctions but instead was a stopgap measure to allow Iran one last chance to comply. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolution called for Iran to comply or face further repercussions. As with before, Iran did not comply and another resolution – including sanctions – was put forward.

China supported each successive resolution that authorized sanctions – but did weaken the resolutions enough to target direct associates of a potential nuclear program only. Each time, the end resolution went through with marginally stronger sanctions, ‘framed as a means to urge Iran to return to negotiations’.6

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It is important to note, that by merely supporting these limited sanctions, China was making a significant step – one that Iran was shocked by. In the past, with regard to sanctions, China had abstained on principle – not wanting to directly veto and challenge the other P5 members. Logically then, Iran expected a protector in the UNSC, or at minimum an abstention. For this issue, though, China voted for all eight resolutions/statements, and all four resolutions authorizing sanctions.

This now leads us to the unilateral sanctions that UNSCR 1929 paved the way for – specifically the US sanctions. China could have argued against US Sanctions and supported the Iranian regime against ‘unjust’ outside interference in their affairs. Notably, it did not. To a certain extent, it appears that a number of Chinese companies followed the sanctions, predominantly to allow for their interests in the US/EU to continue rather than be a party to sanctions and be barred from the US market. This also shows China understood the normative significance of the issue, and implies a values shift to encourage Iran’s compliance.

Actors both in the Chinese government and SOEs unofficially observed sanctions, which further highlighted China’s increasing role in the international community. While in part this showed that China and Chinese companies valued their relationship with the US more than that of Iran, it is a clear evolution from a revolutionary view of sanctions. This makes sense from a purely economic sense, but is still a noticeable shift from its acts of placation in the 1990s. Agreeing not to sell weapons is one thing – but voluntarily following another nation’s sanction regime – when you do not believe in the efficacy of sanctions is a definitive change in perspective.

Increasing Socialization

Throughout the Iran issue, China’s actions show a clear progression of increasing involvement. Of course, there are many factors involved in why and how this happened including the growth of the Chinese economy, the expansion of China’s energy needs, China’s increasing international presence, and an increasing internalization of international norms.

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7 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016.
8 Shichor, ‘Iran’, 3; Kondapalli, ‘Converting’, 64.
Additionally, Iran’s intransigence towards the international community’s requests, breaches of agreements, and general hostility by the Iranian leadership left China with little room for negotiation.

China’s interaction began as an almost purely economic one that benefited both parties. When the nuclear issue gained international attention, China had little to no role. As the issue moved from the EU-3 to the P5+1 and from the IAEA to the UNSC, China was increasingly involved. While China’s role did slow action, they played a part. In the negotiations leading up to and creating the JCPOA, China’s role was viewed as ‘active’ and constructive in achieving the final consensus. Such a shift is clearly indicative of not only China’s role in the international community, but also to how it understands the system.

The ability to have good political and trade relations with the United States and the EU in tandem with aligning with international opinion further encouraged China’s actions. As the issue continued, China’s worries about instability in the region became stronger – as military action seemed to become more likely. This would disrupt oil supplies – so resolving the issue became another key priority. While at times China and the US/EU did not agree on how to precisely deal with Iran, it was clear that they wanted the same result – a non-nuclearized, stable nation.

China has, albeit slowly, become clearly socialized into the international order in dealing with Iran – its actions are not perfect, but socialization is not a perfect process. China pushed for stability, security, and a deal that would work for all without military conflict. All parties wanted the same end goal – a non-aggressive, non-nuclear Iran and an international regime that ensured that peace was kept.

Clearly, China was a part of this system and worked towards a compromise that would address the situation. As its initial views of the situation were akin to ‘it’s not our problem’, moving to an active role in mediation is a significant and noteworthy shift. Part of this can be attributed to China’s economic interests in the region, and therefore a further interest in stability – but this does not explain it all. If China were to only have those interests, it could have supported the status quo for much longer. Instead, it, along with the rest of the P5, utilized the existing components of the international system to encourage Iran’s compliance –
and up until now, seem to have been successful. This suggests that China’s actions were increasingly motivated by values rather than mere self-interest.

**Sino-Iranian Relations – A Brief Historical Review**

China and Iran’s ancient links are often stressed to indicate the strength and longevity of the relationship. It is referenced frequently in official statements by both governments, as well as in discussions with Chinese academics specializing in the relationship. Rhetoric aside - while centuries ago there was a strong connection via the cultural transfer and trade relations that the Silk Road provided, modern Sino-Iranian relations are anchored in the legacy of the Cold War. Strategically, Iran is important as it is a key gateway into the Middle East.

In the two decades following the creation of the PRC, China’s relationship with Iran was minimal and at times antagonistic. For example, China supported the policies espoused by Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddegh in the early 1950s and tried but failed to establish a dialogue with Iran before the 1955 Bandung Conference. Subsequently, Iran officially recognized and established relations with the Republic of China in 1956 – while Beijing harbored members of an Iranian communist party in the early 1960s. Yet, in 1960, China began to import small amounts of Iranian oil.

As China’s relationship with the US began to improve, the Shah’s Iran established formal diplomatic relations with China in late 1971. Relations quickly strengthened after that. Hua Guofeng, the Chairman of the CCP after the death of Mao, was one of the last foreign leaders to meet with the Shah prior to the Iranian Revolution. The purpose of this trip was to underscore their close ties, but occurred in the midst of increasing tension between the Shah and revolutionary anti-Shah groups.

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9 Interview, Chinese Scholar, October 2016.
10 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016.
13 John Garver, *China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 54
14 Ibid.
Hua’s visit would exacerbate suspicions the new Islamic Republic had, and delay diplomatic relations. China however, was prepared to move faster in reestablishing relations.\textsuperscript{15} The pragmatic nature of China in the Deng Xiaoping era allowed this to occur, even while expanding relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{16}

**Weapons Sales and Nuclear Assistance**

In the 1980s, one of the quickest areas to develop was the export of military and technical goods, especially as a result of the Iran-Iraq war\textsuperscript{17}. Iran would become a ‘major purchaser of conventional Chinese-made weapons’.\textsuperscript{18} In 1982, it was said that Chinese and North Korean arms made up 40% of Iran’s total weapons, a figure that increased to 70% by 1987.\textsuperscript{19} After the war, however, sales declined. Still, China was the second largest supplier of arms behind Russia with a market share of 18% between 1995 and 2005.\textsuperscript{20}

China also assisted Iran with missile technology including ‘tactical ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles’.\textsuperscript{21} The sale of these weapons caused tension between the United States and China as Iran used these missiles to strike neutral Kuwaiti vessels, as well as a US tanker in the late 1980s. By July 1987, the UNSC – including China - called for a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{22} After this, China agreed to stop further sales of Silkworm missiles.\textsuperscript{23}

In the early 1990s, as China dealt with the effects of Tiananmen and Iran with the death of their revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, the countries would intensify cooperation on ‘arms and energy issues’ and deepen ‘diplomatic cooperation to resist US and Western pressures’.\textsuperscript{24} This could have been a starting point for increasing solidarity. At this time,

\textsuperscript{16} Calabrese, ‘Iran’, 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Gill, ‘Nonproliferation’, 267.
\textsuperscript{20} Calabrese, ‘Iran’, 10.
\textsuperscript{21} In particular, Silkworm and the more advanced C-802 missiles. Scott Harold, and Alireza Nader, *China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations*, (Santa Monica:Rand Corporation,2012), 7.
\textsuperscript{23} Harold and Nader, ‘Iran’, 7
\textsuperscript{24} Harold and Nader, ‘Iran’, 4
however, China began to rely less on arms sales and ‘by 1996 [they] accounted for less than one percent of China’s total exports.’

The main area of concern was China’s assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Program. China filled a void in the 1980s left by France in Iran’s quest to build a nuclear reactor. In the mid-1980s China was said to have trained technicians, help build a nuclear research facility, and had ‘planned to sell two 300-megawatt [...] reactors’. The United States was strongly against the two reactors – even though they had ‘no direct proliferation implications’ and were similar to reactors being offered to North Korea. In late 1995, these reactors were put on hold, and eventually cancelled because of ‘technical difficulties’.

China denied its role in Iran’s nuclear program until November 1991, when the Foreign Ministry admitted that there had been contracts to assist Iran in developing peaceful nuclear technology - particularly for medical and research purposes. China argued that its assistance was fully compliant with ‘the provisions of Article 4 of the [NPT], which allows for peaceful nuclear cooperation’, and the IAEA concurred. The US, however, did not. As China continued to assist Iran throughout the early-to-mid 1990s, the United States’ criticism increased. After Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton met in 1997, however, nuclear assistance and a number of other arms agreements ceased.

Basepoint - Reducing Arms Sales to Iran to Improve US Relations

A key change in the relationship between Iran and China came with the 1997 meeting between Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton. This visit, in effect defined what China’s foreign policy priorities were in the late 1990s – continued engagement with the United States. The meeting, and the pre-conditions established for it, clearly showed a changed calculus in China’s

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29 Calabrese, ‘Iran’, 12; Meshbahi and Homayounvash, ‘Non-Proliferation’, 77.
31 Ibid. 62.
32 Harold and Nader, ‘Iran’, 8
interactions with Iran. From initial weapons sales, and assistance with Iran’s nascent nuclear program to marked steps away from arms sales and cancellation of nuclear deals, China’s change in this instance was notable. Where China was once quite active, they moved away from weapons sales to reach an agreement with the United States. This sets a point from which to base an examination of Chinese socialization – and a good first indicator of China’s intentions to further join the international system. At this point, China’s interests in stronger relations with the United States likely drove its decisions – rather than an understanding of the norm of non-proliferation. That is not to say, however, that they were not beginning to internalize these concepts – their interest in stronger relations in the long run could have also aided the development of non-proliferation norms in Chinese actors.

**Other Priorities**

Since the reform period, China has continued to join international institutions and agreements concerning arms control and non-proliferation – but its actions with regard to Iran’s nuclear program went further than its commitments required it to. Such a move could have been either interest based, or values based – but in this instance interests motivated the decision. The 1997 meeting presents a baseline in China’s interaction with Iran. It also highlighted three key indicators that explained how China viewed its relationship with Iran.

First, while Iran was important, China’s relationship with the United States took precedence. Second, there was growing importance placed on the view of the international community as well as how China was seen to behave towards key issues. Finally, and most importantly, as in the Sudanese case, in the 1990s China viewed Iran as business and nothing more.

With Iran, China could not ‘afford to directly challenge the United States on an issue that Washington saw as a core strategic interest’. In order to continue focusing on stable Chinese economic development, China needed a peaceful and cooperative relationship with the

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33 Davis et. al., ‘Limited’.
34 Interview Chinese Scholar, October 2016.
35 Davis et. al., ‘Limited’.
US. Tehran had invited China on several occasions to counter the US’s influence in the Middle East, but Beijing declined. It was not in China’s interest to openly vie with the US.

While China’s role in Iran’s economy was increasing, it remained a low priority. Chen Junhua wrote that, in the way China ranks its foreign policy priorities, Iran is merely a third-tier issue – putting it behind the ‘United States(first-tier), and the European Union, Japan, and Russia(second-tier)’. Other scholars concurred with this, saying that China’s importance was placed on the relationship with the United States, and its ties with Iran were secondary.

As a result, ‘if “push came to shove”,... China would choose the United States [over Iran]’. The agreements by China in 1997 to ensure positive relations with the US underscore this. As the US increased criticism of China’s relationship with Iran throughout the 1990s, China’s support waned. The Clinton-Jiang meeting itself, however, was a turning point – China moved from supporting Iran to a more neutral position that was acceptable to the US. This decision reportedly ‘incurred serious anger and unhappiness from the Iranian side’ and resulted in repeated criticism. China still had to balance its need for expanding international economic relations with that of its relationship with the United States. This makes for a clear and positive starting point for the development of China’s role in the Iranian nuclear issue, with China focusing on furthering its interests rather than championing the concept of non-proliferation.

Throughout the 1990s, China’s international role was growing, but was mainly on the sidelines – particularly with international security issues. China wanted to maintain relations with all sides – as doing so was in its benefit. However, due to China’s rising international standing, they also needed to be seen as a responsible player and not a ‘key supplier for a covert, illegal nuclear weapons program in Iran’.

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37 Chen Junhua, ‘Analysis of the Characteristics and Strategic Orientation of Sino-Iran Relations in the New Era, (Xīnshíqízhōngyìguānxìtèzhēnhézhănliùdedìngwèifênxi), World Regional Studies, Vol. 18, No.3 (September 2009), 110-118.
42 Interview. Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016.
43 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.
44 Bagwandeen, ‘Navigating’, 29; Davis et. al., ‘Limited’, 32.
As Johnston demonstrated, China had rapidly joined a number of non-proliferation and arms control groups throughout the 1990s. China supported the concept of nonproliferation, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its role in monitoring and enforcing NPT compliance. China’s pledges to the US in 1997 can be seen as an effort to uphold the nonproliferation regime. This, overall, was in China’s interest, but also was a step to further integration into the international system. In the second half of the 1990s, China needed to be more connected with the world system, and the opinion of the international community was an important aspect. While the term ‘responsible stakeholder’ would not be used until the mid-2000s, China still needed to be seen as such so that it could continue to play a greater role in the international community.

The 1997 agreement did not mean that China completely moved away from the Iranian economy – quite the opposite. Increasing international pressure left Iran with little choice but to strengthen relations with China. This, in many respects benefited China. It had a market that needed Chinese assistance, and resources that China needed. Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, China balanced its relationship with Iran with having closer relations with the United States. When it came down to it, US pressure worked – because relations with the US outweighed trade with Iran. This sort of ‘cost-benefit calculation’ showed that there was too much at stake for ‘Beijing to challenge the United States and its allies.’ Put simply, Iran was purely business.

Iran had wanted a stronger partnership, but at every approach China was ‘primarily interested in commerce and limited political-strategic engagement’. Iran fulfilled a purpose – they were a reliable energy source with a market that China can sell to. Between 1990 and 2005, trade grew from $200 million to $10 billion. For China, this was a mere fraction of overall trade – but for Iran, China was the second largest trade partner following Japan.

45 Johnston, Social, xvii.
47 Ibid.
50 Ibid. 6.
52 Calabrese, ‘Iran’, 15.
53 Ibid. 16; This was until 2009, when China surpassed Japan.
On the one hand, China was hesitant to have too close of a relationship with Iran, as this potentially would harm its international reputation and ties with the United States.54 On the other hand, China did not want to be seen as a pawn of the West. Depending on the diplomatic environment, China’s economic relationship has ‘waxed and waned’.55 This dichotomy between ‘status quo’ and ‘revolutionary’ actor further exhibits the influence of socialization, as being viewed positively in the international community increasingly became a stronger driver than ideologically acting out against the West. When the situation allowed, like in the near total absence of western oil corporations, Chinese oil producers took advantage and invested billions into Iran’s oil and gas fields.

Yet, in times of international tension, China was not been sure if its oil concessions in Iran would be safe in the event a conflict broke out. As a result, China expanded its relationship with other oil producing nations in the Middle East.56 Iran, for the most part has been a fair-weather partner for China. The relationship was good when it was convenient and would not interfere with other interests.

Overall, the 1997 meeting clearly showed that while China had had significant arms deals with Iran and a role in their nascent nuclear program – as it evolved it placed more importance on its relations with the United States and the view of the international community. Business in Iran for China was simply that – business. Though, to be fair, China did and would continue to support Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. At this time, the nuclear issue was not a diplomatic issue for them to be involved with - instead it was one to let the US and Iran deal with. Like with both Sudan and North Korea, they viewed the problems in these nations in the 1990s to involve them. While China was increasingly a member of the non-proliferation regime, it did not act in support of it without other interests coming into play.

54 Harold and Nader, ‘Iran’, 2  
55 Davis et. al., ‘Limited’, 9  
**Slowing of Weapons Sales**

A number of noteworthy events occurred prior to the 1997 Jiang-Clinton meeting. First, China’s conventional arms and missile sales to Iran began to slow. In part, this is a result of an increasing internalization of nonproliferation norms. In the 1990s, China signed onto a number of agreements, including the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). With this China agreed to limit what it could sell. By joining these agreements, China further integrated itself into the international arms control regime, as well as the international community.

The end of the Iran-Iraq war also reduced arms sales, but it was US pressure that further diminished the sales. For the most part, in the 1990s Beijing ‘generally avoided selling provocative weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to Iran’ but provided ‘machinery and equipment used for the production of advanced anti-ship missiles.’ Some of this equipment might be a result of individual Chinese companies selling without governmental approval, but some would have been official sales.

US pressure caused China to cancel its agreement to sell M-11 missiles, verifying China’s support of MTCR – an agreement that ‘China had agreed to [...] but not yet signed’. In 1996, US complaints about the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile also caused China to cancel the second half of the sale. Just before the US-China Summit in 1997, the US pushed for further assurances that it would suspend assistance to Iran’s missile program. China was said to have ‘agreed to halt sales of anti-ship cruise missiles,’ and further ‘curtail sensitive transfers’ to Iran.

In the buildup to the US-China Summit, US pressure successfully ended Chinese nuclear assistance to Iran. In September 1997, the Chinese Foreign Ministry informed the US State Department that it had cancelled the sale of the two nuclear reactors. However, that same
month, the Chinese ambassador to Iran acknowledged Chinese sales of ‘uranium enrichment technology and other nuclear technology to Iran’. Additionally, in 1996, China announced that it was going to sell technology to convert uranium, in accordance with IAEA protocol.

The 1997 US-China Summit

Before 1997, China had not viewed its dealings with Iran – either with regard to missile or civilian nuclear technology - to be a proliferation concern. Consequently, in the buildup to the US-China Summit in October 1997, the US pressured China to reduce and cancel its assistance in certain areas. After Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton reached an agreement in 1997, both arms sales and nuclear cooperation would stop or slow. It is assumed that some ‘technology transfers, dual-use trade, and scientific assistance’ continued. China’s view on the issue is grounded on ensuring several things – nonintervention, continued supply of Middle Eastern energy, and non-nuclear proliferation, all while supporting Iran’s right to peacefully develop nuclear energy. Beijing stressed the need to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue through diplomacy and within the IAEA framework. While China did not want an Iran with a nuclear weapon, it also did not want regional instability caused by military action.

The key shift in the buildup to the 1997 US-China Summit was further promises and agreements regarding China’s nuclear assistance, ultimately to ensure that the US enact the 1985 US-China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA). China wanted this, predominantly because authorization would ‘allow for US companies to initiate civil nuclear trade with China,’ something that could bring in anywhere ‘between $15 and $50 billion over the course of the next two decades’ and allow for the export of US nuclear technology. For this to happen, Clinton had to certify that China was not aiding other countries with their nuclear programs.

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65 Ibid. 64-5.
66 Ibid. One of the components of the agreement in October 1997 was that China cease assistance in this project.
67 Ibid. 60.
68 Davis et. al., 'Limited', 4; Gill, 'Nonproliferation', 267.
69 Gill, 'Arms', 57.
71 Bagwandeenity, 'Navigating', 27.
72 Meshbahi and Homayounvash, 'Non-Proliferation', 78.
Under Clinton, much of the U.S’s efforts to stop proliferation focused on China and its ongoing projects in Iran. China and the US negotiated for somewhere between a year and eighteen months before the summit in order to go forward with the NCA agreement. To make sure this came to fruition, China greatly strengthened its export controls, ‘joined the NPT’s Zangger Committee export control organization’, and at the meeting in October China cancelled ‘the already-suspended sale of two 300 MWe power reactors [and] the uranium conversion plant’ while also providing written statements that it would not assist any other nations’ nuclear programs.

Beijing, in effect, used its role in Iran to benefit their relationship with the US. China used these concessions ‘to win an American commitment to high-profile presidential visits to Beijing and Washington in 1997 and 1998’. Beijing did indeed receive ‘some quid pro quo from the United States’ for its concessions, and it avoided a high-risk confrontation with the US over Iran’s nuclear program – but its views at this point probably remained the same. China’s actions were part of a calculus for what was more beneficial to China’s growth, rather than having any moral concern over the potential of a nuclear program. Additionally, China’s actions can also be seen to ensure that the Jiang-Clinton meeting went well – to provide another step in China’s process to be further integrated into the international economic order via its aspiration to join the WTO. Both of these can be seen as a willingness to become a greater part of the international community – and to acknowledge the rules at their core.

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73 Ibid.
75 These export controls were further expanded in 1998 – targeting ‘nuclear dual-use items and related technologies’ A white paper was also issued in December 2003 stating that it was in compliance. Davis et. al., ‘Limited’,31; Information Office, ‘Non-proliferation’.
76 Davis et. al., ‘Limited’, 30.
Turning Point One – 2006 Sanctions

As has been seen China’s role in the Iranian issue had been very hands off - it interacted with both the US and Iran and had a role in the nuclear program up until the US complained - then it retreated. Initially, it was seen to be a bilateral issue between the US and Iran. For years, China was against referring the case to the IAEA and subsequently the UN. When it could delay no longer, China moved to issue presidential statements or weaker resolutions. Throughout the time, though, China showed an increasing amount of exasperation with Iran’s actions – up until 2006. This year marked a turning point in the relationship between China and Iran - China allowed for sanctions. In all, the path to sanctions exhibited a clear understanding of the rules at play – even while uncomfortable with the move to impose sanctions. China worked with the system and allowed for Iran to be given plenty of warnings – until ultimately sanctions were the only recourse.

Becoming Responsible

China’s actions following the 2006 sanctions clearly showed that China began to recognize the issue’s importance. It was still not a critical issue – but as it was a US and Western priority, the value of resolving the issue increased. Much of the support that China gave was initially ‘a result of US persuasion and pressures’, but the reality was that China voted for the UNSC and IAEA resolutions instead of abstaining, which showed at some level that the normative value were understood and that China’s representative agreed.79

Discussions between Hu Jintao and Barack Obama in 2009 emphasized the US’s concern with the issue. This appeared to directly result in an IAEA vote and ‘a consensus on how to address the nuclear issue’.80 In 2010, when China delayed a resolution, the US began to further pressure China. Hu Jintao was said to have told Obama ‘China and the United States shared the same overall goal’ – and two months later voted for UNSC Res. 1929.81 A statement like this is

79 Swaine, ‘Tightrope’, 7
notable because it implicitly recognizes that there was an issue and both states had the same goal in wanting it resolved.

In part, the US was instrumental in working with China to address the problem – but China also wanted to be seen as acting responsibly on the international stage. Hua Liming, a former Chinese Ambassador to Iran emphasized this, and the role that Iran had when he wrote ‘as a responsible big country, China should go beyond the stereotype of its traditional non-interference diplomacy and play a more positive role in dealing with the Iran nuclear issue’. As with the Sudan case, China did want to be viewed as a responsible power, and continued work to solidify that image. Many academics and policymakers dislike this phrase, because it insinuates that China does not or did not act responsibly. It did, however, push China to evaluate its international actions further and added some reticence in interacting with international outcasts. Increasingly, the values associated with a responsible power and international stability seemed to be recognized.

While China understood the US’s concern, Iran was still a lower priority. The PRC supported Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology – and was not entirely convinced that Iran’s purpose was nefarious. This enabled China to continue business in Iran while the issue was in the UNSC, with no conflict of its values. It is clear, however, that as each resolution passed there was increasing frustration from Beijing as Iran failed to meet its obligations.

The economic connections that China developed with Iran throughout sanctions were significant. It placed China in a unique position, as withdrawing economic support could cripple the Iranian economy. This, however, would also hurt China. So, rather than using its economic connections as a ‘stick’, China encouraged cooperation and negotiations.

Overall, China has balanced its trade with international concern over Iran’s nuclear program – while pushing for non-disruptive solutions. China’s positions stayed ‘in sync with the majority of international powers... while upholding China’s views on sovereignty and support for the developing world’. This sort of consensus required China to support harsher measures

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82 Hua, ‘Nuclear’, 58.
85 Meshbahi and Homayounvash, ‘Non-Proliferation’, 84.
86 Currier, ‘Arms’, 68.
as Iran continued to disregard the requests of the UNSC and IAEA. Throughout this time, though, China’s position was clear – the situation should be resolved peacefully.\textsuperscript{87}

China’s approach before 2006 would have led an observer to believe that sanctions of any sort on Iran would never be approved through the UNSC.\textsuperscript{88} China’s allowance and affirmative votes are a key turning point.\textsuperscript{89} While sanctions were weakened to exclude Iran’s energy sector and targeted those directly involved – each successive round of sanctions increased its scope. Overall, from 2006 to 2010, the Security Council passed four resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran – all with China’s approval.\textsuperscript{90}

While China vocally disagreed with the concept of sanctions, in the case of Iran there were few options. The first UNSC resolution targeting Iran was an ultimatum telling Iran to ‘suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development’ by August 31, 2006 or face repercussions.\textsuperscript{91} This warning delayed the imposition of punitive sanctions and gave Iran a final chance to comply. When Iran’s failure to comply was verified by IAEA Resolution 1737, the first resolution including sanctions, was passed - ‘blocking the import and export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment while freezing the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.’\textsuperscript{92} This trend would continue, with additional sanctions added in 2007(Resolution 1747), 2008(Resolution 1803), and 2010(Resolution 1929).\textsuperscript{93}

China’s approach to sanctioning Iran evolved as Iran continued to resist any international solution. Ultimately, this resistance combined with US and international pressure further enabled China to agree to sanctions that did not target its interests.\textsuperscript{94} As the pressure built and Iran continued its non-compliance, China needed to approve increasingly harsher

\textsuperscript{87} Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.
\textsuperscript{88} Garver, ‘Dual’, 83.
\textsuperscript{89} Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016; Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.
\textsuperscript{90} Wu, ‘Puzzling’, 63.
\textsuperscript{94} Including Russia moving to view sanctions as necessary, in addition to the rest of the P5, Germany, Israel and Saudi Arabia supporting the US position. Wuthnow, Beyond, 175.
sanctions. For Resolution 1929, the authorized sanctions expanded to include the Revolutionary Guard and Iranian banks. While the sanctions were authorized, China maintained a significant role in Iran’s economy, further increasing the importance of China’s role in a successful sanction regime.

Compared to how China viewed the issue and its role before 2006, the change is quite dramatic. China began to recognize that its role was useful – and saw that Iran’s inability to compromise was not good for stability or China’s interests in Iran. Predominantly, China’s participation would become increasingly important as it became one of Iran’s few remaining economic partners.

Even before the imposition of sanctions, the Chinese ambassador to the UN asked Iran to cooperate with the EU-3 negotiations. This was around the same time Ali Larjani visited Beijing to expand bilateral cooperation. Additionally, during Angela Merkel’s visit to China in 2006, Beijing actually expressed interest in playing a role in the negotiations.

China continued to call for Iran to positively respond to the international community’s concerns, as well as for the resumption of negotiations when talks stalled. In 2008, Beijing even hosted talks in an effort to restart the negotiations. In general, these actions underlined an increasing understanding of the values and norms at play as blind interest alone cannot explain the role China was taking.

By 2010, it was clear that Beijing was frustrated with the lack of response from Iran. The Foreign Ministry continued to stress diplomatic talks as the best way to resolve the issue, but other actions revealed its impatience. For instance, China played a role in the creation of a statement issued for the P5+1 calling Iran’s responses to the IAEA ‘inadequate’ and worthy of further action. Wen Jiabao also recognized the use of targeted sanctions when in talks with

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97 Kondapalli, ‘Converting’, 64.
98 Ibid. 65.
100 Kondapalli, ‘Converting’, 65.
the EU on how best to apply them.\textsuperscript{103} US-China interactions also continued to further China’s involvement. Starting in 2010 Barack Obama got personally involved in reaching out to China – first by a long discussion with the new Chinese Ambassador, then with an ‘hour-long phone call’ to Hu Jintao.\textsuperscript{104} Later, when Hu and Obama spoke at the 2010 Washington Nuclear Summit they agreed that China and the US would work together on the new round of sanctions.\textsuperscript{105} Basically, China’s role went from outsider to a partner-of sorts in attempting to peacefully resolve the issue. Chinese actors openly criticizing Iran’s inability to respond clearly show that they recognized the normative issue and saw the need to address it.

China’s actions have been viewed with some concern about whether China was really being duplicitous. Most point to China’s actions weakening sanctions, but realistically while sanctions were significantly weakened, China’s endorsement alone is progress. Another problematic aspect was Chinese weapons sales to Iran. US pressure in the 1990s reduced sales - particularly missile technology.\textsuperscript{106} However, Iran still was the ‘second largest export market’ for China, after Pakistan, between 2005-9.\textsuperscript{107}

The US government found that several Chinese companies were assisting Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and therefore violating the sanctions. As a result, the Obama administration sent a State Department official to Beijing to have China end these sales.\textsuperscript{108} Notably, the US government determined that the Chinese government had not approved these sales.\textsuperscript{109} This shows that Chinese corporations and arms manufacturers pushed their interests ahead without government authorization. A key problem identified was that China’s export control system, while better than in the past, has issues in enforcing its rules.\textsuperscript{109}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lucy Hornby, 'EU, China talk over how, not if, to sanction Iran,' \textit{Reuters}, www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-China-iran-idUSTRE63T0JJ20100430, 30 April 2010.
\item Wuthnow, 'Iran', 3.
\item Swaine, 'Tightrope',6.
\item Ibid.
\item Davis et. al., ‘Limited’,42.
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Sanctions

Initially, China did not view the Iranian nuclear issue to be any of their concern. If Iran came to possess nuclear weapons, it would be a) in response to US/Western threats and b) not ‘threaten Chinese interests’. China’s initial responses and concessions to the US were seen to placate to the United States, rather than espouse any concern of danger or non-proliferation issue. Chinese academic journals viewed the Iranian nuclear issue without concern – any of the issues that were present in the US discussion including Middle Eastern arms races, proliferation to terrorist groups, or threats/attacks against Israel – were not present in Chinese articles or views of Chinese academics before 2006.

China became involved with the debate over the Iranian nuclear issue once information about Iran’s undeclared facilities was released in 2002 and confirmed by 2003 inspections. As a result of China’s support of the ‘Non-Aligned Movement’s position on the Iranian issue’ as well as its policy on non-intervention, Iran believed that China’s support was assured. Iran thought China’s ‘revolutionary’ history would inform its actions – and shield Iran from international sanction.

After this confirmation and the failure of an interim agreement in 2004, the US and the EU tried to move the issue from the IAEA to the UNSC. At this point, China attempted to support Iran – and pushed to have the issue dealt with within the framework of the IAEA, rather than the UNSC. In fact, the Chinese Ambassador to the IAEA ‘issued an unprecedented statement that China would use its veto power in the UNSC if the Iranian nuclear issue was forwarded’. Chinese diplomat Zhang Yan insisted that the resolution of the issue via negotiations through the IAEA’s framework was ‘a fundamental position of [China]’. Even into 2005, Chinese officials were stressing that a referral to the UNSC would not be useful. The

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111 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016.
112 Garver, ‘China-Iran’, 74.
115 Ibid.
Chinese UN ambassador, Wang Guangya publicly stated ‘the Council is not the proper place for [the issue].’ At this point, China’s views regarding non-interference likely superseded those on non-proliferation.

The EU-3 (France, Britain, and Germany) alone tried to negotiate with Iran, and initially there was some success. However, after the IAEA reported Iran’s NPT reporting violations, the US pushed for UNSC action. The EU-3 and Iran reached a further agreement – that fell apart after Ahmadinejad’s election when Iran ‘broke the IAEA seals and began uranium “conversion” (one step before enrichment) at its Esfahan facility’ in August 2005.

As a result, China could no longer keep the issue at the IAEA. By September, the IAEA deemed Iran non-compliant and referred the case to the UNSC. US pressure was likely a factor as well – as it was reported that on September 13, 2005 President Bush ‘tried to persuade Hu not to block the IAEA’ referral when they spoke during a UN Summit. Later that month, on September 21, US deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick questioned China’s commitment to non-proliferation and negatively linked its views on Iran’s nuclear crisis to whether it was acting as ‘a responsible stakeholder’.

In the end, the IAEA adopted a resolution concerning Iran on September 24th, noting its non-compliance. China initially abstained in the IAEA vote to refer the case to the UNSC, but the issue was officially referred in February 2006, with China’s support. This appears to be a step forward in recognizing the moral problems in the situation – as its commitment to non-proliferation and responsibility were challenged.

Once the issue was referred to the UNSC, China preferred non-binding PSs rather than binding resolutions. The first PS ‘called for Iran to suspend nuclear enrichment activities’. This was probably an initial effort to balance its ties with Iran and its role in the Security Council.

120 Referral was in Feb. 2006.
121 Wu, ‘Puzzling’, 58.
the while, China was also ‘urg[ing] Tehran to show flexibility, be ready to compromise and earnestly seek to restore the trust of the international community that Iran’s nuclear programmes were of a non-military nature.’ In doing so, China was showing that it understood that there was concern about the nature of Iran’s program – and the normative issues at play.

For the most part, China let the EU-3 and the US take the lead, preferring to have a background role. After the referral to the UNSC, future multilateral efforts to resolve the issue became known as the P5+1 (P5 + Germany). This appears to have been created in part to placate China’s emphasis on negotiations – because prior to the creation of the P-5+1, China had not been willing to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. After the P5+1 was created, China supported Resolution 1696 in July 2006, that ‘demand[ed] Iran suspend uranium enrichment’ or potentially face sanctions. As this was issued under Chapter VII, it recognized that there was a problem and laid the groundwork for sanctions, but did not implement them.

Once the UNSC became involved and issued successive warnings against Iran and its nuclear program, China could do little but encourage Iran to cooperate. Starting in 2006, China voted for – rather than abstain – a number of UNSC resolutions, each increasing in severity. Each time Iran breached an agreement or failed to meet a deadline, it faced new and ‘increasingly broad sanctions’. Even still, allowing for sanctions and interacting within the discussion implied an understanding of the values at play.

Beijing did not stop the resolutions from passing – however tended to delay them and limited their impact on the Iranian economy. Their actions either ‘narrow[ed] their disruption of Iran’s activities, ma[de requirements] voluntary rather than mandatory, [or] ... ensur[ed] that they did not hobble Iran’s production and export of energy or Chinese investment in Iran’s energy sector.’ One UN official commented that ‘the Chinese think they can play fast and

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126 Garver, ‘China-Iran’, 80-81.
131 Garver, ‘Dual’, 75.
loose on Iran’ – maintaining relatively strong ties while delaying and diminishing the impact of sanctions.\textsuperscript{133}

For example, for Resolution 1747 in March 2007 the US wanted a ban on ‘governmental loan guarantees for firms doing business in Iran’, and China opposed such a move.\textsuperscript{134} The final resolution merely \textit{called for} member states not to grant loans to Iran. Additionally, China insisted that sanctions only target entities directly connected with the issue. China saw the UNSC sanctions up until 2008 as mostly ‘symbolic’, to push for further talks.\textsuperscript{135} While protecting their interests on the one hand, China had a need for a diplomatic resolution that showed a clear understanding of the values and norms at play. For the West, US pressure and the instability of the situation would cause much of the west (including South Korea and Japan) to avoid investments in Iran.

As Western investment became increasingly scrutinized, it slowly withdrew from Iran. Chinese companies saw the opportunity and played an increasing role. This put China in a unique position and made the sanction regimes more reliant on China. China gave support to the most recent resolution in the UNSC after receiving various ‘incentives and assurances’.\textsuperscript{136}

China has still been singled out as striving to limit sanctions so that banking and energy sectors were excluded. The UNSC resolution that introduced the toughest sanctions, 1929, blacklisted a number of banking and financial forms and banned some weapons sales. Arguably, China has ‘adhere[d] only to the letter of Resolution 1929,’ allowing its energy investments and trade to remain intact.\textsuperscript{137} This still shows China’s actions to be a competition between interests and values – thoroughly supporting international stability and the rules of the system but hedging with its economic ties.


\textsuperscript{134} Garver, ‘China-Iran’, 81.


\textsuperscript{136} Fullilove, ‘UN’, 75; Swaine, ‘Tightrope’, 8;

\textsuperscript{137} Christensen, \textit{China Challenge}, 133.
China’s Secondary Role

Throughout this time, while China voted for the sanctions, it stressed the need for a diplomatic resolution. China’s participation in creating the sanctions allowed Beijing to balance its interests in Iran with concerns about the nuclear issue. For the most part, China’s role had been ‘reserved and balanced’ attempting to maintain its relations with both.138 Some have criticized this as China playing a double game, playing the interests of the West off of those of Iran and gaining in both instances.139 For the most part, however, China’s intention encouraged diplomacy – and views complete disengagement from all interaction to be counterproductive. Ambassador Hua Liming underscored this by saying China’s Iran policy is ‘an inclusive attempt to deal with both sides of an issue by engaging with all the actors involved.’140 This could be China’s way of actualizing what it sees to be the values of non-proliferation.

Following the referral to the UNSC, the strategy employed by the P5+1 was a ‘two-pronged’ approach mixing diplomatic efforts and sanctions. The Chinese emphasized negotiations, but these efforts generally failed.141 China continued calls for a peaceful resolution – one that allayed the West’s concerns but allowed Iran to develop nuclear energy.

The fourth UNSC sanctions were created with the cooperation of China, and characterized by US Secretary of State Clinton as ‘strong’.142 This resolution was passed as a response to Iran failing to ‘address core issues’.143 Even with the passage of stronger sanctions, the Chinese foreign ministry stressed that sanctions did not ‘close the door on diplomatic efforts.’144 To China, while initially the limited sanctions were utilized to protect their interests, as time went on it seemingly was used to further negotiations.

Understandably, Ahmadinejad voiced his disapproval of China’s support of the sanctions, and questioned their intentions in Iran.145 When speaking with a visiting Iranian oil minister, Li

139 Chen and Yang, ‘Discussion’, 79-81.
143 Wuthnow, Beyond, 203.
Keqiang emphasized the importance of furthering bilateral cooperation and economic relations. He also stressed China’s willingness ‘to work hard with Iran, continue to push mutual political trust, and maintain communication, dialogue and co-ordination on important international issues, to maintain regional and global peace, stability and prosperity’. This shows the extent to which China wanted to resolve the issue – and how it thought diplomacy and mediation was the only way to get there.

**Stressing Mediation**

Overall, China saw the UNSC sanctions between 2006 and 2010 as a way to ‘induce[...] Iran[] back to the negotiating table’. While China has backed these sanctions, they consistently advocated for diplomacy—fearing sanctions would impede diplomatic progress.

Chinese academics and policymakers frequently stressed that the issue must be resolved ‘through peaceful measures involving persistent negotiations and flexibility on all sides’. China continued to maintain contact with all actors throughout, and stressed that it must be resolved by ‘negotiation – through dialogue and consultation’. China has praised both sides at times to support the continuation of negotiations. Even at the passage of the harshest UNSC sanctions, 1929, the Chinese representative stressed the importance of continued diplomatic efforts. Clearly, China saw the importance of peacefully resolving the issue within the international system.

Once Ahmadinejad came to power, the tone of his regime clearly indicated that progress would not be easy. Even with calls for negotiation, China has clearly become frustrated with the lack of progress on the Iranian side. In part, this is seen through China’s approval of limited sanctions. Additionally, Chinese leaders and the foreign ministry have

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147 van Kememade, ‘Sanctions’, 110.
152 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016.
publicly called on Tehran to ‘show flexibility and sincerity’ and cooperate with the IAEA.\textsuperscript{153} Other scholars have commented on the growing frustration that the Chinese government has with the leadership in Iran.\textsuperscript{154} It was reported that Hu Jintao impacted Ahmadinejad’s consideration of a Western incentive package in June 2006, although this eventually would fall through.\textsuperscript{155} This sort of direct mediation shows that China wanted the issue resolved, and mere interest can only account for part of this. Like in both the Sudanese and North Korean cases, directly calling on a nation to work with the international community – and attempting to influence their decisions – highlight radical change and the importance placed on a peaceful resolution.

**Turning Point Two - Unilateral US Sanctions**

China’s response to external unilateral sanctions resulting from UNSCR 1929 underscored an increasing understanding of the values at play in addressing Iran’s nuclear issue. In particular, the US’s 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISAD) and 2012’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) enacted sweeping rules that prohibited countries that wanted to trade with the US to refrain from interacting with Iran’s Central Bank.\textsuperscript{156} While China was publicly against harsh sanctions, especially unilateral sanctions, Chinese companies began to restrict their activity – preferring access to the US market. Throughout this time, ties remained but diminished or slowed down. Complying with the sanctions and stressing a resumption of diplomacy emphasized that the Chinese accepted the issues with previous attempts to address the problem – but stressed the role of the international system in resolving the issue.

\textsuperscript{154} Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016; Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016.
Values versus Interests

While China did not approve of unilateral sanctions and frequently stated that they were ineffective, the result tells a different story. Although they did not have to, many Chinese projects were delayed and imports were reduced – making the unilateral sanctions have a larger impact than those authorized by the UNSC. Chinese participation was vital for a successful sanctions regime. It is likely that the acquiescence of China to the sanctions was instrumental to bringing Iran back to the negotiation table, which led to the JCPOA.

China played both sides for a time. For the most part, China ‘ha[d] neither fully supported nor obstructed the US’, and instead ‘practiced a strategy of opportunistic pragmatism ... to maximize gains from both parties’.157 This, logically, created tension. In the aftermath of the US’s CISAD Act, it was clear that China had to make a choice.

Beijing recognized that working within the regime was best, and although it still maintained a relatively close relationship with Iran, it complied with the sanctions while promoting diplomacy. If Iran were its only source of energy, maybe the situation would be different – but a stable relationship with the West is much more conducive for continuing Chinese growth. With the case of Iran, it is especially vital because of the importance placed on it by the US158 In this aspect, Chinese interests were a key driver.

China also has strong reasons not to want a nuclear Iran – it would markedly destabilize the Middle East, weaken the NPT, and make China seem irresponsible given its earlier support. Within China, scholars hold that China’s policy has been consistent – resolutely upholding the NPT and Iran’s right to peaceful use.159

China’s working within the regime could be simply placating to the US and EU to ensure those relations were maintained. Yet, by doing so China is implying that they understand the rules of the system and are clearly aware of how they are viewed. This alone shows a high degree of socialization – not in that they do exactly what they West wants, but that there is a core understanding of the rules of the system, the issues at play, and how it all interacts. By

158 Obama calling it a ‘Core interest’ – using China’s terminology to hammer the importance. Swaine, ‘Tightrope’, 3; Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016.
159 Interview, Chinese Scholar, October 2016.
working within this system and in some way addressing the issue, China is showing a key degree of socialization and an understanding of the normative values.

**Gradual Support for Sanctions**

As was seen earlier, China did not approve of using sanctions to force Iran into compliance. As time went on, China allowed for broader sanctions but they were limited to ensure that they would not harm ‘the global economic recovery, the Iranian people, or normal trade with Iran’. In effect, China’s support during the sanctions helped Iran survive.

China maintained that its intentions with limited sanctions and strong economic ties was to ‘promote the resumption of negotiations’ as a component of a strategy to ensure a diplomatic resolution. While the resolutions did get increasingly inclusive, they never came close to being ‘crippling’, as China would not allow that to happen.

China thought unilateral sanctions would push Iran away rather than convince it to return to the negotiations. These were viewed as more harmful to the Iranian people than the government. Even though a nuclear Iran was unacceptable, China continued to share technology and buy energy from Iran – somewhat undermining the sanctions.

Subsequently, after UNSCR 1929, more unilateral sanctions began to appear. In fact, ‘Resolution 1929 … paved the way for individual states to adopt even more stringent penalties’ and before long ‘Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and the European Union implemented unprecedented curbs on investment in Iran’. US legislation also restricted investment in Iran’s energy sector and banned any foreign entity (country or company) from accessing the US financial system if they had had dealings with the Iranian Central Bank.

Initially China, complied ‘only to the letter of Resolution 1929’ as other investors dropped out. Openly, China remained committed against unilateral sanctions. Throughout

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both 2010 and 2011 China emphasized diplomacy, suggesting sanctions would only ‘undermine regional peace and stability’. For the sanctions to work as planned, China would have to observe them, even if unofficially.

**Reduced Support**

As China was a relative late-comer to overseas investment in oil projects, it tended to invest where the rest of the world was not active – like Sudan and Iran. In 2011, China was the largest export destination of Iranian oil. China began to sharply curb its imports beginning in 2012. From 2012 to 2013, Iran’s total oil sales fell by 46% - with China accounting for 11% of this fall. The role of Chinese firms in developing Iran’s resources – either through existing projects or the creation of new contracts – also slowed during this time.

Throughout this decline, Beijing attempted to persuade Iran to address the concerns about its nuclear program – and prevent a potential armed conflict with the US and Israel. A key component of the diplomatic message was – if Iran could comply with its international obligations and satisfy UN/IAEA’s concerns ‘China was prepared to extend large scale assistance to Iran’s industrialization and economic development’ once sanctions were rescinded. This, in a way, shows that China prioritized normative values over its interests – but used these interests to ensure Iranian compliance.

The diplomatic approaches by Beijing were likely undertaken, in part, because they wanted to incentivize Iran. The way China did business with Iran was telling – as most agreements were in the ‘form of non-binding memoranda of understanding which are easily

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revocable in the event of political, economic, or internal instability’. It was clear that risk in dealing in Iran was recognized, and that Chinese corporations wrote escape clauses to protect themselves. As Iran continued their non-compliance, China became increasingly unwilling to shield them. US sanctions forced Chinese companies to choose to either reduce their interaction with Iran or give up ambitions in the United States. Chinese companies – either through their own volition or government pressure – conceded.

In January 2012, increasing frustration from the lack of progress was seen in public statements by top Chinese leaders. Hu Jintao’s remarks were relatively restrained, but did call for Iran to take a more pragmatic and serious approach to address the issue. This echoed an earlier statement from the 2011 Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting, where Hu Jintao directly told Ahmadinejad that Iran needed to establish better trust and ‘speed up the process of dialogue’. Wen Jiabao, on a tour of several Middle Eastern nations in January 2012 used harsher language, stating that China ‘adamantly opposes Iran developing and possessing nuclear weapons’. At the same time, the purpose of his visit was to sign deals with other Middle Eastern nations for oil rights, signaling that China was reducing its reliance on Iranian oil. As with Sudan, public pressure by Chinese leadership is notable, and underscores that the norms surrounding the issue were increasingly being internalized.

China had ample reason for its frustration with Iran. While Iran publicly lauds Chinese investment, internal politics have made China a frequent scapegoat. As a result of China's affirmative UNSC votes, the Iranian parliament threatened to investigate Sino-Iranian relations – and for a while ‘briefly agitated about the plight of China's Muslim population’ particularly the Uighur minority in Xinjiang. A threat like that was serious and potentially undermines China’s territorial sovereignty. The Chinese government does not generally tolerate such statements.

This underscores the frustration that Beijing experienced as a result of Iran’s intransigence. China has tried to allow the issue to be resolved through diplomatic means - but agreements were never conformed to, Iran didn’t meet its obligations, and consensus could not be reached. Beijing was then forced to comply with external sanctions, or lose access to portions of the US market – much more valued than Iran.

**Turning Point Three - The JCPOA**

The unilateral sanctions, in tandem with the election of Hassan Rouhani, allowed for talks aimed at resolving the issue once and for all. China played a key role in ensuring that a deal succeeded – making sure that it was acceptable to all parties. China was believed to have taken up a role mediating, persuading Iran to approve the deal. This increased role is further evidence of Chinese socialization and adaptation, showing an advanced understanding of the problem and actively working towards its resolution.

‘Active’ Involvement

China’s actions leading up to, during, and after the JCPOA show a clear change from the past. While China had always had an interest in a stable Middle East conducive to Chinese growth, its investments in the region grew and made stability a necessity. China clearly viewed itself as a stakeholder and wanted to be considered responsible. It increasingly became, or was viewed to become more actively involved – seeking a resolution to avoid any sort of a military confrontation.

China’s interest in a stable region underscored how its interests and view of the international community have evolved. There was a balance of interest and values inherent in China’s actions. Rather than continuing to refer to the issue as bilateral, China increasingly viewed the role of multilateral talks as useful. China’s implicit support of the unilateral sanctions stemmed from a similar base as to why it supported the UNSC sanctions - nearly universal support from other powers, Iran’s continued defiance and inability to address

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179 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.
concerns, as well as the potential danger of an armed conflict to ensure Iranian compliance. Moreover, China was concerned with ensuring that its external environment is stable so that there were no further challenges to its growth. Iran put this stability into question, and China counseled mediation and resolution of the situation.

The way China interacted throughout the JCPOA negotiations shows that China was both a key stakeholder, and that it wanted to be viewed as a responsible power. While the term ‘responsible power’ is frequently dismissed as a US ploy in private, it is undeniable that it is something that has become a part of China’s policy dialogue and official vocabulary. China’s actions with regard to Iran show that it viewed the intersection of non-proliferation and Middle East stability as issues it was involved in, and ignoring the issues would be, by definition, irresponsible.

Altogether, China’s actions with regard to the creation and implementation of the JCPOA showed a China that was aware of and influenced by the values of the international system. Through this, China has worked to address a problem, multilaterally, with the other powers within the system. This undeniably was evidence of socialization. China has worked with the P5+1 to solve an existing problem – rather than ignore it, fuel a revolutionary agenda, or encourage a solution outside of existing norms. China had come to a point where it had internalized non-proliferation norms, and recognized that solving delicate issues like this was best dealt with within the system.

Key Actor

After roughly two years of negotiation, Iran and the P5+1 approved the JCPOA on July 15, 2015. This agreement attempted to comprehensively address the Iranian nuclear concern and satisfy all involved parties. Much of the negotiation was done behind closed doors – and

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181 Meshbahi and Homayounvash, ‘Non-Proliferation’, 83
aspects are still not publicly available.\textsuperscript{183} The agreement was endorsed by the UNSC through UNSCR 2231 and a timetable set for implementation and the removal of sanctions on Iran.\textsuperscript{184} Realistically, while the end agreement was not exactly what the Iranian government would have wanted, having China and Russia adhere to the US and EU sanctions undermined their position.\textsuperscript{185}

While China’s role is not entirely clear, it was well established that it had a crucial role in mediating between the US and Iran. Resolution of the issue and avoiding a potential military conflict became their priority.\textsuperscript{186} Increasingly this underscores the role that values had. The United States and Iran were understandably the main actors involved, but China was a key intermediary – persuading Iran of the economic and political benefits of a deal, ‘securing international recognition for Iran’s ‘right’ to enrich uranium’, as well as mediating disputes.\textsuperscript{187}

Additionally, without the approval and participation of China the negotiations would have been difficult. By taking an active mediation role and participating in the creation of the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, China has highlighted its more active role in international issues. This represents a ‘notable precedent in [China’s] diplomatic efforts to combat nuclear proliferation and other issues of global governance’ and shows increasing recognition of the normative values inherent in the international community.\textsuperscript{188}

Beijing also attempted to persuade Iran through numerous high level diplomatic visits from June 2013 to July 2015.\textsuperscript{189} Between September 2013 and October 2016, there were at least 5 meetings between the Chinese and Iranian heads of state.\textsuperscript{190} At these visits, China emphasized that if Iran did not address international concerns, military conflict was likely. It was also stressed that if Iran avoided conflict and an agreement was reached, China would help further Iran’s economic development when sanctions were lifted.\textsuperscript{191} China’s ambassador to Iran,

\textsuperscript{183} This is ‘including a side agreement among the P5+1 on future UN action in 10 years and the contents of Iran’s “enrichment and enrichment R&D plan,” which Iran will eventually submit to the …(IAEA).’ Gary Samore, \textit{The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide}, (Cambridge, MA: Report for Belford Center for Science and International Affairs), August 3, 2015, 1.
\textsuperscript{185} Adam Tarock, ‘The Iran nuclear deal: winning a little, losing a lot’, \textit{Third World Quarterly}, Vol. 37, No. 8, 2016, 1421.
\textsuperscript{186} Garver, ‘Emerging’, 1.
\textsuperscript{189} Kondapalli, ‘Converting’, 63.
\textsuperscript{190} Interview, Chinese Scholar, October 2016.
\textsuperscript{191} Garver, ‘Emerging’, 2.
Pang Sen, stressed this in March 2015 – stating that once a deal is made, the resultant relaxed external environment will allow for more investment. In doing this, China was clearly trying to incentivize a quick resolution of the issue.

In general, the end agreement was acceptable to all – even if it did not completely satisfy all parties. The agreement placed limits on ‘Iran’s ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons’ – keeping the amount low enough so that it would not be able to make a warhead. In return, Iran would receive sanctions relief once the agreement was implemented – first from the UNSC sanctions and then from the unilaterally imposed sanctions. One of the key components from the US’s actions – sanctioning anyone who dealt with Iran’s Central Bank – was also lifted, freeing the Chinese companies that had restrained their actions. China was still the largest destination for Iranian oil, but the lifting of sanctions improved the overall situation. A year after the sanctions were lifted, foreign investment in Iran had risen 42%.

Mediation

Similar to China’s earlier role, China acted as a mediator – but now was much more active in seeking a resolution to the situation. China moved away from past precedent to act as a mediator, a bridge for understanding, and an assurer – to convince Iran that the deal would be carried out.

Press reports about China’s activity during the JCPOA negotiations tend to focus on China playing a constructive role that was also ‘objective, fair and responsible’.

193 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.
specifics were sparse, it was clear that Beijing prioritized the negotiations and did what it could to facilitate an agreement.

China’s role in these talks was seen to have been much bolder after 2013, after Xi Jinping took power. Prior to this, however, there was interest in resolving the issue — during Hu Jintao’s term the Chinese government ‘actively lobbied Washington’ to resolve the issue directly with Iran.

Interestingly, while in the past China’s role would have been downplayed or described as merely a participant; after an agreement was reached Chinese media emphasized its role as ‘active’. Many statements stressed the China’s constructive role in the process, giving little detail but emphasizing that its role was indeed useful or even ‘pivotal’ and ‘irreplaceable’. China Central Television (CCTV) stated that China had ‘made “unremitting efforts”’, and ‘played “a significant role”’. PressTv, an Iranian publication, quoted Xi Jinping describing China’s role in the negotiations as ‘an active participant, constructor and contributor’ focused on resolving the issue. Most views of China via the media depict China as proactively mediating and promoting diplomatic resolution wherever it can. Sources particularly call out the activeness of FM Wang Yi, and the preference Xi Jinping has for a more active role. This is a clear change from the disengaged China seen earlier.

China sought to play an accommodating role, mediating to find a balance between the various sides of the issue. Understanding the value of resolving the issue likely drove China’s actions. One of the clearest descriptions of China’s role was from the Iranian ambassador to Beijing. He described China to have ‘worked as a liaison that has successfully bridged the gaps, neutralized misunderstandings and helped alleviate concerns during the negotiations.’ China’s presence in the negotiations, he said, made the Iranian negotiators more confident that

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the deal would be implemented.\textsuperscript{207} Additionally, some have said that China even took a lead on some issues – chairing cooperation on the redesign of the Arak heavy water reactor.\textsuperscript{208}

It is worth noting that some did not see China’s role to have been as significant as has been described – some politely commenting that it was a group effort and others saying Beijing was ‘marginal, evasive and ambiguous’.\textsuperscript{209} China did, however, present itself as an active participant and this alone is an important shift emphasizing its further integration into the international system.

**Conclusion**

Overall, the evolution of China’s actions in the Iranian issue appear to be less extreme than Sudan, possibly because of the international inability to address the situation to any real extent during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s term, and the concurrent lack of any strong multilateral attempts to address the issue. However, even during this time, there was evidence of a change, although somewhat slower than the other cases.

From 1998 to 2005, China’s actions seemed to be counterproductive, with the exception of the reduction in arms sales. This could have been simply a result of China acting in its interest to encourage relations with the US. China viewed the international concerns with Iran to not be their issue. Then, throughout the international negotiations from 2003 to 2005, China was seen to dilute the effectiveness of responses, and continually refuse referral of the issue to the UNSC.

Yet in the next period of time, progress was made. Between 2006 and 2010, the UNSC passed a total of six resolutions and imposed gradual sanctions on Iran. Since they passed, this required at least China’s acquiescence. As a permanent member can threaten a veto, it is notable that China voted in favor each time. Further statements hinted that at least some in China believed that they should have a larger role. At the same time, Chinese-Iranian economic


relations intensified, and Iran replaced Saudi Arabia as China’s main source of foreign oil. Even while allowing the passage of sanctions, China became an economic lifeline for Iran. This shows that motivations were mixed with economic interests interplaying with the value-laden concept of being a responsible power.

From 2010 onwards, it appears that China began to view the issue in a different light. While sanctioned products had been sent to Iran from China, the US government did not think that the Chinese government actually authorized the transactions. So, while Chinese companies were breaching sanctions for their own interests, they were not seen to be doing so with governmental permission. China’s rhetoric towards Iran has also become stronger – ‘adamantly oppos[ing]’ Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons. Both acts signified an increasing understanding of the norms and values that permeate the Iranian nuclear issue and signal an increasing acceptance. Similar to China’s role as a mediator in Sudan, China’s role further expanded in the P5+1 talks that resulted in the JCPOA, initially bringing about an interim agreement and acting to resolve disputes between actors. The level of activeness attributed to China’s role by the Chinese media was unprecedented.

While somewhat slower, the case of Iran still illustrates a shift in China’s approach to the international order from predominantly interest based to a more holistic approach. To a certain extent, China’s policy choices were adaptation in line with Rosenau’s conception – but the choices were not inevitable. China could have set itself outside of international consensus on the issue at the UN – it could have strongly supported Iran and stood with them in revolutionary solidarity. They did not, even to the extent that Chinese decision-makers publicly aired their frustration with Iran.

While other nations were unilaterally sanctioning Iran to bring it back to the table, China could have pushed ahead on principle – subsidizing whatever firms that received damages from sanctions. Instead, China did not. They remained a part of the consensus – albeit utilizing delaying tactics. They sided with the international community in viewing Iran’s actions as a potential international security issue. They also, to a large extent, participated unofficially with the unilateral sanctions – and even began diversification away from Iranian oil. While there was

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an interest based component to this, the normative values of being seen as a ‘responsible power’ and part of the international community were stronger. Simply put, China continued to further understand the norms and conventions of the international community and played a constructive role within this system. One scholar referred to the back and forth on the UNSC as ‘interactive collaboration’, where both sides learn from the other and work to address issues. These actions are perfectly in line with Armstrong’s interpretation of socialization.

211 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 4 August 2016.
Chapter Six
North Korea: No Other Choice but Change

North Korea\(^1\) has been seen as one of the strongest examples of a rogue state in modern times as a result of its dictatorship, nuclear weapons and missile development, and a general disregard for international norms.\(^2\) North Korea’s nuclear program has posed a challenge for the international community for several reasons – it ‘has a long history of aggression against the [US]... South Korea and Japan’, has a record of selling weapons technology to unsavory nations, and makes up an estimated one-third of its GDP ‘through state sponsored criminal activity’.\(^3\) Alone each of these would be worrying enough, combined they underscore the likelihood that North Korea would sell nuclear materials to the highest bidder.

While North Korea is no longer classified as a state sponsor of terror, their actions indicate otherwise. As a result of a Six-Party Talks (6PT) agreement in 2008, North Korea was no longer listed as a state sponsor of terror.\(^4\) North Korea’s behavior up until 2017, however, including missile and nuclear weapons tests\(^5\), aggression towards S. Korea, and ‘abduct[ing] more than 180,000 people from 12 countries’\(^6\) has led to renewed calls to rename the nation a state sponsor of terrorism.\(^7\) The assassination of the Korean leader’s half-brother in Malaysia in February 2017 with one of the most toxic chemical agents was further proof.\(^8\) North Korea in

\(^1\) Chinese language work on North Korea mirrors official policy, please see Appendix A.
\(^3\) Christensen, China Challenge, 121.
\(^5\) Smith-Spark, ‘Report’.
\(^6\) Park, ‘North Korea’s’.
\(^7\) McLaughlin, ‘White House’.
2017 was still sanctioned by a number of nations and international bodies, including the US\textsuperscript{9}, UK\textsuperscript{10}, EU, and the UN\textsuperscript{11}.

If there was one single bilateral relationship that allows one to measure socialization through China’s relationship with pariah states, it would be with North Korea. The relationship’s legacy starts with China’s revolutionary solidarity with Korean comrades in the Communist International in the 1920s and then shared hatred for Japanese imperialism in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{12}

Between the end of the Second World War and the start of the Cold War, the bonds of shared values increased further, reaching its highest point with the Chinese military invasion of North Korea to prevent the defeat of the communist government by UN forces.\textsuperscript{13} The relationship might have seemed like a perfect revolutionary match, but China and North Korea experienced turbulence during the Sino-Soviet clashes over leadership of the world communist movement beginning in 1961, as well as during China’s CR (1966-76).\textsuperscript{14}

This Chapter examines the unwinding of fraternal communist solidarity between the two communist neighbors, as China moved closer to international norms of behavior through the late 1970s and 1980s, while North Korea remained stuck in some sort of ideological hell. China’s relationship with North Korea since the death of Mao has been troubled. This Chapter begins with an overview of the changes that will be seen in the relationship, as well as a review of the bilateral history. It then moves on to create a baseline describing relations in the 1990s. Next, it examines two turning points which clearly show how far China had shifted from its primary values in diplomacy of revolutionary solidarity to values more consistent with those of the international community.

As the first North Korean nuclear crisis began in the 1990s, China would either refuse to take part in negotiations, or act to shield it from punitive resolutions in the UNSC. As North Korea continued to act out against international order – first by leaving the NPT and later by


testing a nuclear weapon – China was forced to adapt. Having been integrated into international arms control institutions throughout the 1980s and 1990s, China was all but socialized to act in the defense of their norms. When the situation with North Korea failed to improve, China worked with the international community to attempt diplomatic negotiations while imposing increasingly harsh sanctions. In this crisis, China went from inaction to a key actor in efforts to resolve the problem stressing its socialization to the concepts of international order.

Overview of Changes

China’s approach to North Korea has shown a clear and consistent evolution in how China viewed its responsibilities and role in the international community. China’s interpretation and use of the values inherent in non-proliferation, international action/sovereignty, as well as China’s role in the system all have undergone significant changes as they have been challenged by the provocations of North Korea.

Non-Proliferation

While it has been argued that China had largely been socialized into the international non-proliferation regime by the 1990s, China did not play much of a role in the first North Korean Nuclear crisis. It may be more accurate to say that at that point China had been socialized in principle, and understood the concepts underlying the norm. They were not yet prepared to act – except in an institutionalized setting by signing on to treaties and agreements.

China’s approach to the North Korean issue indicated evidence of a slow transition in normative values – starting with how China evaluated its level of concern. During the first Crisis, China made it known that the issue was not their concern. The issue was between the United States and North Korea – and potentially also South Korea. This echoed China’s approach to both Sudan’s second civil war and the initial concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. China’s role throughout the 1990s was very hands off, they did not try to mediate or coordinate events.

\[15\] Johnston, ‘Learning’.
Respecting the DPRK’s sovereignty was paramount. The risk that North Korea would make a nuclear weapon successfully, much less distribute illicit materials made the probability of nonproliferation minimal.

Stability on the Korean peninsula was the main priority throughout all of the crises, and China continually stressed as much. As the issue developed, China gradually recognized that North Korea’s actions alone were destabilizing – and would easily affect China’s stability, not to mention regional stability, and nuclear stability in East Asia. China had been brought into non-proliferation norms and institutions throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but by the mid-2000s began to clearly see the implications of North Korea’s actions.

Opinions in the Chinese foreign policy community diverged around this point – one group was convinced that a close relationship with the DPRK was needed and another advocating a harsher line. What China actually pursued is something in between. China has sought to maintain a mediation role, adding a significantly more active level to its international profile. At first, in response to the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 China would act as a host, facilitator and mediator. This would ensure that grievances from all parties were aired and an agreeable resolution could be sought.

It is important to note that China increasingly saw this as an issue. Their frustration with North Korea’s inability to compromise, and tendency to openly provoke the international community consistently rose. At times, there was inaction, as international talks have been suspended for years. China’s reactions have gotten more severe – to the point where it worked together with the United States in drafting resolutions and sanctions at the UNSC. China recognized that North Korea was a dangerous state for its stability in many ways – and it began to fear the potential of an unstable state with nuclear capabilities over that of a failed state.

China moved from recognizing the concept of non-proliferation, to protecting the norm more openly in the international community. It allowed for and consistently approved increasingly harsh measures in response to North Korea’s provocations – and stayed steadfastly opposed to the concept of a nuclear state on the Korean peninsula. China was, in a way, led to

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16 Fulilove, ‘UN’, 77.
this position, as initially it urged restraint and limited responses. Yet, as the North continued to act out, the responses by necessity had to be stronger.

**International action/ Sovereignty**

China’s approach to international action and potential breaches of state sovereignty – especially in its allowance of punitive measures – greatly evolved as the crisis wore on. In part, this showed China’s changing interpretation of the role of the UN as well as what constituted severe breaches in the norm of sovereignty and non-interference. China throughout the 1990s did not vote for measures to censure North Korea in the UNSC. It only allowed for – through abstention – a weak resolution in 1993 (UNSCR 825). This, however, only asked North Korea to reconsider its decision to leave the NPT and allow inspectors into the country. It did not require any repercussions for non-compliance. Sanctions, and in general, referral to the UNSC throughout the 1990s was not something China would allow without threatening a veto.

In part, this was a response to China’s general view on sanctions. As China had been sanctioned and frequently stated that sanctions were ineffective, it has generally refused to use sanctions as a punitive measure. Throughout the 1990s, and even into the early 2000s China used the threat of its veto to water down or delay resolutions. It is also important to note that China had rarely vetoed – only ten times in its UNSC voting history.\(^{17}\)

The circumstances and severity of the North Korean issue did not allow China to advocate leniency or delay sanctions in 2006. The missile test followed by the first nuclear test forced China’s hand and created a situation that required stricter responses. North Korea’s increasing provocations and breach of the clear line set by the international community changed the tone of the conversation. After this occurred, there was no way to reverse course. Like with Iran, North Korea had been warned but persisted. Its successful test expedited the response. The UNSC initially sanctioned a limited group of North Koreans – those directly involved in the creation of missiles and their nuclear program - but left the door open for further sanctions should North Korea refuse to make progress.

China was seen to limit the severity of resolutions regarding North Korea in an effort to lessen the provocative response from North Korea. They also appeared to reduce the scope of sanctions on North Korea for virtually every resolution. Allowing sanctions still, however, was a significant step for China’s role in the international order. North Korea’s actions escalated the priority and potential danger of the issue, making resolution of the problem an even greater necessity. For this, sanctions, while previously not an option, became a last resort. From this point on, all measures, except military action, would be on the table.

Even as stricter sanctions were applied, North Korea continued to test the limits of the international community as it persisted in its nuclear weapons testing program. In response, the UNSC continued to pass more intensive sanctions in an attempt to coerce the DPRK into discussing the issue. Many other states, including China, went as far as to introduce their own sanctions against North Korea.

China’s actions show that it viewed the role of the international community to be increasingly vital to the resolution of complex issues. No longer were issues like the North Korean nuclear crisis a bilateral issue – they were now best solved with the input of the international community. Here too, a change in the conception of sovereignty and non-interference had been demonstrated. In the past sanctions were almost never a possibility, yet as China became more involved they have had to authorize them. China had experienced this while dealing with Iran, as well as with Darfur and the South Sudanese civil war. Essentially, as China became more integrated into the international order and has grown in power it has realized that it must adapt and revise its approach. Scholars in China have agreed in principle to this – but do not call it ‘change’, to be able to describe China’s actions, they refer to it as ‘constructive engagement’.18

Evolution in Role

These actions clearly show that China’s interpretation of the situation as well as China’s role has evolved significantly since the first nuclear crisis. China went from an uninterested

18 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 September 2016.
bystander to an engaged stakeholder – one that understood that the situation needs to be addressed. China, admittedly, dragged its feet and weakened punitive action, but it allowed each successive action to be progressively harsher as North Korea had continued its antisocial behavior. There was a clear progression from non-involvement to involvement with increasingly strict sanctions. In part, this came from a desire to encourage North Korea to accept the international community’s concern, and recognize the instability inherent in their actions.

Initially, China did not want a role at all and was not willing to deal with what it saw as a bilateral problem between the US and North Korea. As a result, while it supported a peaceful settlement that ensured stability, it had no interest in resolving the dispute. After the temporary resolution of the first crisis, China began to have more of a role towards the end of the 1990s with the four-party talks. Even at this point, however, China was not willing to take part in the issue other than to suggest minor changes. In particular, their role amounted to suggesting an alternate seating plan, asking for variation in how the meetings were conducted or passing a message from the US to North Korea. This was a starting point, but was still a China just beginning to realize its role in regional and world affairs.

Once the second crisis began, China’s role evolved quickly into a more proactive sort of mediation– with China working between the parties in an attempt to resolve the issue in a way that was amenable to all sides without resorting to punitive measures. China hosted the talks and ensured they stayed on track. While China was hesitant on taking a clear side, they continued to advocate for mediation and a peaceful resolution of the issue. This was a positive step forward. China was beginning to become engaged with the issue and wanted to play a role in ensuring that it was resolved in a peaceful manner that would guarantee East Asian stability.

Approaching the issue without sanctions as an option became more difficult for all involved after North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test in 2006. Even China could no longer delay the imposition of sanctions. The test itself was also an affront to China – as they had continued to emphasize peaceful measures and that North Korea should cease its testing. As a result of this loss of face, China had no choice but to approve a stronger response. China’s response utilized one of its harshest diplomatic phrases and allowed for the imposition of
sanctions – a clear break from past behavior. This again, shows China clearly invested in the success of the talks and its adaptation to the realities of the situation.

As North Korea continued to test and ignore the concerns of the international community, additional measures had to be taken. Accordingly, with each successive breach China allowed for harsher language and stricter sanctions – going as far as to institute its own sanctions – and at times ‘coincidently’ cut off energy supplies to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. When compared to China’s actions in the 1990s, China became much more involved and committed. From their allowance of the imposition of sanctions to organizing multilateral talks, China clearly took a larger role and further adapted to its role as a great power.

Sino-DPRK Relations – A Brief Historical Review

Although China and North Korea have frequently invoked their long historical relationship - steeped in experience with foreign occupation and a similar Leninist ideology – their relationship has been checkered. Throughout the Cold War, the USSR generally had a stronger influence on North Korean affairs – with North Korea tending to play China off of the USSR. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s role increased and virtually became the sole actor in North Korea.

China had a strong link to North Korea as a result of the Korean War and the resultant formal military alliance - the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The Communist party lineage also played a large role in their connection. Those aside, the

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20 North Korea was one of the first to begin diplomatic relations on October 6, 1949. The National Committee on North Korea, 'DPRK Diplomatic Relations', The National Committee on North Korea, http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/dprk-diplomatic-relations, 25 March 2014.
25 Bates, Gill, ‘China’s North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influences,’ United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 283’ (Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 7; It is ‘the head of the International Department of the [CCP], or his counterpart in the
predominant reasons for China’s continued interaction with the DPRK boil down to ensuring stability on China’s border – ensuring the regime did not collapse or completely shift the balance of power in East Asia.  

As the Cold War ended, China became a major actor in North Korea by default. However, balancing to the new realities of a post-Reform and post-Cold War world also necessitated a normalization of relations with South Korea in 1992. This action was seen as a betrayal by the North, and continued to factor into North Korea’s interaction with China. It is also generally seen as a key moment that defined relations in the 1990s. This damaged official relations throughout the 1990s – while there was trade and aid, there was not an official visit by top leadership until 2000 and 2001.

The First Nuclear Crisis

Even though there was increasing trade between China and North Korea, China’s role in the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s – and the level of influence China believed it had – was minimal. During this crisis, China did not see itself as a party to the negotiations in any way. As for both Sudan and Iran in the 1990s, China viewed it as ‘a direct matter between the DPRK and the three sides—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States, and the Republic of Korea.’ China did not act as a mediator, and did not take part in the multilateral group formed to implement the resolution agreement.

Once North Korea left the NPT, China used its role in the UNSC to delay action – opting for presidential statements rather than a full resolution. At this time, the Chinese FM also

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Workers’ Party of Korea, travels to Pyongyang, or Beijing, each is allowed access to the other country’s top leadership. The arrangements for Kim Jong-Il’s visits to China are handled by the CCP International Department, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  

underscored that China did not approve of any sanctions – or attempts to bring the issue to the IAEA or the UNSC.\textsuperscript{33} Even with China’s threats of veto, a weakened UNSC resolution was passed asking North Korea to reconsider leaving the NPT, with China and Pakistan abstaining.\textsuperscript{34} Essentially, China concurrently viewed the issue as not concerning them – but did not approve of it being brought up at the IAEA or UNSC.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{Basepoint – A Baseline of Inactivity}

The first nuclear crisis sets a baseline for Chinese action from which to examine China’s adaptation in addressing the North Korean nuclear problem. Throughout the first crisis – and into the first few years of the second – China’s role was virtually non-existent.\textsuperscript{36} This action, similar to the baselines for both Iran and Sudan, had China involved with the state in question but unwilling or unable to take part in international concerns.

\textbf{Mediation}

Overall, China’s actions throughout this time set a basepoint for China’s role in the North Korean nuclear crisis. China was predominantly a behind-the-scenes actor that participated very minimally, preferring to let other nations take the lead. This was a result of the issue not registering as a priority for the Chinese leadership. They could not yet see if – or how – the situation could impact them or their regional security.

As a result, China consistently pushed for peaceful mediation, negotiations and stressed the need for stability over sanctions and punitive measures. As the potential that North Korea could successfully develop a nuclear weapon was initially low, the situation was not prioritized.

Moving forward, changes to China’s approach towards North Korea would be easily identifiable – as China was clearly disengaged from the process throughout the early years of the crisis. Its role as a mediator and facilitator began to increase as time went on – but was still

\textsuperscript{33} Kim, ‘Making’, 392.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 393
\textsuperscript{35} Kim, ‘UN’, 55.
\textsuperscript{36} Lee, ‘China’, 312.
not viewed as an issue that they needed to actively participate in. This also clearly illustrates a China in a pre-socialized state – partially recognizing stability issues but not understanding the potential severity of the issue. While it did slowly begin to have a greater role, it was still very much a background actor.

**Behind the Scenes**

Starting in 1993, the US viewed China as the key component to resolving the first nuclear crisis. They would not find much assistance – as China insisted that it had ‘very little leverage with Pyongyang, despite the North’s economic dependence on China’. While this may have been true due to China’s diplomatic recognition of South Korea the year before, through their own admission North Korea was economically reliant on them – so they had more leverage than none. Pyongyang also made it clear that it did not want China to have a key role in the discussion.

This insistence continued to be a theme throughout the first crisis, with China frequently stating that it had little influence, and that the situation is best dealt with between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. China did make statements saying it ‘supports the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, but there is also a national-sovereignty issue’ – so China ‘refused to take any role or responsibility in this situation.’

Its claims of little influence might have been true for much of the Cold War, as North Korea was ‘economically reliant on the Soviet Union.’ The collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the floods, droughts and resultant famine in the mid-1990s increased the need for Chinese aid. North Korea’s trade with Japan was also fairly strong throughout the 1990s. However, China matched and surpassed the level of trade by the early 2000s. So, although

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Beijing was politically connected, throughout the 1990s their influence over North Korea through economic means was limited.

China reportedly frequently took a neutral role behind the scenes to ‘maintain [...]equilibrium’ and keep discussions balanced.\(^{44}\) The first crisis ended with the Agreed Framework – but discussions continued through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization – of which China did not want to be an active participant.

Throughout this time, China had ‘no specific stance but a flexible attitude’.\(^{45}\) The next multilateral forum was the Four Party talks. These talks only lasted from 1997-1999\(^ {46}\), but the most active roles China had were to suggest that the seating arrangement rotated – because North Korea did not like their seat – and suggesting there be bilateral meetings for ‘half of each conference day’ – again because North Korea wanted bilateral meetings with the US.\(^ {47}\)

Although the four party talks met for ‘three preliminary gatherings and six main meetings’, the talks did not result in any sort of ‘binding agreements’ that would address the issue.\(^ {48}\)

The negotiations disbanded and nothing occurred until October 2002 - when China set up a meeting between the US and North Korea. Unknown to China, prior to the meeting, North Korea announced it had a highly-enriched uranium program.\(^ {49}\) This ended the discussion, as it was viewed as a breach of the Agreed Framework. Privately, Chinese representatives again told the US ‘that its influence was “limited” and publicly stressed the importance of a “peaceful solution.”’\(^ {50}\)

Throughout the first nuclear crisis, China blocked any potential UN action or even IAEA action. Only twice was the issue brought up in the UNSC prior to North Korea’s nuclear weapons test – once in 1993, and again in 2006.\(^ {51}\) China abstained on the UNSC vote in May 1993 on the resolution targeting North Korea – their abstention was on the condition that the end resolution was ‘limited’.

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\(^ {45}\) Kim, ‘Making’, 395.
\(^ {47}\) Kim, ‘Making’, 396.
\(^ {48}\) Chung and Choi, ‘Uncertain’, 255.
\(^ {51}\) Wuthnow, Beyond, 120.
They did indicate that they would veto any resolution issuing sanctions, threatening them or ‘even vague language that suggested such sanctions were a future option’. Concern was next issued in the UNSC in September 1998 – after a DPRK missile test – when a ‘press statement’ (lower in severity than a PS) was issued. It was obvious that China did not want the issue brought up at all at the UNSC.

A Bilateral Issue for the US

China defined its role in this way because it did not see it as an issue that they were or even should be involved with. North Korea agreed – and stated that China had nothing to do with the Agreed Framework – it was done bilaterally with the US without ‘relying on someone else’s sympathy or advice’. The Chinese did not see anything to gain from being involved – it was not ‘an opportunity to strengthen ties with the United States or enhance its role in Northeast Asia’. The extent of its role after the Agreed Framework fell apart – was to ‘urge[] the United States to resolve the tense situation through bilateral dialogue with North Korea’. To China, the issue was clearly a bilateral/trilateral issue between the United States, South Korea and North Korea. In the 1990s, China did not bring the parties together to negotiate – that was viewed as ‘America’s responsibility’. Beijing wanted the dispute to be resolved bilaterally, and made this quite clear by its inaction. Even into the early 2000s – when China created the opportunity for a trilateral talk, what it really wanted was to arrange ‘an opportunity for direct bilateral talks between Pyongyang and Washington’.

As a result – since the situation remained virtually the same, with no actual nuclear weapons – China did not see this as an issue that involved or threatened them. Until the issue evolved and pose a threat to China’s national or regional security, China would continue to play

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52 Christensen, China Challenge, 187
53 Wuthnow, Beyond, 121
56 Glaser and Liang, ‘North Korea’, 165.
57 Ibid.
59 Kim, ‘Six-Party’, 125.
60 Helgesen and Thelle, Dialogue, 18-9.
a relatively hands off role. China was present at the meetings, but did little more than facilitate. China alsodeclared its support for ‘denuclearization of the peninsula and’ the need for ‘a peaceful solution’. North Korea continued to insist on direct negotiations with only the US – something the US did not want to do, as a multilateral agreement would be stronger – and more accountable.

**Stability Was Key**

When looking at this issue it is important to emphasize how much stability played a role in China’s thinking. For China, most issues have centered on how they affected or could affect China’s stability – both its regional and internal stability. Chinese leadership viewed stability to be essential in protecting the party and the nation. It is generally viewed that China has three main goals when dealing with North Korea – stability, peace and denuclearization. Many factors come into play at various levels with North Korea, but stability is key.

Christensen listed two reasons why China was reluctant to pressure North Korea, both potentially destabilizing – 1) If North Korea collapsed, migrants would flood into China, and 2) China had no idea what would happen in Korea after a collapse, and this unpredictability was unnerving. It was also hard for China to abandon North Korea and be seen to be placating the United States. This would go directly against the Chinese narrative of Mao and the Korean War, and anger an already ‘increasingly resistive Chinese population’.

North Korea has frequently been viewed as a buffer state to China – which North Korea could use to their benefit. However, it has been argued that China became more active in the early 2000s because it saw the potential negative effects of ‘the growing sensitivity of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula to China’s economic and political interests’.

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61 Jeong, *Foreign Policy*, 55.
63 Easley and Park, ‘Norms’, 657.
65 Christensen, *China Challenge*, 123.
66 Ibid. 130-1.
Korea could harm regional stability in three key ways – undermining the NPT, potentially starting an East Asian arms race, and causing instability on China's northeast border in the event of collapse.\textsuperscript{69} So, in an effort to maintain stability, some viewed China’s actions to have been focused on appeasement.\textsuperscript{70} This was based on a goal to maintain good relations with North Korea – and was severely undermined by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.\textsuperscript{71}

Throughout the talks in the 1990s and into the early 2000s, China emphasized stability – and ensuring this became a ‘primary strategic goal’.\textsuperscript{72} Any action that could damage the precarious stability on the peninsula – and within the North Korean regime itself - was feared by China.\textsuperscript{73} The success of China’s continued reform needed both a stable internal and external environment, and the DPRK’s brinkmanship challenged this.\textsuperscript{74}

China’s logic at this point was that overall, the destabilizing effect of imposing sanctions or the Kim family losing power were greater risks to stability than the unlikely possibility that North Korea successfully created a nuclear weapon. Even when Jiang Zemin met with George W. Bush in 2002, Jiang stressed that China had nothing to do with North Korea’s nuclear program and that the issue was between the US and the DPRK. Eventually Jiang and Bush agreed that ‘peace and stability in Northeast Asia must be maintained’ and to work towards ‘peaceful resolution of [the] issue’.\textsuperscript{75}

**Turning Point One - The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Test**

The second nuclear crisis began when North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003.\textsuperscript{76} China’s more proactive role started to take form in 2003 when it pressured North Korea into three-way talks with itself and Washington that would expand into the 6PT framework.\textsuperscript{77}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[70] Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 9 July 2016.
\item[71] Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 September 2016.
\item[72] Gill, ‘North Korea’,1.
\item[73] Wuthnow, Beyond, 69.
\item[77] Christensen, China Challenge, 223.
\end{footnotes}
Initially, China approached the second nuclear crisis like the first – in that it was for others to solve ‘through dialogue and negotiation’. Soon, however, it began to approach the issue differently. After North Korea successfully tested a nuclear weapon, the threat became real and China faced a potential conflict on its border. Faced with this, China was forced to adapt – and allowed for sanctions to be applied in 2006. While it was not until after the nuclear test, China still chose to act with the international community instead of supporting North Korea.

A Growing Role

Overall, 2006 marked a turning point in China’s role in the North Korean Nuclear crisis. China could no longer view the issue to be resolved solely through diplomatic negotiations. Throughout 2006 and the years that followed, China began to acknowledge that they had a role in the conflict – and made it a priority to ensure the resumption of negotiations. No longer was Chinese action delayed because they did not view the issue to be solely between the US and North Korea. China’s initial role was limited to mediation, but expanded as it became more involved in the activities of the 6PT and its continuation.

The nuclear test forced China’s hand and changed how China approached the issue. China moved from a ‘lukewarm watcher to essentially standing with the United States to punish the DPRK’. China used the harshest language it had ever used diplomatically, and allowed for sanctions to be utilized – breaking its own precedent. This was clearly important and made a marked shift in the way that China viewed the situation and how they would continue to address it. North Korea’s refusal to work with the international community ensured that China would have to react differently or face a damaged international reputation.

While slow, China’s actions evolved while and working to address the issues at hand. It remained consistent in its attempts to encourage mediation and negotiation. Once it could no longer defer sanctioning North Korea, China finally approved them. This showed China’s increasing socialization to the international system – as it adapted to a crisis created by a ‘rogue’.

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79 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 September 2016.
The Six Party Talks

Initially, it appeared that right after North Korea left the NPT, ‘Jiang Zemin, telephoned US president George W. Bush and denounced North Korea’.\textsuperscript{80} In this call, he underscored ‘the importance of safeguarding the international nuclear nonproliferation system and promised to work with all parties concerned to promote an early peaceful settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue.’\textsuperscript{81} Perhaps by this he meant that China would help facilitate meetings – as China was present at discussions about the issue but played a very passive role – occasionally acting as a behind the scenes facilitator and neutral mediator.

China further signaled its disapproval in February 2003 by voting at the IAEA to refer the case to the UNSC – something it had previously been unwilling to do and an action that would get North Korea’s attention.\textsuperscript{82} Additionally, Beijing sent a former FM to meet Kim Jong II in March 2003, and another vice-FM in July 2003 - both ministers were tasked with encouraging North Korea to return to multilateral talks.\textsuperscript{83} Overall, influence did seem to increase as Chinese involvement grew. For instance, in 2003 China got North Korea to agree to 6PT.\textsuperscript{84} China did not just approach North Korea to get the talks going – it sent diplomats to ‘Pyongyang, Washington, Tokyo, Seoul and Moscow in July 2003’ in a sort of ‘shuttle diplomacy’.\textsuperscript{85} For each subsequent round of the talks, similar diplomatic maneuvers were used to bring everyone to the table. Deciding that this needed to occur and proactively sending out diplomats highlighted China’s understanding of the norms at play and urgency of the issue.

For these negotiations, Beijing hosted and continued to pursue the role of peacemaker and mediator.\textsuperscript{86} When the talks appeared to stall in 2004, Beijing again sent a special envoy in an attempt to restart them.\textsuperscript{87} China became a bit more involved in the 6PT – by ‘drawing North Korea into a unique regional, multilateral setting’.\textsuperscript{88} Initially, to get North Korea involved in the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{80} Jones, ‘Pact’.  \\
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{82} Wu, ‘Whispers’, 41-2.  \\
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.39.  \\
\textsuperscript{84} Strategic Comments, ‘Dealing with Iran and North Korea: Proliferation Challenges’, Vol. 9, No. 7, 2003, 1.  \\
\textsuperscript{85} Chung, ‘Approaches’, 750.  \\
\textsuperscript{86} Michael D Swaine, ‘China’s North Korea Dilemma’, China Leadership Monitor, No. 30, 2009, 5.  \\
\textsuperscript{87} Swaine, ‘North Korea’, 5.  \\
\textsuperscript{88} Kim, ‘Six-Party’, 125.
\end{flushleft}
talks, Beijing offered incentives – including 10,000 tons of diesel, as well as potential threats.\(^89\) In spring 2003, a ‘technical issue’ caused China’s oil pipeline to North Korea to shut off, a potential message to join the talks.\(^90\) China had to incentivize North Korea to have them return to the talks in 2004 – offering additional ‘aid and energy assistance totaling around $50 million’.\(^91\) China’s role in the early stages of the 6PT was described by Wang Yi as ‘active mediation’.\(^92\)

Compared to the first crisis, China was more involved though limited their involvement to mediation or facilitation. It encouraged both the U.S and North Korea to attempt to compromise, but would not put forth its own ideas or support escalating the issue in the UNSC. Before 2005, China ‘had refrained from criticizing North Korea,’ instead placing blame on the United States.\(^93\)

Between July and September 2005, ‘China became more actively involved in managing the crisis’.\(^94\) In particular, China did much of the legwork in creating draft agreements working with all of the various involved parties, until a draft agreement ‘amenable to all countries’ was produced.\(^95\) This led to an outline of the steps required to solve the crisis that would later lead to additional documents in February and October 2007.\(^96\) In contrast to earlier sessions of the 6PT, Chinese officials took an active role in discussions and offered their own proposals. They also worked together to combine ideas from other nations at the talks. Even between sessions, Chinese officials were sent to the other nations to continue the search for a resolution. One Chinese scholar remarked that ‘never in the diplomatic history of the PRC has the country been so deeply or extensively involved in a controversial regional issue to which it was not a direct party.’\(^97\)

The DPRK continued to provoke the international community, dropping out of the 6PT and conducting missile tests in early 2006. The tests forced China to condemn the action and

\(^{89}\) Song and Lee, ‘Engagement’, 16.
\(^{91}\) Kim, ‘Six-Party’, 119-20.
\(^{93}\) Sun, ‘Logic’, S29.
\(^{94}\) Pacheco Pardo, ‘Regional’, 342-3; Glaser and Liang, ‘North Korea’, 171.
\(^{95}\) Pacheco Pardo, ‘Regional’, 342-3
\(^{96}\) Ibid.
\(^{97}\) Lee, ‘China’, 323.
allow for limited sanctions through Resolution 1695.\textsuperscript{98} During this time Chinese-North Korean trade volumes began to decrease and official aid measures were delayed, signifying that some coercive measures were not off the table.\textsuperscript{99} Overall, in the early years of the 6PT, China’s role was viewed as relatively constructive in facilitating and attempting to resolve the issue.\textsuperscript{100} It was also a somewhat ‘soft approach’ that only encouraged diplomatic options.\textsuperscript{101}

The Nuclear Test and the Allowance of Sanctions

The most striking turning point was North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 – this action symbolized the point of no return.\textsuperscript{102} After the nuclear test, China’s attitude changed. Stability in the region had been further threatened. It was a massive loss of face to China, as they had continued to press for the talks to try to prevent escalation. It had continually warned the North not to go forward with tests - the Chinese Ambassador to the UN warned that ‘no one [would] protect’ them, and that they would have to face ‘serious consequences’.\textsuperscript{103} The DPRK gave China 20 minutes notice and tested the weapon.\textsuperscript{104} Five days later, the UNSC unanimously passed a resolution condemning the test and ‘imposed an embargo on a range of arms, including artillery, tanks, and WMD-related items, as well as on luxury goods’\textsuperscript{105}

China itself moved to apply ‘significant bilateral economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea in late 2006 and early 2007 through its own Party and military channels’ without significant influence or pressure by external parties.\textsuperscript{106} To continue to bring North Korea back to the table, China on at least two occasions decreased or cut off oil shipments ‘to add pressure.’\textsuperscript{107} Throughout this time in the 6PT, North Korea appeared to be doing everything but negotiating, including criticizing China, alienating all of the other 6PT participants by December 2006. Due to Chinese pressure, by February 2007 North Korea ‘returned to the talks… ready to

\textsuperscript{98} Sun, ‘Logic’, 530.
\textsuperscript{99} Feng, ‘Shifting’, 54.
\textsuperscript{100} Gill, ‘North Korea’, 3.
\textsuperscript{101} Feng, ‘Shifting’, 47.
\textsuperscript{102} Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 9 July 2016; Interview, 21 September 2016; Interview, 6PT representative/ Academic, Beijing, 30 September 2016.
\textsuperscript{103} Moore, ‘Threatens’, 10.
\textsuperscript{104} Kuhn, How China’s, 376; Feng, ‘Shifting’, 45.
\textsuperscript{105} Wuthnow, Beyond, 122.
\textsuperscript{106} Christensen, China Challenge, 230.
\textsuperscript{107} Twomey, ‘Explaining’, 417
negotiate.’ An agreement was reached in February 2007. The talks, however, would ‘stall again in late 2008 over North Korea’s willful misinterpretations of their commitments’ under previous agreements.\textsuperscript{108}

In the years following the nuclear test, sanctions would continue to be unanimously passed in the UNSC further targeting North Korea as they refused to comply with the resolutions’ requirements.\textsuperscript{109} These sanctions have increased in scope to further impact Pyongyang’s leadership, but have not yet forced the regime to cease its provocations.

China saw North Korea’s actions ‘as not only an act of defiance to the international community and a threat to regional stability, but also an act of defiance toward China’.\textsuperscript{110} China had consistently warned North Korea ‘not to conduct either of the tests and “lost face” when Pyongyang went ahead with them anyway.’\textsuperscript{111}

The missile test in 2006 disturbed Chinese leadership, but the nuclear test infuriated them. Even after the DPRK announced that they were going to test a weapon, Chinese state media used ‘unprecedentedly direct cautionary wording’ warning them against going forward.\textsuperscript{112} After the test, the shift in language was much clearer and underscored a clear break.

Directly in response, the Chinese government issued a Foreign Ministry statement that utilized the strongest language yet to censure North Korea.\textsuperscript{113} Xinhua also carried the statement saying that North Korea ‘defied universal opposition of the international community and flagrantly conducted [a] Nuclear test’ and that ‘the Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it.’\textsuperscript{114} The use of ‘flagrantly’ was apparently suggested by Hu Jintao himself, and had previously only been used ‘to signal a high degree of Chinese anger’ after the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed or when a Japanese PM visited the Yasukuni Shrine.\textsuperscript{115} This represented a clear turning point and obvious dissatisfaction from the Chinese side.\textsuperscript{116} After the

\textsuperscript{108} Christensen, \textit{China Challenge}, 230-1.
\textsuperscript{109} In UNSCR 1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094, and 2270); Weissmann and Hagström, ‘Sanctions’, 62.
\textsuperscript{110} Glaser, Snyder, and Park, ‘Keeping, 3.
\textsuperscript{111} Nanto and Manyin, ‘China-North Korea’, 18.
\textsuperscript{112} Swaine, ‘North Korea’, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Feng, ‘Shifting’, 49.
second and third nuclear tests the Chinese government and state media would also use strong language, primarily ‘firmly oppose’ or ‘strongly urge’ – but not as harsh as for the first test.\textsuperscript{117} In addition to using the harshest diplomatic language, North Korea’s nuclear test compelled China to continue the allowance of increasingly strong sanctions on North Korea.\textsuperscript{118} Prior to this, China had been reluctant or opposed to bringing up the DPRK in the UNSC. In 2003 for example, a resolution was under discussion in the Security Council to censure North Korea’s plan to leave the NPT and its nuclear program – but was vetoed by China and Russia for fear it would only ‘provoke North Korea unnecessarily’, exemplifying China’s inactivity.\textsuperscript{119} Yet, as North Korea escalated its provocations, the DPRK was sanctioned for its July 2006 missile tests, with the support of China. Despite these sanctions, they were limited and only banned the sale of weapons technology to/from North Korea.\textsuperscript{120} Additionally, it was reported that China’s first reaction was to urge restraint and issue a UNSC PS, as China had done after 1998’s tests.\textsuperscript{121}

In the wake of the 2006 nuclear test, China’s ambassador to the UN stated that, since North Korea had crossed the lines set in the July UNSC resolution, ‘some punitive action’ would be necessary.\textsuperscript{122} As seen by this statement – China’s position had clearly shifted. Resolution 1718 was quickly passed. Expanded sanctions banning a number of imports and exports were approved and the UNSC set up a sanctions committee to deal with the issue.\textsuperscript{123} When the North again tested a weapon in 2009, China voted with the rest of the UNSC to expand the scope of the sanctions.\textsuperscript{124} This test elicited a similar response – a strong condemnation by China, expanded sanctions, and finally a push by China to resume the 6PT.\textsuperscript{125} This time, however, China went so far as to ‘impose[e] its own sanctions’ on oil shipments to North Korea, and cancelled a joint venture project.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Swaine, ‘North Korea’, 3-4; Jih-Un Kim, ‘Inflated Hope, Unchanged Reality: China’s Response to North Korea’s Third Nuclear Test’, \textit{Asian Perspective}, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2015, 33.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Gill, ‘North Korea’, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Wu, ‘Whispers’, 43.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Wuthnow, Beyond, 126-7.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Helgesen and Thelle, \textit{Dialogue}, 94.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Easley and Park, ‘Norms’, 651.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Helgesen and Thelle, Dialogue, 94.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Pacheco Pardo, ‘Regional’, 350-1; Reeves and Pacheco Pardo, ‘Parsing’, 467-8.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Nanto and Manyin, ‘China-North Korea’, 19.
\end{itemize}
While China did act to weaken sanctions – it still supported them. The mere allowance of limited sanctions in response to the missile test and expanded sanctions after the nuclear test noted China’s increasing frustration with the North’s unwillingness to comply, and that they would not continue to act as a shield at the UN. Even Chinese scholarly opinion changed publicly after the test - viewing the test to have taken advantage of China, and more began thinking sanctions were now an option.

As early as 2005, China also unilaterally sanctioned North Korea – with this being expanded after the nuclear test in 2006. China even allowed for financial sanctions to be placed on a Banco Delta Asia in Macau that ‘held significant North Korean assets’. At the same time, China ‘substantially tightened border control with North Korea and remarkably reduced its exchanges of commodities’. Additionally, China began to take ‘measures to halt banking transactions with certain North Korean entities and temporarily curtail shipments of petroleum’.

In allowing for sanctions – and enacting their own – China visibly crossed a line. They were clearly a part of the international system, increasingly understood the normative issues regarding the North Korean crisis, and adapted to enable action. This by itself shows strong evidence of the progression of socialization in China.

Disapproval and Negotiation

After the 2006 nuclear test, several issues remained priorities for China – particularly the resumption of the stalled 6PT and emphasizing the need for mediation. China’s role facilitating the discussion for the 6PT had been essential in getting them off the ground, but had stalled for over a year between 2005 and 2006 – resuming only for five days in December

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131 Wuthnow, Beyond, 136-7.
China renewed its efforts to resume the 6PT in 2007, as the US was installing a new national security team. The talks would resume in 2007 and run multiple sessions throughout the year, but would not result in any lasting resolution. China sent representatives to the DPRK at various points to encourage their continued attendance, so that the talks could be resumed. In October 2009, Wen Jiabao was sent – the first visit by a Chinese Premier to North Korea in 18 years – to ‘maintain high-level exchanges, deepen pragmatic cooperation, strengthen coordination on major issues, and push [better] relations’.

China was successful in getting talks started several times after the 2006 test, but each time the talks inevitably stalled and needed to be restarted. In response to the UNSC PS against a North Korean satellite launch in 2009, the DPRK announced that it would no longer take part in the talks and restarted its nuclear program. This was confirmed when North Korea tested another weapon in May 2009. While the talks have not resumed since – China has continually tried to promote their resumption – even resulting in Kim Jong Il stating in 2011 that he was willing to return to the talks without preconditions. The talks however did not resume.

Turning Point Two - Kim Jong Un, Continuing Tests, and Harsher Sanctions

After the second nuclear test in 2009, the 6PT completely broke down. China continued to press for a resumption of the talks, with no real success. While there was a lack of real progress in resolving the crisis, China’s became increasingly involved. North Korea continued to provoke international scorn and received increasingly harsh sanctions – crafted by the U.S. and

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135 Yong Chool Ha and Chaesung Chun, ‘North Korea’s Brinksmanship and the Task to Solve the “Nuclear Dilemma”’, Asian Perspective, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2010, 100; BBC, ‘North Korea talks set to resume’, BBC, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6102092.stm, 31 October 2006b
137 Wuthnow, Beyond, 123; Easley and Park, ‘Norms’, 661.
138 Wuthnow, Beyond, 130.
139 Easley and Park, ‘Norms’, 662.
140 Landler, ‘Restart’.
China together. This represents another evolution in China’s international role – emphasizing its understanding of international rules, and working to preserve international order.

**Increasing Involvement**

Throughout Xi Jinping’s presidency, China exhibited a relatively consistent trend to increasingly censure North Korea. It became clear that, on many measures, China was fed up with the unending provocations and weapons tests that continued to escalate the crisis. As a result, China began to work more and more with the US and the international community to address the situation, and help bring it to a peaceful end.

There have been setbacks – China’s reaction to the THAAD missile defense system being one example. Still, on the whole, China’s role continued to increase as has its involvement in sanctions. This is particularly important, because without China’s help the sanctions would fail. China’s participation was vital to the attempts to resolve the issue.

It is important to note how integrated China has become in the system that is charged with resolving the issue. The level of Chinese involvement is higher than could have been foretold in the 1990s, and China is acting in a much more proactive manner. This illustrates how enmeshed China has become with the international system. It has been socialized into the norms of international action and non-proliferation, and reacted as such throughout each successive transgression. The issue is clearly a concern – and China has moved to harshly sanction and reprimand the DPRK’s actions in both obvious and subtler ways.

**Provocations and Leadership Transitions**

China’s role in the years leading up to Xi Jinping’s presidency have often been criticized for not proactively chastising North Korea’s provocative actions – particularly after the intentional sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong island in 2010. In public and in the UNSC, Beijing’s reaction was viewed as ‘conciliatory’, ‘calling for calm and seeking to restart the Six Party Talks’. China’s statement issued against North Korea’s attack was seen

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143 Gill, ‘North Korea’, 2.
144 Ibid.
by many as too ambivalent. On the whole, this lukewarm response made observers think that China was not willing to chastise North Korea’s actions.

Directly following the Financial Crisis (2008-2011), there was a clear backward trend in China’s policies towards North Korea. For most measures, China strengthened its political and economic relations, including ‘frequent high-level public diplomacy’. In part, this was probably a result of fears of instability in internal DPRK affairs, with Kim Jong Il’s stroke in 2008 – but China’s reactions towards North Korea’s provocations distinctly ‘alienated many in the international community.’ However, during this period China did support UNSCR 1874 in June 2009 that called for a complete arms embargo on North Korea.

The relationship during this time was defined by unofficial actors – Chinese or North Koreans ‘doing business or acting as middlemen in trade’ while the Chinese Government took no action, tacitly allowing the trade. When the third nuclear weapon was tested, however, China began restricting their actions.

While China’s initial response to the Cheonan was not a strong condemnation, two points must be reiterated to understand China’s thought process. First, in the beginning China did not view this as a threat to China or regional stability, and saw it solely as an inter-Korean issue to be resolved bilaterally. Second, most accounts of the issue do not consider ‘China’s behavior in private’. In the time following the sinking of the Cheonan, China sent several delegations to North Korea, who ‘told North Korean officials that their behavior was being counter-productive.’

Additionally, ‘Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao criticized Pyongyang’s behavior when Kim Jong Il visited China in May 2011.’ China continued to apply the UNSC sanctions, showing its

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146 Pacheco Pardo, ‘Regional’, 350-1.
147 Christensen, China Challenge, 256-258
148 Ibid. 256-258, 271.
149 Ibid. 272.
153 Pacheco Pardo, ‘Regional’, 351-2; Easley and Park, ‘Norms’, 652
commitment to restraining North Korea. China decided to pressure the government in private, and promote continued talks instead of condemning them in public – something they viewed as counterproductive and believed that it would cause North Korea to further lash out.

China’s reaction to North Korea’s provocations in 2011 and 2012 mirrored this – especially as North Korea was undergoing a sensitive leadership transition. China preferred to ensure that the situation remain stable – calling for calm and emphasizing that the UNSC should ‘be prudent, moderate and conducive to maintaining peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula ... to avoid further escalation of the situation’. As one representative informed me, before the transition China was willing to use both ‘carrot and stick’, but fearing that this would merely provoke North Korea during a transition they preferred to only utilize ‘a carrot’. North Korea continued to escalate the situation, and Chinese opinion – both public and academic, began to increasingly turn against North Korea.

The situation was made worse by the continuing missile and nuclear tests throughout 2011-2016. One of the most remarkable changes has actually been in response to the new leader not considering timing or its effect on China, as they tested each successive missile, satellite, or nuclear weapon. China’s actions became increasingly active in the later Hu Jintao years, and even more so as Xi Jinping took power. Even before Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the CCP or President of the PRC a growing distance in official relations became apparent.

The first visit – and meeting – Kim Jong Un had with a high level Chinese official was seven months after he took power, and the first state visit for a DPRK representative to China was one month later. The visits were by officials that had long been involved with China-DPRK relations – director of China’s International Department Wang Jiarui, and Jang Song-Thaek, Kim Jong Un’s uncle and the de-facto number two. However, the delay in visits clearly signified the growing impatience by the Chinese government, especially when compared to the

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157 Interview with 6PT representative and Academic in Beijing, 30 September 2016.
159 Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart, ‘North Korea’, 2.
160 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 September 2016.
161 Noesselt, ‘Contradictory’, 1314-1315.
number of visits there had been under Kim Jong Il.\textsuperscript{162} This was viewed in China as a big change – one underscoring the fact that the personal relationship between the two countries had become much less important than national interests.\textsuperscript{163}

**Test before Xi, and the repercussions.**

With regard to timing – while China may have helped ensure stability during Kim Jong Un’s transition into power, North Korea would not do the same for Xi Jinping. In December 2012, less than a month after Xi Jinping became General Secretary, North Korea launched a satellite. Then in February 2013, just over a month before Xi Jinping’s Presidency began, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test. Provocations like this placed a severe strain on China’s interaction with the DPRK, and resulted in China supporting UNSCR 2087 and 2094. Resolution 2094 expanded sanctions to target the DPRK’s banking networks.\textsuperscript{164}

 Normally, this would not be good – but during a sensitive Chinese leadership transition, the effect was multiplied. Up until 2017, Xi Jinping had not met with Kim Jong Un as president.\textsuperscript{165} In comparison, and almost certainly viewed as a slight – by 2015 alone Xi Jinping had traveled to South Korea, and met with South Korea’s leader a total of seven times.\textsuperscript{166} It had also been reported that ‘Kim Jong-un was indirectly informed that he was not welcome in Beijing.’\textsuperscript{167} A high-level source viewed this as the beginning of the end for appeasing the government in Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{168}

China opted for this diplomatic pause rather than taking any action that could destabilize the new regime, hoping that North Korea would get the message. China continued to call for stability, restraint, and emphasized its opposition of ‘any provocative words and actions from any party in the region [or] trouble making [on] the doorsteps of China.’\textsuperscript{169} Xi

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Jinping echoed this sentiment at the Boao forum.\(^{170}\) This strategy, however, doesn’t seem to have worked – as North Korea tested roughly 100 missiles in early 2014 and continued work on its nuclear program.\(^{171}\)

Obama and Xi met in California in June 2013. At these meetings, North Korea and Iran featured prominently in the US concept of how China and the US could work together. While China was not willing to ‘destabilize[e] the North Korean Regime’, it was willing to put more pressure on it. By September, the PRC’s ‘Ministry of Commerce produced a lengthy list of items that were not to be sold to North Korea’.\(^{172}\)

**Increasing Dissatisfaction**

Starting in 2010 and 2011, there was already a ‘lively debate on China’s North Korea Policy underway inside and outside Chinese foreign policy circles’ – with a number of influential thinkers ‘coming to the conclusion that the special relationship with politically backwardly and outwardly obnoxious North Korea was creating a bad diplomatic reputation for China’.\(^{173}\) Academics have felt the same way, but are relatively constrained in stating their actual opinion, as some have been penalized for publishing their thoughts.\(^{174}\)

Beijing’s displeasure with the DPRK was also seen through the relatively open level of dissent allowed by Chinese state media and on Chinese social media.\(^{175}\) Directly after the third test, *The Global Times* was especially clear – at times stating that nuclear tests were ‘red lines that North Korea must respect’,\(^{176}\) that China opposes the DPRK’s tests and this ‘opposition should be expressed by action’.\(^{177}\) It dialed criticism back a bit by underscoring that additional...
sanctions should be this action – rather than a military response.\textsuperscript{178} Publicly, Chinese citizens have frequently viewed ‘North Korea as a threat to China’s security interests and requested a change of China’s policy toward the North’ via the Chinese social media site Weibo.\textsuperscript{179}

The relationship continued to change as Kim Jong Un’s regime persisted. After Jang Song-Thaek, a key liaison between China and North Korea for years, was executed it was thought that China might begin to approach North Korea differently.\textsuperscript{180} After the second nuclear test, China began describing the relationship as ‘normal state-to-state relations’ but the relationship was still managed predominantly by the International Department with some MFA input.\textsuperscript{181} It is important to note that Wang Jiarui, the head of the International Department has a higher party ranking than the Minister of Foreign Affairs, so he would be the deciding factor either way.\textsuperscript{182}

This, however, has begun to change. Increasingly, Xi’s ‘less tolerant’ attitude of the DPRK’s behavior has been noted – case in point, the relationship was downgraded from the CCP’s Internal Liaison Department/International Department, ‘to a more normal bilateral relationship managed by the Foreign Ministry’.\textsuperscript{183} This is important as it clearly signals that the relationship has been downgraded.\textsuperscript{184}

**Collaboration with the US for Harshest Sanctions**

In the years leading up to 2016, little was accomplished. North Korea tested nuclear weapons two more in 2016, both without any warning to China. Initially, China continued to stress solving the issue within the 6PT.\textsuperscript{185} China implored North Korea ‘to honor its commitment to denuclearization and... cease any action that may deteriorate the situation’.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{178} Global Times (2013c), ‘China’s Participation in the Sanctions Should Be Confined (Zhōngguócānyù “zhīcāi” cháoxiǎnbīwxǔwòdēdù)’, Global Times, \url{http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-02/3649026.html}, 18 February 2013d.
\textsuperscript{179} Kim, ‘Inflated’, 30.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. 39-40.
\textsuperscript{182} Kim, ‘Inflated’, 37; Noesselt, ‘Contradictory’, 1315.
\textsuperscript{183} Christensen, *China Challenge*, 275.
\textsuperscript{184} Interview with 6PT representative and Academic in Beijing, 30 September 2016.
\textsuperscript{186} Xinhua, ‘China firmly opposes DPRK’s nuclear test’, Xinhua, \url{news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/06/c_134984120.htm}, 6 January 2016b.
Ignoring this suggestion and previous UN resolutions, North Korea tested a long-range missile on February 7.\(^{187}\) This missile test seemed to be timed to target China – as it was on the eve of Chinese New Year – an act that was humiliating to China.\(^{188}\)

In response, China worked with the US in crafting the UNSC resolution.\(^{189}\) UNSCR 2270 was the harshest resolution up to that point – moving beyond sanctioning North Korea’s military programs and those connected to it to ‘target[] the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the country’s banking relationships’.\(^{190}\) The fourth test clearly showed ‘a tangible drift in Chin[ese] policy’.\(^{191}\) Similarly, after the fifth test in September 2016, the UNSC quickly agreed on sanctions.\(^{192}\) These new sanctions again were the harshest issued to that point by the UNSC – and cut off a large portion of North Korea’s sale of raw materials, and expanded its restrictions on military and financial matters.\(^{193}\) China has said that it will ‘seriously implement’ these sanctions and released the extended list of banned export items as of February 2017.\(^{194}\)

One of the most important effects of the tests was that it forced a coordinated response. In particular, the US and China worked together to craft these sanctions – something that had never been done to this extent. As has been seen, China has long threatened to veto sanctions, or water down the end resolution – but in this case China and the US were involved directly in maximizing the impact of the sanctions regime. Previously, China had participated, banned some dual-use products, and allowed for some sanctions and banking restrictions.\(^{195}\)

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\(^{191}\) Chin and Thakur, ‘Change’, 119.


For Resolution 2270, China made it clear that it was not willing to tolerate the DPRK’s continued provocations and was now ready to work with the US and the rest of the UN to further sanction North Korea. Few thought the resolution would be as strict. From the start, it appeared that China was working to more ‘aggressively implement’ sanctions. For instance, China began to arrest smugglers on the border, imports to China fell and continued to fall, and it appeared that China restricted trade to a greater degree than was initially anticipated.

As China had done in each situation, calls to resume the 6PT were issued at every opportunity – but for the most part neither the US nor DPRK were interested in its resumption.

At one point, there was a movement in the direction of a Five-party-talk – one that did not include North Korea at all. For academics in China, discussing a five party talks scenario is a big move. These talks would be conducted to further bring the five parties into a consensus against North Korea’s actions – something that China had long refused, as it would put them even more clearly against North Korea. Chinese academics and policymakers had actually voiced support for this, but Russia was firmly opposed, so there has been no movement.

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197 Ibid. 48.


Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System

The increasing number and yield of tests as well as North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric logically made South Korea nervous. The lack of any real progress in reducing the threat posed by the DPRK encouraged South Korea to accept the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) missile defense system, strengthening the US’s military presence in the region.202

This potential made the Chinese nervous, in conversations with academics they appeared to believe that this weapon system would be able to target China directly – although the specifications barely cover South Korea.203 The attached radar system spans 2000 kilometers, going into Chinese territory but also covering all of the DPRK. In the summer between the fourth and fifth nuclear test, China was increasingly unhelpful and standoffish – saying the THAAD system was provoking the North.204 The US has maintained it is a defensive weapon only, to ensure South Korea’s safety.205

The outrage about the system remained until the North’s fifth test in the fall. This put everyone on about the same page, and even stricter sanctions were passed. As of February 2017, China and Russia have continued to complain and threaten further action if the system is installed.206 Reports have said, however, that since December 2016 China’s approach has softened – and is willing to discuss the issue.207

Conclusion

The international attempts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue have lasted nearly 25 years, with little success. The one key change was China’s willingness to address the situation. North Korea is still an outlier to the international system, one that threatens to disrupt stability in many ways. While certain actor’s roles had essentially remained the same, China’s continued to evolve. China’s diplomacy shifted from an almost exclusively inward looking policy to one that is ready to help address international security issues in a more pragmatic way. This, in and of itself strongly supports the idea that China has become further integrated and socialized into the international system in a way predicted by Armstrong.

Of all possible motivations for interacting with North Korea, China viewed the need for stability as a paramount requirement. Anything that would negatively impact China – be it a hostile regime or a vacuum of power leading to Korean refugees streaming into north China – was to be avoided at all costs. Even with North Korea’s provocations, Kim Jong Un still maintained power, and China had no reason to doubt it at that point in time. North Korea’s actions played a key role in assisting in the evolution of Chinese policy.

In the 1990s with the first nuclear crisis, China took a passive role, offering mediation behind the scenes but little else. At the time, this matched China’s view of the crisis. It was not seen as something that they had a right to deal with – it was solely a bilateral issue between the United States and North Korea. China continued to participate and play an intermediary role, but they did not promote any solution of their own to address the situation.

By the early 2000s however, China’s role began to intensify. They started to organize and encourage talks, rather than passively taking part. The real turning point was North Korea’s first nuclear test. Even with China’s repeated warnings, North Korea ignored China and went ahead with the test. This action forced China to act. It motivated China to strongly censure and legitimize the option of limited sanctions. Neither of these would have been conceivable in the years leading up to the nuclear test.

Each successive test received a strong rebuke and a new application of sanctions. China even went so far as to restrict energy flow into North Korea in addition to other unilateral sanctions. Throughout this time, Beijing sent envoys to North Korea to reprimand their
government. Even though the 6PT have yet to resume, Beijing still appears to be willing to work to address the issue.

Chinese foreign policy responses regarding North Korea are likely to continue to require the completion of the 6PT, and will continue to encourage their resumption. As recently as March 2014, it was reported that China had sent an envoy to North Korea to discuss the resumption of negotiations. Even something as simple as this – proactively approaching North Korea to restart the 6PT – would have been unheard of two decades ago. Beijing will continue to utilize what it can to ensure a stable Korean Peninsula, even in the midst of further provocations. It is very likely that any further aggressive action by North Korea will be met again by censure and sanction.

Throughout the first nuclear crisis and into the first few years of the second crisis, China was not dedicated to addressing the issues surrounding the situation. In particular, China was viewed as excessively passive throughout the first crisis, leaving others to solve the problem. In contrast, during the second crisis China began to play a much more active role. Rather than sitting on the sidelines during negotiations, Beijing began to offer solutions and call for new talks – even when other actors were not yet involved. After the fourth and fifth nuclear tests, China’s actions shifted further. Essentially, China’s actions have ‘moved from passiveness to leadership... and from unilateralism to multilateralism.’

China will no longer be a passive participant in negotiations, especially with regard to issues of international security. As Rosenau’s concept of adaptation would predict, China has adapted to this situation in each instance – driven by the circumstances at hand. Actors within Chinese foreign policy have increasingly internalized the norms in the international system and worked to address the issue within the system as a key participant. As China has become a greater power its role has evolved from a low profile to a much more active and pragmatic one. However, with regard to North Korea, its policies have been slow in adapting to its status. Yet, after every successive provocation, China had no choice but to respond with increasingly stringent measures in tandem with the international community. China has a ways to go, but it is learning and adapting – both positive components - as its international role continues to grow.

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208 Pacheco Pardo, ‘Regional’,337.
Chapter Seven
Socialization and Adaptation: Normative Adaptation and Policy Decision-making

The three case studies, of Sudan, Iran, and North Korea, show that Chinese foreign policy over the last two decades has progressed in a manner unthinkable before the turn of the century. Each case has revealed the same trend of socialization and adaptation. There are, at the same time, unique factors which affected each country’s relationship with China – but overall the changes coalesce around similar timeframes strongly supporting Armstrong’s socialization thesis. When China re-joined the international community in 1971, it began a process of internalizing the rules of that system. By the 1990s, while it was a member it would frequently refuse or defer action towards the international security issues created by ‘pariah’ states. China’s actions in 2006 were challenged in each case to such an extent that there were significant policy shifts – including support of targeted sanctions, harsh diplomatic language, and visible efforts to influence another government’s leadership.

This Chapter explores in more depth how these changes may be related, and what might have caused them. First, it addresses the timing of the key shifts in policy and examines potential causes and externalities that may have affected China’s decision-making process – or who may have been the influential element making decisions. Then the Chapter examines overall trends in the character of the shifts in policy, and discusses potential explanations. Finally, we will examine the initial hypothesis and argument of this thesis in light of the evidence.

Pre-socialization Baselines

For each of the case studies, a baseline in relations was set in the late 1980s and 1990s. Key dates in each do not align exactly, nor would there be any expectation for them to. The aim
is to create a snapshot of what the relationship was like in each case before there were any signs of socialization. Here is a short restatement of the three separate baselines.

Sudan

China’s relationship with Sudan was defined by economic interests with little real political color. Initial involvement was almost solely through CNPC, with little apparent political oversight. There had been no official energy ministry in China since 1993, and in many of the ministries that could have had jurisdiction the minister was lower in party rank than the head of CNPC – meaning decisions by the SOE were more important than the ministry.\(^1\) In essence, corporate policy ran the relationship before other interests played a role.\(^2\)

This minimalist relationship – build infrastructure and get resources – was the norm, especially as oil began to flow. The second Sudanese civil war was not viewed by China to be theirs to resolve, it was an internal matter and therefore the sovereign responsibility of Sudan. China would not meddle. So, essentially, the starting point for China’s relationship with Sudan was a hands-off approach to the conflicts, and an interest in protecting its investment.

Iran

With Iran, China’s initial relationship was defined by their 1979 revolution. China’s role, as a potential non-western ally, allowed for economic ties, and arms sales during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.\(^3\) These exchanges tapered off throughout the 1990s, as the United States increasingly aired its displeasure even with the small volumes of trade and attempted to pressure China to reduce or eliminate it all together. Initially, Beijing acquiesced to some requests, but still continued trading.

In 1997, the relationship would further shift. As part of preliminary agreements to ensure a state visit between Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin, as well as to enact the 1985 US-China

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\(^{3}\) Gill, ‘Nonproliferation’, 267.
Peaceful NCA, China agreed to cut assistance to Iran’s burgeoning nuclear program.\(^4\) China did this even though they believed – and in some instances knew – that the program was suitable for research and energy purposes only.\(^5\) Additionally, China agreed to restrict some weapons sales and cut down on technical assistance for missiles.

What this shows is that China’s relationship with Iran was tentative, based predominantly on what was viewed to be best for China. This initially interest-based approach determined that the opportunity to have a stronger relationship with the United States was preferred ahead of any economic ties with Iran. The latter relationship was one of convenience, and was downgraded – at least in terms of weapons sales – to placate and enrich ties with the United States. Again, China did not view Iran as a potential nuclear issue, as the US did – it only saw Iran as business.

**North Korea**

China’s ‘close’ relationship with North Korea in the 1990s was basically forced upon it as fallout from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Relations with North Korea had been running hot and cold, as Pyongyang played China against Russia. As the latter’s influence waned, China became a virtual trustee of the DPRK, ensuring that its neighbor did not cause Beijing any problems. The first nuclear crisis in 1993 was viewed as strictly a bilateral issue between the United States and the two Koreas. China did not see itself as having a role, even though the United States did try to obtain their help.

China’s involvement with the North would continue to intensify during the famine between 1994 and 1998.\(^6\) This would bring Beijing’s concerns for stability to the forefront. China would aid the North, and continue to be the main source of support for the Kim Jong-Il regime. As issues regarding the 1993 agreement came up in the late 1990s, China was able to begin to pass messages and to a limited extent set up meetings, but did not view North Korea’s

\(^4\) Davis et. al., ‘Limited’, 30.
nuclear quest to be an issue deserving any abandonment of previous positions. At most, China’s motivation was to placate the United States in order to prevent any military action that might destabilize the peninsula. This set the scene for future relations with stability as the prime objective. China’s ties with the DPRK were not as strong as some assumed, even with the strong history of fraternal communist solidarity.

**Pre-socialization**

In the 1990s, China was still expanding rapidly from Reform, seeking external markets, as well as coping with the fallout from Tiananmen Square. In each case, China was in a position where it maintained relations with international outcasts not out of a sense of duty, but rather a necessity. For Iran and Sudan economic reasons prevailed, while North Korea was more of a requirement to ensure regional stability. As a result, stability – both external and internal – was viewed as a key element needed for continued growth as well as regime legitimacy.

China did not view its role in the international community to be anything similar to that of the United States. China’s concepts of sovereignty and non-interference reigned supreme, allowing China to conduct its business affairs and focus on its own internal issues. As a result, China’s role in the international community’s activism was minimal. They were a part of the international society and understood some of the guidelines of international behavior, but were not yet completely socialized.

Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy guidelines, especially ‘taoguang yanghui’, would guide Chinese foreign policy throughout the 1990s, even after Deng’s death in early 1997. For the most part, relations were ‘strictly business’ and China maintained the predictable and ‘classic’ Chinese normative position of non-interference.

In all three cases, there was no need for adaptive or new foreign policy decision-making. The concerns in each case were mostly interest-driven at this point, and China did not see any reason to shift from its pre-existing values. Economic and business interests drove the relationships in Iran and Sudan – until the situation required political action, and then the

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7 Kotch, ‘Four Party’. 
foreign ministry or Jiang Zemin would become involved. For North Korea, everything was coordinated predominantly as an issue of fraternal communist relations through the Party’s International Department. In each of these cases, while China was an increasing member of the international community – it did not view these cases to merit international action.

**Hu Jintao’s Slow but Significant Changes**

In each case, China’s actions to show a turning point around 2006. China moved past its previous policy preferences to act in new ways. Its actions clearly supported an expansion of its international role as well as a discrete understanding of the rules and values of the international order. The changes were not exactly the same in each case, but show enough similarity to indicate a change across the board. In Iran and North Korea, China voted for sanctions – a clear shift from their prior responses. Similarly, with Sudan China moved to directly influence the Sudanese government’s acceptance of UN peacekeeping troops. Altogether, China was increasingly working with the international community to address challenges. At times this was slow, but it exhibited a clear progression from inaction to acknowledgement of their role.

**Sudan and Darfur**

Sudan’s Darfur crisis put China in a difficult position. In the early 2000s, the Darfur crisis was intensifying while China initially did not get involved, and viewed it as an internal crisis. They were only there to do their business, not become involved in something they viewed to be caused by environmental and ethnic divides. To take part in addressing this would require China to meddle in the affairs of another sovereign state – something China’s views on sovereignty and non-interference would not allow.

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9 Ibid; Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.
As the conflict intensified, international pressure on China continued to increase. As China was the main investor in Sudan, international human rights organizations criticized China’s inaction. As this intensified, China began to play a greater role. In the UNSC, it still stressed sovereignty and non-interference – and emphasized the need to have the support of Khartoum before any peacekeeping actions could be authorized. Implicitly, through all of this pressure, China’s values were being challenged and it had to approach the situation in a new light.

While its role in the UNSC remained somewhat static, China’s actions behind the scenes changed dramatically. While it had stressed the need for host government approval, when Khartoum appeared to refuse, China – through diplomats and Hu Jintao himself – campaigned to ensure Sudan complied. This appeared to have been accomplished through both rhetoric and concrete incentives via loans and grants. China even nominated a special representative to Africa – assigned to deal with Sudan – to emphasize the importance of the issue.

Here, China directly attempted to influence another state to accept the dispatch of peacekeeping troops. This was something clearly against China’s stated principles, but ensured that a diplomatic effort could be mounted. China viewed the issue as more than simply an internal-Sudanese issue, but one that had drawn international concern and a reconsideration of values.

**Iranian Sanctions**

In comparison to changes in relations in Sudan and North Korea around 2006, changes with Iran were not as groundbreaking, but nonetheless showed an important evolution. In the early 2000s, China continued to view concern over a potential Iranian nuclear program to be an issue between the United States and Iran. Additionally, China did not think that a nuclear Iran would necessarily come to be, or if it did, that it would threaten China. As a result, it did not view IOs

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12 Saferworld, *China’s Growing*, 31
13 Garver, ‘Cautious’, 75.
to be the right forum to discuss the issue, and delayed referring it to the UNSC. China did this as long as it could, but circumstances forced China’s hand.

China had deferred UNSC discussion of the case until 2005 — when Ahmadinejad was elected and work continued on Iran’s nuclear program.14 Even then, at the UNSC, China preferred PSs, before considering formal resolutions. This was perhaps because of a belief in the peaceful nature of Iran’s program — as throughout this period China was also trying to persuade Iran to be flexible and show their program was not a threat. Clearly, at this point, China views on non-proliferation were being challenged — as attempts to convince Iran implicitly show that there was an understanding that Iran needed to respect the values of the international community.

After the referral to the UNSC, China’s approach changed somewhat. The P5+1 was created as a response to China’s continued calls for negotiations and mediation. After its creation, China supported Resolution 1696 calling for Iran to prove its intentions were peaceful or face sanctions.

As Iran did not meet the requirement set out in Resolution 1696, there was no option but to sanction them.15 China voted in favor of sanctions — in Resolution 1737.16 What this shows, is that China did begin to see this as a normative issue. More importantly, China viewed multilateral involvement to be useful, and that working within this framework could address the issues. Approval of sanctions was a key turning point, and China voted for every successive resolution imposing further sanctions — as Iran continued to fail to meet the requirements of the UNSC.

North Korea’s Nuclear Test

China’s initial role in the second North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 2000s was more active than it had been in the first. It still, however, remained mostly in the background — working to bring the other parties together to discuss and resolve the issue. China’s focus was

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15 UN Security Council, ‘Iran Suspend’.
on being a somewhat impartial mediator, rather than a part of the solution. This was an improvement though, and showed that China acknowledged that the situation was viewed with concern. As the talks progressed, North Korea continued to resist compliance, and by early 2006 conducted missile tests. By all accounts, China was beginning to get frustrated by the lack of progress – and allowed for limited UNSC sanctions to be passed in response.

The point of no return occurred with North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006. China had only been given a mere 20 minutes of advance warning – a huge loss of face. China had no choice but to publicly air its displeasure. It utilized the harshest diplomatic language yet – ‘flagrantly’ – something only used against events that damaged national pride. From this point on, China would allow for further sanctions and apply pressure on the North Korean regime – generally to get it to rejoin stalled talks. Additionally, it would issue its disapproval to the North Korean regime behind the scenes.

Overall, this changed the context of the North Korean nuclear issue for China. Before, it had been a theoretical problem. Now, it had been clearly actualized and could pose a problem. Where before a nuclear North Korea had been seen as improbable, the test made it a reality and questioned China’s values. Beijing broke with precedent and used harsher language while approving UNSC Sanctions. Even though China would continue to call for mediation and diplomatic negotiation, the test caused it to realize the moral impetus of the issue. China increasingly had to acknowledge its role in the conflict as a nuclear armed North Korea – especially an unpredictable one – was not good for China’s or East Asia’s stability. China’s responses were admittedly slow, but were clearly adapting to the situation at hand and learning how to react. Again, China’s actions showed an increasing understanding of the rules of the international system and further emphasized China’s role in addressing the issues inherent in these international security problems.

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17 Helgesen and Thelle, Dialogue, 18-9.
18 Kuhn, How China’s, 376.
19 Xinhua, ‘Nuclear(2006)’.
Increasing Adaptation

The year 2006 was a turning point in many ways for each of these case studies and for Chinese foreign policy on the whole. In general, China was more receptive towards working with, or at least facilitating, the international community. Additionally, each case forced a re-evaluation of Chinese values and allowed for policies to shift.

This was three years after Hu Jintao became President of the PRC, and was one potential cause for the change. With Chinese leadership transitions, some view there to be a consolidation of power phase. This was especially so with Hu Jintao, as Jiang Zemin maintained his role as Chairman of the CMC well into March 2005. The consolidation of power could have allowed for Hu to make a larger impact on policy decisions. Additionally, while ‘taoguang yanghui’ was still important to this era, it appears not to have constrained Hu from such visible shifts. As was so typical of the legacy of Deng, ideology was not present in the phrase, but pragmatism was.

Another key potential component of this change is what Robert Zoellick identified in 2005 as the need for China to be a ‘Responsible Great Power’. While in China the term generally viewed negatively – implying that previously China was not responsible – it is undeniable that this idea had an impact and started a discussion within China. This concept implied that China, as a burgeoning great power, has to abide by a certain set of values in its international interaction. The socializing impact of not wanting to be an outsider – or ‘irresponsible’ should not be overlooked.

Additionally, international pressure likely had some influence in shaping Chinese decisions throughout the three cases. As China does not want to go against the tide of an international consensus, its approach slowly shifted. For all three cases, it is clear that pressure continued to build. For Darfur, initially it was human rights activists pressure, then as the UNSC took up the case, pressure to ensure that Khartoum authorize peacekeepers. For Iran, similarly,
as Iran failed to meet the requests of the UNSC, China could do little but authorize further measures. Both China and the international community had given Iran numerous warnings – outlining what would happen if their actions continued. With North Korea – after the nuclear test, there was little else that could be done other than to authorize sanctions. North Korea had crossed a line, and the rules of the international system required that there be a response.

China’s need for stability also played a role in its decision-making and likely – at this point – delayed action to ensure that stability would be maintained. For Iran in particular, China saw little threat, so could delay – until ultimatums were issued. With Sudan, international pressure and the likelihood that that could cause an unstable situation – or increase negative sentiment about China – likely pressured a reaction. North Korea again, allowed for delayed consideration until it crossed a clear line and action was required. For all cases, the view of stability at this time was likely still tied to ensuring a stable international environment conducive to Chinese growth.

Xi Jinping’s Active Foreign Policy

The changes seen in 2006 would be expanded upon and intensified in 2014-2016. Again, China continued to address issues in novel ways in concert with the international community. Just as important, China’s role continued to be further integrated into the international system and increasingly involved in issues of concern. In each of the cases, China’s decisions seemed to echo an approach to international norms based more on international values – with a renewed willingness to address the issues caused by humanitarian and non-proliferation concerns. China’s actions continued to evolve, and while not always in-sync with the rest of the international community – played an important role.

Military Peacekeepers

China's ties with Sudan have continued to challenge Chinese foreign policy, and allow for it to experiment and innovate in ways previously unthinkable. From China's slow but eventual recognition of the possibility of South Sudan becoming a new nation – to
congratulating it once it had done so – and taking a key role in mediating the resultant oil dispute between the North and South, China had been placed in positions that helped develop novel roles for China.

The South Sudanese civil war was no different. Once the conflict started, China was quick to encourage negotiation and mediation.\textsuperscript{23} In this instance, China also began to have a more hands-on role – engaging with regional actors in its initial attempts to address the situation. China also moved into a more active role trying to negotiate a settlement between the two parties.\textsuperscript{24} At several instances, ceasefires were brokered, but each time they failed and the civil war quickly resumed. China understood the need for continued peace and stepped in to attempt to keep it.

As these negotiations seemed to flounder, China and the international community opted to utilize other methods. First, in 2014 China authorized a battalion of Chinese Military peacekeepers to be dispatched with a protection and prevention of violence mandate.\textsuperscript{25} This was China’s first large scale military dispatch with such a wide mandate. This, in itself, is a key break from past precedent. Additionally, in contrast to earlier crises, China’s role in the negotiation became more proactive. China actually proposed a four-point solution and convened a meeting that resulted in a five point plan - that would lead to a transitional government in 2016.\textsuperscript{26}

These actions showed that China’s approach had noticeably changed since the 1990s. It still preferred mediation, but when that fails was open to alternatives – including sanctions and peacekeeping troops – through an IO. In particular, this shows that China was keenly aware of its role in the international community, and had internalized norms dealing with international peace and security.

\textsuperscript{23} Xinhua, ‘Stability(2013)’.
\textsuperscript{24} Large, ‘Civil War’, 44.
\textsuperscript{25} James, Fields, 30
\textsuperscript{26} Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Wang Yi’.
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

China was against harsh multi- or unilateral sanctions against Iran, and vocally stated that such actions could harm any hopes of a peaceful resolution.\(^{27}\) China publically maintained that sanctions were not the answer, Chinese involvement began to slow. It was said that the government ‘informally’ told state oil companies to slow or stop work in Iran.\(^{28}\) Other Chinese companies too, chose to suspend or restrict business with Iran, in favor of remaining active in the US market. During this time, China increasingly aired frustration with Iran’s lack of progress, and appeared to court other oil producers to hedge.\(^{29}\)

Support of these sanctions, whether intended or unintended, combined with the election of Rouhani, enabled negotiations on the nuclear program to recommence.\(^{30}\) While China’s role is not entirely understood yet, it is clear that as a member of the P5 it played an important role. Most accounts show that China helped persuade Iranian leadership of the benefits of the deal – working to compromise, mediate, and connect the various actors. China’s involvement here clearly shows that China increasingly viewed this as moral value it needed to enforce. In general, most reports show China as an actively engaged party. The end result was an agreement that was a positive step for all parties- more open trade for China, a reduction and eventual cessation of sanctions on Iran, and a nuclear weapon free Iran.

Although there were some that said China’s role was not as active, it is important that China wanted to appear to have been active – especially via its state media.\(^{31}\) This shows that China understands the importance of the issue and having an active role in its resolution. China, at this point clearly viewed itself as a stakeholder, was increasingly interested in a stable region, and wanted to be involved and ensure that the issue be resolved without using military action.

\(^{27}\) Swaine, ‘Tightrope’, 7-8.
\(^{28}\) Davis et. al., ‘Limited’,18.
\(^{29}\) Wines, ‘Warns’.
Harsher Sanctions

After the 6PT broke down in 2009, there was little diplomatic motivation to resume talks with North Korea.\(^{32}\) As in the other cases, China consistently called for talks – but none have occurred. Even still, North Korea has continued to test missiles and nuclear weapons, and has continued to be sanctioned and censured.

As a result of the nuclear and missile tests conducted around the time Xi Jinping was transitioning into office, Sino-North Korean relations had notably reduced – especially in terms of diplomatic visits. While China continued to champion a resumption of mediation, North Korea’s actions forced it to take a harsher line.

There was almost a three year pause between North Korean nuclear tests, but when North Korea tested its fourth and fifth tests within nine months in 2016, the reaction was swift. In both cases the US and China worked together to create sanction regimes.\(^{33}\) China’s reactions here were clearly not interest based, as they were a direct response to a violation to the values and rules of non-proliferation. Enforcing this has become a requirement. These sanctions were the strictest yet applied to North Korea. Additionally, they moved away from solely sanctioning North Korean military programs and personnel and targeted financing and diplomats. The sanctions in response to the fifth test expanded on the previous sanctions and greatly limited sales of raw materials – one of the DPRK’s last revenue sources. In connection, about a week after the DPRK tested a ballistic missile in February 2017, China began to halt imports of North Korean coal for the rest of 2017.\(^{34}\) While China said that this was following the UN resolution regarding the fifth test, the timing is questionable.

On the whole, China’s actions in this period clearly showed increasing frustration towards the regime in Pyongyang. At times, there were setbacks – as in their response to South Korea’s approval of THAAD.\(^{35}\) In general, however, China is increasingly willing to work with the US in censuring North Korea.

\(^{32}\) Cheng, ‘Impact’, 35
\(^{35}\) Marcias, ‘THAAD’.
Actively Pragmatic

China’s approach to foreign policy between 2014 and 2016 exhibited a clear progression towards more active involvement. In general, these cases support an argument of a presidentially defined type of foreign policymaking – in that once power is consolidated, policy begins to shift towards what the new leader would want. The apparent change in policy for this generation of leadership was quicker – only a bit over a year after Xi Jinping was named President, in comparison with roughly three for Hu Jintao. This coincides with external views of Xi’s consolidation of power. Either way, changes appeared quickly after Xi Jinping assumed power. Whether decisions are made in the PSC, the FALSG, or one of the other LSGs, Xi is likely to have a key influence.

It is likely that Xi had a role in determining the activeness in policy for all three cases. With regard to Iran, Xi Jinping was said to have encouraged Wang Yi’s active involvement in the JCPOA negotiations. Even though it was under Hu Jintao that Chinese companies followed the US sanctions – the negotiations that resulted in the JCPOA began after Xi became President. This further supports that the norm of non-proliferation had been further internalized among various internal Chinese actors, and carried on in importance from one leader to another. For North Korea, there have been clear indications of Xi Jinping’s displeasure – visiting South Korea multiple times without ever traveling to the DPRK, as well as downgrading the relationship from the International Department to the Foreign Ministry. Xi’s comments on South Sudan and the role of China in the UN showed the importance of the issue – as did the frequency of visits from Wang Yi as FM and Zhong Jianhua as special envoy to attempt to address the conflict.

38 Interview, Chinese Scholar, Beijing, 21 November 2016.  
39 Hu, ‘Obama’. 
40 Christensen, China Challenge, 275. 
In general, under Xi Jinping, Chinese foreign policy had become more active, and increasingly pragmatic in addressing international issues. This is especially so with issues that had been of international concern for some time – like Sudan, Iran, and North Korea. All in all, it shows an increasing interest in maintaining international stability as well as having a role accomplishing this within the existing system.

**Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-making**

Unfortunately, while this research attempted to identify the exact actors and their motivations, there was not conclusive evidence to deduce exactly how the observed changes was implemented into the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process or who in the system enabled this change. It is probable that, as discussed in the previous section, that much of decision-making was determined or empowered by the Chinese president and his representatives.

Moreover, as noted earlier in the thesis, the strong scholarly interest outside China in how its leadership conducted foreign policy decision-making appears to have fallen dramatically after the turn of the century. It was only after this point that changes appeared to take shape in each of the case studies – in and around 2006. Since then, there has not been much done to ‘peer inside the black box’ and reveal the inner workings of institutions since then. Indeed, it still remains problematic to collect the evidence that would enable such a pursuit.

Most work, even today, has a heavy basis in Doak Barnet’s work in the 1980s as well as Ning Lu’s in the late 1990s. Newer works try to examine from the outside in - utilizing what interviews they can, but generally the analysis is based on how the leadership at the time is viewed. Under Hu, it was seen to be more consultative and collaborative. Now under Xi, there appears to be something more like a top down approach. There is one key explanation for this lack of new authoritative material – China’s lasting crackdown on the leakage of ‘government secrets’. To put this into perspective, one of the criticisms leveled on Zhao Ziyang when he was
purged was that he revealed ‘state secrets’ about Chinese foreign policy decision-making to Doak Barnett. It is probable that, after this point, getting such high level information for research purposes became nearly impossible. Lu Ning may have had success in updating the state of the literature as he was a former assistant to a vice-FM. The kind of access that either of these scholars had would be near impossible to recreate in a modern setting.

Essentially, what is being demonstrated here is that at the time of each turning point there was somewhat of a scholarly vacuum regarding China’s foreign policy decision-making. Scholars had abandoned or were unable to conduct the necessary academic examination of the actors involved. There are statements from various actors, but these alone merely show the key changes. There have been some attempts to examine the system, but many do not go into detail, repeat past information or vaguely expand based upon the confirmation of new institutions or groups within the Chinese state. The only caveat here, however, is that nearly all publications and specialists that attempt to update the institutional concept agree that Xi Jinping appears to be the key driving force behind current Chinese policy – though the exact details are still hidden within the ‘black box’.

While it is unfortunate that the current understanding of how decisions are made is not complete, the basis it is built on still appears to be strong enough to understand that while changes can occur, outside observers cannot easily know how or why such changes have happened. This is a key gap in the scholarship that deserves further research.

**Normative changes**

In each of these cases, China’s pre-existing normative approach was clearly challenged and demonstrably adapted to various situations. In each case, the actions China took would have been inconceivable five or ten years earlier. These examples also all show a realization of the value-systems at play within each norm and an increasing internalization of the values of the international community. This indicates a socialization process – as norms are not instantly internalized and complied with, they are first understood and then applied to action.
Sovereignty and Non-interference

China has long held a strong support of traditional Westphalian sovereignty. This, combined with its experience with foreign intervention in the 19th century, strongly informed its views on sovereignty and non-interference. As a result, China believed that no state should infringe upon the sovereignty of another state. For a large portion of the PRC’s history, it remained steadfast in this position. China did not support the use of sanctions, though would generally abstain rather than veto if it came to a vote.42 Throughout the 1990s, China maintained this position resulting in a rather hands off policy when dealing with international issues.

By 2006, however, this began to shift. In both the cases of Iran and North Korea, China allowed – and voted for – the first imposition of limited sanctions. These were a result of ultimatums not being met, and constant provocations. As these provocations would continue, so too would sanctions. For Sudan, China was seen to have directly influenced the opinion of the leadership in Khartoum to authorize peacekeepers in Darfur. In this case, China had required the consent of the host government in the UNSC resolution authorizing peacekeepers – and without it the peacekeepers would not be deployed. As the situation was continuing to worsen, convincing the Sudanese government benefited all sides.

These actions continued to evolve. As North Korea continued its provocative actions, China would continue to allow for increasingly strict sanctions to be applied – even to the point of cutting off all coal purchases entirely for 2017.43 China also worked directly with the United States in crafting the sanctions in 2016. With Iran, the situation improved enough allow for negotiations. In these negotiations, again China was said to have influenced Iran to understand the benefits they would gain upon reaching a deal.44 After South Sudan fell into civil war, China played an integral role in attempting to negotiate a peace deal. As ceasefires kept failing, the

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44 Garver. ‘Emerging’, 1
UN authorized a military peacekeeping troop featuring, for the first time, a battalion of Chinese military peacekeepers with a protection mandate.  

Clearly, China’s actions now do not reflect a strict interpretation of either sovereignty or non-interference – as sanctions and peacekeeping troops, let alone influencing a government, were a definitive encroachment of sovereignty. China still holds sovereignty and non-interference as key unchanging norms, but in reality, they had become malleable.

Non-proliferation

While by the 1990s, China had signed on to most international non-proliferation agreements, it did not appear to have completely internalized the norm. By all appearances, they had increasing technical skill and the representatives from the Foreign Ministry that dealt with these issues were increasingly professionalized. These actors within the Chinese state were likely the in the first stage of socializing these norms. China’s actions – viewing both Iran and North Korea as bilateral issues between the state and the United States – showed that while they may be committing to and personally attempting to adhere to certain agreements, they did not see non-proliferation as a moral concern – at least not yet.

In part, this may have been a result of China not believing either could create a functional nuclear weapon. For both, however, China could assume the potential non-proliferation risk. Both countries had been involved in selling weapons to unsavory organizations. China’s deal with the US in 1997 to cease cooperation in Iran’s nuclear program did exhibit some concern to the issues at hand– but still it was predominantly a deal to placate the United States.

North Korea’s nuclear test was a key turning point in China’s view. It made the problem of a North Korean nuclear weapon even more tangible – and further underscored the unreliability of the North Korean regime. Iran never went past this threshold, but it too did not meet requirements set by the international community to prove its intentions. As a result, the international community had no recourse but to censure both nations.

46 Johnston and Evans, ‘China’s Engagement’, 241
Iran and North Korea exhibit polar opposite results. Both, however, depict an increasing appreciation for the norm of non-proliferation. North Korea continued provocations and tests and faced increasingly strict repercussions. Iran, on the other hand, while verbally provocative and progressively sanctioned until after the election of Rouhani, was able to make a deal with the international community. China’s role in both is important and underscores its investment in the values of the non-proliferation regime and the international community.

In general, China has moved to increasingly internalize non-proliferation norms and act to support non-proliferation. It has done so through the international community and supported efforts to resolve situations through multilateral groups.

**Role in the System**

China’s role in the international system has also undergone a great deal of change. Throughout this timeframe, it has gone from a quiet participant to a key player enmeshed in the norms and values of the system.

In the 1990s, China was a part of the international system, but viewed the issues examined in these case studies to be external to them, or bilateral problems between the United States and the other state. Only when the issue had a direct impact – like with the 1997 US China summit and its effect on China’s Iran assistance – did China make changes. There may have been an understanding of some of the issues at play, but China viewed them to be external to their concerns, and not China’s place to have a role in resolving them.

By 2006, though, China clearly understood that it had an increasing role. Throughout 2006, China broke past policy precedents, voting for sanctions and actively convincing a government to allow peacekeeping troops. Even still, in particular with the multilateral efforts to address Iran and North Korea, China’s role was in the background, mediating. Even still, these efforts underlined both an increasing role as well as an understanding of the norms at play.

Clearly though, by 2014, China’s role in the international system was considerably greater. In general, China’s actions were more active and pragmatic. The military peacekeepers
with Sudan, the active campaign to convince Iranian officials of the merit of a deal, as well as working with the United States in sanctioning North Korea – all show the growing stake that China now had in the system. They saw that they had a place in resolving international issues, and increasingly stepped into this role. Its actions were not a mirror of any other power – but nor should they be expected to be. Through China’s interactions and roles in the international community it adapted and socialized to more norms as they applied to China. While China was not an outsider in the 1990s, it remained on the edges of action. As their role developed and the rules of the international system continued to take hold they became increasingly enmeshed in the international order.

Creative Involvement

When discussing these changes with academics and policymakers in China, while they admit to changes in approach year on year, they were generally hesitant to refer anything as explicit ‘change’ to any of China’s policies. Much of the time they referred to China’s foreign policy as unchanging, or that China had a very strong stance on sovereignty that cannot change. Even then, they note the changes the international system had gone through – and even the norm of sovereignty - from the foundation of the UN to the present.

This sort of thought was foreseen by Peking University scholar Wang Yizhou starting in the 1990s. In an article he wrote in 1995, he noted that at times sovereignty was limited by a need to address international problems that crossed boundaries or a particular state could not deal with on its own. He expanded on this in 2006, arguing that, while in the past sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of another state had been paramount and could not be encroached upon, the concept has now evolved into one having ‘preconditions’ or a flexibility. For example, increasingly weak states that are unable to address their own issues tend to require international oversight.

47 Wang Yizhou, An Analysis of Contemporary International Politics (Dângdâiguójìzhèngzhìxílùn) (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1995), 81–82.
Between 2011 and 2013, Wang continued to explore this, and coined the term ‘creative involvement’ to explain how China could support a strong conception of sovereignty and non-interference, yet increasingly engage and interact in ways that potentially conflicted with this.\(^{49}\)

In part, as China continues to grow and have an increasing role in the international community, the world will have greater expectations of what China should do. Wang’s idea attempted to account for this change, while maintaining Deng’s ‘taoguang yanghui’, by grounding action to observe certain ideas and values. As these case studies have shown, China acts in cases that are supported by the UN, have host government involvement, and have the support of other regional actors. While the changes to China’s approach to sovereignty, non-interference, and international action are clear shifts, grounding these changes as ‘creative involvement’ or ‘constructive engagement’ allows for Chinese scholars and policymakers to advocate change, without entirely admitting to change.

**Values versus Interest**

When speaking with specialist academics and policymakers in China, the conversations did not reveal whether the observed changes in Chinese policy behavior were caused merely by self-interest or a value change. In the absence of more concrete detail on actors and institutions, it is quite difficult to irrefutably say what exactly drove change. From this research, however, I think that the case studies all strongly suggest that this change is a result of values more than naked self-interest. Arguably, China’s initial reactions in the 1990s were interest driven, but changes in 2006 and later cannot be entirely explained away by interest.

In part, change could have been driven by an increasing professionalization of the diplomatic corps that represent China. Throughout each of the cases the foreign ministry appears to become more professionalized, responsive, and actively involved with the other actors in the international community. Here, in particular it seems that China has been implicitly shaped more by the values and beliefs of the western diplomatic community – in contrast to domestic values or other external values.

\(^{49}\) Wang, New Direction; Wang Yizhou, Global Role; Wang Yizhou, Creative Involvement: The Transition of China’s Diplomacy, (chuàngzàoxìng jiěrú: Zhōngguó wàijiāo de zhuǎnxíng), (Beijing, Peking University Press, 2015).
The synchronicity of the changes also supports a conclusion of a values based shift. If changes were solely the result of naked self-interest, you would expect to see piecemeal implementation that was sufficiently different in extent and timing for each case. Yet, this did not happen. In all three case studies – the changes occurred during roughly the same time-frame. Based on this research China’s change was a response to the internalization of international values, particularly pertaining to international action, non-proliferation and even sovereignty.

What is really interesting is that there has also been a second turning point under Xi Jinping in all three instances – distinct from the changes under Hu. This is especially interesting as most face-value interpretations of Xi Jinping would have us expect a turn away from the norms and values of the international community. However, we have actually seen intensification of the trend towards active collaboration against pariah states in spite of the countervailing trend in domestic policy (a return to past ideological themes and a more nationalistic rhetoric – particularly with regard to ‘core issues’).

Revisiting the Research Question, Hypothesis and Main Arguments:

From the beginning, this thesis has worked to answer the question:

*Has China’s foreign policy with regard to ‘pariah states’ changed in accordance to its increasing role in international affairs, as would be expected via socialization?*

To attempt to answer this, I hypothesized that:

*There has been a notable shift in China’s actions with regard to these types of states, as well as how China has approached international security issues like those in the case studies. Either through China’s interaction with these states or through an across the board adjustment to policy, China has become increasingly socialized to the applicable international norms.*

Throughout the three case studies, there is a strong case proving that, in line with Armstrong’s theory of socialization, that Chinese has increasingly become further integrated into the international system. As this process has continued, China began to further understand
and internalize the norms at its core. Preferably, the evidence would have been more robust. However, it is still quite convincing. In all three cases, noticeable shifts in policy occurred twice on roughly the same time frame. These states inherently are at odds with the international system, and in working to resolve issues with them a state must have an understanding of the norms and values of the international order that are being challenged. In each case, China does just that. At first, this change is slow, but it becomes increasingly noticeable by its actions over time.

The changes in China’s international behavior have a root in China’s domestic realm. Through interaction with the international environment, actors within the Chinese state adapt and begin to internalize a norm. Only then do China’s actions change on the international stage. Socialization is not a perfect process, it is an ongoing and interactive set of practices that at its core highlights strong membership to a group, and a sophisticated appreciation of international rules.

China is now a core component of the international system, and as a result has increasingly played a part in the resolution of international issues. Through this it has adapted and changed its approaches significantly, but still emphasizes mediation and negotiation through consensus to create agreement among multiple actors.

**Conclusion**

Throughout this time period, in each case study China’s view of and approach to the international norms and values has changed dramatically. As the leadership has changed and as China has grown, it has become a greater player in international affairs – with more interest in having a greater role.

For each case, China’s view regarding what issues they were or should be involved in shows significant change. Just over twenty years ago, most issues were viewed as bilateral–with China not having a role at all. Especially, in the case of Sudan and Iran, initially China viewed the entire situation to be business – they stayed out of politics. Now, clearly, China’s
view is different. China’s role is as a distinct member of the international community, helping address the issues.

Even as China started to interact on these cases, it began with China as a mediator, or with China constantly stressing the importance of mediation and negotiation. While China still continues to emphasize mediation in virtually all cases, its toolbox has expanded to include influence, peacekeeping, and even sanctions. As discussed, China’s role has ventured past a strict definition of non-interference and sovereignty to a more ‘constructive engagement’ that understands the values of upholding international norms. Semantics aside, China’s actions now more accurately reflect its growing power and presence in the international arena and are conducted in the interest of maintaining stability and ensuring peaceful resolution of conflicts.

All of these cases work together to show the role that socialization has played. As China has grown, and gained additional status in the international community, its concepts of responsibility and values have somewhat coalesced with that of the greater community. Of course, this is not to say that China has completely internalized all international norms. No power does, especially because norms are not entirely static, though they may maintain similar components. Actors in power will influence them and try to change them. China will likely try to shape the future of international norms – but it will do so within the system that it is enmeshed in.

China, as it joined IOs and agreements, learned to adapt and work within the existing structures – as all new members of a society must. The leaders and policy elites in China likely had an influence on how much China adapted to at one time, but China did clearly choose to stay within the international community rather than to go outside of it.

In essence, China has been socialized to global norms involving humanitarian intervention, nuclear non-proliferation, and sovereignty - to name a few. This does not mean that China agrees on every point of every concept – just that there is an understanding of the concept and the rules pertaining to it. China can, and has, shifted these rules at times – like insisting Khartoum had given its consent for peacekeepers. That is part of what being in the international society is about, especially as a greater power – working with other nations to adapt to the realities of new issues. Socialization is not an all-in or all-out type of process – it is
more of an ‘are you willing to work within the system’ or ‘will you ignore the system and go your own way’ question. China, for now at least, has chosen to work within the existing system.

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288


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Appendix A: Note on Chinese sources regarding North Korea

It must also be noted that, in general, Chinese language academic research focusing on North Korea mirrored official policy. In the course of my research, I reviewed the literature but at many points found it to be somewhat lacking – and this thought was mirrored by the concerns of a number of high level academics I spoke with. They confirmed the state of the literature was constrained by what was politically possible to discuss. As a result, this chapter utilized few Chinese language academic sources because they tended to be inhibited by censorship/self-censorship and examined or repeated facts with little analysis. Since this can be a sensitive issue, most academics appear to be tip-toeing on the side of political correctness, only saying what they view to be acceptable at any given time.50


At times, this allowed for papers to channel accepted nationalist outrage at the deployment of THAAD rather than discussing the reasons for deployment. See: Jin Qiang, ‘THAAD’s entrance to South Korea and China’s peninsula strategy - South Korea’s deployment of ”THAAD” will create a new dilemma’, (Sa de ru han yu zhongguo de bando cele - hangdu bu shi “sa de” bao ji chang xin de kunjing), Journal of Yanbian University (Yanbian dao xue xuebao), No. 5, 2016, pp. 5-6. Available at: http://www.cqvip.com/qk/82849x/201605/670084735.html.
Alternatively, some merely mentioned North Korea as a problematic state, or as an example of an area that China was involved diplomatically in the search for a solution. See: Fang Ning, ‘Large Changes in the world Situation and China’s Strategic Choice’, (Shijie jingji dianbang yu zhongguo de zhanlue xuannze), World Strategy, (Mouliuetandi), No. 1, 2008.