A critical exploration of the ways in which national identification is discursively constructed in the Greek Cypriot system

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A critical exploration of the ways in which national identification is discursively constructed in the Greek Cypriot education system

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The example of my father’s life was a real inspiration for me to study issues related to the current political situation in Cyprus and it is to his memory that I dedicate this thesis.
Abstract
This thesis explores the ways in which national identification is discursively constructed in the Greek Cypriot education system. The study focuses on a set of key educational documents and a set of interviews with some significant education policy actors in Cyprus. The intention is to critically explore those discourses which constitute attempts to imagine and construct Cypriot national identity. The study is based on an assumption that while official educational policies influence the construction of national identity, these educational practices can conflict with alternative and individually-constructed discursive models of national identity. This thesis investigates the tensions between official and individual modes of identification and interprets the tensions involved in attempts to maintain and to transform Cyprus’ national identity through the Greek Cypriot educational system.

This research project adopts a qualitative design in order to explore the broadest possible range of identity constructs and their dialectical interrelations, as well as to identify in detail the recontextualisation of important concepts and arguments related to the ways in which national identification is discursively constructed in the Greek Cypriot education system. The empirical work that lies at the centre of this thesis investigates three different discursive contexts ranging from the official to the private. Specifically these are two key sets of documents: the New Curriculum, and the commemorative messages of the Minister of Education. The study also draws on the private discourse of a small number of policy actors involved in the Greek Cypriot education system, based on nine topic-oriented qualitative interviews.

The findings trace the relations between models of discursive constructs of nations and national identities illustrated in the documentary and interview analysis. The findings also indicate that different identities are discursively constructed according to the anticipated audiences, topic and
substantive content. In this sense, national identities are flexible and frequently ambivalent and diffuse.
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CHAPTER 1

THESIS INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
Greek Cypriot education has been historically linked with Hellenocentric education and had as its main objective the transmission of the Greek cultural heritage of Greek Cypriots. Hellenocentric education emphasises the Greekness of Cyprus and its people and is articulated with discourses that promote the membership of the Greeks of Cyprus to the wider Greek nation on the basis of ethno-cultural criteria of national belongingness – common descent and culture defined by religion, language, customs and arts.

However, leftist political circles deny the official emphasis on Greekness and focus their ideology on the concept of ‘shared Cypriotness’ which allows the inclusion of all the communities of Cyprus, and in particular the Turkish Cypriots. Discourses actually emphasising the ‘Cypriotness’ of Cypriot people were started by leftist political circles of both communities, Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Cypriocentrism has traditionally existed in Cypriot leftist circles.

The official leftist political party, AKEL, since its foundation in 1941, pronounced and put in practice its Cypriocentric ideology by including Turkish Cypriots in its circles and involving them in its leadership. AKEL is the party that represents “civil Cypriot patriotism” (Panayiotou, 2006, p.271). A significant constituent element of AKEL’s policy regarding the Cyprus Problem is the idea of rapprochement between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and it is manifested with the slogan ‘Cyprus belongs to its people’, which it is the opposite pole to the rightist slogan ‘Cyprus is...
Greek'. In its official site there is a clear declaration of AKEL’s consistence and insistence for the rapprochement:

“Our concept of rapprochement is based on our internationalist ideology and our love for our common motherland. Our concept of rapprochement constitutes an extension in contemporary conditions of the common struggles of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots within the framework of the popular movement that took place in previous periods. We consider rapprochement a constituent element of the Cypriot people’s struggle against occupation, and we attain to it above all a political, social and class content”.


Whereas the dominant ideology of Hellenocentrism is based mainly on the idea of ‘historical continuity’ that essentially links Cyprus with mainland Greece, the ideology of Cypriocentrism is the communist alternative that adapts a long-running tradition of lower-class mobilisation and resistance and employs narratives of common class struggles in order to support the peaceful coexistence of both communities (Panayiotou, 2006, p.276).

Although the ideology of Cypriocentrism has a long history, the dominance and hegemonic status of Hellenocentrism has repressed its development. Even AKEL avoids openly disagreeing with the dominant idea of Greekness since, “they are perfectly aware that any serious challenge, or even qualification, to the assumed Greekness of the island would alienate them from the political mainstream”(Mavratsas, 1997, p.9).

However, this started to change in February 2008 when the candidate of the leftist party AKEL Demetris Christophias won the presidential elections and became the first leftist president of Cyprus since the declaration of its independence. This election made possible the repressed leftist discourses to officially embody the educational system of Cyprus. An example is the Circular Letter, emphasising the goal of the school year 2008-09, which called upon teachers to prepare students for
the reconciliation of the two communities, Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The controversies and the massive reactions that the announcement of this goal caused among educators and in public discourses highlight the tension between the conceptualisation of nation-state and the national identity of Greek Cypriots. All these tensions, concerning the way the national identity of Greek Cypriots is conceptualised, increased my interest in examining the way educational documents published and circulated during the days of the leftist government of President Christophias managed issues referring to the national identity of Greek Cypriots.

1.2 Description of the Circular announcing the aim for reconciliation
Since the stimulation for this study was the Circular Letter (2008) announcing the aim for reconciliation and the way it negotiated the national identity of Cypriots, its description explains the rationale of this research project.

The aim for reconciliation promoted the cultivation of the culture of the peaceful coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots and it was expressed in the following way: "Cultivation of the culture of the peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and co-operation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots aiming to put an end to the Turkish occupation and the reunion of our country and its people" (Circular Letter, 2008). This aim stated clearly the way official educational policies envisaged the future of Cyprus and signified the strategies that were employed for the construction of the national identity of Cypriots. The state sought to promote in education the solution which negotiated for the resolution of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and to prepare future citizens to not only be able to manage a possible solution but also to contribute to its fulfillment by creating a culture of peaceful co-habitation, mutual respect and co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, with this aim education was called upon to promote the political aim of the state in order to end the Turkish occupation and reunite “our country and its people” (ibid). For this specific reason, this aim may be described as political rather than educational. Since the discourse “our people” includes both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, this aim cannot be interpreted within the framework of intercultural
dialogue. The similarities between the two communities that constitute them as “one people” were also mentioned as follows: “However, at the same time education in Cyprus must also cultivate those elements which are characteristics of our people” (Circular Letter, 2008). From this point of view the aim for peaceful coexistence promoted the similarities between the two communities and emphasized the will to unify Cyprus and the development of conditions of cooperation and solidarity.

While the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were grouped together as “the Cypriot people”, a discourse that indicated a common cultural tradition, at the same time the ethnic differences between the two communities based on their history, culture and their particular character were mentioned in the explanation of the aim. Actually, it was clarified that the separate educational systems in the two communities, which dated back to the British Colony, would continue to exist within the framework of a dominant federal state. This reference also stressed the composition “of the Cypriot people who basically consist of two ethnic communities who have their own roots, history, their special cultural features and their particular character” (ibid). From the beginning of its promotion the aim left open the way of approaching it, since on the one hand it was placed within the framework of intercultural dialogue, and on the other it presented the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as “one people”.

In this Circular, the relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were considered to be a significant factor in the formation of the contemporary history of Cyprus and its defining role in “the present and future political development of our country” (Circular Letter, 2008) was expressed. Furthermore, a definitive role, but with negative effects, was attributed to foreign interventions “with the ultimate unlawful and barbaric Turkish invasion and the continuing occupation until today of 37% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus” (ibid). Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were considered as legitimate citizens of Cyprus and the responsibilities for the division of Cyprus were indefinitely attributed to “foreign interventions” and Turkey. The Turkish invasion was described as “unlawful” and “barbaric”.

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Thus, the framework of the solution of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ was based on the co-existence with the Turkish Cypriots so that the significance of the peaceful relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the present and future political developments in Cyprus was underlined. By promoting the aim of the cultivation of the peaceful coexistence of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, education was called upon to reinforce the attempts to find a solution that will reunite Cyprus and put the co-habitation of the two communities into effect. There were special references to periods “of peaceful co-habitation as well as to common activities, festivities and political and social struggles” (Circular Letter, 2008). The role of education in passing these memories, which essentially construct a common civic identity, apparently a basic factor for the success of the aim of peaceful co-existence, was emphasized.

However, the Circular clarified that the aim of cultivation of culture of peaceful co-existence did not erase events which “at times caused tensions, collisions and bloodshed among our people” (Circular Letter, 2008). On the one hand, this reference was a reply to any concern one may have that the promotion of this aim indirectly erased the bloody past and on the other, it presented the bi-communal collisions as a civil conflict since they were referred to as bloodshed among “our people”. According to the Circular these bloodshed memories “must be kept alive so that the mistakes of the past can be avoided. Both communities of Cyprus must recognize their mistakes if we wish peace to permanently occur in our country” (Circular Letter, 2008). With this regard both communities were held responsible and they were called upon to learn from the mistakes of the past in order to achieve and maintain peace in “our country”, proposing that coexistence is essential since we share the same country. It was then evident that emphasis was given to the will to unify Cyprus and its people.

Apart from the causes of dissension in the Circular “the common features of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, everything that united and still unites the fate of the children of Cyprus”, were exposed. The domains that contained common characteristics of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not specified. Instead, they were indefinitely referred to as “everything” that united them in the past and still unites “their fate as
children of Cyprus”, emphasizing in this way that Cyprus is the common country of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This reference broadened to include the rest of the communities in Cyprus with the aim that “all of the communities in Cyprus avoid ex-communications and the cultivation of negative stereotypes for the others” (Circular Letter, 2008). At this point, Cyprus was portrayed as the homeland of various communities and the need for peaceful coexistence was emphasized.

Whereas the communities of Cyprus were portrayed as traditional inhabitants of Cyprus and as co-patriots, since they share the same country, at the same time they were approached as culturally different, and intercultural education was recommended as a means for developing co-operation, understanding fraternity and respect for each other. The teachers were required to familiarize themselves with the cultural expression of the two communities in order to communicate with the students according to the modern intercultural approaches. Furthermore, the need to imbue school programmes with these principles, maintaining at the same time the values of equality, freedom, democracy, peace, dignity and justice was stressed. While issues related to cultural identity were implicitly explained, the political identity of future citizens of Cyprus was explicitly defined on the premises of intercultural dialogue and democratic values.

The text announcing the aim for reconciliation in the structure of the dominant Hellenocentric tradition of Greek Cypriot schools actually constructed the Turkish Cypriots as “children of the same land”, with a common history, traditions, cultural and linguistic features, and formulated the two communities as “one people”.

1.3 Reason and assumptions for this study
As described above, the Circular announcing the aim for reconciliation employed several discourses of the leftist ideology and gave some insight into the way this leftist government negotiated issues of national identification. The reactions that followed the announcement of this aim signified the controversies regarding the conceptualization of nation-state and the national identity of Cypriots and constituted the reason for this study.
Inspiration of my study is Wodak’s et al. (2009) method of description and analysis of national identity as it is developed in their study concerning Austrian identity. I adapt the main aims of their study to the case of Cyprus in order to investigate the tension in attempting both to maintain and to transform Cyprus’ national identity in the Cyprus educational system. My study focuses on educational documents that contain discourses that constitute attempts to imagine and construct Cypriot national identity. Although Cyprus has always had close ties with Greece, the educational documents under investigation indicate conscious attempts to differentiate Cyprus from Greece. Additionally, they specify that Cyprus tries to find its place in the European Union, which it joined in 2004. Its membership in the European Union reformulates the identity of Cypriots within the larger context of European integration.

In order to include subjective aspects of self-identification, a number of semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted among educators. The aim was to examine how official educational documents constitute national identity through discourses and to combine their consistency with discourses that social actors employ in their self-identification. Wodak, et al.’s (2009, p. 3) assumption “that the various discursive constructs of national identity are given different shapes according to the context in which they emerge” and their prime objective “to conceptualize and identify the various strategies employed in the construction of national identity” (ibid) were adopted for the purposes of this study.

This study assumes that national identity is not an essentialist and unchanging concept; rather it is interpreted as a socially situated discursive construct in the frame of the socio-political and cultural contexts in which the formation of identity takes place (Wodak et al., 2009). A historical approach to Discourse Analysis was employed as an approach for studying my research topics and was mobilized as appropriate in revealing how Cypriot citizenship and national identity were discursively constructed in official educational documents and in interviews with educators. In the analysis, the two conceptualizations of national identity (cultural and political identity) were employed.
A discourse-historical approach was engaged because it offers us the opportunity to interpret national identifications with respect to the historical background. I consider DA (Discourse Analysis) as appropriate for this study because the intention is to reveal ideologically driven structures of power and political control in language use and to uncover manipulative manoeuvres in policy documents “which are used to impose certain political beliefs” (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 7). I adopted Wodak et al. (2009) core areas in the discursive construction of national identity at content-related areas, specifically: the concept of a nation, the construction of a collective past, a collective present and future, a common culture, a common territory and national consciousness.

1.4 Thesis synopsis
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 present scholarly discussions on nationalism that revolve mainly around two conceptions of the nation: political identity and cultural identity. These perceptions on the concept of the nation are employed in order to explain the national question in Cyprus and also to understand the ideologies that frame policy documents under investigation. Chapter 4 explains how language is related to cultural identity and national identification. Additionally the identity issue is correlated with Cyprus’ membership of the European Union. Chapter 5 describes the methodology used in order to explain why document analysis is triangulated with semi-structured interviews with educators. Chapters 6 analyses the formal state Curriculum (2010), Chapter 7 analyses commemorative messages sent by Mr Demetriou (a Minister of Education) and Chapter 8 analyses the semi-structured interviews. Finally, I conclude with a discussion that is based on the findings of the analysis in conjunction with the literature reviewed.
CHAPTER 2

KEY THEORIES OF NATION, NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

2.1 Introduction
This thesis is centrally concerned with the way in which concepts of nation, nationalism and national identity are reflected in a set of contemporary Cypriot educational texts. My focus is specifically with the formal state Curriculum (2010) and with the Commemorative Messages sent by the Minister of Education to all state schools that clarify and emphasize the meaning of particular days which are celebrated or memorized in schools. These Messages are read aloud in front of all pupils and teachers at the beginning of school’s festivities. I have also conducted semi-structured interviews with social actors involved in the educational matters of Cyprus in order to compare their perceptions with the documents under investigation. My analysis explores the ways in which national identity and its associated concepts of nation and nationalism are portrayed in these texts. I frame my analysis through the critical lens of a range of related themes. Thus this first chapter critically reviews theories of nationalism and the way they use the concept nation “to organize perceptions of basic human identities, grouping people together with fellow nationals and distinguishing them from members of other nations” (Calhoun 2007, p. 39). In this short review, it is not possible to provide a fully comprehensive account, however key sources will be reviewed in order to produce a framework for the analysis which is rigorous and fit for purpose.

There is substantial disagreement about how and when various groups started to acquire political assumptions about any notions of shared nationhood. One school considers the time to be around the late Middle Ages and the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) (Wright 2000, pp.12-4). Modernists regard the French revolution as the starting point of the process of national identification in Europe. Another approach accepts what is known as the perennial interpretation and considers that nations coincide with recorded history (Armstrong 1982, Hasting 1977).
In this chapter I detail the dominant theories of nationalism that are influential (Ernest Renan 1882, Hans Kohn 1961). As I move from some of the main approaches towards nationalism I will also discuss how nation is understood within these paradigms. I start my account by exploring what is meant by organic and voluntarist types of nationalism as these categories are used across the literature that deals with the cultural and political conceptions of national identity respectively. Then I exemplify competing conceptualizations of what is meant by nation.

Smith (2013) has produced a useful synthesis of paradigms of nationalism which I deploy in my study. Following Smith’s (2013) paradigms of nationalism I consider the ‘primordialism’ approach and its two forms: the ‘socio-biological’ and ‘cultural’. Then I explore the ‘perennialism’ approach and its division in ‘continuous’ and ‘recent’. I continue with the ‘modernism’ paradigm which is divided into five groups in terms of the key factors identified by their main analysts. ‘Ethnosymbolic’ perception is also explained and finally new approaches to nationalism are presented.

2.2 Organic and voluntarist types of nationalism
One significant and influential approach towards understanding what is involved in the concept of nationalism was proposed by Hans Kohn. Kohn (1961), one of the founding scholars of the study of nationalism investigated the appearance and development of nationalism as an ideology in Europe and its dissemination worldwide. He based his argument on the ideological differences between the ‘voluntarist’ and ‘organic’ versions of nationalism. These ideas are based on the clear philosophical distance between the French and German models of nation building (Wright 2012, p. 64). However, apart from the dissimilar way these two ideological forms of nationalism perceive the relationship between the individual and the collectivity; both types assert that it is a necessity for each person to belong to a nation (Smith, 2000, p.24). Kohn (1961) examined the differences between the organic and voluntarist types of nationalism and explained the prevalence of voluntarist form of nationalism in West (Britain, France and
America) and the dominance of the organic type in Eastern Europe, Russia, the Middle East and much of Asia.

Wright (2012, p. 61) associates the voluntarist type of nationalism with the French model of nation building and claims that the French Revolution laid the foundations for the organization of the democratic nation-state and introduced “the idea of the ‘one and indivisible republic’ in which the congruence of sovereign people, inalienable territory and single national language was held to be necessary”. This conceptualization of nationalism is ‘voluntarist’ because it reflects the perspective that nationhood is an act of will and thus individuals have, in principle, the right to choose the nation they wish to belong. In this type of nationalism citizens are associated with a recognized historic territory where they deliberately participate in a common political project, accepting a single shared system of laws (Wright, 2012, p. 25).

On the other hand, the formation of the German nation is associated with the organic approach of nationalism. According to Wright (2012) the principle underpinning German nationalism was the congruence of German speaking people and the political state. For Germans, the nation pre-existed the state. German speakers, despite their economic and political differences perceived themselves as a group because of their cultural and linguistic similarities. Thus, German ethno-linguistic nationalism is based on the belief that “races were divided by language” and on the idea that primarily “blood line defines membership of the nations” (Wright 2012, p.62). The precondition that nationality is inherited by birth is the main principle of the organic approach of nationalism; “the individual is born into a nation and is indelibly stamped with its character and genius for life” (Smith, 2000, p.25). The nation is perceived as a spiritual formation in which its members form a distinct cultural community bounded together by a common language and by a narrative of common origins in the confines of their historic homeland.

Calhoun (2007, p. 41) argues that the distinction between organic and voluntarist types of nationalism illuminates the
two sides of the discourse of nations ever since: first, an attribution of common ethnicity (culture and/or biological descent) and second, the idea of common membership of a state (citizenship, and more generally respect for laws and standards of behaviour, which can be adopted not only inherited).

This binary form of usage shapes the discussions and frames the arguments between ethnic and civic approaches towards conceptualising nation and nationalism and resembles the organic and voluntarist type of nationalisms respectively. The distinction between civic and ethnic nations can be trace back to the eighteen century and reflects on the one hand, Enlightenment civic ideals, in particular “Rousseau’s emphasis on law, liberty and the collective will” and on the other, Herder’s perception of a “cultural populism” (Smith, 2000, p.29).

One pre-eminent explanation of the organic form of nationalism is provided by Herder (1744-1803), who starts by clarifying what he takes to be the nation. He acknowledges nations as the expressions of passions implanted by nature and history, and therefore he regards states as a product of bureaucratic mechanisms that aim to create uniformity of existing cultures. He claims that people are only capable of fully developing their faculties, through belonging to identifiable communal groups with their distinctive outlook, style, traditions, historical memories and language. Furthermore, Herder argues that these shared characteristics form their own collective virtue – their own civilisation – which can only be understood and explained in terms of their own culture, and not of other cultures, or in terms of some universal, impersonal and absolute scale. He argues that “every nation has its own inner centre of happiness, as every sphere its own centre of gravity” (Herder 1969, p.186). He is against any assimilation of one culture or way of life to another, or for assimilation to a single universal pattern of laws or language or social structure. What he declares is that people should live in societies united by a common culture, where people can be fully creative. In his view, nationality is entirely a cultural attribute, and in no sense political. He claims that people feel free and at home when they have the feeling of belonging to a distinctive culture. Herder’s perception that people who share a common culture
and language can only fully prosper if they inhabit their own homeland without being ruled by outside imperial centers has continued to influence national claims for self-determination and independence (Berlin, 1976).

Ernest Renan, in his lecture in 1882, combined organic and voluntarist types of nationalism (some commentators employ the German concepts ‘Kulturnation’ and ‘Willensnation’) and suggested that a nation is constituted by two component parts: a heritage of memories, plus a will to continue validating that heritage of memories. As he argued:

“A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things that are actually one make up this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common ownership of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the present-day agreement, the desire to live together, the will to continue validating the heritage that has been inherited jointly” (Renan 1882, cited in Joseph, 2004, p.112).

Renan’s approach combines the subjective, “the identification with a historic homeland”, with the objective, “shared language, religion, culture and public life” (Joseph 2004, p.112) components and emphasises their importance in the formation of a nation and in the construction of a national identity. The strength of the will in the constitution of the nation is encapsulated in Renan’s famous view that “the existence of a nation is – pardon my metaphor – a daily plebiscite…” (Renan 1882, cited in Joseph, 2004, p.114). According to this view, nations are not simply based on shared memories, but simultaneously on shared forgetting. In this sense, a novel nation can be formed if there is a genuine will among different groups to live together. However, this perspective seems to refer to people who share the same language, as Renan developed an essentialist view of language to its highest point. As he believed, “the mind of each people is in the closest connection with its language…” (Renan 1882, cited in Joseph, 2004, p.115).

This dual composition of the nation – the memories and the will of the people who make it up – was influential in other attempts to analyse national identity. The ‘legacy of memories’ appears to represent the ethnic component of nations, while
the other element, the collective ‘will’ of ‘a daily plebiscite’ embodies the ‘civic’ component, as it is perceived to be the foundation for the legitimacy of the political nation.

All debates of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries concerning nationalism lost their academic and ethical status after the horrors and the disastrous consequences of the Second World War. Their association with nationalistic ideals distanced scholars from any version of nationalism, especially from the organic conception of the nation. Dunn’s (1978, p.55) statement on the subject depicts this negative association: “Nationalism is the starkest political shame of the twentieth century, the deepest, most intractable and yet most unanticipated blot on the political history of the world since the year 1900”.

Despite this dark association, many people continue to have strong national sentiments and aspirations and continue to identify themselves in terms of their national identity. Such evidence is illustrated by inter and intra-state wars and conflicts that occurred at the end of the 20th century which were attributed to nationalistic factors. Characteristic examples are the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the violent separatist movements in the former Yugoslavia; the demand for self-determination and the consequent autonomy of Basques, Catalans and Galicians in Spain; the greater constitutional independence of Flemings in Belgium; and the devolution of the Scottish and Welsh communities. On the other hand, “various international movements, from the desire for international socialism to the wish for European integration, have their genesis in a rejection of nationalism” (Wright 2000, p. 10).

Although these international movements encouraged an interest in clarifying what is involved in nationalism, the ethnic version of nationalism and its ‘blood line’ associations continue to distance academia from the organic type of nationalism. However, the ethnic conception of the nation is still evident in scholarly interest and discussion, but it is positioned in cultural and not biological terms. The distinction between civic and ethnic types of nations is still apparent in the general literature on nationalism. Baycroft and Hewitson (2014, p.3) explain that:
“Civic nations are those characterized by an emphasis on citizenship, individual rights, and obligations within a political community... Ethnic nations, on the other hand, have the emphasis placed upon shared myths of ancestry and historical memories, as well as common culture...”

2.3 Competing conceptualizations of the nation and national identity
As the above references indicate, different types of nationalism developed contending definitions of the concept of the nation and national identity. These competing definitions of the nation signify the diverse interpretations of the concept of the nation. Below I refer to some indicative examples.

The social philosopher David Miller (1995) argues that the ‘belief’ that exists when a group of people recognise each other as compatriots, sharing common characteristics of the relevant kind, along with the mutual commitment that connects them is the first among five features of national identity. The second is that national identity is an identity that is extended through history. The third element is that national identity is active, meaning that people, who share it, plan and achieve results together. The connection of a community with a particular territory is the fourth aspect of national identity and the final one is that national identity presupposes that people who share it are distinguished by “a common public culture” (Miller 1995, p.25) avoiding any correlation with ethnic characteristics and without including common language as one of the objective features of national identity.

Based on the concept of the political nation, which is distinguished by the will of its citizens, Habermas (1992) replaced the concept of ‘ethnic’ nationalism with the universalistic principle of a constitutional patriotism and considers a common state along with the derived duties and rights of its citizens as the prerequisites for the unity of the nation.
For Smith (1991) the ethnic conception of the nation is a dynamic political challenge in the sense that “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms” (p. 13). The combination of both civic and ethnic dimensions of nations constitutes what Smith (1991, p.14) understands as a nation, that is:

“A nation can ...be defined as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”.

Richter (1994, p. 316) distances himself from such interpretations that combine political and cultural concepts of nations, and instead suggests that every nation is socially constructed and revolves around the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ built on the image of an enemy.

Some interpretations of a nation suggest that only sharing one characteristic is not sufficient for the existence of a nation (Miller, 1995; Smith 1991). In this case a nation could be reduced to being a linguistic or a religious community. Self-identification is the one inherent trait that appears as a constant in identifying each nation; however, this factor is not self-sufficient as it is rooted in objective factors. On the other hand, subjective elements that enable a group of people to be engaged in a common political project, in the frame of a particular homeland, are always combined with objective traits of a nation. This indicates that the formation of a nation entails both subjective identification and objective requirements.

This thesis focuses on the way national identifications are apparent in Cypriot Educational System. In order to achieve this aim it has been necessary to present the main theories of nation and nationalism since they frame the way we define national identity. Different approaches to nationalism are presented in the relevant literature on nationalism without any one of them gaining general acceptance. After these general remarks I turn to the work of Smith (2013) whose framework I use in order to give an outline of the main paradigms of nationalism by presenting the way they explain the historic origins of nations and national identifications.
2.3.1 Primordialist interpretation of nationalism
According to Ozkirimli (2000, p. 65) primordialism is one of the earliest paradigms of nationalism and is an “umbrella” term that covers perceptions stressing the “antiquity and naturalness of nations”. Social scientists (Geertz 1993) and organic nationalists (Shils 1957, Van den Berghe 1981) based their essentialist form of nationalism on the so-called naturalness of nations and used primordialist arguments in their effort to justify the roots and depth of ethnic identities. Influenced by Herder’s assertion that people (Volk) who share common historical roots and culture aspire to create their own nation state, primordialists consider that nation comes first and the state follows, “albeit in organic union with each other” (Holton 2011, p. 167). Smith (2013, p. 55) has traced primordialism’s origins back to Rousseau and his assertion of the need to abandon urban corruption and to go back to ‘nature’ in order to find our lost virtue. He also explains that the primordial approach alleges that nations “exist in the first order of time, and lie at the root of subsequent processes and developments” (Smith 2013, p. 55).

Primordialism can be divided into two subcategories; the sociobiological and cultural approach (Smith 2013). Both approaches are presented below.

2.3.1.1 The sociobiological approach
This approach focuses on applied sociobiology findings on kinship in the study of ethnicities and claims that “nations, ethnic groups and races can be traced to the underlying genetic reproductive drives of individuals and their use of strategies of ‘nepotism’ and ‘inclusive fitness’ to maximize their gene pools” (Smith 2013, pp. 55-6). The sociologist Van den Berghe (1981, p. 61) argues that the nation is a “politically conscious ethny” characterized by extended kinships. Based on a general behavioral principle that all the species “favor kin over non kin” he asserts that kinship bonds continue to be influential (Van den Berghe 1981, p.18). Furthermore, he claims that although ethny is bounded together with myths of common descent, “the myth cannot be invented and had to be rooted in historical reality” (Van den Berghe 1981, p.27). Accordingly, ethnic sentiments are often interwoven with race sentiments and are comprehended as expressions of kinship.
However, this notion of extended kinship is assumed, because none of the world’s communities and societies can claim that their origins follow a genuine line of descent. It is generally accepted that “myths of origins are rarely correlated with actual biological origins, assuming that these can be traced” (Smith 2013, p.56). Usually the case is that the “cultural group is treated as a wider kin network and cultural symbols (language, religion, colour, etc.) are used as markers of biological affinity” (Smith 2013, p.56).

In current scholarly debate about nationalism, historians of nationalism consider the sociobiological approach as not valid (Eller and Coughlan, 1993) and critique it negatively because they associate it with ethnic genocides recorded in history. For this reason sociobiological approach is rarely apparent in the relevant scholarship.

2.3.1.2 Cultural primordialism
This term is traced back to 50s when Edward Shils suggested that modern society is held together by distinct categories of social ties and named them as: “an affinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and civil sense” (Shils, 1957, p.131). Cultural primordialism emphasizes the durability, power and ubiquity of ethnic attachments and is mainly associated with Clifford Geertz’s definition:

“By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ – of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and times overpowering, coerciveness in and of them”. (Geertz, 1993, p. 259)

This account of primordialism is more influential than the sociobiological approach, as it explains ethnic attachments on the basis of “assumed cultural
givens” of social existence and practices and not as natural or spiritual organic nationalism (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 65).

Although the culturalist approach of primordialism accepts the ties that people may sense in terms of blood, language, religious, social practices and custom; these objects are “‘assumed’ to be given by individuals. What attributes the quality of being ‘natural’ or mystical to the ‘givens of social existence’ are the perceptions of those who believe in them” (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 72).

In a similar way Smith (1998, p. 158) clarifies this point:

“Geertz is underlining the power of what we might term a ‘participants’ primordialism’; he is not saying that the world is constituted by an objective primordial reality, only that many of us believe in primordial objects and feel their power”.

Consequently, cultural primordialism highlights the way that individuals conceptualize and feel kinship ties. “What generates the strong attachments people feel for the ‘givens of social existence’, the culturalists contend, is a belief in their ‘sacredness’” (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 74).

However, Smith (2013, p. 53) argues:

“Cultural primordialism is unable to provide a convincing historical account of ethnic or national phenomena. It can offer only a very general and rather speculative thesis about the continuing role of cultural givens – kinship and territory, language and religion – but it is a thesis that of its nature can never amount to a causal historical explanation”.

Primordialists believe that nations and national identities have their roots on primordial ties and on ancient ethnicity. Nationalists who adopt this point of view consider ethnic traits such as language “as essential or as the very essence of their selfhood or ethnicity” (Schiffman 1998, Introduction), they are devoted to their nation and they are ready to give their life defending it.
2.3.2 Perennialist interpretation of nationalism
According to Smith (2013), the perennialist interpretation of nationalism is based on the perception that nations and even their nationalism are not modern constructs. It shares the same assumption with primordialism that nations have pre-modern roots.

“Perennialism was also encouraged by the idea of social evolution, with its emphasis upon gradualism, stages of progress and social and cultural cumulation. It was easy, even natural to see nations as collective exemplars exhibiting these very qualities of gradualism, development and cumulation especially for those who were attracted to the organic analogy”. (Smith 2013, p.53)

Smith (2013) divides this paradigm of nationalism into two sub-categories namely: the continuous and the recurrent.

**Continuous perennialism** emphasizes continuity and argues that nations are not modern constructs, but “nations had always existed in every period of history, and that many nations existed from time immemorial” (Smith 2013, p.53). Members of nations who share this belief place the roots of their nation back in the distant past. Although ‘neo-perrenial’ scholars such as (Llobera 1994) and (Hasting 1997) recognize discontinuities in historical records, they stress cultural continuities and trace national identification back to the distant past. Thus, this perception rejects the view that nations are products of modernity. Hastings (1977, p.9), a commentator of this paradigm argues that “understanding nations and nationalism will only be advanced when any inseparable bonding of them to the modernization of society is abandoned”. Continuous perennialism assumes the nation as a long-lasting essence with a specific beginning that forms a homogenous unit. Cultural continuity is the main feature of this paradigm and it can be observed in language, monuments, historical places and names.

**Recurrent perennialism** considers the nation a distinct kind of collective identity and human association visible in all historical periods and emphasizes the recurrence of nation and national identifications. Smith (2000, p.34) defines
recurrent perennialism as the paradigm of nationalism that approach nation as “a category of human association that can be found everywhere throughout history”. The main assertion of recurrent perennialism is that particular nations are “historical and change with time but the ‘nation-in-general’, as a category of human association, is perennial and ubiquitous, because it reappears in every period of history and is found in every continent of the globe” (Smith 2013, pp.50-1). “In other words, the concept of the nation refers to a type of cultural resource and of human association that is potentially available in all periods of history” (Smith 2013, p.91). However, this is rare. For instance, the historian Eduard Meyer counts only three nations in ancient times: the Greeks, the Jews and the Persian (cited in Smith 2000, p. 76).

While perennialist versions of nationality and nation still impact to some degree in some contexts, modernist interpretations have been more influential in recent times because they have exposed the fluid and the socially constructed nature of ethnicities.

2.3.3 Modernist interpretations of nationalism
Modernist theorists reject the essentialist forms of nationalism and instead advocate the view of “nations as historically formed constructs” (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 85). Smith (2013, p.50) entitles the perception that nationalism and nations are products of modernity. This approach situates the appearance of nation and nationalism alongside the ideals of the French Revolution for “national autonomy, unity and identity...which placed at the centre of the political stage the sovereign, united and unique nation” (Ozkirimli 2000, p. 85). There is a variety of modernist paradigms but they all share the same belief in the modernity of the concept of nationalism and nations. This perspective asserts that nations “become a sociological necessity only in the modern word: there was no room for nations or nationalism in the pre-modern era” (Ozkirimli 2000, p. 86). Characteristic of this paradigm are the arguments made by Hobsbawn (1990, p. 10), a representative modernist, that “nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way round”.

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Beyond this general assertion, modernists in their theories on nationalism identify and stress dissimilar fundamental factors about the way in which nations and nationalism were constructed. In what follows I explore the indicative categories suggested by Smith (2013).

2.3.3.1 Socioeconomic approach
This approach attributes the appearance of nationalism and nations to modern social and economic factors stressing in particular “industrial capitalism, regional inequality and class conflict” (Smith 2013, p. 51). One aspect of this approach, represented by neo-Marxist scholars (Tom Nairn 1981, and Michael Hechter 1975), channel Marxist views and explain the appearance of anti-colonial movements as national in terms of a “fight against ‘neo-imperialism’, ‘economic imperialism’ or ‘international capital’” (Zubaida 1978, pp.65-6).

Tom Nairn interprets the appearance of nationalism as the result of the imperialist and the “uneven development” of capitalism. He argues that “nationalism can be understood in materialist terms” and that it is “determined by certain features of the world political economy, in the era between the French and Industrial Revolution and the present day” (Nairn 1981, p.332). According to his argument:

“As capitalism spread, and smashed the ancient social formations surrounding it, these always tended to fall apart along the fault-lines contained inside them. It is a matter of elementary truth that these lines of fissure were nearly always ones of nationality”. (Nairn 1981, p. 353)

Although Nairn attributes the development of nationalism to the expansion of capitalism he does not underestimate the role of culture and tradition when he argues:

“It is through nationalism that societies try to propel themselves forward to certain kinds of goal (industrialization, prosperity, equality with other people, etc.) by a certain sort of regression – by looking inwards, drawing more deeply upon their indigenous resources, resurrecting past folk heroes and myths about themselves and so on”. (Nairn 1981, p.348)
In a similar way, Hechter’s analysis of nationalism suggests that economic inequalities combined with cultural differences and sufficient communication among the oppressed group can lead to separatist movements and to claims for independence (Hechter 1975, p. 43).

Although according to this approach nationalism was the result of the uneven wave of industrial-based capitalism and was implanted by the imperialism, it appeared to represent the main reason for anti-imperialist revolutions and declarations for independent sentiments (as the case of East Europe and Latin America indicates) (Smith 2013).

2.3.3.2 Sociocultural approach
This group of theories associates the development of national phenomena with social and cultural factors and transformations. According to Ernest Gellner (1983, p.1), a representative scholar of this paradigm, “nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unity should be congruent”, and “nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism”. He refined the distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism with his association between the political and the cultural components of nations.

Gellner connected the appearance of nationalism with the transition from agro-literate to industrial societies and the subsequent formulation of stable institutions of the state. Agro-literate communities were scattered and insulated from each and the ruling classes maintained their privileges without aiming for “cultural homogenization of the political unit” (Holton 2011, p. 168). Gellner argued that the need for a form of cultural homogeneity coincided with the development of industrial societies which depended on standardized technological and communication competence. He explains the appearance of nations and nationalism as an essential process of modernity and justifies its industrial social organization, “when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities” (Gellner, 1983, p.55). For Gellner (1983, p.48) a homogeneous culture is “the consequence of a new form of social organization,
based on deeply internalized, educated-dependent high culture”. This claim suggests that the main feature of nations and nationalism is the development of a standardized high culture and its transmission to the mass through education and communication. In addition, Gellner considers nationalism as a necessity and argues:

“It is this which explains nationalism: the principle – so strange and eccentric in the age of agrarian cultural diversity and the ‘ethnic’ division of labour – that homogeneity of culture is the political bond, that mastery of (and, one should add, acceptability in) a given high culture ... is the precondition of political, economic and social citizenship”. (Gellner 1997, p.29)

Furthermore, Gellner (1997, pp.10-11) rejects the view that nationalism is contingent and accidental, but rather:

“Its roots are deep and important, it was indeed our destiny, and not some kind of contingent malady, imposed on us by the scribblers of the late enlightenment. But, on the other hand, the deep roots that engender it are not universally present, and so nationalism is not the destiny of all men. It is the highly probable destiny of some men, and the unlikely condition of many others. Our task is to single out the differences which separate nationalism-prone from nationalism resistant humanity”.

Accordingly, the appearance and continuation of nationalistic aspirations is not the same for all people. Nationalistic movements can be explained by examining each case separately. Gellner's investigations suggest that the development of nationalism in Western Europe followed the path of industrialization, as described above. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe the development of nations did not relate to the needs of the industrial societies, since they were less advanced in this domain. For this reason they drew their nationalism on more ethnically driven features (Holton, 2011, p. 169).
2.3.3.3 Political approach
In contrast, this variant of modernism explains nationalism on the basis of political transformations such as the rise of modern professionalized, bureaucratic state in the modern world.

John Breuilly (1994, p.109) rejects any connection between the cultural and political concept of the nation. Instead, he claims that nationalist ideology “arises out of the need to make sense of complex social and political arrangements” (ibid, p.110). This ‘need’ is based on the intellectual assumptions of nationalists about the way they envision society. Consequently, these assumptions are employed for their own political projects. As Breuilly (1994, p.110) claims: “Their precise political projects and the manner in which these are carried through are the product of certain political situations rather than the expression of national needs”.

In addition, Breuilly sees nationalism as “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (1993, p.2). Accordingly, nationalism presupposes “to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power. We need to understand why nationalism has played a major role in the pursuit of those objectives” (Breuilly 1993, p.1). For Breuilly (1993, p.2) “power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state”.

The following three claims frame his arguments:

- “There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
- The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
- The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty”. (Breuilly 1993, p. 3)

This form of nation is equalized with citizenship ruled by liberal and democratic institutions. In this term, “the political rights of the citizens – not their cultural identities – mattered” (Ozkirimli 2000, p. 107).

Thus, according to Breuilly (1994), nationalist ideology is based on intellectual responses concerning the modern problem of the association between the state
and social order. In this sense, nationalist ideology can be enhanced when the interests of various political elite and social classes are in accordance with its objectives. In order for this ideology to become popular and convincing to the masses, it needs simplification. This is achieved through the construction of stereotypes of the nation, such as legacy of historical past, shared racial characteristics, common traditions and culture, as well as the construction of stereotypes of enemies. Symbolism and ceremonial forms can simplify and cement these stereotypes. Simultaneously they have the potential to shift into political ideology on which cultural distinctiveness with a demand for political self-determination is based.

As Breuilly (1994, p.112) argues:

“This emphasis on cultural distinctiveness and values has particular advantages in a situation where it is possible to mobilise mass support or co-ordinate a wide variety of elites in a bid for territorial independence”.

In Breuilly’s approach “nationalism is simply an instrument for achieving political goals, and as such it can only emerge under modern conditions” (Smith 2013, p.60).

2.3.3.4 Ideological approach
The ideological approach considers nationalism as an ideology of modernity invented in Europe, based on the Enlightenment’s principles and Kantian ideas about self-determination in conjunction with the influence of Christian doctrines. Elie Kedourie (1960) supports this theory and explains nationalist ideologies. He emphasizes that nationalist ideology, affected by its religious power, was the mobilizing power for movements for independence which historically have influenced the breaking up of Empires and the formation of novel nations. He argues that nationalism was the consequence of “the predicament of modern man” (Kedourie 1960, xv). For Kedourie, nationalist ideology has the power to control people’s lives, since the nation fulfilled the human need to be devoted in a higher collective idea.
As Kedourie (1960, p.1) argues:

“Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusive its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that one only legitimate type of government is national self-government”.

Kedourie (1960) stresses the role of the ideologies for movements for self-determination and independence and provides an account of nationalist ideologies and their philosophical background. His main attempt was to discredit nationalism by revealing the inconsistency of the ethnic claims offered by the German Romantic School. He argues that nationalism is a product of modernity and is based on Kant’s ideal for the autonomy of group’s good and free will and on Herder’s belief in the strong link between indigenous groups who share the same culture. He also argues that nationalism was a movement of young disoriented intellectuals, a “children’s crusade” alienated from Enlightenment principles. This disoriented conceptualization of nationalism created conflicts and led to terror in areas with ethnically mixed population. “For Kedourie nationalism is a doctrine of will”, also “nationalist ideals are powerful in their own right, indeed, they have the power to lead people astray, to disorient them and ultimately to destroy them” (Smith 2013, p.72).

2.3.3.5 Constructionist approach
According to this approach of modernism, nations and nationalism are socially constructed concepts. Smith (2000, p. 107) argues that, “social constructionists treat the nation as a narrative text or a cultural artifact that, once deconstructed, dissolves into its component ethnic parts; or alternatively ... they reject altogether any notion of the nation as a real community”.
Hobsbawm (1994), takes an ‘instrumentalist’ approach to nationalism, arguing that the nation was ‘invented’ by the political elite in their effort to establish their power in a century of movements for freedom and democratisation. As he suggests, symbols and suitably tailored ‘national history’, which subjectively constitute the modern nations, are results of carefully invented traditions. Hobsbawm (1983) explains nations and nationalism as inventions of ‘social engineering’ based on the efforts of ruling elites to control the masses with the strategy of ‘invented traditions’ by which he means:

“A set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past”. (Hobsbawm 1983, p. 1)

In this sense, invented traditions, despite their fictitious character, act as a channel which influence the continuity of a desired past. They are relatively modern inventions rather than primordial attachments deriving from old traditions from the distant past. Invented traditions are “responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations” (Hobsbawm 1983, p. 2). According to Hobsbawm invented traditions are employed in two different circumstances, in the case of transferring old institutions and traditions to new conditions and when novel traditions serve current interests and purposes.

As Hobsbawm (1983, p.14) argues:

“what subjectively makes up the modern ‘nation’ consists of such constructs and is associated with appropriate and in general, fairly recent symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as ‘national’ history), the national phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition’”.

Another constructionist approach to understanding nationalism lies in Benedict Anderson’s influential concept of ‘imagined communities’ as it regards nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1991, p.6). Anderson argues that imagining does not imply
‘falsity’ arguing that “nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being” (Anderson 1991, p. 14). In this sense, nations are defined as cultural constructs that combine the dichotomy of the civic with the ethnic identifications of the nations. He also claims that the construction of these ‘imagined communities’ is based on “a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human diversity” (Anderson, 1991, p. 44).

On the one hand, Anderson associates the formations of the nation with capitalism and with the spread of print commodities and on the other hand, he emphasizes the ‘imagined’ character of national communities.

The classification of modernist paradigm into several approaches signifies its wide acceptance among scholars of nationalism. All approaches relate the formation of nations with modernity and reject any possibility of nations pre-existing the modern era. However, each modernist approach justifies the appearance of nationalism by employing different and sometimes conflicting factors. The variety of modernist approaches indicates the subjective nature of nationalism.

2.3.4 Ethno-symbolism interpretation of nationalism
The nationalist scholar Anthony Smith added a third position to the dual debate between primordialism/perennialism and modernism approaches of nationalism and proposed the ethno-symbolism interpretation of nationalism as the synthesis of these two opposed perspectives. Ethnosymbolists such Anthony Smith (2013) and John Hutchinson (1994) emphasize the importance of the ‘ethnic past’ and the durability and transformations of shared culture, nations and nationalism into the national present. Greece is employed as an example of a modern national state where distinct premodern ethnosymbolic elements and collective memories are transmitted in texts, institutions and traditions.
For Smith, both perennialism and modernism fail to understand and illuminate the symbolic goals of nationalism as they ignore its ‘inner worlds’ and the emotional influence of shared memories (Smith 2013, p. 64). As he argues, ethno-symbolism aims on this direction:

“while not neglecting external political, geopolitical and economic factors, would focus on subjective symbolic and sociocultural elements, encourage more nuanced perspectives and approaches, and thereby address the vital symbolic issues of ethnic identity, myth and memory that so often prove intractable”. (Smith 2013, p. 64)

Ethno-symbolism challenges modernist arguments and “focuses on the subjective elements in the formation of nations, the character and impact of nationalism, and the persistence of ethnies; and thereby seeks to enter into and comprehend the ‘inner worlds’ of ethnicity and nationalism” (Smith 2013, p. 61). This variant of nationalism considers the division of nationalism as being ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ as simplistic. Ethnosymbolists reject the approach that nationalism is the result of elite manipulations and highlight the emotional and moral aspect of national identities. On the other hand, they do not approach national identities as primordial nor connect them with the ideas of organic nationalism.

Smith (2000, p. 132) argues that

“the outshot of this examination of histories of the nation has been to show that we can best grasp the character, role and persistence of the nation in history if we relate it to the symbolic components and ethnic models of earlier collective cultural identities”.

2.4 New approaches to nationalism
So far I have explored nation and nationalism through the framework proposed by Smith (2013). In what I have written, while I have focused on providing an account of these approaches, within some of these interpretations there are useful concepts that will be deployed in my study as well as other elements that will be less useful
in my work. Now I want to augment Smith's work by exploring more recent approaches, categorized by Ozkirimli (2010) as ‘new’.

Cultural studies have provided an alternative way of understanding concepts such as ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ and, in this approach, the equation of a nation with a culture or ethnicity and perceptions of cultures as linked and confined to a particular territory are contested and discredited (Hall, 1996). The notion of ethnic or national identity is not conceptualised as fixed and coherent, but rather as fluid and more multifaceted. Ethnic and national identities are not perceived as inherited and intergenerationally transmittable. On the contrary, both individual and collective identities are treated as being constantly negotiated and renegotiated, constructed and reconstructed through an endless process of self-definition and identification (Bauman, 2000). Hall (1996a), argues that globalisation, which is mainly correlated with global market control and movement of people and ideas, encourages the mixture of civilizations and the appearance of cultural hybridisation. Additionally, Hall (1992, p.303) emphasises the amplification of identities, and the individuals’ potentiality to have multiple identities: "We are confronted by a range of different identities, each appearing to us, or rather to different parts of ourselves, from which it seems possible to choose". Bhabha (1990, preface) writes: “Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myth of time and only fully encounter their horizons in the mind’s eye”. For Bhabha people's everyday ‘performative’ narratives indicate the spilt, multiple and ‘hybridized’ character of national identifications.

Within this approach, identity only exists in a context of opportunities and relativities. This anti-essentialist approach “aims to reveal the relational and subjective nature of ethnicity and emphasises the fluid and contextual meaning of ‘ethnic phenomena’ " (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996, p.15). Perceptions of a homogeneous ‘pure’ identity are discredited and a group or an individual are assigned to a potentially very large variety of identities that partially overlap in social time and space (Tonkin et al., 1996, p, 24). The term ‘multiple identities’ is the outcome of such perceptions and claims that people participate in more than one collective group, therefore they are assigned more than one identity. According
to Wodak et al. (2009, p. 16), the term ‘multiple identity’ describes the fact that “individuals as well as collective groups such as nations are in many respects hybrids of identity”.

Such points of view disturb some of the older paradigms and concepts such as nations and nationalism.

2.4.1 Banal nationalism
Alternative and more recent approaches to nationalism move beyond the question of the beginning or the end of nationalism and deal primarily with the reasons and the conditions which reproduce and maintain nations and nationalism. Michael Billig (1995) specifies the conditions under which nations and nationalism maintain their autonomy and provides a systematic investigation of the reproduction of nationalism.

Billig (1995) rejects conventional theories which approach nationalism as an ideology manifesting itself in times of crises and representing those people who struggle to create their own state, or as an expression of extreme right-wing politics. Instead, he introduces the term ‘banal nationalism’ in order “to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced” (Billig 1995, p. 11). His term ‘banal nationalism’ suggests that nationalism is apparent in emblematic and symbolic routine habits of all the established nations such as flag hanging on the public buildings, the currency system and stamps (Billig 1995, p. 41). In addition, he argues that national identity is reproduced with “routinely familiar habits of language” (p.93). As he argues apart from typical words like ‘people’ or ‘society’ banal nationalism is commonly expressed in ‘linguistically microscopic’ types such as ‘we’, ‘our’, ‘us’, ‘this’ and ‘here’ by politicians (Billig 1995, pp. 93-4). Apart from politicians who rhetorically promote the interests of their nations, newspapers also contribute to the process of national reproduction by habitually separating the world into ‘homeland’ and ‘foreign’ (Billig 1995, p.119).
Billig considers that social scientists contribute twofold to the reproduction of nationalism: (a) ‘by projecting nationalism’, meaning that nationalism is confined to nationalist movements and approached emotionally as a project of ‘others’, whereas ‘our’ nationalism is not mentioned; (b) ‘naturalizing nationalism’, that reduces nationalism to psychological need and as such, does not require any investigation (Billig 1995, pp. 16-7). Accordingly ‘our’ nationalism is presented as ‘patriotism’, whereas nationalism refers to ‘others’ (p.55). This paradigm argues that nationalistic discourses are international phenomenon and present not only in our daily and routine language, but also in academic theories and critiques of nationalism and have their contribution to the reproduction of nationalism.

2.4.2 Post-colonial theory
Chatterjee drew on post-colonial theory to argue that Third World nationalism is encapsulated in the ‘modular’ forms of earlier forms of nationalism framed by Europe and America. In this frame, post-colonial world is approached as “perpetual consumers of modernity” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 5). Chatterjee rejects this ‘modular’ forms of nationalism which manipulate “colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery” (ibid). Instead, she argues that “the most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an identity but rather on a difference with the ‘modular’ forms of the national society propagated by the modern West” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 5).

Chatterjee (1986, pp.50-1) explains nationalism in the non-Europe world by identifying three stages: the moment of departure, manoeuvre and arrival. The moment of departure is based on the rationalist thought of post-Enlightenment knowledge which distinguishes East and West culturally and leads to the perspective that European culture directs to power and progress, whereas traditional attributes of the East push them towards poverty and subjection. This point of view classifies social practices and institutions into the material and spiritual domain. Chatterjee (1993, p.6) clarifies these two domains:

‘The material is the domain of the ‘outside’, of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved
its superiority and the East had succumbed... The spiritual, on the other hand, is an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity”.

According to Chatterjee (1986, p.30):

“Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people; it also asserted that a backward nation could ‘modernize’ itself while retaining its cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse in which, as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of ‘modernity’ on which colonial domination was based”.

The moment of manoeuvre is the stage during which a politically independent nation-state is formulated by combining contradictory factors such as the institutional structures set up during the colonial rule and the satisfaction of the subordinate classes. It is a crucial stage because “It consists in the historical consolidation of the ‘national’ by decrying the ‘modern’, the preparation for capitalist production through an ideology of anti-capitalism” (Chatterjee, 1986, p.49).

The moment of arrival is the stage when nationalist thought is unified with the function of the state. “Nationalist discourse at its moment of arrival is passive revolution uttering its own history” (Chatterjee, 1986, p.49).

This interpretation signifies the limits of ‘Western universalism’ and suggests new ways of approaching the formulation of the modern state. For Chatterjee (1993, p.13) the aim is “to claim for us, the once-colonized, our freedom of imagination. Claims, we know only too well, can be made only as contestations in a field of power”.

2.4.3 Nationalism as discursive formation
Another way of interpreting nationalism and the nation is to see these terms as constructs and artifacts of discourse.
According to Calhoun (2007, p. 27):

“...nationalism is a discursive formation that gives shape to the modern world. It is a way of talking, writing, and thinking about the basic units of culture, politics, and belonging that helps to constitute nations as real and powerful dimensions of social life. Nations do not exist ‘objectively’: before they exist discursively”.

However, this perspective leaves open different ways of conceptualizing nationalism since as he claims nations are not defined ‘objectively’. Calhoun (2007, p. 6) believes that nations are discursively constructed within the context of nationalism. Beyond his argument for the discursive formation of the nations, he acknowledges that nations “are also ‘real’ material structures of solidarity and recognition” (Calhoun 2007, p. 27).

As Calhoun (2007, pp.28-9) explains:

“Nationalism is pervasive in the modern world because it is widely used, not merely found. But it is used in different projects – claiming or contesting the legitimacy of governments, demanding reorganization of educational curricula, promoting the elimination of ethnic minorities in the pursuit of cultural or racial purity. Its meaning lies in the interconnections among these various uses, not in any one of them. There is no common denominator which precisely defines the set of ‘true’ nationalisms or ‘true’ nations by virtue of being shared by all and by no other political or cultural projects or formations. Yet nationalism is real, and powerful. Nationalism matters because it is a vital part of collective projects that give shape to the modern world, transform the very units of social solidarity, identity, and legal recognition within it, and organize deadly conflicts”.

Although this point of view supports the assumption of the modernity of nations, Calhoun (2007, p.3) recognizes that in some cases national identities have long-lasting cultural attachments and that national histories are sometimes dated long before the discourse of nationalism. He argues that although the formation of the
nation might be based on invented traditions, this does not entail that nations are not real. As Calhoun (2007, p.27) claims: “to say that nationalism is part of a social imaginary is not to say that nations are mere figments of the imagination to be dispensed with in more hard-headed analyses”.

By approaching nationalism as discursive formation, nationalism cannot be explained in terms of a general theory or a single variable such as the urbanization, capitalism, industrialization or state, since the formation of each nation is associated with a particular process and “at the level of practical activity, there are many diverse nationalisms” (Calhoun 2007, p22), which are all shaped by the discourse of nationalism. Calhoun (2007, p.123) argues that “nationalism in its multiplicity of forms requires multiple theories” and suggests that in the theoretical framework we shall address “the factors that lead to the continual production and reproduction of nationalism as a central discursive formation in the modern world”.

The perception that nationalism is discursively constructed accepts that the procedure of its production and reproduction combines multiples theories and approaches of nationalism. Taking nationalism as discursive form further on, Ozkirimli (2010, pp. 208-9) identifies three sets of interrelated claims in nationalist discourses namely: identity claims, temporal claims, and spatial claims. The first set, Identity claims, is based on the assumption that national identity is homogenous and fixed. As such, it divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ stressing the distinct characteristics that differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’. Identity claims consider that the nation and the values that it represents take priority over other forms of collective or individual loyalty. In addition, identity claims present the nation as the decisive source of sovereignty and social and political legitimacy.

The second set, temporal claims of the nationalist discourses seek to prove the “linear time of the nation” and its undeniable temporal continuity from past to present. Elites look back to the past and deploy narratives compatible to their interests and silence aspects of the history incompatible to their nationalistic project. As Ozkirimli (2010, p. 209) claims:
“An obsession with history and the propagation of its ‘authentic’ version through schooling and other ideological state apparatuses are some means through which the particular temporal claims of the nationalist discourse are introduced and imposed”.

The third set is spatial claims and it is the nationalist discourse which frames the fixation of the national territory, actual or imagined. This discourse revolves around everyday shared social practices and the environment, elements that shape the national character in a specific territory and confirm the claim of its members as ‘home’. It also includes discourses about lost countries and territories that lie beyond, features of the perennial nationalist aspiration.

Calhoun’s (2007) interpretation of nationalism as a discursive formation frames my empirical study concerning the discursive construction of national identity in Cypriot educational system. Apart from examining the way in which theories of nationalism are interwoven in my data, the three claims of nationalist discourses suggested by Ozkirimli (2010) provide also useful tools for my investigation.

2.5 Conclusion
To a great extent, this chapter mainly presents Smith’s classification of the theories of nationalism, namely primordialism, perennialism, modernism and ethnosymbolism. The logic of this classification is predicated on the question of ‘when is the nation?’ In short, primordialists and perennialists argue that nations have existed from time immemorial. Primordialism emphasizes the importance and continuance of primordial and ethnic attachments which evoke intense emotions and loyalty to nations. On the other, hand, modernists claim that nations are products of the transformations of the modern era. Ethnosymbolists combine both perceptions and claim that although nationalism as an ideology and movement is a feature of modernity, nations can be found in all chronological periods of history.
What comes out of the discussion in this chapter is that none of the theories of nationalism can identify precisely the factors and the date for the rise of nationalism worldwide. However, each theoretical frame provides a different perspective for the concept of the nation and interprets its reality in a different manner.

Calhoun (1997, p. 38) has summarized these approaches as follows:

(a) nationalism as a source or form of conflict, (b) nationalism as a source or form of political integration, (c) nationalism as a reform and appropriation of ethnic inheritance, (d) nationalism as a new cultural creation. These themes are deployed in debates over “civic” vs. “ethnic” nationalism and over the “modernity” or “primordiality” of nations.

The scope of my study is not to support or to contest any of these theories, nor to argue about the accuracy of these classifications. Based on Calhoun’s (1997, p.8) claim that nationalism is “a rhetoric for speaking about too many different things for a single theory to explain it”, I approach nationalism as a ‘discourse’ in Foucault’s (2002, p. 54) meaning: “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak”.

Foucault outlines the method through which it is possible a researcher to access a discourse and suggests to

“define discourses in their specificity; to show in what way the set of rules that they put into operation is irreducible to any other; to follow them the whole length of their exterior ridges, in order to underline them the better” (Foucault 2002, p.155)

Thus, discourse analysts investigate the conventions that frame a discourse by examining how a particular discursive event emerges and in what way a discourse is “established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization” (Foucault 2002, p.49).
By approaching nationalism as a discourse I accept that nation is socially constructed, but without diminishing its reality and its consequences. In Ozkirimli’s (2010, p. 214) words “the nationalist discourse is only a ‘necessary’ not a ‘sufficient’, condition for the emergence of a particular nation”.

As argued in this chapter, nations are not fixed entities, but follow an ongoing process mixed with numerous social, political, economic, cultural and environmental relations. For this reason, it is not possible to predict or to predetermine the outcome and the shape of the process of national construction. However, a comprehensive understanding of different conceptualizations of national identity will be a useful tool for my analysis, which investigates the ways in which official educational documents and social actors discursively construct national identifications.

My study employs the theories of nationalism presented in this chapter in order to investigate the ways in which Cypriot educational policies discursively construct a specific version of a national identity. The aim of my study is to investigate how the discourses regarding the national identifications in official educational documents of Cyprus aim to naturalize themselves as common-sense truth in order to explain and justify educational policy and practice.
CHAPTER 3
NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN CYPRUS

3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a brief overview of the historical development of nationalist movements in Cyprus. Then it considers some of the main ways in which nation has been understood and institutionalised among Greek Cypriots over time. The aim of this chapter is to draw together the specificities of how nation, nationalism and national identity have been constructed in the Greek Cypriot community and compare this analysis with the debates and deliberations contained in the previous chapter. The chapter also explores the potential that ‘Europe’ has for Cypriot citizenship.

The main objective of this chapter, however, is to provide a contextualisation of the Cypriot setting so that the analysis of policy documents and the views of policy actors can be more clearly understood. As Braun et al (2011, p.588) argue, “policies are enacted in material conditions, with varying resources, in relation to particular ‘problems’. They are set against and alongside existing commitments, values and forms of experience”.

3.2 The development of nationalism in Cyprus
As I argued in the previous chapter, ethnosymbolists such as Hutchinson (1994) and Smith (2013) highlight the importance of the ‘ethnic past’ and the durability as well as transformations of shared culture, nations and nationalism into the national present. They use Greece as an example of a modern national state where premodern ethnosymbolic elements and collective memories have persisted and are still transmitted in texts, institutions and traditions.

Some researchers trace the development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus back to the Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Rule in 1821. Some others, place its appearance back to the fall of Constantinople in the 15th century because of the
‘historic hatred’ and the ethno-national antagonism that this event evolved. This perception is an essentialist justification of Greek nationalism arguing about historic enmity unchanged throughout the ages (Hatjipavlou 2007, p. 352).

Mario Attilio Levi (1965, cited in Smith 2000, p. 76), refers to the shared ethnic features of Greeks since ancient times in order to support the perennial perspective of Greek nationalism. He talks about representative statesmen and intellectuals from ancient Greece in order to argue that Hellenic identity unified all the different *poleis-states*. Each *polis-state* politically unified their citizens. These political identities were characterized by ethnic cohesion, such as Ionian, Aeolian and Dorian communities signified by different dialects, calendars, communal organizations and architectural styles. These ethnic networks were united by the sentiment of Panhellenism, visible during the Persian wars where the ‘civilized’ Greek world resisted the ‘barbarian’ other. There is a dispute regarding the ancient Greeks as a nation or as an ethnic community, however the Panhellenic movements in times of ‘crisis’ do demonstrate a form of national alliance. Many scholars such as Fallmereyer argue that modern Greeks are not the lineal descendants of ancient Greeks due to the massive movements of Slavs, Arabs and Albanians into mainland Greece from the sixth century C.E. onwards (Smith 2000, p. 79). However, it is possible to identify some inherited cultural continuities, with the Greek language and the devotion to historic homeland representing the main continuities of the modern Greeks. Mendels (1997, p. 13-14) argues that, in the Hellinistic period (323 B.C. – 31 B.C.),

“nationalistic traits... can be discerned in many *ethne* (people) of the Hellenistic world, traits that distinguish them from one another. Perhaps the most important factor is that the various people of the ancient world were aware of how they differed in terms of language, territory, history, culture, and religion”.

Nevertheless, it was only after 1850 that the Greek historian Paparigopoulos channeled ancient Greek culture and national consciousness through the achievements of the Byzantine civilization. Influenced by the national
historiographies and the European politics of the time for national formations Paparigopoulos (1850, p. 203) provided his perception of the national conceptualization of Greek history. He defined nations as “moral beings which form gradually, and develop over time needs, interests, emotions, habits, and ideas” (cited in Koubourlis 2016, p. 54) His historiography unified all the national past of ‘Hellenism’ from ancient to modern times.

Paparigopoulos (1860, p.74) argued:

“Nations can accomplish different missions at different periods and try to achieve different ends by different means [...] So when we see the same language and the same [...] quality of moral and spiritual force, it is not permissible to doubt the existence and the action of the same nationality, even if its action has been modified by time and circumstances”. (cited in Koubourlis 2016, p. 61)

The Paparigopoulos’ historiography comes in accordance with the ‘continuous perennialism’, the belief that “particular nation has existed for centuries, if not millennia” (Smith 2000, p.5).

Historically the appearance of Greeks in Cyprus is traced back to 1300 B.C. when Myceneans settled on the island and spread Greek civilization and Greek language over the island. In ethnosymbolic terms this ‘ethnic past’ is visible in cultural and language continuities.

Whereas pre-modern societies were defined by traditional values, beliefs and ethnic identifications, modern societies replaced this primordialist-based identification with instrumentalist-based identification. The turn to modern-based institutions, values and beliefs transformed ethnic groups into nations. This study accepts that nationalism as an ideology was produced alongside the shifts towards modernity, when the claim that existing groups with distinguishable cultural identity should possess a territorial state of their own was articulated for the first time (Breuilly, 1994, p.67). During this period Cyprus passed from the Ottoman
rule which lasted from 1571-1878 to British rule which terminated in 1960 when Cyprus was recognised as an independent state.

The appearance of nationalism in Cyprus followed the evolution from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’; from the ‘paternal’ Ottoman way of domination to the bureaucratic and constitutional British administration, where the ‘subjects’ were transformed to ‘citizens’ and the two communities were defined by their ‘ethnicity’ and ‘language’ (Bryant, 2004). The development of Greek and Turkish nationalisms within Cyprus was associated with the procedure of the nation formation in Greece and Turkey and their respective nationalisms were ideologically depended on their ‘supra-families’.

The newly-born Republic of Cyprus (1960) thus had to accommodate two separate forms of nationalities and two opposing forms of nationalisms. Nationalism, “the assertion of national consciousness and pride” (Stavrinides, 1999, p.9), among Cypriots was either Greece-orientated or Turkey-orientated. Both communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, conceptualized their national identity based on their historic motherlands’ characteristics stressing their ethnic origins which identified and differentiated them in terms of religion, language, culture and traditions.

To some extent, the nationalist dispute in Cyprus is rooted in a primordialist point of view as crucial arguments are focused on matters of the alleged original ‘ownership’ of the territory and on demographic realities. From the Greek Cypriot point of view, both historical and demographic arguments have been and are used in order to ‘prove’ the Greekness of the island. The early and continuous Greek presence on the island, which can be traced as far back as the Mycenaean and Aegean colonial settlement in Cyprus after the Trojan War (Asmussen, 1996, pp.102-3), during the Hellinistic years and under the rule of the Byzantine Empire, constituted a major pillar of their claim to the longstanding Greek ‘nature’ of Cyprus. Along with the demographic principle of majority rule, Greek Cypriots justified their call for Enosis (union with Greece), as part of their right to self-determination. By claiming this kind of ‘majority’ democracy, the aim was for the
political domination by one nation, which consequently could potentially lead to discrimination and exclusion of the minority nation from the full benefits of citizenship.

On the other hand, the presence of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus started in 1571 as a consequence of the Ottoman conquest when approximately 30,000 Turkish peasants settled on the island (Morag, 2004, p.598). For this reason, Turkish Cypriots cannot assert that they are the ‘original’ population of Cyprus even though they have settled and remained on Cyprus for a considerable period. However, this large-scale influx of people onto the island created a new demographic issue. The settlement of Turks in Cyprus resulted in many villages on the island having mixed Greek and Turkish populations, whereas in towns, the Turkish population tended to settle in their own quarters. Usually in the mixed villages, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived peacefully together, and this sometimes involved intermarriage. Over time, Muslim and Christian peasants developed a common language known as Arcado Cypriot, which although closely resembling the language of the ancient Mycenaeans, was incomprehensible to mainland Greeks (Asmussen, 1996, pp.102-103).

According to Morag (2004, p.599), “the first centuries of Ottoman control of Cyprus occurred during the pre-nationalist era, [therefore], people did not think of themselves in national terms”. The average Christian (Greek) and Muslim (Turkish) peasants in Cyprus had a closer relationship with their local Muslim (Turkish) and Christian (Greek) counterparts respectively “than with members of their own national group belonging to higher socio-economic classes, and both identified with their religion” (Morag 2004, p.599). This classification in religious-based ethnic identity – Muslims or Christians – was reinforced by the fact that the Ottoman rule acknowledged the Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus as the official representative of the Greek Cypriots with the powers of self-government over the Greek Cypriot community. However, the influence of religion appears more in the development of loyalties among religious-based communities. This bond is not related to nationalism, but rather may oppose this form of linkage.
The argument of the Patriarch of Constantinople Genadious (d. 1468) illustrates the traditional religious attitude about ties of race and language:

“Though I am Hellene by speech, yet I would never say that I was a Hellene, ...for I don’t believe as the Hellenes believed. I should like to take my name from my Faith, and if anyone asked me what I am, I answer Christian”. (cited in Kedourie, 1994, p.51)

Although a ‘Cypriot’ civic national identity could possibly be developed based on a shared everyday life, values and even language, as events evolved in Cyprus, such an identity was never established, partially because of the unequal influence of modernisation between towns and villages and also between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (Morag, 2004, p.599).

From the very beginning of modernisation the Greek populations in towns embraced nationalist ideas, and in an expression of their support for the Greek War of Independence (1821), and of their ethnic self-awareness, they started giving their children Hellenic names (Morag, 2004, p.609). Specifically, the urban Greeks who occupied a particular socio-economic niche, first articulated and channelled nationalist sentiment, and were prepared to make the transition from ethnicity to nationhood (Morag, 2004, p.609). In addition, the development of print culture, during the British rule (1878-1960), and the expansion of Greek-language newspapers, which in context were mainly produced by nationalists devoting a great deal of space reporting on events occurring in Greece, reinforced further nationalistic feelings of a literate Greek-centred population who mostly lived in towns (Morag, 2004, p.609).

As Miller (1995) emphasises, at this time, all the available means of communication played a pivotal role in the transmission of ‘beliefs’ that holds nations together. Based on Anderson’s (1991) assertion that a nation is an ‘imagined community’, in the sense that any membership beyond the level of a small group with the capability for face-to-face communication can only be experienced through the imagination, he suggests that the collective acts of imagining can find expression through media, and he argues that: “...nations
cannot exist unless there are available the means of communication to make such collective imagining feasible” (Miller 1995, p.32).

In addition, the development of a network of primary and secondary schools in the 1860s that were maintained and controlled by the Church, further cultivated the ideals of Greek nationalism in Cyprus. Therefore, the Hellenic nationalistic ethos became the main value system into which younger generations were systematically socialised (Kitromilides, 1976). Therefore, the growth of literacy enabled the spread of a Greek form of nationalistic ideology on a mass basis.

During the British rule (1878-1960), the forces of modernisation, and the trend towards urbanisation affected both communities, with a larger percentage of the Turkish population moving into cities as compared with the Greek community (Morag, 2004). Since all the cities on the island had Turkish quarters, Turkish peasants gravitated towards them, rather than towards the Greek areas of cities. “By the years just prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the number of mixed villages had decreased from 230 in 1911 to only 33 in 1960” (Volkan, 1979, p.81). This “physical separation of the two communities” strengthened national-based social relations at the expense of class-based social relations, and consequently, “over time bred greater suspicion” between the two communities (Morag, 2004, p.600). Thus, the classification in cultural-religious terms as Muslim or Christian that occurred during the Ottoman period now shifted into national terms, as either Turks or Greeks.

This nationalistic classification was further reinforced by the dual educational system instituted by the British since the “educational systems of both Greece and Turkey were applied to the inhabitants of Cyprus” (Morag 2004, p.612), strengthening their respectively distinctive national identities. As Morag (2004, p.612) argues: “The British fostered the development of two parallel socio-political systems based on secularism and primordial and linguistic ethnicity rather than on religion”. For each of the two communities, the educational curriculum was based solely on that of each group’s ‘motherland’ that also provided school books.
accordingly. The British, by so doing, applied their usual policy among their colonies of ‘divide and rule’ (Hatjipavlou 2007, p. 352).

Extremely belatedly, when the Greek Cypriot riots of 1931 took place, the British, in order to suppress Greek nationalism, began to emphasise ‘Cypriotness’. This attempt was totally rejected by most Greek Cypriots, and was seen as an attack on their Greek identity and against their desire for Enosis by which Cyprus would become a part of the Greek state. Their Greek identity was further reinforced, as the plebiscite on Enosis in 1950 indicates, when 95.7% of the eligible Greek Cypriot voters favoured Enosis (Morag, 2004, p.613).

Ethno-national tensions had increased by the mid-1950s when Greek Cypriots under the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA: Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston) launched their struggle in the name of Enosis. During those years, the British attempted to suppress Greek nationalists through the widespread use of the Auxiliary Police Forces, which was made up of mainly Turkish Cypriots. The result was inevitable as tensions between Greek nationalists and the Auxiliary Police Force led by Turkish Cypriots expanded as an inter-communal problem, making Turkish nationalism a factor for the first time during 1957-58 (Morag 2004, p.614). The Turkish Cypriot response to EOKA’s struggle for Enosis was the demand for partition and the formation of their own militia, which later came to be known as the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT). According to Kitromilides (1976, p.165) Turkish Cypriot nationalism is “a by-product of three interlocking pressures: British manipulation, reactions to Enosis movements and mainland Turkish influence”.

The Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 established the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus. The signatories were Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives. The Treaty of Guarantee secured the survival of the State with the requirement that the Republic of Cyprus remained independent and that its Constitution was respected and upheld. It barred Enosis
and ‘Taksim’\textsuperscript{1}. Great Britain, Greece and Turkey had been acknowledged as guaranteeing powers with the right to intervene to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity and the Constitution of Cyprus.

“The crucial point, however, is that the two main ethnic groups which are to be found in (sic) the island are thought of by their members as being not ‘self-contained’ Cyprus-based nations, but integral parts of larger nations”. (Stavrinides, 1999, p. 8)

In the case of Cyprus, the state was shaped by necessities and options deriving from the political and strategic interests of the former colonial power, rather than from the common will of the native population who saw their struggle for territorial and political union with Greece to be abandoned. The procedure of the formulation of Cyprus as a politically independent state corresponds with Chatterjee's (1986) assertion that post-colonial nations confronted the moment of manoeuvre during which institutional arrangements established during the colonial rule had to be combined with the will of the subordinate classes. Following Chatterjee’s (1986) interpretation for the development of nationalism in former colonial societies, we can explain the ethnic separatism between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and their aim to sustain their ethnic identities and to place it at the moment of manoeuvre designed by the colonial rule (sub-unit 2.4.2). In addition, similarly to Chatterjee's study of nationalism in India, Greek nationalism in Cyprus “produced a discourse in which, even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of ‘modernity’ on which colonial domination was based” (Chatterjee 1986, p.30). At this crucial stage national inspirations and anti-imperialist ideologies were confronted with the interests of the colonial power and with the development of capitalist production.

From the very beginning, Greek Cypriots considered the settlement of the independent state of Cyprus as a historical compromise. Their struggle, instead of fulfilling its nationalist goal of political and territorial union with Greece, resulted

\textsuperscript{1} Partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish sections.
in an agreement that would be viable only by abandoning every nationalist aim
and by adapting in its place new symbols, such as the flag of an independent
Republic of Cyprus. In order to support and justify the existence of this new
independent state, Cyprus’ ties with the two metropolitan ‘mother’ countries had
to be cut, and a new nation-state consciousness had to be developed. For both
Greek and Turkish communities, their Cypriot state identity was different from
that associated with their traditional cultural identities. Thus, from the very
beginning the challenge for the Cypriot state was the conflicting affiliation of two
rival nationalisms that were expressed with the denial of state building within
Cyprus, since Cyprus was not perceived as a self-contained territory in which an
independent state could be created, but as an integral part of their respective
‘supra-families’ (Kizilyürek 2001). However, the paradox in the formation of the
Cyprus-state was the expectation of harmonising opposing tendencies and
achieving political unity, when simultaneously the Greek nationalist position
envisaged political and territorial unity with Greece (*Enosis*), and the Turkish
nationalist position was expressed with the aim of partition (*Taksim*: partition of
Cyprus into Greek and Turkish sections).

With respect to their different nationalist positions, the relationship between the
Greek and Turkish communities was, from the first years of independence, one of
competition and antagonism, with Greek Cypriots considering Cyprus as a Greek
island with a Turkish minority, and Turkish Cypriots declaring that the Republican
State was composed of two equal communities.

The imposed settlement and constitutional arrangements reinforced political and
cultural intolerance between the two communities (Kitromilides 1976). In
December 1963, inter-communal violence broke out which resulted in the ‘Enclave
Period’ with 60% of the Turkish Cypriots moving further into exclusively Turkish
sectors (Morag, 2004). The rest, who lived in areas administered by the Republic of
Cyprus, supported the Turkish Cypriot political leadership based in the Nicosia
enclave. Thus, a *de facto* partition of the island into Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot areas was created, worsening in this way the relations between the two
communities. Due to the lack of any kind of contact between them, the
demonization of 'the other' was easier for each side.

The isolation of Turkish Cypriots into their enclaves badly affected their economic
conditions and strengthened their separate identity, as they were increasingly
dependent on Turkey for financial aid. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots
prospered economically, as they succeeded in becoming an export-oriented society
by combining the advantageous location of the island with its healthy agriculture
and commercial sectors. It is estimated that in 1961, the economic status of
Turkish Cypriots was 20% lower than that of Greek Cypriots, whereas by 1973,
(one year before the Turkish invasion), it was 50% lower because of an economic
blockade by the Greek Cypriots on the enclaved areas (Morag, 2004). This uneven
development of the two communities can be perceived as one of the main reasons
that brought "into being the conditions for the development of Turkish nationalism
on the island" (Nairn, 1979, p.31). A quarter of a century of economic embargo of
the Turkish Cypriots deepened their dependence upon Turkey, consequently
impeding any movement for reconciliation with Greek Cypriots.

As a reaction to the July 1974 military coup d’etat, organised and executed by the
Greek Junta and pro-enosis forces, and the overthrowing of the Cypriot
government, the Turkish army invaded the northern part of Cyprus. The invasion
established Turkish military control over 37% of Cyprus and forced Greek Cypriots
to flee their homes and settle in the southern part of the island. Simultaneously, by
displacing all the Turkish Cypriots to the northern part, Turkish Cypriots were
completely detached from the Republic and a territorial division of Turks and
Greeks that had never occurred until that time was created. Thus, the island was
divided into two parts with the two communities obliged to live apart. The forcible
establishment of the two separate ethnic zones, marked out by the heavily fortified
‘Attila line’, banned any contact between the two zones. In 1983 the Turkish
Cypriots leadership, illegally and unilaterally, declared their own state in the
northern occupied areas, the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’
(TRNC). The southern part of Cyprus, which exists as a purely Greek Cypriot polity,
represents the legitimate and internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. The
Turkish government’s policy of settling Anatolian Turks in the occupied northern areas further changed the demographic character of the island, as about 74,000 Anatolian Turks were added to the local 98,000 Turkish Cypriot population. It is only since the spring of 2003, with the partial opening of the barriers across the dividing line, that the members of the two communities started to have some kind of interaction.

After the 1974 division, the desire for *Enosis* faded and many Greek Cypriots adopted the reunification of Cyprus as their goal. They started to present the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus as the only legal state with part of its territory occupied by a foreign army, and therefore, accused the self-declared ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as being an illegal (pseudo) state. However, the *de facto* division of the island is reflected in the proposed solution of the Cyprus Problem that is negotiated in the frame of integral, bi-communal federal solution based on two separate territorial and autonomous regimes.

Whereas the Dead Zone\(^2\) physically separated Greek and Turkish Cypriots, each side was deeply divided and polarised into left and right-wing. Right-wing parties of both sides embraced a nationalistic perspective, identifying themselves with their respective motherlands, presenting themselves primarily as Greeks or Turks. On the other hand, the left-wing communities on both sides, expressed mutual solidarity, joined by a common discourse on identity as ‘Cypriots first’, as one people sharing a common Cypriot history. The left-wing on both sides, being in continuous conflict with the right-wing within their own side, placed the root of the conflict in Cyprus in divisive and belligerent actions of right-wing nationalists. In addition, they regarded Greeks and Turks as outsiders, and considered their actions in 1974 – the coup organised by the Greek junta and the subsequent Turkish invasion – as being fatal for Cyprus (Papadakis, 1997).

An alternative vision of history that emphasises peaceful struggles – such as common strikes and co-operation at the grass roots level – dominates both the

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\(^2\) The UN supervised ceasefire line that divides Cyprus – Greek Cypriots on the south side of the Dead Zone, Turkish Cypriots on the north.
Greek and Turkish Cypriot left-wing political discourse. This effort of approaching history from a social, rather than nationalistic perspective, stressing the common struggles of both communities, aims to reinforce feelings of mutual solidarity, while at the same time, to oppose the nationalists of both sides. The long-term goal is to gradually prepare the ground for the development of a solid Cypriot identity between the two communities.

3.3 Concepts and discourses in Greek Cypriot politics

Over the last century Greek Cypriot politics and ideological struggles among political parties have their roots on three different ways of national identification (see Stavrinides, 1999). The first is ‘Hellenocentrism’, which expresses the ideology of the political right, and emphasizes the Greekness of Greek Cypriots, who consider themselves as Greeks living in Cyprus. This discourse promotes the membership of the Greeks of Cyprus or Cypriot Hellenism with the wider Greek nation on the basis of ethno-cultural criteria of national belongingness. It stresses common descent and culture defined by religion, language, customs and arts, and is expressed with the vision of *Enosis* (political and territorial union with Greece).

The second national identification is ‘Greek Cypriotism’ that ascribes Cyprus as politically, territorially and socioeconomically different from Greece but similar in terms of culture, tradition and race. Those who support this ideology identify their statehood and nationhood as being Greek Cypriot, living in a Greek Cypriot State. This discourse excludes notions for ‘Union’ with Greece and identifies Greek Cypriots’ statehood and nationhood as being citizens in a Greek Cypriot State.

The third national identification is ‘Cypriocentrism’, which emphasizes that Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities share common Cypriot (cultural and political) identity and encourages the development of a Cypriot consciousness aimed at moderating Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. Thus, this discourse stresses the Cypriot identity that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots share and sets them apart from Greeks and Turks respectively. Although it defines identity along political-legal and territorial factors, it also makes use of cultural elements, such as
common traditions, customs, arts; but not religion, language and descent (Mavratsas, 1997). ‘Cypriocentrism’ is mainly supported and sustained by the political left of both, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities (Peristianis, 2006).

These discourses are employed later in this thesis in order to examine in what ways these different movements of self-identification between Greek Cypriots are represented in official educational documents and in semi-structured interviews among the educational elite, and how the discursively constructed type(s) of Cypriot citizenship are becoming linked to the European citizenship.

3.4 The national question in Cyprus
Turning back to these three different nationalist movements it is interesting to compare their consistency with key features and aspects attributed to the concept of a nation. As the development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus corresponds to some degree with a primordialist perspective, the link with territory is only historical and symbolic, without achieving territorial and political union with Greece. In this sense, Greek nationalism in Cyprus never succeeded in making the transition to nationhood. Instead, a novel state with a constructed component was established without any common form of nationalism to support it, and with the desire for citizenship appearing unclear, with the majority of Greek Cypriots identifying their statehood and nationhood as being a Greek Cypriot state (Stavrinides, 1999).

In a similar manner, by applying Miller's (1995) five distinctive elements of national identity as explored in the previous chapter (collective will for self-identification, extended in history, active, connected with particular territory and sharing common public culture) in respect to the Greek nationalistic position in Cyprus, it seems that the collective action of people and their capacity to confer authority on political institutions along with a shared territory are the missing elements that could make possible the transition from ethnicity to nationhood.
Furthermore, it was exactly through this channel that the nationalistic sentiment of *Enosis* (union with Greece) was expressed.

According to these nationalistic aspirations, it can be suggested that the Greek cultural community in Cyprus never succeeded in becoming a part of the Greek nation, as according to Smith (1991, p.9) “national identity involves some sense of political community”. However, in primordial terms, the ‘ethnic’ representation of the nation, which stresses the existence of a community of common descent, correlated with a fictive ‘supra-family’, appears to partly fulfil the nationalistic aspirations of Greek Cypriots, since political union with a shared political project with Greece was never achieved. In other words, the missing element of ‘Hellenocentrism’ is the ‘civic’ component of the nation that presupposes a shared economy and common bureaucratic state for all of its citizens. Within this nationalistic frame, the Cyprus state failed to accommodate two different ethnic communities that struggled for their own sovereignty within its borders (Stavrinides, 1999).

On the other hand, looking back into the periods of common life between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it is clear that people shared common territory and economic life, and to some extent a common language, but not a common ‘cultural character’. Whereas, as it is argued above (sub-unit 3.2), in some instances there was some potential for the development of civic nationalism based on a shared social life, such a case never ensued because of the unequal impact of modernisation. It is in this direction that Cypriotism aspires, that is the development of a common cultural identity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, it is easier for the Cypriocentrism position to be accommodated with the distinctive features of nationality (Miller 1995, see sub-unit 2.3), as it asserts that people of both communities are recognised as compatriots, stressing their common social life, co-operation and achievements in peaceful periods, instead of their conflicting past.

The ideology of Cypriocentrism is the communist alternative that adapts a long-running tradition of labour mobilisation and resistance and employs narratives of
common class struggles in order to support the peaceful coexistence of both communities (Panayiotou, 2006, p.276). Although Cypriocentrism has a long tradition in Cypriot leftist circles of both communities, the dominance and hegemonic status of Hellenocentrism has repressed its development. Even AKEL (the official leftist political party in Cyprus) avoids openly disagreeing with the dominant idea of Greekness since, “they are perfectly aware that any serious challenge, or even qualification, to the assumed Greekness of the island would alienate them from the political mainstream” (Mavratsas, 1997, p.9). However, due to the de facto division of the island, any effort to cultivate a common culture would be only an abstract construction, and not a socially constructed identity.

Primordialists’ and instrumentalists’ contradictory viewpoints can be employed in order to explain the national question in Cyprus. On the one hand, the primordialist perspective emphasises the differences in the discussion of origins and favours Greek and Turkish separatism, making the assimilation of the two into a single national culture inconceivable. This essentialist way of envisioning cultural identity appears to be narrow and limited. It perceives cultural identity as an already accomplished and static fact, and as a constituted essence. In this sense, both communities in Cyprus are formed and operate as “the national other” (Loizos, 1998), acting as two polarised opposites that can only exist in relation to one another. In other words, there are Greeks because there are Turks, and vice-versa. Accordingly, national identity is constructed in a process that gives rise to an eternal and primordial enemy through the use of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, good and evil, frame of reference (Spyrou, 2002). This approach establishes a sense of the superior ‘self’, while at the same time, dismisses the ‘other’ because it is perceived as so different, as an inferior being.

On the other hand, an instrumentalist’ view suggests that a political union between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is possible when the divisive cultural and religious elements can be demoted to a personal level. From this point of view, particular symbols can be manipulated in order to create political identities, and by putting aside conflicting cultural discrimination among people.
While the ‘Cypriotism’ viewpoint has the potential to be persuasive, adopting the instrumentalist perspective, it has actually become trapped in an essentialist rhetorical mechanism and has become another form of nationalism according to Killoran, (1998). An indicator for such a claim is the attempt from the ‘Cypriocentrism’ camp to rewrite Cypriot history on the basis of a reinterpretation of Cypriot origins, and in a search for primordial origins, the suggestion that the ‘Cypriot nation’ emerged out of strong Phoenician influences (Stamatakis, 1991). Papadakis (2005) points out that the ‘Cypriotness’ image is constructed, as opposed to ‘the other’ mainland Greeks and Turks. As he admits:

“At times we had slowly, imperceptibly, begun to create our own Dead Zones around us by speaking so negatively about Greeks and Turks. To unite together as Cypriots we felt discomfort as we spoke about our island and our history. We were now turning the Greeks and Turks into our opposites, our enemies even”. (Papadakis 2005, p.204)

In this sense, ‘Cypriocentrism’ may be perceived as an anti-ethnic ethnocentrism, as the group of people who aspire to the construction of a ‘Cyprus nation’, they confront their own Greek or Turkish culture, respectively, as a threat to their ‘Cypriotism’. As Fishman (1997) asserts, ethnocentrism and anti-ethnic ethnocentrism are one and the same, and he contrasts them with pluralism and the co-existence of cultures by indicating the following:

“The antidote to ethnocentrism (including antiethnic ethnocentrism, which may be just as supercilious and uncritically biased as is ethnic conditioning) is thus, comparative cross-ethnic knowledge and experience, transcending the limits of one’s own usual exposure to life and values”. (Fishman, 1997, p.337)

A well-functioning nation is based on some form of common public life, a common framework of laws and a common public language in which national debate can take place. However, this is likely to be hampered in the cases where different ethnic groups are strongly attached to their particular identities, therefore demanding the preservation of their own language. In this case, cultural identity provides the framework for demands for autonomy. In other words, cultural
identity provides the options from which individuals choose how they live their life, infusing their choice with meaning. As Miller (1995, pp.85-86) writes “common culture ... gives its bearers... a background against which meaningful choices can be made”. He also continues his argument to claim that cultural identities should be protected because they provide the context in which autonomy is exercised. As he argues: “everyone has an interest in not having their inherited culture damaged or altered against their will” (Miller 1995, pp.86-87).

Accordingly, cultural and political identity are constituent parts of national identity. Since Greek Cypriots are the dominant community, their expectation has been that their culture should shape the character of the state, and hence of the emerging nation. However, such an enterprise encounters fierce opposition from Turkish Cypriots who do not consider themselves as an ethnic minority, but as a community with equal political rights with Greek Cypriots. Thus, the challenge in the case of Cyprus is to invent a new political culture that can encompass both ethnic communities by recognising the possibility of dual identities, a cultural-national and political-national identity.

An alternative way of approaching the 'Cyprus Problem' is by putting emphasis on the uneven economic development of the two communities, and by examining the growth of Turkish nationalism on the island in accordance with this parameter. By employing ‘political economy’ – a means of comprehending the world by examining and analysing the economy, the society and the state as an interconnected organism – Clifford (1992b) places the foundations of partition in Ireland in the different and separate stages of capitalism in the North and South, and in the conflict of interests in the market resulting from this. According to Clifford's (1992b) analysis one solution is to be found through understanding the economics and politics of partition, meaning to comprehend partition by examining the different levels of economic development between the two communities.

In this perspective, the membership of Cyprus in the European Union could function as a catalyst for a new settlement of the Cyprus Problem, as mutual
interests deriving from a form of economic integration among the Cypriots might encourage co-operation, and eventually reduce some of the political barriers arising from their conflicting past. Bearing in mind the nationalist identifications among Cypriots, the division of the island and the consequence problematic identification of Turkish Cypriots with the Cypriot state, their position is actually enhanced through membership of the European Union, which gives them a stage and status that they would not otherwise possess. As far as the Greek Cypriots are concerned their nationalistic desire for political unification with Greece is indirectly achieved via their membership in the European Union.

In contrast, Milne (2003) argues that the only possible solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’, as long as the two communities preserve their diametrically opposed nationalistic sentiments, is a two-state solution. As he acknowledges, “there is no island-wide Cypriot national identity needed to make federation feasible” (Milne 2003, p.159), and for this reason, any attempt for a solution in this direction lacks credibility. In this sense, any federal solution for Cyprus presupposes a considerable shift from the separate Greek and Turkish nationalisms towards a specifically Cypriot island identity.

In the case of Cyprus, the contribution of the European Union to the solution of the national question may be more direct, as it offers a legal frame for diversity to co-exist in a democratic and equal manner by protecting the rights of national minorities and by constraining any kind of ethnic discrimination. Taking advantage of the European Union constitution that promotes economic and cultural integration, any effort for one ‘solution’ of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ shall aim on this direction, leaving behind any nationalistic goals and aspirations.

Furthermore, the globalisation of culture in the European community has the potential, to some extent, to eradicate some of the cultural stereotypes forged by ethnic antagonisms, therefore, weakening the dominant model of the nation-state. However, universalistic tendencies, like the example of the European Union, have not entirely succeeded in harmonising conflictive elements of national consciousness.
As Larrain (1994, pp.141-142) argues:

“In all forms of national consciousness there is a tension between universalistic elements (democracy and the rule of law) and particularistic elements that come from the national history.... Only a patriotism informed by universal principles could escape from triumphal continuities and comprehend the profound ambivalence of all national traditions”.

Whereas globalisation and various elements of global economy, such as increased migration, the mobility of capital markets, travel and communications technology, have an important cultural dimension and can lead to the creation of global culture, there is controversy for its capacity to erode national identities (Smith 2013, p. 135). Moore (2000, p.230) argues that “even if cultural differences become less significant, this does not necessarily lead to the erosion of national identities”. The claim that national identities are social constructs, does not mean that they can easily be deconstructed.

On a political rather than a cultural stage, people may be more willing to add to their national identity attachment and other levels of governance. Thus, the development of a new political identity based on concepts of egalitarianism and human rights can nurture an ideology of ethnic coexistence based on a lively sense of shared interethnic stakes in a highly progressive society. Cultural pluralism would then not be considered as an obstacle or threat, but rather as an element of synthesis.

As Kitromilides (1976, p.172) argues:

“It should be remembered, however, that originally nationalism was a democratic force of change, aspiring at social equality, informed by the humanism of the Enlightenment”.

Moore (2000) provides an alternative argument as to how states should recognise and accommodate national identities. “This is an argument of fairness” (p.72), which recognises the fact that national identities matter to people, and
acknowledges the claim that the contemporary state is not, and cannot be, neutral with respect to national identities. The effectiveness of this argument focuses considerations beyond cultural identity towards an examination of the issues of political identity. In order to support this argument, Moore (2000, p.57) compares the level of violence between competing national or ethnic groups, and argues that “cultural differences do not correspond with the intensity of the conflict” between such groups. As she exemplifies, Northern Ireland, Burundi, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, “where cultural difference is small, and [the] members of the antagonistic communities speak the same language and [share] similar cultural values” (Moore 2000, p.57), experience intense conflict. On the other hand, in Canada, Switzerland and Belgium, where “members of communities speak different languages and exhibit deeper cultural differences” (ibid), relations are generally peaceful.

Thus, the proposition here is to comprehend nations not in terms of cultural homogeneity, but to strengthen political identity. This does not mean that each ethnic group in Cyprus should deny its cultural identity; however, they would have to adopt strategies that establish a common framework in which they can acknowledge each other as fellow citizens, with a shared sense of a common political project. A vibrant public life and democratic processes based on the fairest possible ground rules and regulations presupposes some common political space in which people can act as citizens of a common political life, making collective decisions, which lead to equal economic opportunities, irrespective of their cultural differences. In this sense, national identities are primarily political identities and are bound up with the state in terms of structure, boundaries and membership.

3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have drawn on the work of the previous chapter to align theories of nationalism, nation and national identity with the geopolitical and historically constructed situation of Cyprus. I explain in what ways modernization combining with the demographic situation and the British colonial rule affected the
development of two rival nationalisms and the formation of the competing Greek and Turkish Cypriot national identities on Cyprus. I also argue that social and cultural factors such as language, religion, education and reliance on the mother-countries reinforced these two rival nationalisms. A critical role is attributed and to the uneven economic development of the two communities.

Greek and Turkish ethno-national identifications are still apparent on the island and continue to influence any attempt for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. This study acknowledges the contribution of education for the shape or even the transformation of national identifications. Traditionally the role of education for the Greek Cypriots was the preservation of the Greek culture and tradition in a way that reassures the survival of Greek ethnicity and Greek identity in Cyprus. However this practice was disputed during the days of the presidency of the first elected, left government of Mr Christofias (2008-2013) which aimed to transform Hellenocentric education to a Cypriocentric construct enhancing in this way rapprochement with Turkish Cypriots.

The aim of this study is to critically examine the ways in which this leftist government endeavoured to deconstruct and to transform the 'Hellenocentric' character of the Greek Cypriot education. For the purposes of this study I examine two kinds of official education documents circulated during the presidency of Mr Christophias. The first is the New Curriculum (2010) and the second is the Commemorative Messages sent by the Minister of education in all state schools. The study also include the private discourse of nine policy actors involved in the Greek Cypriot educational matters, based on semi-structured qualitative interviews.
CHAPTER 4
CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ABOUT NATIONAL LANGUAGES

4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I turn to explore what is meant by a national language as well as the ways in which denoting one language from amongst different languages as the dominant form contributes towards a construction of nationhood as well as signalling linguistic hierarchy, power and the exclusion of some linguistic identities.

In this chapter I start by exploring claims made for the links between language and cultural identity. Then I explore the distinction between language and dialect. Language ideologies and languages policies are associated with the language question in Greece and Cyprus. The sociolinguistic situation in Cyprus is explained and language policies in respect with the prospect of a solution to the Cyprus Problem are discussed. I conclude this chapter with my research agenda.

Identity is a complex and hybrid concept that draws on a broad set of factors such as ethnicity, faith and language. This chapter explores the reasons that make language a significant element in national identification with special reference to the case of Cyprus.

4.2 Cultural identity and language policy
According to a culturalistic perspective (see sub-unit 2.2) the possession of a common language appears to be one of the most prominent factors that make people feel part of a shared community a nation. In 1770s Herder provided a rationale for a link between language and politics. For Herder, language served a dual purpose: as a chief medium of understanding and communication between individuals, and even more importantly as a vehicle of self-expression. He considered language to be the principal link and means through which common traditions and common memories are connected and expressed. Beliefs and behaviours that bind people together can be explained in terms of a common language, which is considered as form of public symbolism. As he claimed,
“Language expresses the collective experience of the group” (cited in Berlin, 1976, p.169). Thus, language expresses the experience and consciousness of a cultural-community and constitutes a profound component of a nation’s identity. Fichte (1968) and other German philosophers suggested that language groups were entitled to strive for a sovereign existence in a state of their own, uncontaminated by others speaking different languages.

Fichte (1968) claimed that what defines a nation most clearly is its language:

“Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature itself, long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole”. (quoted in Joseph, 2004, p.110)

According to this notion, the possession of a common language appears to be one of the most prominent factors that bind people together. More recently, historians like Kedourie (1994), influenced by the German Romantic standpoint, define nationality specifically in terms of language and argue that ‘genuine’ nationality is ultimately a linguistic movement, just as language is the main objective feature of nationhood. In a similar way, Ernest Gellner (1983), claimed that the invention of printing accompanied with the wide spread of popular education in conjunction with the rise of industry made possible the construction of modern nation-states and placed language as a crucial factor in modern politics, especially in defining and explaining nations and nationalism (sub-unit 2.3.3.2).

In the absence of other distinctive elements, a unique language provides an objective trait for defining a group and underlying a sense of community as well as shared historical experiences in many cases.

As Smith (1982, p.147) states:

“Language became the ensign and sediment of history for groups and strata in search of meaning in a rapidly changing and turbulent world; and that is an important reason for the proliferation today, even within Western
Europe itself, of ethnic nationalisms, many of which express their demands on the basis of a separate cultural and linguistic identity”.

Spolsky (2004) argues that the perception that each nation-state should be unified by a single common language is the main idea upon which nationalism and nation-states have been defined since their rise in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries up to the present. As he argues:

“Nationalism, with its search for national identity and Great Traditions, was a strong motivation for language management in the nineteenth century. Both the French Revolution and German Romanticism held a view of nationalism that assumed that a single unifying language was the best definition and protector of nationhood. Choosing an appropriate national language and purifying it of foreign influences was a major activity”. (Spolsky 2004, p.57)

The perception that a common national language is a key component of nation building acknowledges the role of language as an important cultural element in each nation. Accordingly, the language (or languages) each of us speaks functions as a bearer of ideas, concepts, beliefs and attitudes.

As Joseph (2004, p.14) puts it:

“Each of us, after all, is engaged with language in a lifelong project of constructing who we are, and who everyone is that we meet, or whose utterances we simply hear or read”.

If there is a correlation between the language we speak and the way we think, then it becomes quite obvious why culture and language are interrelated. Thus, it could be argued that being a member of a linguistic community implies membership of a cultural community as well. In view of this argument, language is crucial to culture and by extending this notion, a common national culture is the source of national unity.
In this sense, a single, unifying national language may become an essential component in the construction of a common cultural identity, as it provides the medium through which each nation constructs its narratives with the production and reproduction of its representative myths, rituals and literature. The adoption of a common language among distinct populations within the boundaries of a nation-state is considered as an important means of integration into a common cultural identity and shared value system.

Billig (1995, p.29) argues that “the creation of a national hegemony often involves a hegemony of language”. According to Hobsbawm (1994, p.183), this kind of linguistic nationalism requires the control of a state and thus imposition of power, status, politics and ideology. For Rasool (2000) language is not a sufficient element for the development of a national identity, but in practice “whether common languages necessarily integrate people into a common national culture remains a highly debatable issue” (Rasool, 2000, p.387).

### 4.3 Standard language and dialects
As discussed in the first chapter, to some extent, widespread literacy contributed towards the appearance of nationalism (Gellner, 1983). Language choice is intertwined with the function of a state, since some common linguistic code is required.

A version of the nationalistic ideal, which envisages the development of nationalities into nations with a common language, encouraged the standardisation procedure. Schiffman, (1998, p.362) suggests that standardisation constitutes both (a) conscious, planned standardisation by language academies, dictionary writers, printers and proofreaders and of (b) the dominance of a particular dialect and its standardisation via use in official texts such as the Bible and the Quran.

The possession of a common language becomes a crucial symbol based upon beliefs about the nature of language. The emergence of standard languages has been strongly influenced by these nationalistic beliefs. In these terms, standardisation is
perceived as a cultural duty for the restoration of the original and correct form of language. Standard languages come out as the language proper, surrounding the reputation of the one, true, original form of the language and any dialects are taken as variants of the standard, regional ways of using it, or decadent misuses.

A significant role for the widespread use of standard language is attributed to the worldwide circulation of printed books and products in association with mass education and socio-economic transformations – together with urbanisation and industrialisation (Gellner, 1983). The ideological association between language standardisation and the aspiration of national unity has been repeatedly pointed out by social historians who highlighted the ‘invented’, ‘constructed’ (Hobsbawm, 1983) or ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 1991) dimensions of cultural nationalism and of linguistic nationalism in particular.

De Witte has questioned Gellner’s insistence upon a single, uniform language to facilitate nation building, and argues that this perception perhaps was only valid with respect to the social and economic evolution of industrialisation. As the current reality of multicultural states differs socially and economically from that of industrialisation, a single uniform language is no longer necessary or sufficient configuration (quoted in Caviedes, 2003, p. 251).

The unifying function of a standard language can play a central role in defining national identity. A group speaking a separate language is usually approached as a people in its own right, while a group speaking a dialect is seen as a sub-group, part of a greater group of people. In these terms a single national language is considered as the highest form and dialects as subordinates that do not constitute different languages.

Van Marle (1997) argues that whereas dialects constitute the roots upon which the formation of written standard is based on, from the moment that this formation becomes a fact any interaction between the written standard and its related dialects is highly limited.
On the other hand, Milroy and Milroy (1999) emphasize the variability in spoken languages in different geographical, social and situational contexts in which individuals find themselves from time to time.

“[A] language is the property of the communities that use it, and it must function effectively at that level in a manner that fulfils the needs of users. It is not the exclusive property of governments, educators or prescriptive grammarians, and it is arrogant to believe that it is”. (Milroy and Milroy 1999, p.45)

In this sense, standardisation is perceived as an abstract ideology “as an idea in the mind not a reality” (Milroy and Milroy 1999, p.19) as “it is speakers who innovate in the first place – not languages” (ibid, p.48). This view emphasises the authenticity of the spoken language and disputes the nationalistic perception that standard written and spoken language is a major goal. However, those nationalistic movements that utilised vernaculars through substantial planning in order to make them “the unifying, authenticating, and modernising tools that they were expected to be” (Fishman, 1975, p.58) seem to suggest that standardisation is to some extent anti-nationalistic in its assumptions, as vernaculars appear to be products of language planning rather than a genuine expression of the soul. This point of view is criticised by Schiffman (1998) who argues that if languages were not standardised they would break up into regional spoken dialects, which gradually would end in mutual unintelligibility.

There is no universally accepted criterion for distinguishing a language from a dialect. Linguistic criteria, such as structural similarity and mutual intelligibility, are not sufficient to distinguish between a language and a dialect. Some linguists such as Finegan, (2007) do not differentiate between languages and dialects and claim that languages are dialects and vice versa. The distinction is therefore subjective and the decision about what is a dialect of another language or a separate language is also a political decision. A repeated quip in a linguistics course, summarising the problems of defining a language, was popularised by Max Weinreich: “A language is a dialect with an army and a navy” (cited in Crowley, 2006, p.23). This highlights the
influence of social and political dimensions in respect of the status of a language or dialect. As Rumsey (1990, p.346) suggests, linguistic categorisations and linguistic ideologies are often closely related. The designation of the status of a ‘language’ or a ‘dialect’ is formulated by social forces, which are beyond linguistic function and structure (Gal and Irvine, 1995).

Modern Scandinavian languages are one illustration of all this. Although they are intelligible and less different than some dialects of German they are considered as different languages. Another example is in the former Yugoslavia, where Serbo-Croatian was considered a single language. Now Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian are considered three distinct languages despite the fact that their grammar remains the same. The reason for this change in status is clearly political and not linguistic.

As modern European history indicates, a language, and not a dialect, is generally associated with a specific nation (Billig 1995). Due to this connection, cultural nationalism is defined in terms of the status of a language and not of a dialect. As Anderson (1991) puts it, “it is hard to imagine a cultural nationalist dying for a dialect rather than a language; it would be like giving up your life for the county rather than the country” (cited in Crowley, 2006, p.24).

4.4 Language ideologies and language policies

Many scholars (for example, Fishman, 1991) highlight the symbolic significance of language and explain in detail how this symbolic function means that language is a salient element of putative national traits. The association of language with ethnic and national identities has also been examined by researchers who draw attention to the ideological aspects that are embedded in beliefs about linguistic similarity and difference. Such an example is the study of Gal and Irvine (1995), which points out that the creation of linguistic boundaries are always correlated with social, political and moral issues. They also assert that perceptions which attribute an isomorphic relation between a culture, a nation and a language, approach communities as essentialised and homogenised, and language as a “neutral warrant for political claims to territory and sovereignty” (Gal and Irvine 1995, p.968).
Kroskrity (2003, p. 498) claims that “language ideologies are beliefs, or feelings, about languages as used in their social worlds”. In his attempt “to identify and exemplify language ideologies – both as beliefs about language and as a concept designed to assist in the study of those beliefs” (p. 501) he considers five levels of converging dimensions. These are “(1) group or individual interests, (2) multiplicity of ideologies, (3) awareness of speakers, (4) mediating functions of ideologies, and (5) role of language ideology in identity construction” (p. 501).

Kroskrity's (2003, p. 498) approach to language ideologies as “a cluster concept” (p. 501) regarding a group’s beliefs and feelings about language and his “five converging dimensions” (p.501) is a useful analytical tool for my research which aims to shed light on the way official educational document and social actors discursively construct national identifications. His focus on ideological contestation is relevant with my second research question which examines how the debate on language policy and national identity is rooted to the historical and socio-political context of Cyprus. Ideological awareness is also relevant to my research since it examines discourses that frame language policies and national identifications in Cyprus and investigates how participants’ awareness and contestations challenge dominant ideologies.

The ideologies of linguistic sameness and differentiation are also important to my study. They are based on the ‘foundational ideology’ that approaches language as a homogenous bounded code that is inextricably and essentially linked with a group’s culture and identity (Jaffe, 2009). This ideology is dominant in Cyprus since the Greek language is perceived as an essential part of the Greekness of Greek Cypriots.

In contrast to this view that correlates language with cultural heritage, the ‘situational’ perspective approaches ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ as social constructions and rejects any significant or even any particular link between ethnicity and language (May, 2001, p.9). The foundational role of language is strongly questioned by the constructionist approach that downgrades language from a primordial binding force of the nation to just one of several ideological sites within nationalist rhetoric.
In the last few decades sociolinguistic studies have questioned the notion of ‘community’ as a distinct entity, and instead offer a more complex understanding of ethnicity and comprehend community in a multi-dimensional way which adopts multiple and different kinds of identification (Gal and Irvine, 1995; Rampton, 2005). In particular, these sociolinguistic studies question the notion of ‘speech communities’ and focus on a micro-analysis of situated interaction in specific settings named as ‘communities of practice’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991) or examine more macro-processes such as the symbolic representation of the members of a ‘community’ (Rampton, 2005).

The effort of each state to control the development of a language is evident in its language policies that reflect the political and ideological presupposition of each successive government. Language policy as a concept developed in parallel with sociolinguistics, a scholarly area that identified itself in the 1960s and included matters of language development. Language policy “refers to the formulation and proclamation of an explicit plan written in a formal document about language use” (Spolsky, 2004, p.11). The nature and aims of all language policies can be comprehended only in correlation to the particular sociolinguistic settings in which they take place (Ferguson, 1997, p.9).

Schiffman (1996) asserts that language policy is primarily a social construct that rests on the ‘linguistic culture’ of a society and comprises conceptual elements such as belief systems, attitudes and myths. In this sense, language is transmitted to each generation with little change as an expression of culture and, indeed, forms it as well. Language policy is therefore a cultural construct that embodies “a belief system, a collection of ideas and decisions and attitudes about language” (Schiffman 1996, p.59) and can only function successfully if it is rooted to the linguistic culture of the language group it represents. Although he perceives language as a cultural construct, he asserts that this does not imply that particular political interventions have the potential to deconstruct, change or radically alter a language.

As Schiffman (1996, p.276) argues:
“The post-modern project of skewering all social constructs and hanging them up to dry does not, in the case of language, alter the structure of particular languages in any significant way”.

In a similar way, Fishman (1991, p.372) asserts that policies alone are rarely sufficient for achieving language goals without “extensive and recurring, out-of-school and post-school societal reinforcement”. In addition, Ager (2001, pp.5-6) argues that: “... language policy represents the exercise of political power, and like any other policy, may be successful or not in achieving its aims”. Further support for this argument is given by Eriksen et al. (1991) who, based on comparative studies of governments and non-dominant ethnic groups in Europe for the period 1850-1940, examined how schooling, educational policy and ethnic identity were correlated. They concluded that the most important factor in the failure of policies, which education employed, “in the processes of socialisation, cultural cohesion and national development” (ibid, p.416) was the efforts of the affected population to resist them. Thus, the main assumption concerning the effectiveness of a language policy is the acceptance of the society where this policy is supposed to be applied.

Although language policies aim to strengthen allegiance to the state framework, they also reinforce self-identification and cultural identity. As a group of sociologists have asserted:

“The processes of identity rest not simply on the claims made but on how such claims are received, that validated or rejected by significant others”.

(Bechhofer et al., 1999, p.515)

In accordance to these claims, we may assert that language “is more a cultural construct than an explicit policy” (Schiffman, 1996, p. 123). This point of view combines the essentialist and constructionist point of view by valuing the ‘myth’ of the past and not dismissing it as mere fallacy unworthy of analytical attention in its own right.
4.5 The language question in Greece

The language question in Greece was reflected in the Greek Cypriot educational system, which traditionally applied the same language policies as was the case in Greece. Thus, in this situation, Cyprus and Greece were bound together linguistically and culturally, if not in a more legalistic manner.

The term diglossia has been employed to describe the artificial bilingualism developed during the foundation of the Modern Greek state due to the official use of *katharevousa* (an archaic form of Modern Greek), by suppressing the *demotic* (the common language of the people) (Charis 1972, p.2).

Kay (1977, p.29) mentions that writing is considered “culture as far as possible divorced from the primate nature”. This applies in the cases that written languages become systems in their own right and develop properties, which are not observed in spoken language. Consequently, written languages differ markedly from their spoken counterparts and thus, their systematic properties must be learned separately. Based on this fact, Koefoed (1995) characterised a written standard as nobody’s native language.

This type of standardisation represents the concept of diglossia as it was introduced by Ferguson (1956, pp.244-245) with this definition:

“A relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or region standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community conversation”.

As this definition suggests, diglossia occurs when the written language defers significantly from the oral language, in a degree that only a few people learn this rigidly codified language. In this case, the standard is not applicable for all the
communicative conditions but “tends to become only one of several styles within a speech community and to create a sharp cleavage between ‘high’ and ‘low’ style” (Haugen, 1966, p.932). Although Ferguson’s (1956) term of diglossia refers to two different forms of language used in different context, in the case of Greece both, *katharevousa* and demotic versions contest for their establishment as official language.

*Katharevousa* was developed as a written language by literary individuals and was enspoused by the cultural and political bourgeoisie in Greece and in Cyprus during the nineteenth century. “[Katharevousa] was not a modernized version of Ancient Greek, but a superficially archaized and fundamentally Europeanized version of the language spoken by the educated middle class” (Mackridge 2009, p. 183). A *Katharevousa* programme envisioned a standard, national language and aimed to purify Greek from any foreign influences and to enrich it with linguistic elements of Ancient Greek. This archaized linguistic form approached language as a noble construction and not as a means of public communication since it was significantly different from the spoken language. On the other hand the *demotic* programme promoted a written language based on the common elements of the spoken Greek dialects, mainly representing the rural colloquial language. Whereas supporters of *katharevousa* envisioned the revival of linguistic elements of ancient Greece, proponents of *demotic* considered their language to be the natural and unbroken development of the Greek language since antiquity.

The language question - concerning the imposition of one of these two forms in formal education - was first raised at the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth century. Both forms, the *katharevousa* and the *demotic* represented two rival movements developed by the bourgeois elite and brought two groups into radical opposition, the conservatives and the progressives (Papanoutsos, 1978, p. 46). The conservatives supported *katharevousa* and considered it as the connecting link with the glorious past of Greece and its great cultural tradition since it enabled direct access to ancient classics. On the other hand, the progressives considered *katharevousa* to be an artificial form, and the
demotic form as their natural spoken language. Both aimed to impose their beliefs as the national written language of Greece.

The struggle for the imposition of one of these two rival forms of the Greek language was highly ideologized since their supporters had strong and dogmatic beliefs and attitudes regarding the official use either of katharevousa or demotic. Each programme represented a different conceptualization of the relationship between ancient and modern Greeks. According to Mackridge (2009, p. 181):

“The Greek language controversy is about the struggle to develop a national written language which would embody and project an ideal mental image of the modern Greeks that would in its turn, express a different relationship between the modern Greeks and their ancient forebears”.

Since conservative governments predominated during the first decades after the foundation of the Greek state (1830), the demotic was suppressed and katharevousa was established in the educational sector. Although in 1911 katharevousa was constitutionally specified as the official language of the state of Greece, elementary schools started to use demotic officially in 1917. When demotic was standardized in a grammar in 1941, Greeks were in some degree habituated to using katharevousa in both written and spoken usage. The official elimination of katharevousa took place in the period that saw the establishment of the democratic regime in 1976 (Mackridge 2009, p. 185).

Since Greek Cypriot educational system adapted all the language policies applied in Greece, this struggle for the imposition in the educational sector the use either of katharevousa or demotic was reflected in the Greek Cypriot educational system, which additional to these two forms had also to accommodate the distinct Cypriot dialect which was widespread used especially in rural areas.

4.6 The case of Cyprus
Turning now specifically to the situation in Cyprus, some studies which investigate the linguistic situation in Cyprus represent the Greek Cypriot speech community as
diglossic (or bidialectal) (Sciriha, 1995; Moschonas, 1996; Panayiotou, 1996). In the case of Cyprus references for the phenomenon of diglossia suggest that the standard is not applicable for all the communicative conditions, but in Haugen’s, (1966, p.932) point of view “tends to become only one of several styles within a speech community and to create a sharp cleavage between ‘high’ and ‘low’ style”.

According to Ferguson (1959), the phenomenon of “diglossia is found in places where two forms of the same language, the standard ‘official’ form and a dialect, are used side by side on a daily basis” (cited in Papapavlou, 1998, p. 215). Greek Cypriots use Greek Cypriot Dialect (henceforth GCD) throughout their daily activities but code-switch into Standard Modern Greek (this term is used for demotic, henceforth SMG) in certain situations. However, this view is not supported by all researchers; Davy et al. (1996), Karyolemou and Pavlou (2001), Goutsos and Karyolemou (2004) claim that the term diglossia, which suggests a dichotomy between the standard language and a dialect, cannot sufficiently describe the linguistic situation in Cyprus, because of the continuum of usage that ranges from various local forms of GCD to a regional form of SMG. Whether or not this distinction between standard and local varieties can be perceived as a situation of diglossia is an issue that is still controversial (Goutsos and Karyolemou, 2004).

The linguistic relationship between dialect and standard language is a controversial subject. One view asserts that the Cypriot dialect does not indicate the existence of any separate ethnic group of its own because it belongs to the Greek language group and, accordingly, the standard language is considered the mother tongue, tied historically and culturally to the dialect. This opinion is in accordance with Haugen’s (1966, p.923) argument referring to language as superordinate and dialect as subordinate. In these terms, the Cypriot dialect is subordinate to the Greek language. Accordingly, the Greek Cypriots speaking the Cypriot dialect are seen as a sub-group, part of a greater group of people; their identity cannot exist independently to the Greek ethnic group. In the sense that language denotes identity, it can be argued that the general identity of Greek Cypriots lies in the Greek language and their regional identity lies in the Greek Cypriot dialect.
The controversy of opinions concerning the relationship between GCD and SMG - as a diglossia on the one hand and as a simple standard case with dialect on the other - is rooted more in linguistic ideologies rather than on any sharp distinctive elements. These conflicting opinions regarding the relationship between SMG and GCD are sometimes transferred into an ideological dispute between left- vs right-wing parties in Cyprus. Conflicts in the social and political domain find an expression in linguistic proposals concerning language-planning and are apparent in several political confrontations. The right-wing party supports the dominance of SMG not only in written but also in the spoken domain, the left wing envisions the upgrade of GCD as a language of education, and a third group, the pragmatists and technocrats, prefer English as the teaching language in tertiary education (Papapavlou and Pavlou, 1998).

According to some of the studies that have investigated the sociolinguistic aspects of the Cypriot dialect (Papapavlou and Pavlou, 1998), language holds what appears to be a central role in defining the identity of Greek Cypriots. This view foregrounds the attempt to upgrade the Cyprus dialect as a fully self-sufficient language and to promote the theory of Cyprus as a natural nation-state. As the mother tongue bears with it the identity of its people, the effort to present the dialect as a self-sufficient language can be perceived as an attempt to foster a Cypriot identity. In this case, the aspiration is the official use of the dialect as a national language.

Arvanity (2006) asserts that the reluctance in recognising the diglossic situation, for political and ideological reasons, resulted in the rise of “a distinct linguistic variety which can be called Cypriot Standard Greek” (p.1). As she argues, this new code can be attributed to the influence of English and GCD on SMG which started to be widely used in semi-formal occasions (ibid). She also claims that this is related to the reluctance of the Greek Cypriots to acknowledge the extent of the differences between SMG as spoken in Greece and their use of it. Following this argument, the emphasis on the symbolic role of language as the main determiner of cultural identity and the resistance to any claim that suggests a distinct cultural identity between Greeks and Greek Cypriots led to the emergence of what became known as ‘Cypriot Standard Greek’ (Arvanity, 2006).
Moschonas (1996) states that there is functional differentiation between GCD and SMG in both the spoken and written language. He argues that in some cases SMG is not in agreement with GCD, a fact that weakens their perceptible similarity. Papapavlou and Pavlou (1998) argue that its diffusion was partially achieved because of the contribution of the social ‘elite’. This opinion accords with the argument of Hobsbawm (1994), a representative of the constructionist approach, who realises national language as a discursive construction:

“National languages [...] are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be, namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national mind. They are usually attempts to devise a standardised idiom out of a multiplicity of actually spoken idioms, which are downgraded to dialects...”. (Hobsbawm 1994 p.51)

Karoulla-Vrikkis (1991) claims that the use of the dialect can act as a symbol of fraternity with the potential to reinforce Cypriot identity, because with the dialect Cypriots express their feelings spontaneously and share warm and friendly sentiments. She also correlates language with identity and questions whether the parallel use of SMG and GCD and code-switching from one form to other, combined with the extensive use of English loan words, indicates the development of a new ‘creole’, or can be perceived as an indication of ethnic ambiguity, and as a desire to have features in common with other nations, and even as a signal of split personalities. Or alternatively as she suggests, the use of foreign terms is a confirmation of prosperity and high standard of education.

At this point it is interesting to refer to some attitudinal studies that were conducted in Cyprus regarding GCD and SMG. Despite the argument that linguistic evidence specifies that no one language or variety is inherently superior from any other, the perception that certain dialects are ‘inferior’, ‘inexpressive’ and ‘incomplete’ still prevails, Papapavlou (1997) studied the attitudes of Greek Cypriots towards their dialect and SMG. The results of his research showed that Greek Cypriots had more positive feelings towards SMG than towards the Cypriot dialect. Particularly, those
who used SMG were perceived to be more educated, sophisticated, reliable, modern and interesting than the people who used the Cypriot dialect. On the other hand, other positive characteristics such as honest, friendly, kind and humorous were assigned to those who used the Cypriot dialect rather than the SMG speakers. Pavlou (1997) investigated whether children's preference for SMG or GCD reflected the socioeconomic status of their family. The results of his attitudinal study confirmed that children of high socioeconomic status were more likely to use SMG than children of lower socioeconomic classes who usually used the dialect. Sciriha (1995) examined the cases in which Greek Cypriots used SMG and GCD. The results of this study showed that even though the participants used GCD in their daily interactions, they considered SMG to be more prestigious, and perceived the dialect as suitable only in informal situations.

The studies concerning the linguistic situation in Cyprus show that the interest in topics such as investigations on the spoken varieties (e.g. Karyolemou and Pavlou, 2001), the effect and degree of borrowing, especially from English (e.g. Davy et al., 1996), the correlation between education and language (e.g. Papapavlou 2004), and language attitudes (e.g. Papapavlou, 1997) is not ideologically neutral. The symbolic function of language and the uncertain future of the Cyprus state make language issues highly political and ideologically defined right up to the present time.

The so-called “antagonistic” relationship (Papapavlou and Pavlou, 1998) between SMG and GCD is not irrelevant to the existing ideological antagonism between left- and right-wing parties in Cyprus today. SMG links to the right-wing ideology of Hellenocentrism and GCD the more left-wing ideology of Cyprio-centrism. Upgrading Cypriot dialect as self-sufficient in its own right or defining it as a subordinate of standard language can be expressed by political positions of left- and right-wing parties, respectively. Because of the symbolic function of language in identity formation, self-sufficient dialect distinguishes its users as a separate group. Therefore, demands for advancing the Cypriot dialect from oral to written language and using it in education can be considered an effort in this direction.
4.7 Sociolinguistic situation in Cyprus
Having explored some of the main issues that surround the linguistic debate within the Greek-Cypriot community, I now want to turn to the sociolinguistic situation on the island. Here I explain the ways in which the sociolinguistic context of Cyprus is reflected in language choices, language policies and in the ideological debates that frame them.

According to the 1960s constitution, the official languages in Cyprus are Greek and Turkish (article 3(1). Cyprus is a state with two official languages – Greek and Turkish – meaning that both languages are used for government business having equal status: (a) in legislative, executive and administrative acts and documents, (b) in administrative and other official documents addressed to the citizens, (c) in judicial proceedings and judgments, (d) in texts published in the official Gazette, (e) on coins, currency and stamps, and (f) in communication between citizens and the authorities.

However, the utilitarian function of official languages “suggests governmental recognition” (Spolsky, 1998, p.69), but does not presuppose the use of the official languages among the populations of the two communities. During the first years of the Republic of Cyprus since, generally speaking, Greek Cypriots did not speak Turkish and the Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek but could not read or write it (asymmetrical bilingualism), official affairs were conducted in English, thus continuing the practice of the years of British rule. Financial affairs and all official publications and offices operated on the basis of three languages, whereas official activities such as parliamentary debates and most court cases were conducted in English.

The maintenance of two distinct linguistic communities, a Greek-speaking and a Turkish-speaking, was further reinforced by the existence of a separate educational system that had been in place since the British colonial era – a regime that also applied to the Cyprus constitution – meaning that decisions concerning educational matters were taken separately by the two Communal Chambers. The Ministry of Education replaced the Greek Communal Chamber a few months after the
withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from the government because of a dispute over constitutional amendments on June 1964. Whereas the new ministry confirmed the full identification of the Greek Cypriot educational system with that of Greece, on their behalf, Turkish Cypriots created their own administrative system which was itself modelled on the educational system of Turkey (Karagiorges, 1986). As a consequence, the existence of two culturally and religiously distinct entities was underlined by separate educational systems, consolidating the role of the Greek and Turkish languages as a main feature of the cultural identity of each community (Karyolemou, 2001).

Since there was no place in these separate educational systems for a common language policy or bilingual education, the alternative solution of using English as a *lingua franca* was envisaged by the British. During the British rule (1878-1960) there was an effort by British officials, to develop an education system which would set English as the medium of instruction with the aim of achieving a certain proficiency in English for Cypriots and perhaps in the long run, English becoming the symbol of a common linguistic identity. With this aim, colonial forces progressively introduced English both in the primary and secondary curricula (Karyolemou, 2001, p.29). These attempts were opposed by the Greek Orthodox Church which had a strong influence on the island's Greek Cypriot population and became a reason for endless protests. Eventually, the introduction of English as the language of a unified primary and secondary education was prevented (ibid).

English language may have failed to be established as the medium of education during the British rule but it was compulsory for civil servants and in public administration including legislation and the judicial system. The use of English as the language of legislation continued to be maintained in the Constitution of the Independent State (article, 189). According to the constitution, this arrangement was meant to last for 5 years, i.e. until 1965 (1960-65), as this period was considered necessary for translating Cypriot legislation (there was no specification for the language that the legislation was to be translated into), it was in1996 that the laws were translated into Greek. During these years, Karyoleou (2001) argues that the hegemony of English endangered the islanders' Greek ethnic identity.
Despite the provisions of the 1960 constitution that stipulated Greek and Turkish as the official state’s languages, English, the colonial language, was de facto adopted as the language of the state. This official function of English at the highest government level upgraded the authority of English and simultaneously the two national languages were downgraded. The emotional ties between the state and the people were not expressed through their own language, but through a foreign language (Ioannou 1991). Both communities used their own dialect in their communications without having the opportunity to use standard Greek and Turkish in more formal and official circumstances. As Ioannou (1991, p.25) argued:

"English was unable to offer Cypriots the linguistic equipment to pass from a close and traditional society where dialect sufficed, to a society of modern economics and technology. That society needed an integrated official language, namely Greek, which could, in a natural way, handle new linguistic relationships, needs and pursuits".

Whereas in the first years of independence, educational policy did not encourage the consolidation of the English language, the current reality demonstrates the influence of the English in all stages of education. Specifically, English-based elementary, secondary and more recently nursery schools have been created, while most private and some public tertiary education settings have English as a language of instruction. Furthermore, according to statistics, in 1995-96 the percentage of students studying in English-speaking universities was about 48%. This extensive use of English is considered by many intellectuals in Cyprus as disastrous to the competent use of the Greek language (e.g. Christofides, 1993, Pastellas, 1993, Pavlou, 1993, cited in McEntee-Atalianis, 2004). They base their argument on the purist views of national language and support the preservation of the Greek language without any attachments to other languages. According to Spolsky (2004, p.23), efforts for linguistic purity are associated with stronger group membership, manifestations by ethnic identity. As he argues: “The eschewing of foreignisms proclaims linguistic and ethnic purity” (ibid, p.23).
The division of the population that followed the 1974 invasion significantly affected the language structure both at an interlinguistic (interaction of the Greek and Turkish standard and local varieties) and an intralinguistic level (variation between the local varieties and their standard varieties) (Goutsos and Karyolemou, 2004, p.4). In addition, the lack of contacts between the Greek and Turkish community for more than 40 years hampered the expansion of bilingualism or the development of a common lingua franca.

In this sociolinguistic context, the choice of language of instruction at the University of Cyprus in the mid-eighties became an arena of ideological debate and a major national preoccupation. In particular, arguments were between the proponents of a two-language (Turkish and Greek) solution and those who favoured a three-language (Turkish, Greek, English) solution. The debate on the choice of language for the newly established University of Cyprus, in 1992, addressed questions on language within a far broader cultural field. On the one hand, those inspired by a 'Western' Cypriot approach, closely connected with Britain along with the high status of English, favoured English. Meanwhile, Greek nationalist circles supported the establishment of a Greek community university. On the other hand, left-wing politicians favoured a university that would serve the needs of both communities, so they wanted Greek and Turkish to be used for instruction. The end result was a bi-communal Greek-Turkish language university with Greek and Turkish Cypriot students to use Greek and Turkish as the language of instruction respectively, without any obligation whatsoever to know each other's language (Karyolemou, 2001, p.32).

This linguistic confusion reflects identity concerns, with Greek, English, Turkish and the very distinct Greek Cypriot dialect representing different perspectives and aspirations regarding the future of Cyprus and its national identification.

As Ioannou (1991, p.15) vividly argues:

"Why, then, do all these issues concern us, though our subject is language? They concern us because, although we belong to the Greek nation, we have our own independent state, because, although the demand of the Cypriot
people until 1957 was union with Greece, a crippled independence was
given to them instead, because, although we are in theory Greek-speaking,
we anglicise ostentatiously even within the borders of Cyprus itself,
because, although we have a living dialect we also use an official mother
tongue, because, although we are Greeks, we were led to the point of
rejecting Greeks and being rejected by them too...."

Goutsos and Karyolemou (2004) estimate that the population of Greek speakers at
more than 71% and the population of Turkish speakers – including Turkish settlers
and soldiers – at roughly 22% of the total population of Cyprus. The remainder
speak Arabic (0,6%), Armenian (0,2%) and other exogenous languages such English
(2,3%), Russian (2%), Bulgarian (0,3%), etc.

Close examination of language policy in the state of Cyprus indicates that a common
language amongst the two communities was never the issue and neither of the two
groups had a conscious policy to try to eradicate the other's language. Until recently,
the Republic of Cyprus never had a conscious bilingual policy. However, this
situation started to change as the New Educational Reform in Cyprus (2004)
suggested the compulsory teaching of Turkish in all secondary schools. This
initiative, which aimed at achieving functional bilingualism between the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots, can be perceived as an attempt to shift people's attitudes and
relations in the name of permanent peace, since language and communication are
important elements in that process. In these terms, learning the language of the
other community cannot be compared with bilingual education. It is also possible
that learning the language of the other community can be interpreted as an effort to
harmonise national unity with cultural and linguistic diversity, which might lead to
partial assimilation while each community retains its heritage, language and culture.
However, by learning the language of the other community there possibility a
hybrid identity to be emerged. Due to reactions on behalf of the representatives of
the dominant Hellenocentric ideology this language policy was excluded from the
formal state Curriculum (2010).

According to Wright (2004, p.8):
“Those who have to acquire the language of the other or a hybrid language of contact will see the relationship of their identity and communicative competence altered”.

Along these lines, the communicative purpose of language can be complementary with its role as an indicator of group identity as people build communities through communication that then provides their members with a powerful source of a shared culture. Language is not simply a means of communication but also a means of establishing and maintaining relationships with other people, a symbol of identity and group membership. In other words, language serves a dual purpose; permitting communication and building identity (Wright 2004, p.8).

4.8 The prospect of a solution to the Cyprus Problem

After the division of the island in 1974, the acknowledgement of the role of language in the accomplishment of cohesion and solidarity was transparent in the attempt for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. As was indicated through a provision in the Annan Plan (2004) (General Secretary of the United Nations) for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem, language planning for communicative competence of both communities in Greek and Turkish was seen as a prerequisite for a federal regime.

The Annan Plan (a long process involving international meetings that started in 1999) proposed the establishment of a 'United Cyprus Republic' as 'an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and two constituent states, the Greek Cypriot state and the Turkish Cypriot state' [article 2(1a)]. Furthermore, 'the constituent states are of equal status. Within the limits of the Constitution, they sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the federal government, organising themselves freely under their own Constitutions' [article 2(1c)]. As education was not vested in the Constitution of the federal government, the two constituent states would be responsible for the planning and administration of their own educational settings. In other words the separate education of the two communities was provided for.
The main provision within the Annan Plan (2004) directly concerning education was article 9(4), which proposed that: “The official languages of the United Cyprus Republic” (Greek and Turkish) “shall be taught mandatorily to all secondary school students”. The other provision which indirectly affects education is the establishment of “an independent, impartial Reconciliation Commission” (Annan Plan 2004, Annex VIII, article 1,1), “with the objective of promoting understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots” (Annex VIII, article 2). With respect to education, the Reconciliation Commission was expected to “make specific recommendations for action by the federal government and the constituent states aimed at promoting reconciliation, including guidelines for...school textbooks so as to promote the mutual understanding of different perspectives on the past” (Annan Plan 2004, Annex VIII, article 2c). These provisions could have served as an opportunity for the two communities to build bridges of communication and also could be explained as an attempt to use education as a means for cultivating rapprochement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

An alternative solution, which does not contradict nationalist perceptions, could be the establishment of English as a functional lingua franca. The possibility for English as an international language to replace group languages, as the sole medium of identity, is limited. According to Hoffman (2000, pp.19-22):

“For most Europeans, instrumental reasons are the most powerful motivator for maintaining and developing their English after schooling....An additional feature of this particular type of bilingualism is that being proficient in English does not mean one has to be bicultural...there is no need to develop feelings of dual identity and shared loyalties [with English-speaking nations]”.

This pluricentric character of English diminishes cultural attachments and allows speakers to use it without identifying with one nation. In the case of Cyprus, a lingua franca would be bound with utility and not with identity since would not have the same deep psychological hold as the mother languages of both communities. This solution is not inconceivable as intergroup communication happens increasingly in
English and moves away from the national to the supranational level and political and economic power moves away from the national capital to more dispersed sites of global power (Wright, 2004, p.14).

This differentiated bilingualism is an alternative as the language of wider diffusion offers opportunities and advantages in gaining access to the wider world, to social and geographical mobility, while the group language provides for socialisation, continuity and identity (Wright, 2004, p.250). However, Kymlicka (1995) rejects the idea that the function of language of wider diffusion can be used only as the language for communication since it is impossible to separate totally the language of culture and the language of utility. Empirical findings indicate that English as a global language can influence the structure of other languages and the linguistic and sociocultural practices of citizens. This has also been found in Cyprus (McEntee-Atalianis, 2004, p.87) and it can be explained as an indication for the tensions between an international language, national language and various lingua francas. In the setting of Cyprus these conflicts seem to be related with the construction of one aspect of identity based on language affiliations.

The correlation that I attempt between language and cultural identity places cultural identity at the centre of the study. Actually, the issue of cultural identity arises whenever there is a conflictive and asymmetric encounter between different cultures. Mercer (1990, p.43) claims that “identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty”. This presents us with the connection that has established between identity, stability and unity.

As Larrain (1994, p.143) argues:

“The main ideas associated with [identity] seem to be those of permanence, cohesion and recognition. When we talk of identity, we usually imply a certain continuity, an overall unity and self-awareness. Most of the time these characteristics are taken for granted, unless there is a perceived threat to an established way of life.”
Indeed, in the case of Cyprus, identity becomes an issue in any attempt for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. The overwhelming and resounding ‘no’ vote to the Annan Plan (2004) on behalf of Greek Cypriots, was partly due to fears of the destruction of their Greek national identity.

While in Cyprus two separate communities speak different languages, its typology in respect to its linguistic and ethnic complexity is not clear as the Cyprus Problem is still unsettled and the dividing line separates apart Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. However, the kind of possible solution will be a determining factor for the selection of its language policy. The solution of federation would classify Cyprus as a dyadic country, like Switzerland and Canada, whereas separatist movements would encourage linguistic nationalism. On the other hand, the international picture suggests that there is not always a direct correspondence between national identity and language as the sociolinguistic situation of modern societies is far from homogeneous.

4.9 Towards the research agenda
The above discussion on nationalism, language and dialect presents perceptions associated with the concept of the nation. These perceptions are employed in order to provide a critical frame for examining how the national identity of Cypriots is discursively constructed in the educational documents under investigation.

Historically Greek Cypriot education was linked to Hellenocentric education aiming to transmit and sustain the Greek cultural heritage of Greek Cypriots on the basis of common descent with the wider Greek nation and shared culture defined by religion, language, customs and arts. However, this started to change during the presidency of Christophias, the first leftist President of Cyprus since the declaration of its Independence. This made possible suppressed leftist discourses emphasising the ‘Cypriotness’ of Cypriot people to officially embody the educational system of Cyprus and to question the dominant Hellenocentrism.
The aim of this study is to examine the way the leftist government (2008-2013) has negotiated issues of national identification in official educational documents and to investigate any tensions in efforts both to sustain and to alter Cyprus’ national identity as reflected in the Cypriot educational system. It focuses on educational documents that contain discourses, which constitute attempts to imagine and construct Cypriot national identity. For this purpose, I focus my analysis on discourses that refer to the past defining the national identity of Cypriots, discourses concerning the current situation of Cyprus and its political problem and discourses that outline the desired future of Cyprus. In addition to these thematic sections, I also examine discourses that show how education is related to the construction of national identity. In order to examine the consistency of the national identification within the educational documents under investigation with subjective modes of self-identification, I conducted nine semi-structured interviews with key social actors engaged in educational issues. The way this study explains and analyses discourse/discourses is provided in the next chapter which justifies the use of Discourse Analysis as a research approach for my study.
CHAPTER 5

METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction
Based on the theoretical perspectives presented in the previous chapters I explain the methodology of this study and I justify the method of my data analysis.

In this chapter I start by justifying the objectives of my study and then I explain my choice to use a qualitative approach as an appropriate method for the aims of this study. My investigation examines two different kinds of official educational documents and nine semi-structured interviews. For the analysis of my data I employ Discourse Analysis and for this reason initially I define the term discourse and then provide concepts and discourses that prevail in the Greek Cypriot politics. I also explain the stages I followed when I put into practise Discourse Analysis. Next I explain the schedule for the semi-structured interviews and I justify my sample. In the subsequent section I explain the procedure I followed when I conducted the interviews and then I describe the stages of the data analysis.

5.2 The objectives of the study
My research project has sought to consider critically the way that official educational documents construct national identity. These policy documents are: a) the formal state Curriculum (analytika programmata, 2010) and b) the Commemorative Messages sent by the Minister of Education, Andreas Demetreou, to all state schools on several memorial days. My aim was to investigate the way in which national identity has been discursively constructed (shaped by discourse) in the documents under consideration and to expose the political ideologies and the perceptions that frame them.

Additionally, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with key social actors engaged in educational issues. The main objective of the interviews was to identify what discourses were employed by educators in constructing the Cypriot nation and
national identity, and to discuss to what extent these discourses reflected (or not) the official educational documents which this study has investigated. One of my operating assumptions is that educational policies and declarations can conflict with subjective models of self-identification.

In asserting the notion that language is often a critical component of national identity as a whole and that every language policy is culture-specific (Schiffman, 1996) this research project addresses the following questions:

(i) How and in what ways do official educational documents discursively frame national identity?

(ii) How and in what ways do key social actors discursively frame national identity?

(iii) How is the debate on language policy and national identity rooted to the historical and socio-political context of Cyprus?

(iv) In what ways does membership of the European Union impact on citizenship and identity in Cyprus?

This study starts from an assumption that ‘national identity’ is not an essentialist and unchanging concept; rather it is a socially-situated discursive construct that is dependent on the socio-political and cultural contexts in which the formation of identity takes place (Wodak et al., 2009).

5.3 Methodology: A qualitative approach

In order to investigate my research questions a qualitative approach was adopted. Qualitative research is “not experimentally examined or measured in terms of quality, amount, intensity, or frequency” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p.11).

“Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers emphasise the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to questions that stress
how social experience is created and given meaning”. (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p.8)

Philosophers such as Searle (1992) point out that social reality is dependent on our having concepts of what we talk about. Searle (2003, p.10) examines the ways in which the use and the structure of language is related to society. He points out that once we have language, we already have a shared convention. In addition to this, he discusses language, as a fundamental social institution, that not only describes, but “is partly constitutive of all institutional reality” (Searle, 2003, p.10). According to this argument, social and institutional reality is concept dependent; meaning that it is dependent on the existence of discourse with the appropriate concepts. In this sense, “the ontology of social and institutional reality” is always a matter “of collective intentionality” (Searle, 2004, p.276).

It is this collective intentionality that my research project seeks to investigate through examining the ways in which national identity is discursively constructed in the Greek Cypriot Educational System. For the purpose of this study, I employ Discourse Analysis (DA) as the central element in the methodological strategy for analysing my data.

5.3.1 Definitions of ‘discourse’
For a better understanding of the terminology that is used in my study, it is useful to define Discourse Analysis (DA). DA as a method of research came to prominence in the late 1960s, and it is an umbrella term applied to a number of distinct approaches. According to Cameron (2001), the way theorists define discourse distinguishes differences in their types of analysis.

Linguists define ‘discourse’ as being two-fold, as language “above the sentence” and as “language in use” (Cameron, 2001, p.10) with the latter meaning: “language used to do something and mean something, language produced and interpreted in real-world contexts” (Cameron, 2001, p.10). Schiffrin, (1994) explains this two-fold definition of ‘discourse’ in relation to two linguistic approaches. One is formalism or structuralism which focuses on the structure of language and its formal organization.
with grammatical rules and syntax. The other is functionalism which investigates the function of language and the purposes it intends to serve. However, Schiffrin (1994) points out that apart from these definitions, ‘discourse’ is determined by the context of its production.

As Cameron (2001, p.13), states:

“Functionalists have always been concerned with form as well as function. They are interested in how the two connect, suggesting that language has a certain kind of formal organisation because of the purposes it is designed to serve”.

This means that discourse involves much more than syntax (word order), grammar (the structures and possibilities of combination of language items) and a concern with semantics (word meaning). It is also concerned with how language is produced and interpreted in particular instances and contexts.

**In the social sciences** the conception of discourse is largely derived from the work of Michel Foucault. The word ‘discourse’ is shorthand for “discursive formation”. Social theorists often talk about ‘discourses’ in plural, reflecting Foucault’s (1972, p.49) definition that ‘discourses’ are “practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak”. Here Foucault correlates practice and speaking with definition, description and classification, which are essentially practices carried out by using language.

Foucault (1980) approaches discourse as social practice and correlates it with the recourse of its constitutive forces, since he examines particular discursive acts within the social context where they are embedded, and suggests that discourses are institutionalized ways of perceiving specific issues and concepts.

Based on Foucault (1980), Luke (1997, p. 2) explains that:

“...language and discourse are not transparent or neutral means for describing or analysing the social and biological world. Rather, they
effectively construct, regulate and control knowledge, social relations and institutions. By this account, nothing is outside of, or prior to, its manifestation in discourse”.

As Wodak et al., (2009, p.8) claim:

“Through discourses, social actors constitute objects of knowledge, situations and social roles as well as identities and interpersonal relations between different social groups and those who interact with them”.

Meutzenfeldt (1992, p. 4, cited in Taylor, 1997, p.25) defines discourse as: “the complex of...notions, categories, ways of thinking and ways of communicating that constitutes a power-infused system of knowledge”. This definition refers to the way social and political power relations shape political and social processes as well as policy-making procedures.

For social researchers, reality is ‘discursively constructed’, meaning that reality is “made or remade as people talk about things using the ‘discourses’ they have access to” (Cameron, 2001, p.15).

In critical linguistics, texts are analyzed for political purposes by attempting to integrate post-structuralist questions of power, truth and knowledge within their linguistic analytical methods. Critical linguists analyze texts for political purposes. Critical linguists integrate Foucault’s (1980) definition of discourse with a systematic linguistic analysis of the text inflicting it with a political concern for the effects of discourse.

As Fairclough (1992, p.67) puts it:

“Discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes power relations, and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between which power relations obtain. Discourse as an ideological practice constitutes, naturalises, sustains and changes significations of the world from a diverse position in power relations”.

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5.3.2 Discourse Analysis
Initially my intention was to follow critical linguists and in particular Fairclough’s approach to Discourse Analysis. However, during the progress of this research project, it appeared that for the purposes of my study it was going to be more appropriate to adapt Fairclough’s political concern for the effects of discourse but without deploying rigorous and systematic linguistic analysis. For this reason I have turned to Gee’s approach to Discourse Analysis because although it has similarities with Fairclough’s approach it limits the linguistic analysis to key words and phrases concentrating on their “situated meanings” (Gee 1999, p. 97).

In particular, Gee (1999, pp. 85-6) lists six types of building tasks, “the tasks through which we use language to construct and/or construe the situation network, at a given time and place, in a certain way”. These are: semiotic building, world building, activity building, socioculturally-situated identity and relationship building, political building and connection building which makes assumptions about the interaction between the past and the future. Gee argues that discourse analysis focuses on these six building tasks and outlines the elements of an ‘ideal’ discourse analysis as follows:

“Essentially discourse analysis involves asking questions about how language, at a given time and place, is used to construe the aspects of the situation network as realized at the time and place and how the aspects of the situation network simultaneously give meaning to that language”.

(Gee 1999, p. 80)

In addition, historical analysis (Wodak et al 2009) was combined with Discourse Analysis. Historical events accompanied by political events are outlined in the third chapter of this thesis, and this historical perception is supplemented with DA to facilitate my exploration of the research questions. In other words, a discourse-historical approach (as defined by Wodak, 1999) is employed as one approach for studying my research topics.
I decided to use DA since this approach is suitable for political and socio-cultural analysis of text. My study focuses on discourses concerning national identity, framed in the socio-political context where they were developed, and examines how ideologies and power relations are involved in discourse. DA can help me to approach different perspectives and discourses related to national identifications, and to provide an interpretation capable of uncovering political ideologies and interests that may rest behind each discourse. On the other hand, by associating them with historical analysis it is possible to provide an explanation of how different discourses construct social reality. Therefore, by applying a discourse-historical approach I anticipate integrating texts of different types, as well as the historical dimension of the subject under investigation. “The discourse-historical approach relates the content of the data with the strategies employed and their linguistic realizations” (Wodak, 1999, p.188). In so doing, the historical dimension of discursive acts is addressed in two ways.

“First, the discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate [the] historical background and the original sources in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded. Second, [this] approach explores the ways in which particular types and genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change” (Wodak, 1999, p.188).

My research project relies on a diversity of methodology by first employing Wodak et al’s (2009) discourse-historical method to trace the intertextual development of arguments and discourses by examining two different kinds of documents combined secondly with semi-structured interviews with educators actively involved in the educational system of Cyprus. This allows me to approach discourse as a social practice in order to reveal any ideological effects and processes in which discourse is constructed, and following Fairclough’s (1992, p.93) approach, to expose the way in which “the articulation and re-articulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle”.

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5.4 The selected educational documents
The selected educational documents this study analyses concern the period of the presidency of Mr Christophas (2008-2013), the first left-wing President of Cyprus. I decided to focus on this period because my interests lie with the way this government re-defined the national identity of Cypriots through official educational documents. It is remarkable that in the first 3 years of his presidency, a new Curriculum was formulated and distributed for application in all the state schools of Cyprus. This reflects the aim of this leftist government to influence the educational system of Cyprus and to structure its expectations regarding the future of Cyprus.

5.4.1 The formal state Curriculum
Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm (1994) argue that the nation-state through its educational systems and practices, constructs, distributes, maintains and perpetuates national identification and belongingness through cultivating common national features such as traditions, myths, history, symbols, values and ideas. In centralized educational organizations, such as the Cypriot system, it is anticipated that the curriculum will serve political ends, to some extent. The curriculum is viewed as an ideological, socio-political and cultural construct that serves specific political aims (Ball, 2001).

The new formal state Curriculum was issued in two volumes in 2010. In the same year it was distributed to all primary and secondary state schools with the instruction to be applied for the next school year (2011-12) in order to allow teachers to study it, and get ready to apply it. The first time I had seen it, before even opening it, I made assumptions about its context by looking at the cover page. At the top of its cover, the emblem of the Republic of Cyprus was printed and underneath it the following was written: ‘Republic of Cyprus – Ministry of Education and Culture’. Predominantly the color of the cover was yellow; this is the dominant color of the flag of Cyprus. The place where the title: “Curriculum for pre-school, elementary and secondary education” was written was white and it looked as if the cover were torn and a blue color emerged. From the cover the existence of the Republic of Cyprus
was emphasized but with an indication of the Greek element as blue and white in the title allude to the colors of the Greek flag (see appendix 2).

My study analyses the formal state Curriculum (2010) in order to explore the role of Greek Cypriot state education in framing national identity and its expectations regarding the vision for the future of Cyprus. My analysis focuses on language subjects (Greek language, Literature and Ancient Greek) and on the lesson of History and, more briefly, on Social and Civil Education. Historically, the curricular space of social studies and language subjects have held a significant position within national educational systems, helping to develop national identities by drawing upon concepts of culture, territory and citizenship (Philippou 2007). In addition, language policies were a core subject in designating the national character of a state, as language is considered a central feature in defining cultural, and by extension, national identity.

(The subjects this study examines are included in the first volume of the new curriculum. I clarify that I employ quotations only from the first volume and when I refer to the formal state Curriculum I mean the first volume).

5.4.1.1 Analysis of the formal state Curriculum
It is anticipated that my analysis of the New Curriculum (2010) will reveal the methods employed by the social and political groups in power in order to promote their ideological stance and to justify their approach. Wodak et al. (2009) suggest strategies, and rhetorical and linguistic techniques that are useful for the examination and explanation of the processes occurring in the construction of national identity. At a macro-discourse level they classify specific strategies employed for the construction of national identity which serve certain political intentions and objectives. Their macro-strategies’ classification and terminology appears to be very useful for the purpose of this study.

Wodak et al. (2009, p. 33) suggest that:

“on the macro-level we can distinguish between different types of macro-strategies employed in the discursive formation of national identity. These
macro-strategies correspond to the main social macro-functions, namely, construction, perpetuation or justification, transformation and demontage or dismantling”.

According to Wodak et al. (2009, p. 33), constructive strategies “attempt to construct and to establish national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation. Strategies of perpetuation attempt to maintain and to reproduce a threatened national identity”. Strategies of justification constitute a subgroup of perpetuation strategies and they are employed in relation to problematic “actions or events in the past, which are important in the narrative creation of national history” (Wodak et al. 2009, p. 33). Strategies of transformation are employed when the aim is to transform “an established national identity and its components into another identity, the contours of which the speaker has already conceptualized” (ibid). Finally, dismantling or destructive strategies seek to dismantle or disparage “parts of an existing national identity construct, but usually cannot provide any new model to replace the old one” (Wodak et al. 2009, p. 33).

These strategies are also employed in my analysis since they fit the purpose of my study which aims to investigate the ways in which national identity is discursively constructed in the Greek Cypriot education System.

The formal state Curriculum (2010) for the Greek Cypriot primary and secondary state schools is written in the Greek language. It is anticipated that some linguistic issues will have to be confronted since I write my thesis in English. At the first stages of my analysis, it was more important to concentrate on the meaning of some words and phrases and on the discourses that were produced and reproduced in text, so I worked in Greek. It was easier for me to analyze the original text in this way because this allowed me to focus on the tasks of my analysis and not on the linguistic differences between the two languages. The fact that I did the linguistic part of DA in Greek limited the risk of appearing to be misleading, since some words and phrases are not possible to be translated precisely into English. Then I continued my interpretation in English.
My data analysis was guided by the research questions and by my theoretical framework. I examined the relevant subjects of the Curriculum separately concentrating on discourses related to national identifications and with images for the future of Cyprus. At the stage of interpretation and explanation I interwove the results of each subject’s analysis in order to synthesize the whole picture of the curriculum and to show the re-contextualization of discourses, some inconsistencies and the exclusion of particular discourses from the text.

5.4.1.2 Putting DA into practice
The initial step in the process of DA was a linguistic description of the text which systematically examined the linguistic features and their organization in my selected documents. My attention to textual features involved an exploration of “choices and patterns in vocabulary (e.g. wording, metaphor), grammar (e.g. transitivity, modality), cohesion (e.g. conjunction, schemata), and text structure (e.g. episoding, turn-taking system)” (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 448). These linguistic aspects of specific discourses were employed in my analysis in order to analyse the selected texts and social practices. As Fairclough (2003, p. 3) states, “no real understanding of the social effects of discourse is possible without looking closely at what happens when people talk or write”. Although my text analysis clarified the role of discourse in social practice, the crucial part of DA is achieved with interpretation and explanation. Text analysis is the foundation for further exploration of the ways in which language is interrelated with other elements of social processes. According to Fairclough (2003, p. 3) “interdiscursive analysis ... (involves) seeing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together”.

Interpretation connects the analysis of texts with the social context of their production and explains the ways in which discourses serve social and political ends aiming either to sustain the existing social order or to challenge it. My intention was not only to examine national identifications but also to provide a critique by exposing the ways in which these practices were used to direct people in specific directions.
Additionally, Fairclough (2001a, p.127) argues:

“Discourses and the texts which occur within them have histories, they belong to a historical series, and the interpretation of intertextual context is a matter of deciding which series a text belongs to…”

My aim was to uncover and explicate any naturalised, discursively constructed forms of social processes which in practice might serve specific ideological and socio-political ends. Within the interplay of power, social actors can exert power in shaping social structures; however, they are simultaneously subjected to these structures within the constant interplay of power relations (Foucault 1980).

The critical aim then, is to explicate the “determinants and effects of discourse at the institutional and societal levels” (Fairclough 2001c, p.137), thus bringing to the surface the power relations and social struggles implicated therein. As Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000, p. 449) remark, by explaining discourse as social practice:

“Hegemonies change, and this can be witnessed in discursive change, when the latter is viewed from the angle of intertextuality. The way in which discourse is being represented, resspoken, or rewritten sheds lights on the emergence of new orders of discourse, struggles over normativity, attempts at control, and resistance against regimes of power”.

5.4.2 Commemorative Messages of the Minister of Education
The Commemorative Messages of the Minister of Education and Culture to all state schools are the second set of official documents which my research project investigate. The Minister of Education sends a written Commemorative Message to all state schools in Cyprus (primary and secondary schools and University of Cyprus), on specific anniversaries, in order to explain to pupils and students the meaning of that date. The Commemorative Messages are addressed to pupils, students and educators, and they are read aloud in front of audiences at the opening of school festivities. These messages are posted in the official web side of the Cyprus’ Ministry of Education and Cultural and everybody can have access to them.
I chose to examine the Commemorative Messages sent by Mr Andreas Demetriou, from the commencement of his duties on the 3rd of March 2008 until the end of the school year of 2010-11 that coincided with the termination of his duties as Minister of Education and Culture. I selected his Commemorative Messages because the formal state Curriculum (2010) was developed, published and officially presented during his time.

Emphasis in my study is given to the educational policies of Mr Christofhias’ leftist government (2008-2013) on issues related to the national identity of Cypriots, the entity of the Cyprus State and the desired future. For this purpose, I analyze discourses that Mr Demetriou (Minister of Mr Christofhias’ government, who in principle directed the procedure for the formulation of the formal state Curriculum) employs in his Commemorative Messages to refer to the political and cultural past, present and future of Cyprus. The messages sent to all state educational settings by the Minister of Education and Culture usually refer to days of remembrance and “primarily serve to retrieve the past for the present” Wodak et al. (2009, p.70).

The Minister's Commemorative Messages illustrate how official and hegemonic discourses were used to construct and maintain the national identification of Cypriots. It is possible though by examining the Minister's Commemorative Messages to explore those events that were accentuated, those which were perhaps hidden from view and those which were not clearly expressed. By identifying the discourses promulgated within the messages of the Minister of Education it becomes possible to identify the vision set out by a then newly elected leftist government.

5.4.2.1 Analysis of the Commemorative Messages

Since the Minister's messages contain a wide range of rhetorical elements, I analysed his Commemorative Messages in rhetorical terms. Based on Wodak et al. (2009), my intention was to investigate the “forms of persuasive, identity-constituting rhetoric” (ibid, p.70) and to explore how the Minister of Education and
Culture “drew upon the repertoire of classical rhetorical topoi” (Wodak et al. 2009, p. 70).

According to Wodak et al. (2009, p. 70):

“Classical rhetoric distinguishes three classes of genre: judicial, the deliberative and the epideictic. According to the ideal-typical classification scheme, judicial oratory is focused temporally on the past, and thematically on justice or injustice, and its function is to accuse or defend. Deliberative rhetoric is associated with the future, thematically with expediency or harmfulness, and functionally with exhorting or dissuading. Finally, epideictic oratory is linked to the present, thematically to honour and disgrace and functionally to praise or blame”.

The messages were not analyzed sequence by sequence, since not everything in each message was equally important, but they were compared and contrasted in terms of the same thematic areas. My analysis focused on content and aimed to identify the main rhetorical elements and the strategic profile of Mr Demedriou (previous Minister of Education and Culture). For this purpose, I analyzed discourses that the Minister of Education employed to refer to the past defining the national identity of Cypriots, discourses concerning the current situation of Cyprus and its political problem and discourses that outline the desired future of Cyprus. In addition to these themes, I also examined discourses about education and the construction of national identity.

The Commemorative Messages, as well as all the official educational documents sent to state schools are written in Greek. In order to overcome the anticipated linguistic issues, I followed the same practices as with the Curriculum analysis (section 5.4.1.1). I did the description of the data and the analysis in Greek and then I translated them into English. The interpretation and explanation were conducted directly in English. I have been engaged with DA for the analysis of commemorative messages and I followed the procedure presented in section 5.4.1.2
5.5 The interviews
In order to compare official and private discourses I have also examined the way that a small number of key policy actors define national identity. For this reason, I have included interviews with individuals involved in the formulation of the formal state Curriculum. Interviewing is a direct and interactive method and develops the conditions for a two way exchange between researcher and interviewee. The data is gathered “through direct verbal interaction between individuals” (Cohen and Manion, 2000, p.269). In addition, “The interview is a flexible and adaptable way of finding things out” and “it has the potential of providing rich and highly illuminating material” (Robson, 1993, p. 229). As Wellington (2000, p.72) argues, interviews “can reach the parts which other methods cannot reach”. In particular, they “can probe an interviewee’s thoughts, values, prejudices, perceptions, views, feelings and perspectives”.

The next step was to decide about the most suitable type of interview for the purposes of my study. I decided on semi-structured interviews in order to give respondents the opportunity to unfold their thoughts and opinions without being interrupted or being led in a certain direction. When the interview is semi-structured, the interviewer has “considerable flexibility over the range and order of questions within a loosely framework” (Richardson et al. 1965, p.80, cited in Bell 1999, p. 70).

As Hölzl (1994, p.63, cited in Wodak et al., 2009, p.146) explains:
“Basically, what is involved here are open, semi-guided interviews, designed to give the interviewees the greatest possible scope of speech. The interviews then centre upon one particular problem, to which the interviewee is led.... There are ... ‘objectively’ existing problem areas which may be of interest to the interviewees, who are required to participate in reconstructing them....”

5.5.1 Constructing the schedule for semi-structured interviews
A key part of my work was the preparation of an interview guide that would include all the relevant topics that would help me to answer my research questions (sub-
The literature review (see chapters 2, 3, 4) directed me to focus my interview on the following topics:

- the way each interviewee subjectively constructs his/her national identity in both political and cultural terms
- the construction of a shared political past
- the role of language in the subjective perception of a nation and national identity
- the role of education in national identifications
- the political and cultural future of Cyprus

Based on these topics I formulated the final set of questions with my main concern to be unambiguous and meaningful to respondents (Wellington 2000). I used open-ended questions because they were appropriate for my investigation on predefined research questions. Wellington (2000, p.78) argues that open-ended questions are employed “in order to seek opinions, to invite the interviewee to express views and attitudes or to encourage prediction or sheer speculation, e.g. on future needs, new developments etc”.

An important aid in assessing the intelligibility of my questions was provided by feedback from piloting the schedule. One pilot interview with an educator with similar characteristics to the invited interviewees allowed me to identify and correct any potential problems.

5.5.2 Research schedule
My research questions have been developed by concentrating on the above thematic areas and they were formulated as follow:

- The way each interviewee subjectively construct his/her national identity in both, political and cultural terms:
  - What does Cyprus mean? (All interviewees were prompted to express spontaneous images and experiences that portray Cyprus. They were also asked to assume how the others think about Cyprus)
What makes you Cypriot? (Spontaneous associations. Their subjective stance about what features they perceive as typical or characteristic of Cypriots).

Who is a Cypriot? (Who belongs to the Cypriot people? Criteria and conditions for acquiring Cypriot citizenship).

How do you define your national identity? (Cypriot, Greek-Cypriot or both. Interviewees are prompted to provide explanations and personal feelings and to report situations in which their national identity becomes more prominent).

Cyprus is divided into two parts. What similarities and differences do you recognize between the populations of the two parts?

The construction of a shared political past:

Which events of the last hundred years do you consider most crucial for Cyprus?

The role of language in the subjective perception of a nation and national identity

Do you think Cypriots and Greeks speak the same language?

What is your opinion for upgrading Cypriot dialect as a formal language of Cyprus and as the language of schools and academics?

What is your opinion for the proposal for the introduction of mandatory teaching of Turkish language in all secondary schools?

The role of education in national identifications

What is your opinion about the aims in our curriculum concerning our national identity?

What is your opinion about the introduction of the aim of reconciliation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot as an emphasis in schools?

The future of Cyprus:

Do you think that reconciliation between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot is possible? (explain)
o In what way do you think is possible to achieve reconciliation between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot? (Interviewees are prompted to mention if they consider as solution the development of common identity or believe that solution should be base on recognition, respect and acceptance of the differences)

o How do you think the accession of Cyprus to the EU affected Cypriots? (with reference to Cyprus Problem and Cypriot identity/the fundamental transformations in the identity of Cypriots, with reference to the perceptions concerning shared political present and future)

o Is that anything else that you want to add?

This research schedule has also been put as an appendix (1).

5.5.3 Sampling and selection

Robson (1999, p.136), states that the selection of ‘people’ in planning research is of particular importance since they act as an indicative population. Bearing this in mind, my sample was chosen in such a way as to fit the purpose of my study. Since the main focus of this study is the formal state Curriculum, I considered as appropriate, individuals associated with its formulation. The sample comprised nine Greek Cypriots, eight educators and one politician who was the president of the Committee of Education in the House of Representatives and because of this position he participated in the committees for the New Educational Reform and the formal state Curriculum. Of the eight educators, four were members of the committee responsible for the formulation of the Curriculum. The president of the Union of teachers of primary education and one more unionist were included in my sample, because the teacher unions have influence on the development and establishment of educational policies. Because of his expertise in sociolinguistics, one professor at the University of Cyprus was also selected. I approached also two Inspectors of the Primary Education Sector twice but they never answered me back to arrange an appointment.
For reasons of anonymity it is not possible to give a more explicit description of my participants and to connect them with a pseudonym since they have prominent positions in the educational system of Cyprus and it is easy to recognize them. For this reason I provide a list describing their association with the formulation of the formal state Curriculum referring to the status they possessed at the time I conducted the interviews. Seven of them were men and two women. In the analysis of the interviews, each interviewee is being described by either F (stands for female) or M (stands for male), combined by a number representing the sequence of the interview. In my analysis, for anonymity purposes, I refer to them with these indicative letters without the description of each interviewee. The only information I give during my analysis is their political affiliations since I base my analysis on interpretation of available ideological standpoints and discourses on national identifications.

Brief description of participants:

- The president of the Committee of Education in the House of Representatives. He participated in the committees for the New Educational Reform and for the formal state Curriculum.
- A member of the committee for the formulation of the formal state Curriculum and professor at the University of Cyprus.
- A member of the committee for the formulation of the formal state Curriculum and assistant professor at the Open University of Cyprus.
- A member of the committee for the formulation of the formal state Curriculum and representative of the Union of the teachers of the secondary education (president of the Union).
- A member of the committee for the formulation of the formal state Curriculum and General Secretary of the Union of the teachers of the primary education.
- The president of the Union of the teachers of primary education.
- A teacher working in the office for the formulation of the formal state Curriculum.
- A professor of sociolinguistics at the University of Cyprus.
- A member of the Union of the teachers of primary education and member of the committee for the syllabus of History of the formal state Curriculum.
I had easy access to the sample because I know almost all of these individuals in person. I called them myself, I explained the purpose of my study, and we arranged an appointment for the interview. Nearly all interviews occurred in the interviewee’s office as it was more convenient for them and ensured a comfortable and habitual environment.

No claim is made for a representative sample. A purposive sample is used and its choice is derived from the educational and political character of the research subject.

**5.5.4 Conducting the interviews**
The interviews took place in Cyprus and were all conducted in the Greek language. All interviewees were willing to have their responses tape-recorded. Due to their career and their education all interviewees were familiar with the conventions of the interview as a method for collecting research data has. They were confident with the use of tape-recorders and they were very forthcoming during the interview. Their analytical speech produced a considerable volume of data.

I also needed to be aware of the potential for bias during the collection and analysis of data as well as during the writing up process because of issues of power/difference between myself and those I interviewed. I had to be aware of my own perspectives and positionality during the interview and I also had to allow the focus to be on the person I was interviewing. I was aware that Cyprus is a small community and that some of those I interviewed knew my family and my role in education. I was also aware that they were senior policy-makers and educationalists and so power/respect matters were involved. For example, it was important for me to respect their contributions in order to extend the interviews. I considered the advice of Robson (1999, p. 232) to interviewers in order to encourage participants to talk openly and freely: “(a) listen more than you speak”, (b) put questions in a straightforward, clear and non-threatening way, (c) eliminate cues which lead interviewees to respond in a particular way, (d) Enjoy it (or at least look as though
you do). I believe that I managed this and that my participants spoke quite freely about their policy perspectives and their work (see Chapter 8).

My open-ended questions offered me the flexibility to change the wording and the order of the questions making the interviews seem like a conversation rather than a question-response dialogue. These qualities of semi-structured interviews were essential and useful in the course of interviewing the ‘powerful’ respondents of the present research.

Walford (1994, p.227) claims that:

“It is usually not possible or desirable to pose a set series of questions to those with power, because it is the depth of understanding that they can give through their individual knowledge that is of greatest importance. Those who have influenced events directly have a detailed knowledge of events and a sophisticated understanding that is worthy of careful examination”.

I spent time in in-depth discussions with a sample of the people whom I have identified for this project. They expressed their opinions, ideas and conceptions concerning the way in which they perceived the concept of nation and national identity. This method of interviewing is sometimes criticised on the grounds that people answering a researcher’s questions may be responding in the way they think the researcher expects them to react (Cameron 2001). However, the open-ended method of questioning allowed interviewees to elaborate with lengthy narratives that illustrated their feelings and attitudes. Furthermore, I examined not just what interviewees said, but how they said things, exposing the way in which they perceived and understood their national identity. “It is less about collecting facts than about studying an interpretive process” (Cameron 2001, p.14).

5.5.5 Data analysis procedures
The interviews were taped-recorded and transcribed by me. I translated into English only the parts of my data that were relevant to my research questions.
Initially, I translated a considerable amount of data for my analysis, but because of space limits I revised it and chose the most indicative arguments and discourses for the predefined themes that emerged from the research questions.

My analysis of the interviews was concentrated on the discursive construction of national identity and on the way that the self-identification of interviewees affected their reactions on specific educational policies related to national identity. The transcripts of the interviews were examined within the framework of content analysis where specific topics were compared and constructed. In the analysis, all the responses concerning a specific topic were united in the same analytical stage and the results were organized according to the key thematic areas of this study. Thus, content analysis provided me with information regarding the way that my interviewees conceptualized their national identity, what constitutive elements and arguments they employed and how they chose to interweave these elements.

I employed DA as method of analyzing the data of the interviews to explore the way that patterns of national identity were subjectively perceived and expressed by individuals actively involved in the educational system of Cyprus. It also illustrated the subjective aspect of perceptions and arguments, and gave some indications about the way the identity of Cypriots is constructed. Moreover DA helped me to compare the use of particular notions about the national identity of Cypriots from official documents’ discourses compared and contrasted with to the opinions expressed by individuals actively involved in the educational matters of Cyprus.

5.6 Conclusions
DA, as a research approach, can serve the aim of this study to investigate the construction of ‘truth’ in the Cyprus educational policymaking concerning national identification. The discursive construction of national identifications and their association with power and struggle for dominance are the main concern of this research project. For the purposes of this study, the utilization of historical and sociological tools offers us the capacity to deconstruct and uncover the discourses through which national identifications are constructed, circulated and sustained.
Simultaneously and most importantly, the utilization of these tools enables us to interrogate the kinds of knowledge involved in the construction of dominant and naturalised discourses and practices (Wodak et al 2009).


“The centrality of language, text and discourse in the constitution of, not just human subjectivity and social relations, but also social control and surveillance, the governance of policy and nation-state, and attendant modes of domination and marginalisation....”

As far as this research is concerned, DA examines the ways that powerful discourse structures lead, through educational policymaking, to frame national identifications and adopt or negate identity positions. Interviewing and documentary based research explore the “social representations in the minds of social actors” (van Dijk 2001, p.301), and explicate the ways that these constructed schemata constitute the essential link between discourse and dominance (ibid). Having established and explicated the rationale of the methodological trajectory deployed, an attempt will be made to shed more light on the prevalent discursive realities that constitute national identifications and their role in the development of a Cypriot state or national entity.

In this chapter I have described my four research questions and I have outlined my approach towards exploring them in the context of Cyprus. I have explained the choices that I have made in terms of the data that I have collected and my two-fold approach - documentary analysis and a small set of interviews with some significant education policy actors in Cyprus. I have also explained my approach towards data analysis. My expectation is that these data sets will help me to provide a rich account that explores and examines my questions. In the three chapters that follow, I will discuss the way in which my data reveals the discursive construction of national identification.
CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS OF THE FORMAL STATE CURRICULUM

6.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the role of Greek Cypriot state education in framing national expectations regarding the vision for the future of Cyprus. It focuses on the formal state Curriculum (analytika programmata, 2010), that was proposed as the new curriculum in all Greek Cypriot primary and secondary schools from the school year (2011-12). In this chapter, I analyze this Curriculum with a specific focus on the lessons of History and Social and Civil Education; and in Language lessons (Modern Greek Language, Literature, Ancient Greeks and Literature) and I discuss how national identity was discursively constructed in this text and explore the envisioned future of Cyprus.

Historically the curricular space of Social Studies and language subjects have held a significant position within national educational systems, helping to develop national identities by drawing upon concepts of culture, territory and citizenship (Philippou and Varnava, 2009, p. 194). In addition, language policies are frequently a core subject in defining the national character of a state, as language is considered a central feature in defining cultural, and by extension national identity (Coulby 2000, p.112). What was included in and excluded from the Curriculum (2010) was a result of contestation; “conflicts over texts are often proxies for wider questions of power relations” (Apple and Christian-Smith 1991, p.3). As such, curriculum represents politically contested priorities and it “acquires a relevance that is not pedagogical but profoundly political as well” (Valverde et al. 2002, p.2).

The theoretical framework of this study and my research questions directed my data analysis. Since curriculum is viewed as a socio-political, ideological and cultural text which serves political ends (Ball, 2001), I decided on DA approach as a suitable form of analysis. The format of my analysis was based on my research questions (sub-unit 5.2).
Consequently, Curriculum (2010), and in particular the lessons of History and Social and Civil Education; and Language subjects are explored in this chapter as an important intersection in the discursive construction of national identity and in the way the future of Cyprus is envisioned.

6.2 Ways in which the Curriculum discursively framed national identity.
This study approaches the formal state Curriculum (2010) as an official educational policy document and its analysis is considered especially important since “the significance of the power discourse at the national legislative level cannot be underestimated (sic)” (Cookson, 1994, p.119). Since the Greek Cypriot educational system is centralized with national curricula (and state controlled textbook production), it could be anticipated that the way the national identifications were addressed would be quite evident in the Curriculum (2010) and would hold a key place in the formation of pupils’ national identifications.

The role of education in constructing national identities based on ethno-cultural criteria was documented by social constructivists (Hobsbawn 1994, Anderson 1983) who consider education as one among other state mechanisms which construct shared national history, symbols, myths and ideals.

“The establishment of one particular option in the curriculum reflects the sociopolitical relationship and the prevailing ideology which underlie the curriculum decisions”. (Koutselini 1997, p.395)

The formal state Curriculum (2010) was introduced by the Minister of Education and Culture Andreas Demetriou, who led this educational policy. In his introduction he emphasized the significant role of this Curriculum in the educational system of Cyprus. He described it as “the corner stone of the proposed educational reform in Cyprus” (Curriculum, 2010, p.3). However, he continued by explaining that these changes also aimed at transforming “successfully the citizens of a European country in the 21st century” (Curriculum, 2010, p.3). Therefore, the educational reform

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3 The word should be ‘overestimated’
intended to create the citizens of a European country. The Minister described these citizens in the following way: “Above all, our citizens must be democratic, inspired by respect for the value of individual itself and social solidarity” and explained that “these great goals must be achieved within the framework of a humane and democratic school in which the students wish to learn and also learn how and why they must be active citizens” (ibid).

In his conclusion the Minister of Education and Culture, Andreas Demetriou, defined “the Cypriot and European citizen of the 21st century” (Curriculum, 2010, p.3). He used the conjunction ‘and’ to include the Cypriot citizens in the wider European Community, attributing them two identities, the Cypriot and European identity. As he stated:

“The Cypriot and the European citizen of the 21st century must be creative, think in a scientific way, be able to exert criticism and be open-minded. He must also... co-operate, live peacefully with others and recognize and respect differences and finally to draw from his own tradition the confidence required in order to live in a modern and multicultural society” (Curriculum, 2010, p.3).

Among other traits he expected “Cypriot and European citizens” to acquire the intercultural education which would enable them to coexist and co-operate with the ‘different’ since he considered them as citizens of a contemporary multicultural society.

Therefore, the Minister in his introduction stated the policy of the government which was focused on the formation of citizens of a European country of the 21st century. Their identity was constructed according to the democratic principles of citizenship within the framework of a multicultural society which accept the different. The state entity of Cyprus was propounded, but the content of the cultural identity of Cypriots was not defined.
6.2.1. The European dimension of the Curriculum

The Curriculum was developed on three core areas which aspired to form the future citizens of Cyprus who would share the following characteristics:

“a) to possess an adequate and cohesive body of knowledge concerning all subjects,
b) to develop attitudes and behaviors that distinguish the democratic citizen,
c) to have the best possible key virtues, abilities and skills required in the 21st century”. (Curriculum 2010, pp.5-6).

These three thematic areas constituted the framework for the aims of all the subjects in the Curriculum and comprised the profile of the citizen the Curriculum sought to create. However, the content of cultural identity was not defined. Therefore, the political identity of future citizens of the Republic of Cyprus was explicitly envisioned, while their cultural identity was implicitly mentioned.

In the introduction of the syllabus of each subject the three core areas of the Curriculum were introduced with the phrase “…the basic principles of the Curriculum of the State schools of the Republic of Cyprus”. This phrase stressed the fact that the Curriculum (2010) was addressed to the State Schools of the Republic of Cyprus supporting in this way the existence of the Republic of Cyprus.

The European dimension in education, which aimed at the development of a European citizenship and identity in combination with the financial prosperity of the European Union (see Brine, 1995), was apparent in these three thematic areas of the Curriculum. These three thematic areas seemed to be developed according to the definition of the European dimension (Shennan, 1991), which involves knowledge ‘about’ Europe and the European Union, skills of living and working ‘in’ Europe and positive attitudes ‘for’ Europe. Furthermore, elements such as encountering, tolerating, accepting and respecting ‘others’ and diversity that are included in many definitions for the European dimension (see Keating et al., 2009) were also evident in the Curriculum, taking into consideration intercultural
dialogue and citizenship in an increasingly integrated Europe. However, these thematic areas were expanded beyond the European borders to broader and more global dimensions.

6.2.2 Conceptualization of social reality
The innovation introduced in the teaching of Modern Greek Language was the pedagogy of critical literacy with the expectation that critically literate individuals would be developed:

“the main pursuit of this pedagogical method is to enable students to participate in the learning process and to enable them to become active citizens who will function according to the principles of equality, claim their rights in a democratic way and struggle against any form of social isolation (caused by descent, a different language and cultural background, gender, sexuality, physical handicap or any other form of ‘differences’ created by the hegemonic culture)”. (Curriculum 2010, p.10)

From the analysis of the text referring to the Greek language lesson it appears that it sought to cultivate the pedagogy of critical literacy and to form active democratic citizens who as educated individuals would perceive the meaning of identity as discursively constructed and would question any hegemonic system of dominant ideologies. Special emphasis was placed on the way “the texts (linguistically or otherwise) construct social relationships, reproduce racism or sexism, promote specific ways of looking at reality as ‘natural’ or produced stereotypes and dominant ideologies” (Curriculum 2010, p.10). By placing the Greek language lesson in this frame the relationship of literacy and nationalism was investigated and the dominant model of literacy was examined in the context of the interests and ideologies that it sub-served. Thus, Calhoun's (2007) interpretation of nationalism that: “It is a way of talking, writing, and thinking about the basic units of culture, politics, and belonging that helps to constitute nations as real and powerful dimensions of social life” (Calhoun 2007, p. 27), was suggested.

It was expected that with the pedagogy of critical literacy, active citizens who would challenge any form of social isolation would be created. This goal was supportive of
the goals of intercultural education and prepared individuals to participate on equal
terms in a multicultural society, since it rejected any form of social isolation due to
descent, a different language and cultural background. The notion that ‘difference’
was considered as a construct by the hegemonic culture demonstrated an
acceptance of the view that social identities are constructed concepts.

This point of view was further clarified in the introduction for the Modern Greek
Language lesson when an attempt was made to explain the term “critically literate
pupils”. In this definition the view that identities, as well as ideologies are
constructed through the content of the language and the texts, as well as through the
employed discourses and the practices of the production and the consumption of
texts in a given society, was expressed. Therefore, the view that social reality is
discursively constructed was clearly expressed.

In addition, in the first core area of the syllabus which concerned “a cohesive and
adequate body of language and skills”, it was mentioned that: “The language is
considered to be a tool to construct texts and cognitive areas as well as the means to
negotiate identities” (Curriculum 2010, p.11). The teaching of language, then,
through its communicative uses was also employed as a means to negotiate
identities (Wright, 2004).

One goal of the same core area encouraged the inflow and acceptance of messages
that do not only originate from “authority” but also from local communities which
may promote ideologies incompatible with the “dominant ideologies”. Specifically it
aimed for the pupils: “to be able to comprehend and accept various notions which
the students carry from their local communities as equivalent to those proposed by
the authority” (Curriculum 2010, p. 13). The dominant element of this thematic area
was the development of critical thought which would enable students to recognize
and comprehend notions and ideologies that co-exist in the texts that dominate in
the various communities. In addition, the access to practices of acquiring knowledge
outside school was encouraged.
This approach to texts implies the critical linguistics tradition (see sub-section 5.3.1) since texts are examined as carriers of constructive discourses which define groups, their purposes and interests, their social role and their relations with other groups (van Dijk, 1997). It exposes interests, political and ideological standpoints as well as power relations captured in discourse, in order to interrogate the constructed representations of social phenomena such as national identities and social relationships. The proposed method of critical literacy perceived social and national identities as discursively constructed by the hegemonic culture and investigated the role of texts in their construction, reproduction and deconstruction. Texts were approached as bearers of dominant ideologies and stereotypes, which were presented as ‘natural’. Texts were also allocated the power to deconstruct dominant ideologies and stereotypes.

Constructed identities were interpreted as not fixed or stable but, rather, the product of a complicated and conflicting interaction of discourses (Garsten and Grey, 1997). In this framework, the issue of identity was portrayed as discursively constructed and pupils were encouraged to question and restructure dominant ideologies and stereotypes.

6.2.3 Constructs of political and cultural identity within:

6.2.3.1 The lesson of Modern Greek Language
A basic area of the Curriculum was the creation of active and democratic citizens able to think critically and to creatively participate in the social and political life of Cyprus. Within this thematic area the goals of the lesson of Modern Greek Language was concentrated on the development of notions, values, attitudes and behaviors that mould the contemporary active citizen who within the framework of equality and social justice, respects, co-operates, exerts criticism on advanced educational practices, and operates as a transnational citizen.

The contemporary democratic conception of the citizen as described by one of these goals, expected the Cypriot citizen “to behave as a transnational citizen, beyond the boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus and to be sensitive to problems of the planet” (Curriculum 2010, p.13). Furthermore, the last goal of the second thematic area
criticized the extent of justice and democracy in contemporary society by asking students “to claim for a more just and democratic society” (ibid).

Within this framework the attempt to create socially and politically active democratic citizens who would be characterized by the critical spirit towards global values for the establishment of a better society and world was emphasized. Contemporary democratic citizenship was placed within a multicultural framework where global and intercultural values predominated.

The intercultural education and the formation of critically thinking pupils who would be able to recognize and react against practices that espouse distinctions among children were promoted. This goal was expressed in the following way:

“To reach the point to accept and respect the language, the culture and the personality of all the children and to check or react against, orally or in writing, practices that do not adopt a similar attitude”. (Curriculum 2010, p.13)

This kind of identifications comes in accordance with Habermas’ (1992) notion of a ‘constitutional patriotism’ which discredits the concept of ‘ethnic’ nationalism as the foundation for national identification and places in the foreground a political culture which follows universalistic principles and emphasizes citizenship in a democratic polity. Critics of this model (for example Wiberg, 1996) disagree with the explicit equalization of citizenship with national identity.

6.2.3.2 The lesson of Literature

Literature was presented as a carrier of our historical and cultural heritage and simultaneously it was recruited to form values, which construct the desired political identity of Cypriots in a democratic society. Constructions of Cyprioticness that legitimise Cyprus as a historically multicultural society were combined with the multiplicity of Europe in order to widen curricular formations of citizenship according to the democratic tradition and to assign Cypriot identity to all communities of Cyprus, old and new. Thus, in the Curriculum (2010) a turn to
Cypriocentrism discourses appeared through a direct recognition of Cyprus as historically multicultural country.

Some attitudes-values-behaviors which the students were expected to adopt through the teaching of Literature were: “to sensitize them to their cultural heritage” (Curriculum 2010, p. 73) and “to form and maintain values and the rights of man (sic), such as respect for differences, the abolition of any kind of social distinctions, struggling and social responsibility” (ibid). The first aim concentrated on the students’ cultural heritage without any reference to ethno-national identities. The second goal stressed respect for differences and the abolition of discrimination. This goal recognized the existence of social and race inequity which it also opposed. In this way, the dual constitution of national identity, cultural and political, was indirectly recognized. However, such claims contradicted the aim of the subject of Literature to approach the issue of identity as a subjective issue and as a result of self-identification (Curriculum 2010, p. 79). This was in line with Ball’s (1993) remark that policies as products of struggles are bound to have inconsistencies and contradictions.

The lesson of Literature, likewise the lesson of Modern Greek Language, intended to cultivate the skills that characterized “the critical literate individual”. One such ability, that was proposed, was approaching literature texts from a different perspective, cultivating at the same time “the subjectivity” of each view. In this way it was expected to contribute to the formation of sensitivity to issues of identity and self-determination. The development of this skill combined issues of identity and self-determination with “subjectivity” proposing in this way the view that the meaning of identity is not based on objective features but it is a result of self-determination. The syllabus was unified in such a way so that the following content can be covered:

“a) the uninterrupted interaction between Greek Literature and European Literature, b) the significant literary contribution of Cyprus, c) the promotion of literature as a cognitive field with special anthropological and humanistic significance”. (Curriculum 2010, p.75)
The syllabus recommended teaching Cypriot and Greek Literature juxtaposed with European literature. Although the contribution of Cypriot Literature was described as significant, it was not clear what its contribution to Greek and European Literature was. Emphasis was given to the anthropological and humanistic significance of literature which in the case of Cyprus was defined as:

“the study of the tragic experiences of a European, half-occupied country, through representative literature texts... offers chances of fertile reflection while it spreads the ‘local’ drama and promotes it to a universal issue concerning the fate of ethnic groups, the rights of individual, the meaning, understanding and the peaceful co-existence of different ethnicities”.
(Curriculum 2010, p.76)

The trauma of the division of Cyprus was not presented as an issue of conflict, reopening old wounds and collisions. Instead, “a reflection” was suggested, which in this case was directed since the anthropological and humanistic meaning of these texts in a gradual reflection that ended in the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups was suggested.

Literature texts were also approached as a means of forming the history of a nation and they were exploited as sources of information about social life and activities in Cyprus in conditions of multiculturalism in which different civilizations interact. Within the thematic area concerned history and cultural tradition, one goal emphasized the formation of the Greek cultural identity which was compared to the cultural heritage of children with a different background and especially of “cultural groups who have been on the island of Cyprus for long time” (Curriculum 2010, p.78).

Another goal proposed specific works of literature as ‘topoi’ for the ethno-national identity and self-awareness of the Cypriot and wider Hellenism. Examples of such works of Literature were “the Hymn to Freedom” by Dionisios Solomos, whose first verses constitute the national anthem of Greeks and “The 9th of July” by Vasilis Michaelides, a representative poem of Cypriot Literature.
The last goal of this thematic unit emphasized the acquisition of critical self-awareness: “that the memorial reference of literature to historic events defines to a great extent and generally contributes to the engagement of the historic past of the nation” (Curriculum 2010, p.79). In this way, the literature texts were considered as the means to construct the history of a nation. Thus, the selected syllabus for Literature was an indicative insight of the way the cultural and political past of Cyprus was constructed.

One main aspect of the Curriculum and in particular of Literature was the thematic unit: “All the same, all different” and the goal for the construction of the notions of ‘subjectivity’, ‘otherness’ and ‘differences’ so that the pupils

“acquire a critical awareness of themselves (self-awareness) in an interactive relationship with the ‘other’ (the other opinion, the other view, the other voice) consolidating at the same time that ‘differences’ should not be the reason for unfair treatment and degradation or disdain” (Curriculum 2010, p.78).

In secondary education, the thematic unit on literature and cultural tradition/history included references to the ‘related’ traditions of the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Furthermore, in 2nd Gymnasioum grade in the sub unit “My place and people” there were references to “the folklore traditions of the island, its history, national struggles, contemporary problems and its social life and activities under multiculturalism conditions and ‘inter-cultural osmosis’ “ (Curriculum 2010, p.84). Therefore, in the lesson of Literature, apart from the texts that presented the traditions of Cyprus, its civilization and national character, texts that presented Cyprus as multicultural society with traditions related to those of the Balkans were also recommended.

6.2.3.3 The lesson of Ancient Greek Language and Literature
In the introduction of the presentation of the syllabus for the lesson of Ancient Greek language and Literature the enhancement of the national identity was positioned as its main aim since it recommended knowledge and understanding of Greek civilization from its beginning and proposed the cultivation of the self-
consciousness of students at a national level. However, this purpose was not restricted to national boundaries. It was rather combined with and extended to a European and global level.

In the lesson of Ancient Greek and Literature, discourses that seem to constitute a perpetuation strategy (sub-unit 5.4.1.1) aiming to cultivate the national consciousness of Greek Cypriots were combined with discourses that presented “the issue of identity” to be at the stage of self-identification. Specifically, the introduction started with the following: “The purposes of the language, historical and aesthetic education in the contemporary schools is directly associated with the issue of identity and self-determination of individuals in the next decade” (Curriculum, 2010, p.100). Such claims for the subjective nature of ethnicity aimed to expose the relational, fluid and contextual meaning of ‘ethnic phenomena’ and appeared in accordance with the anti-essentialist tradition of anthropology (Hall 1996).

In the Curriculum several references stated that classical civilization had influenced the Modern Greek identity to a great extent. However, the Greek identity was avoided to be directly connected with ethnic identifications of Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, some secondary comments referred to the negative attitudes that the Orthodox Church showed towards elements of Ancient Greece. As the relevant part of the Curriculum document stated:

“The classical civilization has historically defined the Modern Greek identity to a great extent...through its use and intermediary adoption in modern times (including Christianity and the Orthodox Church and both the positive and negative attitudes which it occasionally exhibited towards elements of the ancient Hellenic world)” (p.100)

This reference suggested that the ancient Greek civilization was not always compatible with views and beliefs of later years.

While the purpose of the lesson of Ancient Greek and Literature was stated to be the cultivation of the self-consciousness of students at a national level, “the issue of
identity” was presented to be at the stage of self-identification. Furthermore, critical thinking was recommended as an approach to issues of individual and collective identity aiming at the creation of citizens open to diversity. Therefore, emphasis was put on the formation of a political identity, which the citizen must handle within the framework of multinational and multicultural family. The main components of this identity were democratic conscience, critical thinking and intercultural education.

6.2.3.4 The lesson of History
The lesson of History recruited events of the past in order to build the envisioned future and not to study the past per se. The way the lesson of History was approached and the events that were included or excluded can serve as an indication for the kind of political and cultural identity that was validated and also as an indication for the expectations and the aims for the future (Wodak et al. 2009).

The purpose of the lesson of History was stated to be the cultivation of historical thinking and the formation of historical conscience. The attempt to maintain the historical memory was connected with the aim to form active, democratic citizens. Furthermore, the critical approach of historic data “without stereotypes and prejudices” was promoted. This indirectly suggested that the previous syllabuses ignored certain events or did not critically approach them. It was also claimed that the syllabus of the lesson of History developed in time and place by emphasizing the crucial data.

The three basic areas of the New Curriculum (2010) concerning History were stated briefly. In the first thematic area, which was: “the cohesive and adequate body of Knowledge”, the syllabus was sum up briefly and generally with the sentence: “the most significant periods in the History of Cyprus, Greece and the wider Greek world, as well as European and World History” (Curriculum 2010, p.161). The second thematic area which was: “the cultivation of values, the adoption of attitudes and the exhibition of behaviors which constituted contemporary democratic citizenship” was expressed through the general goal: “all students should be transformed into responsible and active citizens, to be able to contribute to the cultivation of mutual trust among nations and promote basic values such as democracy and freedom”
(Curriculum 2010, p.161). As for the third thematic area which was “the cultivation of qualities, abilities and skills required in the 21st century society” the general goal was: “the students to cultivate the skills associated with historic knowledge in combination with critical and creative thought” (Curriculum 2010, p.161).

The linear chronological presentation of historical periods and events followed the Paparigopoulos’ historiography (see chapter 3, sub-unit 3.2) and the approach of continuous perennialism which suggests that “a particular nation has existed for centuries, if not millennia” (Smith 2000, p.5). In the syllabus of History, Cyprus was constructed as ‘historically Greek’, the appearance of Greeks in Cyprus was traced back to the Myceneans’ settlement on Cyprus (1300 B.C.) and its ethnic past was based on cultural and language continuities. On the other hand, this kind of ethno-national identifications was mediated with references to the multicultural character of Cyprus. In addition, claims for critical consideration of the historical events prevailed in all the thematic units of the syllabus of History. This attempt to develop critical thinking engaged pupils in a close examination, explanation and reasoning of historical facts and events.

The special purposes of the History lesson were divided into those for Primary and those for Secondary Education. In the goals for Primary Education the pupils were defined as “members of the Greek Cypriot community and future active citizens of the Republic of Cyprus” (Curriculum 2010, p.161) who should shape explicit comprehension of the history of Cyprus, “their own participation in Hellenic cultural heritage as this functioned and still functions in the wider European and World environment” (p.161). There was also a reference for “substantial consciousness of their historical and ethno-national identity” (p.161), as well as to the other religions, cultural and national communities “of their country” (p.161) which they must appreciate and respect in an appropriate way. At this point, the ethno-national identity of the Greek Cypriots was recognized and placed in a wider European and international environment. In this way, the Greek Cypriots, apart from their national identity, were granted supra-national identities such as those of the European and the transnational citizen. At the same time attention was drawn to the multicultural
character of Cyprus since Cyprus was presented as the country of multi religious, cultural and ethnic groups.

Among the conditions for the fulfillment of these goals, the adequate knowledge of all the significant periods in the history of Cyprus which was presented as a subunit of the History of the Hellenic world was also included. The familiarity with the history of “the religious and ethnic groups that habited Cyprus at certain periods” (Curriculum 2010, p.161) and the most important events that influenced “the historic evolution of Cyprus, the wider Hellenism and other people of Eastern Mediterranean and Europe” (ibid) were also included. Within this framework the history of Cyprus was taught in combination with the civilizations of Eastern Europe. The historical evolution was connected with the cultural achievements of different human societies, the interaction they had among them and the cultivation of respect towards religious and cultural features and mentality. Emphasis was also given to the chapters on the history of the nations of Europe “who contributed to the creation of a common historical and cultural heritage but also of those who contributed to the creation of its multicultural character” (Curriculum 2010, p.163).

In each historical period, Cyprus’ geographical position as “the meeting point of civilizations” (Curriculum 2010, p. 164) and “the border-line between the Christian and the Moslem world” (Curriculum 2010, p. 168) was stressed. The geopolitical position of Cyprus in Eastern Mediterranean was given to be the reason for its successive conquests by the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Persians, the Franks, the Ottomans, the English as well as the Turkish invasion in 1974.

In the syllabus for History, the connection of Cyprus with Hellenism, started with the study of the arrival of the Myceneans in Cyprus in the 3rd grade of the Elementary School and continued in the 4th grade with the Greek settlements in Eastern Cyprus. The political, economic and cultural development of Cyprus in ancient times was placed within the framework of the Hellenic world. In addition, the “Cypriot particularity” (p.165) of writing, which was recognized as Greek writing, was included. Furthermore, in the 1st grade of the lyceum, the presentation of Cypriot writers of the classical period was recommended. The civilization of Cyprus during the Hellinistic period was studied in connection with the rest of Hellenism. The
Hellinistic societies were presented as multicultural since a project “on the elements of co-existence of different traditions in Hellinistic societies” (p.195) was suggested. In addition, the evolution of the Greek language was studied in combination with other Greek dialects. The use of the Greek language in ecclesiastical literature was also mentioned.

In the 5th grade of the Elementary School, in Byzantine History, the Eastern Roman empire was presented as a Hellenized Empire. This approach to the European history construed Cyprus as European because of its association with the Hellenized Roman Empire denoting to the concept of ‘Europe’ ethno-cultural content inherited by the Greek and Roman civilization.

On the other hand, in the 1st grade of Lyceum the extent “of the multinational and multicultural elements of Byzantium in comparison with its Greek character” (Curriculum 2010, p.197), was examined. In the teaching of the Byzantine period the creation of the folklore of Cyprus as well as the literary production in Cyprus were also included. A subunit about the Byzantine civilization in Cyprus presented the relationship of Cypriots with the Arabs. A reference was also made for “the exchange of clashes with reconciliation or/and peaceful coexistence of two different in religion and social organization worlds, mainly in Cyprus” (Curriculum 2010, p.182). These thematic units weakened ethnocentric references by engaging references which represented Byzantium as multicultural empire and Cypriots as citizens of a multicultural and multinational environment.

In the Syllabus the period of Ottoman rule was named as “the Hellenic world from the capture of Constantinople till the Revolution of 1821” (Curriculum 2010, p.170), a title which did not present the Ottomans as conquerors. Furthermore, there was no reference to conquerors and subjects. Instead a reference was made to conditions of cohabitation since a thematic unit of this period was called: “Conditions of coexistence of Greeks and Turks, particularly in Cyprus: convergences and deviations” (Curriculum 2010, p.170). One of the goals referred to the significance of the establishment, the organization and the evolution of Turkish
Cypriot community in Cyprus. This reference to Turkish Cypriots as community and not as minority assigned political equity between the two communities.

The Greek Revolution of 1821 was to be taught alongside the attempt to expand the revolutionary movement to Cyprus. The manifestation of the movement for Union with Greece was placed in the last period of the Ottoman rule (1830-1878). The participation of Cyprus in the evolution of the “Great Idea” and “the Enslavement” were included in the first phase of British rule (1878-1925). The history of Cyprus and Greece from the end of the First World War until their accession to the European Union were taught in parallel. A special reference was made to the participation of Cyprus in the Second World War on the side of the British army. In the Syllabus, the independence of Cyprus was not mentioned to be the result of the EOKA struggle. Instead, it followed the unit on the participation of Cyprus in the Second World War. In the thematic unit on the Independence of Cyprus “the peculiarities of the Cypriot political system” (p.172) were mentioned. There was also special reference to the conditions of the cohabitation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the bi-communal collisions of 1958 and 1963-64.

The historical events that were included in the syllabus of History were an indication of the political and cultural past which this curriculum validated. Their selection represented politically contested priorities:

“[they] are not simply ‘delivery systems’ of ‘facts’. They are at once results of political, economic, and cultural activities, battles, and compromises. They are conceived, designed, and authored by real people with real interests”

(Apple and Christian-Smith 1991, pp.1-2)

In the Curriculum, the lesson of History aimed at developing the historic knowledge needed to cultivate critical and creative thinking and the formation of active, democratic citizens who contributed to the cultivation of mutual trust among nations. In the purposes of the lesson of History in Secondary Education the aim of the development of critical thinking was highlighted so that the students would
“openly approach the historic course – the further but also the chronologically nearer, local and general – of Cyprus and the wider Hellenic world, the cohabitant societies, religious, ethnic groups of the island, the nations of the European family, the Eastern Mediterranean and other areas in the world; will appreciate accordingly and respect the religious and cultural peculiarities and mentalities of different human societies, without any reproductive stereotypes and generally any external ideologically directed factors” (Curriculum 2010, p.173).

According to the objectives, the history of Cyprus was critically and openly studied. The adverb ‘openly’ implied that in previous syllabuses, the ideological stereotypes excluded the critical approach and study of specific historical events. The historical course of Cyprus was put within the broader landscape of Hellenism and was studied in combination with the course of the rest of the religious and other national and ethnic groups of Cyprus. This emphasized the fact that apart from the Greek Cypriots, all these communities were also traditional inhabitants of Cyprus and part of its history. Furthermore, the fact that the historic course of Cyprus was combined with the history of other nations of Eastern Mediterranean showed their interdependence. The historic course was also correlated with the rest of the nations of Europe, who were called “the European family”, as well as other areas in the world.

The use of the adjectives “historic, cultural and ethnic” denoted three characteristics of the identity of the Greek Cypriots. This distinction assigned their historic, cultural and ethnic identity as distinctive features of their Greek identity denoting in this way their ethnic origins. Thus, the identity of Greek Cypriots who were positioned as a Greek Cypriot community and citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, validated both, their cultural and their political identity. As it was stated:

“…possessing stable, intellectual background of their historic, cultural and ethnic identity, they will be able as conscious members of the Greek Cypriot community, to become responsible and active citizens of the Republic of Cyprus”. (Curriculum 2010, p.173)
The events concerning the collective social life diachronically and the interactions among different civilizations which were characterized as “beneficial” were also stated as essential knowledge in the Curriculum documentation. The sequence of causes and consequences was recommended to be the basis of the study of historic developments on the geographical local, district and global level. Moreover, the historic past of different human societies was approached with respect and understanding of diversity, in a way that promoted solidarity, conciliation and mutual trust among human societies worldwide.

The syllabus proposed for each class of Secondary Education was similar to that of Primary Education only with more analysis and critical consideration in its approach. However, it also included thematic units not taught in Primary Education. Along with the spreading of Hellenic civilization in Cyprus, the presence of the Phoenicians and their influence in Cyprus was taught. Furthermore, in secondary education the history of Europe from the Enlightenment till the present was taught. The formation of ethnic states in Europe as well as the development of colonization and “the new European imperialism” (p.185) constituted a subunit. In the study of the period of the British rule in Cyprus the study of Greek education was juxtaposed with the education of the Turkish community. EOKA struggle was not included in the thematic units, but it was only included as a recommended subject in the study of literature and artistic creativity. At the same time, the study of artistic resources was suggested in order evidences concerning the relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots to come out. In the study of contemporary Cypriot migration, it was recommended that the main Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities abroad should be briefly described. In the unit on the union with Europe, one recommended activity was the discussion about “its role in overcoming the ethnic differences among the people of Europe” (Curriculum 2010, p. 190). The prospects derived from the membership of Cyprus in the EU were also included. The attempts made to solve the Cyprus Problem were described as: “insistent bi-communal negotiations carried out in order to restore the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the peaceful coexistence of all its citizens” (p.190). The vision for the future of Cyprus was outlined in a description of the sought for solution of the Cyprus Problem which
was based on the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the peaceful coexistence of all its citizens.

This approach, without diminishing the traditional ethnocentric character of previous curriculums aimed to exploit the potential of the European dimension in a way of transforming divisive nationalistic discourses which excluded the ‘other’ to more inclusive modes of identifications. Despite, its assigned role in constructing shared memories, Curriculum (2010) also applied analytical and evidenced-based approach to historical events and facts. Thus, ethnocentric approaches to history were challenged by the European dimension of Education with an aim to broaden the conceptualization of citizenship and identity. The content of the curriculum is important not “as texts themselves but for what broader social and political debates, struggles, and orientations they represent” (Soysal 2002, p.280).

6.3 The historical and socio-political context of language policy
According to the 1960's constitution the official languages in Cyprus are Greek and Turkish (article 3(1): Cyprus is a state with two official languages – Greek and Turkish). The utilitarian function of official languages “suggests governmental recognition” (Spolsky, 2004, p.69), but does not presuppose the use of the official languages among the population of the two communities.

“It is important to understand that languages receive official status for political reasons, not for reasons of their usage, viability, or practicality (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997, p.17)”.

Each community uses the language of their motherland, which is the official language of their respective educational systems and symbolizes their cultural identity. Language is crucial to culture and by extending this notion; a common national culture is the source of national unity. Coulby (2000, p.112) regards literacy as a double-edged sword and explains: “whilst it gives political access, its acquisition allows political control of identity formation”. In this sense the
homogenized teaching of one language is not only about providing political and economic access, it is also about “the control of identity construction and the reproduction of cultural nationalism” (Coulby 2000, p.112).

Greek is the official language of Greek Cypriot education and is the common linguistic code in all formal state affairs among Greek Cypriots. Its official use is intertwined with the function of the Cyprus state as the national language of Greek Cypriots.

Although the Cypriot dialect is the main linguistic code in informal situations, it has never acquired official recognition of the state as national language and such a case never occurs in my data. However, some leftist circles in their political attempt to foster a Cypriot identity promote Cypriot dialect as the mother tongue of Greek Cypriots and approach it as a self-sufficient language with its own linguistic codes and system.

6.3.1 Modern Greek language and Cypriot dialect
The effort to count Cypriot dialect as different from Greek language is highly political and is based on political rather than linguistic grounds. Although in the New Curriculum Greek language and Cypriot dialect were approached as language of the same family, in some points, lines on linguistic grounds were drawn between the Greek language and the Cypriot dialect.

Apart from some ambiguous references to the Cypriot dialect, in the Curriculum (2010) Cyprus was presented as multicultural and multilingual with an abundance of hybrid texts. Furthermore, the citizens of Cyprus were portrayed as transnational citizens and any ethno-national references were avoided. Such indications demoted the Greek language from its foundational role as an essential trait of the cultural identity of Greek Cypriots and a hybrid identity of Cypriots was suggested.

In the Curriculum (2010), the language subjects were not directly connected to any kind of linguistic nationalism. However, Greek language was not approached as the
highest form and Cypriot dialect as a subordinate form; neither was it presented as a bearer of ideas, concepts, beliefs and attitudes and as an important cultural element of Greek Cypriots. This role was rather assigned to the Cypriot dialect, which was approached as a “variety with its own structure and system of phonology, morphology, syntax and vocabulary” (Curriculum, 2010, p.11). Such an approach is an allegation of the phenomenon of diglossia between the Modern Greek and the Cypriot dialect. In addition, the preference of the term ‘Cypriot variety’ instead of the term ‘Cypriot dialect’ indicated the avoidance to approach Cypriot dialect as a subordinate form of the Greek language. Although in one goal the phrase “Cypriot dialect” was mentioned, it was approached as a variety with its own structure and system. This goal was as follows: “To approach the Cypriot dialect as a variety with its own structure and system of phonology, morphology, syntax and vocabulary” (Curriculum 2010, p. 11). On the other hand, the fact that the ‘Cypriot variety’ was taught as a subunit in the subject of Modern Greek Language suggested that it was approached as its sub category.

This implicit reference to the linguistic relationship between the dialect and standard language reflected the controversy regarding the self-sufficiency of the dialect. Because of the symbolic function of language in identity formation, any reference to self-sufficient dialect would distinguish its users as a separate group. Consequently, any explicit reference for diglossia between Cypriot dialect and standard Greek would suggest that Cypriot dialect represented Cypriot cultural identity and indicated a separate ethnic group of its own (sub-units 4.3, 4.6).

Several commentators suggest that the distinction between language and dialect is subjective and the decision about what is a dialect of another language or a separate language is also a political decision (Crowley, 2006), since “there is nothing intrinsic to set of linguistic practices which make them either a language or a dialect” (Crowley 2006, p.23). In similar way Rumsey (1990, p.346) claims, that in general, linguistic categorisation and linguistic ideologies, “defined as shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world”, are interrelated. Frequently, in language-making forms definition such as ‘language’ or ‘dialect’ is based on social forces rather than linguistic rules (Gal and Irvine 1995).
In a broader frame, Bakhtin (1981, p.270) argues that:

“Unitary language constitutes the theoretical expression of the historical processes of linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the centripetal forces of language. A unitary language is not something given but is always in essence posited – and at every moment of its linguistic life it is opposed to the realities of heteroglossia”.

Although in the Curriculum (2010) Cypriot dialect and Greek language were acknowledged as languages of the same family, in some points, on the premises of linguistic grounds, they were counted arbitrarily as two different languages. While the effort to count Cypriot dialect as different from the Greek language is a highly political action and is based on political rather than linguistic grounds, in the Curriculum (2010) it was indicated on linguistic terms without any political references or attachments to national identifications. Although the Greek language was not implicitly presented as an ‘objective’ criterion of the national identity of Greek Cypriots, lines were drawn between the Greek language and Cypriot dialect.

The ideological role both of the vocabulary and the grammar possessed in proposing or constructing identities was referred in the following goal:

“To comprehend the ideological role of both vocabulary and grammar, that is, to comprehend that words and different grammatical structures codify a theme through a specific perspective, demonstrate relationships among individuals and propose or construct identities (Curriculum 2010, p.11)”.

This goal indicated that the Curriculum (2010) was not directed at perpetuating the foundational role of the Greek language in the national identification of Greek Cypriots. The dominant ‘foundational ideology’ that represents the Greek language as essential part of the Greekness of Greek-Cypriots was demoted from its primordial binding force to a bearer of several ideologies that the suggested critical literacy methodology (subunit 6.2.2) sought to uncover.
Elsewhere, language was combined with diversity and in this frame students were asked: “To learn the basic structural similarities and differences between Modern Greek and the ‘Cypriot variety’ and be able to locate elements of other varieties/languages in hybrid, mixed or multilingual texts” (Curriculum, 2010, p.11). Actually, this aim suggested the existence of hybrid, mixed and multicultural identities. This claim became a clear assertion with the aim “to be in a position to deal with the variety of hybrid texts which are produced by interchanging languages and codes in a multilingual and multicultural society such as the Cypriot one” (ibid, p.11). In addition, this goal indirectly suggested that not only the oral but also the written language contains elements of, and influences from, various languages and texts that are not distinguished by the exclusive use of the Greek language. The claim for the hybrid nature of Cypriot identity was encouraged by references for multilingual and multicultural Cypriot society where interchanging language codes predominate. This indication for “hybrid, multiple identities [represents] a potential element, which can counteract the practices of exclusion and differentiation” (Wodak, et al., 2009, p.17).

The main Hellenocentric discourse that presents Greek language as the language proper and all the other dialects as variants of the standard and regional ways of using it was not applied in the Curriculum (2010). However, the official use of Greek was not questioned and in my data it was self-evident that the role of Greek as the language of Greek Cypriot education and as a common linguistic code in all formal state affairs among Greek Cypriots was indisputable. In this sense, its official use was intertwined with the function of the Cyprus state as the national language of Greek Cypriots.

While in the Curriculum (2010) the Greek language was not presented as a bearer of the cultural identity of Greek Cypriots, the lessons of foreign languages suggested approaching language as a bearer of civilization and a bridge for cross-fertilization between cultures. As was mentioned, the communication in other languages widens the cultural experiences and contributes to the development of positive attitudes and behaviors towards the phenomenon of diversity. The fact that the foundational role of language in the culture of other languages was recognized but
was not mentioned for the Greek language indicated that intentionally linguistic nationalism and symbolic attachments were not attributed to the Greek language.

6.3.2 Language policy and its impact on citizenship and identity
The uncertain future of the Cyprus state makes language issues highly political and ideologically defined. Negotiations for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem are on the basis of the regime of a federal republic. In such a case, Greek and Turkish Cypriots should coexist in unity and peace. The proposal for compulsory teaching of Turkish language combined with the aim for reconciliation might be interpreted as an attempt to socialize both communities into a particular model of Cypriot citizenship.

However, the initial proposal of the Educational Reform (2004) for mandatory teaching of Turkish language in all secondary schools never occurred. Instead, Turkish language is taught as an optional language in secondary state schools. Bringing secondary school pupils into contact with the ‘other’ community’s language could serve as a facilitator for better communication. As Wright (2004, p.8) argues:

“Those who have to acquire the language of the other or a hybrid language of contact will see the relationship of their identity and communicative competence altered”.

According to Baker (2000), nations often view the learning of language or languages as a potential to build bridges for cross-fertilisation between cultures. Therefore, the potential for building inter-community or inter-ethnic relationships and mutual understanding through the medium of language can be claimed to be the hidden aim.

It could be argued that the teaching of the Turkish language corresponds to the same framework for the teaching of every other language in secondary schools. However, learning the Turkish language cannot be isolated from the current political situation in Cyprus. Even if we identify the language of the other community as a foreign language and situate it as such in the curriculum, this
remains primarily a political decision. As Norton (2000, p.7) highlights: “language teaching is not a neutral practice but a highly political one”. In the case of Cyprus, it seems to be more relevant to explain this language policy in connection with cultural governance. According to Pennycook (2002, p.91), “Language policy is a crucial cornerstone of cultural governance that both reflects and produces constructions of the other”.

This point of view follows Foucault’s (1991) perception of governmentality, his notion of ‘docile bodies’, and his concept of language policy as ‘cultural politics’. “As developed by Foucault in his work (e.g. 1991), the notion of governmentality focuses on how power operates at the micro level of diverse practices, rather than macro regulations of the state” (Pennycook, 2002, p.91).

From this point of view:

“Arguments for education in one language or another are...not merely rationalizations of larger economic or political goals, but rather need to be understood within a broader cultural and historical field” (Pennycook, 2002, p.92).

In the case of Greek Cypriots, Turkish is not only the language of the ‘other’ community but also the language of the conqueror. Although negotiations for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem are on the basis of a federal regime and the learning of the language of the ‘other’ can be perceived as preparation for coexistence, there is a possibility in the minds of Greek Cypriots that the learning of Turkish symbolizes their surrender to Turkish sovereignty. Throughout history, conquest has usually been correlated with attempts to incorporate and exploit the native speakers through the imposing use of the conqueror’s language. Appel and Muysken (1987) argue convincingly, the political history of the world can be retold in terms of language contact and conflict. This symbolic function of language has political resonance.

As King (1997, p.64) states:
“Language is a symbol, an icon. Nobody who favors a constitutional ban against flag burning will ever be persuaded by the argument that the flag is, after all, just a piece of cloth”.

6.4 The impact of European Union on citizenship and identity
In the Curriculum (2010), the concept of ‘Europe’ and the European dimension were specified in a subtle way in order to alleviate ethnocentric bias and to provide pupils with a wider range of traits with which to construct their identity. European cultural and social identity was perceived as a paradigm of hybridity and diversity and consequently was employed as uniting rather than a divisive force. Constructions of Cypriot-ness and Europeanness in ways which legitimized Cyprus as a historically multicultural society and recognized Europe’s multiplicity were apparent in the Curriculum.

6.4.1 The lesson of Ancient Greek Language and Literature
In the general purpose of the lesson of Ancient Greek Language and Literature, the humanistic ideal that dominated the ancient Greek texts was combined with the creation of critically and freely thinking citizens open to the ‘different’ within the framework of intercultural dialogue. The critical thinking which was a dominant element of the general purpose of this lesson was also recommended as an approach on issues of individual and collective identity. The fact that constitutional texts of the European civilization were employed as a guide to these issues revealed an attempt to construct an identity in accordance with a contemporary cultural environment characterized by a plethora of ideas, information and knowledge.

Classical education was presented as the basis for humanitarian education and as a significant education chapter for all contemporary European citizens. It was presented as the basis for education throughout Europe and as a defining factor for the formation of contemporary European identities and European civilization.

“Aesthetic education and specifically classical education, as humanistic and the starting point of long-term educational experience, constitutes a
significant educational chapter for contemporary European citizens. The classical civilization is reassessed bearing in mind its historical significance in the formation of the contemporary European identity, notions, literary forms, ideologies and institutions which have determined the formation of European civilizations” (Curriculum 2010, p.100).

However, classical education was not directly associated with the identity of Greek Cypriots. Whenever the identity of the Cypriot citizens was mentioned, it was not associated with classical education and humanistic studies. Instead, it was connected with their past and traditions without mentioning whether the past and traditions of Cypriots were based on classical education. In this way, Cyprus was not justified as a historically Greek island and any reference that would mobilize ‘Europe’ in order to enhance Cypriot’s national identity and to construe it as Greek and Christian was precluded.

What was more; the Cypriot was generally referred to and was described as “each individual” who must deal with his/her civilization within the framework of a multinational, multicultural family. Increasing emphasis was put on the role of the individual, who as a contemporary Cypriot citizen should have, apart from knowledge, meta-cognitive skills. As far as the identity of the Cypriot citizen was concerned the document stated:

“The Cypriot citizen is called upon to handle his own identity, his past and his traditions within the framework of a big multinational and multicultural European family. Within this new environment each person is a carrier of civilization and an administrator of cultural heritage. However, the increasing significance of the individual proposes the personal responsibility of each: the contemporary citizen should not only have knowledge but should also have cultural meta-cognitive skills - it is not enough simply to know, s/he also has to know the way and why s/he knows”. (Curriculum 2010, p.100)

Thus, a critical approach to Europe was introduced and issues like awareness and respect to diversity were combined with ethno-cultural elements, in a way that
indicated that Hellenocentric discourses were transformed to more multicultural and inclusive modes of identification, which did not reject diversity. In addition, a critical approach to national identifications was introduced and issues like cultural diversity, intercultural communications and fluidity were recruited in order that ethnocentrism and traditional pedagogies be alleviated and pupils’ identities broadened.

Although the Greek civilization was presented as the common cultural heritage of Europe, at the same time, the multiplicity of Europe was stressed and the need to overcome any ethnic differences among the Europeans was underlined. Even though classical education was described as the foundation of the cultural identity of Europe, its political identity was placed within the framework of a contemporary multinational and multicultural society. This approach to ethno-cultural definition of Europe discourages any possible divisions within Europe in general and in Cyprus in particular.

6.4.2 The lesson of Social and Civil Education
Social and Civil Education aimed to create responsible, creative and democratic citizens able to think critically, actively participate in the social and political life of Cyprus, Europe and the International Community. Within the framework of a multicultural society it aimed to cultivate global values as well as to achieve peaceful coexistence on both the local and international level.

In the introduction to the subject of Social and Civil Education its general purpose “to create responsible and active citizens who have critical skills and creative, cooperative activity” (Curriculum 2010, p. 220) was presented. According to the intention of the lesson, all students

“must adopt the humanistic and democratic systems of values, acquire the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes which they profess and to regulate with them their behavior according to the requirements of the contemporary society” (ibid).

It was also emphasized that the lesson of Social and Civil Education:
“contributes to the creativity, critical thinking and democratic conscience of the pupil, in the adaptation of the principles, rules and institutions of the operation of the democratic political system, the formation of citizens characterized by frankness and a struggling spirit showing respect to the natural and cultural environment”. (Curriculum 2010, p.220)

Beyond the pursuit to form democratic citizens, the cultivation of universal values was also stressed. The understanding of the necessity to live peacefully together in the social and political life was mentioned with a reference to the significance of participation, starting off from the local community and extending gradually to the Cypriot and European and finally to the global community. At this point the attempt to create ‘the transnational citizen’ on the ground of respect to diversity was expressed. As was stated Social and Civil Education contributes to

“the awareness of the significance and the maintenance of the human rights, the cultivation of universal values, the understanding of peaceful coexistence and the creative participation in the social and political life, of the local, Cypriot, European and global community and the respect of the distinctive and individual character of each pupil”. (Curriculum 2010, p.220)

In the first thematic area of the syllabus of Social and Civil Education that concerned: “cohesive and sufficient body of knowledge”, apart from the goals aiming to understand the way of organization and the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus, goals aiming at the organization of the European Union and its institutions were also included. It also included the goal for responsible position of the students in the global problems after having realized their relation with the International Community and perceived the capabilities and prospects the International Law and the international organizations open for individuals and communities.

The second thematic area of the syllabus of Social and Civil Education concerned: “the cultivation of values, the adoption of attitudes and behaviors which constitute the contemporary democratic citizenship”. This thematic area included goals which stressed the formation of creative, democratic citizens, with a critical attitude and
intercultural education. The reinforcement of their ethnic and cultural education was placed within the wider framework of an intercultural society and the need for respect for diversity. In these goals contemporary society was characterized as multicultural and within this framework the attempt to create socially and politically active democratic citizens who would be characterized by the critical spirit towards global values, for the establishment of a better society and world was emphasized. In addition, the need for communication, peaceful coexistence, cooperation and solidarity between people and nations was also stressed. The contemporary democratic citizenship was placed within a multicultural framework where global and intercultural values predominate and it was suggested the ethnic identity to be reinforced through the awareness and respect to diversity.

In the frame of a wider European and international level of identification, Cypriots were assigned multiple and supranational identities and were portrayed as transnational citizens. In this way, the Greek Cypriots, apart from their national identity, were assigned a variety of identifications. Such a perception comes in accordance with the anti-essentialist tradition of anthropology and aims to expose the fluid and subjective character of national identification in the context of opportunities and relativities (Tonkin et al., 1996). The Curriculum (2010) challenged the idea of homogeneous ‘pure’ identity and indicated that Cypriots belong to more than one collective group and thus they are in many respects hybrids of identity.

Contemporary society was characterized as multicultural and within this framework the attempt to create socially and politically active democratic citizens who would be characterized by the critical spirit towards global values, for the establishment of a better society and world was emphasized. Thus, the contemporary democratic citizenship was placed within a multicultural framework where global and intercultural values predominate. It was also suggested ethno-cultural identity to be reinforced through the awareness and respect for diversity.
6.5 Conclusions
In the Curriculum (2010) the state integrity of Cyprus was emphasized and the political identity\(^4\) of Cypriots was structured within the framework of a contemporary, multicultural society which includes and does not exclude the ‘other’, with an ultimate aim for the peaceful coexistence of all people. As it was manifested in the Curriculum, the main components of the envisioned political identity of Cypriots were the democratic consciousness, critical thinking and intercultural education. Although the cultural identity of Greek Cypriots was recognized, it was not precisely described and the content of their ethno-cultural identity was left open, avoiding any ethno-national references.

In the Curriculum (2010) Cyprus was presented as a traditional multicultural society with a continuously changing population due to the contemporary migratory movements from various countries and cultures. Beyond the pursuit to form democratic citizens, the cultivation of universal values was also stressed. In addition, the national identity of the Greek Cypriots was placed in a wider European and international environment. In this way, the Greek Cypriots, apart from their national identity, were granted supra-national identities such as those of the European and the transnational citizen. While the notion of identity was presented as ‘subjective’ and as the result of self-determination, at the same time Cyprus was portrayed as a traditionally multicultural and multilingual society and the Cypriot as a transnational citizen.

‘Europe’ was therefore used to broaden curricular constructions of citizenship in democratic ways to include old and new communities in Cyprus, to acknowledge ‘own’ and ‘others’ citizenship and human rights. This signified the aim of the Curriculum (2010) to promote a multiple and hybrid identity. On the other hand, Hellenocentric discourses which were apparent in some subjects were interwoven with Cypriocentric and European discourses. This reinvented common national imagination sought to alleviate nationalistic bias, rather than fuelling the divisions

\(^4\) For definitions and explicit discussion on political and cultural identity see chapter 2
and conflicts of the past, making possible the reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots in a Federal Solution.

In some parts of the document (in particular, in parts of the History syllabus) the view that national identity was discursively constructed by the hegemonic culture came out. Such a case was the proposed method of critical literacy which approaches texts critically examining their role in the construction, reproduction and deconstruction of the social web by proposing dominant ideologies and stereotypes as ‘natural’ but also by deconstructing these dominant ideologies and stereotypes. In this way, critical thinking which was a dominant element of New Curriculum (2010) was recommended as an approach on issues of individual and collective identity. The issue of identity was portrayed as discursively constructed and pupils were encouraged to question and restructure dominant ideologies and stereotypes (see sub-unit 2.4.3).

While in the Ancient Greek Language lesson the cultural identity of Europe was stressed, in other subjects the civic dimension of the European identity was emphasized and was defined as European Union citizenship which was mediated via a member-state of the European Union. Thus, on the one hand, the Greek civilization was presented as the common cultural heritage of Europe, and on the other hand, the multiplicity of Europe was stressed and the need to overcome any ethnic differences among the Europeans was underlined. This subtle approach to ethno-cultural definition of Europe discouraged any possible conflicts within Europe and any divisions in Cyprus in particular.

In the Curriculum (2010) Modern Greek was not directly connected with any kind of linguistic nationalism. Greek language was not presented as a bearer of ideas, concepts, beliefs and attitudes and as an important cultural element of Greek Cypriots. This role was rather assigned to the Cypriot dialect which was not clear if it was approached as a dialect of the Greek language or as separate language with its own structure and system of phonology, morphology, syntax and vocabulary.
Some thematic units, especially Literature, History and Ancient Greek Language lessons, referred to the cultural heritage of Greek Cypriots, but this kind of identification was placed at the individual and at a subjective level without any attempt to maintain and reproduce this cultural identity.

Whereas the Hellenic cultural identity of Greek Cypriots was presented as self-identified, any reference to Cypriot culture or to the multicultural character of Cyprus was presented as socially constructed. In this way Cyprus was validated as a multicultural country. Examples are (i) the emphasis that was given in its geopolitical position, which makes Cyprus ‘a cross-road of civilizations’ and therefore a traditional multicultural society, and (ii) the continuously changing population due to the contemporary migratory movements from various countries and cultures was also stated as a feature of the contemporary Cyprus society.

Based on these assumptions, the Curriculum (2010) shaped a political identity of citizens open to diversity within the frame of a multinational and multicultural society. This indicates one of the focal perceptions of ‘instrumentalists’ point of view that adopt the socially constituted character of ethnicity and the capability of individuals to ‘cut and mix’ from a combination of ethnic legacies, traditions and cultures to form their own individual or shared identities (Hall, 1996a). However, this approach divorced the dominant Hellenocentric discourses and the quest for Hellenic cultural identifications from the rational preferences of the policymakers that mainly transformed such identifications to more multifaceted modes.

From the aforementioned analysis it appears that the Curriculum (2010) had a conscious intention to transform Hellenocentric discourses that conventionally occurred in previous curriculums (Koutselini 1997) and to construct a more politically left oriented identity that focuses on Cypriocentric discourses and supranational identifications. Thus, constructive strategies that “attempt to construct and establish national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity” (Wodak, et al., 2009, p.33) were simultaneously interwoven with strategies “of transformation, [which] aim to transform [an] established national identity and its components into another identity the contours” (ibid) of which
were conceptualized in specific discursive acts. Cypriocentric discourses were simultaneously interwoven with strategies of transformation which aimed to transform the Hellenocentric education and by extension a dominant identity, which traditionally was highlighted in the Greek Cypriot education.

Even though the Hellenocentric discourse was sporadically presented in some subjects of the Curriculum, the Cypriocentric ideology was repeatedly apparent and the dominant supranational discourse encouraged a multiple and hybrid identity. However, its mingling with the antagonistic Hellenocentric ideology masterfully sought to reduce nationalistic bias and to construct a Cypriot identity on the premises of political rather than cultural foundations. As the analysis of the Curriculum (2010) indicated, the envisioned national identity of Cypriots was constructed on the frame of political identifications, by stressing the legal-state citizenship dimensions and leaving open ethno-cultural identification.

The New Curriculum (2010) was produced and circulated by a leftist government, and thus employed those linguistic means and discourses which validate the Cypriocentric ideology and foundational principles of the Cypriot political left that was its internationalist and anti-nationalist orientation. In accordance to Ball's (2001) interpretation the Curriculum is a socio-political, ideological and cultural text, which serves a political means.

On the other hand, inconsistencies and contradictions in the way that national identifications were discursively constructed in the New Curriculum (2010) represented the societal dynamics that shape its production and exposed the discursive construction of power relations. Bearing in mind that Greek Cypriot education has been historically associated with Greek education and Hellenocentric discourses has been always dominant in Greek Cypriot schools, we perceived these inconsistencies in national identifications as a product of negotiations between Hellenocentric and Cypriocentric discourses.

As Ball (1990, p. 18) reminds us:
“Meanings thus are not from language but from institutional practices, from power relations, from social position. Words and concepts change their meaning and their effects as they are deployed within different discourses”.
CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS OF THE COMMEMORATIVE MESSAGES OF THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the Commemorative Messages produced by a previous Minister of Education and Culture, Andreas Demetriou, and sent to all state schools in Cyprus, on specific anniversaries. Traditionally each Minister of Education and Culture sends Commemorative Messages to all state educational settings usually referred to days of remembrance and “primarily serve to retrieve the past for the present” Wodak et al. (2009, p.70). The Commemorative Messages I have chosen to examine are those sent by Mr Andreas Demetriou because during his time the formal state Curriculum (2010) was developed, published and officially presented. I analyze his messages from the commencement of his duties on the 3rd of March 2008 until the end of the school year of 2010-11 that coincided with the termination of his duties. I studied all his messages and I selected to examine those that included discourses referred to national identifications which were mainly sent for the celebration of national days.

The national days which one state select to celebrate depicts its political past and portrays how its political identity evolved through specific historical events. In the case of Cyprus, apart from the Day of Independence, all national days which are celebrated in state schools promote the Hellenic-centered political past of Cyprus. Within the messages referred to these days the Minister inevitably employs discourses that connect Cyprus with the greater Greek-nation.

The role of the Commemorative Messages is to express the official point of view of each Minister of Education and by extension of each government for the events that are celebrated in the Cypriot educational system. I have selected to analyze this kind of documents because they indicate the way in which official and hegemonic discourses are employed to construct the national identification of Cypriots. Within his messages the Minister of Education and Culture, Andreas Demetriou, it is
anticipated that he will employ those strategies (see sub-units 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.2.1) which serve to propagate and stress the government’s political positions about events concerning the past, about the current situation and about the vision for the future.

It is also anticipated that the occasion on which each Commemorative Message refers and the audience to which is being addressed, shape their content. Thus, it is taken into consideration that all messages are addressed to pupils, students and educators on specific celebrations but also to the general public, since it is possible for these messages to be communicated to the wider public through the mass media. All Ministers’ messages are posted in the official website of the Ministry of Education and Culture.

By identifying the discourses associated with national identifications and circulated within the messages of the Minister of Education, it becomes possible to identify ways in which a then newly elected leftist government discursively constructed national identity. It is also possible by examining the Minister’s Commemorative Messages to explore which events were accentuated, which were perhaps hidden from view and which were not clearly expressed and to reason the scope of each approach.

For this purpose, I analyze discourses within Mr Demetriou’s Commemorative Messages that referred to the past defining the national identity of Cypriots, discourses concerning the current situation of Cyprus and its political problem and discourses that outlined the desired future of Cyprus. In addition to these themes, I have also examined discourses about the role of education in the construction of national identity. Discourses that referred to history textbooks were also analyzed.

**7.2 Education and construction of national identity**

From his first Commemorative Message, emphasis was given to national autonomy and to the sovereign and independent state entity of Cyprus. In his message on 3 March 2008, on the occasion of taking up his duties as Minister of Education and
Culture, Andreas Demetriou, addressed Cypriots as “the people of Cyprus” and he committed himself saying:

“From my position, I will work to make our education, at all levels, in keeping with the culture and of our people, and that within this situation to make Cyprus internationally respected and powerful”

He also talked about changes in education that need to be taken at all levels, and used first person plural, thus also including himself:

“We owe it to work to achieve the changes needed for our education, at all levels, in order to live up to the expectations of the people of Cyprus by the new President and the new Government”.

Here he referred to expectations that the Cypriot people have of the President, thus placing the changes that would be put in motion, as a response to the aspirations of “the people of Cyprus”. He wrote that:

“The aim is to reach gradually, through the Educational Reform, to the quality level that our children and youth need, in order to make our Cyprus proud for its contribution to the Greek, European and global civilization and science...From my position, I will work to make our education, at all levels, worthy of our culture and of our people, in order through our education to make Cyprus internationally respected and powerful”.

The discourses referred to the culture and the people of Cyprus combined with his expectation that Cyprus as a state entity would be strengthened internationally, constituted constructive strategies aiming at the formation of Cypriot identity on the premises of its legal independent entity and its distinct culture. It is noticeable, then, that from the beginning of his duties the Minister signified his main political aim to strengthen the state entity of Cyprus and to construct Cypriot identity.

However, in this message Mr Andreas Demetriou made reference to the occupied part of Cyprus in the hope that it would have been the last year which found Cyprus divided by occupation. He made reference to the high level talks that started and
hoped that “they will bring reunification and peace to our island.” He asked for the participation of the pupils in this endeavor, explaining that:

“One of the objectives of this year is to learn about the history of the problems that our homeland is still facing. To learn however, also about the years when the inhabitants of Cyprus lived and worked together, and to get ready for a peaceful future in a united homeland”.

With the proclamation of this goal, he expected students to learn about the history of the Cyprus Problem and at the same time, he emphasized the years that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots lived peacefully, and called on students to prepare for a solution that would unite Cyprus, and that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would live peacefully together. The aim of unification of Cyprus and of its people constituted a constructing strategy and suggested the formation of a new Cypriot identity by attempting unification and cohesion between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Emphasis was given to the will to unify Cyprus on the grounds of co-operation with Turkish Cypriots in conditions where both communities will feel and show solidarity.

The power of education to form consciousness was pointed out in the message of the Minister in which reference was made to the ongoing educational reform, and set as the main objective the “creation of a democratic and human school in the context of a more just society in a free democratic and reunited homeland”, where pluralism and diversity would constitute an opportunity for synthesis and creation. In addition to this objective, he also included the goal of peaceful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots:

“The reunification of our country and the peaceful and harmonic coexistence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and in general all the legal inhabitants of our island constitute our main priorities… it has been decided that one of the goals of this school year would be the cultivation of culture of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. With love towards our history, respect to the historical truth but also with spirit of
overcoming the conflicts of the past, we owe it to our country to work systematically, in order to develop for our youth the wish for cooperation, solidarity, understanding and mutual respect”.

With the main objective of the Educational Reform it was expected the education of the new generation to be concentrated on the development of democratic citizenship where intercultural dialogue would be a central feature. The topos of history was employed in order to call for the need for reunification of Cyprus and peaceful co-existence with Turkish-Cypriots.

7.3 The political and cultural past, present and future of Cyprus
The Commemorative Messages sent in all state educational settings by the Minister of Education and Culture usually referred to days of remembrance and mainly sought to draw on the past in order to endorse present aims and interests.

As Staudinger (1994, p.21) argues:

“In many instances, this special aura of anniversaries tends to legitimate ways of dealing with the past, by selecting affirmative elements from the past which seem useful for justifying present interests” (quoted in Wodak et al., 2009, p.70).

Mainly, we found discourses that referred to cultural and political identity of the past, present and future in messages that were sent on national days. However, this thematic area was also negotiated in several other anniversaries.

7.3.1 Commemorative Messages for national days
The Minister of Education and Culture, Anderas Demetriou, in his message (2008) for the March 25th 1821, national anniversary dedicated to the Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Turks, identified this day as "one of our greatest national anniversaries". He used the first person plural, thus including the Greeks of Cyprus in the Greek nation.
The fact that a national day dedicated to the creation of the Greek nation has been established to be celebrated in all the state schools in Cyprus signifies that Pan-Hellenic national identity and Hellenocentric discourses are dominant. This discursive act constitutes a strategy of perpetuation (sub-unit 5.4.1.1) which aims to maintain and reproduce Greek ethno-national identity.

In his Commemorative Message Mr Demetriou urged people to use the fighters of 1821 as examples

“...for the continuation of our own struggle to rid ourselves of the occupation, and to reunify our homeland. In order to break through the Turkish intransigence and to create conditions for ending the occupation”. (March 2009)

At this point, he marked “our own struggle”, and gave emphasis to the state entity of Cyprus, identifying it with the concept of the homeland. He also made reference to the Turkish occupation, asserting the reunification of Cyprus as the goal, and Turkish “intransigence” as a key obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus problem. He then put forward the view that the principles and values of the United Nations and the European Union

“is the only safeguard for a peaceful and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, which would reunite our divided homeland, and will allow the sun of peace, of hope and of justice to rise over our island, which will embraced all the inhabitants, without any discrimination”.

In the last part of this sentence, he referred to peace among all the inhabitants of Cyprus without any discrimination, making his point for the need for the peaceful coexistence of all citizens, including Turkish-Cypriots, even though he had not named them.

In the following school year, 2008-09, the Minister began his Commemorative Message for the national anniversary on March 25th using the first person plural, in the following manner: “Today, 25th of March, we honor and celebrate the anniversary of the national regeneration”. He continued listing events and the
heroes’ feats; also referring to Cyprus’ contribution to the Greek revolution of 1821 and to the efforts of the revolution to spread to Cyprus as well. In the epilogue of this message, he expressed the belief that people and leadership in unity “will achieve our goals of finding a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, which will reunite our homeland and will free it from the Turkish occupying forces and the settlers, intervening rights, foreign bases, being refugees and the artificial walls of hatred and segregation”. (March 2009)

Here the use of the pronoun ‘our’ homeland was used in its exclusive form and indicated Turkish occupying forces, settlers and foreign bases as the ‘other’.

In March 2011, in his message for the same anniversary, again using the first person plural, he invited teachers and students “to come together in the common struggle, in unity, with a competitive spirit, and faith in our rights. Let us also gain faith by the strength of our culture, which is proof that our rights can frame peace, stability and prosperity for all Cypriots”.

Here, in reference to the “strength of our culture”, it was not specified whether he meant Greek culture or if the reference implied to the culture of Cyprus. If the reference to the “strength of our culture” implied the existence of Cypriot culture, the encouragement to derive from “our culture” can be seen as an attempt to create and consolidate Cypriot cultural identity. In such a case, then, in conjunction with the call for a peaceful solution “for all Cypriots”, which emphasized the political identity since it included all the ethnic groups that constitute the lawful inhabitants of Cyprus, we see an attempt to establish Cypriot identity which would include both, cultural and political identity.

The national anniversary of 1\textsuperscript{st} April 1955, in which the struggle of \textit{EOKA} for union with Greece is celebrated, constitutes the highest expression of the Hellenocentric political past of Greek Cypriots. The fact that this day is commemorated in all state schools implies recognition of the ethno-national identity of Greek Cypriots and inevitably highlights strategies of perpetuation (sub-unit 5.4.1.1) attempting to
maintain and reproduce this identity. In the commemorative message (2008) for the celebration of this day the Minister gave a historical background of the events and referred to the “Hellenism of Cyprus”, recognizing the ethnic origin of the Greek Cypriots. He also referred to the desire of the Cypriots for self-determination, but without naming the purpose of the struggle of EOKA which was the union with Greece. As he argued:

“From the early years of British rule, the Greeks of Cyprus expected that the civilized British would grant our island independence and self-determination, as they had done in 1863 with the Greek Ionian Islands...”

Since he mentioned feats of the EOKA fighters, he also made reference to important events that followed the struggle of EOKA:

“As a result of the liberation struggle of EOKA 1955-59, Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state on 16 August 1960, and had as its first President, the late Archbishop Makarios III. In the 48 years of the Republic of Cyprus, which has been a member of the European Union since 2004, it encountered many difficulties and problems, culminating in the tragedy of 1974, the consequences of which our people are still enduring”. (April 2008)

The claim of this point was that the result of the struggle of EOKA was the declaration of Cyprus as an independent state. In addition, the state entity of Cyprus as a European country was validated. Simultaneously the difficulties, problems, the tragedy of 1974 and its consequences were also outlined. In the epilogue of this message, the Minister of Education and Culture made reference to the "painful difficulties of the ongoing occupation" and urged the "competitive spirit and the genuine visions of the heroes of 1955-59" to be the example

“that will soon bring freedom and the reunification of our homeland, which we are obliged to love and honor as a single country, which contributes creatively to the global culture”. (April 2008)
Here the freedom of Cyprus coincided with its reunification. Also as a desirable objective, the Minister, by using deliberative (sub-unit 5.4.2.1) rhetoric, mentioned the strengthening of Cyprus as a single state entity.

The following year (2009), the Commemorative Message for the same national anniversary of April 1st was in the same spirit. The new element was in the introduction, where reference was given to the vision of the liberation struggle of EOKA 1955-59, which aimed the union with Greece:

“Today we celebrate our national anniversary of April 1st, the day of the beginning of the liberation struggle of EOKA 1955-59, which began with vision the union with Greece and which led to the release of our homeland from English colonialism and the establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus”. (April 2009)

This reference, which actually illustrated the Helleno-centric political past of Cyprus, was avoided in the message of the previous year. It is possible this inclusion to have been a result of reactions because of the avoidance of the previous year message to refer to the aim of Enosis (union with Greece).

However, in the epilogue of the same Commemorative Message, when the Minister invited us to learn from the spirit of the struggle of EOKA, he referred to the freedom of Cyprus as its vision:

“Having always in our mind the struggling spirit and the vision of freedom for which the heroes of the 1955-59 fought and were sacrificed we are called to continue our struggle against the occupation with solidarity and unity, with the aim of getting rid of the Turkish occupation and the reunification of our island”. (April 2009)

He continued by explaining what he meant regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem:

“We look forward to a just and lasting solution that will restore the rights of all Cypriot people, on the basis of the United Nations resolutions and the basic principles and values on which the European Union is founded”.

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And he concluded by calling the new generation to follow the example of the heroes of EOKA in order “to stand in the front line of this titanic struggle for the justification of our martyred homeland”. (April 2009)

In 2010, the Minister sent a single message for both national anniversaries of 25th of March and 1st of April, where once again, there was a historical review of events, and again, he concluded with the same message “for a fair, viable and functional solution to the Cyprus problem”, using similar language to that in all messages when referring to the desired solution for the Cyprus problem. The messages (2009, 2010) for the 1st of April were similar to the one for 2011, where in many parts he used identical wording. However, more emphasis was given to the purpose of the EOKA fighters, who “were committed wholeheartedly to the struggle for the freedom of Cyprus and union with Greece”. This reference stated that the purpose of the struggle of EOKA was the union with Greece making explicitly clear that the political past of Cypriots were expressed with the union with Greece emphasizing its Helleno-centric political past. However, this political identity was not transmitted to the current political situation of Cyprus since the official aim of the Republic was declared to be the reunification of Cyprus in a Federal regime.

In addition to the message for the national anniversary on 1st of April (2010), the Minister of Education and Culture, Mr. Andreas Demetriou, sent a message in March 2010 for the anniversary of the sacrifice of the Second-in-Command of EOKA, Grigoris Afxentiou. In this message he stated that Afxentiou fought “with the sole vision of freedom and national vindication of our martyred homeland, Cyprus”. The use of the adjective ‘martyred’ indicated that Cyprus diachronically was an innocent victim. In the following year, March 2011, he tributed Afxentiou's heroism, which as he said: "went beyond the narrow boundaries of our small homeland, and since then became a symbol of self-sacrifice and heroic deeds for all struggling peoples". Although the heroism of Afxentiou was underlined, it was not exemplified as a symbol of Hellenic sacrifice, but as a global symbol for all struggling people.
One more Greek national day that honors the heroism of Greek nation in the Second World War is celebrated in all state schools of Cyprus. This national anniversary is the October 28th, which commemorates the heroic “NO” which the Greeks said against Italian fascism in 1940. The Minister’s message (2008) for this day, initially referred to the contribution of the Greek resistance in "opposing fascism and Nazism and the advocacy of Greek and global freedom". In the epilogue, he characterized the "heroic resistance of the children of Greece" as the “most illustrious pages in Greek and world history”. When he made the transition from the past to present he exploited deliberative rhetoric (sub-unit 5.4.2.1) in order to indicate the envisioned future of Cyprus. As he urged: “This heroic epic... May it now define our path...", and as he explained: “...Our vision is a free, reunited, peaceful and prosperous European Cyprus, without foreign troops, settlers and guarantees, a common and happy homeland for all its residents...”. He concluded with a call towards the new generation of the Republic of Cyprus to be pioneers “...for a better tomorrow and for a happy and secure future in Europe and the world of the 21st century ”.

In messages sent for national anniversaries, the Greek national identity of Greek Cypriots was stated briefly, but emphatically. There was always reference to the Cyprus problem, and the message of these anniversaries was always the continuation of ‘our own struggle’, which was separated from the wider Hellenism with references to ‘Cypriot people’ in a reunited homeland, where all Cypriots, irrespective of ethnic origin would live in peace. This reference to ‘Cypriot people’ was repeated in almost all of his massages making more than obvious his deliberative rhetoric (sub-unit 5.4.2.1) for construction of Cypriot identity on the premises of common political identity in a reunited common homeland. When the messages of the Minister referred to National Days, a perpetuation strategy (sub-unit 5.4.1.1) to maintain and reproduce Greek ethno-national identity was amalgamated with strategies that attempt to construct and to establish Cypriot national identity through promoting unification, identification, as well differentiation. Whereas these commemorative messages indicated the Hellenocentric political past of Greek-Cypriots and clearly stated that the political past of Cypriots was expressed with the union of Greece, at the same time a frequently
repeated range of persuasive and identity constituting rhetoric put forward the aim for constructing a Cypriot identity. In addition, the Minister by using judicial oratory (sub-unit 5.4.2.1) he focused on the past and allocated responsibilities for “the unlawful acts aimed at dissolving the Republic of Cyprus”.

7.3.2 Commemorative Messages for the proclamation of the republic

On the anniversary of the Proclamation of the Republic, the Minister made a reference, and did not overlook allocating responsibilities, to events that have marked the recent history of Cyprus. Furthermore, in his Commemorative Messages for this anniversary, he emphasized the strengthening of Cyprus as an independent state, and described the desired solution to the Cyprus problem. He emphatically underlined the phrase “all of Cyprus to belong to all Cypriots”, a phrase that encapsulates a leftist, Cypriot-centric discourse and aims to strengthen the political identity of Cypriots. Specifically, in his message (2008) for this anniversary, the Minister of Education made historical reference to events that led to the independence of Cyprus, and mentioned the strengthening of Cyprus as an independent state. In his message, he wrote:

“Since then, Cyprus has taken its place in the world, it has been established in the minds of its citizens and of mankind as an independent state, and has offered prosperity, education and culture to its citizens ... ”(October 2008)

Then he referred to the difficulties that Cyprus had, and attributed the bicommunal unrest on acts of illegal organizations and on foreign interventions aimed at dissolving of the Republic of Cyprus. Without naming which he meant as illegal organizations, he insinuated that they originated from both communities. He named, however, EOKA B and the Greek Junta as the perpetrators of the overthrow against Makarios, an act characterized as “the climax” of the unlawful acts aimed at dissolving the Republic of Cyprus. He considered the occupation by the Turkish army of 37% “of our territory” as a final act of the coup. He also pointed out that the goal of negotiation for a solution to the Cyprus Problem was reunification of Cyprus.
Then, using first person plural, he talk about the obligation of the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, which included Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins,

“for us to each create individually and together the conditions that would compel the withdrawal of Turkey from Cyprus, so that all its legal residents... move to the future by producing prosperity and culture, in an environment of peace, mutual respect and cooperation”. (October 2008)

Here, he distinguished Turkish Cypriots as legitimate residents from the occupying army and Turkey whom he called illegal. With this epideictic rhetoric (sub-unit 5.4.2.1) the Minister distinguished the Turkish Cypriots from the occupying forces and the settlers who were approached as the ‘other’. The distinction between ‘Turks’ as the ‘other’, the ‘enemy’, and ‘Turkish Cypriots’ as people of Cyprus is highly ideological and an indicative leftist discourse. However, this discourse contradicted left anti-nationalist ideology in view of the fact that in practice the hegemonic nationalist distinction between ‘us’ and ‘other’ was employed (sub-unit 2.4.1).

In addition, the Minister hoped for the establishment of a common culture of all the legitimate inhabitants of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins. In the epilogue of his message, once again, he distinguished the Turkish Cypriots from the occupying forces, and underlined in bold letters the urge soon “all of Cyprus to belong to all Cypriots”, a phrase that consisted a leftist, Cypriocentric discourse and aimed to strengthen the political identity of Cypriots, in an “independent and reunited Cyprus”. As he concludes “It is our future, free from occupying troops and the separation of barbed wire” (October 2008). In particular, the Minister in this Commemorative Message included appeals for peaceful coexistence in a reunited Cyprus of all the legitimate inhabitants of Cyprus, which he calls “Cypriot people” but mainly applied to Turkish Cypriots. The state entity in Cyprus was emphasized with references that led to pursuit of the creation of a Cypriot identity that combined cultural and political identity.

The Minister’s message on the anniversary of the Cyprus Republic, in October 2009, was in the same spirit. The following year (2010), in his message for the same
occasion, the Minister again used similar references. At one point though, he contradicted his previous messages that made references to the turbulent first fourteen years of Cypriot independence (1960-74) which were marked by bi-communal conflicts and civil unrest. Specifically, for the years of the Presidency of Archbishop Makarios III, he stated that “Cyprus followed a peaceful course of growth and progress”.

The Commemorative Messages on the anniversary of the proclamation of the republic contained a range of elements of persuasive, identity-constituting rhetoric (sub-unit 5.4.2.1). The Minister by using judicial oratory he focused on the past in order to strengthen Cyprus as an independent state and to allocate responsibilities for “the unlawful acts aimed at dissolving the Republic of Cyprus”. With reference to the present he employed epideictic rhetoric to distinguish the Turkish Cypriots from the occupying forces and with deliberative rhetoric he underlined the wish for reunification of Cyprus. In the discursive formation of national identity the Minister made use of constructive strategy (sub-unit 5.4.1.1) in an attempt to construct and to establish Cypriot national identity by promoting unification of all the legitimate inhabitants of Cyprus distinguishing them from the occupying forces and the settlers that were approached as the ‘other’.

The aim of unification and cohesion of Cyprus and its people was deliberately repeated in almost all of the Minister’s messages and signified the envisioned future of Cyprus on the grounds of co-operation with Turkish Cypriots in conditions of solidarity and peaceful co-existence of all the ethnic groups of Cyprus. Even though this form of realizing the unification strategy was usually formulated as an assertion or as hope for the future, the impression of the will of the people of Cyprus to create a collective identity was not apparent.

7.3.3 Commemorating the Cypriot heroes

Besides the heroes of the established national anniversaries which are celebrated in all the state schools of Cyprus, the Minister also sent a separate message about ‘Student Heroes’, where he included deaths which took place in more recent events
and concerned exclusively Cyprus. This discursive act accentuates Cypriot heroes and Cypriot history and thus, constituted a construction strategy in the formation of Cypriot national identity. In addition, the attempt to commemorate more recent events that in some cases concerned civil conflicts can be interpreted as a strategy of justification (sub-unit 5.4.1.1) in the narrative creation of national identity.

For the first time, the Minister of Education and Culture sent a message (2010) for the day of commemorating the students heroes, designated on the 13th March. The message honors "the student youth, who over the years, identifies its footsteps with those of our people and of our land". He referred by name to the student heroes of the "national struggle of 1955-59", where they "stood up against English colonialism". He also mentioned by name the "Hero students who gave their lives defending the Republic during the turbulent period of 1971-74". One student who was referred to was a high school graduate and was "murdered by members of the illegal organization EOKA B". The other "was a fourteen-year-old student who was killed by brotherly fire by the coup d'état members on 15 July 1974 in Larnaca." The message also mentioned unnamed young pupils "who were killed, falling victim to the barbarism of the conquerors" during the Turkish invasion in the summer of 1974. In addition, a pupil was referred to by name, who in January 1975

"left his last breath below the tracks of an English armored vehicle at Akrotiri, where demonstrations were taking place protesting the transportation of the Turkish Cypriot population by the British to the north". (March 2010)

The message concluded by encouraging students to ignore "the voices of nationalism and of chauvinism" and to fight "together with all the people of Cyprus for progress and prosperity", describing again the same pattern as in other messages for the desired solution to the Cyprus problem (e.g. sub-unit 7.3.1). In the same spirit and with the use of similar and often identical wording was the Commemorative Message for the same date the next year (2011).
Furthermore in 2010, 25th September it had been designated, by Chritophias Government, as a day of remembrance for those who lost their lives during the Turkish invasion of 1974. In his message for this day, the Minister Andreas Demetriou, named those whom he considered had undermined the Cypriot Republic and were responsible for the Turkish invasion. The Minister specifically laid the blame for the Turkish invasion to England, American and NATO influences, and he labeled them as “collaborators” with the reactionary, anti-Cypriot forces in Greece, Turkey and in Cyprus. The reference to anti-Cypriot forces, which operated in Cyprus, pointed to enemies of Cyprus not only from the outside but also from within. The message continued with a list of events associated with the Turkish invasion, allocating responsibilities. As the message proclaimed:

“The establishment of the Athens Junta in April of 1967 was the beginning of a destructive track for all of Hellenism but also for our Cyprus. In 1971, EOKA B is established in Cyprus by George Grivas with the aim of overthrowing President Archbishop Makarios III. Terrorist acts and the murderous actions of EOKA B will break down the Republic of Cyprus, and will pave the way for its demolition. On 15 July 1974, a coup d’état to overthrow President Makarios and his legitimate government was organized by the Junta of Athens and EOKA B. This coup has opened the gates to Turkey, which was in the waiting, and on 20 July 1974 invaded Cyprus”. (September 2010)

The metaphorical phrase “opened the gates to Turkey” meant that through betrayal the opportunity was given to Turkey to invade Cyprus. He continued the message adding the facts about the invasion which, “hold Cyprus and its people, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, divided”. At this point the Minister made the distinction of ‘us’ vs ‘others’. He referred to those who support the Republic of Cyprus as ‘us’ and named as ‘others’ and ‘enemies’ not only Turkey and foreign centers of power but also the Greek Junta and extreme right wing groups in Cyprus. In this Commemorative Message the Minister took the opportunity by employing judicial oratory to focus on the events related to the Turkish invasion, to underline the injustice that occurred against Cyprus and to accuse all those he considered as
responsible. This form of persuasive, identity-constituting rhetoric was employed by the Minister in order to construct and to establish national identity by disgracing and blaming the ‘other’, the ‘enemy’.

Reference to the "fascist coup d’état of 15 July 1974" which "opened the gate for Turkey to invade Cyprus", was also in the message (December 2008) of the Minister of Education and Culture for the day of memory of resistance fighters during which those who resisted the coup d’état were honored. This date was established to be commemorated by schools in 2002. In this message, reference was repeated about the bi-communal conflicts of 1963-64 which he blamed on criminal action of "illegal and extremist Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organizations" which, this time, he named saying that "it was the National Front, EOKA B and TMT". He allocated responsibilities to these organizations and regarded them as accountable for crushing the vision of “peaceful coexistence and prosperity for all its inhabitants: Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians, Maronites and Latins". He considered the coup as “the peak of illegality and the undermining of the Republic of Cyprus”, which he characterized as “traitorous” and held the Junta and EOKA B as responsible for aiming to "bring down the Republic, with the ultimate goal of imposing a solution of dichotomy for the Cyprus problem".

In the following year (2009), for the same occasion, the Minister referred to the problems encountered by the Republic of Cyprus during the first fourteen years of independence (1960-1974). Again, he mentioned the bi-communal riots and confrontations in order to include “the action of illegal organizations, such as the National Front and EOKA B which aimed to overthrow the legitimate government and the breakdown of democracy”. He continued his message by assigning responsibilities to the junta of Athens and EOKA B for carrying out the coup, which he characterized as the "pinnacle of criminal action and conspiracy, to the detriment of our suffering homeland". Then he said: “The aim of the coup was the extermination of Makarios, the violent overthrow of the constitutional order and the imposition of the lawless plans for the solution of the Cyprus problem”. Using the first plural he called for, "drawing lessons from the mistakes of the past, in order never to repeat them again in the future." In the epilogue, while taking a clear
stand to the facts, he directed his speech to the students telling them that: “You must know history well, to examine it with a critical eye, and to always be pioneers in the struggle for the protection and defense of democracy and freedom”. Although his call was for critical stand to the historical facts he repeatedly used persuasive rhetoric in order to promote the leftist political orientation and explanation of the historical facts. A combination of the previous messages for the “day of memory and honor for the resistance fighters” was the message for the same date in 2010. In addition, the Minister referred to the means which Cyprus has available in order to solve its problem which are: “…the European family, …and basic principles of the United Nations”.

For the “Day of memory and honor for the resistance fighters”, the Minister employed again forms of persuasive and identity-constituting rhetoric drawing upon judicial, epideictic and deliberative genre (sub-unit 5.4.2.1). With judicial oratory he focused on the past and detectably allocated responsibilities to the Junta and EOKA B for aiming and acting towards the “ultimate goal of imposing a solution of dichotomy”. In this way, any nationalistic goals of the extreme right were connected with the division of Cyprus and therefore they were rejected. The topos of history was put forward in order to allocate responsibilities, to reject any attempt or voice for union with Greece and to dissuade similar acts or aims for the future. Instead, the vision of peaceful coexistence and prosperity for all the inhabitants of Cyprus, which was repeated in almost all of his messages, represented Cyprus as traditionally multicultural society and constructed a common political identity of all the Cypriots. Thus, in these messages strategy of transformation with an aim to transform the established Greek national identity of Greek Cypriots was combined with constructive strategy which sought to form national identity of all Cypriots.

The intention of the Minister to stress events that concern Cyprus exclusively, without any connection to the Greek nation, can be interpreted as an attempt to emphasize the political past of Cypriots by attributing honor to specific heroes who lost their lives during events that mostly illustrate affection to the Republic of Cyprus. The fact that these days dedicated exclusively to Cypriot heroes who mainly
supported the state entity of Cyprus were established by a then new-elected left government indicated that a constructive strategy aiming at forming the development of Cypriot identity was employed.

7.3.4 Commemorative Messages for missing persons

In a similar manner, on the occasion of the 'Marathon of Love' for the missing persons, again, the Minister of Education, Andreas Demetriou used judicial oratory and allocated responsibilities for the Turkish invasion and its consequences. In his message in May 2008, he laid blame for the drama of the families of the missing on the “treasonous coup” and in the “Turkish barbaric invasion of 1974”. In the epilogue of his message he wishes

“for the advancement of the efforts for finding a peaceful and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, which will terminate the Turkish occupation, which will reunite our country and to create the conditions for the harmonious coexistence of all the inhabitants of our island, in conditions of safety, peace, freedom and justice...” (May 2008)

He repeated this wish in his message for the ‘Marathon of Love’ for the missing persons in May 2009, as well as in all messages that can be associated with the Cyprus Problem. In the next year (2010), in the Minister’s message on the same occasion, he allocated the drama that was experienced by “the families and relatives of missing persons of the Cyprus tragedy” to the “traitorous coup” and “the barbaric Turkish invasion of 1974”. Again, he concluded his message with the hope for "harmonious coexistence of all the inhabitants of the island, in conditions of safety, peace, freedom and justice". In his message for the same occasion in March 2011, in a firm tone, he referred to the events of 1974, and again laid blame on those whom he considers responsible for the tragedy. He ended with the wish that “our country is reunified”, describing the desired solution which was identical with other messages, making the wish “to discover the fate of missing persons of the Cyprus tragedy".
In these Commemorative Messages for the missing people of the Turkish invasion the Minister employed persuasive rhetoric and drew upon the repertoire of judicial and deliberating oratory (Wodak et al 2009, p. 70) in order to allocate responsibilities and to disgrace ‘the other’ as barbaric. Cyprus was presented as the common homeland for Turkish and Greek Cypriots and deliberatively Turkish Cypriots were disconnected from Turkey and represented as victims of the “barbaric Turkish invasion”.

7.3.5 Commemorative Messages for Ethnarch Makarios

The message sent about the Ethnarch Makarios on 19 January 2009 was in the same spirit. After he exalted the personality and work of Makarios, the Minister mentioned that, "In the 17 years of his presidency, Cyprus prospered and was able to achieve its own position in the world as an independent and sovereign state."

With this sentence, emphasis was given to the independence of Cyprus as a sovereign state, which, as he reaffirmed had been undermined by “illegal and extremist Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organizations, and as a result, we have the tragedy of 1974”, which was aimed at the “physical extermination of Makarios and the partition of Cyprus”.

The following year (2010), in his message about the Ethnarch Makarios, the Minister described the life and work of Makarios, and then argued that in the 17 years of his presidency, “he always struggled...with consistency and determination, for the protection of Cypriot independence and safeguarding justice and the rights of the people of Cyprus”. With this phrase, emphasis was given to Cypriot independence and its preservation. Moreover, the reference to “Cypriot people” and to the rights of “Cypriot people” referred to the idea of the creation of Cypriot identity, which included all ethnic groups, which constitute the population of Cyprus. His vague reference to “the people of Cyprus” was specified in the epilogue when he declared that:

“It is the duty of all of us to continue the fight for a free and reunited Cyprus, common homeland of all its inhabitants: Greek, Turkish, Armenians, Maronites and Latins, without occupying forces, settlers and
foreign guarantees and barbed wire of hatred and division”. (January 2010)

In his message, the Minister made reference to "unlawful centers" which plotted the “physical extermination of Makarios and the partition of Cyprus”. As such, he named the Greek Junta and EOKA B which he accused for the "traitorous coup of 15 July 1974" and the Turkish invasion which followed five days later.

On the day of Makarios in January 2011, again, the Minister Mr Demetriou listed the adverse conditions under which Makarios led Cyprus. He made reference to bi-communal conflicts, to foreign plans for substantial breakdown of the Cypriot Republic, to the rise of lawlessness and fascism, "culminating in the coup of the junta and EOKA B" and the Turkish invasion of 1974. He also made reference to the declaration of Makarios regarding “politics of the possible” in order to explain the shift of policy from idea of Union with Greece to Independence at the end of colonial period, as well as the acceptance of a federal solution “so that Cyprus be free from occupation and to survive as a state and as a people.” In this way, the attempts for federal solution were supported and federation was presented as the only possible solution.

7.3.6 Day of denouncement of the proclamation of the pseudo state

In the Commemorative Message (2008), on the day of denouncement of the proclamation of the pseudo state, the Minister offered more information about the desired solution beyond the goal for a free and reunited Cyprus. As he said:

“We seek a just, peaceful and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, through the talks today, under the auspices of the United Nations. This solution should ensure the termination of the Turkish occupation, the withdrawal of occupation troops and settlers, the return of refugees, the inquiry of the fate of all missing persons of the Cyprus tragedy and the creation of a federal and united Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality. We want Cyprus free and reunited, where all its inhabitants, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and
Latins can live harmoniously and in a brotherly manner, building a happy and peaceful future together“.

Here, the envisioned future of Cyprus as a federal state was abstractly described and the peaceful co-existence of all the ethnic groups of Cyprus was presented as an easy enterprise. Cyprus was portrayed as multicultural country and thus, on the one hand, the Greek character of Cyprus was diminished and on the other its national identity was built on political and not on cultural identity. In the message, he did not refer to the fact that the act of proclaiming a pseudo state was made by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, but gave the responsibility for the failure to find a solution “to the occupier Turkey, while wishing to be a member of the European Union, it maintains the same intransigent position, and does not show the necessary will to resolve the Cyprus problem and to reunite our island”. (November 2008)

Thus, epideictic rhetoric (sub-unit 5.4.2.1) was employed in order to disgrace and blame Turkey for the division of the island, avoiding allocating any responsibilities to Turkish Cypriots.

However, in the next year (2009), in the Commemorative Message for the day November 15, the condemnation of the pseudo state, the Minister Andreas Demetriou held Rauf Denktash responsible for the proclamation. In the same message, the Minister referred to the “political equality of the two communities”. As he said:

“A bi-zonal, bi-communal solution is a component of which will be political equality of the two communities, as defined in the resolutions of the United Nations… given that the real desire of both communities is that we live together again in a reunited Cyprus, free, democratic and federal”. (November 2009)

In the same paragraph, he referred to a common homeland for people with different language and ancestry:
“In a peaceful and prosperous Cyprus where the person will count, regardless of his language and origin. In a common homeland for Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians, Maronites and Latins”. (November 2009)

In these references, the people of Cyprus were described as communities that come from different origins and have different languages. The following year (2010), in his reference for the desired solution to the Cyprus problem, beyond the message of "a reunited Cyprus, free, democratic and federal", he added, “...in a Cyprus where safeguarding the rights of one community would not be at the expense of the rights of another.”

The Minister in his messages on the day of denouncement of the proclamation of a pseudo state employed forms of persuasive identity-constituting rhetoric and drew on epideictic oratory (Wodak et al 2009, p.70) in order to strengthen the state integrity of Cyprus. As the only weapons in the attempt for a solution, he listed international recognition and the prestige of the Republic of Cyprus, which was strengthened with its membership to the E.U., as well as the principles and values of the United Nations. He brought up Resolution 550 of the United Nations Security Council to demonstrate the illegality of the act of breaking away part of the Republic. With Resolution 550, the Security Council "condemns the attempted secession of part of the Republic, and considers this action legally invalid and calls for its revocation.” At the same time, he called on all states to respect the independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. As it comes out the Minister, in his Commemorative Messages about the condemnation of a pseudo state, employed a constructive strategy (sub-unit 5.4.1.1) in the discursive formation of Cypriot national identity. His attempt was to establish the national identity of all Cypriots by promoting unification, identification and solidarity on the premises of common political identity.
7.3.7 Day of remembrance for the heroes of the Second World War

The Minister made use of May 9th, the day of remembrance of the victory of the anti-fascist peoples during the Second World War, in order to pass messages against fascism, nationalism, racism and intolerance to other religions. As he mentioned, the purpose of this anniversary is to "...remind us to which barbaric limits humanity can be lead by the fanatical ideologies such as fascism, nationalism, racism and intolerance to other religions..." (May 2011). He reminded us that since the end of Second World War, wars and conflicts still exist, in order to make the connection with Cyprus saying that

"...many are the military interventions of various forces against weak peoples and states. A victim of military intervention, a victim of invasion and occupation is our small homeland. Cyprus, a victim of foreign intervention, of the aggressive and expansionary policy of Turkey, for 37 years suffers..." (May 2011)

Speaking on behalf of the people of Cyprus, he addressed the international community, and called on it to enforce international law, to promote peace in Cyprus. He ended with the wish that

"the struggles and sacrifices of the fighters of Second World War also inspire and guide the current generations because the peace loving Cypriot people deserve a peaceful and prosperous country, where all her children, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins create, cooperating harmoniously, the future of their common homeland". (May 2011)

As is apparent, the Minister in every given opportunity employed judicial rhetoric against fascism, nationalism, racism and intolerance to other religions and with deliberative rhetoric put forward his vision for peaceful co-existence in a Federal Democracy.
7.3.8 Europe day and the anniversary of the founding of the United Nations

In his message for Europe day and the anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, the Minister did not overlook connecting the principles of these international organizations with the efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem. For Europe day, the Minister of Education sent a message (May 2008) in which he made reference to the common goals of member states of the European Union. He supported that these goals, which among others referring to peaceful coexistence, were related with the efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem. As he argued:

“The achievement of these aims are the same as our own country’s, which today battles to achieve its reunification and the freedom from the Turkish occupation of 37% of the territory, which continues for 37 years. Peaceful coexistence, economic and cultural cooperation, equality and the implementation of human rights without any discrimination, are basic principles and values of the European Union that we expect will soon prevail, without restrictions, for a federal and reunited Cyprus, in finding a viable and functional solution to the Cyprus problem”. (May 2008)

This wish was also expressed with slightly different wording in his message on the same day in May 2009. It also referred to the independent route that Cyprus was taking since 1960, "which was marked by bloody incidents, dangers and foreign threats and interventions". He added that the finding of a just, peaceful and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, which would ensure an end to the occupation and lead to the reunification of our homeland must be based on fundamental principles and values of the European Union and in the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations. With the same wish he concluded his message of May of 2010 and 2011.

Nearly all messages briefly, or analytically in more detail, mentioned the desired solution to the Cyprus problem. The desired solution was described on the basis of the resolutions of the United Nations and on the basis of the principles of the European Union. In order to achieve a solution “for Cyprus and its people” which would ensure prosperity in conditions of peace, mutual respect and cooperation,
the Minister invited pupils and students to ignore the voices of nationalism and of chauvinism. As a vision for the future of Cyprus, he supported ensuring a single state entity with a secure and happy future in the world of the 21st century which would produce culture and can contribute to world culture.

7.4 The History lesson
One of the key elements that is part of the way that national identities are made and remade is through the maintenance and passing down of historical narratives (sub-unit 2.3.2). In his message on 3 March 2008, on the occasion of taking up his duties as Minister of Education and Culture, Andreas Demetriou, referred extensively to the lesson of History and the need to teach the historic truth through critical pedagogy (sub-unit 7.2).

In his message on the anniversary of the sacrifice of Afxentiou (sub-unit 7.3.1), the Minister referred in detail to the lessons of history and welcomed

“every attempt which aims to impart knowledge of history and cultivate the preservation of historic memory of the period of 1955-59 as well as every aspect of past and contemporary history of Cyprus”.

Here he indirectly signaled that other aspects of the history of Cyprus were not included in the curriculum. In addition, his reference to ‘Cypriot history’ and not to ‘the history of Cyprus’ as it is customarily called, was an example of the intention of the Ministry to proceed with the writing of books as well as the teaching of the ‘Cypriot history’. This attempt indicated an intention to maintain a Cypriot political identity detached from a Greek identity. In the next paragraph of his message he minimized any possible reactions to such an attempt by declaring that:

“Nobody has any reasons to worry about or be afraid to discuss our past as well as our historic records. On the contrary, such a discussion makes us wiser and allows us to transform our historical experiences into directives that will help us to plan a continually better future for our children and grandchildren”.

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In this paragraph, he also referred to the proposed methodology of the history lesson which was based on a critical consideration of events through the use of multiple sources. After this, he adapted the knowledge and examples of history to the present time and repeated the aim of the state which he argued was “…the freedom of our country from the occupation and the peaceful co-existence of all its inhabitants and democracy…” In this way he portrayed the aims of the state as compatible with the struggles of the past and Cypriot history stressing at the same time that “…they are sacred heritage which are secured only if we use the means, effectively at given time in history. The return to the means of the past may annul great aims”. As was noted, the significance of history was recognized not only because it provides knowledge about the past but also because the adaptation of the teachings of the past to the present, contributes to the fulfillment of the aims of the state concerning freedom from occupation and peaceful co-existence of all the inhabitants. More significantly, the teaching of national history can sometimes serve in the construction of what Berger (2007) calls “historiographic nationalism” that shore up a more partisan and less reflexive approach to events.

The effort of narrating the recent events with the intention of placing accountability was obvious in the messages of the Minister of Education and Culture and strategies of shift of blame and responsibility were employed. Negative aspects of Cyprus’s past were presented and interpreted in a way that the responsibilities were attributed to foreign forces and nationalistic and ultra-right groups of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots (sub-unit 7.3.5). Highly epideictic and judicial rhetoric were apparent in the way problematic actions and events related to the Turkish invasion of 1974 and to the de facto division of the island were presented (sub-units 7.3.2, 7.3.3, 7.3.4).

In this particular political context where leftist ideologies and discourses were disseminated, their political truth was in practice what Foucault (1980) called “regime of truth” of those who were the bearers of the institutional authority and power to promote their own “regimes of truth” through the formal and official discourses of the state. The use of historical narratives as a strategy to sustain a
particular version of national identity appeared to be an influential device within the commemorative messages that this study examines.

### 7.5 Criteria of nationhood in the Minister’s messages

Based on the critical survey of the theoretical literature (chapters 2 and 3), the aim is to classify the traits of national identity emphasized in the Minister’s messages and to examine the way these features define and construct the identity of Cypriots.

However, the way the Minister presented the feature of the historically constituted community appeared particularly problematic in his discourses. The way national identity was presented in the course of the discourses referring to historical memories appeared to be conflictive. Whereas the Minister sent Commemorative Messages for national anniversaries that represented Cyprus as sharing the same history with the Greek nation, at the same time in these messages we observe an attempt to cultivate common myths and historical memories among Cypriots and an effort to detach Cyprus from Greece. In addition, during his days as a Minister he took the opportunity to introduce new anniversaries referring to events that concerned only Cyprus, aiming to develop common myths and historical memories among Cypriots. Although the Minister employed discourses that connect Cyprus with the wider Hellenic culture, at the same time he strengthened the emergence of a Cypriot identity.

The Minister frequently addressed the topos of ‘history teaching lessons’ and proposed to learn history well and to approach it with a critical eye, drawing lessons from the mistakes of the past. In history lessons he included the need to learn about the history of the problems that Cyprus was facing. The past was dealt with by means of strongly justifying and relativism strategies (sub-unit 5.4.2.1). His representations of history, through narratives of the past, can be perceived as an aim to construct the present and the future. The intention to allocate responsibilities and to pass messages against fascism, nationalism, racism and intolerance to other religions was apparent in the Minister’s discourses. Emphasis was given to the
independent route that Cyprus has taken since 1960 with repeated depiction of bloody incidences, dangers and foreign threats and interventions. The Minister presented Cyprus as a victim of military intervention and as a victim of invasion and occupation and named English, Americans and NATO as the foreign interveners and Turkey as the invader (sub-unit 7.3.5). Additionally he attributed responsibility to their collaborators whom he specified as reactionary anti-Cypriot forces in Greece, Turkey and in Cyprus and named the Junta of Athens, EOKA B' and TMT as the unlawful centers that shared responsibility for the tragedy in Cyprus. In this sense, the construction of Cypriot Identity was developed in connection with the 'other', the 'enemy', which came not only from the outside but also from within. By underlining years of peaceful coexistence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots he employed the topos of history as an element of constructing national identity, which included Turkish Cypriots with the intention to build a peaceful future in a united homeland (sub-units 7.2, 7.3.6). However, the political present characterized by the political problem of Cyprus that still keeps Cyprus highly divided did not come in accordance with the described past and the desired future.

It was not always clear whether the Minister’s discourses to common culture referred to Hellenic culture or to Cypriot culture. In particular, in his messages for national anniversaries, which are pan-Hellenic celebrations, he employed an abstract reference to 'our' culture without specifying if he meant Greek or Cypriot culture (sub-unit 7.3.1). The same occurred in his messages for the day of Greek education where he avoided any reference to Greek culture and did not present Greek language as a distinct feature of Greek Cypriots' cultural identity. In a more direct way he expressed hope for the establishment of a common culture for all the legitimate inhabitants of Cyprus and also wished Cyprus to create a distinctive culture capable of contributing to the global culture and “to make our Cyprus proud of its contribution to the Greek, European and world culture and science” (sub-unit 7.2). Although he made a clear reference to the formation of Cypriot culture he connected this culture with Greece, and gradually with Europe and the world. With reference to Cyprus he also employed the discourse “the culture of our people”, establishing in this way a subsistence of common culture among Cypriots. It was
apparent that some references cultivate a common cultural identity among all Cypriots irrespective of their ethnic group.

One other trait of national identity is the constitution of a named and stable community of people (sub-unit 2.3). This feature of national identity was focused upon in many of the Minister’s discourses in an effort to construct a Cypriot identity. In almost all of his messages, when the Minister referred to the inhabitants of Cyprus, he used the discourse “people of Cyprus” equating in this way citizenship with nationhood. He signified Cyprus as “our ancestral land” and described the population of Cyprus (which includes: Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins) as mixed with communities that come from a different origin and have different language. This reference about language use in Cyprus presented Cyprus as a multilingual society and Cypriots were represented as a traditional multicultural population that constituted a stable community of people. In general, international differentiation was employed to strengthen the common political identity of all the ethnic groups that traditionally live in Cyprus. However, the representation of Cypriots as a stable community contradicted the Minister's repeated wish for “reunification of our people” which referred to the future and underlined the de facto division of the island and its people.

Common historic territory is another feature that is included in the definition of national identity (sub-unit 2.3). Whereas in the Minister's messages Cyprus was presented as “a single country”, “our homeland”, “our ancestral land”, “homeland of all the inhabitants” and as “homeland of our people”, at the same time emphasis was given and on the de facto division of the island with references for “suffering homeland” and “suffering island”. Any references to common territory constituted wishes for the future and pointed out as a desired solution the creation of a federal and united Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality. While Cyprus, in the Minister's messages, was represented as an independent state at the same time discourses referring to future usually were wishes for a “free and reunited Cyprus”, pointing to “territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus”. 
When the Minister referred to shared public life and common legal rights he used discourses that strengthened Cyprus as an independent state and described the desired political future of Cyprus being based on equality between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and safeguarding that the rights of one community would not be at the expense of the rights of the other. He also framed the desired solution of the Cyprus Problem within principles and values of the European Union by connecting the desired equality and the hope for implementation of human rights with basic principles and values of the European Union (sub-unit 7.3.8).

The absence of a common economic life with Turkish Cypriots was referred to as a wish for economic co-operation in the future. The wish of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live together was taken for granted by the Minister who considered as given the real desire of both communities to live together again in a reunited Cyprus, free, democratic and federal. In the Minister’s messages there was no reference to a common language among the Cypriots; neither was the Greek language identified as a feature of the Greek Cypriots’ cultural identity.

In the Minister’s references Cyprus was described as European Cyprus, as a country that belongs to the great European family. The process of transformation that has been set in motion broadened the notion of national identity by combining it with supranational identification. As he mentioned, this offered new peaceful political advantages to Cyprus and had strengthened its international recognition and the prestige of the Republic of Cyprus. He assessed that the desired bi-zonal, bi-communal solution was based on European and international law and thus, it can be achieved with the steady adherence to fundamental principles, values and ideals of the European Union in connection with basic principles, resolutions and decisions of the United Nations. It was apparent in the Minister’s messages that peaceful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots in a federal and reunited Cyprus would be the basis for the solution to the Cyprus Problem. The desired solution was connected with the application of basic principles and values of the European Union that are peaceful coexistence, economic and cultural co-operation, equality and the implementation of human rights without any discrimination.
7.6 Conclusions
The analysis of the Commemorative Messages demonstrated that the Minister’s persuasive discourses derived mainly from particular political motivations. The persuasiveness and pervasiveness of hegemonic government discourses that promoted leftist ideologies above other forms of identification had inflected education settings. Therefore, the ways in which the identity of Cypriots was constructed through the Minister’s messages is understood as both deliberate and intentional.

Minister’s discourses were carefully selected in order to have certain effects aiming to promote specific political goals and to make them appear rational. In addition, the obvious persuasive discourses, which were employed in order to allocate responsibilities and to promote particular discursive truths about historical facts that occurred in Cyprus and continue to mark its future, were evident in his messages.

The Minister’s messages contained many deliberative elements and arguments concerning the justification of the political future of Cyprus. In these cases the vision for a unified national territory was depicted as an abstract ideal political place where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots live happily together, in harmony, with prosperity and without conflicts.

The Ministerial messages strengthened Cyprus’ sovereignty and although he portrayed the population of Cyprus as ‘multicultural’ he repeatedly referred to Cypriot people avoiding using the term ‘nation’. While recognizing Greek Cypriots as one of the communities that make up the population of Cyprus, he never explicitly detailed the existence of any distinct cultural identity belonging to Greek Cypriots. Instead there were some moves towards cultivating the existence of an inclusive Cypriot cultural identity. Construction strategies that attempted to construct and to establish Cypriot national identity by promoting unification, identification, as well as differentiation (Wodak, et al. 2009) were apparent in the Minister’s messages. The concept of nation, which was implied in his messages, was mainly embodied in those features identified with the concept of political identity.
Only messages referred to celebration of national days connected Greek Cypriots with the wider Greek nation, but again with some signs of subtle change of direction away from Pan-Hellenism, that is a strategy of transformation.

Whereas issues related to cultural identity remain open in the Curriculum (2010), in the Commemorative Messages of the Minister of Education and Culture (Mr Demetriou), discourses that connect Cyprus with the wider Hellenic culture were evident, representing Cyprus as sharing the same history with the Greek nation.

Even though the Curriculum (2010) and the Commemorative Messages under consideration were circulated under the responsibility of the same Minister, we observe that in the case of his messages where the audience was immediate, Hellenocentric discourses were more direct. Specifically, in some of the Minister's messages the political past of Cyprus was linked with the desire of union with Greece.

Such a correlation was avoided in the Curriculum (2010). This indicates that the Minister in his commemorative messages had in mind that the audience expected to hear in a straightforward fashion the meaning of each celebration and inescapably referred to the facts in a way that would not evolve reactions and dissatisfaction. In addition, it confirms the perception that the dominance and hegemonic status of Greek Cypriot nationalism represses the development of the ideology of Cypriocentrism (Mavratsas 1997, p.9).

Nevertheless, in these messages along with Hellenocentric discourses, we observe discourses that attempted to strengthen the emergence of a Cypriot identity, which was developed on the assumption that Cyprus is a traditionally multicultural country. In this way, the proclaimed Greek character of Cyprus was diminished and its political past was disconnected from any nationalistic aims. Although the Greek national identity of Greek Cypriots was recognized in the messages sent for national anniversaries, in those same messages Cypriocentric discourses such as “the people of Cyprus” and “Cypriot people” that promote leftist ideology and Cypriot identity were also dominant. The term “Cypriot people”, which was
repeated several times in all of his messages was the main linguistic means for the
construction of Cypriot identity and a part of his unification strategy aiming to
strengthen the state entity of Cyprus. The ‘state’ connotation of ‘people’, which was
repeated in all of his messages included Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots,
Maronites, Armenians and Latins (without any reference to others who hold
Cyprus citizenship or settlers), portrayed the population of Cyprus as multicultural.

References to Cypriot culture as well as the establishment of days dedicated
exclusively to Cypriot heroes who mainly supported the state entity of Cyprus
indicated that the Minister employed a constructive strategy aiming at forming the
development of Cypriot identity. The intention of the Minister to stress events that
concern Cyprus exclusively, without any connection to the Greek nation, can be
interpreted as an attempt to emphasize the political past of Cypriots by attributing
honor to specific heroes who lost their lives during events that mostly illustrate
affection to the Republic of Cyprus. This discursive act accentuates Cypriot heroes
and Cypriot history and thus constitutes a constructive strategy in the formation of
Cypriot national identity. In addition, the attempt to commemorate more recent
events that in some cases concern civil conflicts can be interpreted as a strategy of
justification in the narrative creation of national identity.

The effort of narrating the recent events with the intention of placing
accountability was obvious and strategies of shift of blame and responsibility were
employed. Negative aspects of Cyprus’s past were presented and interpreted in a
way that the responsibilities were attributed to foreign forces and nationalistic and
ultra-right groups of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Highly epideictic and judicial
rhetoric were apparent in the way problematic actions and events relate to the
Turkish invasion of 1974 and to the de facto division of the island. The topos of
history was put forward in order to allocate responsibilities, to reject any attempt
or voice for union with Greece and to dissuade similar acts or aims for the future.
Instead, the vision of peaceful coexistence and prosperity for all the inhabitants of
Cyprus, which was repeated in almost all of his messages, represented Cyprus as a
traditionally multicultural society and constructed a common political identity of
all the Cypriots. Thus, in these messages a strategy of transformation with an aim to
transform the established Greek national identity of Greek Cypriots was combined with a constructive strategy, which sought to form the national identity of all Cypriots.
CHAPTER 8
INTERVIEWS ANALYSIS

8.1 Introduction
The main objective of the interviews was to identify what discourses were employed by a small number of Greek-Cypriot educators in the ways that they understood the concept of nation and their national identity (for the schedule for the semi-structured interviews see appendix 1), and to explore to what extent these discourses fit—or do not fit—with the policies that were promoted in educational settings in Cyprus. One of the operating assumptions in my analysis was that educational policies can conflict with subjective models of self-identification. (Wodak et al. 2009)

My analysis of the nine interviews was concentrated on the discursive construction of national identity and on the way the self-identification of interviewees affected their views and perceptions about educational policies related to national identity. The transcripts of the interviews were examined within the framework of content analysis where specific topics were compared and constructed (Wodak et al. 2009). In the analysis, all the responses concerning a specific topic were united in the same analytical stage and the findings were thematically organized according to the research questions of this study. Thus, content analysis provided insights into the way interviewees conceptualized their national identity, what constitutive elements and arguments they employed and how they interwove these elements.

The interview data exposed the ways that patterns of national identity were subjectively perceived and expressed by individuals actively involved in the educational system of Cyprus. Moreover, the interview data indicated the ways in which certain notions about national identifications in official documents were expressed as opinions by individuals actively involved in the educational matters of Cyprus.
8.2 How do key social actors discursively frame national identity
This section examines how the participants of the interviews discursively construct their national identity. The seven male interviewees are addressed with the initial capital letter M and an indicating number, whereas the two female with the initial capital letter F and an indicative number (for sample description see sub-unit 5.5.3).

The first sub-unit investigates in what ways interviewees were associated with Cyprus. In the second sub-unit the spontaneous response of the interviewees to the question “what does Cyprus mean for you?” is presented. This is followed by an investigation about the similarities and differences which the respondents perceived that they have with Turkish Cypriots. The last sub-unit of this section investigates the historical facts that interviewees considered as important for Cyprus. The aim here is to explore the way in which the interviewees construct their political past.

8.2.1 Auto and hetero images related to Cyprus
Initially, all interviewees replied to the open question asking about spontaneous associations and self-images that formed in their minds, when they thought about Cyprus and what Cyprus meant to them. In addition, they were asked to explain what they assumed others thought about Cyprus.

All nine respondents argued that Cyprus was most frequently associated with Cyprus Problem. Some respondents used what they perceive as characteristics of a nation to define Cyprus. Others reported strong feelings of belonging to the Greek nation, and others referred to the multicultural character of Cyprus, emphasizing on its entity as a state. In addition, all the participants argued that Cyprus is associated with the natural space and its people, irrespective of their ethnic origins.

One respondent M2, referred to familiar characteristics related to the term of nation, to describe Cyprus in relation to its geographical position and its history in connection with the current realities and the political problems of Cyprus:
“The geographic position is intertwined with the facts of time, in other words of the history and with the reality, something which has relation with the current reality, with many difficulties and many familiar political problems”.

From what he said M2, seemed to understand Cyprus in ethnosymbolist terms, following the view of Smith (2013, p.64) that “while not neglecting external political, geopolitical and economic factors,...myth and memory that so often prove intractable”.

The association which M3 made related to the concept of state, which he situated geographically, describing the population of Cyprus as multicultural:

“Okay, the first image which comes to my mind is the shape of Cyprus (chuckles), that it is an independent state, eh, since 1960 in the eastern Mediterranean, eh, which consists of a multi-cultural, I would say, population, eh, Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians, Latins, eh, that’s all”. (M3)

To some extent, it can be argued that his political stance was articulated within this response since M3 constructed Cyprus as a multicultural country avoiding any notions of national identification.

In exploring his understanding of Cyprus, M1 used the personal reference ‘we’ in order to describe that Cyprus is ‘our’ homeland without specifying who is included in ‘we’ and ‘ours’. In addition, he generalized his emotional connection with Cyprus, using the generalizing pronoun ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ to replace a semantically narrower expression with a semantically wider one.

“Cyprus is our homeland. It’s the place where we were born. The place where our families live and we will live, let’s say..., at least as much as we can foresee. It’s the place that we love, and we want to see it progress”. (M1)

Even though he described Cyprus as a place where “we and our families will live”, at the same time, he expressed uncertainty using the indefinite expression, “let’s say”, when he referred to the future, making his concerns about the future of Cyprus more
evident, in his explanatory sentence saying, “at least as much as we can foresee”. This uncertainty was explained by his final statement that Cyprus “is an island which half is under occupation”. With his categorical expression “under occupation”, his opinion was summed up about the responsibility of the Turkish occupying forces for the partition of Cyprus. He also mentioned:

“Characteristically then, it is an island, quiet life, but it is changing constantly. … Whatever good Europe has, we will have it, and whatever bad it has, we will also acquire it, if we haven’t done so already” (M1).

M1, who belongs to a right-wing party, stressed the emotional and moral aspect that he connected with national identity, but without any association with primordial or organic ideas of nationalism (sub-units 2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.2).

F1 connected Cyprus with the Greek homeland, with national problems and negotiations, including the factor of Turkish expansionism. She classified the entity of Cyprus in relation with the ‘other’, with the ‘enemy’, which she considered is Turkish expansionism. In addition, she referred to the coup d’état, thus linking it with the partition of Cyprus. Specifically F1 mentioned: “Homeland, eh, national problems, eh negotiations, Turkish expansionism, coup d’état”. F1 who belongs to the political right accepted primordial’s national identifications (sub-unit 2.3.1) which define a nation as opposed to the ‘other’, the ‘enemy’.

By using the unconnected representation: “Blue, Hellenism, history, tradition, conquerors, violence, invasion, occupation, struggle for liberation, disappointment”, F2 identified Cyprus with Hellenism, and designated Cyprus based on its Greek history and civilization. She also highlighted images and emotions which are connected with the Turkish invasion, and in a similar way to F1, she identified Cyprus in relation to ‘the enemy’, ‘the other’. She equated Cyprus with Hellenism and identified Cyprus based on its history and its civilization. F2 was proud of connecting Cyprus with motherland Greece, and had the view that maintaining Greek identity is a prerequisite for Cypriot survival as a people:

“Eh, it means many things, pride about culture and the connection of Cyprus with mainland Greece, historically, as much as some do not want to admit it, it
is something that ... is that which we can maintain to survive without obviously meaning that this is incompatible with tolerance of diversity and respect to any others. An island that traditionally was a crossroad of cultures and nations etc”.

Without specifying who she was referring to, using the indefinite pronoun ‘some’, she mentioned efforts, which she recognized, have being made so that Cyprus might be cut off from Hellenism. She specified though that maintaining Greek identity does not mean refraining from diversity, referring in this way to the relations with Turkish Cypriots in the sphere of intercultural dialogue. F2 belongs to a right-wing party. Her emphasis of the roots and depth of her ethnic identity resemble primordialist arguments and the essentialist form of nationalism (sub-units 2.3.1, 2.3.2)

M4 who belongs to the political right, associated Cyprus with its natural environment, “the sun, the sea”. He then referred to its historical monuments from the Byzantine period, connecting Cyprus with Byzantine civilization. He also correlated Cyprus with personal experiences, such as his studies in several schools, festivities and scenes from everyday life from previous years. He used the geographic term ‘an island’ to define Cyprus and became more lyrical by personalizing Cyprus when he referred to the misfortunes of its people. He criticized the behavior of Cypriot people for appearing disorderly with their words and acts, giving as an example their declaration that they love Cyprus without doing anything to prove this love. While at this point he spoke generally about ‘people’, without including himself, in the next sentence he associated every part of Cyprus with personal experiences.

When M6, a person with left-wing political affiliations, was asked what Cyprus meant to him, he repeated the expression “everything, everything” pointing out his love for Cyprus. He emphasized the fact that he is a refugee within the borders of his own country and associated Cyprus with the experiences he had as a child and young man in his village, which is now occupied by Turkish families. He recalled those years and expressed his desire to live in his birthplace; a right that he said was illegally taken away from him.
For M7 Cyprus is defined by

“the people, the natural environment, mainly by the relations between people. The people of this place which are divided in specific categories, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, anyway, anybody living in this place and we share some kind of association”.

M7, who belongs to a left-wing political party, associated Cyprus with all its inhabitants and emphasized that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots share the same country. He considered that Cyprus belongs to its entire people, a point of view that characterizes the left-wing ideology of Cyprus.

The difference between the way interviewees identified themselves with the way others defined them (auto- and hetero- stereotypification) was reflected in the answers to the question designed to elicit respondents’ views on how Cyprus is perceived by non-Cypriots. The response of F1 condensed this perception with her argument that non-Cypriots consider Cyprus as

“...as a region like any other in the world. We have the impression that it is the center of the Earth, but this only applies to us”.

M2’s experience of having contact with people abroad, in his capacity as a trade unionist, confirms that Cyprus is frequently seen as a headache and a bother.

“For many foreign entities with whom we collaborate with, Cyprus is a headache. Often it is an annoyance, and in many cases is an extremely complex problem to understand in detail” (M2).

A similar view was expressed by M1 and M4, when they stated, “They sometimes see us as a nuisance in Europe”. M3 jokingly highlighted that the geostrategic location of Cyprus makes foreign politicians view Cyprus as an unsinkable aircraft carrier.

“For politicians or for interests, I don’t know, I can say it jokingly that they see Cyprus like an unsinkable aircraft carrier, (laughter, humor), right? So, it depends on the prevailing geostrategic interests”. (M3)
Many of my respondents argued that foreigners regard Cyprus as a tourist destination, by using expressions such as “a very good tourist destination, but expensive, with very good sunshine, with attractive beaches” (M2). “Foreigners consider Cyprus a good destination for holidays”. (M1). “Possibly foreigners consider us as a good tourist destination, see, sun, etc” (M4). Reference was also made to the ‘attractive’ tax system for foreigners in Cyprus: “… and with some significant benefits in terms of the tax system” (M2). “If they are businessmen, perhaps a good place to have their companies”. (M1)

Although the interviewees associated Cyprus with ethnic and civic national features when they were asked to consider what others might think about Cyprus, they mainly referred to its geographic and topographic setting. Some references were made to its attractive tax system and to the mentality of Cypriots.

8.2.2 What does Cypriot mean?
The question “What does being Cypriot mean?” was primarily designed to elicit spontaneous associations about what it means to be a Cypriot, and thus to obtain statements about the conceptions of ‘typically Cypriot’. The responses to this question range from mere ‘coincidence’ to typical characteristic of Cypriots. Almost all respondents mentioned more than one characteristic, including those who in the first place attributed the identity of Cypriots (Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots) to coincidence. When interviewees referred to typical characteristics of Cypriots, they usually meant Greek Cypriots, but without associating them with Greeks.

The interviews indicated that combination of politically-based and culturally-based lines of argumentation prevail in discourses of national identification. Even when interviewees emphasized citizenship, which did not occur very often, as a criterion for national membership and identity, most of them referred to linguistic, cultural and ethnic features of Greek-Cypriot self-perception. The interviews also highlighted that the emotional attachments most respondents felt about Greece is a very important aspect in the discursive construction of Greek-Cypriots’ identity.
Some interviewees specified citizenship as the sole defining characteristic in the construction of national identity (for example M3, M5). Some (M4, M5, M6) emphasized the emotional factor and defined as Cypriot everyone who feels this way. They assessed that even those who hold official citizenship cannot be defined as Cypriots if they do not feel that they belong to this place. Some others called attention to the random nature of national membership, determined by the mere coincidence of place of birth and socialization in national identity (M1, M3). By contrast, several respondents (F1, F2) made it very clear that for them, citizenship is too limited a criterion for national membership. Thus, they regarded citizenship as a mere formality which has little bearing on national identity. One (M2) placed Cypriots in the broader context of Europe, facing the problems deriving from globalization.

Very clearly M3 supported the idea that citizenship is the sole criterion to belong to the Cyprus people:

“A Cypriot, eh ... as I know, as a Greek or Turkish or French etc, spontaneously to mind comes that someone who has Cypriot citizenship, eh, based on the Constitution, the laws governing the Cypriot State, has acquired Cypriot citizenship, eh, he has Cypriot identity, that’s all” (M3).

Elsewhere, M3 referred to the Constitution in order to determine the multicultural character of the Cypriot people:

“The Cypriot people consist of different cultural or ethnic groups, let’s say, composition of population is not as such, let’s say, it’s even recognized by the Constitution. Okay, we have two main communities, which are different in terms of ethnicity, Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots, and we have the various religious groups which are defined on the basis of creed and not ethnicity, which chose to belong to the Greek-Cypriot community. These are the Maronites, Armenians, Latins ...”. (M3)

Although he adopted ethnic segregation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, he mentioned that:
“The similarity first of all which should unite us, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, is to love our land, and so in other words love of Cyprus. To accept that we are Cypriots, right?” (M3)

M3 also added that the separation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots depends on the mere coincidence of place of birth, making an association with Switzerland.

“Beyond this, if someone is Greek-Cypriot or if someone is Turkish-Cypriot, it’s something that we ourselves do not choose. It depends where we are born, as I know it is the same and in other countries. Let’s say, if a Swiss man is born, ..., in the French speaking part of Switzerland, or in that German-speaking part, let’s say, it doesn’t mean that this thing will dissolve Switzerland, right?” (M3)

He had also equated the concept of citizenship with the concept of people, explaining that the Cypriot people are one, regardless of ethnic origin:

“From the moment you are a Cypriot citizen... now the concept of Cypriot society... On the other hand, this is defined, and the politicians use it, ‘the people of Cyprus’, the ‘Cypriot people’, also this is what we are trying to accomplish now through negotiations, saying that the Cypriot society is one, regardless of national origin. Cypriot people, anyone who is a Cypriot citizen, simultaneously belongs to what we define as people of Cyprus”. (M3)

However, elsewhere in the interview, M3 mentioned that it is complicated to determine who the Cypriot people are. He commented that the national identity of each person is an instrument to accept and live with the other. In this way he showed acceptance of multicultural societies and multinational states.

“Cypriots, I know now, eh, a complex issue, to tell you the truth, it doesn’t really bother me, eh, I simply consider that the national identity of each person is the vehicle which helps him co-exist with other people of other ethnic identities. And the greatness of a national identity is this, in other words, to be able to accept the other, the different one, to coexist with him,
to acquire the positive aspects of this coexistence, and the collaboration together mainly for the good of society, more broadly, of mankind” (M3).

The spontaneous reaction of M1 to the question “what does it mean to be Cypriot?” was the monologue: “This is difficult...” accompanied by a prolonged pause. This spontaneous response reveals his concern and the difficulty to define what it means to be a Cypriot. After a prolonged “eeeh...” he explained that the concept of the identity of a Cypriot is a composition of legal, emotional and cultural factors. While in the definition of Cyprus, M1 used the first person plural ‘we\our’, in his definition of what is Cypriot he used the exclusive third person singular (he) and plural (they). Regarding the legal dimension of the Cypriot identity, he mentioned using the adverb “correct” to characterize that this is the proper status: “Legally, correct, the laws define who Cypriots are ...” (M1). Even though he determined settlers as illegal, he accepted that the coincidental fact of their birth in Cyprus is enough to grant them Cypriot nationality:

“and even those who are born here in Cyprus are Cypriots, and this is applies to the settlers, etc. Eh ...even though they are illegal, and they are born here, they are Cypriot. Eeh, so culturally speaking, a Cypriot is one who speaks Greek or Turkish, but was born in Cyprus, has lived all his/her life in Cyprus from the moment s/he was born until now.” (M1).

In addition, he defined as Cypriots also those who lived most of their lives in Cyprus: “or they who have lived most of their lives in Cyprus and live on the island” (M1). This legal definition of a Cypriot which is determined by the mere coincidence of birth, or of the time someone spent in Cyprus was complemented by cultural and emotionally laden identifications with Cyprus:

“They who have the culture of Cyprus, in other words, the manner in which they think and function, behave at festivities, and how they behave in their daily lives. Okay, it is mainly how you feel. If you feel that you’re a Cypriot, and you have Cyprus in your heart, etc, or even if you behave and practice the Cypriot customs and traditions of this place, yes, you will be characterized as Cypriot” (M1).
Briefly and clearly, M5 defined as Cypriot “everyone who lives in this place and works for the prosperity of Cyprus, irrespective of their ethnic origins”. Without any attachments with mother countries, he regarded love for Cyprus as a criterion for defining Cypriot people. As he stated: “He shall first fight for the country and then for himself”. This perception comes in agreement with Habermas (1993) ‘Staatsnation’ which is characterized by the will and the constitutional patriotism of its citizens and their devotion to the state.

For some, the legal definition of a Cypriot was not considered as sufficient criterion for the characterization of the Cypriot people. They defined Cypriot people in terms of linguistic and cultural criteria, identifying them with the broader concept of Hellenism:

“Citizenship isn't enough criterion. Alright, typically everyone is Cypriot within the population, but characteristics of the people as a whole are many and varied. Common language, common religion, tradition, are aspects which characterize a nation” (F2).

F2 was also opposed to efforts by a few circles to abandon the identification of being Greek Cypriots. She also, defined as “foreign” whoever gains Cypriot citizenship, but belongs to a different ethnic group, expressing the view that even s/he shouldn't lose the elements of her/his identity:

“And perhaps this is our problem while trying to show that we are progressive, etc, they consider that we should abandon our identity. As a foreigner who obtains Cypriot citizenship, it does not mean that should he lose the elements of his own identity” (F2).

In the definition of a Cypriot, F1 recognized Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as different ethnic groups, and acknowledged the need to live peacefully together, without having to change their identity:

"It means to be Greek Cypriot, to be Turkish Cypriot, to be of any other origin, to be able to live peacefully, within a common homeland, without having to become mandatory someone else, other than who you are. Greek
to remain Greek, Turkish to remain Turkish, German to remain German” (F1).

Although she separated Cypriots into various ethnicities, when requested to determine the typical features of a Cypriot, she refers only to Greek-Cypriots, and outlines their characteristics as citizens:

“Typical features of a Cypriot is that he gives too much trust in leaders, cares little for politics as an individual, and he expects to have political situations explained, rather than he himself being bothered to read politically related articles, agreements, eh, plans and so forth”. (F1)

M2 connected the Cypriot citizen with his/her obligation to be an active citizen, placing the Cypriot in the wider European environment, faced with the problems of globalization. He acknowledged the concern of the Cypriot citizen for the solution of the Cyprus problem, and his/her interest in public affairs and political developments regarding Cyprus:

“At the given moment, I believe that as like almost everywhere in Europe, a basic value is that you are an active citizen, now with many problems that resemble the problems which have been imposed everywhere by globalization, without substantial differences. I think that there is a ‘color’ due to the unsolved Cyprus problem, that other European countries and other European populations might possibly not have, the concern for the political issues, the concern that there’s an expectation for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, and that is why there is more contact with the political developments” (M2).

In addition, M2 mentioned as a Cypriot feature the speed in which s/he tries to solve her/his problems. And at this point, he connected the interpersonal problems of the Cypriot with the broader society and described it as a shared feature with the rest of the world:

“It's to a very large degree a person who invests in speedy problem-solving, personal issues and so on; and at the given moment, he faces serious social
and other interpersonal problems, which are also faced by a wider population”. (M2)

M4 used second plural, to define as Cypriots those who “feel Cypriot, love their country, feel pain for all the negatives and want to get to know Cyprus”, recognizing that substantially they do not know it. He also referred to the need of Cypriots to have back their country and to be free to travel and enjoy every part of the island.

With reference to the legal definition of Cypriot, M4 acknowledged that the coincidence of a birthplace is a criterion for defining membership of Cypriot people, but not the sole sufficient factor. Instead, he connected the identity of Cypriot with the history of Cyprus and with the emotional connection of feeling a part of this history. As he clarified, elsewhere during the interview, when he referred to Cypriots he meant Greek Cypriots and when he spoke about historical continuation he indicated the Greek culture.

Referring not to the foreigners, but to the traditional citizens of Cyprus, M6 argued that citizenship is not a sufficient criterion for defining a Cypriot, to disapprove in this way the behavior of some Cypriots. Instead, he classified as Cypriot:

“people who's appearance shows that they come from another background, they might not speak the language very well, but they feel comfortable in the Cyprus environment and choose to belong to its people”. (M6)

Questioned about which criteria were essential for defining membership of the Cypriot people, interviewees’ answers frequently suggesting cultural foundations underlying the construction of Greekness. At some point in their interviews, most interviewees referred to typically Cypriot modes of behavior but, in many cases, without accepting the construction of Cypriot national character. They usually admitted that these traditional characteristics of Cypriots are changing, giving their place to other more negative features. Sometimes, they argued that what we consider as Cypriot characteristics are usually also the same characteristics of other people. When the discussion came to their national character, they usually used Hellenic-centered discourses to identify their national self-conception. With reference to the typical characteristics of a Cypriot, in several cases, interviewees
repeated consumer clichés: “I would say that is to a large degree s/he is a consumer” (M2).

M3 gave some stereotypes regarding Cypriots, which he claimed that they have been altered in recent years. At this point, jokingly, he pointed out that changes in the social fabric of Cyprus have made Cypriots more racist than hospitable:

“Eh, Cypriot is a peace-loving citizen, hospitable, okay... I say that these things might be some stereotypes that have developed during our lives, because especially in recent years with the changes in the composition of the family, social fabric, etc, we are more racists instead of hospitable, (laughter), but I think that Cypriots are quite generous”.

Then he clarified that the features he gave are not exclusively Cypriot characteristics, but they can also characterize other people:

“Eh, hard working, with all the good and the bad which may also characterize other peoples, right? Eeh, and not only ours, some characteristics are not exclusively our attributes” (M3).

Similarly expressed herself F2, who recognized that some positive typical Cypriot characteristics are on the verge of disappearing, giving way to other negative attributes:

“S/he is hospitable, s/he is outgoing, regardless of the unfavorable circumstances. The institution of the family, the traditions function. Unfortunately we see we are developing very differently. Something which we are not, and we have allowed ourselves to become individualistic, confined to ourselves, selfish, attempting to mislead others, all of this...”(F2)

M4 used both, positive and negative characteristics in order to define Cypriots and to describe their personal character and their relationships with other people:
“Cypriot is honorable, sensitive, but also he is credulous and easily accepts domination without reacting”.

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Without any references to culture and tradition, M5 used personal characteristics that define social life to define Cypriots. As a positive feature he gave “open-minded” and as negative their “usual interest-driven behavior”.

M1 considered spontaneity as the main characteristic of Cypriots, and that their function led by emotions. He considered that in comparison with Europe, professionalism is lacking: “Professionalism is not at the levels of Europe, shrewd professionalism” (M1). He also confirmed that typical Cypriot characteristics of the older generation are on the verge of disappearing: “Eeh you often find humanity, etc, but this is also an element towards extinction” (M1).

M2 used spatial reference through persons “for our side”, meaning the Greek-Cypriots, leaving to be understood that there is also another or other sides and he listed features that make up the cultural identity of Greek-Cypriots. He also expressed the opinion that socialization plays a decisive role in national identity.

“I think that for our side an important feature is the language, religion is an important feature or religious beliefs and lifestyle. A specific way of life, that prioritizes values such family relationships, the relationships within the community, his/her friends. Here I would say, this is his/her identity with a single meaning”. (M2)

Before referring to the features he assigns to Cypriots, M6 expressed the view that everyone may subjectively “approach these features in a positive or negative way”. He used the inclusive ‘we’ to outline that:

“We have some typical characteristics... This made us Cypriots. Sometimes, when we want to gain something we use strategies, and the discourses we employ send out messages”. (M6)

Although he spoke about typical characteristics of Cypriots, when he began to give examples he used the phrase “because we are Greeks”, identifying in this way Cypriots as Greeks.
8.2.3 Similarities between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots

Some interviewees (M1, M2, M3) recognized similarities between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. One (M3), commented that there is a common identity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which was created in the years of peaceful coexistence. Besides the similarities in the mentality, M1 and M4 also recognized similarities in their appearance. M5 stated as a main similarity the fact that “we are inhabitants of this place”, pointing out citizenship as a main unifying element. M7 clarified that Turkish Cypriots are Cypriots. It was also mentioned that Cypriot dialect was borrowed from Turkish and also the dialect of Turkish Cypriots was influenced from the vocabulary and intonation of the Cypriot dialect (M6).

The opinion of M2 regarding similarities with Turkish Cypriots was created by personal contacts which he had through his capacity as a trade unionist with members of the corresponding Turkish Cypriots trade union. When he referred to the cultural characteristics of the Greek Cypriots, he used the verb “I think”, which illustrates some form of uncertainty. Once again he referred to the common features with Turkish Cypriots, using the expression, “I could” which does not reveal a complete opinion, but a personal confirmation. Both ways of expression show moderation in his views, and not confidence and absolute certainty.

“Now the common features that I could find with Turkish Cypriots in the degree and extent of my contacts through my profession are the way of life, they are also consumers, they like good food, they like jokes, they deal with and comment on the social reality and the political reality, which also occurs with us. They have concrete and high family values, such as prosperity and the progress of their children, their studies and so on, which also happens with Greek Cypriots; and they put general emphasis on their personal well-being, the prosperity referred to about home, the car, to the material goods, and also they are distinguished predominantly by either serious concern for the political future of Cyprus and its survival as an entity...”. (M2)

M1 identified a common way of thinking, culture and behavior with both Turkish Cypriots and settlers. He even recognized similarities in physical characteristics, a
confirmation which he expressed with uncomfortable laughter. The reference to similarity in physical characteristics refers to common origin:

“I think the differences are minimal. Almost zero between Turkish Cypriots, and even minimum with settlers. Most of them at least, the older settlers who have been here for years...and in the way of thinking and in culture and in the way we react and behave, eh ... it is understood that in the face, you cannot tell the difference (laughter). Eh ... but also in the way of thinking, in culture etc”. (M1)

With modesty M3, using the verb “I think”, supported the existence of common identity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the basis of common habits, traditions and artistic expressions. He recognized the ethnic differences of the two communities, which he considered can also serve as a unifying element:

“I think there is a common identity, thus, in other words.... ...various issues having to do with our habits, our customs, dances, songs, eh, performances etc, which unite Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, simply each community has its own traits, let’s say it’s the differentiating component, but which may not hurt by being a unifying element of the national identity of each individual, right?”(M3)

M4 recognized similarities in physical characteristics between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots which attributed to the years of common life. He referred in vague to these similarities presenting them as elements that “you catch on the air”. When he described an experience he had in London when he met a Turkish Cypriot in a train, in a humoristic way, he referred in similarities in physical characteristics. As he said:

“when I saw him, even though I didn’t classify him to Greek Cypriots, he reminded me something from Cyprus and I was thinking that he looks like a relative from Dali. As I found out later, indeed this man was a Turkish Cypriot from Potamia, a village close to Dali. This is a clue, let us say, that there is something in the air that makes you think that there is something in common” (M4).
However, in the progress of the interview, when M4 spoke about a visit he had in the occupied Cyprus, he became more specific and referred to similarities with Turkish Cypriots in the way they think, act and react. When he referred to Turkish Cypriots he classified them as Cypriots; on the other hand, he recognized many differences with settlers whom he did not classify as Cypriots. He mentioned that the occupied areas show a picture of a different world, which in some cases presents strongly the Eastern culture, without having something in common with the rest of Cyprus. He also mentioned that as he had being told by a Turkish Cypriot, they also recognize differences with settlers.

8.2.4 Differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots

The distinction which was made between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots referred to both their political and to their cultural identity. In their political identity, dependence of Turkish Cypriots from Turkey was mentioned, (F1, F2); the different way of interpretation of political terms relating to the Cyprus Problem was also stated (M2). Language and religion were mentioned as defining differences in their culture. For some (M1, M2) religion was not a significant difference, because as they argued young people in both communities are not very religious. In addition, it was pointed out that the de facto partition of Cyprus created differences between the two communities (M6).

When referring to Greek Cypriots, M2 used the addressee-exclusive “we”, disassociating himself from Turkish Cypriots. He indicated language as the essential difference with Turkish Cypriots. Also he identified a difference in the manner of interpretation of historical events, as well as in the different interpretation given in political terms used in the settlement process for the Cyprus Problem. According to M2:

“If I had to say something about the differences; first of all, it is the language, it is a vital difference. They are, I would say, perceptions which exist about the history of Cyprus and the accountability that is very different in most times from our side and eh, the perception we have or that they have about
which could be a the future of our country. In other words, I think we use the same terms several times without talking about the same things. We, for example, most of the time, I mean people, with the term reunification, under the title of reunification is basically the return if possible to the pre-’74 situation, before the invasion; namely the Republic of Cyprus, the strong factor - the return of refugees. When Turkish Cypriots say reunification, most times it means a new situation in which it will not be a return to ’74, but where they could in essence have to have some conditions to live in a new state” (M2).

With reference to differences between population in the occupied territories and the population in free areas, F1 using the spatial reference of adverbs of place “from there” and “from here”, she separated the two communities geographically. She commented on matters relating to the political identity of Turkish Cypriots:

“...There the population is much less democratically oriented in the sense that they are totally dependent on Turkey. In contrast to the Greek Cypriot, from here, which is not in the occupied part, and even the Turkish Cypriots who are not in the occupied areas who are over here, do not feel that they take instructions from another state for how they will vote, how they will behave, what they will write in their newspapers, and so on. I think that they lack basic civil rights...” (F1)

F2 positioned herself similarly. She argued that the Turkish Cypriots are trying to impose their own wishes onto the Greek Cypriots. She used the adverb “unfortunately” to express the view that, contrary to what one would expect, the Turkish Cypriots are oppressed by Turkey and the settlers:

“Unfortunately, there, a minority of Turkish Cypriots exists, which is under pressure from settlers and from Turkey. I believe that fanaticism exists there, and it is the efforts of the minority trying to impose its own wishes onto the majority. At this time, the conqueror, the invader, is over there...not as a Turkish Cypriot, but this is the situation. The territory is under occupation. Ei...”. (F2)
Language and religion are the defining differences between the two communities for M1. He considered that the second is decreased because as he claimed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot youths are not religious to a large degree:

“If you put one next to the other, besides the fact that they speak differently, the only difference is language and religion to the extent that they practice religion, and I mean either Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots”. (M1)

A similar view was also expressed by M3:

“For example, okay, I am Christian Orthodox, I speak Greek, so, eh, I have a Greek education. The Turkish Cypriot is Muslim, in the degree that it is because Turkish Cypriots are not very religious, eh, they receive a Turkish education and they speak Turkish ...”. (M3)

M2 referred to the shrinking numbers of Turkish Cypriots, and to the great influx of settlers to highlight the changing demographic population in the occupied territories. While recognizing similarities between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, he considered the mentality and the way of life of the settlers totally different.

“There is tremendous inflow of settlers, a great and officially declared decline of the Turkish Cypriot population, which has resulted at this moment that the common characteristics which someone could find is with Turkish Cypriots who live in the occupied part, instead of with the settlers who have a totally different mentality and outlook in relation to the way of life and to Cyprus”. (M2)

References were made for negative stereotypes created for Turkish Cypriots because of identifying them with settlers (M3). M3 also expressed the view that the de facto partition of Cyprus will inevitably create another state within Cyprus, with its own characteristics. He reiterated that he recognized that Greek Cypriots are different in their mentality than the settlers, but not with Turkish Cypriots, and he had the opinion that if direct trade with Turkish Cypriots was allowed, any social differences would be eliminated:
“But if we take Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots in terms of their habits, their standard of living, their train of thought, etc there are not many differences, in other words, the image which has been created that Turkish Cypriots are like the settlers, and I don’t know, they are uncivilized, barbarians, etc, etc, I think it’s something that doesn’t exist. With the passing of years, whether we want it or not, in the north a state is being created, which is a pseudo state, but it has its institutions, it has its pseudo president, its pseudo prime minister, its pseudo ministries… And as time passes, the Cypriot problem is not solved, and we have new generations being born in the north, growing up and not knowing something else, at the end of the day another state will be created within Cyprus… The differences, I told you, what are they in relation to the settlers, from that point on, in other words if they manage to proceed with direct trade, and the north begins to develop economically, there will not be many differences regarding the social structure etc” (M3).

In addition, M5 had the opinion that “in previous years any kind of differences, was less important than today”. M5 undermined the importance of differences by referring to them in vague. He used the indefinite pronoun “somebody” to allocate responsibility to “somebody” for intentionally constructing these differences: “somebody cleverly attempt to maximize these differences and to create disputes between the two communities, serving their self-interest aims” (M5).

M7, without any reference to the Turkish invasion, he attributed differences with Turkish Cypriots to the division of Cyprus. Although he spoke in general about a gap, he specified only the difference in living standards. As he said:

“Obviously division created differences, because it produced distance between people - emotional, psychological, social and political distance. It was unavoidable to create gaps“.

He realized that the opening of barricades offered opportunities for some kind of contact and the two communities came closer, but as he argued: “this gap still exists. It is true that there is a huge gap”. (M7)
With reference to ethno-national symbols, M6 recognized differences and pointed out the provocative way the Turkish flag is displayed in the mountain range of 'Pentathaktilos', mentioning that “there are also provocative people and in the other side”, to continue explaining “… but I face the same thing with Greek Cypriot in this side”.

8.2.5 The construction of a common political past

With the question referring to crucial 20th century events concerning Cyprus, the aim was to prompt useful answers in order to examine the role of history in the construction of national identity, and to highlight those historical periods and events from the repertoire of the interviewees’ collective memory, which they perceived as the most crucial. Historical recollections which are stored in the collective memory of social groups are of particular importance for the construction of national identity (Wodak et al 2009).

As was seen in the answers, each person attributed different weight to the events of the past. From the answers of each, the way in which they identified themselves was visible. Some gave emphasis to the independence of Cyprus (M1, M2), others to the EOKA struggle for union with Greece (F1, F2). One, M5, considered as first in importance the accession of Cyprus in EU and second the Independence “we received in 1960”, which he characterized as “curtailed”. Those emphasized the independence of Cyprus, placed themselves as citizens of an independent state. And those who emphasized to the struggle of EOKA, overstated their Greek national identity. The accession to EU was described as an enlarged identity in the European environment. Four of the participants (M2, M3, M4, M6) referred to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot intercommunal hostilities, defining in this way Cyprus in relation to the Cyprus Problem, and the expansion of nationalism.

M7 connected all the events he considered as important with the development of nationalism in both communities. As he explained:

“it is a sequence of events, which if you approach them historically, examining how they are related - because there are demands from the one
and the other community that evolve at the beginning of 20th century. Namely the Turkish and Greek nationalism begun at the beginning of 20th century and as result the demands of ‘Union’ and ‘Taksim’ affected the route of Cyprus afterward” (M7).

He included the two World Wars and Asia Minor catastrophe to the important events. He also considered, as “very very important fact” the British colony period. By using the adverb “obviously” he emphasized “the conflicts between the two communities with the events of 1963 and 1974”. With this sentence, M7 equalized the events of 1963 and 1974 presenting them as conflicts between the two communities, avoiding again any reference to Turkish invasion.

M3 considered that the painful events of the decade ’63 – ’74 determined the future of Cyprus. This decade included bi-communal hostilities, division between Greek Cypriots, the coup d’état and the Turkish invasion. In this way, he connected his identity with the political problem of Cyprus.

During the period ’63 – ’74, there were bi-communal clashes of ’63 and ’67, which were referred to by M2 as “bi-communal problems of ’63 and of ’67”, adding the impact which the hostilities had on the national identities of the two communities: “...of which the identities and the national passions and national hatred were very much influenced” (M2).

M4 put bi-communal conflicts in a wider frame of events that shaped the national issue of Cyprus. According to M4 these are: “the events of 1923, 1931, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1967 and certainly 1974 that marked Cyprus almost totally and divided it”. As we can see, M4 included Asia’s Minor catastrophe and the expulsion of Greeks, to the events that influenced Cyprus in some way since it offered shelter to many refugees. The rest of the interviewees did not include the bi-communal clashes of ’63, ’67 as important events.

Reference to the negative importance of the coup d’état was also given by F2, saying: “the tragic event of coup d’état and the invasion came to condemn Cyprus to this situation”. The rest did not mention the coup as an important event. As was seen
from the answers, events which were a point of juxtaposition in regards to attributing responsibilities and mistakes were not included by all as important.

The Turkish invasion of 1974 was referred to as negative fact by all. Some used the term “invasion” (M1, M2, F2) and others “occupation” (F1), a fact which shows the definite attribution of responsibilities to Turkey.

Moreover, the struggle of EOKA was mentioned by all as an important event, but with different definition by each one. M1 made a simple reference saying, “the EOKA struggle”, M2 defined it as “the independence struggle of EOKA”. M3 placed the struggle of EOKA in a wider current of decolonization which aimed at the creation of a national state, and used in indefinite expressions “let’s say” and “I don’t know”, distancing himself from these events: “when the decolonization, let’s say, of the people, creation, the need for creation, I don’t know, of a national state, eeh... lead us to ’55 – ’59, I don’t know, the struggle” (M3).

F1, on the other hand, categorized the struggle of EOKA as the most important event, and she explicitly stated that its purpose was union with Greece: “First and foremost, the struggle of EOKA was for the union with Greece”. F2 also considered the highest as unique moment the struggle of EOKA which, as she mentioned, was an expression of the soul of the Greek Cypriot. She made the note that in our days we do not have to demonstrate such examples, using the adverb “unfortunately” expressing her nostalgia for the national sentiment which dominated the period of the struggle of EOKA.

“The highlight of the Greek Cypriots, I believe, was the struggle of ’55 – ’59. It was there that the Greek Cypriot soul gained distinction to the highest level, and I think that this moment will not repeat itself. It was unique, because to reach until there, there was eh... the situation which allowed people to behave that way. At this moment, unfortunately, we do not have such examples”. (F2)

Some also referred to two events which came before the EOKA struggle, and which signaled the beginning of the struggle for self-determination – union, those were the
events occurred in October of 1930, (M2, M3), and the Union Referendum of 1950 (M1).

The accession of Cyprus into the European Union was mentioned as important by M1, M2, M4 and M5. They referred to it after my clarifying question, posing a reservation about the benefits of the accession of Cyprus into the European Union. Specifically M3 mentions: “now some can say about 2004 when we got into the European Union, alright, I do not consider this thing as a milestone, we got in for various reasons”. Also F2 mentioned: “And the accession into Europe, alright, as an important event, but it depends... Definitely it is important; in time I hope that will prove to have been important”.

M2 also included as important events the voluntary participation of Cypriots in the Second World War. As he mentioned:

“I can also say that the participation during the second world war in 1940. Participation of the Cypriot regiment, militarily, even under British flags, in the war in Greece, it was an important element which later influenced in a great degree the constructed perceptions”. (M)

In this way, M2 connected Cyprus and a Cypriot citizen with universal values, adding at the same time that the participation of Cypriots in the Greek army heightened their national sentiment.

M2 mentioned the Referendum for the Annan Plan in 2004 as an important event. M4 also emphasized the referendum for Annan Plan, arguing that “it marked politically Cyprus” and that with better process it could lead to the solution of Cyprus Problem. M4 was the only one that considered the foundation of the pseudo-state by Turkish Cypriots as an important event and included it among other events that marked Cyprus as a state:

“after 1974, I consider as important 1983 with the decisive action concerning the pseudo-state, and certainly the events that followed: the referendum and the accession to EU”. (M4)
The reference to these events that were decisive in the procedure for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem indicated that M4 defined his identity in connection with the political problem of Cyprus.

The nomination of Nobel Prize for economy to a Cypriot was referred by M5 as an important event for Cyprus. In this concept, important personal achievements of Cypriots in social domain were presented as historical events, which usually in history text-books are connected with political and military actions.

8.3 Critics for national identifications within the Curriculum
Differing opinions were expressed about the method that the previous Curriculum puts forth the identity of Greek Cypriots. Some (F1, F2, M1, M4) agreed with the Hellenic-centric direction of it, but others (M2, M3, M7) argued that it expressed national extremes and intolerance to diversity. M6 recognized weaknesses in issues related with language policy in our educational system. They all agreed that there was a need for the new curriculum to include subjects of intercultural dialogue.

While only one of those who belonged to the political right disapproved the inclusion of any nationalistic references in the Curriculum, all the others agreed with the Hellenic centric character of the previous Curriculum but recognized the need for the New Curriculum to include intercultural dialogue in a way that will not conflict with the national consciousness of Greek Cypriots. They placed intercultural dialogue on the base of respect to diversity emphasizing that it is on these grounds the relationship with Turkish Cypriots should be built, rejecting any notions about common cultural identity with Turkish Cypriots. In addition, their answers indicated that the European dimension and intercultural dialogue were validated as being positive and essential.

In general, M1 agreed with the method that the previous Curriculum puts forth the national identity of Greek Cypriots. He did not believe that many changes were necessary. He recognized though the need for some subjects such as intercultural dialogue to be included in the new Curriculum; however in such a way they would
not conflict with the national consciousness. In this sense, he leaned towards Hellenic-centric Greek education which was cultivated by the previous syllabuses:

“I believe, that in general, we will not find many changes which must be made in order to be better improved. That which should be included are perhaps subjects relating to intercultural education etc. In such a way, however, that the national consciousness will not be affected. In general, we do not disagree with the previous Curriculum”. (M1)

M4 agreed with the national orientation of the previous syllabus and as he explained, it was a need that derived from the persistence of occupation and the aim for cultivating the passion for return. On the other hand, he agreed with the addition of goals that aim the coexistence with Turkish Cypriots, since it is a necessity in a unifying Cyprus.

M2 mentioned that our education contributed to intensifying the Greek element:

“In addition, there is a standard value, and through our education, through our literature, through our contact with all that we have contributed, the projected Greek element exists”. (M2)

M3 considered the previous curriculum as quite ethno-centric, and he commented that it prevented getting to know the ‘other’. He had the opinion that the strong reference to the suffering of Cyprus supports the opinion that everyone wants to harm Cyprus, and cultivates the non-acceptance of the ‘other’, the different one.

“... in order for them to be able to understand the world, to understand that Cyprus is not the center of earth and that everyone wants to harm me...eh that we are simply a part of the Mediterranean, of Europe, of the Middle East, right?” (M3).

With references to relevant researches, M7 mentioned that the goals of the previous syllabus “include elements of nationalism and mono-culture”. He agreed with these studies and pointed out that the new curriculum put apart any nationalist positions, but he had some preservation if this could be achieved. Based on these parameters
he argued that the realistic approach is not to try to delete national identity but to refer to it in a way that "do not perpetuate divisions of the past" (M7). He put himself out of the logic of national divisions and used the exclusive first plural to attribute the divisions of the past to lack of self-confidence regarding 'our' national identity. This, as M7 claimed, resulted in the feeling that we are threatened by the national identity of 'the other'.

F1 placed herself in contrast to the above opinion. She considered it correct that education should have the Hellenic centric character which it has since it refers to Greeks of Cyprus. In addition she has the opinion that it would be positive to add the element of reconciliation, not only with Turkish Cypriots but with all ethnic groups. At this point, she began talking about the goal of reconciliation in the wider framework of intercultural dialogue:

"We are Greeks of Cyprus, and good for us, and I believe that they are very correct in saying this thing. To be Greek, and to be able to reconcile with a Turk and a Turkish Cypriot and with whomever else, it is positive, and this should be included. And this should be completed. The same happens with the Turkish Cypriots over there. Education, yes, must cultivate an environment of reconciliation, but on the other hand it shouldn't de-nationalize its groups". (F1)

Similarly to F1, F2 positioned herself, strongly supporting that Greek culture “must” be cultivated as a goal of the curriculum, making the assertion that “besides” Greek civilization influenced all civilizations. She clarified though that the elements of our national identity must be promoted without fanaticism and chauvinistic tendencies:

"Eh, alright,...eh and in the constitution Greek civilization must be cultivated. As an aim of the Curriculum, the connection with the Greek culture beside, which is a culture, which penetrates and passes other civilizations, which exist in all countries, the values of Greek civilization etc. And within the Curriculum, not with fanaticism and chauvinistic tendencies, but yes the elements of our national identity should be promoted". (F2)
When M2 mentioned the suggested new Curriculum, he commented that even though there were not many references about national orientation, efforts to alter the identity of the Greek-Cypriot were not seen, since the teaching language is Greek, and the religion lesson remains the same. With this point of view he correlated national identity with the cultural elements of language and religion. He mentioned that an additional aim in the new Curriculum was intercultural dialogue which he did not consider “harmful” or degrading for the national identity:

“At the given moment, in the New Curriculum all the lessons are in the Greek language, right? The second element remains, religion remains as is. Orientation about Greek literature is steady or the same. Simply in this case, there are not many references about national orientation. There are references about multiculturalism, but I think and it is my conviction, that in its application, and by working on it, I do not think that this would be harmful or degrading regarding identity”. (M2)

8.4 Language policy within the historical and socio-political context of Cyprus

According to the culturalistic perception, the possession of common language appeared to be one of the most prominent factors that make people nationalism-prone (see sub-units 2.2 and 4.2 for explicit discussion). In most of the individual interviews, respondents with right political affiliations stressed their linguistic and religious identity. They defined Greekness in terms of linguistic and cultural criteria and identified Greek language as a very important feature of their cultural identity. For them, the unifying function of Greek language serves nationalistic essence for common national language and has a central role in defining the national identity of Greek Cypriots. As M2 mentioned: “The term Greek Cypriot is mainly ethnical, ethnic nationality which has to do with language, with the past, with a tradition and with a specific way of life which has a strong Greek element”.

All the respondents who belong to the political right recognized the symbolic function of Greek language and defined it as a central feature of their Greek identity. For this reason they were very sensitive with proposals related to the
Greek language lesson and usually explained them in ideological and symbolic terms. Linguistic nationalism found its expression also in the reactions concerning proposals for mandatory teaching of Turkish language when some perceived them as ideologically driven, having as an aim the reduction of national sentiments of Greek Cypriots. However, the majority did not denote any symbolic attachments to proposals concerning the mandatory teaching of Turkish language but recognized its instrumentalist and communicative role in the prospect of a solution to the Cyprus Problem.

M6 recalled his expertise to claim that language is a definitive factor in the formation of national identity. Some of them (M2, F1, F2) claimed in advance the view that there is correlation between the official teaching language and national identity. Recommendations for introduction of use of the dialect in language teaching was interpreted by some respondents (M2, F1, F2) as an attempt to create a Cypriot identity. Also the proposal for compulsory teaching of Turkish in secondary education was interpreted by F1 as an action which would “de-color” the national identity of the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, M5 and M6 agreed with the proposal for the introduction of Turkish language in secondary education as an obligatory foreign language. Also some (M1, F1 and F2) pronounced themselves against proposals to shorten the time teaching of Greek, recognizing the difficulty of students expressing themselves with ease in Modern Greek. M4, M5 and M7 supported the reduction of teaching time of the Greek language emphasizing the qualitative and not the quantitative time of teaching. The other's (M2, M3) realized that any reforms relating to teaching of the Greek and Turkish languages are sensitive issues, and are usually accompanied by reactions.

8.4.1 Dialect vs standard
As for the difference in language which Greek Cypriots and Greeks speak, most of the participants in the interview had the opinion that there was no issue of diglossia and they described the situation as one of language and dialect. Some (M4, M6) even though they considered the Cypriot as a dialect of Greek language, they defined Cypriot dialect as different language, with different codes and recognized the phenomenon of diglossia between the two languages. On the other hand, even
though M5 accepted that there was a distinctive difference between the Greek language and the Cypriot dialect he rejected the opinion that this consists the phenomenon of diglossia. However, he referred to the opinion of some academics that have advanced Cypriot dialect as a language. Almost all of them considered the possibility that the Cypriot dialect be established as the teaching language and the language of academics as implausible. Most of them, in fact laughed ironically when hearing this point of view. Only M6 suggested bi-dialectic education, meaning apart from Greek language at the same time Cypriot dialect to be taught. Although M5 argued that “Cypriot dialect shall be preserved and to stay alive for ever”, he avoided answering whether he supported the opinion that the Cypriot language be introduced as a teaching language by saying: “this is a question that I cannot answer now”. In similar way was and the response of M7.

On the other hand, supporters of the left ideology emphasized the role of the Cypriot dialect in the formation of the identity of Cypriots. For example, M6 characterizes Cypriot dialect as riches that Cypriot people produced; pointing out that Cypriot dialect is a feature that defines Cypriots.

M2 acknowledged the efforts to advance the dialect as official teaching language, and even as an academic language, to be associated with a wider circle of thoughts which aim to cultivate a Cypriot identity disassociated from the Greek element. He disagreed with this approach which considered “oversimplification and naive”. Specifically he said:

“There is a wider circle of thought which considers that if for example the history books are completely changed, if for example we teach the Cypriot dialect, then one fine day we will become Cypriots and we will no longer be Greek Cypriots, and I think that this is oversimplification and naive”. (M2)

F2 regarded the effort to upgrade the dialect as the official language and comprehended it as a more broad movement which aims in the creation of a transnational citizen, without ethnic references. She considered that this effort is aiming to “de-color” the identity of the Greek Cypriots:
“Eh, it's happening, it is the whole effort to de-color the identity of the Greek Cypriot. Some, artistically and deliberately want to create a new identity, they are already denying it, the term national identity annoys them, the connection with any nation, and they want to transform us into citizens of this world”. (F2)

F1 expressed herself strongly when considered those who are trying to create Cypriot consciousness and a Cypriot state with the distinctive characteristic being the Cypriot dialect as anti-historians and without political judgment. This strong view illustrated that F1 correlated the official language with the identity of the state.

“there are also voices for the Cypriot awareness and others, however I consider that they are anti-historians, but on the other hand they are people who have no political judgment. They consider in other words that the Cypriot dialect will become reality,... and the Turks will stop speaking their language, the Indians will stop speaking their language, the Pakistanis will stop speaking their language? And so I will do, what shall I do? Today will I give birth to a new state which will be called Cypriot? Where in history has this ever happened before? For example in Belgium they cannot find a government and therefore they want to have separate ones, there where they were saying that they had a solution. In other words, with which logic are these things proposed? I cannot even understand them, and nor can I explain them scientifically”. (F1)

As the modern European history indicates a language, and not a dialect, is attached to a specific nation (Billig, 1995) and is considered the highest form, with dialect being subordinate to it (Stalin, 1973, p.415). In these nationalistic terms the possession of a common language becomes a crucial symbol based upon beliefs about the nature of a language. Because of this correlation, the status of a language rather than a dialect is associated with cultural nationalism (sub-unit 4.2).

In these lines was the response of F2 who stated in an absolute manner that the language is one, Greek, and she distinguished the dialects as colloquial:
“Eh of course, the language is one! ... The dialects are clearly colloquial. Just as there is the Cretan dialect, the dialect of Rhodes, eh of other islanders, eh God help us, the language is one, it is the common standard Greek. From there onwards, there are dialects as there are in all of the areas of Greece” (F2).

On the other hand, M7 referred clearly about diglossia between Greek language and Cyprus dialect (sub-unit 4.3). He explained his opinion with some hesitation:

“Eee... the language is the Greek. In Cyprus we speak one dialect that is differentiated in a semantic degree and creates its own codes of communication. Eee.. in some degree I consider that there is one common language since there is a common communication, but at the same time there is one different language, thus there is and a different code. Eee.. we would speak about diglossia? Yes, yes”.(M7)

When M7 was asked to comment the opinion of establishing Cyprus dialect as a teaching language he initially did a vague reference to the conflicting opinions concerning this point of view. He had the opinion that pupils shall learn standard Greeks, but at the same time to acquire elements of Cyprus dialect without downloading standard Greeks. He characterized Cyprus dialect as riches that Cypriot people produced; pointing out that Cypriot dialect is a feature that defines Cypriots. He also mentioned that informally Cyprus dialect is used at all levels of education, but he considered as problematic its establishment as an academic language. At the same time he believed that it is an exaggeration in the classroom to be obligatory only standard Greeks to be used.

To the question if Cypriots speak the same language with people from Greece, M6 initially answered “not at all” showing that he believes that Cypriot and people from Greece speak different language. As he mentioned: “However, and the same language to speak again we do not completely understand each other sometimes”. He continued giving examples in which for the same thing or fact Cypriots and Greeks use different word or expression. In the forward, he differentiated his opinion when saying: “there are many differences, but it doesn’t mean that they are
two different languages. They are not different languages...”, recognizing at the same time that educational level narrows any differences. During the interview M6 always referred to Cypriot language and not to Cypriot dialect. His belief is the development of bi-dialectic education where both Cypriot and Greek language would be taught in equal time. He spook about Cypriot language but at the same time he recognized that it is not clear yet what language among the several idioms we have perceived as Cypriot language.

While M2 in previous topics was more moderate, and he practically always made an introduction with the verb “I think”, at this point he expressed clearly his disagreement with the opinion that Greek and the Cypriot dialect are two different languages:

“Cypriots and Greeks speak the same language. Simply in Cyprus, there is the dialect, which of course belongs to the Greek language. But, yes we would say that a Cypriot does not encounter a language problem when he is in Greece. A Greek may face a communication problem when he comes to Cyprus, but basically the language is the same”. (M2)

Also he used the verb “I disagree” for the first time to express his opposition to the opinion that suggests an upgrade of the Cypriot dialect as a taught language, considering such a possibility as anti-scientific. He disagreed however with the view that the Cypriot dialect is a subordinate form of expression and he suggested the promotion of it in schools during the teaching of Cypriot literature:

“I disagree with this opinion; firstly we are talking about the dialect, about an idiom. The common language is Greek. Of course under no circumstances we should not feel as in the past, that in other words, the Cypriot dialect is being persecuted and that it is a secondary form of expression. Perhaps we should examine its promotion within literature lessons, something which we have noted as progress, at least in primary education, but there are still things that need to be done. However, I think that nor linguistics nor in a broader scientific sense, nor in searching in
today's society, would we be able to transmit a dialect, and to establish it as the general teaching language” (M2).

M4 also disagreed with the opinion to upgrade Cypriot dialect as official teaching language and as an academic language and came to the conclusion that such movement would cultivate diglossia further. In this way M4 recognized the phenomenon of diglossia between the Cypriot dialect and the Greek language and considered that the efforts to strengthen diglossia aims to the development of Cypriot consciousness by “some people”, without specifying them. He mentioned that Cypriot literature and folk poetry are already taught in schools and Cypriot dialect is widely used as a spoken language. He repeated again his disagreement for upgrading Cypriot dialect into teaching language, arguing that Cypriot dialect includes a number of regional idioms, wondering which of these idioms should be taught in schools. He considered this opinion as politically driven when he mentioned: “this proposal is probably put deviously on the table”.

M1 did not rejected the use of dialect as the spoken language in schools, and admitted, using the pronoun “alright”, that sometimes students, especially from rural areas, understand more words in the Cypriot dialect instead of in the standard Greek:

“Alright, the Cypriot dialect is okay to be used as the spoken language, either way many students are able to better understand if you tell them a word in the Cypriot dialect instead of in Greek. It’s this that they use in their daily lives. I dare to say especially in the schools in the rural areas, the phenomenon is more visible”. (M1)

Even though M3 acknowledged the Greek language as the official language, and the Cypriot as a dialect, he referred to two languages, and considered as an advantage for Cypriots compared to Greeks to have this ease to jump from one language to another. While such a position refers to the assumption of diglossia (sub-unit 4.6), when he summarized his opinion he clarified that Greek and Cypriot is the same language with the first being the official language and the second its dialect:
“if we’re talking about issues in the official language, its common Greek, alright. Cypriots though have a second language, let’s say the Cypriot dialect. We also have the possibility or the ability to jump from the dialect to standard Greek, and perhaps this is an advantage over the Greeks (laughter), or the Greece residents, to apply terms that are used, but it’s the same language, yes... It is the main language, the official, and the dialect”.

(M3)

M3 considered the existence of different dialects according to their geographical regions in Greece as wealth for the Greek language and he underlined that the Cypriot literature has produced culture. He did not see any usefulness in the adoption of Cypriot dialect as the official language and as the teaching language:

“I do not consider that this thing is a subject for discussion... It is an advantage for us that we can use standard Greek and the Cypriot dialect, isn’t it? In other words, we know one language, if you want, more than someone who lives in Athens and he is a local Athenian, because even in Greece depending on the geographical region there are different dialects... There is no reason which will supersede which, it’s a part of our life, our culture, these things have been established. In addition though we shouldn’t underestimate the Cypriot dialect, right? And even the Cypriot dialect has contributed to culture. We have poets who have used the Cypriot dialect. Now how common would it be to see an official document and to be, I don’t know, in the Cypriot dialect, if it will be something that will help somewhere... Will it be useful somewhere?...I don’t think it will be useful, so what would the reason be, right?”(M3)

F1 strongly considered as wrong the effort to upgrade the dialect to language. She acknowledged that this opinion expresses a group of people who aim the creation of a Cypriot consciousness cut off from its Greek roots:

“Totally wrong, it is not a language, it’s a dialect. Therefore I cannot advance it because... the Cretans didn’t consider upgrading their dialect to language. Why for us these considerations are still taking place? I consider
that they are taking place from people who want to de-Hellenize Cyprus”.

(F1)

Similarly F2 expressed herself and considered the possibility of conversion of the dialect as official language and teaching language as ‘unthinkable’. She made the connection that in no other country the dialect has been adopted as the official language. She acknowledged the dialect as our local idiom. She considered as correct the acquaintance of the dialect through Cypriot literature and through other school activities; however she was absolutely opposed to its conversion into the teaching language. Using the negative exclamation “God forbid” twice, she expressed her opposition to the opinion of creating grammar rules for the Cypriot dialect, and she wondered in which idiom of all geographical regions of Cyprus this grammar would refer to. However on the other hand, she expressed the opinion that the study of the Cypriot dialect proves the connection of Cyprus with Greek culture and with the language of Homer. She concluded that the efforts of cutting off of the Greek identity through the conversion of the dialect into the language cannot lead anywhere:

“I strongly react to this. The Cypriot dialect, eh we will see that it is already, eh and our local dialect. I have not seen in any other country any dialect being adopted as the official language, these things are unimaginable… You get to know the Cypriot dialect as we have done, we can do it through literature texts, other activities at school, under no circumstances should it be adopted not even as a teaching language...Which grammar? God forbid, God forbid that we reach that point. Eh, the study of the Cypriot dialect, in other words I will come to put together a deceptive and artificial construction. Which grammar? From the region of Karpasia or from the mountainous area of Larnaca? ... I must also look at it the other way, studying the Cypriot dialect it emphatically shows our connection with ancient Greek civilization, straight from Homer, for example. Eh these things, I believe are efforts which will not lead anywhere” (F2).

Only one (M6) suggested the bi-dialectical approach; meaning to teach both Greek language and Cypriot dialect in parallel. Some, with right-wing political affiliations
(M2, F1, F2), perceived such an attempt as an effort for development of Cypriot identity detached from any Hellenic cultural elements. All interviewees supported the teaching of Cypriot dialect through texts of Cypriot literature, a practice that is currently applied, but nobody assigned to Cypriot dialect the status of the official language.

Greek language as a common language becomes a crucial symbol based upon beliefs about the nature of language. These nationalistic beliefs influenced its standardisation, and the restoration of the original and correct form of language is perceived as a cultural duty (see sub-unit 4.3 for discussion regarding standard language and dialect). Accordingly, a standard language is validated as a national language due to its interrelation with politics and history and serves ideological ends, rather than be related with language forms and linguistic rules.

8.4.2 The proposal for the mandatory teaching of Turkish language in all secondary schools
The proposal for mandatory teaching of the Turkish language in all secondary schools initially appeared in the planning of the educational reform (2004). However, this proposal was not included in the formal Curriculum (2010).

M1 believed that the Turkish language wouldn't be useful for the youth. On the other hand, though, he admitted that it would be useful with the reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots because there would be better communication. Speaking hypothetically: “Let’s say, when somebody speaks Turkish”, he argued that the Turkish language is not a useful language for young people. On the other hand, without hesitations, he categorically recognized its usefulness for the reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots:

“I believe that it should be this way... There are two parts. The Turkish language will be useful to a young person....I believe that the answer to this question is ‘no’. The Turkish language will be useful in the reconciliation of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots? It will be. You will be able to better communicate with the other, etc”. (M1)
M1 did not reject the proposal for teaching Turkish in secondary education, “I believe that it could happen, right...” however, when he referred to the mandatory teaching of Turkish, he expressed some hesitation, by saying “probably not: Eh that is why the answer to this question about the Turkish language as mandatory is probably not”. Again speaking hypothetically, in the event of a solution to the Cyprus problem, M1 agreed that there would be positive results with the mandatory teaching of Turkish. In this case, he considered the knowledge of the language of the other’s side as a useful tool which would facilitate economic needs and commercial transactions between the two communities:

“In the event of a solution, Turkish can also become a language of communication. In such a situation, it could become mandatory. Anyway, I would not consider it as negative. I would see it as positive in the event of the settlement, because by then the needs of the economy will change. Typically education, especially in middle school and high school, should also aim towards the economy. Because things are changing…”. (M1)

He emphasized the importance of economy and commercial transactions for the development of the state. In the event of a settlement, he considered the economy as a unifying element saying:

“...and because the economy in a state is a unifying element. The key to the economy is taxation and economics; eh they are the elements which help a state first in its consolidation and then its development. Therefore, the economy is important, and so I would consider the Turkish language in case of a solution, I would consider it, yes, within the mandatory languages”. (M1)

Whereas he referred to the settlement of a state, in another point of the interview he mentioned the transactions with the occupied territories, a fact which indicates confusion in terms of the desired solution:

“Because you will have to make... I don't know, a company may want to expand to the occupied part, let’s say it must open shops etc. When you know Turkish, you will be able to easily approach the customer or to collaborate or to develop commercial relations etc”. (M1)
Even though M2 realized the rationale underlying such an intention, he understood the reasons which provoke reactions regarding the mandatory teaching of the Turkish language in secondary education:

“I think that this specific thought such as other similar ones have created an opposite result rather than the desired outcome. Whereas they are relying on the logic that we should become familiar with the other language, we must help in order for us to communicate, the mandatory part is what ruins the whole situation. In other words, for some mandatory means a provocation, all of the things we discussed before about national identity are activated, they take on other dimensions, other intentions and finally there is no benefit”. (M2)

For M4, the Turkish language was not a priority since the main languages of Europe are English and French and classified Turkish to any of the other foreign languages that is offered as an optional lesson in secondary schools. By equating Turkish language with the teaching of other foreign languages, any kind of historically or politically associated meaning that the language of the ‘other’, the ‘enemy’, might evoke was disregarded. In the case of coexistence with Turkish Cypriots he was convinced that we would find ways to communicate, as it was happening and before 1960. As he mentioned: “at this time we communicate with people from Srilancka, with Chinese and with numerous other races, I don’t think that it would be a considerable difficulty…” (M4).

F1 disagreed with the previous proposal for compulsory teaching of the Turkish language in secondary education. With her answer she clearly related language with national identity. She boldly expressed her opinion by characterizing such a unilateral action as “criminal” as long as the Cyprus issue is unsolved. Again she made the distinction “over here” and “over there” to explain that such decisions must be taken jointly and to be applied accordingly in both sides. She considered the unilateral application of teaching the language of the other as an action which weakens the national identity of the Greek Cypriots:
“As a mandatory subject, at this moment, it shouldn’t be... I’m of the opinion that we should not do anything more than what Turkish Cypriot do there. When there are open problems, open issues there should be a common agreement, I cannot compromise as a Greek, and a Turk over there strengthens his nationalism. These things must be done through common committees, to decide and to say that we put forth Greek over there, and you put forth Turkish over here, because we have common positions in the public service where they must speak about these things, and carry them out. But to do it only on one side, again I consider it a criminal”. (F1)

F1 and F2 commented that it was not the time to discuss such possibilities. F2 distinguished between Greek and Turkish sides, identifying in this way Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots according to their mother countries. However, in the future and in the case of a potential solution, she did not reject the possibility of compulsory teaching of Turkish with a requirement that the other side would do the same:

“For the time being I don't think it is correct to discuss such a case. Our students have the right to choose if they will learn Turkish in secondary education at lyceum, they can choose it if they wish. I will also put forth the question, is there a possibility for mandatory teaching of Greek in the Turkish Cypriot side? Therefore, I believe that at this moment, as the things are, anyone who wishes to learn Turkish can learn Turkish by choosing it as an optional lesson. I don’t know how it will be in the future. In other words when we proceed to a solution, or are we at stage of agreements, if they will happen and similar moves from the other side?”(F2)

M3 viewed with hesitation the possibility of mandatory teaching of Turkish in secondary education. He did not adopt the view that by learning the language of the other, I get to know him better. He also commented on the fact that since both languages, Greek and Turkish are official languages of the state, it is unnecessary that Turkish be introduced as a mandatory subject:
“Because it wouldn’t help,... some say it would help, in other words by getting to know someone better, to learn Turkish by compulsion while the other learn some Greek by compulsion...Official languages of Cyprus are Greek and Turkish, whichever of the two languages I speak, I have access to public services and wherever else I want, so, I don’t think anything more would be gained if they were mandatory”. (M3)

M5 supported the proposal for introduction of Turkish language as an obligatory language in secondary education. As he claimed: “I consider that Turkish is one of the most important languages which somebody shall learn, if he is clever, in order to be prepared for the future”. He expressed negatively and indefinitely for those who stopped this attempt recognizing their “tremendous” power in the decision centers, which as he mentioned: “I cannot understand what aims they serve”. (M5)

In a similar way but without naming those who prevent this proposal M7 disapproved their attitude. For M7 the obligatory learning of Turkish is “self-evident”, since as he supported that learning the language of ‘the other’ is one step to get to know him. He also mentioned: “we have two communities in Cyprus, okay the one is bigger than the other, but on the other hand, we do not know what will happen in the future” (M7). With this argument M7 made clear his distance from national identifications, since he accepted the possibility Turkish Cypriots to become majority in the future.

Most of the respondents, though, agreed with the present policy that Turkish be taught as an optional lesson. Thus, the debate about the actual aim of language learning begins at the point where language learning is perceived as having political meaning and acts as a vehicle for transforming the relation of power between the two communities. The possibility that the proposal for mandatory teaching of the Turkish language aimed at equalizing people and cultures was raised by some interviewees.
8.5 The impact of European Union on citizenship and identity

Most interviewees had the opinion that the EU has not influenced Cyprus in any significant way. They felt rather disappointed about the influence the EU had in the efforts for a resolution of the Cyprus Problem. Some interviewees mentioned that membership specified our belonging to the European family, but when the discussion came to national identity, they usually perceived that the EU did not have any fundamental effects on their identity, which might be explained by the fact that they defined it primarily through ‘cultural’ terms.

Contrasting the opinion that EU was possible to assimilate cultures and civilizations, M4 recognized that in the case of Cyprus, the contact with European Civilization made more obvious the distinct culture of Cyprus. As he stated:

“I think that EU influenced us in different ways than many we expected. That is, all these theories about melting pot for civilizations and people etc, I think that in the case of Cyprus they haven’t found suitable conditions, in contrast, getting to know better all the elements of European civilization gave us the opportunity to consolidate that we have a separate civilization and different cultural identity. Thus, from this point of view, I consider that Europe did good and not bad, as many afraid”. (M4)

M7 clearly excluded himself from any identification with national identity. He used third person to mention that there is a discontent about the opinions concerning the way EU influences national identity. As he mentioned: “On the one hand, there is, anyhow, a danger European identity, in a way, to over cover the Greek Cypriot identity”. With the adverb “anyhow” in an interrogative use, M7 distanced himself from this opinion. Instead, he used the adverb “certainly” to compare it with another point of view by saying: “Certainly, there is the argument that Greek and European identities are connected, in a way some people want to believe this”. With the expression “some people want to believe”, he pointed out his disagreement with this opinion.

Some of those who participated in the interview (M2, F1) commented, using the personal pronoun ‘we’ that our accession into the European Union has begun to
determine where we belong, that we belong to the European family. But when M2 referred to the issue of identity, he used the impersonal “one” to lift the discussion to a more general level with the view that within the context of multicultural dimension of European citizenship a European identity would gradually be created. Specifically he says:

“There is a trend which considers, anyway, that with our membership there is the direction of where we belong, and finally we belong to Europe. Therefore the conditions of a European citizen became more attractive, if you’d like, the cosmopolitan, the multicultural dimensions, and within this context, the fact that we live in Europe and we are within Europe there will be a series of events that will slowly create a European identity”. (M2)

The rest (M1, M3, F1, F2) commenting on different aspects of everyday life mentioned that the membership to the European Union did not affect Cypriots.

M1 was of the opinion that our joining into the European Union has no influence on the average Cypriot. Even though, he hoped it would influence the next generations positively in business opportunities. When he referred to the benefits that would be enjoyed by future generations, he used first person plural. This showed that he also included his own generation in regards to the professional opportunities and options offered by Europe:

“The accession for the common Cypriot, practically nothing. I hope it will positively influence the future generations.... Thus, opening our horizons, to go abroad, to see new professions, to come into contact with more professionals, so that in turn we can use our knowledge in the future to help our country developent. And that we have Europe, that’s positive” (M1).

In terms of identity, M1 did not think that the EU would have an effect, since he considered that national identity was more a sense of emotional expression. On the other hand, he recognized the EU’s multicultural policy requiring Member States to respect and accept diversity:
“It's how everyone feels. Either way, Europe does not intervene in issues of culture and identity instead it allows the right, it obliges the state to allow the person the right in order to behave as s/he wishes. Not to abuse he/his freedom, in other words. Eh, but I don’t think that Europe will influence” (M1).

However, in another point of the interview M1 admitted that Cypriot society was changing constantly adopting all the good and bad elements of Europe.

Using first person plural, F2 expressed the view that we have not managed to adopt and make the positive elements of the EU as our own, and nor we identify ourselves as Europeans. Instead she observed that in our discourses we disassociate Cyprus from Europe saying “Cyprus and Europe”. Specifically she said:

“I have a question mark if we have managed to feel as European citizens. There are several positive elements that we have yet to include in our personality, which we should have done. In other words we say Cyprus and Europe. Whereas the French man, the English man, the German does not say this thing. It is considered that he is also the Europe. Eh it is a mentality which has not been overcome and I believe that it is good to take the positive and to react to the negative”. (F2)

 Whereas in a previous question when he referred to Cypriot identity, M3 emphasized the multicultural character of Cyprus, when he referred to the impact of the Europe on topics of identity, he changed his previous answer. He considered that the geographical position of Cyprus is an inhibiting factor regarding interaction with other European countries, and he characterized Cyprus as closed, conservative and hesitant towards foreign societies. He stated that the European Union has not influenced us in any way:

“In regards to identity, I do not consider that we have been affected…e eh and the main reason I consider is that Cyprus, we are an island, right, movement of the population is not easy, if you are, I don’t know, in Germany and you get into your car… you can cross all of Europe… And this to a great degree affects that we are a closed society, we have certain stereotypes
which still exist, we are a bit hesitant towards foreigners…. We entered into the European Union, but it has not influenced us... Not even negatively nor positively because we are a bit isolated, let’s say”. (M3)

In the association which they were asked to make between the European Union and the solution of the Cyprus problem, the answers indicated a disappointment in their expectations regarding the catalytic role which Europe could have taken on in the solution of the Cyprus Problem. M6 referred to the expectation Cypriots had from EU to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. With the use of third person he pointed out that was not his opinion but, “Greek Cypriots expected that with EU Cyprus Problem would be solved in magic way”.

F1 and M3 commented that their ambitions that our membership in the European Union would help the solution of the Cyprus Problem were contradicted. Using the term “unfortunately”, F1 stated her disappointment in the position which until now the European Union had hold regarding the Cypriot issue. She mentioned:

“Our accession into Europe, for me, held many ambitions, but unfortunately Europe is prepared to withdraw even on human rights in order to solve the Cypriot Problem, and this thing bothers me.... But in essence our ambitions of how they would handle the issue of occupation and invasion were many more than of Europe’s. From the moment that Europe accepted, for the sake of settlement, to make concessions on European vested rights, for me this means that we are simply in a family which possibly has common economic interests, but the most important thing is respect of human rights. And these are not being upheld as we had expected” (F1).

M4 argued that it was “pious wish” to expect that the membership of Cyprus in EU would solve Cyprus Problem. In his reference to Europeans he called them as “foreigners” and stated that substantially they do not facilitate the resolution of Cyprus Problem. On the other hand, he argued that Europe can act as an example for coexistence in a multicultural society.

For M3, the EU stance on the Cyprus issue was expected, commenting that basically it is an organization that calculates economic interests. However regarding
negotiations, he recognized that EU membership had strengthened the negotiating position of Cyprus. With his position, he emphasized the decisive role which Turkey has for the solution of the Cyprus Problem, and the dependence of Turkish Cypriots on Turkey. As he explained:

“For example, the fact that we have the opportunity to freeze or to unfreeze chapters relating to Turkey’s accession course, it’s a paper that helps us in negotiating. To the substance, pressure from the European Union or member states of the EU, towards Turkey has not had any results because it was not at the intensity or at the degree which we expected it would be, due to the interests that they have mentioned to you earlier”. (M3)

Referring to the Cyprus Problem, M2 had the opinion that Europe cannot have a catalytic role in the solution, due to Turkey’s powerful position in international politics. With this position, similar to M3, he argued:

“The current perception though after six or seven years, is that the European Union can do only a few things towards the solution of the problem, mainly because, simplified and oversimplified, Turkey is a very strong country with a vital role in global politics, and the European Union will not dare to play a definitive role in order to force a solution” (M2).

One, M5 referred to the way he wanted Europe to influence Cypriots. By using first plural he expressed his wish “to start to act poly-thematically and to stop to act mono-thematically, thus to stop begging for the just of our struggle and for our rights and to strengthen our voice to decisions centers”. In this way he answered to those who expected from Europe to solve our problem, admitting that “we have distance to cover for this specific goal” (M5). M5 elsewhere else employed European Union in order to stress that strong national identity is a precondition for respecting the different and connected national identity with historical determination. He mentioned that:

“European Union demands its citizens to strengthen their national identity in order to find the strength to respect the others. You know, if you don’t
believe to your own historical development, you won’t be able to respect the development of anyone else”.

8.6 Conclusions

8.6.1 National identifications of the interviewees

The national self-identification – the national identity – of the interviewees was based both on political and on cultural national identification with the majority believing that sharing cultural characteristics such as language, history and religion are essential features of their national identity. Political and cultural references to the 3000-year-old Greekness of Cyprus, seemed to have entered the minds of the majority of educators belonging to the political right, and to function as a foundational element for their discursively constructed national identification. They mainly employed “strategies of perpetuation, [aiming] to maintain and to reproduce” (Wodak, et al., p.33) their Greek identity. This kind of national identification was based on the assumption of homogeneity and consistency and suggests that “people belong to a solid, unchanging, intrinsic collective unit because of a specific history which they supposedly have in common, and that as a consequence they feel obliged to act and react as a group when they are threatened” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.11).

Interviewees referred both to the culturally based concept of national identity and to the political state-centered nationality by referring to numerous components: the emotional dimension, the shared culture (specifically the shared cultural past), the common territory, a kind of historically extended Greekness of the island, common language, shared history, common traits of mentality and habits of everyday life, collective present and future and the Cyprus political problem.

The importance allocated to these dimensions differed from individual to individual. Even those interviewees, who primarily considered citizenship as a central constituent part for national identification, when they were asked to define their national identity, classified themselves as Greek Cypriots. Some used cultural foundations that underline the construction of Greekness to assert that nationality
stands independently from citizenship (F1, F2). The analysis of the interviews indicated the complicated process of compromising the subjective construction of national awareness as well as the combination of linguistic and cultural dimensions of national identity with exclusively political dimensions of nationhood. The use of the phrase “the Greeks of Cyprus” (F1, F2) and of the adjectives “Greek Cypriot” and “Greek” was notable, as it indicated the polysemy and “ideological polysemy” (cf. Hermannss 1982, pp.95f, cited in Wodak et al. 2009, p.154) of the adjective ‘Greek’, which can be used as a flag word, “that is a programmatic, positively connotated, declarative concept…” (Wodak et al. p. 154) such as high culture “…and so on, transporting strong ideological commitment” (ibid). The phrase ‘Greeks of Cyprus’ proposes ‘Greater Greek’ connotation, since the concept ‘Greek nation’ itself could indicate such a Greater Greek interpretation. In one case, M7 did not classify himself according to national identity as he considered other identities as being more important. Ideas were also expressed about a multiculturally shaped Cypriot nation (M3).

The term ‘Cypriot nation’ never occurred explicitly in my data, but some respondents with left-wing political affiliations mainly implied its existence in their answers. However, all the respondents defined themselves as Greek Cypriots, identification that signified that the dominant Hellenocentric discourse covered all the other modes of identification and indicated the conscious avoidance of the political left to challenge it publicly.

Although a number of interviewees underlined the importance of citizenship in ‘formal’ or ‘bureaucratic’ terms, they did not perceive it as a constituent element of their national identity. Instead they emphasized emotional attachments with Cyprus in their national self-identification. Even though their emphasis on Greek or Cypriot cultural elements reflects their political affiliations, all the responders demonstrated strong emotional ties to Cyprus.

On the one hand, in political terms almost all the interviewees defined in similar ways their Cypriot citizenship and characterized Cyprus as a political entity clearly perceived and recognized by the Cypriot population, on the other hand, they
conceptualized their cultural identity in different ways. This argument is in agreement with Wodak et al. (2009, p.22) who claim that national identity is

“Constructed and conveyed in discourse....A nation is a mental construct, an imaginary complex of ideas... this image is real to the extent that one is convinced of it, believes in it and identifies with it emotionally”.

In a similar way Hall (1996b, p.612) claims that “People are not only legal citizens of a nation: they participated in the idea of the nation as represented in its national culture. A nation is a symbolic community...”.

Those with leftist political affiliations consider identity in a more comprehensive way. They emphasized a common Cypriot cultural identity that unifies all the traditional citizens of Cyprus, presenting in this way Cyprus as a traditional multicultural country. They employed stereotypical formulations or arguments from political discourses, pursuing in a number of interdiscursive leads as these occur in official educational documents (as these are presented in chapters 6 and 7).

In addition, discourses that define national identity in terms of objective assessable criteria were combined with discourses that suggest the perception of socially constructed national identity. Respondents belonging both to the political left and right considered place of birth and socialization along with environment and influence of education in childhood and adolescence as important factors for the construction of their national identity; perception that indicates acceptance of the socially constructed nature of national identity. In this perspective, national identity was perceived as a combination of widespread concepts and perceptions adopted in the course of socialization. This point of view reminds us Billing’s (1995) ‘banal nationalism’ which suggests that nationalism is apparent in emblematic and symbolic routine habits of all the established nations” (p.41). In addition, he argues that national identity is reproduced with “routinely familiar habits of language” (p.93) (see sub-unit 2.4.1).

Culture-based national features mentioned by respondents comprised both Greek and typically Cypriot modes of behavior. In some cases, manners and habits of
everyday life and culture related to ‘Cypriot mentality’ served as a signal for
differentiation from foreigners but also as an indication for shared ‘Cypriot
mentality’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Such behavioral definitions constitute a mode of objective definition since they
suggest that typical ways of behavior distinguish ethnic groups from other groups.
The perception of shared ‘Cypriot mentality’, which actually indicates cultural
similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, was expressed not only by those
belonging to the political left but also by some interviewees with political right
affiliations. Claims for a biological link with Turkish Cypriots were articulated by
interviewees with right political affiliation who on the one hand, defined their
Greek Cypriot identity with objective assessable criteria and on the other, they
related themselves biologically with Turkish Cypriots. This is an indicative example
of ambivalent and contradicted modes of identifications.

8.6.2 Opinions on language policies in connection with national identity
According to the culturalistic perception, the possession of common language
appears to be one of the most prominent factors that make people nationalism-
prone (see sub-unit 4.2 for explicit discussion). In most of the individual interviews,
respondents with right-wing political orientation stressed their linguistic and
religious identity. They defined Greekness in terms of linguistic and cultural
criteria and identify Greek language as a very important feature of their cultural
identity. For them, the unifying function of Greek language serves nationalistic
essence for common national language and has a central role in defining the
national identity of Greek Cypriots.

Reaction to approaching Cypriot dialect as a distinct language is based on this
nationalistic essence that approaches a group speaking a separate language as
distinct people deserving an independent state of their own, while a group
speaking a dialect is seen as a sub-group, part of a greater group of people (sub-unit
4.3). In these terms, the Greek language is considered as the highest form and the
Cypriot dialect as subordinate that does not constitute a different language.
Accordingly, Cypriot dialect does not represent the Cypriots’ entire identity but the
general identity of Greek Cypriots lies in the Greek language, and their regional identity lies in the Cypriot dialect.

Greek language as a common language becomes a crucial symbol based upon beliefs about the nature of language (sub-unit 4.4). These nationalistic beliefs influenced its standardisation, and the restoration of the original and correct form of language was perceived as a cultural duty (see sub-section 4.5). Accordingly, a standard language is validated as a national language due to its interrelation with politics and history and serves ideological ends, as well as is related with language forms and linguistic rules.

The power of education in the construction of national identity was recognized and for this reason, interviewees who belonged to the political right reacted to proposals and policies they perceived aim to transform their Hellenic identity and aspire the construction of Cypriot identity. On the other hand, supporters of the left-wing ideology emphasized the role of the Cypriot dialect in the formation of the identity of Cypriots.

However, only one of the interviewees used the Cypriot dialect during the interview. All the others used standard Greek with only some expressions in the dialect. One, who lived and studied abroad occasionally, employed some expressions in English. Their response in standard Greek indicates that in quasi-private circumstances Standard Greek language predominates. This is an indicative example of the language used in semi-private occasions.

Although all the respondents accepted the use of the Cypriot dialect in informal situations and recognized its value in Cypriot literature, nobody openly supported its introduction as a teaching language.

As this study indicates the official status of Greek language was not confronted. What was implicitly suggested was the recognition of the Cypriot dialect as a language with its own codes, grammar and syntax. However, without the institutional and official recognition, the Cypriot dialect cannot be upgraded to a language of its own (sub-unit 4.3).
8.6.3 Perceptions concerning the proposal for mandatory teaching of the Turkish language

Although the proposal for mandatory teaching of the Turkish language in all secondary schools initially appeared in the planning of the educational reform (2004), such a case never occurred because of the predominated linguistic boundaries created by language ideologies and beliefs about linguistic difference and similarity (sub-unit 4.4). As Gal & Irvine (1995) point out, these aspects are always correlated with social, political and moral issues.

The important role of language in the construction of national identity was apparent in the answers of interviewees concerning the proposal for mandatory teaching of the Turkish language in all secondary schools. The response of interviewees to this proposal was indicative of the perceptions that frame the relationship between language ideologies and discourses on identity. (sub-unit 4.4).

Almost all of those who took part in the interview disagreed with the obligatory teaching of Turkish at secondary schools. Some considered it useless at this moment (F1, F2, M4) and others who understood that such a project would provoke such reactions that would nullify any possible benefit (M1, M2, M3). F1 interpreted the proposal for mandatory teaching of the Turkish language as an action, which would ‘de-color’ the national identity of Greek Cypriots. Her response indicated that she acknowledged language as a bearer of culture and clearly related language to its symbolic function in national identifications (sub-unit 4.2). Similarly, other respondents with right-wing political orientation perceived any attempt for compulsory teaching of Turkish as an anti-Hellenism action.

On the other hand, those with left-wing political affiliations considered such an attempt as self-evident since the aim is reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots, a perception that was also articulated by some with right political affiliation. Some (M5, M6) agreed with this proposal and spoke disapprovingly of those who prevented its application. M5 and M7 considered it as a very good proposal and
necessary for the future. M6 stated that his vision is Cyprus “to become like other bi-lingual countries”. For M7 the obligatory learning of Turkish is “self-evident”, as he supported learning the language of ‘the other’ is one step to get to know him.

This point of view stresses the contribution of language in cross-cultural understanding, and acknowledges its positive role in building tolerance and understanding between the two communities. If language reflects people’s culture and culture constitutes a distinctive marker of our identity, then one may argue that accessing one’s language can act as a means of creating cross-cultural understanding. As Coulby (1998, p.319) claims: “To have access to one’s neighbour’s culture is to be able to understand something of their language, religion, literature, philosophy, law and science”.

M1 disregarded the symbolic function of language, which equalizes people and nations and instead, emphasized as determinable the instrumental motive in learning a language, which is based on the dictates of society. He considered the proposal as positive in the event of the settlement and admitted that in such a case it would be useful with the reconciliation of Turkish Cypriots because there would be better communication. In this case, he considered the knowledge of the language of the other side as a useful tool, which would facilitate economic needs and commercial transactions between the two communities. This approach underlines the instrumentalist role of the Turkish language as an extra qualification for employment.

Most of them, though, agree with the present policy that Turkish is being taught as an optional lesson. Thus, the debate about the actual aim of language learning begins at the point where language learning is perceived as having political meaning and acts as a vehicle for transforming the relation of power between the two communities. The possibility that the proposal for mandatory teaching of the Turkish language aimed at equalizing people and cultures was raised by some interviewees.
8.6.4 Summary of discursive practices of each interviewee

Each interviewee used different discursive practices in their national identifications. Their responses combined several theories of nationalism and illuminated how national identifications mingle culturally and politically based conceptions of nation and national identity. The way the interviewees constructed their national self-identifications through discourse is summed up below.

M1, who is a member of a right-wing political party, emphasized the emotional factor in his self-determination of national identity and connected sentiment with knowledge; “to know what you are”. He identified himself as Greek Cypriot and emphasized his Hellenic cultural identity in terms of language, mentality, tradition and history, considering these elements as critical in the creation of national identity. According to M1, these factors constitute the national identity of Greek Cypriots and give rise to the subjective factor of national consciousness. Thus, he adapted an approach to ethnicity that singles out cultural traits and defined his national identity as a culturally defined collectivity (sub-unit 2.2). In addition, he explained consciousness as an expression of the objective attributes that shape national identity. Although he assigned Cypriot identity for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the context of state relativities, he also recognized some behavioral and biological similarities between them. Even though M1 recognized similarities with Turkish Cypriots in mentality and in appearance that indicates some genetic kinship, in his view, the sense of sharing the same ethnic group membership was absent. The way that M1 saw his national identity reflects the assertion that: “The subjective factor of consciousness is the ultimate factor which eventually decides the issue of national identity” (Krejči and Velimsky, p.209, cited in Wodak et al., 2009).

M1 also included common territory as a trait of national identity when he described Cyprus as “our homeland”. He argued that membership in the European Union had started to influence Cypriots’ daily life, meaning that this supranational identity started to affect national identity, recognizing in this way that national identity is not something fixed but it evolves according to the sociopolitical environment (sub-unit 2.3.3.3). Although M1 considered Cyprus dialect as “a peculiarity of Cyprus” he saw the Greek language as a feature of his cultural identity. Thus, for M1 the Greek language is employed “as pictorial guides to the nature of groups” (Kroskrity, 2003,
p. 507) and such iconic association is assigned to Greek Cypriots (sub-unit 4.4). However, his opposition to the proposal for mandatory teaching of Turkish was not connected with the symbolic function of language as a salient characteristic of ethnic identity. It was based on its instrumentalist utility for the youth. He recognized its communicative purpose and admitted that it would be useful in the case of reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots because there would be better communication. He also considered the knowledge of the language of ‘the other’ as a useful tool, which would facilitate economic needs and commercial transactions between the two communities emphasizing the importance of economy and commercial transactions for the development of the state (sub-unit 2.3.3.1). He agreed with the Hellenic-centric direction of the previous Curriculum but he also agreed with the inclusion of intercultural dialogue in the New Curriculum commenting that this should develop in a way that will not conflict with the national consciousness.

M4 also belongs to the political right and his ideological standpoint was reflected in his answers. M4 who feels Greek Cypriot, used ethno-symbolist terms (sub-unit 2.3.4) He referred to historical determination of the Greek civilization and connected the identity of Cypriots with the historical continuation of Greek culture. His sense that he belongs to a particular ethnos is justified through a sense of ancestry and historical continuation. He mediated this perennialist interpretation of national identity (sub-unit 2.3.2) when he included shared public life in connection with the coincidence of birth as features that shaped his national identity (sub-unit 2.3.3.2). Although he spoke about Cypriot-Greek mentality, he recognized similarities with Turkish Cypriots. This reference to similarities in mentality and appearance demonstrates common cultural collectivity as well as biological kinship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and illustrates the problematic concept of ethnicity when referring to diverse cultural groups and origins of ethnies. Even though he thinks that Cyprus has a different culture and civilization from the European Union, he assessed that the European Union has positively influenced Cyprus.

M4 recognized the phenomenon of diglossia between the Greek language and the Cypriot dialect, defining Cypriot dialect as a different language with different codes. He considered the proposal for upgrading the Cypriot dialect as an official and
academic language, as an effort to strengthen this diglossia with the aim of developing Cypriot consciousness. This point of view presents language as a symbolic resource for ethnic groups and indicates that the distinction between language and dialect is drawn on political rather than on linguistic grounds (sub-unit 4.3). M4 classified Turkish with any of the other foreign languages that are offered as optional lessons in secondary schools, without considering bilingualism in Greek and Turkish to be an essential target.

Although M5 belongs to the political right he did not define his national identity in terms of objective criteria as he perceived political identity as a determined factor in national identity. He identified citizenship as a criterion of sharing common national identity and by adopting Habermas’ (1996, p.172) “difference-sensitive inclusion” he used the inclusive “we” to classify both Greek and Turkish Cypriots as Cypriots. In addition he equated Cypriots with “everyone who lives in this place and work for the prosperity of Cyprus”, emphasizing, apart from common territory, shared public life as a feature of national identity. He recognized the role of education as well as the church in his self-identification as Greek Cypriot. He also commended claims of the constructionist approach (sub-unit 2.3.3.5) when he discussed his socialization in a state that is administrated by Greek Cypriots. In addition, he stressed the emotional factor when he stated that he feels Greek Cypriot. When he referred to common features of Cypriots he meant only Greek Cypriots and recognized positive and negative characteristics in their social life. On the other hand, he referred to common cultural identity with Turkish Cypriots, which is obvious in “our” manners and customs as they were shaped during “our” common life. M5 agreed with the proposal for the introduction of the Turkish language as an obligatory language in secondary education, emphasizing its public communicative role, without associating it with any symbolic dimensions. The way M5 explained his national identity is similar to the way it is described in the New Curriculum, which in practice avoids any nationalistic references and promotes intercultural dialogue.

F1 is a member of a right-wing party. She described Cyprus as common homeland for Greek and Turkish Cypriots and those of other origins. She recognized Turkish Cypriots as compatriots but she presented Greek Cypriots as genetically Greek emphasizing the Greek heritage and roots of Cyprus. Although she identified herself
with the Hellenic cultural collectivity and had a strong sense that she belongs to the Greek ethnos in terms of ancestry and nativity through her parents and grandparents, she operated a principle of authenticity in order to validate the mutability of Cypriot people. She referred to the mentality of Cypriots and mentioned that positive typical characteristics are disappearing giving way to other negative characteristics. She also argued that membership in the European Union began to determine where belongingness.

For F1, language is an important symbolic resource for ethnic groups and she recognized the language ideologies behind proposed language policies. Her point of view confirmed the notion that language ideologies in Cyprus reflect multiple and conflicting socio-cultural divisions (Kroskrity 2003, pp. 504-505). She strongly disagreed with the effort to upgrade the Cypriot dialect to the status of being a language and interpreted recommendations for introduction of use of dialect in language teaching as an attempt to create a Cypriot identity cut off from its Greek roots. In addition, she perceived the proposal for the compulsory teaching of Turkish in secondary education as an action, which will “de-colour” the national identity of the Greek Cypriots. She had the opinion that since education refers to the Greeks of Cyprus it is correct that education has a Hellenic centric character. F1 used Hellenocentric discourses in her self-identification and perceived education as a medium for providing Greek Cypriot pupils with an awareness of their Greek origins and as a means for sustaining the Greek culture and identity in Cyprus. However, this ‘ethnic’ approach to national identification (sub-unit 2.2) does not affect her support for cultivating a European dimension and multiculturalism in education.

F2, who also belongs to the political right, shared similar perceptions with F1. Although F2 described Cyprus as an island that has always been at a crossroads of cultures and nations, she considered the identity of Greek Cypriots as historically constituted and clarified that Cypriot identity referred only to the state entity. She was proud of her Hellenic cultural identity and saw her national identity in terms of objective attributes emphasizing a common Greek language, religion and traditions as distinctive features of Greek Cypriots. She considered the Greek language as a distinguishing cultural feature of Greek Cypriots and perceived it as a symbolic resource of their identity. She connected the official language with the identity of the
state and recognized that proposed language policies are drawn on language ideologies (sub-unit 4.4). Accordingly she considered that proposals for upgrading dialect as an official language aims to create a transnational citizen, without ethnic references. In addition, recommendations for the introduction of the use of the Cypriot dialect in language teaching were also interpreted as an attempt to create a Cypriot identity. Her devotion to Hellenic-centric education did not appear incompatible with multicultural education since she pointed out that coexistence should be placed on the ground of acceptance and respect of diversity, emphasizing that Greek and Turkish Cypriots constitute two distinct ethnic groups.

M7 belongs to the left-wing party. He considered national identity as a convention and contested concepts such as ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ arguing that national identity did not identify him and instead, he classified himself with other social or ideological forms of identifications (sub-unit 2.4). This kind of identification with multiple and different collective groups or systems implies the idea of ‘multiple identity’, which in turn suggests a hybrid nature of identity. He attributed the division of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to the importance of national identity in “somebody’s lives”. M7 adopted an anti-essentialist perception, illustrating the fluid and subjective character of ethnicity and emphasizing the relational and contextual meaning of ethnic associations and identifications. He assigned multiple identities for himself that overlap in social time and space. Although he rejected national identity in terms of ‘objective’ criteria, when he referred to the Cypriot dialect he defined it as a distinctive feature of Cypriots, and as a part of the civilization in Cyprus, not only for Greek Cypriots in relation to the Greek language but also for Turkish Cypriots in connection with the Turkish language. He mentioned that typically a Cypriot dialect is used at all levels of education, but did not think it should be upgraded as a language of education. He spoke clearly about diglossia between the Greek language and the Cyprus dialect, taking the Cypriot dialect as a different language with different codes. His reference to two different languages denotes symbolic attributes to the Cypriot dialect in terms of the cultural identifications of Cypriots. Although M7 rejected any objective identification with the Greek cultural identity when it came to the identification of Cypriots he referred to cultural traits such as the Cypriot dialect and mentality in order to
accentuate similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He mentioned that the New Curriculum puts apart any nationalistic positions. For M7 the obligatory learning of Turkish is “self-evident”, since he supported learning the language of ‘the other’ as a step to get to know them.

Although M2 is not a member of any political party his ideological standpoint is closer to a leftist ideology. For M2, Cypriot national identity is determined by its geographic position and history. He emphasized the geopolitical position of Cyprus by avoiding any self-identification in terms of national identity. By using the impersonal third plural person, he described the way Greek Cypriots perceive their national identity, excluding himself from such an identification. With reference to the cultural identity of Greek Cypriots, in the first place he asserted that they share a specific way of life, which has a strong Greek element and listed as their distinctive cultural features as being the Greek language, the Christian Orthodox religion, their past and traditions. He then referred to the Cypriot mentality and recognized similarities with Turkish Cypriots specifically in the way they value family, friends and community relationships. In this way he talked about the identity of Greek Cypriots in terms of objective criteria and at the same time distinguished behavioral similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He also mentioned that although Greek Cypriots generally live an American or Anglo-Saxon lifestyle, in critical moments their Greek identity surfaces. This comment indicated that, for M2, the Greek cultural identity of Greek Cypriots is symbolic. He placed Cypriots in the broader context of Europe, and recognized the development of a supranational European identity, which influences where ‘we belong’.

M2 correlated the official teaching language with national identity and considered that Greek Cypriots and Greeks speak the same language and placed the Cypriot dialect among the other dialects of the Greek language. Although he suggested promotion of the Cypriot dialect in schools during the teaching of Cypriot literature, he did not agree to upgrade the Cyprus dialect as a taught language. He denoted instrumentalist reasons behind the proposal for teaching the Turkish language and argued that this proposal was based on the logic of enabling direct communication between the two communities. M2 recognized the symbolic function of language in
the formation of identity and underlined the language ideologies behind language policies and the reactions that can follow them (sub-unit 4.4).

He criticized the previous Curriculum asserting that it was organized in a manner that prioritized Greek Christian values, Greek attributes and Greek identity. He commended the New Curriculum for not including many references about national orientation and for its references to multiculturalism. Although M2 avoided any self-identifications, some of his comments and justifications indicated that he validated the multicultural character of Cyprus and approached national identity as a socially constructed issue. On the other hand, he emphasized the decisive and symbolic function of language in the creation of national identity when he specified that there is no effort to alter the national identity of Greek Cypriots since the teaching language is Greek.

M3 described the population of Cyprus as multicultural and stressed its entity as an independent state. He asserted that Cyprus is a multicultural nation placing its multiethnic composition as far back as ancient times. Although he argued that the inhabitants of Cyprus form more than one people, he interpreted ‘people’ and ‘state’ as synonymous. For him, citizenship is the sole criterion of being part of the Cypriot people. He regarded Turkish Cypriots as compatriots and included them in the “people of Cyprus”, which as a term denotes a social entity with an obvious identity and its own features. This perception stresses the shared ‘Cypriotness’ of all Cypriot communities and displaces Hellenocentrism (sub-unit 3.3). Essentially, he referred to the common identity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was created in the years of peaceful coexistence and he mentioned common labor struggles, common habits, traditions and artistic expressions with Turkish Cypriots. Although he referred to stereotypes and common cultural features that characterize Cypriots, he specified that these features are not exclusively our attributes, placing the identity of Cypriots to more broad and supra-national (global) level. In contrast to his affirmation of the multicultural character of Cyprus, when asked about the way the European Union affects Cyprus, he characterized Cyprus as closed, conservative and hesitant towards foreign societies.
M3 also referred to the love of “our land” as a criterion for belonging to Cypriot. By accepting the Greek language as the official language and Cypriot as its dialect, without attempting to disconnect them or to point to any kind of linguistic nationalism, he recognized the Cypriot dialect as subordinate to the Greek language. Without denoting any symbolic function to the language or signifying it as an essential feature of self-identification M3 distanced himself from the proposed language policies. Even though he connected the Cypriot dialect with the cultural identity of Cypriots, he disagreed with adopting it as the official language and as the teaching language. M3 viewed with hesitation the possibility of mandatory teaching of Turkish in secondary education. He also commented that since both languages, Greek and Turkish, are official languages of the state, it is unnecessary that Turkish be introduced as a mandatory subject. He considered reconciliation as the necessary prerequisite for the solution to the Cyprus Problem and criticized the previous curriculum as being ethno-centric cultivating the non-acceptance of the other.

M6 defined as Cypriot those who love Cyprus, choose to belong to its people and feel Cypriot, seeing Cypriot identity in terms of subjective feeling. When he came to his self-identification as a Greek-Cypriot he justified his national identity in terms of ‘objective’ attributes and in relation to behavior, referring to the Greek element of his identity, which is strong in “our” culture and in any action of “our” daily life. For M6 language is a definitive factor in the formation of national identity. In relation to behavior he recognized many common features that exist between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He considered the Cypriot dialect as a feature that defines Cypriots and as a part of civilization in Cyprus, not only for Greek Cypriots in relation to the Greek language but also for Turkish Cypriots in connection with the Turkish language. He referred to the Cypriot language but he did not clarify what language among several idioms should be perceived as the Cypriot language. He also claimed that learning the Turkish language can contribute to the reconciliation between the two communities.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Introduction

This study accepts that national identity can have its roots in established ways of life that contains both cultural and political elements. Based on the work of Miller (1995) and his emphasis on a common perception that enables a group of people to be engaged in a common political project, this thesis suggests that the will of a group of people to live and function together is a crucial precondition for the development of national identities. It also suggests that national unity can be achieved without necessarily striving for homogeneity but rather by understanding cultural differences. This is feasible where there is a will among a diverse population to live and function together and to develop a political community. At the same time this study suggests that national identities are not fixed but alter over time. They are socially constructed but not easily deconstructed or infinitely manipulable (Jenkins, 1997).

My research project focuses on educational documents that constitute efforts to conceive and form national identifications in the Greek Cypriot educational system. The main aim of this study was to identify how the national identity of Greek Cypriots was discursively constructed within these documents and to indicate its emotional and social influence through examining a diverse range of discursive acts. My project studied three dissimilar discursive contexts, specifically these were: a) The formal state Curriculum (2010), b) The Commemorative Messages of a Minister of Education and c) A sample of nine semi-structured qualitative interviews.

The discursive constructs of nations and national identities in my data set outline the associations between the kinds of identity institutionalized by the formal state Curriculum (2010), ceremonial discourses and those of private discourses (the recontextualisation of the individual’s discourses). The data analysis indicates that
according to the audience, subject and content, different discourses are employed and diverse identities are discursively constructed. In this sense, discursive national identities are flexible, and should be perceived “as dynamic, vulnerable and rather ambivalent entities” (Wodak, et al, 2009, p, 187).

**9.2 Theoretical and practical implications**

This study confirms the work of Wodak et al. (2009), and similarly conceptualizes and identifies the various macro-strategies engaged in the construction of national identities and describes them through a hermeneutic approach. All these discursive national identifications are approached as constructs and interpreted through their linguistic realization with reference to the content in which they are relayed and the strategies and arguments that are deployed in their construction.

This research project proceeds from a premise of Foucault’s (1972) that institutional and political power makes possible the distribution of discourses that serve ideological and political aims. Through education, discursive acts and linguistic representations manipulate the construction of groups’ identity by employing “constructive, perpetuating and/or justifying discursive strategies as well as strategies of transformation and dismantlement or disparagement” (Wodak, et al., 2009, p. 33) according to the ideological purposes of those who inhabit power positions. These main strategies were illustrated in the analysis of my data. Since each data set of this study was a product of different discursive acts, it could be argued that the degree of conscious intention was greater in official educational documents than in the individual interviews.

At the level of content, following Wodak et al. (2009, p.30), I distinguish the following as the main thematic areas of my study: a collective past, a collective present and future, a common culture, a common territory and a common national consciousness. It is important to emphasize that these concepts must be explained in the frame of the specific historical and cultural features of Cyprus. In the case of Cyprus, at the intersection between identity and history, two ideologies Hellenocentrism and Cypriocentrism (sub-unit 3.2) have shaped the ‘collective
memory of national identifications in their own specific ways. In practice, these two ideologies are integrated in my analysis since they represent the main historical and political matters which shape the national identification of Greek Cypriots.

9. 3 Summary of thesis findings

9.3.1 National identifications
As the analysis of the collected data indicates, highly diverse and ambivalent constructions of national identifications, influenced by both Hellenocentric and Cypriocentric ideological standpoints, were apparent in the Greek-Cypriot educational mainstream. Cultural and essentialist modes of national identifications occurred more frequently when the degree of informality increased. Accordingly, in the New Curriculum the concept of state-based identity predominated and ethnocultural identification was avoided. In the Minister's messages, constructive strategies aiming at the establishment of Cypriot identity on the premises of both political and cultural identity were evident. Cultural and essentialist definitions of a nation appeared in the interviews conducted among educators. Thus, essentialist and cultural conceptions of national identity appeared more frequently in informal situations and they decreased gradually as the degree of formality increased (Wodak et al. 2009).

In the educational documents under investigation, constructive strategies were interwoven with strategies of transformation (Wodak et al 2009, p.33) and were consciously employed with an intention to transform predominantly Hellenocentric discourses into Cypriocentric discourses (sub-unit 3.3). Within these texts there were indications of attempts to form and to establish a Cypriot identity through supporting the peaceful coexistence of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. On the whole, these educational documents accentuated the importance of the state integrity of Cyprus.

However, ethnically based modes of self-identification were combined with perceptions which signified that bearing a national identity implied a combination of related concepts, of comparable emotional associations and similar manners and
behaviors which were socially constructed through education, politics and everyday practices. This supports the claim that national identifications move to more multifaceted and comprehensive forms.

Specifically, within the formal state Curriculum (2010), the political identity of Cypriots was structured within a framework of a contemporary, multicultural society and according to the democratic principles of citizenship, which include and do not exclude the ‘other’, with an ultimate aim for the peaceful coexistence of all people. Thus, the political nation, distinguished by the will of its citizens (Miller 1995, see sub-unit 2.3), replaced the concept of ‘ethnic’ nationalism which had prevailed in previous versions of the Curriculums (Koutselini 1997) with a universalistic principle of a constitutional patriotism emphasising a common state along with the derived duties and rights of its citizens as the prerequisites for the unity of the nation (Habermas 1993).

Beyond the attempt to form democratic citizens, the national identity of Greek Cypriots was being placed in a wider European and international environment. Apart from their national identity, Cypriots identified supra-national identities such as those of the European and the transnational citizen. In this way, the documents under investigation broadened national identifications by assigning multiple identities to individuals and encouraging the appearance of cultural hybridisation (Hall 1996a, see sub-unit 2.4). Therefore, to some extent, ethnocentric bias was alleviated and pupils were provided with a broader variety of elements for the construction of their national identity.

In the formal state Curriculum (2010), the cultural identity of Cypriots was not precisely defined and any ethno-national references were avoided. Instead, the envisioned identity of the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus was focused on their political identity and issues related to their ethno-cultural identity were left open. In the Curriculum (2010), the cultural identity of Greek Cypriots was recognized but it was briefly suggested that it should be reinforced through the awareness of and respect for diversity (see sub-unit 6.2). However, such references were combined with discourses that presented cultural identity as a subjective issue and
the consequence of self-identification. In this manner, identity was framed through an anti-essentialist approach, in a context of opportunities and relativities that “emphasise(d) the fluid and contextual meaning of ‘ethnic phenomena’” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996, p.15, see sub-unit 2.4)

In addition, some references in the formal state Curriculum (2010) portrayed the issue of identity as discursively constructed and encouraged pupils to question and restructure dominant ideologies and stereotypes. By approaching critically long-standing dominant ideologies and discourses that frame national identifications (Kroskirty 2003, p. 505), Curriculum (2010) puts into practice a dismantling strategy (sub-unit 5.4.1.1) aiming to dismantle “parts of an existing national identity construct” (Wodak et al. 2009, p.33).

While the notion of Hellenic cultural identity was presented as ‘subjective’ and as the result of self-identification, at the same time Cyprus was portrayed as a traditionally multicultural and multilingual society and the Cypriot as a transnational citizen. Constructions of Cypriotness and Europeanness in some ways, which legitimised Cyprus as a historically multicultural society and recognized Europe’s multiplicities, were apparent in both the Commemorative Messages of the Minister and the Curriculum (2010). The European discourse suggested an intention to construct citizens who would embrace the principles of democracy, to acknowledge ‘own’ and ‘other’s’ citizenship and human rights and to make visible the coexistence of all the communities in Cyprus (sub-units 6.4 and 7.3.8). In this way, perceptions of a homogeneous ‘pure’ identity were discredited and a potentially larger variety of identities, which partially overlap in social time and space, were constructed (Tonkin et al., 1996, p, 24).

Although the Hellenocentric discourse still appeared in some subjects of the Curriculum (2010), its combination with the Cypriocentric and European discourses encouraged multiple and hybrid identifications and moderated a range of contradictory discourses. This reinvented common national imagination sought to counter nationalistic bias and to contribute to changing the vision for the future,
rather than fuelling the divisions and conflicts of the past, making possible a reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots in a federal solution.

While issues related to cultural identity remained open in the Curriculum (2010), in the Minister’s Commemorative Messages, discourses that connected Cyprus with the wider Hellenic culture were evident, representing Cyprus as sharing the same history with the Greek nation. Even though, both documents were circulated under the responsibility of the same Minister, Andreas Demetriou, in the case of his Commemorative Messages where the audience was immediate, Hellenocentric discourses were more direct. In these messages, in parallel with Hellenocentric discourses, there were also discourses aiming to strengthen the emergence of a Cypriot identity based on the assumption that Cyprus is a traditionally multicultural country. In this way, the proclaimed Greek character of Cyprus was changed and its political past was disconnected from the aim of union with Greece. Instead, the political future of Cyprus was envisioned in a unified homeland where all of its citizens would peacefully coexist.

In some cases, constructive strategies were employed in order for Cypriot identity to be developed on the premises of both political and cultural identity to unify the traditional citizens of Cyprus. Such examples were contained in the Commemorative Messages referring to Cypriot culture as well as the establishment of days dedicated exclusively to Cypriot heroes who largely supported the state entity of Cyprus. By adapting an instrumentalist point of view, the aim was to construct more inclusive political identities by putting aside ethno-cultural references (sub-units 3.3 and 3.4).

In the semi-structured interviews my sample included members of the educational elite who actively participated in the committee for the development of the formal state Curriculum (2010). Those who belonged to the political left conceptualized their national identity in terms of Cypriocentric discourses and supranational identifications as promoted in the Curriculum. On the other hand, those with right-wing political affiliations tended to deploy Hellenocentric discourses, primordial definitions and associated their national identity with notions of cultural or historical heritage and common descent (see sub-units 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). This might
explain the sporadic appearance of Hellenocentric discourses in the Curriculum (2010).

Despite the conflict between Hellenocentric and Cypriocentric ideologies which represented (to some extent) the political opposition of the right and left wing parties, these two discourses were not always distinguishable in the interviews of the nine educators who participated in the interviews. Respondents with both left-wing and right-wing political affiliations mixed discourses from both ideologies when they talked about their national identities and occasionally drew on the representation of an antagonistic ideology. This suggests that the available discourses tended to conceptualise the perceptions of national constructions and explain in what ways the Hellenocentric and Cypriocentric ideologies influenced each other. Following Wodak et al.’s (2009) investigation, this intermingling of opposing discourses traced a diachronic transformation of specific discourses in different contexts during a particular period of time.

In the formal state Curriculum (2010) and in the Minister’s Commemorative Messages, constructive strategies of unification prevailed. The Cypriot state was presented as a multicultural country where democratic principles predominated to make possible the peaceful coexistence of all of its citizens. As far as the interviews were concerned, this perception was explained by a multicultural theory of origins by those respondents with leftist political affiliations. On the other hand, those who belonged to the political right emphasised cultural-based national elements, not only in terms of ‘high culture’ but also using the concept of homogeneous everyday culture and national mentality as well as a concept of naturalised descent (sub-unit 2.2).

The results of my analysis indicate that a precise division between cultural and political identity cannot sufficiently explain national identification (Wodak et al. 2009). Instead, national identity was represented through discourses that usually included elements of both cultural and political identity. This dual representation of national identifications resonates with Smith’s (1991) ethnic conception of the
nation which suggests that “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms” (p. 13) (see sub-unit 2.3.4).

The Greek language appeared to be a fundamental feature of national identification among the interviewees in my study. The association some of them made between the Greek language and their ethnic and national identity attributed an isomorphic relation between Greek culture and the Greek language and positioned the Greek nation as essentialised and homogenised (see sub-unit 4.4). This ideology of linguistic sameness, based on a ‘foundational ideology’, approaches language as a homogenous bounded code linked with a group’s culture and identity (Jaffe, 2009), and it appeared to be dominant among the interviewees since the Greek language was perceived as an essential part of their Greekness.

However, the Curriculum (2010) analysis indicated that officially such essentialised and homogenised approaches were not promoted. Instead, the ‘situational’ approach to ‘identity’ as social construction (May, 2001, p.9) was suggested. The Greek language was downgraded from its primordial binding force of the nation to being one carrier of ideologies (see sub-unit 4.4).

In addition, interviews suggested that differentiation from Turkish Cypriots proved to be ambivalent especially in regards to issues referring to ‘common mentality’ and ‘common cultural identity’. Although some of the interviewees drew on primordial modes of identifications (sub-units 2.3.1, 2.3.2) and emphatically stressed their Greek ethno-cultural identity, when they referred to Turkish Cypriots they mentioned not only common cultural elements with them but also biological sameness. Even though all of the interviewees appeared to accept the possibility of peaceful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots in a reunited homeland, those with right-wing political affiliations resisted the possibility of reducing or reconstructing their Greek ethno-cultural identity in the name of rapprochement and peaceful co-existence. They placed their possible co-existence in the frame of multiculturalism and rejected any notions for a shared Cypriot identity with Turkish Cypriots.
9.3.2 Consensus and tensions between official and individual modes of identifications

Whereas it is evident that the educational documents under investigation employed constructivist strategies that aimed to construct a Cypriot identity, the analysis of the interviews indicated highly diverse and ambivalent discourses on national identity. The educators who participated in my research, irrespective of their political affiliations, characterized Cyprus as an independent political entity and identified themselves as Greek Cypriots. Their arguments were mainly based on the concepts of cultural and political identity and, according to their political affiliations, they emphasized different dimensions of national identity. Some interviewees accentuated the importance of citizenship in ‘formal’ or ‘bureaucratic’ terms but did not perceive it as a constitutive element of their identity, which they comprehended at the emotional and cultural level. This point of view combines primordialist/perennialist and modernist approaches to nationalism and conceptualizes the nation in ethno-symbolic terms. According to Smith (2013) ethno-symbolist interpretation emphasizes the importance of the “ethnic past” and highlights the emotional and moral aspect of national identities (sub-unit 2.3.4).

Each interviewee contributed different perceptions related to national identity. These different responses illustrate Anderson’s (1983, p. 15) notion of the ‘imagined’ character of nation. Their discursive practices shed light on the way that ethnically based and politically based conceptions of nation and national identity are interwoven. On the one hand, the overlap between institutional practices and interviewees’ discursive practices signified the recontextualisation of their discourse, and on the other, they indicated a degree of conflict (sub-unit 8.6.4).

By examining national identity as a discursive formation, it became apparent that it cannot be explained in terms of a single theory but it combines multiple theories and approaches towards nationalism (Calhoun 2007). The way in which each interviewee formulated his/her national identity indicated that there is “no such thing as one national identity (in an essentialist sense)” (Wodak, et al. 2009, p. 4). In practice the image of national identity “is real to the extent that one is convinced of it, believes in it and identifies with it emotionally” (ibid, p. 23).
Although the term ‘Cypriot nation’ never occurred in my data, some interview participants, mainly those with left-wing political affiliations, implied its existence in their answers and exploited the notion of the ‘Cypriot people’ in order to negotiate cultural elements such as the mentality and a strong Cypriot self-consciousness with political elements. The term ‘people’ in some discourses was treated as synonymous with the state and in others as synonymous with an ethnic group or nation. Wiberg (1996, p.322) states that:

“i) The term ‘people’ denotes a social entity possessing a clear identity and its own characteristics, ii) It implies a relationship with a territory, even if the people in question have been wrongfully expelled from it and artificially replaced by another population, iii) People should not be confused with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, whose existence and rights are recognised in article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.

Many respondents emphasized the significance of emotional identification with Cyprus for their individual, discursively constructed, national identity; a fact that signifies national identity to be the result of self-identification. Interestingly, this point of view was observed in the answers of both respondents with right-wing and respondents with left-wing political affiliations who recognized all the legal citizens of Cyprus who feel Cypriot as so-being. Even though their emphasis on Hellenic or Cypriot cultural elements of their national identity reflected their political affiliations, all the respondents demonstrated strong emotional ties to Cyprus and considered as compatriots all those citizens who love Cyprus (sub-unit 8.2.2).

The fact that numerous respondents considered that their place of birth and socialization along with the environment and education influenced their mentality in childhood and adolescence, suggests a perception of socially constructed national identity. In this sense, according to Hobsbawm’s (1983, p. 2) ‘invented traditions’: “responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations”, transfer old institutions and traditions to new conditions which serve current interests and purposes (sub-unit 2.3.3.5).
Although the perception of national identity being socially constructed was apparent in their answers, respondents with right-wing political affiliation, in some instances, referred to their Hellenic ethno-cultural identity as genetically defined. This point of view has its roots in the sociobiological approach of primordialism and reflects Van den Berghe’s (1981, p.61) claim that the nation is a “politically conscious ethny” characterized by extended kinships (sub-unit 2.3.1.1).

Those who had strong feelings of belonging to the Hellenic ‘ethnos’ had turned ‘the Cypriot’ into ‘Greek Cypriot’ distinguishing between Greek Cypriots and other ethnic communities in Cyprus. They constructed Greekness in terms of linguistic and cultural criteria and identified language as an important feature of their cultural identity. According to this culturalistic perspective, the Greek language appeared to be a crucial factor in their collective experience as Greek Cypriots (sub-unit 4.2). In a similar way Kedourie (1994), considers language to be the main objective criterion of national identity.

On the other hand, those belonging to the political left stressed the importance of the shared ‘Cypriotness’ of all Cypriot communities. Although they self-identified as Greek Cypriots, they did not emphasize the Greekness of Cyprus. Instead they focused on the multicultural character of Cyprus, which includes all the communities of Cyprus, and in particular, the Turkish Cypriots to be incorporated in the concept of ‘shared Cypriotness’ (sub-unit 3.3). In this context, the leftist ideology, which supports ethnic coexistence, focuses its argumentation on Cypriocentric discourses which evoke working-class movements and resistance and adapts a long-running tradition of the common labor mobilizations of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. In addition, those with left political affiliations referred to the symbolic significance of language and perceived the Cypriot dialect as a feature of their cultural identity.

Gellner (1983) emphasizes the contribution of education in the development of a homogeneous culture and the formation of the nation (sub-unit 2.3.3.2). This approach was reflected in the answers of all the interviewees who recognized the power of education in the construction of national identity. Although all the interviewees defined their political identity in a similar way, their perceptions
differed in the way they perceived their cultural identity. Those with leftist political affiliations, who self-identified as Greek Cypriots, mainly stressed cultural elements that unify all Cypriots and employed discourses that were apparent in the official educational documents that my study has investigated. Whereas the educational policies that referred to a politically based understanding of the nation were accepted by all interviewees, proposals or policies that correlated with ethnically based modes of self-perception created oppositional opinions and reactions. The emphasis that the formal state Curriculum (2010) put on the political dimension of identity and the avoidance of any ethno-cultural references suggested that, on a political rather than a cultural stage, there was an attempt to add to the pupils’ national identity in order to prepare them for the envisioned future of Cyprus.

Differentiations between the way respondents comprehended language policies and proposals also reflected their political affiliations. Those belonging to the political right considered the Greek language to be a main feature of their Hellenic cultural identity, whereas the supporters of leftist ideology emphasized the role of the Cypriot dialect in the formation of the identity of Cypriots. The unifying function of a standard language can play a role in defining national identity in cultural terms. In this sense, a single national language is considered to be the highest form and dialects as subordinates that do not constitute different languages. The unifying function of a standard language in defining national identity is acknowledged in a sociocultural approach of nationalism (sub-unit 2.3.3.2). A language, and not a dialect, is generally associated with a specific nation (Billig, 1995). Accordingly, standard language is considered as the highest form and dialects as subordinates. In addition, a group speaking a dialect is seen as a subgroup, part of a greater group of people (sub-unit 4.3). Thus, cultural nationalism is here constructed in terms of the status of a language and not of a dialect.

Although all the respondents accepted the use of the Cypriot dialect in informal situations and recognized its value in Cypriot literature, nobody supported the introduction of the Cypriot dialect as a medium for teaching. Those with right-wing political affiliations perceived such an attempt as an effort for the development of Cypriot identity. However, many hurdles, such as codification and standardization, need to overcome before this proposal could happen.
The correlation interviewees made between cultural identity and language was also evident in proposals concerning the introduction of teaching Turkish as a compulsory subject. The majority of the interviewees with right-wing political affiliations perceived such proposals as an act of anti-Hellenism. On the other hand, those with left-wing political affiliations considered such an attempt as positive since the Turkish language is an official language of Cyprus, a perception that was also reflected in the answers of some interviewees with right-wing political affiliations (sub-unit 8.6.3). According to Ager (2001, p. 125) “attitudes of individuals derive from their beliefs and, at a deeper level, from the sets of values that they hold... attitudes hence depend on identity”.

While only one of those who belonged to the political right disapproved of the inclusion of any nationalistic references in the New Curriculum, all the other participants agreed with the Hellenic-centric character of the previous Curriculum but recognized the need for the New Curriculum to include intercultural dialogue in a way that would not conflict with the national consciousness of Greek Cypriots. They saw intercultural dialogue as the basis of respect for diversity emphasizing that it is on these grounds that the relationships with Turkish Cypriots should be built, rejecting any notions about common cultural identity with Turkish Cypriots. Their comments indicated that the European dimension and intercultural dialogue were positive and essential to Cypriot citizenship.

All the interviewees participated actively in the committees for the development of the formal New Curriculum (2010). Their modes of self-identification, in many cases, contradicted the positions of the Curriculum (2010). Although this study highlights the contradictions between individual and official modes of national identifications, it does not examine the way in which the participants came to an agreement about the discursive strategies of national identification that were included in the Curriculum (2010). This could be a useful field for further investigation. However, my study found that the interaction of group work in the committee for the development of the Curriculum (2010) reduced cultural and essentialist modes of national identifications. In the Curriculum (2010), the concept
of state-based identity within a framework of a contemporary, multicultural society open to diversity predominated, making possible what Habermas (1998, p. 172) described as “difference-sensitive inclusion”.

9.3.3 The impact of language policies on national identifications
In the Greek Cypriot society, different forms of national identifications are closely related with linguistic ideologies. In the New Curriculum (2010) where the multicultural character of Cyprus was emphasised, the hybrid nature of Cypriot identity was encouraged by provisions that suggested the use of hybrid texts which were the product of interchanging language codes. Although the official language in the Greek Cypriot state schools is Greek, in the formal state Curriculum (2010) the Greek language was not presented as an essential part of the identity of Greek Cypriots. Instead, it was approached as a bearer of several ideologies and the relationship between literacy and nationalism was challenged. In addition, the teaching of the Cypriot dialect was examined as a language with its own codes and system; an approach which indicates the phenomenon of diglossia between the Greek language and Cypriot dialect (sub-unit 4.6).

My data indicates that those interviewees who did not include in their conceptualization of national identity a political component, emphasized ‘objective criteria’ such as culture, language and territory. Such national identifications, which are based on cultural identity, perceive language to be an essential common national trait, and fuel oppositions against any attempt to demote the Greek language from its primordial binding force of the nation (sub-units 8.4.1 and 8.4.2).

This study asserts that language is often a critical component of national identity as a whole and every language policy is culture-specific (Schiffman 1996). As my data suggests, the promotion of language policies are not ideologically neutral but certain national and language ideologies are hidden behind their development and promotion. The degree of acceptance of these policies reflects their consistency with the specific culture in which they are evolved. Reactions to specific language policies signify that in practice it would be difficult to be accepted and applied sufficiently.
The official status of the Greek language in Greek Cypriot education and its link with the function of the Cyprus state as the national language of Greek Cypriots was not confronted in my data. Attempts from leftist circles to foster a Cypriot identity by promoting Cypriot dialect as the mother tongue of Cypriots were never adopted by the mainstream educational system. Although the data under investigation indicates an effort to distinguish Greek language from Cypriot dialect, there was no such claim for the official recognition of the Cypriot dialect as a national language (sub-unit 8.4.1).

The teaching of the Turkish language as an optional foreign language in secondary education indicates a conscious attempt at intercultural dialogue with the aim of peaceful coexistence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Although the optional teaching of the Turkish language was not discussed at any length by interviewees, those with right-wing political affiliations were strongly against its mandatory teaching because they emphasized the symbolic function of language as a characteristic of national identity (sub-unit 8.4.2).

9.3.4 The impact of Cyprus’s membership in the European Union

An essential assumption of my study was that national identifications of Cypriots have been influenced by Cyprus’s membership in the European Union. According to Smith (2013, p. 135) European unity and identity produce “a considerable decrease in the power and intensity of national identities, and transfer of existing loyalties to the national state upwards to the federal union”. This supposition was self-evident in all the educational documents under investigation, which broadened the notion of national identity to more multicultural modes and shifted Cyprus’s orientations towards supranational identification. Emphasis was given to the multicultural character of Europe and in correlation with the proclaimed traditional multiculturalism of Cyprus, the call of all the documents I analyzed centred on development of a mutual understanding and respect for diversity.
The tension between Cypriot and European identification followed the pattern of political affiliations. Those belonging to the right-wing political party defined themselves more easily as European than those of the political left. In particular, one interviewee with leftist political affiliations classified Cyprus as a part of the Middle East and not of Europe. Some referred to possible or visible conflicts between supranational (European) and national aspects. Others emphasized the requirement for national self-consciousness in order to moderate the tensions between national and supranational (European) identifications. In some cases, the European Union created supranationalism associations mainly for respondents with right-wing political affiliations (sub-unit 8.5). Those with leftist political orientations had mainly been associated with the political dimension of Europe and its connection with multiculturalism where “the nation is fragmented into its constituent cultural parts and national identity becomes ‘hybridized’” (Smith 2013, p. 136). They had also acknowledged European Union membership as an opportunity for building a mutual understanding and respect for diversity.

9.4 Concluding remarks
This study argues that “discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.8). Discourse analysis provided an analytical perspective and offered insights into national identifications through combining contents, strategies and linguistic realizations. Combining the results of the documentary analysis with those of interview analysis, I conclude that whereas interviewees’ identifications in political terms appeared to be in agreement with the official documents, identifications in cultural terms emerged with different sets of opinions and emotional attachments. This suggests that educational policies aimed at transforming Greek identifications or at constructing a Cypriot identity may not be straightforwardly accepted. The formal state Curriculum (2010), following Habermas’ (1993) approach, based its national identifications on the political nation and excluded ‘ethnic’ identifications. It focused on the universalistic principle of a constitutional patriotism and emphasized the value of democratic principles as the prerequisites for national unity. The exclusion of ethno-national
identifications combined with the development of “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1993) was the main device for transforming national identifications.

As this study indicates, in the struggle for dominance between the Hellenocentric discourses and the formerly repressed Cypriocentric discourses, the latter obtained dominance in the official educational documents under consideration. Due to the fact that the formal state Curriculum (2010) was developed during a leftist presidency, Cypriocentric discourses dominated for the first time in official educational documents. This indicates that dominance in the government can empower repressed discourses and promote them in the mainstream setting. However, as the interviews suggested, although Hellenocentric ideology can be combined with intercultural dialogue and acceptance of diversity, interviewees who espouse this ideology were in opposition to any claims for construction of a common cultural identity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

My research project has explored the discourses and ideologies involved in educational documents with reference to national identifications. The formal state Curriculum (2010), which was analysed for the purposes of this study, constitutes the main official educational policy of the state. According to Ball (1994), policy documents are conceptualised as a ‘circle’ between three contexts: influences, text production and practices. My research has concentrated on the first two perspectives. In order for the circle to be completed the examination of classroom practices could form a useful follow-up study. This could provide useful insights into the compatibility between the Curriculum as a policy document and its application in classroom practices.

In January 2013, the presidential elections transferred power from the political left to the political right. In the elections of January 2018, the political right under the leadership of Nicos Anastasiadis has been re-elected. An examination of the way in which this right-wing government implements and assesses the formal state Curriculum (2010) would also be an interesting field of comparative study between policy production, its revision or its application.
The key issues which have arisen from my data offer a useful insight into the way that national identities are discursively constructed in general and of national identifications in the Cyprus mainstream in particular. Typically, studies in this field mainly focus on the investigation of historical sources in combination with quantitative approaches within the social science tradition. My study was designed to examine a diverse range of data with reference to the way national identity was being constructed, giving emphasis to their dialectical interweaving, in connection with the recontextualisation of key concepts and discourses located in different discursive contexts - from official text to private opinions. This research project has helped me to realize how the discursive construction of national identity can influence the way we conceptualize both the imagined and essentialist modes of national identifications.

My theoretical findings are the result of thorough analysis of the data under consideration. They do not lead to any general conclusions but are limited to the period 2008-2013 when the political left governed Cyprus. Although during this period a systematic effort to promote Cypriocentric discourses was evident, this attempt was assessed and revised by the next government. Since my study follows the political and ethical framework of Discourse Analysis, I do not regard my findings as conclusive and definitive. My expectation is that new information will emerge through new research projects of this kind, which would make possible a re-examination and reassessment of data (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997).

Finally, I would like to repeat that the intention of this thesis is not to propose absolute answers and results, or a socially neutral analytical stance, but to add material for discussions in a domain with great prospects for further investigation.
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Appendix (1)
Research Schedule

My research questions have been developed by concentrating on the above thematic areas and they were formulated as follow:

- The way each interviewee subjectively construct his/her national identity in both, political and cultural terms:
  - What does Cyprus mean? (All interviewees were prompted to express spontaneous images and experiences that portray Cyprus. They are also asked to assume how the others think about Cyprus)
  - What makes you Cypriot? (Spontaneous associations. Their subjective stance about what features they perceive as typical or characteristic of Cypriots).
  - Who is a Cypriot? (Who belongs to the Cypriot people? Criteria and conditions for acquiring Cypriot citizenship).
  - How do you define your national identity? (Cypriot, Greek-Cypriot or both. Interviewees are prompted to provide explanations and personal feelings and to report situations in which their national identity becomes more prominent).
  - Cyprus is divided into two parts. What similarities and differences do you recognize between the populations of the two parts?

- The construction of a shared political past:
  - Which events of the last hundred years do you consider most crucial for Cyprus?

- The role of language in the subjective perception of a nation and national identity
  - Do you think Cypriots and Greeks speak the same language?
  - What is your opinion for upgrading Cypriot dialect as a formal language of Cyprus and as the language of schools and academics?
  - What is your opinion for the proposal for the introduction of mandatory teaching of Turkish language in all secondary schools?
• The role of education in national identifications
  o What is your opinion about the aims in our curriculum concerning our national identity?
  o What is your opinion for the introduction of the aim of reconciliation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot as an emphasis in schools?

• The future of Cyprus:
  o Do you think that reconciliation between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot is possible? (explain)
  o In what way do you think is possible to achieve reconciliation between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot? (Interviewees are prompted to mention if they consider as solution the development of common identity or believe that solution should be based on recognition, respect and acceptance of the differences)
  o How do you think the accession of Cyprus to EU affected Cypriots? (with reference to Cyprus Problem and Cypriot identity/ the fundamental transformations in the identity of Cypriots, with reference to the perceptions concerning shared political present and future)

  o Is that anything else that you want to add?
Appendix (2)
The cover page of the Curriculum (2010)
Appendix (3)
Cd with Interviews