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Imperial classifications and anti-colonial resistance in North
Africa

There is a tendency in much of the recent scholarship on trans-Mediterranean relations to privilege Europe. This proclivity takes a range of related forms. The continent, which is frequently elided with the EU, is either made the object of analysis, used to frame the study of the region, or assumed or argued to be the decisive influence on the political and economic development of the southern Mediterranean. Intra-regional interactions are explicitly or implicitly presented from a European perspective. Europe's interests, objectives and anxieties habitually determine both the topic of discussion and the direction of debate. This helps explain the literature's focus on security and, in particular, such issues as Islamist terrorism, migration, and oil and gas. For these are Europe's primary concerns and are routinely cited as crucial influences on its behaviour towards the southern Mediterranean both before and since the Arab Spring.¹ Furthermore, many diagnoses of the EU's failure to anticipate or react quicker and more effectively to the protests attribute its lacklustre response to internal deficiencies or tensions,² to lapses in the bloc's will, capacity and organisation, rather than to anything beyond its direct control. Thus, the EU is frequently portrayed as instrumental to its neighbours' progress, as the main determiner, either by

how it acts or in what it fails to do, of the region's political and economic development.

The recent literature's privileging of Europe and elision of the continent with the EU leads much of it to focus on inter-governmental interactions when examining trans-Mediterranean relations.³ While many studies look at the composition and activities of a range of non-state actors, including civil society groups, opposition parties and protest coalitions, they do so mainly in domestic contexts.⁴ Few trace and analyse the links these bodies have to organisations elsewhere in the southern Mediterranean. And fewer still investigate their ties to similar outfits in Europe, or their influence on the continent's leaders, policy-makers and governments.

Individually and collectively, the books by Mathilde von Bülow, Liat Kozma and Odile Moreau and Stuart Schaar help counter this tendency in three important ways. The first is by contextualising the recent political and public debates over trans-Mediterranean migration. Von Bülow meticulously charts the extent to which French, German and other European governments of the 1950s and 1960s viewed North African migrants to their countries as threats to public order and state security, and the souring effect these fears had on relations between the continent's capitals. Kozma examines the mounting concerns of Europe's governments in the early twentieth century over the trafficking of women and girls as sex workers around the region, and their efforts to prevent and police the cross-border

movement of unaccompanied females. And Moreau and Schaar's contributors chart the lives and careers of selected North African and Middle Eastern figures many of whom not only were determined to limit and counter European political and cultural influence in the southern Mediterranean, but also drew on Islam to promote and gain local support for their causes. All of these works show that Europe's concerns over migration from the southern Mediterranean are longstanding, and that many of the responses to this movement of people devised and implemented by the continent's current leaders and governments have evolved out of measures and plans developed by their predecessors from the late nineteenth century onwards.

The second way in which these works help counter the recent literature's tendency to privilege Europe is by paying direct attention to the interests and behaviour of North African and Middle Eastern actors. Von Bülow's study centres on the Federation of France (*Fédération de France, FF*), the European wing of the National Liberation Front (*Front de Liberation Nationale, FLN*), which orchestrated and led the armed struggle for Algeria's independence. Kozma's point of departure is the individuals involved in the sex trade in Europe's southern Mediterranean territories, and the efforts of the responsible imperial power to manage these persons. And Moreau and Schaar's contributors chronicle either the lives and activities of hitherto unheralded figures who helped stimulate and marshal national awareness and anti-colonial resistance in North Africa

and the Middle East, or previously neglected episodes in the careers of better known personalities opposed to Europe's influence and authority over the region. Thus, each of these works makes the southern Mediterranean the object of their enquiry rather than Europe.

And the third way in which these works help counter this tendency is by focusing not solely on governments and their interactions with one another, but the activities and political influence of non-governmental groups, bodies, organisations and figures. While Von Bülow assiduously traces the efforts of successive French governments to compel their West German counterparts to take an ever-harder line against the FLN, and Bonn's efforts to placate both Paris and the newly independent countries of North Africa and the Middle East, she also details the development and execution of the FF's strategy in Europe. And even though Kozma compares the attempts of the French and British imperial governments to control both the movement of unaccompanied females and the spread of venereal diseases around the Mediterranean, she also chronicles the role of the League of Nations in coordinating the international response to the trafficking of women and girls, and the experiences of specific individuals and groups involved in the cross-border prostitution networks. And although Moreau and Schaar's contributors pay some attention to how the French and British imperial authorities ruled their respective territories in North Africa and the Middle East, their main objects of focus remain their chosen

cultural, nationalist and anti-colonial leaders. Furthermore, each of these works spends at least some time considering the cross-border interactions of their respective non-governmental actors.

These works are bound to one another not only by the similarity of their contributions to the literature on trans-Mediterranean relations, but also by their revelation of the opportunities to resist colonial rule generated by the imperial powers' classification of particular individuals and groups operating in and out of North Africa and the Middle East. Despite their different subject matters, each study looks at how these designations allowed nationalist bodies and figures to challenge, circumvent and, thereby, destabilise colonial authority. They also show that these opportunities were created as much by the act of classifying as the content of the classifications themselves, as anti-colonial forces explored and exploited the limits of particular designations to pursue courses of action that the imperial powers were actively trying to close down. Furthermore, none of the studies identifies their exposure of these opportunities as one of their core objectives. Rather, the insights they offer are corollaries of other lines of enquiry they each take.

As part of her study into the efforts of successive French governments to contain and counter the FLN's campaign in Europe, von Bülow highlights and examines the consequences of several vital designations. One of the most important at which she looks

is that of the conflict itself. Despite deploying hundreds of thousands of troops to Algeria during the nearly eight years of fighting, the French government never formally declared war on the FLN.⁵ Its forces were instead involved in what was officially described as a police action.⁶ In categorising its armed struggle with the FLN this way, Paris sought not only to downplay the scale of the confrontation and minimise the legitimacy of its adversary, but also to prevent and deter the involvement of external actors, including its own allies.⁷ Indeed, one of the main reasons the French government adopted this classification was to reinforce its claim that the conflict was a solely domestic security matter in which the international community had no right to intervene.

In her study, von Bülow charts the effect of this decision on the French government's efforts to disrupt the flow of weapons and equipment from Europe to the FLN's fighters in North Africa. In particular, she highlights the ways in which Paris's designation of the conflict impaired its ability to mount a more effective blockade of the enemy's forces. She notes that without a declaration of war, the French authorities could not invoke the rights of either pursuit or riposte.⁸ And while they were prepared on occasion to break international law and board and impound ships and property registered and belonging to West German companies and citizens, Cold War political considerations prevented them from doing the same to Warsaw Pact vessels and goods. These restrictions, born of its definition of the

conflict, undermined the French government's attempts to starve the FLN of the means to keep fighting. As a result, and as von Bülow details, the number of weapons in the possession of the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale, ALN) units in Tunisia and Morocco,⁹ increased from 10,000 and 1,500 respectively in February 1959 to 60,000 and 7,000 in May 1960.¹⁰

Paris instigated this blockade partly in response to the effects of another ambiguity over what constituted weapons of war.¹¹ According to von Bülow, one of the most important tasks in which FF operatives in West Germany were engaged was the procurement of arms for their ALN comrades in North Africa. Under this assignment, these envoys had to identify and liaise with dealers who were willing to circumvent Bonn's ban on the export to Algeria of munitions of an overtly military function (*Kriegswaffen*). One of the ways in which some suppliers got around this prohibition was by making just enough modifications to the weapons they were providing to be able to claim that they were designed and intended for civilian use (*Relativwaffen*). While Paris continued to denounce such classificatory chicanery, by these means the FF succeeded in procuring hundreds of firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition for its forces.

Another equally important designation explored by von Bülow is that of nationality, of who was - and who was not - considered a citizen of France. The conditions and corollaries of this particular classification were instrumental to the evolution of the Algerian nationalist movement and the FLN's resort to

violence. Since the extension and consolidation of French rule over Algeria from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the territory's Muslim majority had been subject to a range of discriminatory and humiliating provisions that afforded them fewer civil rights than either the nearly one million Europeans who eventually settled there or the Metropolitan French.¹² Despite the occasional efforts of well-meaning ministers and governments in Paris, and administrations in Algiers to redress this imbalance, many of these provisions remained in force until the final days of *Algérie française*, largely at the insistence of the settler community. Nevertheless, from the 1930s onwards, the authorities in Paris and to a lesser extent Algiers grew increasingly alarmed at the effect this discrimination was having on both the direction of development of the Algerian nationalist movement and the country's international reputation as an enlightened and liberal power. In the wake of the Second World War and Sétif and Guelma massacres of 1945,¹³ therefore, Paris began to pursue more actively a range of reforms intended to improve the political and civil rights of the Muslim majority.

With the start of the war of liberation, however, Paris faced an intractable dilemma. On the one hand, it recognised that granting Algeria's Muslims comparable civil rights to those of their European compatriots was vital to winning their support or, in the very least, to preventing them from siding with the FLN. Yet on the other, it actively restricted and infringed some of these rights as part of its campaign against the FF. This led

Paris to pressure Bonn to treat the growing number of Algerians living in West Germany as French citizens in some instances and as not in others. While this approach arguably helped Paris to monitor and control the movement of Muslim Algerians in some ways, it also had significant drawbacks. Not least, as the legal confusion it engendered in West Germany helped ensure that the country's authorities rarely felt able to pursue the FLN members and supporters residing there with enough vigour to satisfy their French counterparts. Von Bülow details how FF operatives succeeded in turning this classificatory tension to their advantage and thereby established West Germany as one of their most important bases from which to mount their European campaign.¹⁴

The allocation of rights on the basis of civil status is a core theme of Kozma's book as well. She charts and analyses the ways in which Europe's imperial powers tried to control the movement and social interactions of certain categories of women who lived and worked in their respective territories. The first such group she examines comprised women and girls whom Western governments deemed vulnerable to the immoral machinations of the pimps and procurers who worked the Mediterranean. To help protect them from such predatory forces, these governments, in collaboration with the League of Nations, devised and introduced a raft of legal measures that constrained the ability of young and unaccompanied females to travel overseas. To prevent women and girls from being encouraged or forced into prostitution,

therefore, Western governments and the League tried to reduce their freedom of movement. Yet, as Kozma notes, these attempts were of only limited effectiveness as procurers continually found ways to circumvent these restrictions and spirit them from one country and to another.¹⁵

The second category of females that Kozma examines is made up of prostitutes who lived and worked in several North African and Levantine cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These women were subject to a range of conditions and constraints that greatly affected what they could do and where they could go. In France, as in much of the rest of mainland Europe, prostitution was considered an unavoidable corollary of male sexuality. As such, prostitutes and brothels were permitted to operate legally and semi-openly under state supervision. This attitude, along with the broader principles of the regulatory regimen to which it gave rise, were gradually extended to France's territories overseas including those in North Africa and the wider Middle East.

Thus, by the early twentieth century prostitutes and brothels in the Maghreb were only allowed to work and operate legally if they satisfied a range of official requirements. For individual women, these included registering as a prostitute with the local authorities and submitting to regular health checks with a state-approved physician. Any woman who refused to meet these obligations could be arrested, tried, fined and imprisoned. Registering as a prostitute, therefore, imposed a

unique array of responsibilities on those forced to take on this status. And once acquired, it often proved difficult to discard as, 'to change their official categorization, women had to apply to the authorities and convince them that they had repented, providing a guarantor or proving that they had married'.¹⁶

Some colonial officers in French North Africa also imposed restrictions on where prostitutes could live and work, and the appearance of the premises in which they resided. In the early 1920s, the city authorities in Casablanca built a new bespoke red-light district that was specifically designed to reduce the visibility and control the movement of its residents. The lodgings there all looked the same and were 'connected by identical courtyards and doors.' The buildings had 'only one entrance [which was] protected by a double door, and no external sign[s] or emblem[s]. The windows [had] to remain closed at all times, and those overlooking ... neighbors had to be covered by matte frosted glass'.¹⁷ The women who lived there could leave the district but once a week and only then if they had official permission to do so. To move to another part of the city they had to apply for and obtain a clean bill of health from the local authorities. And to move further afield, they also had to gain the approval of medical officers in the place to which they wanted to relocate. As Kozma explains, prostitutes in France's North African and Middle Eastern territories were subjected to a raft of highly restrictive and invasive regulations which they then struggled to have rescinded.

The legal-medical experience of these women and girls was taken up by members of the rapidly growing feminist movements in France and Britain. By the early 1930s, campaigners in both countries were calling for the abolition of these regulations as a prelude to ending prostitution in the overseas territories. While British feminists were more successful in achieving this objective - largely because, in gaining suffrage earlier, they had greater influence on their country's political process and colonial policies - both they and their French counterparts relied on paternalistic arguments to make their case. For they maintained that these regulations and prostitution more broadly were incompatible with the aims of the civilising missions to which their respective imperial governments were ostensibly committed. Thus, as Kozma explains, the lives and experiences of female sex workers in North Africa and the Levant were central to the increasingly intense yet complex debates that took place in France and Britain and their respective overseas territories over how best to challenge the colonial relations that existed between men and women, and, more ambiguously, Europeans and the peoples whose lands they had colonised and settled.

The rights and status of North Africa's colonised peoples is also a central theme of Moreau and Schaar's edited volume. Each of their contributors, charts and examines the life and career of an individual who either fomented and led local resistance to European rule in one or other North African territory, or influenced the development of indigenous

nationalism somewhere in the region. For some of these figures, challenging imperial power and authority was a primary objective. For others, it was a corollary of their efforts to secure either their own interests or those of a particular community or constituency. Collectively these contributions highlight and, in some instances, interrogate, the advantages these figures derived from manipulating and exploiting European designations and classifications, and anti-colonial expectations.

The ways in which each of these individuals did so, however, varied significantly. As Odile Moreau explains in her chapter, Aref Taher Bey spent the years leading up to the Great War fighting a rear-guard action against the growing French and Italian influence over Morocco and Tripolitania respectively. His primary goal in both instances was less the preservation of each territory's mainly Muslim population from encroaching Christian rule, and more the defence of Ottoman interests in the region including, in the case of Tripolitania, maintaining Constantinople's suzerainty over the province. And despite claiming to a French journalist that pan-Islamism was largely concocted by Europe's imperial powers to justify their interventions in North Africa, he was closely associated with a number of trans-national religious groups that helped stimulate and orchestrate local Muslim resistance to European interference and rule in the region.¹⁸

Aref Taher Bey's motivations, as well as some of his key experiences, were similar to those of Enver Pasha, another of the volume's case studies (see the chapter by Şuhnaz Yilmaz). Far better known than his compatriot - mainly for his leadership of the Young Turk movement and Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and Great War role as the Ottoman Empire's minister of war - Enver also spent time in North Africa immediately prior to the First World War helping to organise a number of Libyan tribes against the Italian invasion. Like Aref Taher, Enver's aim was not to save Tripolitania from Italy so that it could gain its independence, but to keep it within the Ottoman Empire. He was also drawn to trans-national Islamist groups and networks, in part, because he recognised their potential utility to the defence and advancement of Constantinople's interests throughout the North Africa and Middle East. Nevertheless, and again like Aref Taher, he was willing to deny and set aside such sympathies in pursuit of other opportunities, as he arguably did in the early 1920s when he sought Soviet and international Communist support for his political ambitions. Unlike Aref Taher, however, Enver harboured strong pan-Turkic sympathies, sufficient to lead him to break with Moscow and fight to liberate the Turkish emirates of Central Asia from Soviet rule.

As Moreau and Yilmaz document in their respective chapters, Aref Taher Bey and Enver Pasha spent significant parts of their careers fighting the spread of European power and influence in North Africa and the Middle East. On occasion, this led them to

make common cause with a number of Islamist and ethno-nationalist groups that embraced and pursued anti-colonial agendas. Yet arguably neither of them was committed to combatting all forms of imperial rule or every empire that held territory in the region. They intervened in Tripolitania at the behest of the Ottoman government to try to preserve its influence over the province. Their anti-colonialism, therefore, was selective, expedient and ambiguous. They denounced and fought against only Europe's empires in a belated attempt to defend and save their own.

In contrast to both Aref Taher Bey and Enver Pasha, Mukhtar Al-Ayari (see the chapter by Stuart Schaar) was neither an Ottoman official nor a military commander nor from an aristocratic or affluent family. He was a Tunisian Arab who rose to prominence in the protectorate's nascent trade union movement in the inter-war period. After being exposed to Marxist ideology and Communist politics while serving in the French army during the Great War, he became an active member of a small but influential coterie of Tunisian leftist-nationalists. With strong personal connections to the Destour Party, he helped establish the General Confederation of Tunisian Workers (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, CGTT) in 1924, the country's first indigenous trade union. His involvement with the CGTT got him into trouble with the protectorate authorities, and in 1925 he was arrested, tried and convicted of inciting opposition to French rule. Sentenced to

10 years in exile, he travelled first to Cairo and later to Paris where he died before ever returning home.

While also directed against France and Europe's other imperial powers, Al-Ayari's anti-colonialism was markedly different from that of either Aref Taher Bey or Enver Pasha. For unlike they, he wanted not to preserve what remained of the damaged and dying Ottoman order, but to liberate Tunisians and North Africans from all forms of imperial rule by establishing a new system of economic relations. For Al-Ayari, class and imperialism were synonymous. He drew little distinction between either French rule and capitalism, or anti-colonialism and socialism. Yet despite being labelled an enemy of the colonial order, he accepted one of the key arguments upon which the protectorate system was premised: that all human development was linear and sequential.¹⁹ Like Messali Hadj and other,²⁰ better known North African leftist-nationalists of the same period, Al-Ayari used some of the French authorities' arguments against them. He appropriated ideas and concepts that they drew upon to explain and justify their rule in Tunisia and the rest of the Maghreb to challenge and expose the legitimacy of their claims and power. The extent to which the arrogation of these notions and arguments impaired the ability of indigenous nationalists to bring an end to colonial rule and imperial power over the peoples and territories they represented has long been the subject of fierce academic debate.²¹ Nevertheless, in drawing upon them, Al-Ayari and his fellow North African nationalists

advanced their respective political causes by exploiting the colonial powers' own definitions and designations.

West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War is primarily a history of the FLN's activities in the Bonn republic during the war of liberation. It begins by considering the importance of safe havens and rear bases to insurgent groups and factions around the world. As von Bülow notes, such 'sanctuaries mattered because they provided ... [these] forces the time, space, and security required to build up troops and resources and develop effective and durable politico-administrative structures'.²² Her book then charts and analyses the increasingly vital role West Germany played as an operating base for the FLN during the Algerian war of liberation.

The importance of other countries as safe havens to the FLN's campaign is widely acknowledged by many existing studies.²³ The contributions of Tunisia and Morocco as staging grounds for the ALN are habitually referred to by specialist and general histories of the conflict,²⁴ and many other accounts not explicitly about the war.²⁵ France is also routinely identified as having played host to an array of individuals, groups, movements and networks that supported and advanced the cause of Algerian independence.²⁶ Similarly, Nasser's Egypt is frequently mentioned as one of the FLN's earliest and most vocal allies from which the group's uprising was launched.²⁷ Much less attention, however, has been paid to other countries and the roles their territories played as places in which FLN members

and supporters could live and mobilise in comparative safety from the French security services.

Von Bülow's is the first in-depth study of West Germany and the FLN. In it, she confirms both the importance and singularity of the Bonn republic's contribution to the organisation's campaign. In addition to much needed revenue, the country became a vital source of arms and ammunition to the group. Indeed, by October 1958, the French army's external military intelligence agency, the *deuxième bureau*, identified West Germany as one of the FLN's three "principal sources" of weapons.²⁸ And while the quantity of munitions sourced through the country was never as great as that provided by either Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia, the FLN still valued the supply of arms through the Bonn republic sufficiently highly to establish its 'only permanent procurement mission outside of the Arab world' there.²⁹

The focus and extensive primary archival research of von Bülow's book make it compelling reading for anyone interested in modern Algeria. And it will also appeal to scholars and students of the early EU. For in charting the FLN's growing presence in the Bonn republic, it details the effect of the war of liberation on Franco-West German relations over this critical period in post-war European politics. Throughout much of the conflict, Bonn was forced to balance several vital national interests. The most important of these was placating and appeasing Paris. By the time the uprising began on 1 November 1954, the West German authorities were fully aware of the extent

to which they depended on their neighbour for their security, prosperity and ongoing international rehabilitation. And almost as important, were the cordial relations they hoped to forge with the governments of the growing number of independent ex-colonies. For they understood that doing so represented one the best ways of dissuading the leaders of these states from formally recognising East Germany as a separate entity, to maintaining the international isolation of the Berlin regime.

The war of liberation presented Bonn with a complex and protracted dilemma. If it agreed to all of the French government's demands on how it should respond to the FLN members operating in its territory, then it risked alienating the organisation's allies in the Middle East and Africa. Yet should it fail to keep France onside, then it risked upsetting this vital ally and the cohesion of the Western alliance on which it relied. But if it upset the FLN's supporters too much, including the governments of the newly independent countries of Tunisia and Morocco, then it risked undermining its ability to dissuade them from recognising the East Berlin regime. In meticulously charting Bonn's response to the ever-shifting contours of this dilemma, von Bülow is the first to expose the true impact of the Algerian war of liberation on intra-European relations at this time.

West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War is also ideally organised. Chapter one begins with an overview of the developments and forces that led to the establishment of the FLN

before explaining the importance of safe havens, sanctuaries and rear bases to insurgent groups. Chapters two through five, which together comprise part one, then chart and analyse the FLN's growing presence in West Germany from the Federation of France's initial appreciation of the potential opportunities presented by the Bonn republic as a base of operations through to the creation of the organisation's procurement and smuggling networks there. Chapters six through nine, which together comprise part two, then focus on the efforts of the French government, intelligence and security services, armed forces and authorities in Algeria to contain and counter the FLN's international campaign and activities in West Germany specifically. Finally, chapter 10, which comprises part three, then looks at what happened to the FLN's cadres and networks in the Bonn republic over the final 18 months of the war of liberation. In adopting this structure, the book's analysis is able to be both chronological and thematic. Each part focuses on a distinct period of time while every chapter addresses a different topic. Thus, Von Bülow can provide a series of highly-detailed and focused accounts that build on one another and develop her thesis while avoiding unnecessary repetition.

Global Women, Colonial Ports is a history of prostitution in North Africa and the Middle East over the inter-war period. It begins by focusing on the activities and development of the League of Nations' Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Women and Children (CTW). The CTW first met in June 1922 to monitor

the implementation of the 1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children. This agreement was the outcome of nearly 50 years of escalating European and North American concern over what was initially called white slavery.³⁰ This circulation of females was increasingly viewed by the US and various European governments as a moral hazard both to the individuals involved and the societies in which they lived and worked. In particular, prostitution was seen as a key contributory cause to a range of serious health and social problems that affected all parts of the Mediterranean region. The remainder of the book then examines the ways in which the French and British authorities in Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon, Egypt and Palestine tried to address these issues by managing the lives and bodies of the women and girls whom they thought were, at least in part, responsible.

While the local colonial authorities in each of the urban centres examined by Kozma had their own approach to managing these women, an especially noteworthy difference existed between the methods used by French officers and their British counterparts. With their colleagues in Morocco arguably at the forefront, French administrators sought and exercised far greater control over the prostitutes based in their locales than did any of their British peers. As Kozma carefully details, the women and girls working in Tunis, Beirut and, above all, Casablanca were subject to extensive and invasive controls that, once in force, they found hard to have lifted. This difference

reflected the competing views of the French and British empires on how best to stop the spread of venereal disease within their territories and amongst their armed forces. And while Britain's approach might have been less intrusive, that of France was more effective at safeguarding the health of prostitutes and their clients.

With its carefully developed and substantiated thesis, *Global Women, Colonial Ports* is essential reading for scholars and students of European colonial rule in North Africa and the Levant in the early twentieth century. In detailing both the ways in which the French and British authorities tried to manage the prostitutes based in their respective territories and their reasons for doing so, Kozma provides a detailed account of a specific form of imperial control that spans the macro and micro levels. For the health of these women directly affected that of their clients, many of whom were soldiers, sailors and functionaries in the service of one or other European empire. Thus, as Kozma shows, the colonial authorities believed that the stability and efficiency of their rule in the Mediterranean rested in part on monitoring and disciplining this group of females.

Global Women, Colonial Ports will also appeal to academics and students working in the field of postcolonialism. For in explaining how and why the French and British authorities sought to control these women and girls, Kozma highlights the complex interplay of several types of relation that can be described as

colonial. A key reason for the different approaches to managing prostitutes in their overseas territories taken by France and Britain was the degree of influence each country's feminist movement had on imperial policy. And just as domestic gender relations affected colonial rule in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, so the perceived needs of empire fed into the debates over women's rights taking place at home. Kozma not only highlights the parallels between the imperial powers' treatment of women and minorities in their own societies and conduct towards the populations of their overseas territories, but also confirms the extent to which practices of control were exercised, developed and shared right through their empires. Thus, she contributes to the longstanding crucial debate in postcolonialism over what constitutes colonial rule and whether it has ended.

Global Women, Colonial Ports is also well organised, drawing together three complementary lines of analysis. The first is thematic as each of its five chapters tackles a different topic. Chapter one traces the origins and development of the international legal and political environment in which the book is set. Chapter two looks at the regulatory regimens established by the French and British colonial authorities in a series of North African and Middle Eastern urban centres. Chapter three examines how and why women and girls moved around the Mediterranean to work as prostitutes and the measures taken by the imperial powers to monitor and stop them. Chapter four

considers the medical concerns and responses of the French and British authorities in these urban centres. And finally, chapter five charts the development of the feminist-led campaigns to abolish the regulatory regimens and end prostitution in Europe's imperial territories. The second line of enquiry is temporal as each theme corresponds to a successive stage in the prostitution network. And the third line is geographic as the book's focus shifts from Europe to North Africa to the Levant and back to Europe. In taking these lines of enquiry, Kozma is able both to provide a detailed and comprehensive account of the phenomenon of trans-national prostitution in the Mediterranean in the early twentieth century and reconstruct the main political and civil debates that took place in Europe over the working lives and treatment of the women involved.

Subversives and Mavericks in the Muslim Mediterranean is a collection of essays on the lives and careers of a series of figures who rejected and resisted European influence and rule in North Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While most of these individuals shared the same broad concerns over the implications and effects of this outside interference on the development and direction of their respective societies, the specific causes of their opposition, and forms that their resistance took, varied considerably. Some of the figures examined in the book - most notably Al-Najim bin Mubarak bin Mas'ud, Aref Taher Bey and Enver Pasha (see the chapters by Odile Moreau, Wilfred Rollman and Şuhnaz Yilmaz) -

were soldiers and military commanders who fought against the invading forces of France and Italy. Their opposition was violent, public and in the service of incumbent Muslim leaders (the sultans of Morocco and the Ottoman Empire).

Other of the individuals examined in the volume - including Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Mukhtar Al-Ayari (see the chapters by Sanaa Makhlouf and Stuart Schaar) - were political activists who developed and propounded alternative visions of Arab society that began with bringing an end to European influence over North Africa and the wider Middle East. While their respective plans for the region were almost entirely different, they each wanted to create a new order rather than try to salvage or rebuild what Europe's imperial powers had taken over and, at least partially, dismantled. In different ways, their opposition was ambitious, sweeping and intellectual, pursued on behalf not of a dispossessed ruling elite, but national and religious imagined communities.

And still other of the figures studied in the book - in particular Boubeker El-Ghanjaoui, Nazli Hanem, Kmar Bayya and Khiriya Bin Ayyad, and Tahar Darghouth and Lilia Djemma (see the chapters by Khalid Ben-Srhir, Leïla Blili and Julia Clancy-Smith) - were intermediaries, aristocrats and ordinary people who, in pursuing their personal goals, challenged prevailing social structures and norms. Unlike the others examined in this book, none of these figures openly or consistently denounced the European powers. Of humble origins, Boubeker El-Ghanjaoui

acquired wealth and prestige representing the interests of the Moroccan crown and British Legation in Tangier. Nazli Hanem and Khiriya Bin Ayyad exploited the comparative freedoms afforded women in Western Europe to argue for the reform of the Ottoman Empire. And Lilia Djemma took full advantage of what educational opportunities were available to her in the French protectorate of Tunisia to pursue a career not normally open to either women or those from her socio-economic background. Thus, their opposition was largely a corollary of their pursuit of other goals which their respective social circumstances made difficult to achieve.

Subversives and Mavericks in the Muslim Mediterranean will appeal most directly to academics and students interested in early resistance to the expansion and entrenchment of European rule in North Africa and the wider Middle East. Together, the volume's essays highlight novel ways in which the members of colonised societies were able to oppose and subvert imperial power. They confirm that effective resistance could take any form and be mounted by anyone. It was not limited to dramatic acts or grand gestures. Nor was it pursued solely by or for great men. In adding this nuance and subtlety, and in providing real-world examples of the range of colonial relations that exist, the volume will also be of interest to those working in the field of postcolonialism.

The volume is also effectively organised. Its eight essays are grouped together in two parts of unequal length. Part one

includes the chapters on Boubeker El-Ghanjaoui (Ben Srhir), Aref Taher Bey (Moreau), Nazli Hanem, Kmar Bayya and Khiriya Bin Ayyad (Blili), Al-Najim bin Mubarak bin Mas'ud (Rollman), and Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (Makhlouf), while part two comprises those of Emver Pasha (Yilmaz), Tahar Darghouth and Lilia Djemma (Clancy-Smith) and Mukhtar Al-Ayari (Schaar). Each part broadly mirrors the organisation and content of the other. In both, the chapters are arranged in broadly chronological order. And each includes essays on figures who engaged in different types of resistance. In adopting this structure, Moreau and Schaar are able to emphasise the interconnectedness of the region. By not ordering the chapters on the basis of country - which would have been difficult given the amount of travel in which so many of the figures examined engaged - the volume highlights the high degree to which the different parts of the Mediterranean were bound together.

¹ For example, see: P. Rivetti and R. Di Peri (eds.), *Continuity and Change Before and After the Arab Uprisings* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); P. Bauer (ed.), *Arab Spring Challenges for Democracy and Security in the Mediterranean* (London and New York, Routledge, 2015); A. Teti, 'The EU's First Response to the "Arab Spring": A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity', *Mediterranean Politics* Vol. 17 (2012), pp. 266-284, at 266; L.A. Way, 'Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Lessons of 1989', *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 22 (2011), pp. 17-27, at 24.

² See for example: T.A. Börzel and V. van Hüllen, 'One Voice, One Message but Conflicting Goals: Cohesiveness and Consistency in the European

Neighbourhood Policy', *Journal of European Public Policy* Vol. 21 (2014), pp. 1033-1049, at 1034; L. Mouhib, 'EU Democracy Promotion in Tunisia and Morocco: Between Contextual Changes and Structural Continuity', *Mediterranean Politics* Vol. 19 (2014), pp. 351-372, at 352; A. Echagüe, H. Michou and B. Mikail, 'Europe and the Arab Uprisings: EU Vision versus Member State Action', *Mediterranean Politics* Vol. 16 (2011), 329-335, at 330.

³ For example, see: I. Fontana, *EU Neighbourhood Policy in the Maghreb: Implementing the ENP in Tunisia and Morocco Before and After the Arab Uprisings* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017); V. van Hüllen, *EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation and Authoritarianism* (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁴ For example, see: C. Moreno-Almeida, *Rap Beyond 'Resistance': Staging Power in Contemporary Morocco* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); M. LeVine, *The Revolution Never Ends: Music, Protest and Rebirth in the Arab World*, in L. Sadiki (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 354-365; C. Schriwer, *Graffiti Arts and the Arab Spring*, in L. Sadiki (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 376-391; D. Hochman Rand *Roots of the Arab Spring: Contested Authority and Political Change in the Middle East* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); F. Cavatorta and R. Hostrup Haugbølle, 'The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali', *Mediterranean Politics* Vol. 17 (2012), 179-195.

⁵ As William Cohen reports, up to an estimated 2.7 million French service personnel had served in Algeria by the time the fighting had ended. W.B. Cohen, 'The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory', *Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques* Vol. 28 (2002), 2-19-239, at 221.

⁶ Cohen, p. 225.

⁷ For an excellent account of the strength of the French government's determination to minimise the involvement of the United States and Britain in the conflict, see: M. Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight*

for *Independence and the Origins of Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁸ M. von Bülow, *West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 284.

⁹ The ALN was the name given to the FLN's military arm. A Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006), p. 133.

¹⁰ Von Bülow, p. 321.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 140.

¹² For more detailed accounts of the discrimination endured by Algerian Muslims and its effect on the nationalist movement, see: J.N.C., *Identity in Algerian Politics: The Legacy of Colonial Rule* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009).

¹³ For more detailed accounts of these massacres and their effect on the development of the Algerian nationalist movement, see: R. Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945: massacres en Algérie* (Paris: De Paris Editions, 2008); B. Mekhaled, *Chroniques d'un massacre. 8 mai 1945: Setif, Guelma, Kherrata* (Paris: Syros, 1995).

¹⁴ For an excellent exploration of the scale and severity of the constitutional challenges generated by the war of liberation and President de Gaulle's decision to grant Algeria independence, see: T. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006).

¹⁵ L. Kozma, *Global Women, Colonial Ports: Prostitution in the Interwar Middle East* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2017), pp. 96-101.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp.57-58.

¹⁸ O. Moreau, *Aref Taher Bey: An Ottoman Military Instructor Bridging the Maghreb and the Ottoman Mediterranean*, in O. Moreau and S. Schaar (eds.),

Subversives and Mavericks in the Muslim Mediterranean: A Subaltern History (Austin: University of Texas, 2016), pp. 57-78, at 65.

¹⁹ For more information on the French empire's concept of the protectorate and view on civilisation and human development, see: M. Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 63; R.J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2001), p. 89.

²⁰ For more details on Messali Hadj's life and career, see: J. Simon, *Messali Hadj invente la nation algérienne* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2018); B. Stora, *Messali Hadj (1908-1974): Pionnier du nationalisme algérien* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000).

²¹ A core facet of this debate is over the extent to which anti-colonial activists can draw upon Western theories - including the more critical ones of postcolonialism, poststructuralism and postmodernism - to challenge Western colonial and imperial power. For a succinct overview of this debate, see: B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths and H. Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 177-178.

²² Von Bülow, pp. 12-13.

²³ For more detailed accounts, see: C. R. Schrader, *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999).

²⁴ See: Horne, pp. 263-267; M. Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

²⁵ For example, see: D. Macey, *Frantz Fanon: A Biography* (New York: Picador, 2000).

²⁶ For example, see: M-P. Ulloa, *Francis Jeanson: un intellectuel en dissidence de la Résistance à la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Berg International, 2001).

²⁷ The FLN announced the start of its uprising in flyers it posted and distributed in parts of Algeria, and a radio announcement broadcast on from Cairo. S. Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris : Editions Flammarion, 2012).

²⁸ Von Bülow, p. 280.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 280.

³⁰ Kozma, p. 21.