The Role of Military Integration in War-to-Peace Transitions
The Case of South Sudan (2006-2013)

Warner, Lesley Anne

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The Role of Military Integration in War-to-Peace Transitions:

The Case of South Sudan
(2006 – 2013)

Lesley Anne Warner

Submission for the title of PhD in War Studies
King’s College London
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to memory of my father, Dr. Kenrick V. Warner (1941-2017), who passed away before he could see my work come to fruition. Although his memory was fading in his final years and we spoke the languages of different disciplines – him chemical engineering and me war studies – he never failed to ask how my research was progressing and express his pride in my unceasing quest for knowledge.
Acknowledgements

This thesis was an intellectually and emotionally demanding fixture of the last five years of my life, and I could not have completed it without the advice, mentorship, and encouragement of too many individuals to list. But I shall try.

Professor Mats Berdal was an exceptional advisor who provided timely critiques and suggestions to ensure that I stayed on track. He and David Ucko facilitated financial support for my fieldwork through the Conflict, Security and Development Research Group at King’s College London and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Professors Kieran Mitton and Christine Cheng, as the examiners for my mini viva, posed hard-hitting questions that sharpened my analysis as I turned from conceptualizing a notional thesis towards writing up the final product.

Lauren Ploch Blanchard, who has an encyclopedic knowledge of South Sudan, provided quick-response fact checking whenever I thought my conclusions might not add up. Jok Madut Jok, my dear contrarian friend, provided me with several initial fieldwork contacts and was always a good sounding board for my research findings. Majak D’Agoot’s experience with the SPLA and his superbly analytical mind also helped shape my thinking on the role that military integration played in South Sudan’s attempt to transition from war to peace. Richard Rands’ institutional knowledge of the SPLA helped me better understand the context of integration during the period under examination in this thesis. As a pioneer in the study of military integration, Roy Licklider’s critiques pushed me to think through what prospects military integration might have in South Sudan’s future, considering my preliminary research findings.

The analysis in this thesis would not have been possible without those anonymous South Sudanese, expat advisors, and United Nations personnel who agreed to be interviewed after I stalked them in Juba, Addis, and Nairobi by email, phone, and twitter direct message. There is one SPLA officer in particular to whom I will always be indebted. Vouching for my work as a researcher, he personally guided me through SPLA Headquarters to speak to personnel who had been involved in previous integration
processes, provided me with records from his personal archives, and provided lengthy and critical responses to my follow-up requests for information. It is my sincere hope that the analysis in this thesis helps him improve the force to which he has devoted much of his life.

Finally, I would like to offer a special thanks to my family and friends, who provided ample love, support, and encouragement for me to ‘finish the damn thing’. In particular, words can hardly express how thankful I am to my mother and father, who instilled in me a passion for life-long intellectual enrichment and made every sacrifice to ensure that I have ended up where I am today. In addition, I am thankful for my sister Nadine, not only for setting the best example for me as her little sister, but also for keeping our family functional as we lurched from one parental health emergency to the other during my course of study. My partner Anderson has been one of my biggest cheerleaders, especially when I would complain how arduous the writing process was and jokingly accuse him of forcing me to keep going. Because of his constant encouragement, I no longer have to feel like I’m being unfaithful to him with my thesis, which I often referred to as my selfish mistress.

Writing this thesis while working full time and helping manage my father’s illness from afar meant that all aspects of my life were in a delicate balance. In the final year, my personal life essentially fell apart. As I was yanked between Chicago and DC for the first four months of 2017, there is no way I could have managed to maintain the delicate family–thesis–work balance absent the compassion and understanding displayed by Jason, Doug, and of course, The Boss.

To all mentioned above and those unnamed, the best of the work that follows is due to your investment in me and all the errors are mine alone.
Abstract

This thesis examines the role of military integration during war-to-peace transitions, with a particular focus on the case of South Sudan between 2005 and 2013. Drawing on the nascent literature on military integration, this thesis makes five contributions that help understand the role this process can play in such environments. First, this thesis argues that governments undergoing war-to-peace transitions can either fight armed groups, ignore them and accept that they lack the monopoly on the use of force within the country, or seek political-military accommodation with them through military integration. When presented with these options, integration can be the ‘least bad’ choice in some cases. Second, this thesis demonstrates that military integration can help temporarily overcome wartime factionalism, thereby benefitting short-term peace consolidation, but can eventually lead to instability if the process is not approached as a transitional security mechanism. Third, the case of South Sudan examined in this thesis shows how the combination of an open-ended integration process and failed demobilization initiatives can increase pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups pose to stability. Fourth, this thesis argues that a disconnect between the integration process and broader defence sector reform efforts can result in the security sector being rebuilt on an unstable foundation, as was the case in South Sudan. Finally, this thesis uses South Sudan’s experience with military integration to demonstrate how a military’s failure to ‘graduate’ from the integration process risks leaving the security sector in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force prone to fracturing during periods of heightened political competition.
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCSS</td>
<td>Agreement on the Resolution on the Conflict in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNDF</td>
<td>Burundi National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CANS</td>
<td>Civil Authority for the New Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONADER</td>
<td>Commission Nationale de la Demobilization et Reinsertion (National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandan Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPAA</td>
<td>Greater Pibor Administration Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDRDRP</td>
<td>Interim Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISM</td>
<td>Interim Stabilisation Mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDB</td>
<td>Joint Defence Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMCC</td>
<td>Joint Military Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Khartoum Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>Mouvement du 23-Mars (March 23 Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATT</td>
<td>Military Advisory Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto We Sizwe (‘Spear of the Nation’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoDVA</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MYDDRP Multi-Year Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programme

NCP National Congress Party

NDDRP National Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programme

NIF National Islamic Front

NLC National Liberation Council

NRA National Resistance Army

OAGs Other Armed Groups

OAU Organisation of African Unity

PLAN People’s Liberation Army of Namibia

POC Protection of Civilians

RCD-G Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma)

RCD-K Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani (Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani)

RCD-ML Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Liberation (Rally for Congolese Democracy-Movement for Liberation)

RCD-N Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Nationale (Rally for Congolese Democracy-National)

RDF Rwandan Defence Force

ROLSISO Rule of Law and Security Institutions Support Office

RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army

RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front

RPF Regional Protection Force

SAF Sudan Armed Forces

SADF South African Defence Force

SANDF South Africa National Defence Force

SDSR Strategic Defence and Security Review

SDTP Security and Defence Transformation Programme

SMI Structure Militaire d’Intégration (Military Integration Structure

SNGs Special Needs Groups

SPDF Sudan People’s Defence Forces/Democratic Front

SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition

SSDDTP South Sudan Development and Defence Transformation Programme

SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces

SSDM/A South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army

SSIG South Sudan Independents Group

SSIM/A South Sudan Independent Movement/Army

SSLA South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SSPS South Sudan Police Service
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRA</td>
<td>Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSUM/A</td>
<td>South Sudan Unity Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWATF</td>
<td>South West African Territorial Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei homelands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDSF</td>
<td>United Democratic Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDSSF</td>
<td>United Democratic South Sudan Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAP</td>
<td>Union of Sudan African Parties</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Statement of the Problem

In December 2013, South Sudan’s military integration process faced its most serious challenge, as a political crisis that had been developing throughout the year within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) suddenly escalated, dragging the country into civil war. In July of that year, President Salva Kiir issued Republican Decrees 50/2013 and 51/2013, dismissing all ministers and deputy ministers, respectively, in effect sacking his entire cabinet.\(^1\) Included in this effort to marginalize potential challengers within the SPLM was Kiir’s Vice President, Riek Machar.\(^2\) With Machar having attempted to wrest control of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) by force during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), many feared that his dismissal might catalyse a new rebellion — this time against the government of a newly-independent South Sudan. However, Machar, who had spent the past decade since returning to the SPLM/A attempting to repair his tarnished image and promote himself as a potential successor to Kiir, initially chose to try and gain power through legitimate means. A few months prior to his sacking, Machar had articulated the president’s failures as rationales for his own pursuit of SPLM leadership, including dysfunction within the ruling party, the government’s inability to deliver services, public sector corruption, tribalism within the civil service and security forces, widespread insecurity, and the country’s regional and international isolation.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Aside from the Vice President, other members of the political elite affected by Kiir’s shakeup included Pagan Amum (Secretary General of the SPLM), Deng Alor Kuol (Minister of Cabinet Affairs), John Luk Jok (Minister of Justice), Gier Chuang Along (Minister of Internal Affairs), Oyay Deng Ajak (Minister for National Security in the Office of the President), Madut Biar (Minister of Telecommunications), Majak D’Agoot (Deputy Minister of Defence), Cirino Hiteng (Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports), Kosti Manibe (Minister of Finance), Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth (former head of mission for the Government of Southern Sudan Mission to the United States), and Chol Tong Mayay (former governor of Lakes state). John Young, “A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO,” Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (Small Arms Survey, September 2015), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP39-SPLM-IO.pdf.

\(^3\) Peter Adwok Nyaba, *South Sudan: The Crisis of Infancy* (South Africa: Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, 2014).
With the SPLM’s powerful brand as liberation-moveent-turned-political party, political competition occurred within a de facto one-party state, thereby making a fight within the ruling party a fight for national power. Therefore, throughout the remainder of the year, Machar and other prominent members of the SPLM whom the President had marginalized continued their attempts to unseat him as party Chairman. Their calculus was that by replacing Kiir as Chairman of the SPLM through internal party mechanisms, the new party leader would, according to the SPLM constitution, become the party’s presidential candidate in the 2015 elections, and would then become the next president of South Sudan by default.

In November, Kiir announced, and later retracted, his intention to dissolve all political structures of the SPLM other than the Chairman’s office, thus threatening the political futures of former party insiders. On December 6, senior SPLM leaders who had been sacked by the president held a press conference calling for the long-delayed meeting of the SPLM Political Bureau to be held to discuss differences over the management of the party. Some of these individuals subsequently boycotted the meeting of the SPLM’s National Liberation Council (NLC) on December 14 and 15, protesting that the meeting had not been delayed to allow additional time for dialogue. Suspicious that a Machar-led, SPLA-supported coup was imminent, Kiir reportedly ordered the Presidential Guards, some of which included the personal forces of his former Vice President, disarmed.

During disarmament the evening of the 15th, fighting erupted between Dinka and Nuer members of the presidential guard, allegedly over selective disarmament, and quickly spread to SPLA Headquarters at Bilpam. By the following day, Kiir had ditched his civilian attire and his trademark black 10-gallon Stetson for army fatigues, accusing Machar, via nationally televised press conference, of plotting a coup. Denouncing his former vice president as a ‘Prophet of Doom,’ Kiir alluded to the events of 1991 in which Machar, Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong defected from the SPLA, thereby unleashing an

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5 Ibid.
6 “Timeline of Recent Intra-Southern Conflict.”
ethnic conflict within southern Sudan that occurred as a subset to the broader southern resistance to the government in Khartoum. While Machar escaped Juba and made his way into the bush, eleven senior political leaders were detained and accused of complicity in the alleged coup attempt.

Within days of the initial conflagration, Nuer elements of SPLA Division 8 in Jonglei state, Division 4 in Unity state, and Division 7 in southern Upper Nile state had defected and formed an armed opposition – the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). These units had been comprised of armed groups, such as the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) that had been integrated into the SPLA following the Juba Declaration (See Appendix B) nearly eight years prior. Many of the original SPLM-IO commanders and the men they led could also trace their lineage to the Sudan Armed Forces or to Anyanya II; the latter had fought the SPLA in the 1980s for control of the southern rebellion. By February 2014, South Sudan’s parliament estimated that up to 70 per cent of the SPLA had defected to the opposition. Machar denied that he had attempted to oust Kiir by coup, yet by the end of the first week of the conflict, he was claiming that SPLA commanders who had defected in parts of the Greater Upper Nile and had pledged their support for him in the initial days of the crisis were, indeed, under his command.

Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army had been integrating other rebel groups operating in what was then southern Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). Even so, by the time the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed ending the war with the Government of Sudan, over 50,000 men were members of up to 50 armed groups that included rivals to the SPLA,

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9 Young, “A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO.”
which came to comprise the military of South Sudan. Faced with both legal and practical imperatives to address non-SPLA armed groups, the Government of South Sudan could either attempt to fight them, accept that it did not possess a monopoly on the use of force in the South, or attempt to reach a political-military accommodation with them. For the most part, the government chose to accommodate armed groups, formalized through the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration in January 2006, which granted these groups amnesty for all war-related activities in exchange for their loyalty to the government and integration into the SPLA. Through military integration, the SPLA thus became the primary vehicle for political-military accommodation in South Sudan between the Juba Declaration and the outbreak of conflict in December 2013.

Beyond simple correlation, there is no evidence of a causal relationship between the government’s decision to integrate armed groups into the SPLA and the political crisis that precipitated South Sudan’s descent into civil war in December 2013. However, considering the role that the fragmentation of the SPLA played in transforming the political crisis into armed conflict, it is important to understand the military integration process that the country had undertaken in the years preceding the conflict.

This thesis is a detailed study of South Sudan’s effort to integrate armed groups into a statutory security framework during its attempt to transition from war to peace. Within this study, I will answer the following questions:

• Why did the Government of South Sudan choose to accommodate armed groups after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed?
• Why did this attempt to accommodate armed groups ultimately fail?
• What are the wider lessons that can be drawn from South Sudan’s attempt at accommodating armed groups during its aborted transition from war to peace?

Having answered these questions, I will reflect more broadly on what this case could tell us about the role of military integration during war-to-peace transitions.

Background on South Sudan

Affectionately known as ‘the world’s newest country,’ South Sudan gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan in July 2011. South Sudan’s independence was the result of an internationally-recognized referendum on self-determination, in which the population of the then-autonomous region of Southern Sudan voted overwhelmingly in favour of separation from Sudan, per the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. By 2005, South Sudan had been at war for 40 of the years since Sudan’s independence in 1956 – during the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) and the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). As a result, South Sudan had some of the worst development indicators in the world and lacked basic services such as water, sanitation, and health facilities. In addition, 51 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line and only 27 per cent of the adult population was literate.14

**Geography**

With a capital in Juba, South Sudan had ten states that generally fell into three regions: Greater Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Equatoria. The Greater Upper Nile region, comprising the former Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states, has historically been afflicted by insurgencies and inter-communal violence. Located in the northeastern part of the country, this region is strategic not only because it produces the entirety of South Sudan’s oil, but also due to its shared borders with Sudan and Ethiopia, which had previously supported armed rebellions operating there. This region bore the brunt of infighting within the southern liberation movement from the outset of the Second Sudanese Civil War, which grew in intensity after the 1991 split within the SPLA. Much of the history of factionalism within the SPLA is tied to this region, as are the former combatants who subsequently integrated into, and in many cases defected from the SPLA.

**Ethnicity**

Ethnicity and regional identities have played salient roles in South Sudan’s conflicts, as well as in the political sphere. In fact, the strength of such identities is such that South

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15 In October 2015, President Kiir issued a decree (36/2015) expanding South Sudan’s states from 10 to 28.
Sudanese have a stronger sense of citizenship in their ethnic groups than in the geographic expression that is South Sudan. The country has over 60 major ethnic groups, of which, the Dinka are the majority (35.8 per cent), followed by the Nuer (15.6 per cent), Azande, Toposa, Shilluk, Murle, and other ethnic groups. Some of these ethnic groups are subdivided into sub-ethnic groups; for example, the Dinka are subdivided into more than twenty major, named, sub-ethnic groups while the Nuer are subdivided into between eleven and thirteen such groups. Smaller ethnic groups, such as the Acholi, Azande, Bari, Mundari, and Toposa, which reside in Equatoria are collectively referred to as Equatorians. Inter-ethnic conflicts have occurred between the Dinka, Murle and Lou Nuer in Jonglei state, between the Lou Nuer of Jonglei and the Jikany Nuer of Upper Nile state, between the Bor Dinka and Mundari of Central Equatoria, and more historically, between the Dinka and the Nuer within the southern liberation movement.

Post-CPA Context

To say that South Sudan faced a challenging political, social, and economic context after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is an understatement. Between the CPA and South Sudan’s eventual independence in July 2011, the region embarked on a massive state-building enterprise unparalleled in its history. In addition to working to implement various protocols of the CPA in partnership with the government in Khartoum, South Sudan also faced the daunting task of building a government quite literally from scratch. After decades of marginalization, South Sudan had to create structures and procedures to govern the autonomous region that it had been granted in the CPA, and prepare governing institutions in case the region’s citizens voted for

independence in the 2011 referendum. This included establishing, furnishing, and staffing ministries at multiple levels of government from the federal government to the ten states, 86 counties, and several payams and bomas. In addition, South Sudan had to establish the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, as well as state assemblies and local councils, and agree upon a Transitional Constitution for Southern Sudan.

At the same time, the former guerrilla movement that was in the process of transforming into a political party at the helm of a civilian government faced immense pressure to deliver services to the population, which was expecting a peace dividend after decades of war. In addition to having a shortage of experienced public administrators, South Sudan had limited civil service delivery mechanisms to build off of despite the existence of wartime constructs such as the SPLM/A’s Civil-Military Administrators, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SSRA), and the Civil Authority for the New Sudan (CANS).

During the Interim Period of the CPA, there were three militaries in Sudan/South Sudan – the SAF, the SPLA, and the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). Per the CPA, there was to be a formal process of military integration between the SAF and the SPLA, and the JIUs were established with the intent of demonstrating national unity and serving as a nucleus of a future national army should South Sudan vote for unity over independence in 2011. Chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander, a JIU support group was established in November 2007 to coordinate international support, and included the JIU Commander and representatives from UNMIS and donor countries including the United States, United

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21 Author interview with senior Ministry of Defence official A, Juba, South Sudan, August 15, 2014.
22 Per the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements, equal numbers of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA would comprise Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) with a total force strength of 39,000 soldiers during the interim period of the peace agreement. In addition, parties to the peace agreement were to establish a Joint Defence Board (JDB) under the Presidency of Sudan, comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the SAF and the SPLA, their deputies, and senior officers from both forces. The JDB was responsible for coordination between the SAF and the SPLA and for command of the JIUs. The subsequent Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices spelled out the command and control, composition and organization, training, and detailed deployment for the JIUs.
Kingdom, Egypt, Norway, and the Netherlands. Furthermore, UN Security Council Resolution 1784 (2007) requested that UNMIS develop a plan to support the Joint Defence Board and enable the full establishment of JIUs.

**Economy**

South Sudan occupied an area almost the size of France, but had extremely limited infrastructure, making connectivity between rural areas and urban centres, or between urban centres themselves extremely difficult. A majority of the roads were unpaved, and many were impassable during the May–October rainy season. This raised transportation costs and hindered the movement of goods to market, which in turn made the country highly reliant on imports. In addition, due to the toll the wars had taken on South Sudan, the region had limited economic activity outside of subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. Although approximately 90 per cent of South Sudan’s land was arable, only 10 per cent was under cultivation by the time the country became independent. According to some assessments, South Sudan’s large and fertile tracts of land had the potential to produce hardwood timber, gum arabic, and honey.

Depending on where the border between Sudan and South Sudan was drawn, approximately three-fourths of Sudan’s oil ended up in South Sudan after independence. However, as South Sudan was landlocked, it was at the mercy of an oil

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26 Ibid.
pipeline that ran through Sudan towards Port Sudan on the Red Sea to get its oil to the global market. With oil accounting for 98 per cent of public sector revenue and almost all foreign exchange earnings, South Sudan was the most oil-dependent government in the world, which left it vulnerable to the volatility of global oil prices.\footnote{Government of the Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013.”}

In January 2012, the Government of South Sudan decided to cease oil production due to an inability to reach an agreement with the Government of Sudan with regards to oil pipeline transit fees. A leaked March 2012 World Bank memo predicted the fallout of South Sudan’s decision: a dramatic contraction of the economy, massive depreciation of the South Sudanese Pound, and a depletion of fiscal reserves.\footnote{World Bank, “Briefing by Marcelo Giugale, World Bank Director of Economic Policy and Poverty Reduction Programmes for Africa,” March 1, 2012, http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/WB_SS_Analysis.pdf.} In addition, the World Bank predicted a rapid reversal in some of the key development gains achieved since the CPA, such as increased poverty, higher child mortality, lower school attendance, and deepening food insecurity.\footnote{Ibid.} In September 2012, Sudan and South Sudan reached an agreement on the pipeline fee, and production resumed in April 2013.

A few months after the World Bank memo was leaked, President Kiir wrote an open letter to 75 former and current senior government officials in an effort to recover stolen government funds. In this letter, the president estimated that an amount of $4 billion had been unaccounted for in the country’s coffers.\footnote{PaanLuel Wël: South Sudanese Bloggers, “Letter from President Kiir on Corruption: $4 Billion Dollars Stolen; Only $60 Million Recovered,” June 2, 2012, https://paanluelwel.com/2012/06/01/letter-from-president-kiir-on-corruption-4-billion-dollars-stolen/.} As an indication of the level of corruption that afflicted the new post-conflict government, this amount was estimated to comprise about a third of South Sudan’s oil revenue between the signing of the CPA in January 2005 and the country’s independence in July 2011.\footnote{Hereward Holland, “South Sudan Officials Have Stolen $4 Billion: President,” \textit{Reuters}, June 4, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-corruption-idUSBRE853QI20120604.}
As this and other cases of gross corruption have demonstrated since the Interim Period, Kiir’s unwillingness to take a harder line against massive corruption has been one of his methods of maintaining political stability and avoiding exacerbating the fragile security situation in South Sudan. Accordingly, the South Sudanese state became above all, an instrument of patronage, with senior and/or symbolic posts consuming a large portion of the state’s budget following the signing of the CPA, as salaries alone accounted for 40 per cent of the government’s budget between 2006 and 2011. Yet while this approach facilitated short-term stability, it precluded the long-term development of a functioning government that administered and provided public services through effective institutions.

‘Enemies of the Peace’

South Sudan’s potentially volatile post-conflict environment contributed to the perpetual fear that the CPA would not hold, prompting the SPLA to maintain a wartime posture. Indeed, skirmishes along the common border between Sudan and South Sudan in the spring of 2012 raised concerns that a new conflict would erupt. Meanwhile, the security environment was continually non-permissive in the Greater Upper Nile region, which witnessed multiple instances of ethnic conflict and cattle-raiding, including the SPLA’s fight to disarm the White Army militia in 2006, and a succession of Khartoum-supported armed groups in 2010 and 2011.

Given the southern liberation movement’s history of fragmentation and the Government of Sudan’s record of support to non-SPLA armed groups, the Government of Southern Sudan faced an immediate imperative to mitigate the threat potential of tens of thousands of spoilers to the peace agreement during the Interim Period (2005-2011) of the CPA, which preceded the referendum on self-determination. As the focus of the CPA had

37 Ibid.
primarily been on North-South peace, there was insufficient focus on forging South-South unity and reconciliation to overcome the ethnic factionalism that had afflicted the southern liberation movement in the past. The CPA left many issues of contention in the South unresolved, such as divisions within the South that were tied to competitions over leadership of the southern rebellion; perceptions of ethnic marginalization between the Dinka and the Nuer; or personal animosities towards SPLM/A leader John Garang’s style of leadership and his conceptualization of the SPLM/A as a revolution aimed at transforming a united ‘New Sudan’ through the replacement of the ruling NCP (formerly the National Islamic Front) regime in Khartoum with a secular, democratically elected government.38

In an effort to streamline the peace process, all non-SPLA armed groups – such as the South Sudan Defence Force and local self-defence militias, referred to in the CPA as Other Armed Groups (OAGs), had been excluded from participating in the negotiations. Yet some of these groups collectively possessed the size, weapons, military capabilities, and strategic locations to become spoilers and may have controlled up to 20 per cent of the territory of South Sudan – including some of the areas vital to oil production.39

Why Military Integration?

The CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements and Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices stipulated that OAGs were required to either be incorporated into the security forces of Sudan or South Sudan (i.e. Army, Police, Prisons, and Wildlife) or be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.40 Moreover, recognizing the threat that these armed groups posed to

38 For a discussion of Garang’s efforts to reconcile his belief in a ‘New Sudan’ with the demands of many southerners for independence, see Robert O. Collins, “Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in the Sudan,” in Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan, Southern Sudan, and Darfur, 1962–2004 (Hollywood, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2005) and Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Garang had hoped that the South’s participation in a government of national unity after the overthrow of the regime in Khartoum and an interim period before a referendum on self-determination, would allow time to heal the wounds inflicted by the war, and allow the South’s future to continue to be tied to that of the North.
39 Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration”; Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 15, 2014.
the stability of southern Sudan, President Salva Kiir negotiated a settlement with the SSDF, resulting in the issuance of the Juba Declaration in January 2006. The Juba Declaration offered members of various southern rebel groups amnesty for all war-related activities in exchange for their loyalty to the Government of Southern Sudan and integration into the SPLA. Many members of OAGs chose to integrate into the SPLA, swelling its ranks to between 140,000 and 200,000 soldiers – more than twice the size of a military that a future potentially independent South Sudan would need and could afford. During the Interim Period, the SPLA was also trying to reduce its parade to 120,000 soldiers while conceptualizing several demobilization initiatives that could attempt to provide alternative livelihoods for former combatants.

Further complicating matters, South Sudan chose to integrate armed groups into the SPLA because this process allowed South Sudan to temporarily overcome its history of factionalism and ethnic conflict in order to consolidate political-military power. By reducing the manpower available for armed groups, the Government of South Sudan limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use its support of non-SPLA armed groups in the South to undermine CPA implementation and derail the referendum on self-determination. Military power-sharing through integration was also a means by which to signal a genuine commitment to peace and a willingness to compromise, allowing armed groups an insurance policy’ to help assuage fears about their role in the post-CPA South.

The Civil War-Era SPLA

At the outset of the process of integrating OAGs into the SPLA, there were questions regarding what kind of force armed groups were actually integrating into. Although some of its forces were conscripted, the SPLA was largely a non-salaried volunteer army of

41 “Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) And the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF).”
between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers spurred into action by combatants’ frustration with the government in Khartoum and their desire to protect their communities. In the months leading up to John Garang’s death in July 2005, some elements of the SPLA had started adopting conventional military formations, at least on paper, and were starting to possess the attributes of a national army. This was a transition from the SPLA’s modus operandi during the civil war.

Because its rank-and-file was largely rural and socio-economically marginalized, combatants had limited social awareness or political consciousness. One of the drawbacks of the composition of the SPLA was that it assumed the attributes of an occupying force within the areas it controlled due to a lack of political education as to the purpose of the movement, as well as its inability to develop solidarity with the population on whose behalf they were fighting. In other words, contrary to the Socialist rhetoric of the movement’s leadership, the rank-and-file were not spurred into action by ‘revolutionary zeal.’ In the early days of the movement, recruits were trained in Ethiopia on tactical combat skills as well as in political and moral orientation, and eventually this training was able to take place within the liberated parts of the South as they gained ground against the Sudan Armed Forces.

Within the literature on South Sudan, there are some disparities when it comes to the structure of the SPLA during the war. Although South Sudan’s terrain made centralized administration of the SPLA rather challenging, the Political-Military High Command was still able to maintain a level of control over the formation of strategy and policy.

44 Peter Adwok Nyaba, South Sudan: The Crisis of Infancy.
46 Ibid.
47 Saskia Baas, From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012).
48 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars.
Contrary to the structure of Anyanya, the southern liberation movement during the First Sudanese Civil War, the SPLA was highly centralized.\textsuperscript{49} By some accounts, the SPLM/A blended autocratic control at the strategic level with the delegation of a degree of autonomy to local leaders and military commanders at the tactical level.\textsuperscript{50} By other accounts, power within the SPLA was personified in its leader John Garang, who contradicted his rhetoric on democracy and pluralism with his proclivity for maintaining autocratic control of the movement.\textsuperscript{51} By Garang’s design, the SPLA depended on his personal control from top to bottom.\textsuperscript{52} Opposed to the institutionalization of the movement, he neutralized his military high command by maintaining complete control over weapons and supplies, putting his supporters in key positions, and dealing directly with select commanders.\textsuperscript{53} This resistance to institutionalizing the SPLM/A made the movement dependent on his personal control, and prevented the emergence of cohesive, professional units that could potentially provide a base from which internal rivals could mobilize.\textsuperscript{54} Consequently, Garang retarded the development of military capacity and cohesion within the SPLA, while simultaneously stunting the movement’s political culture.\textsuperscript{55}

The experience of the SPLM/A’s struggle for self-determination emphasized unity of purpose, thereby attempting to transcend the ethnic boundaries in the South.\textsuperscript{56} In fact, the SPLM/A was the first institution in the South that attempted to create a national identity

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.; Saskia Baas, From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan.
\textsuperscript{50} Matthew LeRiche and Matthew Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence (London: Hurst & Co., 2012); Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.; Saskia Baas, From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan.
\textsuperscript{52} “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
\textsuperscript{55} Young, “John Garang’s Legacy to the Peace Process, the SPLM/A & the South”; Peter Adwok Nyaba, South Sudan: The Crisis of Infancy.
\textsuperscript{56} Jok Madut Jok, “Diversity, Unity, and Nation Building in South Sudan.”
that had the potential to transcend these ethnic or regional identities. During the liberation struggle, the SPLM/A became a melting pot for the South’s ethnic differences and contradictions, allowing the contradictions between North and South to remain stronger than the internal contradictions within the South. Included in the movement at various times were divergent actors such as Garang’s loyalists including Dinka from his home area of Bor in Jonglei state, Nuer members of Anyanya II who resented Garang’s leadership of the southern resistance at the outset of the civil war, Equatorians who were at times threatened by the expansion and predation of SPLM/A in their home areas, Socialists who believed that Sudan’s struggle was between its core and its periphery, those opposed to the imposition of Arab-Islamic culture by the government in Khartoum, and former SPLA officers who had defected and returned to the fold. Across this panoply of diverse interests, the movement’s focus on a revolution aimed at transforming a united Sudan through a secular, democratically elected government allowed it to have the flexibility to advocate for a broad vision across the South rather than defending the parochial interests of its members. As a result of the SPLA’s habitual absorption of armed groups during the civil war, the post-CPA military eventually came to consist of old guard SPLA, southerners who had previously belonged to the Sudan Armed Forces, and former members of the SSDF and other armed groups that had been affiliated with the Government of Sudan during the Second Sudanese civil war. Because the SPLA never succeeded in developing the ethos of a national military, the outcome was described as a confederation of ethnic militia in which parochial interests superseded national ones. Former armed group commanders, many of whom had been granted

57 Saskia Baas, *From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan*.
58 Throughout this thesis, I will use the terms ‘North’ and ‘northern’ and ‘South’ and ‘southern’ as shorthand for Sudan and South Sudan, respectively.
59 Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*.
61 Saskia Baas, *From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan*.
senior ranks upon integration into the SPLA, allegedly composed ethnically-defined units of rank-and-file soldiers that had previously fought under their command. There were also allegations that prominent South Sudanese ministers and other politicians maintained their own personal security forces. Consequently, many of the integrated forces were believed to maintain loyalties to their particular ethnic groups or to their former leaders rather than to the Republic, the President, or even the formal SPLA chain of command. This meant that every military operation risked ethnic conflict.

One of the reasons the SPLM/A failed to foster a cohesive identity may have been a diminishing focus on political and moral orientation over time. In particular, a lack of commitment to a common national political agenda could be attributed to the eventual neglect of political education and ideological training. In fact, some argue that the SPLM/A’s failure to forge cohesion within an ethnically-diverse movement gave the government in Khartoum ample opportunities to exploit divisions in the South.

As the wartime dream of self-determination turned into reality in the post-CPA era, there was concern that the limited cohesion forged through collective opposition to the North could threaten the viability of the new nation. Southern solidarity during the Interim Period, by one assessment, was opportunistic and superficial, rooted in the collective opposition to the North. By several assessments, the SPLA by 2006 was a diverse collection of armed groups whose loyalties belonged to their ethnic groups or individual leaders rather than to the SPLA or the nascent South Sudan state. Due to its inability


65 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”

66 Young, The Fate of Sudan; “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”

67 Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan.

68 Young, The Fate of Sudan.

69 Jok Madut Jok, “Diversity, Unity, and Nation Building in South Sudan.”

70 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan.

71 Peter Adwo Nyaba, South Sudan: The Crisis of Infancy; Young, The Fate of Sudan; Naomi Pendle, “They Are Now Community Police’: Negotiating the Boundaries and Nature of the Government in South
to forge a national identity within the southern liberation movement, factionalism had been a major characteristic of the SPLM/A, and consequently, the SPLA had been and continued to be quite factionalized at the outset of the integration process. Once independence was secured in 2011, there was little to deter the emergence of divisions within the SPLM/A.73

Civil-Military Relations

Despite the fact that it has multiple political parties, South Sudan is a de facto one-party state. Both of the monikers ‘SPLM’ and ‘SPLA’ are highly coveted and have sentimental value in South Sudan. This is a function of the status that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army attained as the strongest armed group in the South during the Second Civil War, the role that its founder, the late Dr. John Garang, played in delivering the much-desired Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the role the SPLM/A played after his death as the protector of South Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the dominant political force that midwifed South Sudan’s independence after decades of civil war.74 The status the SPLM/A achieved in the South is relevant to the line of inquiry in this thesis because inclusion in the ruling party and the military therefore became a competition for national power and prestige. In other words, because of the legitimacy of the SPLM/A, the single most important determinant of access to political and economic power in South Sudan was the movement or one’s relation to it.75 With the line between political party and guerrilla army blurred by the SPLM/A’s armed liberation lineage, such competition eventually manifested itself militarily, as evidenced by the perpetual proliferation of armed groups in Greater Upper Nile after the April 2010 elections, and the outbreak of civil war in December 2013.

72 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
73 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan.
74 Ibid.
Overall, the SPLM was submerged within a military subculture.\textsuperscript{76} Since the founding of the liberation movement in 1983, the armed movement was always dominant to the political wing, which arguably led to a deeply ingrained militarization of governance and politics in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{77} This characterization can be attributed to the fact that the evolution of the SPLA rapidly outpaced the political and ideological development of the SPLM.\textsuperscript{78} Furthermore, the movement’s failure to engage in dialogue as a means by which to resolve its internal contradictions meant that military confrontation became the primary means of resolving political disputes.\textsuperscript{79} Additionally, the party and the military had become synonymous due to the fact that the political leadership of the SPLM was comprised of many old guard military leaders.\textsuperscript{80} As the only state-like structure during the civil war, the SPLA logically became the primary source of manpower for not only the state security forces, but also the civil service.\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, with the SPLA’s officer corps largely composed of ‘politicians-in-waiting,’ the SPLM/A was sometimes described as a politicized armed group.\textsuperscript{82} The fusion of the military and politics was evident in the political nature of the armed forces, where, due to the lack of cohesion within the SPLA, parts of the military would identify with particular political leaders.\textsuperscript{83} Politics in South Sudan has thus been underpinned, and in fact defined, by the ability of politicians and army officers to mobilize fighters and destabilize strategic regions of the country such as Greater Upper Nile.\textsuperscript{84} As a result of all these factors, political factionalism was often expressed within the military – as demonstrated by the political crisis within the SPLM that led to the outbreak of the South Sudanese civil war in December 2013.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{76} Peter Adwok Nyaba, \textit{South Sudan: The Crisis of Infancy}.
\textsuperscript{77} “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan”; LeRiche and Arnold, \textit{South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{78} Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{79} Peter Adwok Nyaba, \textit{South Sudan: The Crisis of Infancy}.
\textsuperscript{80} von Habsburg-Lothringen, “Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan.”
\textsuperscript{81} Saskia Baas, \textit{From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{82} LeRiche and Arnold, \textit{South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{83} “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan”; LeRiche and Arnold, \textit{South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{84} Young, \textit{The Fate of Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{85} “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
While the SPLM and the SPLA were supposed to be legally distinct as the independent Republic of South Sudan began to take shape, they maintained ‘enduring and structural links’ and were never completely disaggregated from one another.\textsuperscript{86} The 2011 Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, Part 10, Chapter 1, Article 151 (2) stipulated that the Sudan People’s Liberation Army “…shall be transformed into the South Sudan Armed Forces, and shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, regular, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority as established under this Constitution and the law.”\textsuperscript{87} However, President Kiir faced stiff resistance to renaming the military, and the ‘new’ national military continued to be referred to as the SPLA.\textsuperscript{88} Transformation from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army to the South Sudan Armed Forces would have signalled a clean break between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the national military of the newly independent Republic of South Sudan. In addition, new, non-partisan nomenclature could have indicated a greater sense of socio-political and ethnic equality within the diverse and often recently-adversarial members of the newly-integrated security force, which could have helped mitigate the history of factionalism within the South.

**Support from the International Community**

Amidst the aforementioned challenges, South Sudan benefitted from substantial goodwill, foreign investment, and humanitarian assistance on the part of the international community, which endorsed South Sudan’s independence in 2011.\textsuperscript{89} International support came from the Joint Donor Team and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan; multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, European Union, and the World Bank; and individual donors, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Norway,

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\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*.
Germany, Japan, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden. Furthermore, the United Nations Mission in Sudan was established by UN Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), with a mandate to support the implementation of the CPA largely through monitoring the ceasefire agreement and the redeployments of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA during the Interim Period. Its successor, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, was established by UN Security Council resolution 1996 (2011), with an original mandate to support the Government of South Sudan in peace consolidation, thereby fostering longer-term state building and economic development; assist the Government of South Sudan in conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and the protection of civilians; and help the Government of South Sudan to develop the capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law, and strengthen the security and justice sectors in the country.

**Core Argument**

This thesis provides a detailed study of South Sudan’s experience implementing a military integration process during its attempt to transition from war to peace between 2006 and 2013. In order to accomplish the objectives of this study, I will argue that the Government of Southern Sudan faced three choices vis-à-vis adhering to the requirements articulated in the CPA and addressing the threat that non-SPLA groups posed to stability. They could: 1) attempt to combat them militarily, 2) ignore them and accept that they did not possess a monopoly on the use of force in southern Sudan, or 3) reach a political-military accommodation with them. As the government sought to ease over divisions in the South in the runup to the 2011 referendum on self-determination, it...
largely chose to reach an accommodation with armed groups by offering them amnesty and integration into the SPLA – an approach formalised by the 2006 Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration, which brought many OAGs into a statutory security framework per the requirements of the CPA.

Integration thus took on the attributes of military power-sharing within South Sudan, and served multiple peacebuilding purposes during the Interim Period (2005-2011) of the CPA. First, given the civil war-era divisions in the South, military integration was a means by which to signal a genuine commitment to peace and a willingness to compromise. Second, by reducing the manpower available for armed groups and containing former combatants in a statutory security mechanism, the Government of South Sudan limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use its support of non-SPLA armed groups in the South to undermine CPA implementation and derail the referendum on self-determination. Third, by bringing OAGs into the government’s power structures of the South, the Government of South Sudan was allowing non-SPLA armed groups an ‘insurance policy’ to help assuage fears about their role in the post-CPA South. Integrating them into the SPLA through the Juba Declaration offered them a mutually reinforcing political-military power-sharing arrangement that was arguably necessary due to the legacy of South-South divisions and the exclusion of OAGs from the negotiations that led to the CPA. Finally, the SPLA, although multi-ethnic, carried the perception of being a Dinka-dominated movement – especially after the 1991 split between Garang and Machar, after which the South-South conflict took on Dinka vs. Nuer attributes. Therefore, military integration, which brought in primarily Nuer armed groups, made the SPLA more diverse, thereby making it more of a symbol of national unity. After integration, the SPLA became between 65 and 70 per cent Nuer. Overall, by allowing the Government of South Sudan to consolidate political-military power,

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military integration allowed for the implementation of the CPA, including the 2011 referendum on self-determination, which resulted in its independence from Sudan.

Despite the initial utility of military integration, it became, over time, the government’s de facto means by which to mitigate the threat that armed groups posed to stability. Consequently, integration became an open-ended process with armed group leaders repeatedly defecting and reintegrating without consequence. With the expectation that the government wished to ‘buy peace’ at any cost, this cycle had several negative implications. It created a perverse incentive for members of the SPLA to use violence in order to advance their positions or increase their wealth. It precluded the SPLA from ‘graduating’ from the integration process and focusing on cohesion and professionalism. And it created a continuous opportunity cost for the SPLA, as well as the country at large, by diverting resources from military professionalism due to the ever-growing need to pay the salaries of military personnel.

Due to South Sudan’s open-ended approach to integration, a process that should have been temporary and transitional became an end in and of itself. This kept the SPLA in a state of arrested development and prone to fracturing during periods of heightened political competition. Compounding the pressure placed on the integration process was the failure of demobilization initiatives, such as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, Wounded Heroes, a Civic Works Corps, and a Pensions program, that were all supposed to contribute to rightsizing the SPLA. This meant that while the SPLA was absorbing armed groups, there was no functioning ‘release valve’ to flush former combatants out of the security sector.

Transformation of South Sudan’s defence sector, including assisting the SPLA in becoming a cohesive national military, was concurrent to the integration process. However, these efforts were not aligned with the military integration process. As a result, SPLA Transformation was being conducted on an unstable foundation, which eventually unravelled in December 2013 when South Sudan collapsed into civil war.
The end result was that while South Sudan’s military integration process played a stabilizing role prior to the referendum on self-determination, it eventually played a destabilizing role due to the manner in which it was implemented. Thus, through military integration, South Sudan addressed short-term security dilemmas, but created long-term instability with its lack of a long-term strategic vision for the integration process.

**Contribution to the Field**

Much of the literature on war-to-peace transitions tends to focus on the role of the United Nations and other third party actors in such a context, and not enough on how former combatants themselves attempt to consolidate peace. This thesis takes an ‘inside-out’ approach to analysing the case of South Sudan, with a primary emphasis on gathering data on the implementation of the integration process between 2006 and 2013 that had not been gathered previously.

There has been a rather substantial body of work on South Sudan in the past decade and a half, which may be attributed to the peace process finally gaining momentum in 2002, the signing of the CPA in 2005, and the anticipation of the referendum, which provided for the possibility of a new country in East Africa. The attendant political, economic, social, and security issues have been analysed in depth by academics, consultants, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and government agencies. Analyses of South Sudan’s security issues have focused on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, security sector reform, and armed conflict, including insurgencies, cattle-raiding, and other types of communal violence. The focus of this thesis specifically on the SPLA emphasizes the importance of this socio-political entity within South Sudan. In addition to its legitimacy being based on the fact that it fought for, and won, self-determination for the South, the SPLA has become a primary vehicle through which to access power and wealth in South Sudan. Thus, this thesis’ focus on the dynamics of this attempt to integrate armed groups into the SPLA adds another layer of nuance to the existing body of analysis on South Sudan.
While a single case study may be limited in external validity, an in-depth case study on South Sudan yields important data on the country’s military integration process that may otherwise be inaccessible or overlooked. Empirical data on South Sudan’s integration provides details on the role this process played during South Sudan’s transition from war, to autonomous region, to independent state, and back to war. As there has been little substantive analysis that provides the level of empirical data I have been able to collect on South Sudan’s military integration process, this thesis fills the gap by providing in-depth analysis on this aspect of South Sudan’s security sector, and the role this process has played in the country’s attempt to transition from war to peace.

As will be explored further in Chapter 3 (Review of the Literature on Military Integration), my thesis topic is situated in the broader theoretical literature on managing potential spoilers in the aftermath of a peace settlement. Through my analysis of South Sudan’s experience with military integration, I am thus able to make the following five contributions to the theoretical understanding of the role that military integration plays in transitions from war to peace:

- During such transitions, governments can either fight armed groups, ignore them and accept that they lack a monopoly on the use of force within the country, or seek political-military accommodation with them through military integration. When presented with these options, integration can be the ‘least bad’ choice in some cases.
- Military integration can help temporarily overcome wartime factionalism, thereby benefitting short-term peace consolidation, but can eventually lead to instability if the process is not approached as a transitional security mechanism.
- The combination of an open-ended integration process and failed demobilization initiatives can increase pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups pose to stability.
- A disconnect between the integration process and broader defence sector reform efforts can result in the security sector being rebuilt on an unstable foundation, as was the case in South Sudan.
• A military’s failure to ‘graduate’ from the integration process risks leaving the security sector in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force prone to fracturing during periods of heightened political competition.

This thesis seeks to fill a critical gap in the understanding of the role that this relatively under-examined process of bringing armed groups into a statutory security framework plays as countries attempt to transition from war to peace. Considering the increasing use of military integration as part of civil war settlements across the world, the sheer complexity of South Sudan’s case warrants further analysis – if only as a cautionary tale on how not to pursue a military integration process.

**Research Methodology**

This thesis is a qualitative explanatory case study that employs historical analysis and interviews to examine the role that military integration played in the transition from war to peace in South Sudan between 2006 and 2013. I have chosen this research design because the evaluation of political-military processes in transitional security environments, such as in the case of South Sudan in particular, provides a deeper understanding of the sequence of events through which initial conditions have been translated into case outcomes.

It is important to stress that, in this study, 2006 is chosen as the starting point for understanding the military integration process in South Sudan because the Juba Declaration, signed in January of that year, formalized the integration of armed groups into the SPLA. Over time, military integration became the de facto approach for managing the threat posed by armed groups until the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 – another bookend for this study. Although the focus of this thesis is on the time period between 2006 and 2013, part of it covers the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) in order to offer a historical context that explains why the Government of South Sudan pursued military integration during the period that followed the war.
Operationalization of Major Terms

Interim Period

The term Interim Period, used frequently in this thesis, followed the Pre-Interim Period that lasted six months from the signing of the CPA (January – July 2005). In this thesis, Interim Period refers to the six-year period between July 2005 and July 2011, during which signatories to the CPA agreed to make unity attractive through implementation of the agreement’s protocols on political power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security arrangements. It was during this period that military integration became formalized through the signing of the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration in January 2006, and eventually became the government’s de facto approach to mitigate the threats that armed groups posed to stability. During the Interim Period, national elections took place in Sudan and in the semi-autonomous region of Southern Sudan. In accordance with the provisions of the CPA, a referendum on self-determination was held in January 2011. During the referendum, 98.8 per cent of South Sudanese voted for secession from Sudan, resulting in South Sudan’s independence in July 2011.  

Military Integration

After the Second Sudanese Civil War ended, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement articulated four dimensions of power-sharing (military, political, economic, and territorial) between the National Congress Party in the North and the SPLM/A in the South. Within South Sudan, power-sharing arrangements were less formal; accordingly this thesis addresses these arrangements as forms of de facto power-sharing.

Power-sharing is a reconstitution of state authority through the creation of government institutions that balance power among rival forces, or at the very least, prevent one party from accumulating the power to exercise unilateral authority. Created during negotiated settlements to armed conflict, power-sharing institutions determine who holds power, to what end, and how it is exercised. Military integration can be one dimension of power-

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sharing that is often employed alongside other power-sharing arrangements along political, economic, and territorial dimensions. In this thesis, I use the term military integration to refer to a dimension of power-sharing that involves the distribution of authority within the coercive apparatus of the state by incorporating or amalgamating non-statutory armed groups (i.e., rebel groups, local militia, etc.) into a statutory security framework (i.e., military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, etc.)

Of the 128 civil wars fought and concluded between 1945 and 2006, approximately 40 per cent of the peace settlements had some element of military integration. Integration as a part of peace settlements has also been increasing over time – from not being included in peace settlements in the 1940s, to being a part of 10 per cent of such settlements in the 1960s, 36 per cent in the 1980s, and 56 per cent in the 2000s. Between 1945 and 1999, there were 34 cases of military integration, and the majority of these were in sub-Saharan Africa in countries such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Outside of the continent of Africa, integration has also been attempted in Lebanon (1989), Cambodia (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Georgia/South Ossetia (1995), and the Philippines (1996).

Military power-sharing involves the distribution of the state’s coercive powers among former combatants through the integration of warring parties into the state’s security forces on the basis of a balance of troop numbers or on a proportional basis, contingent

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100 Ibid.


102 Licklider, *New Armies from Old*. 
on the size of the armed factions. Alternatively, military power-sharing can be accomplished by the creation of a new military that draws members from former combatants; the creation of a new military that draws members based on the proportions of former combatants and factions; the appointment of non-dominant former combatants to key leadership posts in the military; and by allowing former combatants to maintain their own security forces. The appointment of members of the ‘subordinate’ group to key leadership positions allows them to, in principle, monitor the policy decisions and movement of troops that could threaten the interests of their group, and prevent the coercive apparatus of the state from being monopolized by a single group which has recently demonstrated hostile intentions. The CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements and the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices stipulated that Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) comprised of equal numbers of Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Army would serve as the nucleus of the national military in the event of a vote for unity in the referendum on self-determination. Within South Sudan, military power-sharing was formalized through the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration signed in January 2006, through which a Military Technical Committee was to oversee the integration of OAGs into the SPLA.

Political power-sharing covers the proportional distribution of political power within the executive, administrative, or electoral sectors of government. Political power-sharing arrangements usually entail the distribution of political positions such as cabinet posts and seats in the legislature. The participation of former combatants in the political sphere can place them in a better position to prevent the imposition of policies that would

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be detrimental to their interests. The CPA’s Protocol on Power Sharing stipulated southern participation in a Government of National Unity. In addition, during the Interim Period, a series of conferences aimed to discuss matters of political-military power-sharing within the South: OAG Dialogue Conferences (April 18-21, 2005; June 20-July 3, 2005; and January 6-7, 2006), Dialogue between the SPLM and Southern Political Parties (November 8-13, 2008), All Political Parties Conference (September 26-30, 2009), South-South Dialogue Conference (October 13-17, 2010). Upon succeeding Garang in mid-2005, Kiir also met with SSDF leadership to indicate his willingness to accommodate them, and subsequently appointed several SSDF members as ministers, commissioners, and members of regional assembly and state legislatures. As part of the Juba Declaration, the Administrative and Civil Service Committee was created to manage the integration of non-military personnel into national and state government.

Economic power-sharing involves access to and the distribution of the state’s economic resources among former combatants, and often entails formulas for resource distribution or pledges to direct resources to individuals on the basis of group membership or geographic location. Economic power-sharing prevents the state’s economic resources from being monopolized by one group, or from being used to marginalize potential competitors. In Sudan, the CPA’s Agreement on Wealth Sharing covered the management and distribution of the country’s resources and revenue during the Interim Period.

Territorial power-sharing covers the decentralization or division of authority on the basis of federalism or regional autonomy. Territorial power-sharing creates opportunities for regionally-concentrated groups to govern themselves, thus providing them with political influence vis-à-vis the central government, and the assurance that their culture and values

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108 Hartzell and Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security.”
109 Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”
112 Hartzell and Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management.”
will be protected from the interests of the political centre. Accordingly, the CPA’s Protocol on Power Sharing stipulated the establishment of an autonomous region in the South.

Military integration is a distinct process from disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, which is defined below. However, integration can take place prior to, or even concurrent to DDR and broader social, political, and economic assistance to former combatants. As it encompasses a wide array of policies and is not a standardized process, there exists no universal concept of, or approach to military integration. Generally, the process includes negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment.

As Roy Licklider notes, integration takes place amidst a range of political-military contexts. Of the cases he examined in New Wars from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, some processes (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone) had a high level of foreign involvement while others (Lebanon, the Philippines, Rwanda, and South Africa) developed autonomously. Some cases (Mozambique and South Africa) benefitted from substantial political support at the local level, while others (Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) did not. And some cases (Rwanda and Sierra Leone) followed military victories, while others (Burundi and Sudan) were the outcome of negotiated settlements.

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113 Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace; Hartzell and Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security.”
114 Hartzell and Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security.”
SPLA Transformation

This thesis argues that military integration should have been the foundation of any future plans to reform South Sudan’s security sector. Security sector reform (SSR) is a concept that emerged in the late 1990s for which no single definition has been agreed upon. For the purpose of this thesis, I use the definitions of security sector and security sector reform from the 2008 Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which states that:

“‘Security sector’ is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services, and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-state actors that could be considered part of the sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.”

This report goes on to define ‘security sector reform’ as:

“a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

Although security sector reform normally includes a focus on aspects of the security sector outside of the military, the scope of this thesis is on the integration of armed

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groups into the SPLA. As such, the term SPLA Transformation captures the most relevant aspects of security sector reform for the purpose of this thesis.

The definition of SPLA Transformation used in this thesis has been derived from U.S. and UK requests for proposals and periodic program reviews pertaining to defence sector transformation projects – an approach similar to the method used in Richard Rands’ *In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond*. The goal of SPLA Transformation was for the SPLA, supported by foreign donors, to transition from a guerrilla force into a professional, accountable, affordable, and disciplined military operating under civilian authority and capable of providing security for the people of South Sudan.118

As Transformation commenced during the interim period of the CPA, the goal was for the SPLA to either operate as part of the national Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under a government of national unity or as the national military of a potentially independent South Sudan post-2011.119 According to the SPLA’s *Objective Force 2017*, SPLA Transformation involved four main activities: 1) enhancing operational capabilities; 2) educating and training SPLA personnel; 3) improving SPLA values and standards; and 4) rightsizing the SPLA.120 The SPLA received a range of support from the United Nations missions, the United States, United Kingdom, and Switzerland for SPLA Transformation – from improving command and control structures to facilitating the development of core and supporting defence institutions to improving the military’s understanding of the rule of law and human rights.

**Rightsizing**

Of the aforementioned aspects of SPLA Transformation, rightsizing the SPLA is most relevant to this thesis, as reducing the parade of the military over time should have

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relieved the pressure that the military integration process placed on the SPLA. Estimates of the SPLA parade vary widely. At the signing of the CPA, it was believed to comprise 90,000 personnel. With the integration of armed groups, it was believed to total 140,000, but by independence, it was believed to have risen to 207,000. Since then, the parade was believed to have grown to 230,000 soldiers (before the onset of civil war in December 2013 and defection of tens of thousands of soldiers) due to recruitment and re-enlistment; this figure may have also included tens of thousands of ghost soldiers, based on a previous internal audit of the SPLA.

The definition of rightsizing used in this thesis comes from Richard Rands’ *In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond*, which used the term ‘rightsizing’ to refer to “…the process of finding a balance between military effectiveness and affordability in terms of force structure, composition, and size. Rightsizing need not always imply ‘down-sizing’ or reductions in troop numbers; depending on the nature of perceived threats, it could imply a need to increase the size of a military force.” In the period in question in South Sudan, rightsizing refers to the SPLA’s goal to reduce its parade, thereby reducing the stress that non-essential personnel placed on the military’s operational capabilities and resources.

Both during the interim period and after South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the primary method of reducing the parade of the SPLA was to be through Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, and to a lesser extent, through the Wounded Heroes program and a pensions scheme and civil works brigades that the government had conceptualized but never quite implemented.

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122 Author interview with consultant on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 25, 2012; Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond.”


Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration is the process through which former combatants are reintegrated into civilian society. Although the focus of this thesis is not on the DDR process in South Sudan, it was to play a central role in counteracting the rapidly expanding parade of the SPLA. According to the United Nations:

- Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.
- Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.
- Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.  

Data Collection

Two types of sources were utilized in this thesis. The first method of data collection was analyses of primary and secondary sources; the second was individual interviews. Original data for this thesis was collected between August 2012 and July 2015 in South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Financial and safety

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considerations prevented fieldwork in South Sudan from extending beyond a few weeks at a time over the course of three trips to the region.

My fieldwork spanned an active period for South Sudan, in terms of its internal and external relations. During this timeframe, South Sudan moved from post-independence tensions with Sudan, allegations of supporting armed groups in each others’ countries, austerity measures due to the cessation of oil transport from South Sudan to Sudan, the government’s open-ended amnesty and integration of armed groups, and the conceptualization of various mechanisms to reduce the parade of the SPLA. It also spanned the sacking of the entire cabinet in July 2013 and the outbreak of conflict just over four months later. These events not only created a natural endpoint for examining the fragility of the military integration process, but I suspect also contributed to the combined enthusiasm and suspicion with which I was received on research trips to South Sudan after the conflict had broken out. The attitudes and potential biases of interviewees will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter.

**Primary Sources**

Several primary sources provided background information on the military integration process, and concurrent efforts to rightsize and transform the SPLA. They also provided insight on the priorities, interests, and concerns within South Sudan as well as its international partners between 2006 and 2013. For this thesis, I relied on primary sources such as the SPLA’s strategic guidance documents, powerpoints and conference reports from workshops on SPLA Transformation, official speeches, transcripts, briefings, internal policy memos and reports, memoirs, constitutions and other legislation, peace agreements, ceasefires, and amnesties. I also relied on reports by the United Nations Security Council, UN agencies, and those of the donor community on efforts to accommodate armed groups in South Sudan and transform the country’s security sector. Some of these primary source documents were obtained from interview subjects, while others were obtained on the internet. While I had originally hoped to develop a more thorough record of the numerous integration processes conducted by the SPLA since the signing of the Juba Declaration, it was extremely difficult due to the fact that records
documenting the process were not officially maintained in any centralized facility or by any organ of the South Sudanese government. Rather, access to this information depended on getting in touch with the rapporteurs of each integration committee, and on the quality of notes this individual kept on this process. Combined with the fact that some of these officers were retired or had moved on to new command positions, it ended up not being a worthwhile endeavour to go into that level of granularity on the integration process. In any event, the focus of my thesis was not at the tactical level, but rather on the integration process at the strategic and operational levels.

**Secondary Sources**

From a historical standpoint, there was a substantial body of secondary source literature on Sudan’s second civil war, which provided the context for understanding divisions within the southern rebellion and the subsequent bidding war that the South Sudanese government waged with the Government of Sudan for loyalty of non-SPLA armed groups after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005. During the interim period, due to the level of international interest in what would potentially become ‘the world’s newest country,’ there were several books, academic journal articles, commissioned studies, reports by non-governmental organizations, and news reports on South Sudan’s transition, from which I could draw additional information to supplement the aforementioned primary sources.

**Interviews**

Lastly, but most importantly, personal interviews of individuals who had first-hand experience with, or significant knowledge of South Sudan’s military integration process provided critical insight on the means and modalities of the process, the context in which it was implemented, and reasons why it fell apart. In order to conduct these semi-structured interviews on the military integration process, I made three trips to South Sudan (August 2012, August 2014, and December 2014), two trips to Ethiopia (August and December 2014) and two trips to Kenya (August and December 2014). Before these trips, I secured a ‘research permit’ from a South Sudanese colleague who was in government, which would provide me the necessary top cover in case any other government or military officials inquired if I possessed the appropriate certifications to
conduct research in South Sudan. I conducted 54 interviews of SPLA generals, staff at the Ministry of National Security, former Ministry of Defence officials, personnel at the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), academics, civil society observers, diplomats, expatriate security consultants, and current/former mediators of South Sudan’s peace processes. These interviews are the basis for much of the analysis in this thesis. In the event that in-person interviews were not possible, interviews were conducted by phone, Skype, and over email correspondence. After all interviews, I was able to call or email the interviewees with follow-up or clarification questions.

The primary target population of interviewees was individuals who had personally participated in the decisions surrounding the integration of armed groups into the SPLA, or in the direct implementation of the process. The secondary target was individuals who had maintained visibility of the integration process specifically, or the transformation of South Sudan’s security sector more generally. Interviewees were initially identified based on a network I had built from working on South Sudan prior to commencing this program of study. When originally interviewed, these individuals verbally consented to being contacted for future research once I informed them that I would be writing a PhD thesis focused on the military integration process in South Sudan.

While protecting the identities of the initial interviewees, I snowballed into an expanded network of potential interviewees whom I approached by phone and email prior to and during future trips to South Sudan, and eventually to Ethiopia and Kenya. In many instances I would not receive a direct referral, but rather a name and personal cell phone number from an interviewee. It was then left to my powers of persuasion to get what were often high-ranking strangers to take time out of their busy schedules to indulge my line of inquiry. Some of these individuals went above and beyond what I asked of them as interviewees and became invested in the progress and outcome of my research. Many of these initial contacts and offers of assistance were made based on the familial ties of people in my network, or based on my own academic kinship networks. My ability to leverage both of these networks vastly facilitated my access to interview participants with deep subject matter expertise on my thesis topic.
The nature of the questions asked of each interviewee depended on their relationship to my thesis topic and on any issues I sought to clarify, either from other interviewees or from my primary source research. Some interviewees were long-time SPLA cadres who I was able to ask about the basic structure of the integration process, their personal experience implementing the integration of armed groups into the SPLA, and their assessments of the implications of integration. Some interviewees were diplomats, UN personnel, or expatriate security consultants who were able to give me visibility on the relationship – or lack thereof, as I discovered – between the SPLA’s integration process and broader efforts to transform the defence sector with the assistance of foreign donors, as well as the challenges associated with reducing the parade of the SPLA. Some interviewees were academics, researchers, or civil society observers who provided broad, external analysis on the implications of South Sudan’s oversized and non-cohesive military for internal security, and the tensions, and often blurred lines between the civilian and military spheres in South Sudan. Across all categories of interviewees, I was able to ask questions that drew on their long-term knowledge of, and engagement in, the Sudan-South Sudan peace process, of which military integration in the South was a by-product. This served as a means by which to understand the rationales underpinning South Sudan’s approach to armed groups during the interim period and after independence.

I opted to use open-ended questions in a semi-structured manner to encourage interviewees to speak at length about their experience with, or knowledge of, military integration in South Sudan. Using a qualitative method such as interviews allowed me to gather yet-unrecorded data from interviewees and allowed me to understand their experiences and place them firmly in context. By allowing me to reinterpret questions and clarify answers, this format allowed me to expand upon the thought processes, associations, and narratives that interviewees had constructed regarding the recent military integration process, providing both a variety of perspectives, as well as a more comprehensive understanding of political phenomena than other forms of data collection. However, one potential shortcoming of relying on interviews for data collection is that
my interpretation of the material could be highly subjective and the interview process may not easily be replicated by future researchers.

**Methodological Challenges & Limitations**

Near the end of my first year of research, half of my original dissertation quite literally ran away. As originally conceived, the focus of this thesis had been equally split between the SPLA’s concurrent integration and demobilization efforts. However, the demobilization initiatives conceptualized in South Sudan quickly became less relevant in December 2013, due to the defection of much of the SPLA to join the armed opposition. Following discussions with my advisor in early 2014, we made two decisions on the way ahead. First, we decided that I should scope the thesis more narrowly on the process of integrating armed groups into the SPLA, and only speak to the demobilization initiatives so far as they affected the military integration process. Second, we decided to make the cutoff date for data collection December 2013, in order to mitigate the challenge of keeping up with the rapidly changing security situation and peace negotiations after the civil war broke out. In the end, the fracturing of the SPLA improved the scoping of this thesis and allowed me to dive deeper on understanding the role of military integration during war-to-peace transitions, rather than splitting my time and energy between integration and demobilization.

This thesis presented multiple additional challenges in the spheres of methodology and fieldwork. As previously mentioned, due to the level of interest in South Sudan after the signing of the CPA, there were ample studies on the proliferation of armed groups, DDR, and even some on SPLA Transformation. However, the majority of information that I required specifically on the military integration process had not been documented in writing. The lack of centralized oversight over the military integration process combined with poor record-keeping meant that much of the data I needed to gather was in the heads of select individuals or in their personal files. Some records were incomplete, or had large gaps due to the fact that it did not appear that any person or organization had formally assumed responsibility for collecting and preserving records on military integration in South Sudan. In addition, due to political and military reshuffling and retirements from
service, many of these individuals were no longer involved with the military integration process and needed to be tracked down. My ability to track them down was usually based on my ability to tap into their professional or kinship networks. Furthermore, following the outbreak of conflict in 2013, there was a diaspora of South Sudanese political elites and expatriate advisors who relocated outside South Sudan and now live in neighbouring countries, Europe, Australia, or North America. Tracking these individuals down was a challenge, as was, at times, gaining access to personnel within the Office of the President or National Security, who could have shed light more on their bureaucracies’ roles within the integration process.

My personal safety was continually a concern, prompted by mid-2012 border skirmishes with Sudan and fears that the two countries would return to war, increasing criminality exacerbated by South Sudan’s worsening economic situation, and the perpetual threat of violence or predation by the country’s security forces. Most importantly, the events of December 2013 demonstrated that violence was not always restricted to the Greater Upper Nile region (Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states where the majority of armed groups had proliferated.) Rather, the sporadic gunfights and roving death squads in Juba in December 2013 were unanticipated at the outset of this course of study, as was the eventual targeting of both national and expatriate humanitarian aid workers, publicized by the attacks by the South Sudanese military on the Terrain Camp compound in Juba in July 2016. Two incidents in 2014 and 2016 in which South Sudanese security forces shot at armoured U.S. Embassy vehicles, although perhaps not intentionally, highlighted the dangers of trying to navigate Juba on my own post-2013. This level of unpredictable violence and the growing sense that foreigners were not immune from being targeted had a substantial impact on my decision to only stay in Juba for a few weeks at a time. Fortunately, my decision to spend only the most necessary time in South Sudan, restricting my travel to Juba, and the safety precautions I took meant that no harm came upon me during the course of my fieldwork.

Before the drastic shift in the security environment in 2013, it was already looking difficult for me to conduct fieldwork that would help me gain greater granularity on the
integration process. Yet, even before the conflict commenced, I had accepted that I would have difficulty accessing members of armed groups safely through my interviewee network, and within the financial constraints of my budget. Any biases that may have resulted from these constraints are discussed in further depth later in this chapter.

After December 2013, there were significant doubts as to my ability to safely access interviewees and pose questions about my thesis topic, which had become, overnight, politically sensitive due to the role the SPLA had played escalating the level of violence at the outset of the conflict. Indeed, in multiple instances prior to fieldwork in August and December 2014, I was warned by colleagues concerned for my safety that I should not be conducting research on military integration in light of the ongoing political-military context. Fortunately, I was able to build rapport with interviewees during these rounds of fieldwork by asking them very general questions about political-military power-sharing arrangements from the CPA period to the present before drilling down to the disintegration of the military integration process. As previously mentioned, some participants were suspicious, while others were eager to engage with me. I sensed a genuine desire to place more analytical rigor behind understanding how the military integration process had contributed to war rather than peace in this particular case. This line of inquiry was particularly relevant for some of the interviewees who had visibility on the ongoing peace negotiations in neighbouring Ethiopia, where the issue of merging the SPLA and the armed opposition had, during the course of 2014, become a feature of the potential transitional security arrangements.

Bias

Interviewer Bias

During the fieldwork interviews for this thesis, interview data could have been biased as a result of the questions I asked, or due to my actions during the interviews. I may have also encountered response bias during the course of my interviews, as interviewees may have been anxious to appease me, or impress me with how well-connected they were to the topic at hand.
My identity as an American in the context of the conflict that commenced in 2013 may have influenced interviewee responses in two ways. The first is that there had been allegations that the United States and other Western powers encouraged the opposition to challenge the ruling elite, which caused the SPLM to fracture and catalysed the outbreak of armed conflict in December 2013. This created a narrative that the United States was tacitly backing the opposition and was therefore responsible for the actions that ultimately led the country down the path of war in December 2013. The reality, however, was far more nuanced – that the donor community was in favour of the development of pluralism within South Sudan’s political system, as it would in any other country transitioning from war to peace. Second, the stance of the U.S. government vis-à-vis the origins of the outbreak of the country’s current civil war negates the coup narrative perpetuated by the Government of South Sudan, in which the government’s disarmament of Nuer members of the Presidential Guard and targeted killings of Nuer in Juba in December 2013 were in response to Riek Machar’s alleged coup attempt. In fact, South Sudanese government officials found it offensive that the U.S. government denied that there was proof that a coup attempt occurred in December 2013.

**Normative Bias**

The research topic itself presented me with an unanticipated bias that was a result of the outbreak of conflict midway through my research. Overall, there were instances during my interviews in which there was a bias against the concept of military integration, due to strong opinions that integration was a bad idea and had caused the conflict in 2013. The topic of military integration had become more politicised in South Sudan, meaning interviewees may have had insights coloured by their regional/ethnic affiliations, may have wanted to downplay their own roles in sabotaging the process or cast blame on external actors for the collapse of the process, or for having had to pursue integration in the first place. There was also not only a civil-military divide on the costs and benefits of the process, but I also sensed the development of a narrative that the ethnic Nuer favoured integration because it brought their armed kinsmen into the SPLA en masse, and that the former Vice President Riek Machar personally favoured it because he thought he
might benefit from a ‘creeping coup.’ To be clear, the crafted narrative stipulated that the integration of mostly Nuer members of armed groups into the SPLA was an intentional move by Riek Machar to eventually take power by force. Such allegations tended to be isolated, and were likely derived from a need to perpetuate a particular narrative of the events leading up to the onset of civil war in December 2013. (That said, it is a matter of speculation that the perception that the SPLA had become numerically dominated by the Nuer may have given Machar the impression that he could successfully take power by force – a Plan B if his efforts to gain power legitimately through the internal organs of the SPLM did not work.)

**Urban Bias**

One of the early concerns during fieldwork was the difficulty, cost, and safety concerns that accompanied conducting fieldwork in South Sudan outside of Juba. Originally, I would have liked to travel to the state governments in the areas that had been afflicted by armed group violence (Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states), as well as the SPLA Division Headquarters in these regions. But due to border skirmishes with Sudan in 2012 and the constant instability in these regions, I was unable to conduct interviews at these levels. As it subsequently turned out, due to the manner in which I had scoped my analysis at the strategic and operational levels, all the data and potential interviewees to which I needed access were in Juba. That said, potentially tens of thousands of SPLA defected and currently operate in Greater Upper Nile, which was a warzone for the duration of the fieldwork and data collection phase of my research. This study would have been enriched by their insights on the integration process and whether their decision to defect in December 2013 was in any way influenced by their experiences during the implementation of the integration process. That, among other things, is a potential topic for future analysis.

**Overcoming Bias**

In order to overcome the aforementioned biases, I started each interview with background questions not only to establish rapport with the subject, but also to gather clues that might

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shed light on potential biases. These clues included their region of origin, ethnic group, kinship ties, and wartime military service. I also sought to avoid group interviews, which could have allowed dominant personalities to shape the opinions of others in the group, thus introducing bias into the discussion. After collecting interview data, I examined the interviewee’s statements for plausibility and potential inconsistencies, and corroborated information on the execution of the process across interviewees.

Throughout the process of conducting interviews for this thesis, I triangulated data collected from these interviews with primary and secondary source documents and my own observations from the field, and ran some of the more controversial responses through other subject matter experts familiar with the case of South Sudan. These external validity checks highlighted potential contradictions and inaccuracies, thus allowing me to explicitly consider potential effects on substantive findings.

**Ethical Considerations**

Due to the sensitivity of my line of inquiry and the context in which I was conducting fieldwork after the outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war, I paid a lot of attention to protecting the identities of my interviewees and to ensuring their comfort with speaking to me. Prior to interviews, participants were sent an information sheet and consent form that stipulated the nature of my fieldwork and reassured them of the measures I would take to protect their confidentiality. Based on the participant’s level of comfort discussing military integration with me, I gave them a choice as to where they would prefer the interview be held. Accordingly, some interviews were held in private homes and offices, while others were held in restaurants, coffee houses, and hotels.

Although I initially gave participants a choice as to whether they would be fully or partially identified, or remain anonymous, I subsequently decided to keep the identities of all participants confidential due to the nature of the topic, and in order to facilitate a frank discussion of my thesis topic. My rationale was that military integration had become a controversial and potentially contentious process due to the role that the fragmentation of
the SPLA had played in accelerating the events of mid-December 2013 that led to the civil war. For this reason, I opted to put my interviewees at greater ease by offering blanket anonymity and only referencing them with general descriptions such as ‘former defence official’ or ‘SPLA officer’ as needed.

Given the increasingly controversial topic of my thesis, I have not listed interviewees by name but have listed them anonymously with a description of the individual’s background and the date and geographic location of our interview. For my own records, I have the precise names, occupations, dates, and locations of my interviewees in a separate location from my thesis in order to protect the confidentiality of my interview subjects.

**Structure of Thesis**

Chapter One (Introduction) provides an overview of the structure of this thesis, as well as an explanation of why my topic is relevant and adds to the discourse on military integration as a means of addressing the threat posed by non-statutory armed groups. This chapter also includes the research questions and core argument for this thesis, and outlines my analytic approach, and discusses some of the constraints I faced in the process of conducting fieldwork in South Sudan.

Chapter Two (Historical Context) gives a historical context of armed groups in South Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War and the peace negotiations that led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This chapter explains how civil war-era divisions within South Sudan and the exclusion of non-SPLA groups from the peace process created an imperative for the government to find ways to neutralize the threat these groups posed to stability in order to ensure that the referendum on South Sudan’s independence from Sudan could be held in 2011.

Chapter Three (Review of the Literature on Military Integration) is an overview of the literature relevant to the case of South Sudan on engaging armed groups during the transition from war to peace, and the factors that tend to determine the success or failure
of military integration processes. This chapter examines the rationales that drive former combatants to seek political-military accommodation through integration; how military integration can be a transitional security measure; the practical application of dual track military integration and demobilisation processes; how an open-ended military integration process can provide incentives for defection or non-compliance; the importance of fostering cohesion along political, task, and social dimensions within a newly integrated military; the role of third parties in military integration processes; and whether or not military integration can lead to sustainable peace. Overall, this chapter situates my original analysis of the military integration process in South Sudan in the research in existing bodies of academic and practical literature.

Chapter Four (Integration) argues that, in light of the divisions that permeated the southern resistance during the civil war and the goal of holding a referendum on self-determination in 2011, the Government of South Sudan’s options to neutralize the threat posed by non-statutory armed forces were to either combat, ignore, or integrate them into the political and military structures of the new state. Accordingly, this chapter analyses the rationales behind the government’s decision to accommodate armed groups during the interim period, and covers the signing of the Juba Declaration in January 2006, which formalised the government’s amnesty and integration approach to armed groups and the means and modalities of the integration process. This chapter also gives an overview of some of the anti-government armed groups that proliferated after the April 2010 elections, and how these rebellions contributed to the development of the government’s de facto open-ended integration process. This chapter concludes that military integration served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan, and ensuring a level of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011.

Chapter Five (Transformation) places the military integration process in the broader context of efforts to restructure the security sector to transform the SPLA into a conventional military while simultaneously rightsizing the force by various means, including through DDR. This chapter argues that military integration was a foundational
aspect of SPLA Transformation, but failed efforts to rightsize the SPLA prevented demobilization initiatives from relieving the pressure on integration as a means by which to address the actual or latent threat of armed groups. The chapter also demonstrates that minimal foreign assistance was directed towards the military integration process, but was rather directed towards DDR and SPLA Transformation.

Chapter Six (Disintegration) assesses the reasons why South Sudan’s military integration process disintegrated, and argues that integration was poorly-conceived and implemented, and received no meaningful support from third party actors that were more focused on rightsizing the SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional military. The chapter concludes that due to the failed implementation of the process, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to fragment along factional lines during periods of heightened political competition.

Chapter Seven (Conclusions) consists of research findings and conclusions, and addresses the broader implications of this thesis and lines of inquiry for future research.
Chapter 2: Historical Context

Introduction

The roots of South Sudan’s military integration challenges lie in the factionalization of the southern resistance movement in the 1990s and the subsequent proliferation of armed groups in Southern Sudan opposed to the SPLM/A. This chapter offers an overview of the factionalism in Southern Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), demonstrating how non-SPLA splinter groups were co-opted by the Government of Sudan in order to weaken the southern resistance movement. This chapter sets the scene for understanding how the exclusive nature of the peace process that ended the Second Sudanese Civil War created an imperative for the government to seek political-military accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups so that they would be less inclined to be co-opted by the Government of Sudan, thus spoiling the chance for a referendum on self-determination to be held, in accordance with the CPA.

Anyanya versus the SPLA

During the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), a primarily Nuer southern rebel group called Anyanya had fought for southern independence. Elements of this group did not agree with the terms of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the war, and resisted President Gaafar al-Nimeiri’s decision to create an autonomous region in the South. As a result of the steady disintegration of the peace agreement, remnants of Anyanya started to rearm in the Southern Autonomous Region in the late 1970s and came to be called Anyanya II. Like their predecessor Anyanya, Anyanya II was mostly Nuer and sought an independent South Sudan.

Thus, Anyanya II had already started fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the South prior to the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in May 1983. From its founding, the SPLM/A sought to avoid the mistakes

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129 Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*. 
Anyanya had made during the First Civil War – most notably, its explicit aspiration for South Sudanese independence, which alienated the movement from potential allies within Sudan and abroad.\textsuperscript{130} Despite a preference on the part of many southerners for independence, SPLM/A founder John Garang did not conceive of the group as a separatist movement, but rather as a revolution aimed at transforming a united Sudan through the replacement of the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum with a secular, democratically elected government. Considering the regional and international context of the time, Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ vision was more likely to gain foreign support than a platform rooted in secession.\textsuperscript{131}

For reasons connected to personality, ideology, and leadership, tensions arose between Garang and the leaders of the separatist Anyanya II faction.\textsuperscript{132} The older generation of Anyanya veterans had held more senior military ranks to Garang at the end of the first war, and had been in the bush several years before the SPLM/A was created. As such, they believed they should have been the leaders of the new armed resistance in the South.\textsuperscript{133} Moreover, while Anyanya II’s platform was to fight for total liberation from the Arab Islamic north, the SPLM/A’s platform was a liberation struggle for a united, secular, and democratic ‘New Sudan’.\textsuperscript{134} Over time, what started as a political power struggle between Anyanya II and the SPLA, took on Dinka versus Nuer undertones; the SPLA was depicted as a Dinka movement, although it contained many Nuer.\textsuperscript{135}

The power struggle between Anyanya II and the SPLA was, in some respect, dictated by neighbouring Ethiopia, whose Derg regime under Mengistu Haile Mariam became a key

\textsuperscript{131} Rolandsen, \textit{Guerrilla Government}.
\textsuperscript{132} Rone, \textit{Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights}.
\textsuperscript{134} Madut-Arop, \textit{Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace}.
\textsuperscript{135} Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}. 
supporter of the SPLA. Ethiopia supported the southern resistance movement in Sudan because the Sudanese government gave support and sanctuary to rebels operating in Tigray, Wollo and Eritrea.\textsuperscript{136} In addition to allowing the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to have political offices in Khartoum, Sudan allowed them freedom of movement across Sudan’s border with Ethiopia. Mengistu allowed the SPLM/A to operate from Ethiopian territory based on the understanding that the movement’s charter was in line with the fight for social justice, equity, and the distribution of wealth and power that he believed his own government was pursuing.\textsuperscript{137} Ethiopian support to the SPLM/A also came under the condition that they avoided the separatist rhetoric of Anyanya II. Like Emperor Haile Selassie before him, Mengistu would not have supported a separatist movement in Sudan while facing a similar challenge with the Eritreans on the domestic front.\textsuperscript{138} Moreover, the peace agreement that had ended the First Sudanese Civil War had been signed in the Ethiopian capital, which was also the seat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), whose charter protected the territorial integrity of its member states.\textsuperscript{139} With its ‘New Sudan’ platform, the SPLA had access to rear bases in Ethiopian territory, and received arms, training, intelligence, logistical support, and direct combat assistance from the Ethiopian military, and political direction and backing from the communist Eastern Bloc.\textsuperscript{140}

By 1984, Anyanya II had been defeated and driven out of Ethiopia, and the SPLA, under Ethiopian pressure, had tracked down and killed the older more experienced Anyanya veterans who were staunch separatists.\textsuperscript{141} Between 1988 and 1991, some elements of Anyanya II were absorbed into the SPLA, thereby contributing to the high point of southern unity.\textsuperscript{142} Meanwhile, the rump of Anyanya II that remained after it was expelled from Ethiopia and largely defeated by the SPLA, continued to attempt to gain control of

\textsuperscript{136} Madut-Arop, \textit{Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace}; Collins, “Sudan at the Crossroads.”
\textsuperscript{137} Madut-Arop, \textit{Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace}.
\textsuperscript{138} Collins, \textit{A History of Modern Sudan}; Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{139} Madut-Arop, \textit{Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace}.
\textsuperscript{140} Young, \textit{The Fate of Sudan}; Collins, \textit{A History of Modern Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{141} Rone, \textit{Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights}.
\textsuperscript{142} Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}; Rone, \textit{Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights}; “South Sudan’s Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-Conflict Prospects.”
the armed resistance in the South. The Sudanese government provided support to Anyanya II in order to destabilize the SPLA, seeing the fractured group as a lesser evil to the much stronger SPLA.

**Khartoum support of non-SPLA armed groups**

The use of pro-government (with the term ‘government’ in this chapter used to refer to the Government of Sudan during the civil war) armed groups to conduct raids and pacification patrols in parts of Sudan dates from 19th century. Yet, during the second civil war it was the scale of the government’s military and financial support for armed militias that distinguished this divide and rule strategy from its historical antecedents. It was, from the Government of Sudan’s point of view, a necessary strategy to compensate for the ineffectiveness and low morale of the Sudan Armed Forces and to curtail the wave of momentum of SPLA military offensives in the 1980s. Accordingly, successive regimes in Khartoum (Gaafar al-Nimeiri until 1985, Sadiq al-Mahdi between 1986 and 1989, and Omar al-Bashir since 1989) used divide and rule tactics to weaken the SPLM/A by funnelling arms, food, and other supplies to non-SPLA militias in the South. This meant the SPLA fought not only the SAF but also southern militias backed by Khartoum.

Comprised of primarily Nilotic (especially Dinka) ethnic groups, the SPLA caused resentment in areas outside main SPLA recruiting grounds, or in those controlled by government-aligned armed groups. In these areas, the SPLA tended to use higher levels of coercion against civilians, and was accused of being ill-disciplined, living off the land, and using harsh recruitment methods. The SPLA’s conduct thus prompted the

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144 Madut-Arop, *Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace*; Rone, *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.*

145 Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars.*

146 Madut-Arop, *Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace.*

formation of localized, ethnically-defined self-defence militias in parts of the South to resist the SPLA and to protect local communities that were caught up in the violence. Before he was overthrown in 1985, Sudanese president Gaafar Nimeiri made a large sum of money available and instructed southern governors to further recruit and train militias to prevent the Dinka from dominating smaller ethnic groups and from spreading the rebellion across the South. Although these groups may have supported the SPLA’s liberation platform, their main objective was the defence of their communities; southern militias accordingly proliferated among the Mundari, Murle, Toposa, Zande, Madi, Fertit, and Acholi. The Government of Sudan’s methods of supporting non-SPLA armed groups to destabilize the South continued throughout the civil war, through the Interim Period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and beyond South Sudan’s independence.

The 1991 split

Ethiopia under Mengistu was a satellite state of the Soviet Union; when it disintegrated, it had political repercussions for the SPLA, as Ethiopia had been its primary foreign supporter. Following the May 1991 fall of the Derg regime, the SPLA was expelled from western Ethiopia, their radio station was closed, supplies seized, training camps shuttered, and political headquarters in Addis shut down – and the files kept by the Derg on the SPLM/A were handed over to the Sudanese government. The new government, under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was hostile to the SPLA, as it had been supported by the previous regime. Furthermore, the EPRDF owed its ability to make a final push on Addis Ababa to the Sudanese government.


148 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
149 Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace.
150 Young, “Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace”; Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars; Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan; Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace; Rone, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.
151 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
152 Ibid. The EPRDF’s opposition to the SPLA dissipated by the mid-1990s following the Khartoum-supported assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. After this, Ethiopia felt the need to counterbalance the National Islamic Front’s burgeoning international agenda, which was perceived to pose a threat to regional security.
When the National Islamic Front seized power in Khartoum in June 1989, the SPLM/A controlled approximately 90 per cent of the territory of southern Sudan, having benefitted from the support and secure supply lines provided by Ethiopia. However, the collapse of the Derg in May 1991 and the consequent loss of Ethiopian support slowed the SPLA’s momentum, causing Garang’s power to wane and giving some of his commanders more room to manoeuvre. Up to this point, the South-South divisions had failed to manifest mainly because the internal contradictions were weaker than the North-South contradictions, which made the movement more cohesive than it would have been otherwise. But by the early 1990s, the internal contradictions within the SPLM/A that cut across ethnic and ideological lines had started to become more salient. Knowing Mengistu’s fall was imminent, Garang had hoped to strengthen his position by making a push for Juba, which required a significant shift of resources and manpower south towards the Equatoria region. This movement would leave Upper Nile, where Riek Machar and Lam Akol had been assigned as zonal commanders, dangerously exposed and soon to be cut off by the onset of rainy season.

In August 1991, when both the movement and its leader were at their weakest, Machar, Akol and Gordon Kong, all members of the SPLM/A Political-Military High Command, announced that Garang had been ousted as Chairman of the SPLM/A from the city of Nasir in Upper Nile. In Why Garang Must Go Now, complaints against the SPLM/A leader included Garang’s centralization of power and the stifling of genuine democratic debate. There had been tension over Garang’s absolute authority, which was in a sense necessary to ensure the cohesion of a movement that was becoming more diverse in spite of existing ethnic animosities. Additionally, the leaders of what came to be called the ‘Nasir coup’ cited the fact that Garang had several prominent SPLA leaders arrested,

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154 Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*.
155 Madut-Arop, *Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace*.
156 Young, *The Fate of Sudan*.
tortured, and executed for having political differences with him or with the movement.\textsuperscript{159} The movement under Garang was characterized as lacking political structures, as the Political-Military High Command had only met once in eight years of existence, and decision-making was at Garang’s prerogative.\textsuperscript{160} The SPLM/A under Garang was also characterized as having failed to effectively wage a revolutionary people’s war.\textsuperscript{161} According to a subsequent press release on Garang’s removal, actions to remove Garang from the leadership of the SPLM/A were taken in order to “save the movement from imminent collapse.”\textsuperscript{162} However, in spite of the sentiments expressed in the Nasir Declaration, the coup leaders aspired to top leadership in the South, and their subsequent actions revealed their true motives to be parochial and tribal.\textsuperscript{163} In addition, the Nasir faction’s calls for human rights and democracy were further discredited by the fact that they, like the group from which they had split, committed human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{164}

The leaders of the Nasir faction were motivated by the opportunity to capitalise on a slew of aforementioned grievances against Garang in the South.\textsuperscript{165} Furthermore, the Nasir faction – also known as SPLM/A-Nasir – had ideological differences with Garang over the concept of a unified ‘New Sudan.’ By distinguishing themselves from Garang’s unionist rhetoric, Machar and Akol hoped other SPLA commanders would rally to their explicitly secessionist cause, which would appeal to many southerners.\textsuperscript{166} With the creation of new post-Soviet states and Eritrea’s imminent independence, the leaders of SPLM/A-Nasir perceived that the international order was changing in such a way that might favour outright sentiments in favour of the South’s secession from Sudan.\textsuperscript{167}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[159] Collins, \textit{A History of Modern Sudan}; Young, \textit{The Fate of Sudan}.
\item[160] Young, \textit{The Fate of Sudan}.
\item[161] Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\item[162] Akol, \textit{SPLM/SPLA}.
\item[163] Young, \textit{The Fate of Sudan}; Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\item[164] Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\item[165] Collins, \textit{A History of Modern Sudan}, p. 301.
\item[166] Johnson, “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism.”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
However, contrary to their expectations, the Nasir coup did not receive the response its architects had anticipated. Although many SPLA commanders may have agreed with the Nasir faction’s grievances, they were more receptive to reform within the SPLA than to a change in leadership.\textsuperscript{168} The view that the timing was not optimal for a change in leadership was amplified by the SPLA’s weakened position in the aftermath of the loss of Ethiopian support, and of the SPLA’s rear base after the fall of the Mengistu regime.\textsuperscript{169} Moreover, mobilization in support of the coup failed to expand beyond the Nuer and Shilluk areas of Upper Nile, and thus lacked popular support throughout much of the South.\textsuperscript{170}

Two factors gave the split within the SPLM/A an ethnic dimension, thus transforming what had originally been a conflict over leadership. First, as two of the three leaders of the Nasir coup (Machar and Kong) were Nuer and Garang was Dinka, and the troops that followed them were Nuer, the split was perceived as falling along Dinka-Nuer lines.\textsuperscript{171} (Akol failed to get his Shilluk kinsmen to side with the Nasir faction, having allegedly alienated them when he was zonal commander in northern Upper Nile in 1987-88.)\textsuperscript{172} Consequently, the SPLA and the Nasir faction took on a more Dinka and Nuer character, respectively.\textsuperscript{173} Additionally, some of the Nuer that supported the Nasir coup included many of the Anyanya II elements that had been absorbed into the SPLA in the late 1980s, and may have been motivated more by their ethnic identity than by their understanding of the ideals of the Nasir Declaration.\textsuperscript{174} Those that rose to the support of the Nasir coup were also motivated by personal animosity towards Garang and feelings of betrayal and injustice as a result of his defeat of Anyanya II in the early days of the rebellion.\textsuperscript{175} Many who had joined the SPLA after the peace and unification agreement of 1988 had still not recovered from the fact that the Nuer had failed to take leadership of the Southern rebellion from the Dinka, as the Anyanya II-SPLA conflict had been fought along Nuer-

\textsuperscript{168} Johnson, \textit{The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars}.
\textsuperscript{169} Collins, \textit{A History of Modern Sudan}; Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{170} Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{171} Rone, \textit{Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights}.
\textsuperscript{172} Johnson, \textit{The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars}; Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{173} Young, \textit{The Fate of Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{174} Rone, \textit{Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights}; Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{175} LeRiche and Arnold, \textit{South Sudan}.

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Dinka lines.\textsuperscript{176} Thus, the Nasir coup was also an opportunity for these individuals to challenge what they perceived to be ‘Dinka hegemony,’ which had generated a sense of marginalization and resentment within the movement.\textsuperscript{177} Second, in an attempt to encourage fence-sitters to defect to SPLA-Nasir, Machar’s primarily Eastern Jikany Nuer and Lou Nuer fighters attacked Garang’s home turf in Jonglei State. Due to the indiscriminate slaughter of Dinka civilians during this offensive into primarily Dinka-inhabited areas, his plan instead turned southern and international community opinion against the Nasir faction, thereby solidifying Garang’s control of the southern resistance.\textsuperscript{178}

The years following the split within the SPLM/A saw some of the worst atrocities of the broader north-south conflict and an unprecedented scale of displacement and killing between the Dinka and the Nuer.\textsuperscript{179} Both Garang, as leader of the SPLM/A-Mainstream (also called SPLM/A-Torit or the Torit faction), and Machar were perceived to have reached for the ‘ethnic card,’ from which the conflict devolved into warlordism.\textsuperscript{180} This dynamic ushered in a civil war in the South as a subset of the broader conflict with the Government of Sudan.\textsuperscript{181}

By 1994, the Nasir faction itself (also called SPLM/A-United) had fractured into tribal and regional splinter groups.\textsuperscript{182} Machar and Akol split in February 1994 when the latter was ousted as Secretary for External Affairs and Peace in the Interim National Executive Committee. Akol remained the de facto leader of SPLM/A-United, and Machar changed the name of his movement to South Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A) between 1994 and 1997. Other SPLM/A splinter groups included the SPLA-Unity groups led by Cdr. William Nyuon Bany (assassinated in 1995), SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal led by

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{176} Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Collins, \textit{Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan: Essays on the Sudan, Southern Sudan, and Darfur, 1962–2004}; LeRiche and Arnold, \textit{South Sudan}; Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Johnson, \textit{The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars}.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Collins, \textit{A History of Modern Sudan}; Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Nyaba, \textit{The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan}.
\end{itemize}
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Cdr. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol (killed under mysterious circumstances in 1999), SPLA-Bor led by Cdr. Arok Thon Arok, and the Equatoria Defence Force led by Cdr. Theophilous Ochand. These splits of SPLM/A-United were a function of that faction’s inability to create an alternative leadership of the national liberation struggle as well as of its collaboration with the government in Khartoum. By the mid-1990s, the leaders of these SPLM/A splinter groups were fighting for personal survival, and many eventually became components of the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) in the late-1990s.

**Continuation of Khartoum Support to Armed Groups**

Also responsible for transforming a North-South conflict into a South-South one was the Government of Sudan’s continued support to the loose assortment of SPLA splinter groups and tribal militias that emerged from the splintering of the SPLM/A. The goal of the ruling National Islamic Front regime in Sudan was to encourage factionalism by funnelling arms, food, large sums of money and other supplies to these groups, using them as proxies to compensate for the Sudanese military’s previous lack of success on the battlefield. Splits within the liberation movement allowed the NIF government to impose its ‘peace from within’ strategy, through which it promoted divisions within the South by co-opting factional leaders and giving them military and financial support, with the intent of starving the SPLA of grassroots support and weakening the South through Balkanization. In an attempt to prevent the emergence of a cohesive command structure with the political clout to represent southern interests, the Sudan Armed Force’s Military Intelligence maintained separate relationships with individual commanders of such SPLA splinter groups, even encouraging local-level commanders to challenge their superiors or form breakaway factions. Some commanders of non-SPLA armed groups

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183 Madut-Arop, *Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace*.
184 Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*.
185 Collins, “Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in the Sudan.”
186 Young, “Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace.”
187 Madut-Arop, *Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace*.
188 Ibid.

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had formal commissions in the SAF, and were offered rewards of cash, cattle and houses in Khartoum to guarantee their acquiescence.190

Like Anyanya II before it, SPLA-Nasir established an alliance of convenience with the NIF regime in Khartoum to fight what was now SPLM/A-Mainstream – in spite of its claims to be fighting for secession from Sudan.191 Without support from the Sudanese government, the Nasir faction had no means of resupplying their troops, and no access to arms and ammunition. In September 1991, Machar signed a protocol to coordinate military operations with the Government of Sudan, and further formalized this collaboration in the Frankfurt Agreement signed in January 1992.192 As a result of these agreements, Machar’s forces did not attack the SAF between 1991 and 1999.193

Although reliance on a regime determined to thwart independence created a clear ideological dissonance with the Nasir faction’s secessionist platforms, the group saw Khartoum’s support as a means to fight the near enemy – the SPLA – before turning their attention to the far enemy – the Sudanese government itself.194 This dissonance ultimately cost these the Nasir faction and other SPLA splinter groups their political credibility in the eyes of the international community and the people of South Sudan, and discredited their claims to be fighting for an independent South Sudan.195

In addition to weakening the SPLM/A, the Government of Sudan sought to develop a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around oil-producing areas in Western Upper Nile, from which many of Machar’s soldiers hailed.196 The Government of Sudan thus armed southern militia groups in order to displace proximate populations and expand the development of the oil

190 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan.*
192 Madut-Arop, *Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace*; Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan.*
193 Rone, *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.*
196 Young, *The Fate of Sudan.*
industry.\textsuperscript{197} Government proxies were encouraged to attack these areas in order to conceal the hand of the government, and to achieve what direct military action could not in terms of controlling the oilfields of the South.\textsuperscript{198} Between 1992 and 1994, the Government of Sudan was given free passage through SPLM/A-United territory, thus causing the SPLA to lose strategic territories, and enabling government forces to regain the offensive in the South. SPLM/A-Mainstream managed to recover by 1996, and launched a successful counter-offensive. In order to reverse this tide, the Government of Sudan attempted to mobilize some of the southern opposition to the SPLA and provide them with weapons to coordinate an offensive. When this plan failed, the government made southern militia leaders formally part of the SAF by reinstating their SAF commissions.\textsuperscript{199}

In April 1996, the Government of Sudan signed the Political Charter with the SSIM under Riek Machar and SPLM/A-Bahr al-Ghazal under Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, and in April 1997, the Khartoum Peace Agreement incorporated the Political Charter into an agreement that also included SPLM/A-Bor, the Equatoria Defence Force, the South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG), and the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP). The groups that signed these agreements called for a federal state, with provisions to call for a referendum for southerners to determine their political aspirations at some point in the future.\textsuperscript{200} These groups collectively adopted a new name – the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), with the South Sudan Coordinating Council headed by Riek Machar. Additionally, these agreements brought non-SPLM/A armed groups in the South under the umbrella of the South Sudan Defence Forces, which would come to be the greatest military competitor to the SPLA in the South. Leaders who, by signing the KPA, pledged allegiance to the government in Khartoum, still had a measure of autonomy and separate lines of logistic support from the government in the areas in which they operated.\textsuperscript{201} Many had little in common with one another, save deep antipathy for the

\textsuperscript{197} Rone, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{199} Collins, A History of Modern Sudan.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{201} Young, “Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace.”
SPLA’s dominance of the rebellion in the South.\textsuperscript{202} In addition to being head of the UDSF, Machar became the commander in chief of the South Sudan Defence Forces. In spite of the ambiguous and non-committal promises made in the Political Charter, Machar continued to fight the SPLA, primarily to preserve the Nuer as a political counterbalance to the SPLA.\textsuperscript{203}

In the late 1990s, an intra-Nuer civil war broke out in Upper Nile due to a rivalry between Riek Machar and Paulino Matip Nhial. Matip had been integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, but left for Ethiopia after rebelling in 1975. Between 1985 and 1986, he returned to Western Upper Nile and led Anyanya II.\textsuperscript{204} Due to the SPLA’s attacks on Anyanya II in 1983, Matip had not integrated into the SPLA, although some of his militia had been incorporated between 1986 and 1988.\textsuperscript{205} Following the Nasir coup, Matip joined Machar’s breakaway faction in 1991, and his forces were incorporated into the SSDF following the Khartoum Peace Agreement.\textsuperscript{206}

However, forces aligned with Machar and Matip began fighting in September 1997 following a contentious gubernatorial election in Unity State in which members of the state assembly voted overwhelmingly for Taban Deng Gai, the UDSF candidate. Matip’s preferred candidate lost, after which he refused to concede defeat. In December 1997, Matip began attacking Machar’s forces with the tacit approval of the Government of Sudan.\textsuperscript{207} He then formed the South Sudan Unity Movement/Army (SSUM/A) in 1998, incorporating former Anyanya II and Bul Nuer forces, and supported by the Sudanese government. By April 1999, the Sudanese government shifted support from Machar to Matip because the former’s duplicity had caused him to lose credibility and alienate other southern militia leaders.\textsuperscript{208} After he failed to stem the forced displacement of civilians by

\textsuperscript{202} LeRiche and Arnold, \textit{South Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{203} Collins, \textit{A History of Modern Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{204} Young, “The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF).”
\textsuperscript{205} Rone, \textit{Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights}.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{208} Collins, \textit{A History of Modern Sudan}. 72
the Government of Sudan in Western Upper Nile/Unity State, many Nuer also eventually turned against Machar’s leadership.\textsuperscript{209}

The Sudanese government’s broader strategy was to stoke the flames of intra-Nuer fighting and develop individual military alliances with Machar’s rivals, thereby enticing them to challenge his leadership.\textsuperscript{210} The SAF Military Intelligence had a separate relationship with individual commanders, with the intention of preventing the SSDF from developing an overall command structure or political clout to apply pressure on the government to implement the provisions of the Khartoum Peace Agreement. Accordingly, the Sudanese government used Matip as a political counterweight to Machar in order to undermine the agreement.\textsuperscript{211} Wary of the UDSF’s self-determination agenda, the Sudanese government did not want Machar’s forces in control of the oilfields in western Upper Nile.\textsuperscript{212} Matip’s forces operated in Bul Nuer territory and provided a buffer against SPLM/A incursions into Blocks 1, 2, and 4 from their strongholds in Bahr al-Ghazal.\textsuperscript{213} The Government of Sudan also separately supported Gabriel Tanginye (defected from Machar in 1997), Gordon Kong Chuol (defected from Machar in 1999), Simon Gatwich Dual, and Garkoth Hothnyang operating across Upper Nile, as part of a strategy to divide the SSDF into smaller Nuer militias.\textsuperscript{214} After an April 2001 conference, the Nuer, Dinka, and Equatorian southern armed groups aligned with the Government of Sudan were unified under the SSDF under the general command of Paulino Matip.\textsuperscript{215} The addition of new groups included members of the Bari, Didinga, Dinka, Fertit, Mundari, Murle, Nuer, and Toposa communities, many of whom had started out as localized self-defence militias to protect their communities from the marauding SPLA.\textsuperscript{216} The amalgamation of these groups under the umbrella of the SSDF significantly increased its

\textsuperscript{209} Rone, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.
\textsuperscript{210} Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace.
\textsuperscript{211} Hutchinson, “A Curse from God? Religious and Political Dimensions of the Post-1991 Rise of Ethnic Violence in South Sudan”; Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace.
\textsuperscript{212} Rone, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
size, areas of control, and ability to disrupt the SPLA.\textsuperscript{217} These non-SPLA armed groups received little support from the government unless they were fighting the SPLA.\textsuperscript{218} The government’s handling of pro-government militias reflected their desire to prevent the emergence of a cohesive and effective representative of southern interests.\textsuperscript{219} The rationale was that a referendum on self-determination could not be held in the South as long as the Nuer were fighting among themselves.\textsuperscript{220}

Throughout the war, the South-South divisions and intra-ethnic fighting allowed the Government of Sudan to cast the South as ‘ungovernable,’ and absolve itself of the blame for insecurity in the South – despite its historical marginalization of its peripheries and support for militia groups.\textsuperscript{221} The government’s approach was thus not only able to evade accountability, but also to prevent the development of political-military cohesion in the South.\textsuperscript{222} Throughout the 1990s, defections between pro-government militias and the SPLA were frequent. Once it became evident that the Government of Sudan did not intend for its Southern proxies to participate in the decision-making of the state, many defected back to the SPLA or acted as mercenaries to clear the path for oil exploration.\textsuperscript{223}

Riek Machar led the SSDF and the USDF until January 2000, when he resigned from his posts in the Government of Sudan as Assistant President of the Republic, Chairman of the Coordinating Council, and President of the UDSF and Commander-in-Chief of the United Democratic South Sudan Forces (UDSSF).\textsuperscript{224} His rationale was that the government had failed to implement the Khartoum Peace Agreement, and with the collapse of peace from within, they had to give external peace processes another try.\textsuperscript{225}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid.]
\item[Rone, \textit{Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights}.]
\item[Young, “Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace.”]
\item[Ibid.]
\item[Ibid.]
\item[Ibid.]
\item[Madut-Arop, \textit{Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace}.]
\item[Ibid.]
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Machar then formed the Sudan People’s Defence Forces/Democratic Front (SPDF), which he led until his return to the SPLA in January 2002, when Machar and Garang reconciled, signing the Nairobi Declaration of Unity. The Nairobi Declaration formally merged the SPLM/A and the SPDF, which agreed to coordinate military operations against the NIF regime. The agreement also made Machar second-in-command of the SPLM/A, after which several of his soldiers joined the Government of Sudan’s forces rather than return to the SPLM/A. Machar’s return to the SPLM/A helped mitigate some of the divisions in the South in the months preceding the signing of the Machakos Protocol (July 2002), which was the first of many protocols that came to comprise the CPA. However, violence between the SPLA and its rivals in the South, such as the South Sudan Defence Forces and various ethnically defined local self-defence militias, subsequently increased.

**OAGs and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement**

There had been many attempts to negotiate an end to Sudan’s second civil war throughout the 1990s. After over a decade of false starts, the government and the SPLM/A signed the CPA in January 2005, brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Given its narrow focus on brokering peace between the National Islamic Front – and the National Congress Party (NCP) that succeeded it – and the SPLM, historian John Young has rather appropriately described the CPA as an “agreement reached on an acceptance of the lowest common denominator of the parties.” As a result, the CPA overemphasised the north-south dynamic of the conflict, and lacked explicit provisions for South-South peace.

On the part of the mediators of the peace process, there were concerns that expanding the participation in peace talks would make a process that was difficult to begin with too

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226 Rone, *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights*.

227 “South Sudan’s Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-Conflict Prospects.”

228 Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”


231 Young, *The Fate of Sudan*. 

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complex, unworkable, and difficult to conclude. In fact, groups outside of the NCP and the SPLM/A, eventually referred to as Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the CPA, had repeatedly requested formal or observer status for the IGAD peace process. However, IGAD mediators erroneously assumed that each party would also represent the interests of the political opposition and armed groups in the North and the South, respectively. Additionally, the signatories to the agreement likewise resisted expanded participation in the peace process. In the South, the NCP feared the SSDF, which Young claims was of comparable size to the SPLA, would make common cause with the SPLM/A, and did not trust them because they were southerners and continued to insist on the South’s right to self-determination as articulated in the Khartoum Peace Agreement. The SPLM/A feared that bringing the SSDF into peace talks would undermine their claim of militarily controlling most of the rural South. Furthermore, they viewed groups like the SSDF as government-sponsored militias, whose equities should have been addressed by the Government of Sudan.

The failure to accommodate non-NCP and non-SPLM/A representatives to the peace talks meant that the CPA firmly entrenched parties with no democratic legitimacy in power. Moreover, this approach created many potential spoilers to the peace process, and contributed to the subsequent conflicts that emerged in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile in the North, and across the South, such as the post-2010 election rebellions and the outbreak of civil war in December 2013.

As CPA negotiations progressed, the SPLA made several attempts to pursue reconciliation with the SSDF and other armed groups. Such attempts, however, were compromised by the legacy of wartime atrocities perpetrated by all sides, which

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232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
235 Young, The Fate of Sudan; Rone, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.
236 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
contributed to an environment of mistrust and antagonism. Furthermore, many armed group leaders harboured personal grudges against Garang as a result of his authoritarian leadership and his ideological preference for a united ‘New Sudan’, while Garang himself was often dismissive of non-SPLA armed groups, referring to them as Government of Sudan-sponsored militias.237 Indeed, as the bearer of a much-desired peace agreement, Garang believed himself to be in a strong negotiating position, and his intransigence with regard to the specifics of reconciliation efforts impeded their progress.238

There is much speculation about Garang’s intentions towards armed groups as the CPA negotiations drew to a close and Southern Sudan entered the Interim Period of the peace agreement. For example, there has been speculation that Garang wished to militarily defeat his southern opponents, despite his failure to do so since the split within the SPLA in 1991, or that he wanted a minor insurgency in order to maintain control in the South.239 There has also been speculation that Garang was concerned that the integration of such a large group of Nuer into the SPLA would have increased their leverage and dilute his leadership. This is why he may have opposed the collective integration of the SSDF into the SPLA, instead encouraging individual SSDF commanders to defect.240 These groups represented a political challenge to Garang, and with strong backing by the international community, he may have believed it was not necessary to accommodate them.241 Regardless of what Garang’s approach would have been, his death in July 2005 left the issue of addressing the threat posed by OAGs to his successor. Salva Kiir, as the unexpected new leader of South Sudan, then had to act with urgency to meet the January 2006 deadline set in the CPA’s Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements for all members of OAGs not aligned with the SPLA to either demobilise or redeploy north of the border to be integrated into the SAF.

237 Ibid.; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan.
238 Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”
239 “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name”; Young, The Fate of Sudan.
240 Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”
241 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
The Rumbek Affair

In the weeks prior to the signing of the CPA, a high-profile rift emerged between Garang and his deputy Salva Kiir, as rumours circulated that the former intended to arrest and dismiss the latter as the SPLA’s second in command. Refusing to leave Yei, where he was based at the time, Kiir subsequently gathered senior SPLA commanders from his home area in Warrap state, who he believed would remain loyal to him.242 According to some explanations of this clash, Kiir started to form alliances with the support of the government in Khartoum, militia groups, and dissident southern politicians in order to confront Garang militarily.243

As this standoff was in the waning days of CPA negotiations, there was an added urgency towards resolution, lest the fissure between Kiir and Garang threaten the impending signing of the peace agreement.244 Between November 29 and December 1, 2004, the senior leadership of the SPLM/A held an emergency conference in the town of Rumbek. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were subsequently leaked, several members of the SPLM/A leadership essentially expressed their lack of confidence in Garang and many of his commanders.245 Accusations levied against them included mismanagement of the movement, rampant corruption, lack of inclusive decision-making processes, failure to develop a governance system for the future of Southern Sudan, and delaying a dialogue with other southern opposition groups.246 Although it became clear during the course of the Rumbek meeting that several individuals within the movement shared Kiir’s grievances and had presented clear issues with Garang’s leadership, they

242 Ibid.
244 Roque, “Reforming the SPLM: A Requisite for Peace and Nation Building.”
246 Young, The Fate of Sudan; Roque, “Reforming the SPLM: A Requisite for Peace and Nation Building.”
feared division on the eve of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and could not agree on a viable alternative.²⁴⁷

Following the Rumbek incident, Kiir was replaced as Chief of Staff and retired from the SPLA, and was subsequently appointed vice president of the Government of Southern Sudan, which is how he came to succeed Garang upon his death just seven months later. Had Garang lived, there is speculation that it may have only been a matter of time before the next confrontation within the senior leadership of the movement.²⁴⁸ Notably, the grievances levied against Garang in 2004 mirrored the grievances articulated by the Nasir faction in 1991, and foreshadowed those raised against Kiir himself prior to the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan in 2013. The Rumbek incident presented a cautionary tale for pushing the resolution of the SPLM/A’s internal dissonance down the road, and demonstrated the fragility of political-military alliances in the South.

Conclusions

This chapter covered several themes that are relevant to understanding the background behind why the Government of South Sudan approached armed groups the way they did during the interim period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The first theme is the legacy of internal divisions within the southern rebellion – from tensions between Anyanya II and the SPLM/A in the 1980s to the splits within the SPLM/A in the 1990s to the falling out between Garang and Kiir on the eve of the signing of the CPA. The SPLM/A’s method of bringing in other armed groups is the second theme, from the integration of Anyanya II to coalescing into a unified group in advance of the signing of the CPA. The third theme is Khartoum’s support of non-SPLA armed groups in order to encourage factionalisation and weaken the SPLA, and how this led (as will be detailed in Chapter 4) the Government of South Sudan to have to outbid the Government of Sudan for loyalty of these rebel leaders during the interim period. Finally, the exclusive nature of the peace process, with only the SPLM/A as the representative of southern interests during the peace process, is the fourth theme. While restricted participation may have

²⁴⁷ Young, *The Fate of Sudan.*
²⁴⁸ Ibid.
simplified the negotiation process, it meant that the Government of South Sudan was behoved to negotiate a separate South-South peace and seek political-military accommodation with excluded parties for the purpose of peace and stability. Across these four themes, we can start to understand why the Government of South Sudan embarked on the path of military integration.

In Chapter 4, I will discuss why the Government of South Sudan started down the path of political-military accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups and how it dealt with the issues of factionalism, Khartoum’s divide-and-rule tactics, and an exclusive peace process covered in this chapter in the aftermath of the CPA. But first, in Chapter 3, I will provide a review of the literature on military integration during war-to-peace transitions, drawing from both theory and practice.
Chapter 3: Review of the Literature on Military Integration

Introduction

As detailed in the previous chapter, the southern rebellion was fragmented during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) due to competition between Anyanya II and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the proliferation of SPLA splinter groups in the 1990s. Moreover, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the National Congress Party in the North and the SPLM/A in the South not only excluded other political and armed opposition groups across Sudan, but also failed to account for peace among the various southern rebel movements that had been fighting each other throughout the conflict. In order to comply with the stipulations of the CPA and consolidate political-military power in advance of the 2011 referendum on self-determination, the Government of South Sudan largely decided to seek political-military accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups by integrating them into the SPLA.

This thesis uses the case of South Sudan to examine the role of military integration during war-to-peace transitions. As defined in Chapter 1, military integration is a peace-building strategy that involves the distribution of authority within the coercive apparatus of the state by incorporating or amalgamating armed groups into a statutory security framework.\(^{249}\) As will be detailed in Chapter 4, military integration in South Sudan included negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment. This process was concurrent to a transformation of South Sudan’s defence sector, to be discussed in Chapter 5, which entailed both rightsizing and professionalizing the military.

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This chapter draws upon a sparse, but growing body of theoretical and empirical analysis of military integration. The literature that drives this thesis situates the concept of military integration at the intersection of broader analyses of negotiated settlements to civil wars, provisions for accommodating potential spoilers during war-to-peace transitions, and post-conflict defence sector transformation. Within this literature, several themes emerge, which are relevant to understanding the role that military integration plays during the transition from war to peace:

- the rationales that drive former combatants to seek political-military accommodation through military integration;
- how military integration can be a transitional security measure;
- the practical application of dual track military integration and demobilisation processes;
- how an open-ended military integration process can provide incentives for defection or non-compliance;
- the role of social, task, and political cohesion within a newly integrated military;
- the role of third parties in military integration processes; and
- whether or not military integration can lead to sustainable peace.

In this chapter, I will give an overview of the literature on military integration, then provide insights on the relationships between this literature and the case of military integration in South Sudan between the 2006 Juba Declaration and the outbreak of civil war in December 2013. In so doing, I will highlight the contributions this thesis makes to the discourse on military integration.

**Overview of the Literature**

Some analyses of military integration tend to take a strategic-level approach and are, as a result, more theoretical than they are practical. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008), for example, derive insights on the process of military integration from large-n quantitative studies, while others such as Møller and Cawthra (2007), Burgess (2008), Knight (2009), Colletta (2012), and Licklider (2014) use
qualitative analysis. Overlapping with this strategic-level perspective of military integration are studies by Walter (2002), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008), Sriram (2008), and Toft (2009) that cover the potential benefits of integration and conceptualize military integration as one dimension of power-sharing, along with political, economic, and territorial power-sharing. Additionally, strategic-level analyses delve into models of military integration, such as Knight’s (2009) concept of incorporation versus amalgamation, Krebs and Licklider’s (2014) conceptualization of the magnitude of integration, and well as the extent of horizontal and vertical integration, Burgess and Licklider’s (2015) technocratic versus political integration, and Licklider’s (2015) hypothesis that individual integration may be more successful than collective integration.

Other studies of military integration are case studies of one, and sometimes up to three countries that go into far more country-specific depth than the aforementioned studies. Here, we have Dennis (Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe), Baaz and Verweijen (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Gaub (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Nigeria), Hall (Philippines), Jowell (Rwanda), Karake (Rwanda), Kibasomba (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Koekenbier (Lebanon), Jackson (Zimbabwe), Lucas (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Malache and Macaringue (Mozambique), Rupiah (Zimbabwe), Rusagara (Rwanda), Samii (Burundi), Warner (South Sudan), Wilén (Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and Williams (South Africa).250 However, of

these case studies, few delve into the specific means and modalities of the integration process, or how the process is executed from start to finish. This thesis will cover these aspects of integration for the case of South Sudan in Chapter 4.

Some of the case study authors narrow their focus to a specific aspect of military integration. From the perspective of a practitioner, Dennis (1992) focuses on the role of British Military Advisory Training Teams (BMATTs) in Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, and potential implications for South Africa, as it amalgamated armed groups into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) when apartheid ended in the early 1990s. Baaz and Verweijen (2013) highlight the drawbacks of an ‘open-door’ military integration process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Gaub’s (2010) study analyses multi-ethnic military cohesion in Nigeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Lebanon, while Koekenbier’s (2005) study of Lebanon’s multi-ethnic military before and after the 1975-1009 civil war derives insights for Iraq’s multi-ethnic security forces after the U.S. invasion in 2003. In separate analyses, Karake (2008), Rusagara (2011), and Jowell (2014) examine the Rwandan practice of ingando, a tool used to rebuild trust between Hutus and Tutsis after the genocide, when the Forces Armées Rwandaises

(FAR) were integrated into the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Wilén’s (2015) analysis focuses on post-war professionalization, socialization, welfare-provision, and political education in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while Samii (2006) uses the case of Burundi to demonstrate the utility of a quota-based integration system during the post-civil war establishment of the Burundi National Defence Force (BNDF). Finally, Wilén, Birantamije, and Ambrosetti (2015) examine the temporarily stabilizing effect that Burundi’s involvement in peace support operations in Somalia and the Central African Republic since 2007 had on the military in the aftermath of integration.

**Rationales behind Political-Military Accommodation**

The literature on military integration details several justifications for why former combatants decide to share power along political, military, economic, and territorial dimensions following negotiated settlements to conflict. Accommodation through military power-sharing provides armed groups with an ‘insurance policy,’ or security guarantee, in case peace negotiations become derailed. According to Møller and Cawthra (2007), this approach notionally mitigates the vulnerability of armed groups after they have disarmed and ceded control of occupied territory. Beyond peace negotiations, Walter (2002) asserts how the ability to defend armed group interests may mitigate the chance that rivals could exclude them from power or easily seize control of the state. At the same time, Krebs and Licklider (2015) dispel the myth that military integration provides security to vulnerable populations. Depending on the level of integration into the military and its operational capacity, some constituencies may still be vulnerable if, for example, they are severely under-represented in the military, concentrated in certain units, or if the military lacks the operational reach to protect them.

The notion of an ‘insurance policy’ for armed groups participating in a military integration process is reflected in a handful of empirical cases: In South Africa, the retention of armed forces on the part of the apartheid-era government and the African National Congress (ANC) that succeeded them was seen as a psychological and symbolic
asset necessary to appease their respective constituents.\textsuperscript{251} Pending a political solution in Iraq that would ensure their security against other groups, militias were an ‘insurance policy’ before they eventually transitioned into the statutory security forces – in the legitimizing uniforms of the national forces – to further the sectarian interests of their masters.\textsuperscript{252} Likewise, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, members of integrated brigades retained parallel chains of command, which served as a potential fallback for political leaders who may have found the outcomes of the 2006 elections unfavourable.\textsuperscript{253}

Another rationale behind political-military accommodation is that containing formerly warring parties in a statutory security framework limits the manpower available for armed group mobilization. Based on the assumption that former combatants can be spoilers to the peace process, Berdal and Ucko (2009) argue that the demilitarization of non-statutory armed forces is meant to ensure that combatants do not return to conflict or otherwise undermine stability. According to Hall (2009) and Licklider (2014), limiting the manpower available for armed group mobilization through military integration can reduce the likelihood of armed conflict due to the fact that it makes it less likely that a new force can be readily used against either side. Alternatively, Licklider (2014) posits that military integration might make renewed civil war less likely in the aftermath of a negotiated settlement by reducing the fear among former antagonists or making the military less threatening to members of integrated groups. Indeed, with the reassurance that military power is unlikely to be used against them, Licklider argues that warring parties may be more amenable to taking risky steps toward resolving underlying disputes.\textsuperscript{254}

\textsuperscript{251} Williams, “Integration or Absorption?”
\textsuperscript{254} Licklider, \textit{New Armies from Old}. 

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Finally, military integration can introduce diversity into the armed forces, thereby making the military a symbol of national unity. According to Hall (2009), military integration in the aftermath of armed conflict can be a way to address identity-based conflicts and introduce diversity into the composition of the armed forces. Hall (2009) and Licklider (2014) argue that integration can make the military a ‘school for the nation,’ in the hope that collective experiences and sustained contact among formerly competing groups will erode communal boundaries and symbolize integration for society as a whole.

**Identity, Cohesion and Military Integration**

Uniting former enemies into one structure to work towards the common goal of securing the country notionally allows them to forge trust, build cohesion, and prevent the maintenance of competing allegiances (Hajayandi 2015). Within the literature on military integration, discussions of identity and cohesion within a newly reconstituted armed forces are relevant to the aforementioned concept of an integrated military having nation-building potential or becoming a ‘school for the nation.’

Some of this literature approaches the military as an effective vehicle for fostering national cohesion and integrating a country’s diverse population. This argument is predicated on the belief that participation in the military emphasizes collectivism rather than individualism, and thus facilitates integration (Gaub 2010). The military, according to Gaub (2010) is a collective endeavour that seeks unity, purpose, effectiveness, and functionality, similar to the characteristics Simonsen (2007) highlights as unifying factors within a country’s armed forces: the all-consuming nature of military life, the strict hierarchy and opportunities for meritocratic advancement independent of ethnic background, the perception of the military as the most modern institution in an underdeveloped country, and the shared notion of national service across ethnic groups.

Simonsen (2007) argues that, if a new inclusive military can be built successfully, it may be able to contribute to the construction of a national identity that transcends the ethnic divisions of a post-conflict society – thus decreasing their salience and the risk of armed conflict. He describes the notion of military personnel returning home after military
service and disseminating their new ‘national’ inspirations to civilians in their areas of origin, who may thereby start thinking in terms of the shared interests they may have with other ethnic groups.255

Simonsen (2007) posits that an ethnically representative military is less likely to pursue ethnically divisive goals. The author asserts that the integrative power of the military as a nation-building enterprise is contingent not only on its ethnic makeup, but also on its composition, effectiveness, and professionalism, and the nature of interethnic relations within the force. Berdal (1996) highlights that one of the major challenges in the aftermath of conflict is to overcome ethnic divisions, which may have been reinforced during the war. Berdal (2009) argues in subsequent analysis that it is necessary to pay particular attention to the ethnic composition of forces in order to gain legitimacy and prevent further destabilization. Therefore, Simonsen (2007) argues that ethnically-mixed units should be formed, trained, and deployed because ethnically segregated units serve to uphold ethnic divisions within the army – and possibly within society as a whole.

Based on the literature on cohesion and military integration, I have derived three dimensions across which cohesion can be fostered during transitions from war-to-peace: political indoctrination, common professional orientation, and social contact. These three dimensions are not mutually exclusive, as cohesion can be fostered through multiple dimensions during a military integration process.

Political indoctrination is the use of re-education to secure political control over potential adversaries and reify the socio-political reforms that military victory made possible – but certainly did not guarantee.256 While considering eleven cases of military integration, Burgess and Licklider (2015) describe the ingando process that followed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as this type of ‘political model’ of integration, in contrast with the


‘technocratic model’ used in post-apartheid South Africa, which focused on conventional military training for former combatants.

Krebs (2004) characterizes the military as an institution in which personnel are required to perform common tasks in a highly structured environment and in close quarters. Accordingly, cohesion fostered through common professional orientation refers to the development of a common purpose and a shared commitment to achieving a task (Simonsen 2007). Notably, Simonsen warns that in the most extreme cases, a lack of shared objectives may cause a force to disintegrate.

Finally, cohesion fostered through social contact refers to emotional bonds between members of the armed forces (Simonsen 2007). The belief in the integrative power of socialization within an integrated military is predicated on the so-called ‘contact hypothesis’ – that contact at the individual level has a socializing effect on military personnel. According to the contact hypothesis, the armed forces bring together people from various ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds in a collaborative spirit in pursuit of a common cause. This environment can be suitable for breaking down communal boundaries, suggesting that intense interaction among individuals of varied backgrounds can eliminate prejudicial attitudes and behaviour (Krebs 2004). As a proponent of the contact hypothesis, Gaub (2010) argues that life in the military may deconstruct or soften ethnic identification, thereby facilitating cooperation across ethnic boundaries erected due to conflict. Using this logic, she posits that multi-ethnic militaries contribute to social integration, with a secondary benefit of contributing to peace consolidation.\textsuperscript{257} Krebs (2004) disputes the explanatory power of the contact hypothesis, arguing that it is plausible but theoretically indeterminate. He goes on to argue that while meaningful contact may foster a sense of common destiny, familiarity may breed contempt, and may even foster the consciousness of difference. Regardless, he concedes that many leaders turn to the armed forces to help build cohesive national communities in the quest for national integration, although the vision of the military construct for building a national identity may be, in large part, misguided.

\textsuperscript{257} Gaub, \textit{Military Integration after Civil Wars}.
Rwanda’s use of *ingando*, a form of peacebuilding, best captures a model of efforts to foster a common political orientation during a military integration process. Rusagara (2004), Karake (2012), and Jowell (2014) in provide in-depth insight on *ingando* as a political model of indoctrination. In Kinyarwanda, *ingando* refers to a military encampment or assembly area where troops receive their final briefings before deploying on a military expedition and are reminded to put national interests above individual ones. During this process, former combatants unburden themselves emotionally by discussing the conflict in solidarity camps, and undergo intensive political education focusing on a pre-colonial Rwanda free from ethnic hatred, and with the unifying ideal of the pre-colonial military as the defender of the nation. Then, former combatants are assigned to mixed units and undertake a joint military deployment, which provides additional opportunities to build trust. Finally, members of the armed forces return to their communities after joint deployments in the hope that the positive messages from their deployment will engender inter-communal trust. This civil-military follow-up is intended to address misperceptions and remove barriers to communication. Both Rusagara and Karake use *ingando* to explain how the Rwandan military was able to become more cohesive and even overcome the trauma of the 1994 genocide and the preceding decades of ethnic strife. In addition, Jowell (2014) highlights how the Rwandan Defence Force’s (RDF) emphasis on welfare and political education allowed peer group associations to be established, and helped forge cohesion, foster military ethos and strengthen national consciousness.

The case of Rwanda also provides an example of an integrated military’s orientation towards a common professional task and purpose. Jowell (2014) characterizes how the modern-day Rwanda Defence Force originated with Rwandan members of the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, which then formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and invaded Rwanda in 1990. The RPA then attracted Tutsi recruits during the Rwandan civil war (1990-1994) and then transitioned to the post-genocide Rwanda Defence Force, which integrated approximately 38,500 former members of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), previously the national military of Rwanda, between 1995
and 1998. Over time, the RPA and its successor, the Rwandan Defence Force, were able to accomplish what Rusagara (2009) characterized as ‘consolidation of the RDF through fire’ – defending against armed incursions by ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* from late 1994 until 1996, and intervening against these forces in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1996 and 1997, and again between 1998 and 2003. Furthermore, Jowell (2014) notes that receiving professional military education, training in the same cohorts, and fighting together allowed peer group associations to be established, and helped forge cohesion within the RDF. In addition, because troops deploying on peacekeeping operations trained together before and after deployments, peacekeeping, like offensive operations, provided additional opportunities for soldiers from different backgrounds to work together towards a common cause (Jowell 2014).

The case of Burundi also provides an example of task cohesion – specifically how the involvement of a newly integrated military in peacekeeping operations can also improve cohesion. According to Wilén, Birantamije, and Ambrosetti (2015), the Burundian government used the newly-integrated Burundi National Defence Force’s involvement in peacekeeping operations as one way of addressing internal problems, easing tensions, and improving cohesion. The authors assert that the benefits the Burundian military received from its involvement in international peacekeeping – professionalization, national and international prestige, and financial compensation – also weakened the negative ties former combatants had formed during the civil war. In late 2007, Burundi became a troop contributor to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and subsequently joined United Nations peacekeeping missions in Darfur, the Central African Republic, and Côte d’Ivoire. At a time when the simultaneous disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration and security sector reform processes were placing strains on the delicate ethnic balance of the BNDF, deployments to peacekeeping operations not only engaged the BNDF’s ‘surplus’ manpower, but also assisted the newly composed BNDF in building cohesion against a foreign enemy. As the AMISOM deployment was by far the
largest, the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab assumed the position of a common enemy around which the BNDF’s cohesion could be forged.  

Finally, Samii (2006) and Gaub’s (2010) analyses on the use of quotas during military integration can provide a useful lens for understanding cohesion fostered through social contact. After examining the consequences of a quota-based military integration strategy in the aftermath of Burundi’s civil war (1994–2003), Samii (2006) found that the Burundi National Defence Force operated as a deeply integrated and cohesive institution at the macro levels as a result of the imposition of ethnic quotas during the process of military integration. Furthermore, at the micro level, he found that the contact that resulted from integration reduced the prejudices and ethnic salience among ex-combatants. This is contrary to the findings he cited from the field of social psychology, that such a method could intensify or ‘freeze’ conflicting ethnic identities. Like Samii, Gaub (2010) supports the idea that the use of quotas can be beneficial in calming fears and ensuring that the military has an equitable ethnic complexion. However, she argues that quotas can have negative side-effects by creating jealousy among those who do not benefit, reinforcing loyalty towards one’s ethnic group, perpetuating the concept of ethnic identity, and contradicting the ethos of a military constituted out of merit.

The empirical literature on the use of quotas in a military integration process details how these arrangements were implemented in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Hajayandi (2015) argues that it was necessary to address ethnic and regional imbalances in the Burundi National Defence Forces through security sector reform in order to prevent the killing of ethnic Hutu leaders in the future. As South Africa played a role as a mediator in Burundi, it pushed a model of quota-based integration based on its own experience with military integration during its transition to majority rule. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the Pretoria Protocol on Political Defence

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259 Samii, “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration?”
260 Ibid.
261 Gaub, Military Integration after Civil Wars.
262 Samii, “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration?”
and Security Power Sharing, and the Forces Technical Agreement established the concept of 50 per cent Hutu-50 per cent Tutsi quotas in the BNDF in order to overcome the country’s history of coups and instances of mass killing.\textsuperscript{263} In addition, the top officer echelon would have 60 per cent personnel from the old Burundi Armed Forces (FAB) and 40 per cent personnel from the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), with the margin between these quotas to be made up with Hutu members of the FAB, combatants of other armed political parties, and new recruits.\textsuperscript{264} In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the main rebel factions agreed to merge using a quota system based on declared troop numbers.\textsuperscript{265} The official quota of integrated brigades was 35 per cent from the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), 17 per cent from the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, 28 per cent from the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma, 8 per cent from the Mai-Mai and 12 per cent from other groups.\textsuperscript{266} Each commander was to be assisted by two deputies from two different groups so that no one faction could have complete control over the chain of command.\textsuperscript{267} The division of positions in the national and regional command structures was also based on a quota system, yet the nomination of individual candidates and the distribution of non-senior positions often failed to follow transparent criteria.\textsuperscript{268}

**Open-ended Military Integration**

The literature on military integration details several drawbacks associated with an open-ended integration process. An open-ended military integration process can create incentives for armed groups to use violence to extract benefits from the state and advance their positions. Alden, Thakur, and Arnold (2011) argue that the military integration

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{264} Møller and Cawthra, “Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States”; Samii, “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration?”
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{268} Baaz and Verweijen, “The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse.”
process provides perverse incentives to those who spoil peace negotiations, thereby encouraging others to behave in a similar manner. In some cases, like in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Møller and Cawthra (2007) assert that military integration has actually contributed to insecurity, as members of integrated battalions appeared to respond, when they deemed fit, to orders from factional political leadership rather than from the transitional government. In their analysis of the military integration process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Baaz and Verweijen (2013) detail how, in some instances of military integration, the process creates a ‘demonstration effect,’ showing that violence and disobedience can be translated into benefits. For example, in the DRC, commanders who had failed to obtain favourable positions during brassage took the initiative to defect from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC).269 (The French term brassage means ‘brewing’, and refers to the process of breaking the chain of command among integrated forces by mixing units for formation within the new FARDC). The authors argue that serial, or repeated, military integration created a class of military entrepreneurs with incentives to turn desertion, non-integration, or violence into a political resource, thus reinforcing their position to negotiate re-entry into the government’s fold.270 With a lack of credible guarantees to sanction defectors, the fact that these individuals have been granted continuous rewards can have profoundly demoralizing effects on the troops that have decided to remain loyal.271 With no obligation to surrender arms caches, the permission to remain deployed in former zones of influence and maintain control of combatants, and a lack of military pressure on uncooperative parties, the costs associated with military integration on the part of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were rather low.272 Conversely, potential rewards in the form of financial benefits, impunity for past crimes, high ranks, and lucrative deployment locations, were quite high.273 The imbalance between costs and rewards led Baaz and Verweijen (2013) to conclude that the relative

269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
272 Baaz and Verweijen, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army.”
273 Ibid.
ease with which army deserters could integrate back into the FARDC from a better negotiating position played a role in their decision to desert.

Shortcomings in justice and accountability have sometimes been associated with open-ended military integration processes, as former combatants are perceived as having been ‘rewarded’ with integration into a country’s security forces. Berdal and Ucko (2009) note that in the aftermath of violent conflict, there is often tension between the need to balance reconciliation and stability with legitimate demands for justice. Dudouet, Giessmann, and Planta (2012) assert that the best way to increase public confidence in the state’s new security institutions and build cohesion between former combatants is for all forces to be vetted for past war crimes and human rights violations. Similarly, Alden, Thakur, and Arnold (2011) note that there are often concerns that individuals responsible for serious abuses against civilians must be brought to justice instead of being rewarded.

This tension between justice and accountability and the imperative for military integration has manifested differently across various cases of military integration. In Colombia, the pursuit of justice for political crimes was not a priority, as most combatants, leadership, and rank and file received full pardons for political crimes. Guáqueta (2009) notes that there was a sense that this approach was fair, given the flaws of the state and some of the ‘objective’ causes behind the rebellion. Jackson (2011) adds that, during the integration process in Zimbabwe, there was no vetting for human rights violations. Similarly, Baaz and Verweijen (2013) detail how armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo decided against a vetting process for integration into the FARDC. Although the final peace agreement included an amnesty exempting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, limited efforts were made to implement these provisions of the agreement. Select armed group leaders – Thomas Lubanga of the Union of Congolese Patriots, Mathieu Ngudjolo of the Congolese Revolutionary Movement, and Bosco Ntaganda of the Congress for the Defence of the People – received amnesty and were integrated into the FARDC. However these individuals were subsequently handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to face charges of

274 Ibid.
war crimes. In such instances, Alden, Thakur, and Arnold (2011) argue that the pursuit of justice can lead to mistrust, potentially derailing future amnesty and military integration arrangements.

**Military Integration as a Transitional Part of Security Sector Reform**

The concept of military integration as a foundation of broader security sector reform is absent from much of the literature, and Krebs and Licklider (2015) note that the international community’s guides for peace-building and security sector reform lack a substantive discussion of military integration. The reason for this, they argue, is due to the historical circumstances in which SSR emerged – during relatively peaceful transitions to democracy across Europe and Latin America in the 1990s. With a focus on transforming formerly authoritarian security forces into those subject to civilian oversight during a peaceful transition, there was no need for these guidelines to address the integration of armed groups into a statutory security framework.

Some of the literature on military integration, however, characterizes the role that military integration plays as a transitional, short-term means by which to contain potential spoilers in a statutory transitional security framework. Colletta and Muggah (2009) characterize five carefully timed and phased Interim Stabilization Measures (ISMs) that can occur between the signing of the peace agreement and its eventual implementation, and may accompany Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration. These ISMs include involvement in a civilian service corps; military or security sector integration; transitional security forces; semi-autonomous and decentralized local community forces; or combined military integration and civilian reintegration programs. Colletta and Muggah assert that the key benefit of these ISMs is to convert potential spoilers into stakeholders and take former combatants off the battlefield. In this respect, ISMs improve the management of statutory and non-statutory armed forces, and reduce insecurity by attempting to break the negative command relationships of armed groups that are now contained in a transitional security framework.

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275 Colletta, “Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations.”
structure. ISMs can also simultaneously prevent the emergence of security vacuums during a war-to-peace transition. The authors also note that these ISMs can build confidence and trust between formerly warring parties, and buy time for the development of more favourable social, political, and economic conditions.

South Africa’s transition from apartheid to black majority rule provides a useful empirical example of how an integration process both coexisted with, and fed into a broader security sector reform process. During this process, potential spoilers were transformed into stakeholders, negative command relationships were broken, and a post-apartheid military emerged following the concurrent integration process and reforms to the security sector.

Military integration in South Africa was a three-year process that often required political interventions from President Mandela and other political elites. South Africa’s 1993 Interim Constitution provided the framework for a singular National Defence Force that would be under parliamentary and civil control. Accordingly, the South Africa National Defence Force was created by amalgamating the combatant forces of the South Africa Defence Force (SADF), Umkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the African National Congress), the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (the armed wing of the Pan African Congress), and the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei (TBVC) forces from the apartheid era black homelands. A Transitional Executive Council was established in late 1993, and one of its sub-councils was the Sub-Council on Defence. This entity was responsible for not only maintaining oversight over the armed forces during the pre-election phase and the period of transition to majority rule between April and May of 1994, but also initiating the planning required to create a new, integrated South African National Defence Force. South Africa also had a Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC), which was responsible for the management of pre-

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277 Møller and Cawthra, “Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States.”

278 Ibid.

integration strategic planning.\textsuperscript{280} The JMCC was chaired by the South African Defence Force chief and the chief of staff of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) on a rotating basis.\textsuperscript{281} Representatives on the JMCC were drawn from the SADF, MK, and five other armed groups, but in practice, the SADF and MK either co-chaired these committees or dominated proceedings.\textsuperscript{282} The JMCC had working groups to handle issues in service-specific or functional areas such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and finances.\textsuperscript{283} Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence authored a White Paper on National Defence in 1996, which articulated a strategy and resourcing plan for the integration process, and completed a Defence Review process that provided a blueprint for integrating the military and restructuring the defence sector.\textsuperscript{284} The fact that the integration process was streamlined into South Africa’s security sector reform process may have contributed to the success of both processes during South Africa’s transition to majority rule.

**Dual Track Military Integration and Demobilisation**

Military integration is a distinct process from disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration – the process through which ex-combatants are reintegrated into civilian society. However, military integration is a process that can take place prior to, or even concurrent to DDR, the provision of livelihoods opportunities, and broader social, political, and economic assistance to ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{285} According to Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) and Jackson (2011), military integration can provide an economic incentive for ex-combatants, who might otherwise renew hostilities, to keep the peace by providing them with employment. As there is a strong economic incentive for individuals to take part in the military integration process to gain employment in the reconstituted military, Knight (2011) advises that military integration should not be conceived or planned separately from the civilian reintegration process. Indeed, while military

\textsuperscript{280} Williams, “Integration or Absorption?”
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{282} Burgess, “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict”; Møller and Cawthra, “Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States”; Williams, “Integration or Absorption?”
\textsuperscript{283} Williams, “Integration or Absorption?”; Burgess, “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict.”
\textsuperscript{284} Burgess, “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict.”
\textsuperscript{285} Hall, “From Rebels to Soldiers.”
integration can reduce the DDR caseload, civilian reintegration programs are sometimes used as a substitute for military integration when the funding to support DDR is forthcoming.  

Case studies on Burundi and the DRC detail a ‘dual track’ approach to military integration. From 2004 to late 2005, 7,000 forces of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy assembled in cantonments, where they were immediately merged with 40,000 Burundi Armed Forces (FAB) into integrated units. Then, from late 2005, the force was rightsized towards a target of 25,000 army and 20,000 police, which included the demobilisation of 14,000 soldiers (5,000 from the FAB and 9,000 from the CNDD-FDD). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo the processes of military integration and DDR were also linked. The main rebel factions amalgamated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) were the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani (RCD-K)/ Rally for Congolese Democracy-Movement for Liberation (RCD-ML), Rally for Congolese Democracy-National (RCD-N), and Mai-Mai. As military integration and DDR were concurrent, these processes were jointly organized by the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration (CONADER) and the Structure Militaire d’Intégration (SMI) under a system called tronc commun (dual-track). Under the tronc commun, former combatants were given the choice of reintegrating into civilian life or integrating into the national army. The SMI was responsible for former combatants who wanted to integrate into the FARDC.

In its entirety, this process included a census of all former combatants, disarmament at assembly points located throughout the country, and transfer to one of at least ten

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286 Licklider, *New Armies from Old*; Glassmyer and Sambanis, “Rebel—Military Integration and Civil War Termination.”
287 Samii, “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration?”
orientation centres. There, they would be selected to either demobilise and return to civilian life or to integrate into the FARDC. Those who chose the latter were then sent for training at one of six military integration centres, called *Centres de Brassage.* At these centres, they would be issued standard FARDC equipment and weapons and undergo 45 days of basic training. Aside from instilling basic military principles into ex-combatants, the purpose of brassage was to ensure that old loyalties were broken down and that a unified chain of command was established. After brassage, former combatants were officially integrated into the army and assigned to one of 18 FARDC brigades across the country.

**Role of Third Parties**

Of the 128 civil wars that took place between 1945 and 2006, 40 per cent called for some element of military integration. Licklider (2014) posits that the increase in military integration arrangements can be attributed, *inter alia,* to the involvement of mediators in said settlements. Indeed, according to Hartzell (2014), military integration is often implemented due to pressure from the international community – sometimes in the face of considerable local resistance. In fact, she asserts that it is likely that the international community plays a particularly significant role in increasing the likelihood that military integration will be agreed to as part of the civil war settlement.

Integration can be a turbulent process, implemented in the immediate aftermath of conflict when many states remain weak. In this context, Walter (2002), Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) and Burgess (2008) assert that third party actors such as bilateral donors

292 Baaz and Verweijen, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army.”
293 Alden, Thakur, and Arnold, *Militias and the Challenges of Post-Conflict Peace.*
295 Hartzell, “Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s End.”
or international organizations can help supervise, monitor, and verify compliance with the agreement if they are perceived by warring parties to be objective. These authors add that third parties can supplement the confidence necessary to fully implement the peace agreement by reducing mutual suspicion during the implementation process and by helping overcome the actual or perceived political bias of extant security forces. In addition, third-party actors may be able to distribute observers more easily throughout the country without threatening warring parties (Walter 2002), and may be able to compensate for gaps in knowledge or technical competence (Dudouet, Giessmann, and Planta 2012).

Dudouet, Giessmann, and Planta (2012) argue that the involvement of third party actors contributes to a sense of minimized risk associated with engaging in the peace process. The authors posit that armed groups can notionally divest themselves of the ability to defend themselves while relying on the protection provided by a neutral, trusted outside force, which can provide objective, non-partisan standards during a rather contentious process. However, Walter (2002) asserts that the implementation of peace agreements is a function of the confidence that warring parties have in the commitment of third-party actors to serve as verification and enforcement of implementation. If either side does not believe that third parties will honour their commitments, combatants may perceive promises to monitor and protect as empty, and could refuse to abide by the agreement.

Based on the literature on war-to-peace transitions, I have identified three potential roles for third-party actors during the negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment stages of military integration processes. In these contexts, third party actors can be mediators during peace negotiations; guarantors of security in the form of peacekeepers or a ceasefire monitoring force; or providers of financial, logistical, or technical assistance.

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297 Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.


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From the empirical literature on military integration, we see that third party actors have been mediators during the negotiation phase of integration. In Tajikistan, Torjesen and MacFarlane (2009) note that the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) monitored developments in-country and facilitated dialogue between warring parties.299 The literature also demonstrates how third party actors can provide a stabilising force, such as peacekeepers or ceasefire monitors, to deter former combatants from resuming full-scale hostilities during an integration process. The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which preceded the current United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), was partially tasked with ensuring the integration or disarmament of all rebel factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.300 In Burundi, the Pretoria Protocol stipulated that there would be an internationally supervised DDR process that would commence with the cantonment of forces followed by a training program for new forces.301 Drawing upon its own experience with military integration, South Africa provided substantial technical assistance for Burundi’s integration process.302 With the endorsement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1375 (2001), a South African Protection Support Detachment of 800 troops officially operated under the auspices of the African Union (AU). Subsequently, the Organisation of African Unity/African Union mandated the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was staffed by soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, to oversee the cantonment and disarmament of combatants.303 Additionally, despite lacking the authority to constrain warring parties, an Implementation Monitoring Committee was comprised of six Burundians designated for

300 Møller and Cawthra, “Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States.”
301 Ibid.
302 Samii, “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration?”
303 Møller and Cawthra, “Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States.”
their integrity, two representatives of the parties to the Arusha Agreement, and one representative each from the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity/African Union (AU), and the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi. This committee was responsible for monitoring and coordinating implementation of the peace agreement.

Finally, the literature details how third party actors can provide financial, logistical, or technical assistance to a military integration process. Specifically, in several cases of military integration, third-party actors have deployed teams of trainers to provide intensive ‘bridging training’ to integrated forces. In post-conflict contexts in which former combatants are likely have diverse training backgrounds and operational (i.e., conventional vs. asymmetric) experience, such training is provided to bridge gaps between statutory and non-statutory armed forces that may prevent key leadership roles from being filled by integrating forces. In addition, bridging training can not only increase the professionalism of the non-statutory armed forces being integrated, but it can also maintain the level of professionalism within the security force that is absorbing them. In the post-conflict context of mistrust and animosity, third party actors providing bridging training can also act as impartial brokers of the integration process – albeit without the size or political will to necessarily deter the outbreak of violence.

In cases of military integration from Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, BMATTs were deployed to provide bridging training to integrated forces. Their presence ensured that former combatants believed the integration process was conducted in an inclusive, transparent, and fair manner, especially when it came to the matter of adjudicating how ranks were harmonized across the new military force.

As previously mentioned, the integration process in Zimbabwe benefitted from the presence of a British Military Advisory and Training Team, which was able to engender trust and build confidence during the integration process.\textsuperscript{307} The original mission of the BMATT in Zimbabwe was to help select and train a cadre of leaders and instructors who would then train the rank and file.\textsuperscript{308} Accordingly, a BMATT trained senior and mid-level officers and NCOs before integrating and subsequently deploying them to remote areas.\textsuperscript{309} In July 1980, four officers each from the Rhodesia Security Forces, ZANLA, and ZIPRA spent two weeks doing an assessment and bonding exercise before visiting a British military training facility at Camberley for a familiarization course on conventional force functions.\textsuperscript{310} Although former members of the Rhodesia Security Forces possessed a framework for the administration and command and control upon which a new military could be established, it was completely mistrusted by rebel forces. In this context, the BMATT acted as an ‘honest broker’ at the top levels of defence management to ease tensions between erstwhile enemies and enable progress within the integration process.\textsuperscript{311} Moreover, the BMATT was able to play a mitigating role, for the most part, when violence broke out between factions in early 1981.\textsuperscript{312} Although the BMATT was not originally established to provide a presence in all training establishments in which integration was being conducted, Dennis recommends that BMATT should have had a presence on the ground to train and advise at training establishments and to act as neutral umpires.\textsuperscript{313}

Aside from Zimbabwe, a BMATT was involved in modern-day Namibia after South West Africa gained its independence from South Africa in 1990. BMATTs played an instrumental role in training the Namibian Defence Force, which was the amalgamation

\textsuperscript{307} Rupiah, “Demobilisation and Integration.”
\textsuperscript{308} Jackson, “The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe”; Dennis CB, OBE (rtd), “The Integration of Guerrilla Armies into Conventional Forces: Lessons Learnt from BMATT in Africa.”
\textsuperscript{309} Rupiah, “Demobilisation and Integration.”
\textsuperscript{310} Jackson, “The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe.”
\textsuperscript{311} Dennis CB, OBE (rtd), “The Integration of Guerrilla Armies into Conventional Forces: Lessons Learnt from BMATT in Africa.”
\textsuperscript{312} Dennis CB, OBE (rtd), “The Integration of Guerrilla Armies into Conventional Forces: Lessons Learnt from BMATT in Africa.”
\textsuperscript{313} Jackson, “The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe”; Dennis CB, OBE (rtd), “The Integration of Guerrilla Armies into Conventional Forces: Lessons Learnt from BMATT in Africa.”
of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which was the military wing of the South West African People’s Organization, and the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF). In addition, a BMATT was invited to post-apartheid South Africa to arbitrate the creation of the South Africa National Defence Force. There, integrated forces were fast-tracked through training through affirmative action to reduce the gap between those with conventional military experience and those who lacked it.\textsuperscript{314} The remainder of the integration process focused on educating and training all members of the SANDF to meet international standards of competence and professionalism.\textsuperscript{315}

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it was a multilateral, rather than unilateral actor that provided support to the military integration process. The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo oversaw and provided logistical support for the Structure Militaire d’Intégration to transfer former combatants to the Centres de Brassage.\textsuperscript{316} With MONUC overseeing the brassage process, newly-integrated brigades received ‘on-the-job training’ by carrying out operations in conjunction with experienced soldiers from troop contributing nations.\textsuperscript{317} MONUC and its successor, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, provided limited technical and logistical support, while the European Union’s security sector reform mission assisted with biometric identification. Besides these initiatives, there was little direct donor involvement in the implementation of the DRC’s integration process.\textsuperscript{318} The reason for this was that some key figures and military advisors close to President Joseph Kabila were not receptive to foreign involvement in the integration process, as it was perceived to be meddling in internal affairs.\textsuperscript{319} Consequently, foreign donors also made few efforts to influence the military integration

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{316} Alden, Thakur, and Arnold, Militias and the Challenges of Post-Conflict Peace.
\textsuperscript{317} Lucas, “Brassage Congolais: The Efforts to Forge the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Wake of the Second Congo War.”
\textsuperscript{318} Baaz and Verweijen, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army.”
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid.
process until the *Mouvement du 23-Mars* (M23)\textsuperscript{320} rebellion between 2012 and 2013, which commenced as a mutiny of former rebels from the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) who had been integrated into the FARDC, against the Congolese government.\textsuperscript{321}

Within the literature, there is no conclusive evidence that third party actors can ensure the success of a military integration process. Licklider (2014) cites the example of South Africa to highlight that the presence of third party actors is not necessary for success, while citing the example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to demonstrate that the involvement of such actors is also insufficient to prevent failures. For one, Berdal (1996) warns that external actors cannot force the formation of basic trust and willingness to forego war aims in pursuit of compromise. In addition, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) raise the question of whether the number of third-party troops is sufficient to provide security and arbitration of the peace agreement, and guarantee that violators of the ceasefire will be punished. Moreover, Walter (2002) argues that when there is an unequal balance of power between warring parties, a stronger type of intervention capable of using force is necessary. Burgess (2008) cites an insufficient level of external involvement as contributing to the unravelling of peace processes and the failure of military integration in Angola. He argues that donors failed to seriously consider the long-term integration of ex-combatants, and instead focused on upcoming elections after the Bicesse Accords were signed in May 1991.\textsuperscript{322} Berdal (1996) also cites the example of Angola’s 1992 elections as an example in which external assistance, pressure, or support could have prevented Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) from rejecting an electoral outcome that did not result in bringing him to power.

\textsuperscript{320} On March 23, 2009, the CNDP and the Government of the DRC signed a peace agreement through which the CNDP was to become a political party and its soldiers were to be integrated into the FARDC. The *Mouvement du 23-Mars* (M23) rebellion that emerged between 2012 and 2013 was a reaction to the failed implementation of this accord.

\textsuperscript{321} Baaz and Verweijen, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army.”

\textsuperscript{322} Burgess, “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict.”
Conclusions

In this chapter, I have discussed what the literature on military integration says about why former combatants decide to seek political-military accommodation with their former enemies through military integration; how military integration can be a transitional security measure; the practical application of dual track military integration and demobilisation processes; how an open-ended military integration process can provide incentives for defection or non-compliance; the role of social, task, and political cohesion within a newly integrated military; and the role of third parties in military integration processes. Now, I will discuss how these themes relate to South Sudan’s experience with military integration between 2006 and 2013, and highlight the contributions this thesis makes to the existing body of literature on military integration.

In both the northern and southern parts of Sudan, many armed groups and political opposition had been excluded from the peace process between the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. In South Sudan, armed groups outside of the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army armed groups were required by the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements and Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements to either be incorporated into the security forces (i.e., Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife) of Sudan or South Sudan or be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions. In this context, non-SPLA armed groups accordingly had to find a way to mitigate their isolation from the peace process, as they could not be perceived as opposed to the long-awaited peace that was quite popular in the South. By bringing OAGs into the governing structures of the South, the Government of South Sudan was allowing these armed groups an ‘insurance policy’ to help assuage fears about their role in the post-CPA South. At the same time, by seeking political-military accommodation with such groups, the Government of South Sudan was attempting to rectify the exclusive nature of the CPA and reduce the

323 “Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period”; “Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements: Implementation Modalities between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) during the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods.”
324 Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”
possibilities for such groups to become spoilers of the peace agreement and derail the referendum on self-determination.\textsuperscript{325} The ability for non-SPLA armed groups to partake in South Sudan’s post-CPA political dispensation parallels arguments made by several authors that having access to a share of state power offers former combatants an ‘insurance policy,’ and minimizes the risk of the new military being used against either side (Walter 2002, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, Møller and Cawthra 2007, Sriram 2008 Hall 2009, and Licklider 2014).

When the CPA was signed, some armed groups, such as the South Sudan Defence Force possessed the size, weapons, military capabilities and strategic locations to become spoilers, and may have controlled up to 20 per cent of the territory of South Sudan.\textsuperscript{326} Thus, the integration of the groups referred to in the CPA as Other Armed Groups made logistical sense in order to outbid Khartoum for their loyalty during the Interim Period.\textsuperscript{327} In addition, by reducing the manpower available for armed groups, the Government of South Sudan limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use its support of non-SPLA armed groups in the South to undermine CPA implementation and derail the referendum on self-determination.\textsuperscript{328} In this respect, the case of South Sudan parallels arguments made by Berdal and Ucko (2009), Hall (2009), and Licklider (2014) that military integration can be a means by which to limit the manpower available for armed group mobilization.

However, despite the parallels between the literature on military integration and South Sudan’s experience following the Juba Declaration, there are several major divergences to the notion of integration as an ‘insurance policy’ for former combatants. In 2012, a militia of young Dinka men called the Mathiang Anyoor from President Kiir’s home region of Greater Bahr al-Ghazal was created as a parallel security force within the SPLA. The formation of this ethicised security force outside the chain of command of the

\textsuperscript{325}“Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”; De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan.”

\textsuperscript{326}Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration”; Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.

\textsuperscript{327}De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan.”

\textsuperscript{328}“Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”; De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan.”
Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs and the SPLA General Staff may have indicated that the President and his inner circle no longer trusted the integrated SPLA to protect their interests. Furthermore, the subsequent integration of this parallel security force into the Presidential Guard eroded trust within the Government of South Sudan and the military, and was viewed as a betrayal of the SPLA’s attempt at integration.\textsuperscript{329} The outbreak of conflict in December 2013 and the subsequent targeting of Nuer SPLA and civilians by the country’s security forces on the basis of their ethnicity was a strong indication that being a part of the SPLA was insufficient to prevent state security forces from eventually being turned against them. Thus, the formation of parallel security forces negated the protection that multiple authors argued that formerly warring parties would have had within an integrated military.

Up until the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, one could argue that military integration made the barrier higher for the SPLA to pursue ethnic agendas. However, the formation of parallel security forces, the ethnic fragmentation of the SPLA, and the targeting of ethnic Nuer when the war broke out render this hypothesis invalid for the case of South Sudan. As I have argued in the previous paragraphs, integration served a critical purpose between the signing of the CPA and the referendum on self-determination. However, as I will argue in Chapter 6, the collapse of political power-sharing arrangements, the flawed implementation of the military integration process, and the establishment of parallel security forces outside the SPLA chain of command eventually contributed to the disintegration of the military integration process. These factors mitigated the extent to which the SPLA was deterred from using force along political or ethnic lines when the civil war broke out in 2013, and undermined the protection that should have accompanied membership in the SPLA.

Another element missing from analyses of post-peace agreement integration is the idea that seeking political-military accommodation with armed groups was the ‘least bad’ choice, which the case of South Sudan demonstrates. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, I argue that the Government of South Sudan faced three choices

\textsuperscript{329} “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name.”
vis-à-vis adhering to the requirements articulated in the CPA and addressing the threat that non-SPLA groups posed to stability: The government could have attempted to fight these armed groups, ignore them and accept that the government did not have a monopoly on the use of force in South Sudan, or pursue a political-military accommodation with them.

Accordingly, one of my contributions to the literature is that for South Sudan during the Interim Period, accommodating armed groups through military integration was the ‘least bad’ choice, which allowed the government to ease over divisions in the South in the runup to the 2011 referendum on self-determination. During this time period, it would have been difficult for the government to militarily defeat non-SPLA armed groups. The SPLA had not been able to defeat these groups during the South-South struggles of the 1990s, and the size and strategic location of such groups would have made them difficult to defeat. Even if it had been possible to defeat these armed groups militarily, the continuation of South-South conflict would have further destabilized the South during a period when southern unity was critical. In addition, both protracted conflict or ignoring the existence of non-SPLA armed groups would have provided additional opportunities for Khartoum to continue destabilizing the South during the Interim Period. It is for these reasons that South Sudan demonstrates how integration can be the ‘least bad’ choice during a war-to-peace transition. By allowing South Sudan to temporarily overcome its history of factionalism and ethnic conflict in order to consolidate political-military power, the military integration process averted a potential civil war in the South. Integration thus contributed to a marked decline in insecurity during the Interim Period of the CPA, and ensured that the region remained stable enough for the referendum on self-determination to be held, thus paving the way for South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011.\(^{330}\)

Within the literature on military integration, the process is believed to help make the national military more diverse, and a symbol of national unity (Hall 2009 and Licklider 2014). Moreover, the nature of the military as an institution supposedly lends itself to

\(^{330}\) De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan”; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*; LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*. 

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being a natural integrator (Simonsen 2007). Based on the theoretical and empirical literature, I derived three dimensions across which cohesion within a national military is manifested during war-to-peace transitions: Political Indoctrination (Rusagara 2004, Karake 2012, Burgess and Licklider 2015), Professional Orientation (Krebs 2004, Simonsen 2007, Jowell 2014, Wilén, Ambrosetti, and Birantamije 2015), and Social Contact (Samii 2006, Simonsen 2007, and Gaub 2010). Due to the ethnic nature of the SPLA’s split in the 1990s and the group’s behaviour in the Equatoria region throughout much of the conflict, members of non-SPLA armed groups included mostly Nuer and some Equatorians. Integrating these forces into the SPLA made the military a more diverse force, reversing some of the ethnic fallout of the 1991 split.

However, contrary to the literature on militaries being ‘natural integrators,’ the SPLA did not appear to make much progress at fostering cohesion across the political, professional orientation, and social dimensions. In terms of political ideology, the Marxist ideology that was pervasive in the early years of the SPLA and allowed it to receive support from the Marxist regime in neighbouring Ethiopia dissipated after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in 1991. In addition, after the CPA was signed, the anti-North sentiment that had galvanized much of the South and helped overcome the internal contradictions of the movement dissipated and there was no new ideology or nationalist concept to fill that void. The SPLA’s history of civil war-era factionalism, detailed in Chapter 2, contributed to its post-independence inability to truly transcend ethnic divisions to create a national South Sudanese identity, and a cohesive national military.331 Issues that had been divisive in the South included the competition for dominance of the southern rebellion between SPLM/A and Anyanya II, the 1991 split within the SPLM/A and the ethnic massacres and population displacements that followed, and the Government of Sudan’s ‘peace from within’ counterinsurgency strategy that further destabilized the South by funneling support to SPLA splinter groups.332 As a fractured post-CPA South would have threatened the opportunity to vote in the referendum on self-determination and thus play into the Government of Sudan’s hands,

332 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
the prevailing rationale was to address internal fissures among southern political factions and ethnic groups after independence. Consequently, shortly before independence, these divisions between disparate ethnic groups and political factions bubbled to the surface.

In terms of cohesion through common professional orientation, the continuous cycle of integration and the competing loyalties of integrated forces made it difficult for the SPLA to pursue unified aims. One of the implications of this was that the SPLA lacked a consistent approach to preventing or responding to inter-ethnic conflict, leading to confusion about its role and mandate. The salience of ethnic identities within the SPLA made it such that the military could not be trusted to act as a cohesive national army when addressing conflict between the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle. For example, according to Human Rights Watch, during the SPLA’s disarmament and counterinsurgency campaigns in Greater Upper Nile, there were reports of ethnic Lou Nuer, Murle, and Toposa soldiers defecting to carry out revenge attacks on rival ethnic groups, returning to their home areas, or being reluctant to fight members of their own ethnic groups. One of the reasons for their reluctance to engage in fighting in these areas may have been because they feared entangling their families in blood feuds. In terms of social contact cohesion, the Ministry of Defence and the SPLA recognized that the military had a cohesion problem and established Reorganization Committees and planned the subsequent Battalion Reset to ‘mix’ forces from South Sudan’s three major regions (Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria). Ultimately, the SPLA’s failure to foster cohesion within its ranks lends credence to Krebs’ (2004) rebuttal of the contact hypothesis, that familiarity may breed contempt, rather than affinity.

335 Ibid.; Young, The Fate of Sudan.
The SPLA did not use quotas during the integration process, so it is not possible to test Samii (2006) and Gaub’s (2010) hypotheses on their utility except to posit how quotas might have had an impact in this case. The majority of OAG members and members of subsequent armed groups were Nuer. The SPLA’s lack of quotas meant that even though they were only 16 per cent of the population, the Nuer quickly became a majority within the SPLA due to the post-Juba Declaration integration process. According to one analysis, one of the reasons that violence quickly took on an ethnic dimension in December 2013 was due to a widely held perception that one ethnic group dominated the army hierarchy. Arguably, this imbalance may have contributed to the development of parallel security forces to protect the interests of the political elite, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. That said, the verdict on the use of quotas to ensure diversity within an integrated military is mixed. Applying Samii and Gaub to the case of South Sudan, quotas could have made the SPLA more cohesive by reducing prejudices and ethnic salience (Samii 2006), but they could have also contradicted the notion of a military where entry and promotion were not based on merit, but on identity (Gaub 2010).

Overall, one could argue that the SPLA’s cohesion and ethnic representation were undermined by the open-ended nature of the military integration process. When Alden, Thakur, and Arnold (2011), Baaz and Verweijen (2013), and Møller and Cawthra (2007) wrote about integration, they discussed how integration can provide a perverse incentive for defection, which is a low-cost, high-reward enterprise. However, these authors do not address one of my arguments in this thesis, that the dynamics that developed between a class of rebellion entrepreneurs and those who eschewed rebellion and remained loyal to the SPLA may have eroded cohesion within the new military. Due to repeated cycles of rebellion and the degree to which the Government of South Sudan placed a premium on ‘buying peace,’ South Sudan’s integration process became de facto open-ended. Knowing how important it was for the government to bring them back into the fold, armed group leaders were able to become entrepreneurs of rebellion. The case of South Sudan demonstrates that open-ended military integration encouraged defections, which is

337 von Habsburg-Lothringen, “Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan.”
particularly paralleled in Baaz and Verweijen’s (2013) analysis of armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the case of South Sudan demonstrates how repeatedly rewarding defectors through this open-ended process contributed to tensions within the SPLA and eroded what little cohesion existed within the new military. In this respect, I argue that an open-ended military integration process also prevented the SPLA from ‘graduating’ from the integration process and focusing on fostering cohesion within the new national military. South Sudan’s failure to ‘graduate’ from the integration process undermined efforts to transform the military, leaving it prone to fracturing during periods of heightened political competition. In its failure to ‘graduate’ from the integration process, the SPLA remained a confederation of armed groups rather than a national military – an unfavourable departure point for establishing a statutory security force for what would become the Republic of South Sudan. Furthermore, missing from the literature is how the open-ended military integration process became an opportunity cost for security sector reform (SPLA Transformation) due to the rising personnel costs imposed by the government’s drive to ‘buy peace.’

Integration complicates issues of justice and accountability, and can be perceived as rewarding those who contributed to the conflict in the first place (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011; Dudouet, Giessmann, and Planta 2012). This is especially the case when former combatants may not be held accountable for past human rights violations and for essentially committing treason with their multiple rebellions against the state before they are ‘rewarded’ with material or financial benefits during the process of integrating into the military. In fact, efforts to bring members of armed groups to justice can also contribute to mistrust and potentially derail the integration process (Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011). In the case of South Sudan, neither the government nor the international community held the leaders of armed groups accountable for rebelling against the government or committing human rights violations. In fact, the absence of accountability has been cited as one of the weaknesses of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and this has contributed to perpetuating the cycle of impunity during the Interim Period, through South Sudan’s independence, and well into the civil war that broke out in 2013.
The outbreak of conflict in South Sudan reveals the dangers of constructing a security sector on an unstable foundation. The concept of military integration as a foundation of security sector reform during transitions from war to peace is relatively new, and Krebs and Licklider (2015) explain why this process is only now entering the contemporary discourse on security sector reform. The authors point out that security sector reform as a concept has not accounted for military integration due to the context in which SSR emerged. I would argue that, when applied to post-peace agreement environments such as South Sudan, this shift in how the concept of SSR has changed is important because the foundation (military integration) is often overlooked for both the government undertaking the SSR process as well as for third-party actors attempting to reform a country’s security sector in the aftermath of conflict. Later in this thesis, I argue that military integration in South Sudan should have been approached as a foundation of SPLA Transformation. The disconnect between integration and SPLA Transformation meant that both the SPLA and the international partners that committed to establishing South Sudan’s security sector did not approach integration as a foundation for broader security sector reform. Military integration in South Sudan was approached as an end in and of itself, rather than as a stage to implement en route to eventual security sector reform. This is contrary to how the process is characterized by Colletta and Muggah (2009) as an interim, transitional measure to temporarily contain former combatants so that they do not become spoilers during war-to-peace transitions. Integration is useful as a transitional measure to address short term security dilemmas, but as this case demonstrates that it is not designed to be an endstate for security forces during war-to-peace transitions.

Military integration provides an economic incentive to remain in the military (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008 and Jackson 2011), which is why integration and demobilisation should not be planned separately (Knight 2011). In South Sudan, the Juba Declaration preceded the implementation of the first phase of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration by at least two years. In the meantime, there were tens of thousands of former combatants integrated into the SPLA and the other organized services. Many of these were integrated on a continuous, or even repeated basis due to the proliferation of
armed groups, which counteracted efforts to rightsize the SPLA. In South Sudan, I argue that the failure of demobilisation initiatives to get off the ground, along with the open-ended nature of the military integration process, increased pressure on the integration process as a means by which to address the actual or latent threat of armed groups. This example highlights the need to link military integration and demobilisation initiatives, so that as a country is amalgamating armed groups into a statutory security force, it simultaneously has the means in place to off-ramp them if it is determined that the military needs to be rightsized. This particular dynamic between integration and demobilisation is not reflected in the existing literature.

Military integration tends to be implemented due to pressure from the international community (Hartzell 2014). Bilateral or multilateral third party actors can add confidence to fully implement the peace agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), verify compliance with the peace agreement (Walter 2002, Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, Burgess 2008), and compensate for gaps in knowledge or expertise (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012). The presence of third parties can also minimize the perceived risk of participating in the peace process (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012).

As will be detailed in Chapter 5, third-party actors such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Switzerland provided technical, financial, and logistical assistance to the process of defence sector transformation. However, none of these actors played a direct substantive role, either individually or as a collective, in the process of integrating armed groups into the SPLA, which included negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignments. Specifically, none of these third parties fulfilled the role as a neutral arbiter or provider of bridging training – that is, training specifically targeting the integrated forces to bring them up to the standard of the military into which they were integrating.

The United Nations Mission in Sudan was a guarantor of the CPA between Sudan and South Sudan, but was not explicitly intended to play this role within South Sudan. In fact, before the outbreak of conflict, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
was discredited as a guarantor of security due to armed group violence in Jonglei and its inability and perceived unwillingness to protect civilians. The inability of UNMISS and its predecessor UNMIS to prevent communal violence in Jonglei state and other parts of South Sudan may have contributed to the perception that the United Nations was not truly a guarantor of security between armed groups and the government in South Sudan. Regardless, the UN mission chaired a ceasefire Joint Military Commission to halt fighting between SAF- and SPLA-aligned contingents of the Joint Integrated Units in Malakal in November 2006. The United Nations Mission in Sudan was also a mediator during ceasefire negotiations with Gatluak Gai, and deployed forces in support of David Yau Yau’s integration in 2011. Additionally, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan witnessed the surrender of two armed group leaders and 200 of their men in Upper Nile in May 2012. UNMISS also transported members of armed groups to be integrated from remote areas to cantonment sites, assisted with screening and registering them, and supported the logistics of ceasefire negotiations between David Yau Yau and Murle leaders.

Within the literature on military integration there is some scepticism with regard to whether third parties can ensure the success of a military integration process. Trust between formerly warring parties should develop organically and cannot be forced from the outside by third parties (Berdal 1996). Furthermore, Burgess (2008) attributes failure to insufficient third party involvement, while Licklider (2014) argues that such involvement can be insufficient to guarantee success. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) and Walter (2002) question the balance of power among former combatants, and whether a third party would have sufficient power to punish violators of the peace agreement.

**Does Military Integration Work?**

The literature on the utility of military integration tends to be centred on the factors contribute to the successful implementation of a military integration process and whether the process can lead to sustainable peace. However, as military integration is implemented concurrent to other peacebuilding measures, it is difficult to isolate specific
effects in order to determine whether the integration process contributed to success or failure. Indeed, Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) question the utility of the term ‘military integration,’ referring to it as “a catch-all phrase that describes a wide array of policies, which work in very different ways and therefore can be expected to have different effects under different conditions.” Cautioning that failed integration is both a cause and a symptom of the failure of the broader peace process, the authors challenge the premise that military integration is an effective peace-building mechanism because many integration agreements are poorly structured and not fully implemented. Similarly, Krebs (2014) conceives of the failure of military integration as an important early indication that the peace process is in decline, but not as the fundamental cause of renewed violence.

While calling attention to the dearth of theoretical or empirical analysis as to what constitutes ‘good’ military integration, or under what conditions integration leads to beneficial post-conflict outcomes, Krebs and Licklider (2015) find no evidence of causality between military integration and an outcome of sustainable peace. For example, they argue that combatants who are already inclined to negotiate a settlement are also prepared to make costly concessions – therefore integration does not independently result in post-war stability. Rather than shaping the preferences and actions of former combatants, Krebs and Licklider claim that military integration simply

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339 Glassmyer and Sambanis, “Rebel—Military Integration and Civil War Termination.”


342 Ibid.
reflects the incentives confronting political actors. In another analysis, Krebs (2014) argues that military integration is the result of rather than the cause of peace.

On the contrary, based on 16 cases of military integration, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) argue that the successful implementation of the process within five years of the termination of a conflict increases the prospects for lasting peace. The authors argue that military integration may make renewed civil war less likely because it is a costly commitment that signals ‘conciliatory intent’ on the part of warring parties. This is attributed to the fact that warring parties are genuinely committed to peace, and are willing to absorb the high costs associated with compromising on power-sharing. Indeed, the implementation of military power-sharing agreements demonstrates a willingness to compromise the original war aims of the signatories, and withstand challenges from within their own groups.

Overall, the literature is inconclusive when it comes to whether or not military integration works. Based on the case of South Sudan, I would argue that there needs to be a temporal consideration of the process’ success or failure. Considering the outcome – the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, one may assume that military integration in South Sudan was unsuccessful. However, it is insufficient to cast blame on the integration process, as the outbreak of war was not sparked by the integration process, but rather by a political crisis. Between 2006 and 2010, military integration diminished the risk of armed conflict in the South. Integration thus worked for the period of time in which there was a strategic imperative to consolidate political-military power. In this sense, this thesis demonstrates that military integration can play a stabilizing role during war-to-peace transitions as a short-term, transitional measure. However, integration can also play a destabilizing role depending on the manner in which it is implemented and the military’s ability to transition out of this phase.

\[343\] Ibid.
\[344\] Krebs, “Military Dis-Integration: Canary in the Coal Mine?”
\[345\] Hoddie and Hartzell, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements.”
\[346\] Ibid.
In order to understand the role that integration played during South Sudan’s aborted transition from war to peace, I will examine the means and modalities of integration between 2006 and 2013 in Chapter 4. Then I will provide an overview of the concurrent defence sector reform process in Chapter 5 in which the SPLA was rightsizing and transforming into a conventional military, followed by an assessment of why the integration process disintegrated in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4: Integration

Introduction

By the time the CPA was signed, over 50,000 men were members of up to fifty armed groups that included rivals to the SPLA such as the South Sudan Defence Force and local self-defence militias.\(^{347}\) Referred to in the CPA as Other Armed Group, these groups had been excluded from the peace negotiations and posed a latent threat to CPA implementation in the South, including the goal of holding a referendum on self-determination in 2011.

Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army had been integrating other rebel groups operating in what was then Southern Sudan. This was especially necessary considering the legacy of factionalism covered in Chapter 2 – from competition between Anyanya II and the SPLA to the splintering of the SPLA after 1991, Khartoum’s support of non-SPLA armed groups to OAG exclusion from the CPA peace process, and the dispute between John Garang and Salva Kiir in Rumbek in the weeks before the CPA was signed, which highlighted the intra-SPLA divisions that would continue to plague the South. These divisions are the context for understanding why, when presented with the choice between fighting, ignoring, or accommodating armed groups, the government chose to accommodate armed groups during the Interim Period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This chapter further explores these rationales, demonstrates how the 2006 Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration formalized what would become the government’s ‘amnesty and integration’ approach to some armed rebellions, and presents empirical data on the military integration process in South Sudan between 2006 and 2013.

\(^{347}\) The estimates of the number of OAGs and their membership come from “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”; Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”
Background

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement established a six-year interim period, after which southern Sudan would have the opportunity to vote in a referendum in January 2011 to either remain united with Sudan or become the independent Republic of South Sudan. In accordance with the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements and Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices, armed groups outside of the SPLA and the SAF were prohibited from operating in Sudan. Accordingly, members of OAGs were offered the choice to either be incorporated into the security forces (i.e., Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife) of Sudan or Southern Sudan or be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions. Per the subsequent Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, parties to the peace agreement were to establish an OAGs Collaborative Committee within 15 days of the signing of the CPA to manage the integration process. In addition, within twelve months of the signing of the CPA – by January 2006 – all members of OAGs not aligned with the SPLA were expected to have demobilised or to have redeployed north to be integrated into the SAF.

After the CPA was signed, there were fears that if a deal were not reached between the SPLM/A and the OAGs, Khartoum would continue to support non-SPLA groups in the South, making the region ungovernable, and thus undermining the implementation of the peace agreement during the interim period of the CPA. Faced with both legal and practical imperatives to address non-SPLA armed groups, the Government of South Sudan could either attempt to fight them, accept that it did not possess a monopoly on the

348 “Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period”; “Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements: Implementation Modalities between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) during the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods.”
349 “Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period.”
350 “Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements: Implementation Modalities between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) during the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods.”
351 Ibid.
352 “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead.”
use of force in the South, or attempt to reach a political-military accommodation with them. The government largely chose to reach a political-military accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups, which involved absorbing or integrating them into the SPLA.

**Juba Declaration**

After the CPA was signed, South-South Dialogues were held in an attempt to rectify civil war-era divisions. During these dialogues, John Garang’s statements assured OAGs of a general and unconditional amnesty, necessary, he argued, to ensure implementation of the CPA and facilitate unity, peace, and stability. In the part of his speech where he discussed Principles for Integration of OAGs, he also vowed they would receive equal treatment with other SPLA forces, equal chances for participation in the SAF and SPLA’s Joint Integrated Units, participation in DDR, participation in training to take place both locally and abroad, recognition and harmonization of ranks, and absorption into the other organized forces and civil service. Although Garang had also stated the SPLM’s willingness to integrate the OAGs into the security sector and the civil service, or to allow them to participate in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program, the issue of accommodation between the SPLA and OAGs remained unresolved until Garang’s death in July 2005 – possibly due to divergences as to how integration would work in practice.

Relations between the SPLM/A and the SSDF showed marked improvement in the aftermath of Garang’s death as his successor, Salva Kiir, was more amenable to South-South dialogue. As president of Southern Sudan, Kiir prioritised finding ways in which the SSDF could buy into the CPA and later, as president of the independent Republic of South Sudan, became instrumental in accommodating former adversaries into the

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354 Ibid.

355 Ibid.

356 “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead.”
structures of the new post-CPA polity. Recognizing the threat that these armed groups posed to the stability of southern Sudan, Kiir negotiated a settlement with the SSDF, after which he issued the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration in January 2006. Its terms included an immediate cessation of hostilities; a declaration of amnesty to cover any criminal acts committed during previous periods of hostilities; the integration of the SPLA and the SSDF in the formation of a unified, non-partisan army; and an appeal to forces outside the SPLA and the SSDF to join the process of unity and reconciliation. The Juba Declaration formalized the SPLA’s ‘amnesty and integration’ approach to armed groups that had existed since the movement’s inception, and became the primary vehicle for political-military accommodation in South Sudan.

Many members of OAGs chose to integrate into the SPLA, swelling its ranks to between 140,000 and 200,000 soldiers – more than twice the size of a military that a future potentially independent South Sudan would need and could afford. Some remained part of the SAF, as was their prerogative per the CPA. Others, such as groups commanded by Matthew Puljang, Bapiny Monytuiel, James Gai Yuach, and Gatluak Gai, avoided integration into either the SPLA or the SAF and maintained open lines of communication with Khartoum, yet largely refrained from violence to avoid derailing the referendum that would determine whether Southern Sudan remained part of Sudan or became the independent Republic of South Sudan.

In line with the Juba Declaration, SSDF Chief of Staff Paulino Matip became deputy commander-in-chief of the SPLA until his death in August 2012. Other former armed group commanders also acquired prominent posts: Clement Wani (former commander of the Mundari forces) became the Governor of Central Equatoria, Ismail Konyi (former

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357 “Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan”; Young, The Fate of Sudan; “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead.”
358 “Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) And the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF).”
359 Hutton, “Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate during a Civil War.”
SSDF commander in Jonglei) became the Government of Southern Sudan’s Presidential Adviser on Peace and Reconciliation, and Sultan Abdel Bagi (former SSDF commander in Northern Bahr El Ghazal) became an adviser on border conflict resolution.361

At the outset of the process, there were questions regarding what the SPLA actually represented, and what kind of force armed groups were actually integrating into. When the Second Sudanese Civil War ended, the SPLA was a non-salaried volunteer army estimated to have between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers. In the months leading up to John Garang’s death in July 2005, some elements of the SPLA had started adopting conventional military formations, at least on paper, and were starting to possess the attributes of a national army.362 This was a transition from the SPLA’s modus operandi during the Second Sudanese Civil War, during which the SPLA had few standing military formations and would assemble ad hoc forces for each battle.363 By Garang’s design, the SPLA depended on his personal control from top to bottom.364 Seeking to prevent the emergence of cohesive, professional units that could potentially provide a base from which internal rivals could mobilize, he neutralized his military high command by maintaining complete control over weapons and supplies and dealing directly with select commanders.365 Garang thus retarded the development of military capacity and cohesion within the SPLA by resisting the development of institutions within the political-military spheres of the liberation movement.366 Consequently, the SPLA was quite factionalized at the outset of the integration process.

Article 151 (2) of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan stipulated that the Sudan People’s Liberation Army “…shall be transformed into the South Sudan Armed Forces, and shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, regular, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority as

361 “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan.”
363 De Waal and Mohammed, “Breakdown in South Sudan.”
364 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
365 De Waal and Mohammed, “Breakdown in South Sudan”; Young, “John Garang’s Legacy to the Peace Process, the SPLM/A & the South.”
366 Young, “John Garang’s Legacy to the Peace Process, the SPLM/A & the South.”
established under this Constitution and the law.”

Transformation from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army to the South Sudan Armed Forces would have signaled a clean break between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, originally the political wing of the armed guerrilla movement which became the country’s ruling political party, and the national military of the newly independent Republic of South Sudan.

Nonetheless, while the SPLM and the SPLA were supposed to be legally distinct as the independent Republic of South Sudan began to take shape, they maintained ‘enduring and structural links’ and were never completely disaggregated from one another. One reason is that the armed movement had always been dominant to the political wing since the founding of the liberation movement in 1983, which arguably led to the militarization of governance and politics in South Sudan. Another reason is that the party and the military had become synonymous due to the fact that the political leadership of the SPLM was comprised of many old guard military leaders. Finally, due to the lack of cohesion within the SPLA, parts of the military would identify with particular political leaders. As a result of all these factors, political factionalism was often expressed within the military – as demonstrated by the political crisis within the SPLM that led to the outbreak of the South Sudanese civil war in December 2013.

**Rationales behind military integration in South Sudan**

Between 2006 and 2010, the GoSS amnesty and integration policy that emerged from the Juba Declaration became the basis of internal stability in South Sudan, greatly diminishing the threat that OAGs posed as spoilers to the peace process. Indeed, like many OAGs, the South Sudan Defence Force had been excluded from the peace process, yet possessed the size, weapons, military capabilities and strategic locations to become

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368 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
369 Ibid.
370 von Habsburg-Lothringen, “Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan.”
371 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
372 Ibid.
spoilers, and may have controlled up to 20 per cent of the territory of South Sudan – including some of the areas vital to oil production.374

By allowing South Sudan to temporarily overcome its history of factionalism and ethnic conflict in order to consolidate political-military power, military integration contributed to a marked decline in insecurity during the Interim Period of the CPA.375 By some analyses, the Juba Declaration may have been of equal or even greater importance than the CPA itself in both averting a potential civil war in the South and ensuring that the region remained stable enough for the referendum on self-determination to be held, thus paving the way for South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011.376

During his independence day speech on July 9, 2011, President Kiir stated:

“It is my ardent belief that you are aware that our detractors have already written us off, even before the proclamation of our independence. They say we will slip in to civil war as soon as our flag is hoisted. They justify that by arguing that we are incapable of resolving our problems through dialogue. They charge that we are quick to revert to violence. They claim that our concept of democracy and freedom is faulty. It is incumbent upon us to prove them all wrong! On this note, I would like to again declare a public amnesty to all those who may have taken up arms for one reason or another to lay down those arms and come to join your brothers and sisters to build this new nation.”377

By reducing the manpower available for armed groups, the Government of South Sudan limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use its support of non-SPLA armed groups in the South to undermine CPA implementation by renting the allegiances

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374 Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan; Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”
375 De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan”; Young, The Fate of Sudan.
376 Young, The Fate of Sudan; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan.
of southern militias, thereby derailing the referendum on self-determination.\textsuperscript{378} Outbidding Khartoum to purchase the loyalties of armed groups in the South appeared to have been successful for some period of time, as members of Sudan’s ruling party had allegedly complained that they had been priced out of the market.\textsuperscript{379}

At the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Government of South Sudan needed to consolidate political-military power and create a more unified front in the South in preparation for the referendum on self-determination. While the CPA had secured peace between its signatories, the National Congress Party in the North and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in the South, it did not address divisions within the South that were tied to competitions over leadership of the southern rebellion, perceptions of ethnic marginalization between the Dinka and the Nuer, and personal animosities towards SPLM/A leader John Garang’s style of leadership. Moreover, there were tensions over the fact that Garang did not conceive of the SPLM/A as a separatist movement, but rather as a revolution aimed at transforming a united ‘New Sudan’ through the replacement of the ruling NCP (formerly the National Islamic Front) regime in Khartoum with a secular, democratically elected government. Furthermore, the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and non-SPLA armed groups, although never implemented nor granted regional or international legitimacy, served as a model for the CPA – especially its provision for a referendum on southern self-determination. Non-SPLA armed groups used their participation in the KPA as justification for why they deserved greater recognition during peace negotiations, seeing as the SPLM/A’s platform was for a united Sudan. Moreover, veterans of Anyanya II and SPLA splinter groups resented that they had been militarily defeated as secessionists by Garang’s unionist cause, which was subsequently abandoned once he died in July 2005.\textsuperscript{380}

Given the civil war-era divisions in the South, political-military accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups was a means by which to signal a genuine commitment to peace

\textsuperscript{378}“Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”; De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan.”

\textsuperscript{379}De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan.”

\textsuperscript{380}Young, \textit{The Fate of Sudan}. 
and a willingness to compromise. After Garang’s death, Kiir held a series of informal meetings with SSDF leadership in Khartoum in August 2005 to indicate his willingness to reach accommodation between the SSDF and the SPLM/A. He subsequently appointed several SSDF members as ministers, commissioners, members of regional assembly and state legislatures. By bringing OAGs into the governing structures of the South, the Government of South Sudan was allowing these armed groups an ‘insurance policy’ to help assuage fears about their role in the post-CPA South. Integrating them into the SPLA through the subsequent Juba Declaration offered them a mutually reinforcing power-sharing arrangement that was arguably necessary due to the exclusion of OAGs from the CPA negotiations. While the CPA was popular in the South, its protocols in fact stipulated the dissolution of OAGs, and these groups accordingly had to find a way to mitigate their isolation from the peace process, as they could not be perceived to be opposed to the long-awaited peace. Political power-sharing granted these groups a share of the new political dispensation in the South, while military integration made the forcible disarmament of OAGs an exception rather than the rule. Overall, the military integration process formalized by the Juba Declaration was a reasonable short-term approach to stabilisation and played a large role in preventing fissures within the southern rebellion from coming to the fore during the Interim Period.

Means and Modalities of Military Integration

When asked about the United Nations as a guarantor for the CPA, John Garang stated that the South’s only guarantee was organic:

“The fact that Southern Sudan will have its own separate army during the interim unity in addition to the integrated forces and other security forces, is the only fundamental guarantor and indeed the cornerstone for the survival of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”

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381 Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
384 Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road To Peace.
After the CPA was signed, there was to be a formal process of military integration between Sudan and southern Sudan during the Interim Period, the details of which had been explicitly stated in the CPA. Per the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements, equal numbers of Sudan Armed Forces and SPLA would comprise Joint Integrated Units with a total force strength of 39,000 soldiers during the interim period of the peace agreement. These JIUs were intended to demonstrate national unity and serve as a nucleus of a future national army should Southern Sudan vote for unity over independence in 2011. Parties to the peace agreement were also to establish a Joint Defence Board (JDB) under the Presidency of Sudan, comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the SAF and the SPLA, their deputies, and senior officers from both forces. The JDB was responsible for coordination between the SAF and the SPLA and for command of the JIUs. The subsequent Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices spelled out the command and control, composition and organization, training, and detailed deployment for the JIUs. In spite of the thorough means and modalities of military integration, JIUs were characterized more by their collocation than by their true integration, which was unsurprising given the expectation that Southern Sudan would vote for independence in 2011.\textsuperscript{385} Compared with the notional SAF/SPLA integration within the JIUs, the CPA did not articulate the means and modalities to drive and manage the process within southern Sudan.

The Juba Declaration, which formalized military integration in South Sudan, in theory articulated how the process would be implemented. The SSDF Chief of Staff, the late Paulino Matip would assume the figurehead post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA, and in consultation with Kiir as Commander-in-Chief, a High Political Committee would be created to oversee the implementation of the agreement. A Military Technical Committee was to be established, reporting to the High Political Committee, to handle the integration of the SSDF into the command structures and component units of the SPLA, harmonise ranks, deploy forces, and handle issues of demobilisation and downsizing in accordance with the provisions of the CPA. Finally, an Administrative and

Civil Service Committee was to be established to deal with the integration of the SSDF’s non-military personnel into national and state government.\textsuperscript{386}

Most amnesty and integration processes in South Sudan were initiated by the Office of the President and the Ministry for National Security, which made the political decision to offer amnesty to armed group commanders and negotiated the terms of integration deals.\textsuperscript{387} The currency of these negotiations took the form of military promotions, positions in government, cash, cars, houses, free accommodation during the integration period and promises of regular salaries once forces were integrated.\textsuperscript{388} The type of amnesty and integration package leaders of armed groups received was contingent on their specific ‘threat potential’, which could be understood in terms of a commander’s ability to secure external funding or to mobilise fighters.\textsuperscript{389}

Once amnesty and integration negotiations were finalised, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MoDVA) and the SPLA were instructed to integrate the agreed number of armed group members. Rather than submitting armed groups to the DDR process, the government preferred to integrate them into the SPLA in order to dilute their cohesion before deciding whether or not to include them in a larger pool of DDR candidates at a later date.\textsuperscript{390} This approach was based on the theory that integrated armed groups that were well absorbed within SPLA command and control would pose less of a threat if and when they were demobilised.\textsuperscript{391}

\textsuperscript{386} “Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) And the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF).”
\textsuperscript{387} Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 20, 2012; Author interview with South Sudan Ministry of Defence, Juba, South Sudan, August 30, 2012.
\textsuperscript{388} McEvoy and LeBrun, “Uncertain Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan”; Author interview with subject matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, South Sudan, August 25, 2012.
\textsuperscript{389} Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 20, 2012; Author interview with subject matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, South Sudan; Lacher, “South Sudan: International State-Building and Its Limits.”
\textsuperscript{390} Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 31, 2012.
Although the amnesty and integration process seemed straightforward, it had many moving pieces and potential points of failure, and there was no single part of the national government responsible for overseeing the entire process from inception to completion. Amnesty and integration negotiations could include stakeholders from SPLA commanders, government ministers, and members of state and local government – depending on their previous relationships with armed group commanders, the area in which the rebellion was taking place, or the particular grievance at hand. If too many stakeholders became involved, this led armed group leaders to attempt to increase the value of their integration package, further drawing out the negotiation process. Moreover, there were repeated instances in which an armed group commander would accept amnesty, but subsequently renege on the integration deal, possibly in order to recruit additional men and improve their negotiating position.

As there was no standing committee to manage South Sudan’s continual integration processes, each of the committees established for the integration of various armed groups may have been different in their execution of the process. Nonetheless, once negotiations with armed groups were concluded, the integration process generally had four stages:

First, the President issued a directive to the SPLA’s Chief of General Staff to convene a committee charged with integrating an armed group into the SPLA. Once the committee has been selected from the SPLA and the leadership of the integrating forces,

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392 Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 31, 2012; Author interview with subject matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, South Sudan.
393 Author interview with subject matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, South Sudan.
395 Author interview with senior SPLA officer E, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2014; Author interview with senior Ministry of Defence official A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan, August 19, 2014.
396 Author interview with senior Ministry of Defence official A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan, August 13, 2014; Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan, August 20, 2014; Author interview with senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan.
the President would sign off on its composition. The Chief of General Staff then issued guidance to the committee on how the integration process should be executed, including rank adjustments, age and education requirements for integration, the limits on the number of soldiers accepted into the SPLA and other organized forces, budget and logistics for the movement of forces, and where to send those deemed unfit for service. The committee itself would also begin to set out the budget and timelines for the integration process, as well as determine the screening requirements for integration into the SPLA.

Second, the leaders of the armed groups would submit lists of forces to be integrated into the SPLA, and the committee would visit assembly sites to verify the parades of integrating forces. During the integration process, the SPLA was responsible for housing and feeding armed groups as they awaited integration. While these forces did not receive salaries, some were apparently given money and other tokens to demonstrate that the government was committed to integration. Starting in 2011, the government decided to separate armed group leaders from their troops by bringing the former to Juba, as they believed that leaders would be less concerned about extracting benefits for their troops if they themselves were taken care of in the capital. In addition, while armed groups had previously remained in their home areas for the duration of the integration process, post-2011 integrations saw these forces transported out of their home areas to avoid agitation and also ensure that local non-combatants could not join the assembled armed groups in order to reap the benefits of the integration process.

397 Author interview with senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan, August 22, 2014; Author interview with senior SPLA officer F, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2014; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2014.
398 Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan.
399 Author interview with senior SPLA officer F, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan.
400 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan, August 15, 2014; Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer F, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan.
401 Author interview with senior SPLA officer E, Juba, South Sudan.
402 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan.
403 Ibid.
404 Author interview with senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan.
Third, the integration committee would interview members of the armed groups at their cantonment sites in order to determine their placements.\textsuperscript{405} Often, due to time constraints, only officers would be interviewed by the committee, while the remainder of the soldiers would just be checked for their physical fitness.\textsuperscript{406} Those interviewed were asked their preference for which organized service (SPLA, South Sudan Police Service, Prisons, or Fire Brigade) they wished to join, or whether they would like to become a part of the civil service or go through the DDR program.\textsuperscript{407} Due to the size restrictions of the organized services, sometimes they had to be persuaded to pursue one track over the others.\textsuperscript{408} The committee was then responsible for negotiating which of the integrating forces would be officers in the organized forces and which would not, but the ultimate decision was determined by the SPLA members of the committee.\textsuperscript{409} Due to the continuous cycle of integrations, after the initial round of post-Juba Declaration integrations, the criteria for rank assignment was changed so that it would account for integrating forces having the appropriate number of officers per formation.\textsuperscript{410} For example, the leader of an armed group integrating with 500 combatants would hypothetically be entitled to the rank of Colonel with a Leftenant Colonel as a deputy, while the leader of an armed group integrating with 3,000 combatants would be entitled to the rank of Brigadier General with a Colonel as a deputy.\textsuperscript{411} Yet in spite of the required officer-to-soldier ratios for integrating forces, the President could still alter rank allocations during the subsequent stage of integration.

\textsuperscript{405} Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{406} Author interview with senior SPLA officer F, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{407} Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer F, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{408} Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer F, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{409} Author interview with senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer E, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{410} Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{411} The SPLA believed that integrating forces should match the officer-to-soldier ratio of SPLA formations, in which a Squad (8ppl) is led by a Corporal, a Platoon (20ppl) has one Sergeant and is led by one 1st or 2nd Leftenant, a Company (80-150ppl) is led by a Captain and a Major, a Battalion (300-1300ppl) is led by a Colonel and a Leftenant Colonel, and a Brigade (3K-15K) has a Brigadier General with a Colonel as a deputy.
Finally, the integration committee would submit a list of recommendations to the SPLA Chief of General Staff with the integrating forces’ name, age, previous rank, education, training, proposed rank, and remarks on prospective assignments (i.e., infantry, signal corps, engineering corps, police force).\footnote{Author interview with senior SPLA officer E, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior Ministry of Defence official A, Juba, South Sudan.} For final approval, this integration report was then sent to the President, who would then make alterations to rank assignments if he saw fit, in an attempt to encourage the compliance of armed group leaders with the process.\footnote{Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan.} Then, the president would issue a decree announcing the outcomes of the integration to SPLA units.\footnote{Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan.} At this point, the committee’s work would be complete, and it would then fall to the SPLA Deputy Chiefs of General Staff for Administration, Training, and Operations to calculate the salaries of integrating forces, arrange their transport to training centres, and assign them for deployment across various SPLA Divisions.\footnote{Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan.} Although the work of the integration committee had been completed, the SPLA had no metrics to indicate when members of an armed group could be deemed ‘integrated,’ as opposed to simply being collocated with other SPLA troops.\footnote{Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan.} As a result, the military remained divided along ethnic and factional lines.\footnote{Author interview with former senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan.} Aside from the committees that were stood up to manage the integration of OAGs into the SPLA, there was an effort, started in 2006, to ‘mix’ SPLA forces so that they could

\footnote{Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan. Author interview with senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan. Licklider, \textit{New Armies from Old}. Licklider attempts to highlight some indicators of success/failure to watch, which include: military efficacy (the extent to which the new military can perform tasks or remain integrated in peacetime); whether the new military is subject to civilian control on budget and personnel issues, or when ordered into use against foreign adversaries or domestic opponents; and whether military integration makes the resumption of large-scale violence less likely. \footnote{\textit{Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile},” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (Small Arms Survey, November 2011), http://www.smallarms surveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-18-Armed-insurgencies-Greater-Upper-Nile.pdf.}}
eventually transcend regional and ethnic identities. The intent behind this initiative was to mix units from the squad level on up with forces from the three major regions of South Sudan (Bahr al Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile), so that there would be mixed divisions of troops from all over the country plus a support battalion with a tank unit, artillery unit, and engineering to complete the brigade. These newly mixed formations would then be sent for training and deployed on operations. Unfortunately, however, reorganization was unable to break the relationships between former rebel commanders and the fighters they once led.

The aforementioned tradeoffs the government made in order to buy peace in the immediate aftermath of the CPA were worthwhile, as military integration succeeded in averting large-scale conflict between the Government of South Sudan and the OAGs in the period that immediately followed the CPA. However, the flawed implementation of the integration process affected its success as a long-term stabilization measure, and eventually contributed to its disintegration in 2013.

### 2010-11 Rebellions

The amnesty and integration approach that emerged from the Juba Declaration provided an element of stability during the Interim Period. However, the Government of South Sudan’s response to the assortment of armed groups that proliferated in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei State after the April 2010 elections demonstrated its enduring commitment to use military integration to co-opt the armed opposition. Over time, this de facto open-ended approach to military integration would incentivize a cycle of defection-integration-defection. It would result, as detailed in Chapter 6, in increased pressure on

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418 Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official B, Juba, South Sudan, August 19, 2014.  
419 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan.  
420 Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official B, Juba, South Sudan.  
421 Author interview with senior SPLA officer D, Juba, South Sudan.  
422 Ibid.  
423 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan.
the military integration process and an opportunity cost for SPLA Transformation due to the increased cost of paying salaries.

The elections held in April 2010 were for the national Government of Sudan and the regional Government of Southern Sudan, and were part of the process of CPA implementation. In Southern Sudan, elections for the presidency, the legislative assembly, governorships and state assemblies could have been a means by which those excluded from the peace process, such as civil society and other political parties, could attempt to influence the shape of the potentially independent future state, albeit indirectly.424

However, during the candidate selection process that preceded the elections for the presidency, the legislative assembly, governorships and state assemblies, the SPLM was accused of handpicking unpopular parliamentary and gubernatorial candidates who had not been chosen by the people residing in various constituencies. In so doing, the SPLM Political Bureau damaged some of its relationships within the party.425 In response, over 300 individual members of the SPLM stood as independents against officially sanctioned SPLM candidates.426 During the elections themselves, there were also allegations of fraudulent and exclusionary practices, and of intimidation and vote-rigging.427 Although some independents, such as Angelina Teny, wife of then-Vice President Riek Machar, and Peter Adwok Nyaba had previously been threatened with expulsion from the party, they were compensated with government posts after their losses in the election.428

Focused on the referendum on self-determination in January 2011 and the possibility of southern independence six months hence, the international community was reluctant to criticize the conduct of the SPLM during the electoral process.429 Concerned that the

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424 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
425 “South Sudan’s Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-Conflict Prospects.”
426 Lacher, “South Sudan: International State-Building and Its Limits.”
427 “Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan”; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan.
429 “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile.”
conduct of the elections should not undermine the peace process, referendum, and possible independence of South Sudan, many donors turned a blind eye to the flawed electoral process.  

By the time South Sudan finally reached independence on July 9, 2011, there was a proliferation of armed groups operating in the Greater Upper Nile region. In sum, the rebellions that emerged after the elections were a function of the mismanagement of the political processes in South Sudan. Disenchanted with their exclusion from the new political dispensation and their lack of success at the ballot box, some concluded that armed violence was the only option for any disenfranchised group wishing to influence South Sudan’s system of governance. Following the election, at least three individuals subsequently began armed rebellions with grievances linked to the undemocratic method in which the SPLM handled the April 2010 elections – Lieutenant General George Athor, Colonel Gatluak Gai, and David Yau Yau.

Lieutenant General George Athor, a Dinka SPLA officer, had served as former Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Moral Orientation and commander of the 8th Division in Jonglei prior to resigning from the military so that he could stand in the 2010 elections as an independent candidate for governor of Jonglei state. The SPLM discouraged Athor’s candidacy and backed incumbent governor Kuol Manyang Juuk; after his electoral defeat, Athor began an insurrection. Prior to the January 2011 referendum, Athor signed a ceasefire agreement with the GoSS, but violated it once the referendum results were announced the following month. In May 2011, he proclaimed the creation of a South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) and claimed to command other militia leaders in other southern states, such as Peter Gadet, Gordon Kong, and Sultan Abdel al-Bagi.

Colonel Gatluak Gai, a Nuer SPLA officer, was in the Unity state prisons guard and had been expecting county commissioner post if independent candidate Angelina Teny had

\[430\] Young, *The Fate of Sudan*.
\[431\] “South Sudan’s Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-Conflict Prospects.”
\[432\] “Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan.”

David Yau Yau, a former a theology student from the Murle ethnic group, ran unsuccessfully as an independent candidate for the Gumuruk-Boma constituency in the state assembly in Jonglei. Despite his lack of prior military or militia experience, he led a rebellion in Pibor County in Jonglei between May 2010 and June 2011, and received weapons from Khartoum via George Athor. Aside from his election-related grievances, Yau Yau’s rebellion may have been motivated by internal Murle politics, or as he claimed, the underdevelopment and marginalization of Pibor County.\footnote{Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan,” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (Small Arms Survey, November 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB22-Pendulum-Swings.pdf.}

Peter Gadet also started a rebellion in 2011, but his motivations were not tied to political grievances, but rather to perceived ethnic marginalization within the SPLA and the associated lack of promotions. Gadet is a Nuer from Unity state who left the SPLA with Riek Machar during the 1991 split and eventually became key commander in Paulino Matip’s South Sudan Unity Movement/Army.\footnote{Rone, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights.} His forces mutinied against Matip in September 1999, allegedly over his disgust at intra-Nuer fighting while the Government of Sudan exploited oil in Nuer areas.\footnote{Ibid.} After rejoining the SPLA in 2000, he re-defected to the Khartoum-backed South Sudan Defence Forces in late 2002 over disagreements with the SPLA’s military discipline.\footnote{Ibid.} After the Juba Declaration, he became the SPLA’s Chief of Air Defence, which was the most senior former SSDF position in the SPLA aside from Paulino Matip, who was deputy Commander in Chief of the SPLA until his death in August 2012.\footnote{Young, The Fate of Sudan.}
Following a round of officer promotions and reshuffling in October 2010, it was clear that former SSDF were being marginalized and being removed from posts that required decision-making. Gadet became the Deputy Commander of the 3rd Division in Warrap State – a position he considered a demotion. Gadet claimed that there were two lists of SPLA officers: original members of the SPLA, who received regular promotions and had priority for training, and officers who had, at one point, defected and thus lacked the confidence of SPLA leadership and were not assigned positions of responsibility.

Accordingly, Gadet’s subsequent re-defection was motivated by the belief that he and other capable former SSDF commanders had been overlooked for promotion, while lower-ranking, primarily Dinka officers were given higher ranks and more influential posts. In April 2011, he issued the Mayom Declaration, in which he accused the government of corruption and nepotism, reneging on 2010 South-South Dialogue agreements, mismanagement of the SPLA and biases in its promotions, and exclusionary political practices. The Mayom Declaration also called for liberation from the unjust rule of the SPLM. Gadet then became the leader of the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A), an umbrella group of Nuer militias operating in Mayom county in Unity state.

Rhetoric aside, in many cases the primary goal of armed group leaders was to increase their own power within state institutions, rather than improving them for the betterment of their communities. The leaders of armed groups accordingly leveraged their threat potential to extract benefits from the state and increase the amount of patronage under their control, as well as increase their own personal wealth.

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439 Author interview with consultant on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2012.
440 “Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts”; “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile.”
441 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
444 “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile.”
These rebellions coincided with ongoing Dinka-Nuer-Murle communal violence in the Greater Upper Nile region, where small-arms proliferation, the availability of young male fighters, the inability of the government to provide security, and the security forces’ heavy-handed and uneven civilian disarmament campaigns fanned local grievances among ethnic groups and against the state. Unlike the armed movements led by the likes of Athor, Gai, Yau Yau, and Gadet, these groups tended to be ethnically defined local militias more concerned with the protection of their communities and property from rival ethnic groups than with attaining political power. Yet, boundaries between these groups were sometimes blurred, as this type of ethnicized armed group violence was at times directed by disgruntled politicians and military officers who were able to capitalise on the local grievances of ethnic militias or localised conflicts over resources (i.e., cattle, land, fishing/grazing rights) to gain manpower for their armed groups to further destabilise South Sudan. For example, Athor was able to lead a multi-ethnic coalition of armed groups across the country, including Lou Nuer youth, even though he was ethnic Dinka from Pigi county in Jonglei. Lou Nuer youth who received weapons and ammunition when they joined Athor’s rebellion in 2010 then joined White Army formations that attacked Murle-inhabited Pibor in December 2011. As during the civil war, the government in Khartoum provided these rebellions with funding, weapons, and logistical support.

In response to this proliferation of armed groups, President Kiir continued to extend amnesties to those taking up arms against the South Sudanese state, reiterating this in his speech marking South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011. By the end of 2011, the government was able to neutralize these armed groups through a combination of coercion

445 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
446 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan; Young, The Fate of Sudan; “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan”; Author interview with senior Ministry of Defence official, Juba, South Sudan, August 30, 2012.
448 Ibid.
449 “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile.”
and political-military accommodation: Having refused multiple government overtures to persuade him to return to the fold, George Athor was killed in an ambush in December. In February 2012, soldiers loyal to Athor signed a cease-fire with the government, and in March, the government signed an agreement to integrate approximately 1,800 SSDM/A forces into the SPLA.\(^451\) Gatluak Gai accepted Kiir’s independence day amnesty in July 2011 and agreed to sign a ceasefire and integration plan, but he was subsequently killed by one of his deputies under suspicious circumstances. Approximately 450 of his supporters were subsequently moved from Koch County, Unity State to an SPLA facility in Mapel, Western Bahr al-Ghazal State, presumably to be integrated.\(^452\) David Yau Yau accepted the government’s amnesty in mid-2011 and began to integrate approximately 200 of his forces in Pibor into the SPLA in Eastern Equatoria State.\(^453\) Peter Gadet returned to the SPLA in August 2011 with just under 1,000 soldiers that were relocated to SPLA barracks in Mapel in Western Bahr al-Ghazal by November. Some of his senior commanders notably refused to join the integration process, and the SSLM/A was led by James Gai Yoach, Kol Chara Nyang, Bapiny Monituel, and Matthew Puljang after Gadet’s departure.\(^454\)

**Conclusions**

In the context of southern factionalism and the exclusion of non-SPLA groups from the CPA negotiations, the military integration process formalized by the Juba Declaration was a reasonable short-term approach to ‘buy peace’ in the South. The government’s decision to pursue military integration is reflected in the themes discussed in the review of the literature in Chapter 3. First, integration demonstrated the Government of South Sudan’s conciliatory intent, and its commitment to work towards peace in the South (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003; Colletta, 2012). Referred to as Kiir’s ‘large tent’ policy, amnesty and integration was a form of patronage intended to demonstrate the nascent


\(^453\) Ibid.

state’s inclusivity, as well as prevent insurrections that would destabilize it. Second, integration offered non-SPLA armed groups an ‘insurance policy’ in case the peace process failed, and provided mutually reinforcing forms of political-military accommodation to consolidate power and create a more unified front in preparation for the referendum on self-determination (Walter, 2002; Møller and Cawthra, 2007; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2008, Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008). In so doing, the government made forcible disarmament of such groups the exception rather than the rule. Third, integration helped contain potential spoilers in a statutory security force, thereby reducing the manpower available for the Government of Sudan undermine CPA implementation in the South through its support to such groups (Berdal and Ucko, 2009; Colletta, 2012; Licklider, 2014). In sum, the Government of South Sudan chose political-military accommodation through military integration because fighting groups that held 20 per cent of the South’s territory and would be continually resupplied from Khartoum would have made the South ungovernable and could have thwarted the implementation of the CPA, including the referendum on self-determination. This is why, in this particular period of time, military integration was the ‘least bad’ option for the government to pursue when faced with the choice to fight, ignore, or seek political-military accommodation with armed groups.

Partly as a result of military integration, South Sudan was able to avoid full-scale civil war during the Interim Period by temporarily overcoming the wartime factionalism that was described in Chapter 2. Yet, the durability of the integration process proved vulnerable to the deterioration of the political atmosphere in South Sudan. The conduct of the ruling SPLM during the 2010 elections undermined the government’s claims to be committed to peace during the Interim Period, and negated integrated groups’ insurance policy against marginalization. As a result, some individuals who had been excluded from South Sudan’s new political dispensation resorted to armed violence. In addition, the concurrent marginalization of former OAG elements within the SPLA provided a justification for armed rebellion against the government during the 2010–2011 timeframe, and supplied armed group commanders with an ample supply of manpower.
Despite the government’s short-term successes, the underlying factors that perpetuated the cycle of armed group proliferation – namely legitimate political grievances, opportunism, and greed– remained, leaving the government’s approach to neutralising armed groups open to multiple vulnerabilities. For one, during this timeframe, military integration became de facto open-ended, which increased pressure on the military integration process – especially as rebel leaders became entrepreneurs of rebellion in response. Integration thus became an end in and of itself, rather than a transitional security mechanism that Colletta and Muggah (2009) argue can be a useful interim measure during war-to-peace transitions. The open-ended nature of the process also undermined efforts to reduce the parade of and professionalize the SPLA, which will both be discussed in Chapter 5. Continual integration undermined SPLA Transformation and cohesion so that the SPLA was never able to graduate from the integration process.

The apparent shortcomings of South Sudan’s attempts at political-military accommodation are critical points of departure for the massive and concurrent transformation of the country’s defence sector. The processes of rightsizing and professionalizing the SPLA and CPA-mandated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration will be discussed in Chapter 5, followed by an analysis of the disintegration of the military integration process in Chapter 6.
**Chapter 5: Transformation**

**Introduction**

In order to understand the role that military integration played in South Sudan’s transition from war to peace, we must understand the context in which integration was occurring. Concurrent to the process of bringing disparate groups under the banner of the SPLA as described in Chapter 4, the SPLA was undergoing a process of defence sector transformation. This transformation included two processes: reducing the parade of the military through Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, among other demobilization measures, and transforming the SPLA from a guerrilla force into a professional, conventional, and modern military. These processes were disjoined from the military integration process and aimed to build a new security sector upon an unstable confederation of armed groups into which additional armed groups were being continually integrated.

Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, this chapter offers an overview of South Sudan’s attempts to ‘rightsize’ the SPLA – finding a balance between military effectiveness and affordability in terms of force structure, composition, and size.\(^455\) This chapter covers the efforts to reduce the parade of the SPLA and the impediments that confronted such efforts. In so doing, it sets the stage for demonstrating how both the de facto open-ended nature of the integration process, as covered in the previous chapter, and failed efforts to rightsize the SPLA prevented demobilization initiatives from relieving the pressure on integration as the primary means by which to address the actual or latent threat of armed groups. Second, this chapter details the transformation of the SPLA, and gives an overview of the support that multiple security donors contributed to this process. In so doing, it highlights the fact that SPLA Transformation and the foreign assistance that supported the process did not specifically address the issue of the integration of armed groups into the SPLA. This chapter therefore illustrates how efforts to transform South Sudan’s security sector post-CPA were being built on an unsound foundation. In addition, this chapter illustrates how the continual influx of personnel and

\(^{455}\) Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond.”
the inability to off-ramp them into the civilian sphere meant that the SPLA’s resources were being spent on salaries for its personnel and not on transformation into a cohesive national military.

**Background**

After the CPA was signed and concurrent to the military integration process, South Sudan embarked on a defence transformation process that included rightsizing and transforming the SPLA. Although the primary mechanism through which the SPLA was to be rightsized was DDR, the Government of South Sudan also conceptualized Wounded Heroes, Pensions, and Civil Works Corps programs that were supposed to provide additional off-ramps for the SPLA’s excess manpower.\(^{456}\)

Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration was originally mandated by the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements / Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements. The United Nations Mission in Sudan supported South Sudan’s demobilization process during the Interim Period through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1590 (2005), which authorized the UN to assist in the establishment of a DDR program called for in the CPA. The original mandate for its post-independence successor, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, similarly called for the UN to support the development and implementation a DDR strategy under UNSC Resolution 1996 (2011).\(^{457}\)

According to the South Sudan Development Programme, 2011-2013, the opportunity cost of the oversized SPLA was the allocation of resources that could have been put towards the development of the new country.\(^{458}\) Intended by the donor community to reduce the cost that military expenditures imposed on the Government of South Sudan’s budget and allow the government to deliver a peace dividend to the population after decades of war, the optimal execution of the process could have provided sustainable livelihoods and

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\(^{456}\) Author interview with South Sudan DDR Commission, Juba, South Sudan, August 28, 2012.  
\(^{458}\) Government of the Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013.”
fractured the command and control of armed groups – all as a means of reducing the likelihood of a recurrence of armed conflict. According to the South Sudan DDR Commission, the South Sudanese military would eventually be able to “turn around its reputation as a ‘welfare army’ to being ‘fit-for-purpose’ in defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.”

Concurrent to the rightsizing process, the SPLA was to transform from an unpaid guerrilla army and establish conventional military organization and procedures, acquire formal military training, advice, and technical support, and establish a non-partisan military force subordinate to civilian authority. This transformation effort was done with the support of multiple foreign donors and under the assumption that the SPLA would either be merged with the Sudan Armed Forces or become the national military of an independent South Sudan at the end of the Interim Period. Accordingly, the intent behind SPLA transformation was for the SPLA to become professional, disciplined armed forces capable of providing a source of security for all the people of South Sudan, underpinned by a sustainable policy, institutional and legal framework enshrining the principles of civil control, accountability and transparency. The aforementioned rightsizing efforts thus bolstered the ongoing transformation process, as a military that was ‘adequate, affordable, and appropriate’ would be better suited to address the country’s internal and external threats, and play a new role as guarantors of peace in South Sudan.

One of the rationales behind defence sector transformation was for the SPLA to evolve from being a consumer of security to a force that contributed to the country’s security. During the Interim Period, over 80 per cent of defence spending was on salaries, and approximately one-third of the government budget was spent on the SPLA. (The latter

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460 UK Department for International Development, “Annual Review: Security Sector Development & Defence Transformation (SSDDT) Programme in South Sudan”; (Like Richard Rands in In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond, the definition of SPLA Transformation was derived from US and UK requests for proposals and periodic program reviews.)
462 Snowden, “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012”; Lacher, “South Sudan: International State-Building and Its Limits”; See also Africano Mande Gedima, “From a Guerrilla Force to a State Military: An Assessment of the Transformation of the Sudan People’s
Within the security sector, the size and the cost of the SPLA had operational implications, as the SPLA was unable to be proactive in the face of internal security challenges. Better tactical mobility could have allowed the SPLA to increase its presence throughout the country to respond to or deter violence, while better strategic mobility could have allowed the SPLA to deploy forces to sustain conventional operations while avoiding being spread too thin to be effective. Soldiers were poorly equipped, and the SPLA tended to deploy its forces to remote areas without sufficient supplies to sustain themselves. As a result of these operational challenges, the SPLA was at increased risk of preying on the communities it should have been protecting.

The government’s response to insecurity in Greater Upper Nile, particularly in Jonglei state, also illustrated the necessity for, and potential benefits of defence sector transformation. Local conflicts in South Sudan had been catalysed by cattle-raiding, small arms proliferation, perceptions of marginalization by the state, food insecurity, poverty, the breakdown of traditional authority structures during the war, lack of roads and basic infrastructure, conflicts over property, land, and water, inaccessible justice

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systems, and politicized ethnic identities.\(^{467}\) The government’s response to insecurity in Jonglei and other parts of South Sudan was a combination of local reconciliation and peacebuilding dialogues and voluntary/coercive disarmament campaigns. The SPLA, however, was either unable, or in some cases, unwilling to intervene in intercommunal violence, as they were not adequately prepared or equipped with the expertise or resources to conduct such operations successfully.\(^{468}\) Considering the lack of SPLA cohesion previously detailed in Chapter 4, the military’s array of ethnic and regional allegiances was also an impediment to its ability to intervene in communal conflicts. In fact, during previous instances of large-scale armed conflict in Jonglei state, the SPLA instructed local commanders not to intervene to stop the attacks. On one hand, the SPLA feared that armed civilians would have outnumbered and outgunned the security forces.\(^{469}\) On the other, there had also been fears that soldiers would join in the violence along ethnic lines if permitted to intervene.\(^{470}\) The SPLA’s inability to protect civilians from communal violence and respond to security threats encouraged citizens to take matters into their own hands, and caused local conflicts to escalate rapidly. Absent security guarantees that would extend SPLA protection to the population, the civilian population had few incentives to cooperate with the government’s disarmament campaigns, which perpetuated the cycle of violence in the country.\(^{471}\)

With all these factors in mind, defence sector transformation had the potential to allow for a reallocation of resources within the security sector – or even towards non-security sectors. Following the reduction of the SPLA parade, a more efficient allocation of resources within the security sector could have freed up funding to train a streamlined and professionalized force on human rights and civilian protection, and to improve the SPLA’s operational capabilities to respond to internal and external threats. Reduced defence expenditure could have also allowed the government to concentrate on building the capacity of civilian institutions to promote economic growth and development.

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\(^{468}\) Rands and LeRiche, “Security Responses in Jonglei State in the Aftermath of Inter-Ethnic Violence.”

\(^{469}\) Human Rights Watch, “No One to Intervene: Gaps in Civilian Protection in Southern Sudan.”

\(^{470}\) Ibid.

\(^{471}\) Lacher, “South Sudan: International State-Building and Its Limits.”
Nonetheless, the financial burdens associated with the SPLA’s ever-ballooning parade presented an opportunity cost for these efforts.

**Initiatives to Rightsize the SPLA**

The actual parade of the SPLA has been subject to varied and unconfirmed estimates, but was believed to be in excess of 200,000 by the time the civil war broke out in 2013. After the international community rejected the SPLA’s declared parade of up to 300,000 troops following the integration of several thousand armed group personnel in 2005-2006, the military’s actual force strength was estimated as being no more than 40,000 troops.\(^\text{472}\) The SPLA eventually settled on an estimated parade of 90,000, yet by 2011, the parade of the SPLA was estimated to be approximately 200,000.\(^\text{473}\) The SPLA expanded to a payroll of between 210,000 and 240,000 soldiers in 2011, with an additional 90,000 in the other organized services.\(^\text{474}\) However, an internal SPLA audit at one point detected a minimum of 40,000 ghost soldiers out of whatever the exact parade of the force was at that time.\(^\text{475}\)

The Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) started in 2006 and was replaced by the Multi-Year DDR Programme (MYDDR), which was to run from January 2009 to June 2012 and target 90,000 ex-combatants.\(^\text{476}\) The DDR programme offered financial incentives, such as reinsertion grants and food ration vouchers, and participants were allowed to choose from a range of vocational training activities such as small business management, mechanics, agriculture and livestock management, as well as adult education, including

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\(^\text{473}\) Snowden, “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012.”


\(^\text{475}\) Snowden, “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012”; Author interview with consultant on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2012.

\(^\text{476}\) Rand’s, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond.”
literacy training. However, the first phase of DDR in South Sudan was largely regarded as a failure, as only 12,525 of the SPLA’s original caseload entered the program. Most of these were Special Needs Groups (SNGs) that consisted of the elderly, the disabled, and women and children associated with the armed forces.

With an ambitious caseload of 150,000 people (80,000 from the SPLA and 70,000 from the other organized services), the South Sudan DDR Commission developed the National DDR Program (NDDRP), which was to be implemented between 2012 and 2020. From the standpoint of the SPLA’s Transformation Programme 2012-2017 which required a reduction in force of approximately 80,000 personnel by the year 2017, surplus manpower was to be funneled into the DDR program, and the SPLA’s Administration Branch was to help develop DDR selection criteria, articulate management procedures, and establish initial lists of personnel selected for DDR.

Starting in April 2012, the second phase of DDR was supposed to have a pilot of 4,500 former combatants across ten training centres, which was subsequently scaled down to a pilot of 500 people at a transitional facility in Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal state. Between April and September 2012, approximately 290 former combatants out of the target caseload of 500 were demobilized, verified and registered at the facility. The government committed to paying the salaries of former combatants for up to 12 months after demobilization; reintegration would include three months of training, the teaching of

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477 Author interview with South Sudan DDR Commission, Juba, South Sudan; Munive, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan: The Limits of Conventional Peace and Security Templates.”
478 Nichols, “DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late?”
479 Ibid.
literacy, numeracy, and life skills, and psychosocial support. 483 Meanwhile, UNMISS support enabled the construction of three DDR centres in Mapel (Western Bahr el-Ghazal State), Torit (Eastern Equatoria State) and Pariak (Jonglei State) as well as the construction of ten national DDR offices for training and outreach. 484 The transition facilities were to be capable of handling caseloads of up to 500 ex-combatants each at any one time over a three–month period. 485

While the majority of the SPLA’s surplus manpower was to go through the DDR process, some was channelled towards the Other Organized Forces, such as the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS), Prisons, Fire Brigade, and Wildlife. In addition, some of the SPLA’s non-essential forces could have gone through nascent initiatives such as the Wounded Heroes Program, Pensions programs, and Civil Works Corps.

In 2006, the SPLA established a Wounded Heroes program to care for soldiers who had sustained injuries during the civil war and were no longer on active duty. 486 The program covered between 20,000 and 30,000 former combatants living in 18 assembly areas throughout South Sudan; 487 some were above the statutory age for service and others were simply unfit for military service. 488 Not only were those deemed Wounded Heroes likely to refuse to enter the DDR program, but the SPLA would not put them through the initial attempt at DDR as it did not provide sufficient rewards considering their contributions to the liberation struggle. 489 After independence, the Government of South Sudan attempted to fine-tune the Wounded Heroes program so that it would cease being a dumping ground for able-bodied personnel deemed non-essential to the military. 490

483 Munive, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan: The Limits of Conventional Peace and Security Templates.”
484 Hutton, “Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate during a Civil War.”
485 Munive, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan: The Limits of Conventional Peace and Security Templates.”
486 Stone, “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.”
487 Ibid.
488 Author interview with consultants on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, September 1, 2012.
489 Stone, “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.”
490 Author interview with consultants on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
The government also considered the establishment of pensions programs to gradually age out soldiers of retirement age. In recognition of their service and sacrifice during the liberation struggle, the National Freedom Gratuity Fund offered a one-off payment to SPLA generals who had not been channelled through the DDR program.\(^{491}\) In addition, under the proposed National Military Pension Fund, all members of the SPLA would receive pensions based on their service since the CPA was signed (January 9, 2005), when the SPLA transitioned from a voluntary, non-salaried liberation group.\(^{492}\) These programs were to be designed to pay for themselves. For example, soldiers would contribute 8 per cent of their salaries and the government would contribute 17 per cent, and the soldier would receive 65 per cent of their active duty SPLA salary when they left the military.\(^{493}\) However, implementation was held up by the need for an actuarial valuation to determine the affordability and sustainability of these programs, which would have been determined by the actual size of the SPLA, and the health and projected retirement ages of active duty soldiers.\(^{494}\)

Finally, the Government of South Sudan considered the creation of Civil Works Corps so that the military’s excess manpower could contribute to the development of the country’s infrastructure. This concept was predicated upon the need to shift away from the traditional one-time DDR reinsertion package, towards a more sustainable support program for former combatants. Under this hypothetical program, 50,000 able-bodied former combatants were to be trained in specialized, income-generating skills such as agriculture, carpentry, construction, livestock management, mining, petroleum, plumbing, and river dredging.\(^{495}\)


\(^{492}\) Ibid.

\(^{493}\) Author interview with consultants on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.

\(^{494}\) Ibid.

SPLA Transformation

Rightsizing initiatives such as DDR, Civil Works Corps, Wounded Heroes, and pensions programs were intended to run parallel to and be closely coordinated with the execution of SPLA Transformation. Collectively, these programs were to be key enablers for transforming the SPLA from a guerrilla army to a professional, conventional, and non-partisan force, as the presence of non-essential personnel was not only a constraint on the force’s operational capabilities but also a drain on its resources. Transformation, therefore, was contingent on the SPLA’s ability to undertake a sizeable reduction in force, as well as on the absence of major conflict with Sudan, and South Sudan’s ability to recover from the impact of the austerity budgets of 2012, which was a result of the oil pipeline transit fee dispute between Sudan and South Sudan.

Written in anticipation of the military’s strategic post-independence challenges, the *SPLA White Paper on Defence* was published in 2008. The White Paper articulated the need for the SPLA to transform from a guerrilla force into a professional, conventional, modern military, whilst consuming a declining proportion of the national budget expenditure over time. In 2011, the SPLA Chief of General Staff signed additional strategic guidance, *Objective Force 2017* and the *Transformation Programme 2012-2017*, which were also linked to the 2008 SPLA White Paper, SPLA Act, Transitional National Constitution, National Security Strategy, and Military Strategy.

The purpose behind *Objective Force 2017* and the *Transformation Programme 2012-2017* was to guide the development of the SPLA between 2012 and 2017, inform national security/defence policy implementation, help prioritize and provide a framework for security assistance to be provided by foreign donors, and monitor the development,

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497 Ibid.
progress, and implementation of transformation programs.\textsuperscript{499} \textit{Objective Force 2017} described the overall operational capability of the force desired in 2017, including structure, size and processes (command and control, management, training, sustainability and readiness). The \textit{Transformation Programme 2012-2017} laid out a coordinated and sequenced programme with timescales and costs to transform the SPLA from its post-CPA form into the ‘Objective Force’ by the year 2017.

SPLA Transformation thus involved four major activities: enhancing operational capabilities, education and training of SPLA personnel, improving SPLA values and standards, and rightsizing the parade of the SPLA to 120,000, per the force requirements articulated in these documents.\textsuperscript{500} Phase I (2012) was Preparation, in which command and control structures, facilities, capabilities, and resource requirements for implementation would be set up.\textsuperscript{501} Phase II (2013-2017) was to be Implementation, in which transformation would be implemented through the concurrent and coordinated management of the core (i.e, sector command headquarters, infantry forces, mechanized force, logistics, soldiers’ education, rightsizing, and air defence) and supporting (i.e., general headquarters transformation, combat support including armour, artillery, antitank, engineering, signals, medical, training, administration, moral orientation, inspectorate, Commando Brigade, air force, strategic reserves forces, and military police) programs.\textsuperscript{502}

Included in the \textit{Transformation Programme 2012-2017} were plans to establish a mechanized division and logistics brigade, a Junior Staff College in Malou, a sector headquarters in Mapel, Lainya Logistic Training Centre, and a Military Academy in Owinykibul.\textsuperscript{503} Also included were plans to develop medical facilities and capacity, hold basic Commando training in New Kush, improve management and control of the SPLA budget, and remove non-effective personnel from operational units. As part of SPLA

\textsuperscript{499} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{501} Emmanuel, “SPLA Transformation Strategy Overview 2012-2017.”
\textsuperscript{502} Ibid.
Transformation, Training and Advisory teams were to be embedded in the Sector and Division headquarters throughout the Transformation program in order to provide on-the-job training and advice to headquarters staffs.\textsuperscript{504}

Having recognized the need to develop a cohesive military with national character, the SPLA sought to transform infantry battalions through a standardized ‘Reset’ program of instruction at one of three training centres in each of South Sudan’s regions: Sector 1: Mapel (Bahr al-Ghazal), Sector 2: Pariak (Greater Upper Nile), and Sector 3: Owinykibul (Equatoria).\textsuperscript{505} Through this Reset, SPLA units would be screened during the course of three to five months to ensure soldiers were fit for service and be oriented with the SPLA Act, Rules and Regulations, and the Rule of Law, thereby addressing the military’s ballooning parade and enhancing its warfighting capabilities. The Reset plan\textsuperscript{506} laid out three potential courses of action: Under the first, there was to be one brigade (~3,000 soldiers) in each of the country’s three sectors, with two rotations per year over the course of five years. Under the second course of action, there would be two battalions (~1,500 soldiers) in each of the country’s three sectors, with two rotations per year over the course of ten years. Under the third course of action, there would be one battalion (~750 soldiers) in each of the country’s three sectors, with two rotations per year over the course of twenty years. When the civil war broke out in December 2013, plans were being finalized as to which course of action the SPLA would follow in its efforts to ‘reset’ the force.

**Foreign Assistance to South Sudan’s Security Sector**

Prior to 2007, there was a gap in donor support to and engagement with South Sudan’s security sector, and many decisions had already been made, which set the course for the scope of foreign engagement after this time period.\textsuperscript{507} By this point, the post-Juba

\textsuperscript{504} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{505} “Reset Courses of Action, Information Briefing for SPLA Command Council” (SPLA Headquarters, October 28, 2013).
\textsuperscript{506} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{507} Bennett et al., “Aiding the Peace: A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005–2010”; Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
Declaration integrations were already underway, which may explain why foreign assistance was not specifically directed to support the military integration process. Alternatively, it is possible that the South Sudanese and the international community saw integration as a purely internal military affair, thus believing that the process did not warrant external financial, technical, or logistical assistance.508

After 2007, the leading contributors to developing the South Sudanese security sector were the United States, United Kingdom, and Switzerland, in addition to the UN missions.509 All of these third-party actors focused on aspects of SPLA Transformation, but none included specific provisions for support to the aforementioned stages of the military integration process (negotiation, cantonment and parade verification, fitness screening, and rank and division assignment).

Role of United States

The United States provided the majority of support to the SPLA’s transformation process. While it was governed by Sudan, which was under U.S. sanctions, assistance to South Sudan’s security sector was done under a presidential waiver.510 Military assistance was thus non-lethal, and focused on military education and training. For example, in 2009, SPLA officers commenced professional military education in the United States.511 The United States also facilitated command staff training, sought to train Non-Commissioned Officers through a ‘train-the-trainer’ approach, and provided assistance with power generation, vehicles and communications equipment, and the construction and renovation of infrastructure including SPLA Headquarters, some divisional headquarters and training

508 Author interview with Ministry of National Security official, Juba, South Sudan, August 22, 2014.
509 Author interview with consultant D on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2014; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan.
facilities, the infantry training school, and assembly points.\textsuperscript{512} The United States also advised the SPLA in the development of Objective Force 2017 and the Transformation Programme 2012-2017, as well as the aforementioned conceptualization for the ‘Reset’ training that was derailed by the outbreak of conflict in December 2013.

Since 2008, the United States had a Ministry Advisory Training Team (MATT) in South Sudan, through which State Department-funded contractors provided training and mentorship to the staff and leadership of the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs and the SPLA at the operational and tactical levels.\textsuperscript{513} The goal of the MATT program was to enhance the overall effectiveness of the Ministry of Defence staff and leadership to effectively manage the transformation of the guerrilla SPLA into a conventional military operating under the Ministry as the civilian authority within the government, and address fundamental weaknesses in extant staff procedures and planning efforts.\textsuperscript{514} While embedded in the Ministry, the MATT provided support in the areas of strategic defence planning, personnel readiness and force planning, financial management, veterans affairs, military production, acquisition, procurement, and logistics, public affairs, and inspections.\textsuperscript{515}

\textbf{Role of United Kingdom}

There was some overlap between the assistance the United States offered to the SPLA and that offered by the United Kingdom. Both the United States and the United Kingdom


\textsuperscript{513} Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond.”

\textsuperscript{514} “Statement of Work: South Sudan Armed Forces Transformation Capacity Building of the Ministry of Defense Ministry Advisory Training Team (MATT)” (Department of State Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and Bureau of African Affairs, August 4, 2011), https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=af72af5a2970cf7cd6777c92d6d0bb4b&tab=core&cvview=1.

\textsuperscript{515} Ibid.
provided assistance in the drafting of the Defence White Paper and SPLA Act.\textsuperscript{516} Training offered by both countries was in basic command and staff skills, internal security, counterinsurgency, close protection, and medical and communications skills.\textsuperscript{517} However, the UK acknowledged that it had fewer resources available to support defence transformation in comparison with the United States, and accordingly opted to focus on the development of human capital at the strategic level, rather than focusing on implementation at the operational and tactical levels like the United States.\textsuperscript{518}

The UK began working with the SPLA from late 2006 through 2007 during a series of consultations on the SPLA White Paper on Defence, which led to a broader program of support for SPLA Transformation.\textsuperscript{519} The goal of the subsequent Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation Programme (SSDDTP) was to provide support to the SPLA Transformation process and support the development of broader South Sudanese government security decision-making structures and relevant oversight institutions.\textsuperscript{520} Between February/March 2009 and December 2012, the SSDDTP provided advisory support to the development of the Government of South Sudan’s security decision-making architecture, and helped improve the linkages between the Ministry of SPLA Affairs/Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs and the SPLA and the demarcation of the financial responsibilities between these entities. The SSDDTP also focused on improving SPLA command and control structures; training strategy and policy; logistics management, asset management, human resource administration; the development of information management systems; internal communications and civil

\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.
education; and monitoring, evaluation and reporting.\textsuperscript{521} The Security and Defence Transformation Programme (SDTP) was the successor to the SSDDTP, and was to run from May 2013 until October 2015, until it was cancelled in April 2014 due to the outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war.\textsuperscript{522} The SDTP was to focus on strengthening civilian oversight of the military and making it more accountable, as well as on defence transformation and the development of a National Security Policy architecture.\textsuperscript{523}

**Role of Switzerland**

The Government of Switzerland’s relatively smaller Security Sector Reform Project focused improving discipline and respect for human rights through the dissemination and implementation of codes of conduct and support to the military justice system.\textsuperscript{524} The project, which commenced in March 2008 and ran until 2012, involved a small team from the Swiss Armed Forces working on promoting and implementing international norms and democratic control of armed forces, transferring knowledge in International Humanitarian Law/Law of Armed Conflict, improving the reliability of and rule of law within the SPLA, and providing advice for the development of the Dr. Garang Memorial Military Academy.\textsuperscript{525}

**Role of UNMIS/UNMISS**

As previously detailed in this chapter, the United Nations Mission in Sudan had a mandate that included assisting in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program called for in the CPA.\textsuperscript{526} After South Sudan’s independence, UNMIS, which had also included assistance towards rule of law, police, prisons, and


\textsuperscript{522} Phase II was slated to end in December 2015 before the conflict broke out in December 2013.


\textsuperscript{525} “Interim Review: Swiss Armed Forces - Southern Sudan Security Sector Reform Project: Recommendations on the Scope and the Design of Future Activities.”

\textsuperscript{526} “UNMIS Mandate.”
judiciary, transitioned to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. The mandate of UNMISS included supporting the Government of South Sudan in peace consolidation, assisting it in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and the protection of civilians, helping the authorities develop the capacity to provide security, establishing the rule of law, and strengthening the security and justice sectors in the country.

In spite of the social and political importance of the SPLA in South Sudan, neither UNMIS nor UNMISS was mandated to support SPLA Transformation, aside from the development of a military justice system, which contributed to improving the SPLA’s values and standards. The Rule of Law and Security Institutions Support Office (ROLSISO) under UNMISS was comprised of the Justice Advisory, Military Justice Advisory, Corrections Advisory, and Security Sector Reform sections, which were responsible for working with the South Sudanese government and other national/international partners to reform the police, justice, corrections, and military sectors. UNMISS provided training for SPLA Military Police on investigations, arrests, search and seizure procedures, and prison management and provided technical support to the SPLA’s Directorate of Military Justice on the review of the SPLA Act and its regulations. In addition, UNMISS focused on capacity-building within the SPLA’s Directorate of Military Justice and the Military Police to strengthen their coordination mechanisms. The UN also trained the SPLA on the marking, registration and physical security of small arms and also trained junior and mid-level SPLA officers issues such as accountability mechanisms, international humanitarian law, human rights, and children in

528 “UNMISS Mandate.”
529 Hutton, “Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate during a Civil War”; Rands and LeRiche, “Security Responses in Jonglei State in the Aftermath of Inter-Ethnic Violence.”
armed conflict.\textsuperscript{533} UNMISS collaborated with the African Union, Norway, and the United Kingdom, to provide technical training and logistical support to the government’s national consultations on a draft National Security Policy.\textsuperscript{534} Through capacity-building and training, the UN’s Security Sector Reform section supported the governance and oversight of South Sudan’s security sector and supported the government in reforming the national security institutions and policy by advising at the ministerial level.\textsuperscript{535}

**Transformation Impediments**

Efforts to rightsize the SPLA should have reduced the cost the SPLA imposed on South Sudan’s budget and allowed the SPLA to focus on transformation. However, efforts to demobilise ex-combatants and reform the security sector fell victim to several impediments.

In South Sudan, the implementation of DDR programs was inhibited by disagreements with the donor community over the objectives and modalities of such programs, as well as over ownership of the process.\textsuperscript{536} Specifically, across the donors, DDR planners and implementers (UNMIS/S, the UN Development Program, and the South Sudan DDR Commission), the Government of South Sudan and the SPLA, there had been indications that these stakeholders had different needs, priorities, and commitments.\textsuperscript{537} These stakeholders viewed the process as a means to different ends, from improving security and socioeconomic conditions to reducing the amount of money the country spent on SPLA salaries.\textsuperscript{538} Moreover, there were concerns that DDR ‘best practices’ from other programs were being prioritized when the reality was that these may have been inapplicable to the post-CPA context of South Sudan, given the SPLA’s sense of

\textsuperscript{536} “DDR in South Sudan”; Munive, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan: The Limits of Conventional Peace and Security Templates.”  
\textsuperscript{537} Hutton, “Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate during a Civil War”; Snowden, “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012.”  
responsibility for its soldiers – many of whom fought for the liberation of the South for over two decades.\textsuperscript{539} Due to the failure of DDR stakeholders to transcend these disagreements, the program suffered from inertia, bureaucratic mismanagement, poor coordination and disagreements within the donor community and implementing partners over the shape and outcomes of future DDR programs, a lack of capacity to plan and implement the process, and reluctant financial support from the donor community.\textsuperscript{540} Implementation challenges were arguably exacerbated by the Government of South Sudan’s austerity measures following its January 2012 decision to cease oil production over a dispute with Sudan regarding oil pipeline transit fees.\textsuperscript{541} These measures complicated the government’s ability to finance its other demobilization initiatives, compounded the shortage of economic alternatives to remaining in the SPLA, and may have contributed to the lack of buy-in on the part of the government and SPLA.

Because the DDR process was donor-driven, the government had little ownership of or buy-in to the process.\textsuperscript{542} In spite of the military’s understanding that a reduction in force was a key enabler for SPLA Transformation, the Government of South Sudan and the SPLA were arguably the biggest obstacles to the implementation of DDR programs.\textsuperscript{543} Indeed, Government of South Sudan’s rhetoric often failed to match its actions.\textsuperscript{544} On a very practical level, the Government of South Sudan was concerned about the social and political implications of significant reductions in force, concerned that former combatants would not receive sufficient reintegration benefits to neutralize their threat potential.\textsuperscript{545}

\textsuperscript{539} Stone, “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.”
\textsuperscript{541} Munive, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan: The Limits of Conventional Peace and Security Templates.”
\textsuperscript{542} Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 20, 2012; “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
\textsuperscript{543} “Project Completion Review: Security Sector Development & Defence Transformation (SSDTP) Programme in South Sudan [GB-1-200329].”
\textsuperscript{544} “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
The ideal time to reduce the parade of the SPLA through DDR would have been before the Government of South Sudan’s 2006 decision to start paying the SPLA salaries. For many soldiers, the post-CPA SPLA was the first time they had ever received regular salaries, and large numbers of extended family depended on this income.\textsuperscript{546} For many former combatants who had spent their lives fighting in the war, staying in or integrating into the SPLA was the safest option, considering the lack of alternative livelihoods available in South Sudan in light of a damaged agricultural sector and a virtually non-existent private sector.\textsuperscript{547} There was no pension scheme in place, and reintegration benefits were never able to compete economically with the salaries former combatants would receive from remaining in the employment of the SPLA or of the other organized services. While the one-time DDR reinsertion grant was the equivalent of $360 USD, the South Sudan Legislative Assembly voted to double the SPLA’s salaries to $150 per month shortly after the Juba Declaration, and later raised it to $220 per month by the time of the 2011 referendum.\textsuperscript{548} Both pay raises were to prevent the Government of Sudan from using southern militias to disrupt the referendum on self-determination. After the referendum, the SPLA’s pay ranged between $300 and $500 per month.\textsuperscript{549} The decision to transform the SPLA into a salaried military reduced the financial incentives for former combatants to demobilize and face seriously limited employment prospects outside of the military.\textsuperscript{550}

After decades of marginalization and conflict, South Sudan’s underdeveloped and undiversified economy had limited absorptive capacity for former combatants, and did not provide alternative livelihoods that could absorb the soldiers that the SPLA needed to demobilise. Consequently, there was a fear that soldiers were being reintegrated into poverty, and that the government and the donor community had not managed


\textsuperscript{547} Saskia Baas, From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan.


\textsuperscript{550} Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan; Stone, “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.”
expectations vis-à-vis civilian life as an alternative to the SPLA.\textsuperscript{551} Former combatants were reluctant to forego relatively reliable salaries for the economic uncertainties of civilian life.\textsuperscript{552} Soldiers being demobilized from the SPLA had to overcome not only their limited skill profiles, but also the country’s low economic base and limited capacity to absorb their labour.\textsuperscript{553} This economic reality made demobilization a huge political risk – especially when it came to angering the SPLA’s core fighters if they were forced to demobilize.\textsuperscript{554} Thus, wary that unemployed ex-combatants would contribute to insecurity, the SPLA ensured greater security by retaining and paying soldiers instead of forcibly ejecting them, as there were not viable livelihoods for the tens of thousands of former combatants in need of civilian employment options.\textsuperscript{555} In the context of what was described as a ‘very weak economy and very strong SPLA,’ having the SPLA continue to pay soldiers as they were gradually reintegrated into civilian life may have been pragmatic and responsive to local demands.\textsuperscript{556} In some cases, however, some soldiers would have to be pushed into the DDR process, since the prospects for earning a living outside the SPLA as an uneducated former combatant were bleak.\textsuperscript{557}

Another impediment to the implementation of DDR in South Sudan was that there was a sense that the CPA was merely a ceasefire, and there was substantial uncertainty as to whether Sudan would actually allow South Sudan to hold the referendum on self-determination called for in the CPA. During both the Interim Period and during border skirmishes with Sudan in 2012, the fear that the SPLA would need to draw upon excess manpower to defend the South decreased the incentive for the military to take the DDR program seriously.\textsuperscript{558} This sense of insecurity was exacerbated by post-2011 allegations that South Sudan was providing support to SPLM/A-North in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile state across the border in Sudan, and counter-allegations that the Government

\textsuperscript{551} Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 31, 2012.
\textsuperscript{552} Stone, “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.”
\textsuperscript{553} Munive, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan: The Limits of Conventional Peace and Security Templates.”
\textsuperscript{554} Stone, “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.”
\textsuperscript{555} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{556} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{557} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{558} “DDR in South Sudan”; Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond.”
of Sudan was providing support to armed groups operating in the Greater Upper Nile region of South Sudan.

In addition, so long as true victory – independence from Sudan – had not yet been achieved, and the SPLA was still considered to be the guarantor of South Sudanese sovereignty, reducing the size of the SPLA could not be a serious prospect.\(^{559}\) As a result, senior officers had no significant commitment to DDR, as they wished to avoid losing valuable manpower during the pre-referendum period.\(^{560}\) Indeed, in hindsight, it was widely agreed that, while its future with Sudan still hung in the balance, the SPLM/A was not ready for the first phase of DDR.\(^{561}\) This was evident in the more active and leading roles the South Sudanese government and security forces played during the post-independence DDR planning, motivated by an economic imperative to rightszie the SPLA to approximately 120,000 personnel.\(^{562}\) Moreover, DDR was not perceived by the government or by the SPLA as part of the defence sector transformation process that improved the future operational effectiveness of the SPLA.\(^{563}\)

Considering the economic and security impediments to reducing the parade of the SPLA, the force actually grew between 2005 and 2013.\(^ {564}\) The SPLA’s growth during this time period can be partially attributed to the lack of a centralized personnel management system to track the recruitment process, as successive efforts to establish such a record of SPLA manpower had been unsuccessful.\(^ {565}\) In addition, the 2006 Juba Declaration and President Salva Kiir’s subsequent amnesties towards groups that had since rebelled against the government resulted in the integration of tens of thousands of former combatants into the SPLA. The SPLA also had to integrate 15,000-20,000 members of the SAF and SPLA components of the CPA-mandated Joint Integrated Units, which were


\(^{560}\) Stone, “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.”

\(^{561}\) “DDR in South Sudan.”

\(^{562}\) Ibid.

\(^{563}\) Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond.”

\(^{564}\) Stone, “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.”

\(^{565}\) De Waal and Mohammed, “Breakdown in South Sudan.”
comprised of combatants who, while aligned with the North, identified as southerners and would likely opt to remain in or return to the South. The approximate cost of integrating these individuals into the SPLA would have been about 200 million South Sudanese Pounds per year.

Finally, pervasive conflict and insecurity also drove SPLA recruitment drives. During the low-intensity conflict along the border with Sudan in 2012, the SPLA mobilized new recruits to join the military in case the conflict escalated. Furthermore, SPLA recruitment drives used relatively high and consistent salaries as a pre-emptive measure to target ‘at risk’ male youth who might otherwise be recruited by militia groups or become involved in the cycle of Murle-Nuer-Dinka communal violence that afflicted the Greater Upper Nile region.

Conclusions

Defence sector transformation in South Sudan was done under the assumption that the SPLA would be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces in the event of a referendum vote for unity, or would become the national military of the Republic of South Sudan in the event of a vote favouring independence. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the government of what was then Southern Sudan faced the monumental challenge of constituting a security force out of a guerrilla movement with various armed factions, while professionalizing the military and demobilizing tens of thousands of former combatants. These processes occurred in a particularly challenging context in which Southern Sudan was emerging from decades of war, ramping up a massive state building enterprise, and combatting internal and external security threats –

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566 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*; Snowden, “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012.”
567 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*.
568 Snowden, “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012.”
570 Snowden, “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012”; Author interview with consultant on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2012.

This transformation of the SPLA was a massive undertaking, and a reduction of force through initiatives such as DDR, a Pensions scheme, a revised Wounded Heroes program and Civil Works Brigades, was to be a key enabler of this effort. However, neither of South Sudan’s two attempts at DDR, which was supposed to address the bulk of the SPLA’s rightsizing imperative, were able to play a significant role in rightsizing the SPLA or in its transformation during the interim period of the CPA.\footnote{Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond.”} Despite recognizing the economic imperatives behind reducing the parade of the SPLA, DDR planning failed to compensate for the political and military necessity of inclusion in the SPLA as a means of political accommodation and service delivery.\footnote{Hutton, “Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate during a Civil War.”}

In particular, the Government of South Sudan was concerned about the social and security implications of demobilizing former combatants into poverty – especially amid rampant insecurity across the South, and amid ever-deteriorating conditions along its border with Sudan. This threat of further insecurity actually caused the SPLA to go on a recruitment drive to bolster their defences against the North and employ at risk male youth who could otherwise be targeted for militia recruitment. The lack of alternative livelihoods combined with the fact that SPLA salaries were available and relatively more reliable in the long term than reintegration benefits meant there were few incentives for former combatants to pursue DDR. The failure of demobilization initiatives meant that the size and cost of the SPLA remained a burden to the country and limited the extent to which the SPLA could press forward with Transformation.

Several of South Sudan’s demobilization initiatives either never progressed beyond the conceptual phase or were poorly implemented. If such programs had been implemented, they could have helped address the ballooning parade of the SPLA, which consumed resources that could have been devoted to allowing the government to be operationally
capable of addressing both internal and external sources of instability. The failure of various initiatives to reduce the parade of the SPLA increased pressure on an already complex military integration process as a means by which to address the actual or latent threats posed by armed groups in South Sudan. These factors contributed to the inability of DDR and other civilian reintegration initiatives to be a ‘release valve’ for the SPLA. Combined with the government’s open-door integration process described in Chapter 4, ineffective demobilization initiatives compounded pressure on the military integration.574 As a result, the failure to rightsize the SPLA, combined with the government’s decision to integrate armed groups as described in earlier chapters, meant that the SPLA’s finances were dominated by salary payments to non-essential personnel, at the cost of the eventual professionalization of a leaner force.

As referenced in the review of the literature in Chapter 3, Krebs and Licklider (2015) argue that the context in which the concept of security sector reform emerged does not account for the more recent phenomenon of military integration in modern conflicts. When applied to the case of South Sudan, this meant that military integration was overlooked as a distinct, foundational aspect of SPLA Transformation, and that while the processes of military integration (negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment) and SPLA Transformation were concurrent, the processes overviewed in Chapters 4 and 5 occurred in a disjointed manner.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature on the use of military integration during war-to-peace transitions identifies three potential roles for third-party actors: mediators during peace negotiations; guarantors of security in the form of peacekeepers or a ceasefire monitoring force; or providers of financial, logistical, or technical assistance.575 As articulated in this chapter, the United Nations missions, the United States, United

574 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
Kingdom, and Switzerland supported the transformation of the SPLA in a range of ways. These initiatives included articulating a strategy for what many assumed would be the national armed forces of an independent South Sudan, organizing the military into units that were operational and conventional, and developing its support elements and infrastructure. These third party actors also assisted in developing the capacity for the executive direction of such a force from the Ministry of SPLA Affairs and its successor, the Ministry of Defence, including management and administration, rule of law, and military justice. However, while there was ample foreign assistance to rightsizing and transformation, there was limited foreign assistance specifically directed at the technical or financial aspects of military integration process, which included negotiations, cantonment, verification of parade, screening, rank and division assignment. For the most part, third-party actors focused on what was traditionally conceptualized as DDR and SSR – with the end result being that the military integration process was disconnected from the success of both efforts to rightsize the SPLA and the broader professionalization of the force. Moreover, there was limited foreign assistance that was specifically devoted to technical or financial aspects of integration.

During South Sudan’s transition from war to peace, military integration should have been the foundation from which defence sector transformation took place. However, as this chapter has argued, there was a disconnect between the military integration process and concurrent defence sector transformation efforts; integration outpaced rightsizing initiatives, and was not considered a departure point for defence sector transformation. As a result, I argue that efforts to reform the new national military were built on an unstable foundation, making the security sector prone to destabilization, as was the case during the 2010-11 rebellions, or making it prone to collapse, as was the case during the intra-SPLA tensions leading up to the political rupture that led to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013. As such, the SPLA was never able to ‘graduate’ from the integration process and create a cohesive national military. Due to the continuous integration process, ineffective rightsizing initiatives, and the disjointed integration and transformation processes, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development prone to fragmentation – a scenario that played out as a result of the steady erosion of political
power-sharing arrangements. South Sudan’s example demonstrates how military integration should have been the foundation for security sector reform, and as we will see in Chapter 6, serves as a cautionary tale for what could happen if this aspect of defence sector transformation is overlooked during a transition from war to peace.

In the next chapter, I will discuss how the disconnect between integration and transformation, an open-ended military integration process, ineffective rightsizing, and the dearth of foreign assistance specifically focused on the integration process contributed to the disintegration of the military integration process – and whatever progress had been made towards defence sector transformation as well.
Chapter 6: Disintegration

Introduction

Chapter 4 argued that military integration may have served a critical purpose during the interim period of the CPA and contributed to a certain level of stability in South Sudan. Thus, integration was arguably the least harmful choice considering the factionalism within the southern rebellion, the Government of Sudan’s support to non-SPLA armed groups, and the need to consolidate political-military power and mitigate the threats that OAGs posed during the Interim Period. However, military integration became open-ended, which created a class of rebel entrepreneurs. Chapter 5 subsequently detailed the concurrent efforts to reduce the parade of, and professionalize the SPLA. These processes were disjointed from the military integration process, which meant that the SPLA was being constituted on an unstable foundation. Combined with failed demobilization initiatives, open-ended integration increased pressure on the integration process and prevented the SPLA from moving on from integration to focus on Transformation, which left the SPLA as essentially a confederation of militias with competing loyalties. In this respect, integration, which was relatively stabilizing in the short term, proved destabilizing in the long term when it became and end in and of itself rather than a transitional measure en route to broader security sector reform.

This chapter analyses the factors that contributed to the disintegration of the military integration process, including situational constraints that were outside of the control of the Government of South Sudan, as well as design flaws in the implementation of the process. This chapter also discusses how these flaws contributed to the disintegration of the process as South Sudan’s civil war broke out.

Background

In practice, military integration in South Sudan was not a particularly standardized process; there was no clear strategy or guidelines for how armed groups should be
integrated. This may have been attributed to the fact that between 2006 and 2013, South Sudan faced concurrent and competing imperatives in its governance, economic, and security sectors, and arguably had limited bandwidth to design and implement a military integration process that would address the threat posed by armed groups.

During the six-year Interim Period of the peace agreement (2005-2011), the CPA’s protocols needed to be implemented in cooperation with the government in Khartoum. After decades of marginalization, South Sudan also had to create structures and procedures to govern the autonomous region that it had been granted in the CPA, and prepare governing institutions in case the region’s citizens voted for independence in the 2011 referendum. Complicating matters, South Sudan shut down oil production in January 2012 due to disagreements with the Government of Sudan regarding oil pipeline transit fees. For an economy that was 98 per cent dependent on oil revenues, this meant that many of the processes that required financing, including military integration, were short of funding.

The CPA had ended half a century of civil war in Sudan, but there remained concerns that the agreement was merely a ceasefire, prompting the SPLA to maintain a wartime posture. Indeed, skirmishes along their common border in the spring of 2012 raised concerns that a new conflict would erupt. The security environment was continually non-permissive in the Greater Upper Nile region, which witnessed multiple instances of ethnic conflict and cattle-raiding, including the SPLA’s fight to disarm the White Army militia in 2006, and a succession of Khartoum-supported armed groups in 2010 and 2011.

Finally, between 2005 and 2006, the SPLA was transitioning from a guerrilla army into a more conventional force with military formations. Further complicating this transition was the fact that there were three militaries in Sudan/South Sudan during the Interim

576 Author interview with consultant B on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 12, 2014; Author interview with UNMISS official A, Juba, South Sudan, August 15, 2014; Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan.
577 Author interview with senior Ministry of Defence official A, Juba, South Sudan.
Period of the CPA – the SAF, the SPLA, and the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs).\(^{579}\) Per the CPA, there was to be a formal process of military integration between the SAF and the SPLA, and the JIUs were established with the intent of demonstrating national unity and serving as a nucleus of a future national army should South Sudan vote for unity over independence in 2011.\(^{580}\) However, JIUs were characterized more by the collocation of SAF and SPLA troops than by their true integration, which was unsurprising given the expectation that South Sudan would indeed vote for independence in 2011.\(^{581}\)

**Design Flaws of South Sudan’s Military Integration Process**

The successful implementation of military integration within five years of the termination of a conflict is believed to increase the prospects for lasting peace.\(^{582}\) Yet, as military integration is implemented concurrent to other peace-building measures, it is difficult to isolate its specific effects in order to determine the success or failure of the process.\(^{583}\) Nonetheless, the structure of military integration is believed to hold the key to the successful implementation of the process, as some integration agreements fail because they are poorly structured and not fully implemented.\(^{584}\) The flaws of the design of the military integration process in South Sudan will be discussed in additional detail in the following paragraphs.

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579 Author interview with senior Ministry of Defence official A, Juba, South Sudan.
580 Per the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements, equal numbers of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA would comprise Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) with a total force strength of 39,000 soldiers during the interim period of the peace agreement. In addition, parties to the peace agreement were to establish a Joint Defence Board (JDB) under the Presidency of Sudan, comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the SAF and the SPLA, their deputies, and senior officers from both forces. The JDB was responsible for coordination between the SAF and the SPLA and for command of the JIUs. The subsequent Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices spelled out the command and control, composition and organization, training, and detailed deployment for the JIUs.
581 “Neither ‘Joint’ nor ‘Integrated’: The Joint Integrated Units and the Future of the CPA.”
582 Hoddie and Hartzell, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements.”
584 Glassmyer and Sambanis, “Rebel—Military Integration and Civil War Termination.”
Lack of strategic guidance

As discussed in Chapter 3, much of the success or failure of military integration agreements derives from the manner in which the process is managed. A well-managed integration process may ensure that major parties to the conflict are able to dictate a strategy and allocate resources for the integration process. On the contrary, as a result of insufficient strategic planning and guidance, the SPLA’s military integration process was not well-managed. There were no quotas placed on the integration of former combatants from various regions or ethnic groups, which meant the new military became ethnically and regionally lopsided in favour of the Nuer who had been members of non-SPLA OAGs during the civil war. There were also insufficient efforts to foster cohesion along political, task, and social lines, which would have been critical, given the SPLA’s history of factionalism and the fact that South Sudanese identity was centred around collective opposition to the North, which became a less relevant rallying point in the post-secession period. In sum, the SPLA’s military integration process was short-sighted and devoid of a vision on what the endstate of the process should look like. This meant that the military was unable to allocate sufficient resources to support the process, establish criteria to determine when armed groups had been successfully integrated, or determine how the integration process dovetailed with the defence sector reform efforts detailed in Chapter 5.

Despite the fact that the process had been concurrent to the release of the SPLA’s post-CPA strategic guidance, these documents included rather limited detail on the implementation of military integration. The integration of OAGs was only mentioned in passing, if at all in the 2008 SPLA White Paper on Defence, the 2009 SPLA Act, the SPLA Transformation Strategy Part I: Objective Force 2017 Concept and Part II:

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586 Burgess, “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict.”
Transformation Programme 2012-2017,590 or the Battalion Reset plan.591 Furthermore, there existed no implementation plan that laid out the long-term vision of military integration, timelines for execution, budgetary requirements, or measures of progress.

In addition, despite the fact that South Sudan’s military integration process was continual, there were no standing management and support structures to facilitate integration. Instead, each time an armed group was to be integrated into the SPLA, a new integration committee would be stood up and dissolved when the process had been completed. While it is possible that a new committee would be required to account for potentially unique local and ethnic sensitivities during the integration process, the absence of a standing committee meant that the process started from scratch each time, and would not necessarily leverage past experience to improve the execution of future integrations.592

Although the amnesty and integration process seemed straightforward, it had many moving pieces and potential points of failure. In addition, there was no single body within the national government that was responsible for overseeing the process from start to finish. Negotiations could include stakeholders from SPLA commanders to government ministers, members of local government and church organisations, depending on their previous relationships with armed group commanders, the area in which the rebellion had been taking place, and the particular grievance at hand.593 Yet if too many stakeholders became involved, this could lead armed group leaders to seek to increase the value of their integration packages, further drawing out the negotiation process.594 Moreover, there had been repeated instances in which an armed group commander would accept amnesty, only to subsequently renege on the integration deal, possibly in an attempt to recruit additional men or to improve his negotiating position.595

591 “Reset Courses of Action, Information Briefing for SPLA Command Council.”
592 Author interview with senior SPLA officer H, Juba, South Sudan, December 18, 2014.
593 Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 31, 2012; Author interview with subject matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, South Sudan.
594 Author interview with subject matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, South Sudan.
595 “Compounding Instability in Unity State.”
Limited third-party involvement

Many states are weak in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and integration can be a costly, technically demanding, and turbulent process – from negotiation to cantonment and verification of parade, to fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment. In this context, the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 stipulated that third party actors can act as mediators during peace negotiations; providers of financial or logistical assistance; guarantors of security in the form of peacekeepers or a ceasefire monitoring force to act as a deterrent to violence; or provide teams of trainers to increase the professionalization of integrated forces so they may eventually qualify for senior ranks in the reconstituted military.596

While foreign assistance may generally be helpful in the implementation of a military integration process, it may also be insufficient to prevent failure.597 Yet, in light of the concurrent post-CPA challenges and limited guidance and structures to manage integration, foreign support for integration could have facilitated the implementation of the process in South Sudan. Instead, despite foreign engagement in parts of South Sudan’s security sector – from mediating ceasefires to DDR to SPLA Transformation – there was limited foreign support to the military integration process. Consequently, efforts by the international community to transform South Sudan’s security sector were built on the unsound foundation of a fragmented military.

While the donor community had pushed the concept of military integration between the North and South in terms of the Joint Integrated Units, South Sudan’s status as an autonomous and not yet independent region prior to 2011 made it awkward for international donors to get involved in the SPLA’s military integration process – lest they

597 Licklider, New Armies from Old.
be accused of implicitly supporting the dismemberment of Sudan. Indeed, the SPLA’s status as a military within the autonomous region of Southern Sudan meant that donors had to be careful not to overstep the bounds of impartiality, as the JIUs were intended to meet internal security needs during the interim period, in accordance with the provisions in the CPA. Consequently, the SPLA had minimal contact with the donor community prior to 2007/2008, and received limited foreign assistance specifically directed towards assisting with the integration process, which had already commenced by 2006.

As previously detailed in the survey of foreign support to South Sudan’s security sector in Chapter 5, the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the UN missions all contributed to various aspects of the SPLA’s transformation and professionalization. Yet, these countries did not play the aforementioned roles that third party actors have played in the previous cases of military integration detailed in Chapter 3. One explanation for this is that the actual process of military integration in which members of armed groups were assembled and accommodated while the SPLA committees verified their parades may have been too expensive for the international community to fund. Another explanation draws on the assertion made by Krebs and Licklider (2015), who argue that the definition and understanding of security sector reform has changed since it was initially conceptualised. Accordingly, third party actors may not have been cognizant of the fact that the transformation they proposed for South Sudan’s security sector needed to specifically account for the integration of non-statutory armed forces before commencing the transformation of the statutory national military. Alternatively, there may have been normative or legal restrictions on funding non-statutory armed forces before they had advanced through the vetting and rank assignment processes of integration.

Of the foreign actors contributing to shaping South Sudan’s post-CPA security sector, both the United Nations Mission in Sudan and its successor, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan at times played the roles of mediator and guarantor of security between

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598 Author interview with UNMISS official B, Juba, South Sudan, August 23, 2014.
600 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan.
601 Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
the Government of South Sudan and the leaders of armed groups, and provider of logistical support to the integration process. This is despite the fact that the integration of armed groups into the SPLA was not a direct area of focus under the mandates of these missions. In one instance, the UNMIS-chaired Ceasefire Joint Military Committee played a key role in bringing fighting between elements of the SAF and the SPLA in Malakal, Upper Nile in November 2006 to a halt after fighting had erupted from a series of skirmishes between the SPLA Joint Integrated Unit contingent and SAF-aligned other armed groups. On a handful of occasions, the UN missions also acted as a mediator between the Government of South Sudan and the leaders of armed groups. In 2011, UNMIS provided support to ceasefire negotiations with Gatluak Gai in Unity state, and UNMISS witnessed the surrender of over 200 members of armed groups and their two commanding generals in Upper Nile in May 2012, after which they were reportedly integrated into the military. Due to security concerns, the UN was unable assume a third party verification role in Mayom county where fighters under Peter Gadet awaited integration into the SPLA. However, the UN missions supported some integration processes by providing logistical assistance, which involved transporting members of armed groups due for integration into the SPLA from remote areas often accessible only by helicopter to cantonment sites, then screening and registering them. Specifically, the UN provided support to the Government of South Sudan for the relocation of approximately 1,000 of Peter Gadet’s forces, just over 200 of David Yau Yau’s forces, and an unknown number of Gabriel Tanginye’s forces in 2011. UNMISS also supported the logistics behind ceasefire negotiations, for example, facilitating the travel

605 “Compounding Instability in Unity State.”
of over 50 Murle leaders in January 2013 to initiate contact with David Yau Yau and conduct outreach activities with local communities after Yau Yau’s second rebellion.607

In spite of these contributions, neither UNMIS nor UNMISS were intended to, or designed to, act as guarantors of security during the military integration process in South Sudan. Indeed, inter-ethnic violence across Upper Nile and Jonglei states and the predation of the Lord’s Resistance Army on the populations of Central and Western Equatoria demonstrated how challenging it was for these missions to carry out even those activities that were indeed in its mandate – namely, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in line with their Chapter VII mandates.608 During the Interim Period as well as in the aftermath of independence, there were outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence between the Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka communities and the Murle in Jonglei state, which resulted in over 3,500 deaths.609 The overwhelming majority of clashes took place between the Lou Nuer and the Murle, and were driven by uneven disarmament campaigns, cattle rustling, the abduction of children during raids, manipulation of ethnic violence by opportunistic politicians, and the importance of revenge in the absence of state protection and means of accountability.

 Partially because of its inability to protect civilians, there was a lack of trust between the UN missions and the Government of South Sudan. By some assessments, UNMIS only started to act on its protection of civilians mandate in 2009, which was four years into its deployment.610 Furthermore, the mission’s inability to protect civilians targeted by the Sudanese government in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile in the last weeks of the CPA in 2011 meant that its successor faced inherent distrust in the will and ability for the UN to intervene when the security situation deemed necessary in the new Republic of

609 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, n.d.), http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/626.
610 Human Rights Watch, “No One to Intervene: Gaps in Civilian Protection in Southern Sudan.”

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South Sudan.\footnote{Hutton, “Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate during a Civil War.”} Another impediment for UNMISS was that the mission’s transition from UNMIS, which had a headquarters in Khartoum, was never truly socialized so as to engender trust with South Sudan’s security forces.\footnote{Rands and LeRiche, “Security Responses in Jonglei State in the Aftermath of Inter-Ethnic Violence.”} This led to the perpetuation of mutual distrust between UN troops and South Sudan’s security forces, the latter of which may have believed that UNMIS reports on the South were being channelled to Sudanese security forces.\footnote{Ibid.}

Like its predecessor, UNMISS was criticized for not being more proactive at deterring inter-ethnic violence and protecting civilians.\footnote{Ibid.} Some troop contributing countries were said to be risk-averse and reluctant to adhere to a protection of civilians mandate. In addition, there was a shortfall of troops below the mandated level of 7,000, and insufficient personnel trained in the protection of civilians.\footnote{Ibid.} Both UN missions suffered from significant capacity and capability challenges that inhibited their response to threats against civilians. For one, with few paved roads, South Sudan’s terrain was difficult to expand UN access and reach.\footnote{Ibid.} The UN missions also lacked a riverine capability and had insufficient logistical assets, such as military aircraft, to deploy and support troops.\footnote{Ibid.} Furthermore, for a period of time, UNMISS was only allowed to fly one mission per week due to new safety restrictions imposed as a result of the SPLA shooting down a UN helicopter in December 2012.\footnote{Ibid.} These mobility challenges limited the ability for the UN missions to deploy on a substantial scale in multiple parts of a conflict-prone country.\footnote{Ibid.}
Finally, the UN missions had trouble getting the Government of Sudan to grant access to certain parts of the country in which the SPLA was conducting military operations.\textsuperscript{620} These SPLA-imposed restrictions in movement meant that the UN missions could not make use of their mandates to protect civilians.\textsuperscript{621} Moreover, South Sudanese civilians did not see the UN as a neutral actor due to the perception that the mission was unable or unwilling to challenge the South Sudanese government on key issues related to its mandate.\textsuperscript{622} This sentiment was confirmed by an alleged quote from a former Force Commander that “We won’t step in if the army turns on communities.”\textsuperscript{623} This statement reflected a need to maintain good ties with the South Sudanese government on one hand, and the realization that the UN mission could find itself outgunned by the SPLA on the other.\textsuperscript{624} This placed an insurmountable constraint on the UN’s ability to fulfill a protection of civilians mandate, and damaged its credibility as an objective guarantor of security.\textsuperscript{625} Needless to say, the UN missions’ response, or lack thereof to inter-ethnic violence during the Interim Period of the CPA and the immediate aftermath of independence served as an indication for why they were never credible guarantors of security between warring parties.

**Open-ended process without accountability**

The aftermath of the 2010 election process in South Sudan, as described in Chapter 4, demonstrated the sensitivity of the military integration process to political competition and instability. After the elections, it became clear that any individual or group disenchanted with the electoral process had no political recourse within South Sudan’s

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\textsuperscript{620} Jort Hemmer, ““We Are Laying the Groundwork for Our Own Failure”: The UN Mission in South Sudan and Its Civilian Protection Strategy: An Early Assessment.”

\textsuperscript{621} Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Jon Harald Sande Lie, “Challenges to Protection of Civilians in South Sudan: A Warning from Jonglei State”; Fenton and Loughna, “The Search for Common Ground: Civil–Military Coordination and the Protection of Civilians in South Sudan.”

\textsuperscript{622} Fenton and Loughna, “The Search for Common Ground: Civil–Military Coordination and the Protection of Civilians in South Sudan.”

\textsuperscript{623} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{624} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{625} Ibid.
system of governance. The government’s response to the armed groups that proliferated after the elections demonstrated its continuing post-Juba Declaration commitment to use military integration to address armed opposition. Over time, the process in South Sudan became de facto open-ended, thereby increasing the pressure on integration as the primary means of addressing armed opposition. This defection-reintegration cycle, described by Alex de Waal as ‘rent-seeking rebellion,’ became a revolving door process whereby some armed groups would rotate in and out of the SPLA.

Despite the benefits that military integration can provide during war to peace transitions, the process is a political quick fix that not only runs the risk of creating a ‘demonstration effect’ – that violence and disobedience can be translated into benefits, but it also displays the lack of credible guarantees to sanction defectors. The Government of South Sudan’s approach to resolving armed rebellions provided a post-CPA affirmation that accountability and integration were mutually exclusive. Accordingly, from the perspective of armed group leaders, the costs associated with military integration remained low, while the potential rewards in the form of financial benefits, impunity for past crimes, high ranks, and lucrative deployment locations, were persistently quite high. Knowing how much the government was willing to compromise for the sake of stability, armed group leaders could perpetually use the threat of violence as a bargaining tool to resolve political grievances, or to forestall compliance with integration and remain deployed in their home areas. Consequently, the SPLA became a vehicle for purchasing loyalties through the distribution of patronage, which was contingent on the actual or threatened use of violence to extract additional benefits from the state.

626 Author interview with consultant on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2012.
627 De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan.”
628 Baaz and Verweijen, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army.”
629 Young, The Fate of Sudan; Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond”; “Allies and Defectors: An Update on Armed Group Integration and Proxy Force Activity.”
The open-ended integration process created a perverse incentive for members of the SPLA to defect in order to advance their positions or increase their wealth. By seeking to neutralize the threat these armed group leaders posed, the government gave them and other aggrieved parties an incentive to defect. The most tangible demonstrations of the Catch-22 element of military integration were the repeat defections of David Yau Yau and Peter Gadet. After accepting the government’s amnesty in September 2011, David Yau Yau’s decision to re-defect from the SPLA in April 2012 and form the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army-Cobra Faction is believed to have been tied to two factors.631 One was due to his disappointment at receiving the rank of Major – a severe demotion, given his threat potential and the fact that he had held the self-appointed rank of Major General during his first rebellion.632 The other was due to the political marginalization of the Murle in Jonglei and the onset of the March–October 2012 civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei, during which the SPLA perpetrated human rights violations against the Murle.633 After South Sudan’s civil war commenced in December 2013, the government quickly reached out to Yau Yau for a ceasefire and granted him administration of the Greater Pibor Administration Area (GPAA), which was composed of the former Pibor and Pochalla counties in Jonglei state. The creation of the GPAA following Yau Yau’s two rebellions demonstrated the government’s continued use of political and military patronage and power-sharing to buy off armed opponents. Meanwhile, Peter Gadet, then commander of the 8th Division in Jonglei, mutinied within days of the outbreak of violence in Juba in December 2013 and became part of the SPLM/A-in-Opposition until his break with Machar in 2015.

Ineffective rightsizing initiatives

Containing former combatants in transitional security mechanisms such as military integration and civilian reintegration programs can often buy time for political and

631 “Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan.”
633 “Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan.”
economic development and help prevent the resumption of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{634} The problem, however, is when either of these mechanisms fails to provide a ‘release valve’ for the security sector and the system becomes overwhelmed trying to accommodate armed groups. In the case of South Sudan, the process for bringing armed groups into the SPLA through military integration outpaced the SPLA’s efforts to reduce the size of the military.

As detailed in Chapter 5, there were several attempts to rightsize the SPLA before and after independence, and the majority of the SPLA’s manpower was to go through the DDR process. Indeed, efforts to rightsize the SPLA should have reduced the cost the SPLA imposed on South Sudan’s budget and allowed the SPLA to focus on transformation. However, efforts to demobilise ex-combatants and reform the security sector fell victim to several security dilemmas. Due to the ever-present threat of renewed north-south violence and ‘enemies of the peace’ within South Sudan, the government was reluctant to undertake the required reduction in force. Furthermore, after decades of marginalization and conflict, the southern economy did not provide alternative livelihoods that could absorb the soldiers that the SPLA needed to demobilise, and the government was wary of the threats that unemployed ex-combatants would present to sustained peace. With South Sudan’s post-war economy providing limited livelihoods for demobilized soldiers, there was a fear that soldiers were being reintegrated into poverty, and that the government and the donor community had not managed expectations vis-à-vis civilian life as an alternative to the SPLA.\textsuperscript{635} This was exacerbated by the inability of civilian reintegration initiatives to compete economically with the level of pay in the security forces, particularly given the decision to pay the SPLA after the CPA was signed.\textsuperscript{636} Thus, the government’s open-door amnesty and integration policy combined with ineffective demobilization initiatives increased pressure on the military integration process to address the actual and potential threats posed by armed groups.\textsuperscript{637}

\textsuperscript{634} Colletta, “Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations.”
\textsuperscript{635} Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 20, 2012.
\textsuperscript{636} Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{637} Author interview with former senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with consultant A on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
SPLA resistance to integration

The decision to pursue an open-ended military integration process was a political one. Some of the SPLA senior leadership believed they had not been sufficiently consulted as to the wisdom of integrating armed groups into the military, and thus felt they had little ownership of the process. Specifically, some officers were concerned that the armed groups being integrated would eventually betray the military. Nuer comprised the bulk of armed groups initially integrated, which was unsurprising due to the alignment of many Nuer with the SSDF and other non-SPLA armed groups during the civil war. Consequently, the integration process had also altered the demographics of the SPLA such that an estimated two-thirds of the military was Nuer by the time the South Sudanese civil war broke out in December 2013. Furthermore, integration had essentially overtaken recruitment, which precluded the force from bringing in qualified soldiers who may have been younger, more physically fit, and devoid of the baggage of past defections.

The integration of armed groups into the SPLA was limited by the military’s absorptive capacity, as it counteracted the concurrent imperative to rightsize the military. Military integration was costly, and the SPLA was concerned that too much money was being spent on salaries at the expense of operations and transformation. Military integration thus increased the costs imposed by the security sector on the nascent Republic of South Sudan, with the government spending almost 50 per cent of its budget on the MoD and the SPLA, of which over 80 per cent was on salaries. This expenditure on salaries came at the expense of investment in military professionalization, training, logistics and mobility, in turn undermining the development of the SPLA’s capacity to contribute to

638 Author interview with consultant D on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, August 21, 2014.
639 Author interview with consultant E on South Sudan’s security sector, Nairobi, Kenya, August 31, 2014.
640 “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name.”
641 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer C, Juba, South Sudan.
642 Ibid.
643 Snowden, “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012”; Author interview with consultants on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
the country’s security by deterring communal violence.\textsuperscript{644} Furthermore, the SPLA was unable to ‘graduate’ from what became an open-ended integration process towards the development of a cohesive, professionalized force. This meant that it remained a collective of armed groups under the banner of the SPLA up until the point at which it fractured in December 2013.

Certainly, rank harmonisation was a serious challenge, and was at times a red line in the implementation of integration deals. Throughout the process, some officers maintained reservations that the low quality of integrating forces was compromising the strength and cohesion of the military, and was therefore not serving the interests of the SPLA.\textsuperscript{645} With integrated armed groups in possession of diverse training backgrounds, ranks and allegiances, seniority within the SPLA was difficult to determine. Many in the South Sudan Defence Force were poorly trained, had below-average levels of literacy, and were more likely to have received military training in the bush than through service in organised security forces.\textsuperscript{646} As they had little or no formal training, former members of armed groups faced the prospect of foregoing the prestige and higher salaries that would have accompanied higher ranks.\textsuperscript{647} Additionally, many members of the SSDF who had previously opted for integration into the SAF had been promoted above their abilities, in an attempt by the SAF to make integration into the SPLA less attractive, thereby creating an abundance of high-ranking officers among former SSDF personnel.\textsuperscript{648} This diluted the position of SPLA officers within the military hierarchy, placing the SPLA’s erstwhile enemies in positions of equal or higher rank by comparison within the reconstituted military.\textsuperscript{649}

\textsuperscript{644} Young, \textit{The Fate of Sudan}; Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond”; Lacher, “South Sudan: International State-Building and Its Limits”; Author interview with consultants on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{645} Author interview with consultant B on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan; Author interview with consultant D on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan.
\textsuperscript{647} “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan.”
\textsuperscript{648} “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”; “Armed Groups in Sudan: The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Aftermath of the Juba Declaration.”
\textsuperscript{649} Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration.”
Some SPLA officers were concerned that there were insufficient conditions placed on the integration process – that integration was an appeasement of finite duration, and that the process was devoid of accountability. Some SPLA officers also believed that integration should have been done according to SPLA rules and regulations – with the appropriate number of officers per military formation – rather than allowing the Commander-in-Chief to manipulate the SPLA integration committees’ rank allocations and increase the ranks of armed group leaders in order to buy peace. Rank inflation within the SPLA also led to the development of an inflated officer corps, with too many commanding officers relative to the number of soldiers. This impeded the ability of commanding officers to command a given division effectively in the field, for example, in situations in which commanders, deputy commanders and chiefs of staff were all at the two-star level.

The terms of the integration deals negotiated by the Office of the President and the Ministry for National Security in the political sphere were also frequently subject to resistance on the part of the MoD and the SPLA in the military sphere. In addition to often being unable to fulfil the promises made during negotiations, the military resented the fact that former adversaries were ‘rewarded’ for their rebellions with integration into the SPLA and that taking up arms had become an alternative to promotion for those unhappy with their ranks.

Not only did the open-ended military integration policy inflate the officer corps, but it also deepened divisions within the military, as long-time SPLA soldiers felt that integrated forces were being rewarded for treachery, in essence encouraging armed rebellion by rewarding armed group leaders with senior ranks. This was especially the sentiment towards officers like Peter Gadet, who were repeat defectors who would sign a

650 Author interview with senior SPLA officer A, Juba, South Sudan.
651 Author interview with former senior SPLA officer B, Juba, South Sudan.
652 "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan"; "Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan"; Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, South Sudan, August 20, 2012.
653 "South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name."
ceasefire with the government and eventually defect – perhaps in order to negotiate better integration deals, to include money, promotions, food for the men under their command, and positions in the government and military. Due to his wartime success on the side of the Sudanese government, Gadet was deeply unpopular among many in the SPLM/A, even prior to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013.655 For example, during the 2012 disarmament campaign in Jonglei, Gadet was charged with collecting weapons in the Lou Nuer-populated areas of the northern part of the state under Operation Restore Peace.656 He partially succeeded in this endeavour, to the chagrin of some senior SPLA officers, who reportedly hoped he would fail and trigger conflict and division among the Nuer communities, as he was Bul Nuer.657 In March/April 2013, there was allegedly an attempt to assassinate Gadet in Eastern Equatoria state, and in October of that year, there was a tense standoff with SPLA headquarters in northern Jonglei.658

With armed groups remaining formally or informally outside of the SPLA, integration was often incomplete even after the conclusion of integration negotiations. In effect, this demonstrated the reluctance of SPLA officers to implement it, as well as the aforementioned financial and logistical challenges that impacted the execution of the process.659 At times, due to the sabotage of the process within the SPLA officer corps, the integration process proceeded slowly, causing recently integrated soldiers to feel marginalized and uncertain of their future within the SPLA. Due to logistical challenges and poorly planned/executed integration, integration processes often dragged on for weeks or months after an amnesty was agreed upon; tensions and misunderstandings among sizeable groups of armed men escalated on occasion as a result.660

The manner in which the SPLA executed the integration process led former armed group leaders to feel marginalized within the force, and excluded from senior decision-making

655 “South Sudan: Jonglei – ‘We Have Always Been at War.’”
656 Ibid.
657 Ibid.
659 “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan”; “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile.”
660 “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile.”
positions. The late Paulino Matip reportedly complained in October 2009 that he was being sidelined, and his former SSDF forces had been excluded or mistreated.661 He furthermore resented that, despite holding the number two position as Deputy Commander in Chief of the SPLA, he exercised little operational control and was rarely consulted in decision-making processes.662 Within the senior ranks of the SPLA, mistrust towards the largely Nuer officers that were integrated after the Juba Declaration led to the re-emergence of tensions in later years.663

Development of parallel security structures

In 2012, during a tense period in Sudan-South Sudan relations, General Paul Malong Awan, the former governor of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal state reportedly assembled a militia of at least 7,500 soldiers.664 This parallel security force was referred to by a Dinka term ‘Mathiang Anyoor’ and the phrase ‘Dut ku Beny’, which reportedly translates to mean “Rescue the President.”665 These forces were mainly recruited from the predominately Dinka-populated Warrap and Northern Bahr al Ghazal states, the former of which is President Kiir’s home state. The ethnic and regional composition of these forces may have indicated a lack in confidence on the part of the ruling elite towards what was suspected to be the Nuer-dominated composition of the SPLA and its ability to protect their interests.666 Malong, who replaced SPLA Chief of General Staff James Hoth Mai in April 2014, subsequently denied complicity with standing up this group, stating that “no one can recruit an army apart from the national army.”667

661 “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan.”
662 “Compounding Instability in Unity State.”
663 Young, The Fate of Sudan.
664 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
667 “Generals Say Juba Massacres Done by Private Militia, Not SPLA.”
Adding to the tense political environment that had been building up prior to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, there was concern that these new recruits essentially operated outside the formal military command. Organized entirely outside the Ministry of Defence and the SPLA’s General Staff, these forces reported directly to the President, and accordingly received support for salaries, training, and equipment directly out of the Office of the President, as the Ministry of Defence refused to fund them. A majority of these forces were not initially integrated into the SPLA, although a few were eventually integrated into the 3,000 soldier Tiger Battalion (Presidential Guard). The Presidential Guard, which was composed of troops loyal to President Kiir, former Vice President Machar, and the late Paulino Matip, had previously been an example of integrating Dinka, Nuer, and other ethnic groups into a functional unit. Bringing this new parallel security force into the Presidential Guard was seen by some as a betrayal of the force’s multi-ethnic ideal, which had been one of the aims of the integration process.

These parallel forces were reportedly trained at Pantiit Military Training Centre in Northern Bahr al Ghazal, and subsequently transferred to Luri, approximately 16 miles west of the capital. Between 300 and 700 personnel were then transferred to Juba to be integrated into the Presidential Guard in the days immediately before the meeting of the National Liberation Council in mid-December. Some of these forces were allegedly involved in the killing of Nuer civilians in Juba between December 16 and 18, 2013. Concerns of ethnic cleansing and the desire for revenge on the part of the Nuer motivated the military commanders of the SPLM-in-Opposition, who had defected from the SPLA.

669 “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name”; “Generals Say Juba Massacres Done by Private Militia, Not SPLA”; “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
671 “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name.”
672 “Generals Say Juba Massacres Done by Private Militia, Not SPLA.”
673 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan”; “Generals Say Juba Massacres Done by Private Militia, Not SPLA.”
following the events of mid-December 2013. These killings also triggered hostilities along Dinka-Nuer lines across the country; arguably, the Juba Massacres garnered support for Machar in Bentiu that he may not have secured without violence by Dinka against Nuer in the capital.

Conclusions

Considering the competing imperatives of the post-CPA period, military integration in South Sudan occurred in a challenging context. Due to the concurrent state-building tasks South Sudan was undertaking, and the persistent threat of return to war with Sudan, the country lacked the bandwidth, technical expertise, finances, and logistics to be able to design a more functional military integration process. In this context, the military integration process outpaced the institutional growth of the SPLA and its thinking on how to address armed groups.

The Government of South Sudan not only lacked a long-term strategic vision for implementation, but also failed to clearly articulate the means and modalities of the military integration process. The lack of strategic guidance for military integration left implementation open for interpretation, and meant that there were limited guidelines to drive the planning, budget, and timelines for the process, or to establish measures of success. An implementation plan that dictated the strategy and resourcing for the entire process, from start to finish, could have improved the management of the process (Burgess, 2008). Understanding the maximum number of former combatants that the military could absorb could have limited the extent to which the SPLA’s parade ballooned to over 200,000 – a trend exacerbated by the open-ended nature of the process and the failure of various demobilization initiatives (Sangha, 2013). In this sense, integration outpaced demobilization initiatives, leading to the former process becoming overburdened as a means to address the threat of armed groups.

676 “Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts.”
677 Author interview with former senior Ministry of Defence official, December 10, 2014.
The lack of ethnic or regional quotas in the integration process created a loophole whereby the ethnic composition of the force did not match the country’s demography – and the government should have anticipated what the impact this trend could have. With only 16 per cent of South Sudan’s population,678 Nuer were believed to comprise 65-70 per cent of the SPLA by the time the civil war broke out in South Sudan.679 Following the 1991 split and the creation of SPLMA/A-Nasir and other mainly Nuer splinter groups, many of the Government of Sudan-backed armed groups had been based in predominantly Nuer areas of Greater Upper Nile (Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states). The government’s efforts to integrate mainly Nuer OAGs following the Juba Declaration resulted in the pendulum swinging towards a predominantly Nuer composition of the SPLA after 2006.680 This numerical imbalance in favour of the Nuer contributed to a sense that the SPLA lacked national character and diversity.681 Furthermore, the Government of South Sudan’s lack of strategic direction meant there was insufficient focus on fostering political, task, or social cohesion in order to counter the pull of regional and ethnic identities within the SPLA. Consequently, the components of the SPLA continued to act in ethnic and partisan manners, thus undermining the spirit of military integration.

The ethnic composition of the SPLA that resulted from an open-ended integration process without quotas did little to assuage fears that the equities of President Kiir’s Bahr al-Ghazal political circle could be protected by the SPLA. This may have contributed to the recruitment of parallel security forces primarily from the Bahr al-Ghazal region starting in 2012. In turn, the establishment of regionalized and ethnicised parallel security structures undermined the premise of military integration as an insurance policy for integrated forces – or meant that the Bahr al Ghazal ruling elite was so threatened by the ethnic imbalance in the military that they sought out their own insurance policy. Going outside the SPLA chain of command in the pursuit of ethnically loyal forces further

678 “CIA World Factbook - South Sudan.”
679 “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name.”
681 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”
undermined attempts at defence sector transformation, and undermined the notion of cohesion in the establishment of a professional national military.

The open-ended nature of integration created incentives for defection from the SPLA. The demonstration effect from the 2010 elections – that political failures and armed violence could be transformed into rewards when the government inevitably bought off armed group leaders – helped create a class of rebel entrepreneurs who benefitted from a lack of accountability within the open-ended integration process. Moreover, open-ended integration counteracted concurrent efforts to demobilize former combatants, and prevented the SPLA from ‘graduating’ from the integration process and making progress towards professionalization. However, DDR and other civilian reintegration initiatives failed to get off the ground, increasing pressure on the military integration to address the threats posed by armed groups. Effective demobilization mechanisms could have freed up resources for SPLA Transformation or the country’s socioeconomic development, while reducing the pressure on the military integration process as a means by which to address the actual or latent threat of armed group violence.

While foreign assistance could have facilitated implementation of the military integration process, it may have been insufficient to overcome the challenging context in which integration was being conducted. Still, foreign assistance to South Sudan’s security sector was largely limited to DDR and SPLA Transformation, which meant that military integration was not approached as a building block for the consolidation of the SPLA and the force was established on an unstable foundation.

While the integration process itself was not responsible for setting off the political impasses that reached a boiling point in 2013, the acceleration of the conflict may be attributed to the fact that the national military was being built on a destabilized foundation. Due to the design flaws of South Sudan’s military integration process, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, which handicapped its efforts to transform into a more professional military force, that could have been less prone to fragmentation in the face of political instability. The integration of armed groups into the SPLA should
have been a short-term quick fix and a means by which to move beyond civil war-era divisions; instead, the military integration process became an end in and of itself.
Chapter 7: Conclusions

Introduction
The previous six chapters of this thesis have spanned the historical factionalism within the southern rebellion, concurrent efforts to consolidate political-military power and transform the security sector amid a massive state-building enterprise and the proliferation of non-statutory armed groups across the South.

Throughout this thesis, I have argued that military integration played a stabilizing role in the short term and helped achieve the goal of the referendum on self-determination, but was destabilizing in the long term due to the manner in which it was implemented. In this final chapter I will reiterate the core arguments of this thesis and discuss the findings of the three research questions presented in the introductory chapter, through which I will offer an overview of the themes covered in the previous six chapters. I will also articulate in this chapter the contributions this thesis makes to the field, outline the theoretical and policy implications and broader lessons for fragile states managing the threat of non-statutory armed forces while undergoing transitions from war to peace, and make suggestions for potential areas of future research.

Core Argument

As defined in Chapter 1, military integration can be a power-sharing mechanism that is often employed in conjunction with other power-sharing arrangements along political, economic, and territorial dimensions. Military power-sharing involves the distribution of authority within the coercive apparatus of the state by incorporating or amalgamating non-statutory armed groups (i.e., rebel groups, local militia, etc.) into a statutory security framework (i.e., military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, etc.)

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In Chapter 4, I argued that in South Sudan’s post-CPA context, the government had three choices vis-à-vis adhering to the requirements articulated in the CPA and addressing the threat that non-SPLA groups posed to stability: attempt to fight them, ignore them and accept that the government lacked a monopoly on the use of force in Southern Sudan, or seek accommodation with armed groups. Due to the South-South divisions of the civil war era covered in Chapter 2, and the imperative to consolidate power in preparation for the referendum on self-determination, the government largely chose to accommodate armed groups through integration into the security forces. I also argued in Chapter 4 that the Government of South Sudan chose this course of action because they needed to signal a genuine commitment to peace within the South and a willingness to compromise; give non-SPLA groups that had been excluded from CPA negotiations an ‘insurance policy’; and outbid the Government of Sudan in purchasing the loyalties of southern rebel groups, thereby largely containing potential spoilers in a statutory security framework. As an added benefit, the Government of South Sudan was able to diversify the country’s armed forces, thereby mitigating the ethnic fallout from the SPLA’s 1991 split.

The SPLA had a long history of integrating former armed groups, but this process was formalized through the 2006 Juba Declaration. As a result of the Government of South Sudan’s reaction to the rebellions that commenced between 2010 and 2011, the integration process became de facto open-ended. As I concluded in Chapter 4, this indicated an over-reliance on the integration of armed groups into the military in order to address armed dissent. What should have been an interim measure during South Sudan’s aborted transition from war to peace thus became and end in and of itself, creating incentives for members of armed groups to use violence to achieve political or material gain. As I argue in Chapter 5, the open-ended defection-integration cycle led to ballooning personnel costs, which created an opportunity cost for SPLA Transformation and prevented the SPLA from ‘graduating’ from the integration process and focusing on cohesion and professionalization.
The failure of various demobilization initiatives – DDR, Wounded Heroes, Pensions, and the Civic Works Corps – increased pressure on the military integration process as a means by which to manage the threats posed by armed groups, as I argued in Chapter 5. Moreover, in the context of an open-ended integration process, there was no ‘release valve’ to flush the SPLA’s excess and ever-increasing manpower out of the security sector. The concurrent transformation of South Sudan’s security sector, which I discussed in Chapter 5, involved support from the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and UNMIS/S, but was not aligned with the military integration process. In fact, these third parties provided limited direct support to the negotiation, cantonment and verification of parade, fitness screening, rank assignment, and division assignment phases of the military integration process in South Sudan. As a result of this disconnect and limited support, the SPLA was being built on an unstable foundation, which fractured during periods of heightened political competition.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I argued that the integration process disintegrated due to: a lack of a long-term strategic vision for the process, limited third party assistance, the open-ended nature of the process which undermined accountability, ineffective rightsizing initiatives, SPLA resistance to integration, and the development of parallel security forces outside of the integration process.

**Answers to Research Questions**

In Chapter 1, I posed three research questions to guide this thesis. In the paragraphs that follow, I will provide answers to each of these questions, highlighting where they have been answered in the body of this thesis.

**Research Question 1: Why did the Government of South Sudan choose to accommodate armed groups after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed?**

In spite of the legal and practical imperatives to largely accommodate armed groups, bringing armed groups into the SPLA’s fold was a legacy initiative, as I discuss in
Chapter 2. Although formalized by the 2006 Juba Declaration and the subsequent integration of the South Sudan Defence Forces and other armed groups, the SPLA had been integrating dissident groups since its inception in the 1980s. For example, elements of Anyanya II were absorbed into the SPLA between 1988 and 1991, and forces loyal to Riek Machar were brought back into the SPLA when he and John Garang reconciled in 2002.

Inclusion in the SPLA was important not only because of the history of factionalism that I discussed in Chapter 2, but also because it became the main purveyor of patronage within the new country’s limited economy. As I argue in Chapter 4, President Kiir’s ‘large tent’ approach to dissent during the interim period demonstrated an enduring commitment on the part of the Government of South Sudan to use military integration to co-opt armed opposition. In this sense, President Kiir’s approach demonstrated the nascent state’s inclusivity while simultaneously working to prevent insurrections that would have destabilized it. As a result of the military integration process, the SPLA became the primary vehicle for political-military accommodation in South Sudan.

In Chapter 3, I discuss how the literature on military integration describes the process as a short-term transitional means by which to contain potential spoilers or convert said spoilers into stakeholders (Colletta and Muggah 2009). Specifically, integration can limit the manpower available for armed group mobilization (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Hall 2009; and Licklider 2014). In Chapters 2 and 4, I discussed how the Government of Sudan supported non-SPLA armed groups during the civil war, the interim period, and the post-independence period. During the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Government of Sudan used armed groups in the South to conduct raids and pacification patrols to generally weaken the SPLA. This divide and rule strategy was necessary to curtail the momentum of SPLA offensives and compensate for the ineffectiveness of the Sudan Armed Forces. The Government of Sudan continued to support non-SPLA groups while preventing the emergence of a cohesive political agenda or command structure within government-aligned militias, which allowed government forces to regain the offensive in the South. In addition, the Government of Sudan was able to establish a cordon sanitaire in the oil-
producing areas of Greater Upper Nile while stoking further intra-ethnic fragmentation and casting the South as ungovernable.

This legacy of factionalism within the southern rebellion and Sudanese government support to non-SPLA armed groups partially explains the imperative on the part of the Government of South Sudan to accommodate such groups lest they become spoilers to the CPA. Both the CPA signatories and facilitators had opposed expanded participation in the peace process, which meant that the agreement created several potential spoilers who then contributed to the subsequent emergence of conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and across the South. In Chapter 4, I argue that military integration both limited the extent to which the Government of Sudan could use OAGs to undermine the Government of South Sudan and prevent the full implementation of the CPA, but also allowed non-SPLA groups to find a way to mitigate their isolation from the peace process. In addition, I argue in this chapter that seeking political-military accommodation with non-SPLA armed groups allowed South Sudan to overcome its history of factionalism and ethnic conflict to consolidate political-military power prior to the 2011 referendum on self-determination.

In Chapter 3, I discussed how the literature argues that integration can give former combatants an ‘insurance policy’ that minimizes the risk that the new military can be easily used against either side (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Møller and Cawthra 2007; Sriram 2008; Hall 2009; and Licklider 2014). In South Sudan, integration allowed armed groups this type of insurance policy, which could be interpreted as an attempt to rectify their exclusion from the CPA peace process, notionally minimizing the risk that the new military could be used by one side against the other. At the same time, integration signalled a genuine commitment to peace and a willingness to compromise, while making the SPLA more diverse and inclusive, which tracks with what the literature says about integration increasing diversity within the military, thereby making it a symbol of national unity (Hall 2009; Licklider 2014).
In sum, considering South Sudan’s history of factionalism, the impact of Khartoum’s meddling, and the imperative to consolidate power during the interim period, the Government of South Sudan was faced with the decision to fight, ignore, or accommodate non-SPLA armed groups. This decision to largely accommodate these armed groups after the CPA arguably allowed the country to avoid a return to conflict that was all but certain considering the relative power, support, and strategic positions of these armed groups. The consolidation of political-military power during the interim period allowed South Sudan to hold divisions at bay long enough for the region to achieve its independence from Sudan via referendum in 2011.

**Research Question 2: Why did this attempt to accommodate armed groups ultimately fail?**

One of the primary reasons the military integration process failed in South Sudan was that the context was not favorable for a process that can be complicated even in the best of situations – with effective political leadership, engaged third parties that are perceived by warring parties to be objective, and capable institutions to manage and finance the process from start to finish. As described in Chapter 1 of this thesis, during South Sudan’s attempt to bring non-statutory armed forces into a statutory security framework, the country faced an extremely challenging political, social, and economic context and a potentially volatile post-conflict security environment. After decades of conflict, South Sudan had unfavourable human development indicators, poor infrastructure, and a limited economic base. During the interim period, South Sudan undertook an unparalleled state-building enterprise in which new government and security force structures were created from scratch as the SPLM/A attempted to transform from guerrilla movement to a political party and a separate non-partisan military under civilian control. Concurrent to the military integration process, the SPLA was undergoing a process of defence transformation that included rightsizing and professionalizing the SPLA, while there was to be a formal process of military integration between the Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLA.
Military integration also failed due to an insufficient focus on overcoming the ethnic, regional, and political divisions covered in Chapter 2. While at times the southern rebellion embodied a unity of purpose, thereby transcending ethnic and regional boundaries, such divisions have been a consistent theme in South Sudan’s recent history and contributed to the ultimate failure of efforts to integrate armed groups into the SPLA. South-South divisions manifested in the conflicts between Anyanya II and the SPLA, conflicts over John Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ platform for the SPLM/A as a revolution aimed at transforming a united Sudan into a secular democratic government, and in the Nasir coup which attempted to unseat Garang as the head of the southern rebellion. The southern rebellion further splintered throughout the 1990s with the subsequent emergence of groups such as SPLM/A-Nasir (also called SPLM/A-United), the South Sudan Independence Movement, SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal, SPLA-Bor, and the South Sudan Defence Force. In addition, divisions continued to manifest even as the South moved towards peace, as exemplified by the Rumbek dispute on the eve of the signing of the CPA and the intra-SPLM tensions that eventually led to the sacking of the cabinet in July 2013 and the eventual outbreak of armed violence almost five months later.

Despite having actors with divergent interests, collective opposition to the North was at times able to galvanize the southern opposition. However, after South Sudan’s independence in 2011, there was little to deter the emergence of divisions in the South. Fissures continued to destabilize the South during the interim period, as I highlighted in Chapter 4, and the government did not place a sufficient emphasis on fostering a new collective identity to fill the void left by opposition to the North. As a result of the SPLA’s habitual absorption of armed groups, the military never succeeded in developing a national ethos and thus remained a confederation of ethnic militias with parochial interests that maintained loyalty to their ethnic groups or former armed group leaders. In addition, whether it was a deliberate decision or merely an oversight, the failure to utilize quotas when integrating armed groups into the SPLA may have also contributed to the failure of the process. The use of quotas could have ensured that that the reconstituted military reflected the ethnic and regional diversity of the country. The fact that the integration of largely Nuer armed groups altered the demographics of the SPLA in their
favour exacerbated this dynamic. Moreover, the post-2012 development of the Mathiang Anyoor, an ethnically-homogenous parallel security force, undermined the spirit of an integrated security force and may have contributed to the ultimate failure of the process, as I argue in Chapter 6.

Another reason integration failed was that elements within the SPLA resisted implementation of the process due to the fact that members of armed groups were essentially being rewarded for their defections with higher ranks and material benefits. Such inflated ranks distributed to officers formerly associated with armed groups diluted power of SPLA loyalists. As I argue in Chapters 4 and 6, the costs of defection from the SPLA were low and the benefits of integration were seemingly unlimited. The open-ended nature of the integration process undermined the premise of justice and accountability, which implied that integration and accountability were mutually exclusive. Consequently, armed group leaders became entrepreneurs of rebellion and could continually use the threat of violence as a bargaining tool to extract professional and material benefits from the government. Moreover, remaining in or integrating into the SPLA was more financially viable than civilian reintegration, considering the limited availability of alternative livelihoods in post-war South Sudan. Open-ended military integration in the context of failed demobilization initiatives also meant that there was no release valve for the SPLA’s excess manpower, thus adding stress to the integration process as the primary means to address armed group violence. In addition, this defection-integration-defection cycle created an opportunity cost for SPLA operations and professionalization of the force.

In Chapter 6, I argued there did not appear to be much long-term planning for military integration – especially on what the desired endstate was and what indications there might be that troops had been integrated and not simply collocated while maintaining command and control linkages to their previous armed group leaders. In this chapter, I argued that better strategic guidance on the part of the government could have allowed the military to articulate a budget, timelines for execution, metrics of success, a long-term
vision and connection to broader security sector reform, and areas for third party actors to plug in and provide support.

Another reason I argue in Chapter 6 for why efforts to integrate armed groups into the SPLA failed was that third party actors involved in transforming South Sudan’s security sector had limited involvement in the integration process, which may have been attributed to a lack of awareness of the importance of implementing integration before advancing to security sector transformation. In addition, the ambiguity of South Sudan’s security sector during the interim period between the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War and South Sudan’s potential independence made it awkward to engage too much with the SPLA lest donors be perceived as endorsing the region’s de facto independence prior to the referendum. The level of financial investment required may have also been prohibitive for such donors, when coupled with traditional post-conflict areas of engagement.

In Chapter 5, I discuss how the concurrent transformation and professionalization of the SPLA, which was contingent on a reduction in force, was intended to run parallel to demobilization initiatives. However, in this chapter, I articulated the multiple impediments to rightsizing the SPLA, which posed another constraint to the implementation of the military integration process. The SPLA was not sufficiently bought into the demobilisation process due to internal and external security concerns. Internally, they feared the threat potential posed by demobilising nonessential personnel into an economy that provided limited livelihoods outside of military or government service. Externally, with independence still on the horizon and not yet secured, and with post-independence tensions along the border with Sudan, the SPLA believed that it was not in the country’s best interest to allow its military strength to atrophy. As a result, instead of reducing in size, the SPLA grew during the interim and post-independence periods, and due to the failure of demobilisation measures to reduce the size of the military, integration became the only reliable way of dealing with armed groups. As I mentioned in Chapter 5, depending on estimates of ghost soldiers on the payroll, the SPLA may
have grown from approximately 40,000 troops in 2005-2006 to in excess of 200,000 by the time the civil war broke out in 2013.

**Research Question 3:** *What are the wider lessons that can be drawn from South Sudan’s attempt at accommodating armed groups during its aborted transition from war to peace?*

Because South Sudan’s experience with military integration between 2006 and 2013 is a veritable case of how not to address the threat posed by non-statutory armed forces during a transition from war to peace, the research findings from this thesis have multiple implications from both academic and policy standpoints.

It is difficult to assess whether military integration leads to sustainable peace. In Chapter 3, I discussed how Krebs and Licklider (2015) found no evidence of causality between integration and sustainable peace, while Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) cautioned that failed integration was both a cause and a symptom of the failure of the broader peace process. Indeed, military integration can be a complex process with several moving parts, and can be challenging to implement given the fragile political, economic, and security contexts of most war-to-peace transitions. As the case of South Sudan demonstrates, the process can have short-term, stabilizing utility while posing long-term, destabilizing risks.

According to the literature on military integration, the process is an interim, transitional measure that can temporarily contain former combatants in a statutory security apparatus so that they do not become spoilers during a transition from war to peace (Colletta and Muggah 2009). As such, the wider lesson based on the case of South Sudan is that military integration should not be an end in and of itself. Instead, the integration process should serve a purpose – be it consolidating power prior to a broader security sector reform process, fostering cohesion within a factionalised security force, or temporarily mitigating the risk that spoilers pose to stability in the aftermath of a conflict.
The literature on military integration also provides insights on the implementation of the process that shed light on wider lessons from the case of South Sudan. Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) caution that many integration agreements are poorly structured and not fully implemented, while Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) argue that the successful implementation of military integration within five years of the end of conflict increases the prospects for lasting peace. Considering South Sudan’s experience with implementing a military integration process, one wider lesson is that it might be useful to articulate a plan for the implementation process that includes timelines for completion and metrics that indicate success, establishes quotas and limits on the number of personnel that can be sustainably integrated, projects estimated costs, highlights best practices based on previous iterations, and proposes how the military will foster cohesion to engender a national ethos to break chains of command from their previous armed group leaders. In addition, better strategic guidance for the integration process may prevent it from being too disconnected from the security sector reform process, which may prevent the new military from being built on an unstable foundation. In South Sudan, SPLA Transformation operated in a very disconnected manner from the remainder of the process and was not approached as a stage to implement en route to eventual SSR but rather as an end in and of itself. As a result of this weak foundation, the SPLA was thus more likely to fracture along ethnic lines, thus undermining the security sector reforms that preceded this disintegration.

While an implementation plan could have helped pinpoint areas where third parties can plug in and offer mediation, logistical/financial/technical support, or act as guarantors of security between warring parties, the literature has not determined whether insufficient third party involvement in a military integration process contributes to the failure of a military integration process (Burgess 2008) or is insufficient to guarantee success (Licklider 2014). Several authors posit that third party actors can minimize the perceived risk of participating in the peace process (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta (2012), add confidence to fully implement peace agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), verify compliance with said agreements (Walter 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Burgess 2008), and compensate for gaps in knowledge or expertise (Dudouet, Giessmann and
Planta 2012). In the complex post-CPA environment, direct third party assistance to South Sudan’s integration process could have helped contribute to a more favourable long-term outcome. At the very least, such involvement would have been unlikely to hurt the implementation of the process. Likewise, third party involvement could may help compensate for the technical and financial deficits of post-conflict countries undergoing a military integration process and help build trust between former adversaries if they are perceived to be fair dealers.

Another lesson from South Sudan’s experience with military integration is that the intervention of political and military elites can have a negative impact on the integrity of the process. In Chapter 4, I discussed how President Kiir’s decision to continually offer amnesty and integration to those who rebelled against the government is what led to the process becoming open-ended over time. President Kiir altered rank allocations in such a manner that was inconsistent with SPLA rules and regulations, thus manipulating the integration process to perpetually buy off armed opposition no matter the cost. In the same chapter, I highlighted how political-military elites would become involved in amnesty negotiations, thereby indicating how important ‘buying peace’ was to the government, thus increasing the bargaining power of armed group leaders. Consequently, armed actors would use violence, or merely the threat of violence to increase their power within state institutions, increase the amount of patronage under their control, or because they were overlooked for promotion or for placement in more influential posts. Meanwhile, the Government of South Sudan was concerned not only about the threat that non-SPLA groups would pose if not brought into the fold of the SPLA, but also about the social and security implications of demobilized former combatants. Knowing how desperately the Government of South Sudan needed to ‘buy peace’ for the sake of stability, armed group leaders could perpetually use the threat of violence as a bargaining tool to resolve political grievances and forestall compliance with the integration process. The lack of pressure on those participating in the military integration process and the fact that they were allowed to maintain control over their former combatants plus the benefits meant that the rewards of an open-ended integration cycle outweighed the risks of defection, as I argue in Chapter 6.
This dynamic highlights the Catch-22 aspect of the military integration process. On one hand, armed groups are integrated due to the imperative to buy peace and consolidate power; on the other hand, this process can undermine efforts to secure justice in the aftermath of conflict and risks creating a demonstration effect for armed group mobilization. Accordingly, another lesson from South Sudan’s experience with integration is that an open-ended integration process undermines justice and accountability mechanisms by failing to hold defectors accountable for betraying the military or committing human rights violations. In addition, by incentivizing armed group leaders to become entrepreneurs of rebellion, open-ended integration can be a burden on military financing in terms of increased personnel salaries, and can also undermine cohesion within the security forces due to defectors being rewarded with higher ranks while the career progression of loyalists is stalled. Continually rewarding defectors with integration into the military may mean that the military is unable to ‘graduate’ from the integration process and focus on professionalization. Another lesson is that the costs of defection must be higher than the costs of remaining in the national military in order to incentivize such entrepreneurial behavior. And while it may not be possible to either offer blanket amnesty or push for the prosecution of all perpetrators of human rights abuses, governments facing this dilemma must decide where to draw the line between accommodation and accountability.

Based on some of the SPLA’s reactions to the integration process, the case of South Sudan indicates that, as a central stakeholder, the military needs to be brought into the amnesty and integration decision-making process early and their equities need to be protected as much as possible so they are less likely to sabotage the implementation of the process. Absent such engagement, there is a danger that the military could marginalize and alienate members of armed groups who have been integrated, which could contribute to the development of armed rebellions in the future. In Chapter 6, I discussed allegations that some SPLA officers overtly or covertly sabotaged the implementation of the integration process in order to avoid rewarding defectors. Such officers viewed integration as contrary to the interests of their institution, as the excess
personnel costs created an opportunity cost for professionalization. In addition, the inflated ranks promised by the president made rank harmonization challenging and created disaffection within the cadre of long-time SPLA loyalists who saw defectors being rewarded for their disloyalty.

The case of South Sudan also offers the lesson that cohesion within a newly integrated military is not necessarily organic. In fact, the leadership of the new military should determine how best to foster cohesion across political, social, and task dimensions in order to discourage newly integrated forces from acting in a parochial manner, encourage a sense of belonging to a national institution, and erode the allegiances and chains of command between members of armed groups and their former leaders. South Sudan’s political and military leadership neglected the need to foster cohesion along these dimensions during the military integration process. As a result, integration was a missed opportunity to replace the galvanizing aspect of opposition to the North, which gradually eroded the closer South Sudan got to achieving independence. Based on my own observations of contemporary plans to reconstitute security forces in the aftermath of conflicts in places such as the Central African Republic and Somalia, I can affirm that this remains an overlooked and poorly understood aspect of engagement during war-to-peace transitions. In short, both national governments and the donor community seem to believe that cohesion within a newly reconstituted military can be willed into existence.

While integration was an opportunity to introduce diversity into South Sudan’s security sector, it was a missed opportunity to create ethnic and regional balance. Thus, the lesson for other instances of military integration is that quotas, which were not employed in South Sudan, may be an important means by which to ensure that the new military is representative of the nation. In an interesting development, the lack of quotas in South Sudan meant that the Nuer ended up comprising a majority of the military despite being an ethnic minority. Arguably, the development of an ethnically homogenous parallel security force outside of the integration process can be traced to the ethnic imbalance within the SPLA and the notion that a given force might not protect the interests of the majority ethnic group, the Dinka. Contrary to the literature on military integration,
political exclusion and the establishment of parallel security forces can undermine the validity of the ‘insurance policy’ that armed groups get, assuming that being a part of the security forces minimizes the risk of the new military being used against either side.

Finally, the case of South Sudan highlights the importance of having a release valve for the security sector during the integration process. When combined with failed demobilization initiatives, an open-ended integration process can increase pressure on the integration as the primary means of addressing armed group violence during war-to-peace transitions. Consequently, military integration and demobilization initiatives need to be linked so that there is less pressure on military integration to address the threats posed by armed groups. A disconnect between integration and demobilization initiatives means that one process can outpace the other – such as the integration of armed groups outpacing ways to flush excess manpower out of the SPLA. A related lesson from the case of South Sudan is that demobilization needs to be financially competitive with a reliable military salary; in order for rightsizing to work, civilian reintegration has to be economically commensurate with remaining part of the military. Absent a financially compelling reason to leave the relative security of the military, the force will be saddled with excess manpower. The operational implications of this included having insufficient equipment, a lack of tactical and strategic mobility, and less of a willingness within the security forces to be more proactive in addressing security concerns across the country.

The Role of Military Integration during War-to-Peace Transitions

In Chapter 1, I stated that, after answering this thesis’ three research questions, I would discuss what the case of South Sudan tell us about the role military integration plays during war-to-peace transitions.

Like South Sudan, many countries attempting a war-to-peace transition may have to deal with the outcome of exclusive peace negotiations, factionalized armed movements, and foreign support for potential spoilers. In these contexts, military integration can help such countries temporarily overcome post-conflict security dilemmas, resolve civil war-era
divisions, and build confidence between formerly warring parties – as was the case in South Sudan during the interim period.

How the military integration process unfolded in South Sudan demonstrates how integration can avert conflict, as some observers note that the Juba Declaration may have averted another round of South-South conflict after the CPA was signed. In South Sudan, integration temporarily took potential spoilers off the battlefield and reduced the manpower available for armed group mobilization. In addition, this decision allowed the Government of South Sudan to outbid the Government of Sudan for the loyalty of potential spoilers to the peace process. Considering the wartime divisions in the South and the Government of Sudan’s use of non-SPLA armed groups to further destabilize the region, the case of South Sudan provides an empirical example of how military integration can serve an important purpose in the short term by allowing formerly warring parties to consolidate political-military power and overcome wartime divisions. From this example, we can also understand how the decision to seek political-military accommodation with former adversaries can allow governments undergoing war-to-peace transitions to achieve a goal that would have been harder, if not impossible, if they were to ignore or attempt to fight armed opponents. In the case of South Sudan, this goal was the 2011 referendum on self-determination, which secured the region’s independence after several decades of conflict within Sudan.

That said, there is an argument to be made that military integration may merely postpone conflict, as the war that broke out in South Sudan in December 2013 was fought over the same sets of grievances that had been raised in 1991 during the Nasir coup and in 2004 in Rumbek, as detailed in Chapter 2. Thus, the case of South Sudan demonstrates that military integration may help avert conflict in the short term, but it is by no means a permanent solution. Moreover, military integration, as shown in this case study, also cannot overcome failed efforts at political accommodation. The case of South Sudan demonstrates how military power-sharing arrangements can become more vulnerable when political power-sharing arrangements start to erode. This was the case in 2010-2011 after the SPLM’s exclusionary electoral practices prompted multiple rebellions, and again
in 2013, as the politics of South Sudan became more exclusionary and the SPLA became embroiled in a political conflict between President Kiir and former Vice President Machar.

South Sudan’s experience with military integration also demonstrates how a military integration process during a transition from war to peace can be an attempt to rectify an exclusive peace process. Members of non-SPLA armed groups were excluded from the peace process that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but were able to participate in the new political-military dispensation through the Juba Declaration and subsequent amnesty and integration agreements. Yet, while integration provided many of these groups some level of assurance that the new security force would not be used against them, the case of South Sudan shows how the notional trust that can be built during an integration process can be undermined by the creation of ethnically homogenous parallel security forces outside the military’s normal chain of command, such as the Mathiang Anyoor.

Besides its inclusive function, the military integration process in South Sudan also diversified the SPLA’s manpower base by integrating primarily Nuer members of non-SPLA armed groups into the command structure of the new national military. In this respect, we can see an example of how integration can attempt to counteract some of the ethnically polarizing elements of the Second Sudanese Civil War within the South. That said, the case of South Sudan demonstrates that integration alone cannot resolve ethnic factionalism, but that during the integration process, the new military must initiate efforts to foster cohesion along political, task, and social dimensions. This sort of cohesion may be an asset once the military embarks on a broader security sector reform process.

The case of South Sudan demonstrates the risk that the integration of armed groups poses to overwhelming a post-conflict military, and highlights the importance of having a means by which to flush excess manpower out of the statutory security forces. The failure of demobilization initiatives to get off the ground in South Sudan indicates that integration may be best executed in a dual-track fashion so as to minimize the pressure on
the integration process as the primary means by which to address the actual or latent threat of armed conflict. Therefore, it is important during war-to-peace transitions that include military integration, for there to be concurrent demobilisation options that are as economically viable as remaining in the military in order to manage potential spoilers to the peace agreement.

Finally, referenced in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Krebs (2014) argues that the failure of military integration can be the ‘canary in the coalmine’, or an early indication that a peace process is in decline, but not the cause of renewed violence. The disintegration of the military integration process in South Sudan certainly fits this mold. While integration contributed to a period of relative stability during the interim period, there were other factors that contributed to this atmosphere – among them, high-level diplomatic engagement and economic support from the international community, and incentives within the South to keep the majority of its divisive tendencies subdued until after independence. In this respect, we can conclude that integration may not itself cause peace, but can contribute to a peaceful atmosphere during a transition from war to peace. Furthermore, the gradual disintegration of the military integration process from the 2010/11 rebellions until the outbreak of war can be understood as an indication that South-South accommodation was in decline, which aligns with Krebs’ argument.

**Contributions to the Field**

This thesis makes several contributions that advance the academic study and practical application of military integration as a potential peace-building mechanism during war-to-peace transitions.

Some of my contributions to the field are based on the examination of the case of South Sudan itself, which was based on information that was previously not well documented or collated. The interviews I conducted with individuals who played a direct role in the implementation of the military integration process provide useful insights as to why this approach was pursued, how it was implemented, why it succeeded in the short term, and
why it ultimately failed in the long term. Thus, this thesis’ examination of South Sudan’s experience with military integration contributes to a body of literature that has largely been focused on DDR and SSR processes.

This thesis also provides a deeper analysis of an ‘inside-out’ approach to how former combatants themselves attempt to consolidate peace. In this thesis, the South Sudanese government and security forces play a primary role, whereas the focus on third party actors such as the United Nations, United States, and United Kingdom is secondary. This stands in contrast to much of the literature on war-to-peace transitions that focuses on the roles that external actors play in shaping the environment, and not enough, in my opinion, on the roles that individuals and groups in the country itself play in shaping the post-conflict outcome.

This thesis also fills a critical gap in understanding the role that bringing armed groups into statutory security frameworks plays in countries transitioning from war to peace. Unlike the existing body of literature on military integration, which casts the process as good or bad, this thesis has demonstrated how integration can be the ‘least bad’ choice for a country attempting a transition from war to peace. As one considers how to address armed groups during such transitions, it is useful to think of accommodation through integration as a potentially lesser evil than fighting or ignoring armed groups. Accordingly, in this thesis, I argue that the Government of South Sudan could either fight, ignore, or accommodate armed groups. The government largely chose accommodation, the option with the fewest immediate drawbacks, which afforded them short-term stability and helped them achieve independence through the referendum on self-determination.

In the context of the increasing use of military integration as an element of contemporary peace agreements, this thesis also illuminates why military integration can benefit short term peace consolidation as a transitional measure, but can become destabilizing if approached as an end in and of itself. Again, integration is not good or bad; such
characterization depends on the purpose the process serves during particular points of the war-to-peace transition.

An additional contribution that this thesis makes to the field is that when confronted with failed demobilization initiatives, an open-ended integration process can increase the pressure on the integration process as the primary means by which to address the threat of armed groups. Furthermore, an open-ended military integration process can make it harder for a military to ‘graduate’ from the process and focus on cohesion and professionalization, making the military prone to fracturing when political-military power-sharing arrangements fall apart.

Finally, this thesis also singles out military integration as a distinct subset of security sector reform and posits that integration can be considered a foundation of broader security sector reform during negotiated settlements to armed conflict. However, the analysis provided on the case of South Sudan in this thesis warns of a disconnect between the military integration process and broader security sector reform, which meant that the security sector was being built on an unstable foundation.

**Additional Research**

Due to the outbreak of civil war near the outset of my research, I was not able to tap into the insights of current or former rebel leaders who had gone through the integration process. As a result, I believe that future research on this topic could benefit from their perspectives on the implementation of the process and whether their experiences contributed to their decision to defect.

As academics and policymakers in this field continually expand their analyses of military integration during war-to-peace transitions, cross-national comparisons might provide useful insights on how integrating non-statutory armed forces into statutory security frameworks might play out in contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia, and Yemen. Specifically, there should be further
examination along the lines of the functional subsets of military integration that I have conceptualized throughout this thesis. Potential research questions include:

- Under what conditions can military power-sharing persist when other power sharing arrangements have collapsed?
- Is there a particular dimension through which a military can foster cohesion that contributes to a more favourable military integration outcome?
- In what circumstances might a particular type of third party support (i.e., technical, financial, logistical) be most effective?
- How should practitioners effectively integrate military integration and security sector reform processes so that they are not disjointed?
Epilogue: The Future of Military Integration in South Sudan

As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, one of the bookends for my analysis was the outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war in December 2013. In the body of this thesis, I have laid out the history of military integration in South Sudan between 2006 and 2013 and offered an assessment as to the peaks and pitfalls of this approach when it comes to managing the threats posed by armed groups. Based on this analysis and the evolution of South Sudan’s civil war, I will now give an overview of the military power-sharing arrangements in the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution on the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) and speculate on the future prospects for military power-sharing in South Sudan.

Following over a year of international pressure, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition as the representative of the armed opposition in South Sudan, the Former Detainees,683 and representatives of the other political parties in South Sudan signed the Agreement on the Resolution on the Conflict in South Sudan. Guarantors to the peace agreement included IGAD heads of state and government, the African Union–High Level Ad hoc Committee for South Sudan and African Union Commission, and international partners as witnesses, including a representative of the United Nations.

Chapter II (Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements) of the ARCSS addresses the issues most relevant to future plans for reconstituting and rightsizing the

683 The term ‘Former Detainees’ refers to a group of prominent politicians arrested by the South Sudanese government in the early days of the conflict and accused of complicity with Riek Machar’s alleged coup attempt. These individuals were subsequently released and participated in the IGAD-mediated peace process in Addis Ababa as a bloc representing the non-armed political opposition. This group of Former Detainees included: Pagan Amum (former Secretary General of the SPLM), Deng Alor Kuol (former Minister of Cabinet Affairs), John Luk Jok (former Minister of Justice), Majak D’Agoot (former Deputy Minister of Defence), Oyay Deng Ajak (former Minister of National Security), Kosti Manibe (former Minister of Finance), Gier Chuang Along (former Minister of Internal Affairs), Cirino Hiteng (former Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports), Madut Biar Yel (former Minister of Telecommunications), and Chol Tong Mayay (former governor of Lakes state). Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior (former presidential advisor and widow of John Garang) later aligned with the Former Detainee bloc without formally joining, although her son Mabior became the spokesman for SPLM-IO. Peter Adwok Nyaba (former Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology) and Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth (former head of mission for the Government of Southern Sudan Mission to the United States) were also detainees, but subsequently joined ranks with the armed opposition.
security forces, as well as broader security sector transformation.\textsuperscript{684} Some highlights that may be relevant to the future of military power-sharing in South Sudan are as follows:

- Article 2 (Separation, Assembly, and Cantonment) stipulates that within 30 days of the signing of the peace agreement, warring parties should separate, assemble, and place forces in cantonment in order to enable accountability, screening, reorganization, disarmament and demobilization, during which said forces would receive non-military logistical supplies.

- Article 3 (National Architecture for Permanent Ceasefire) stipulates that a Temporary National Architecture for the Implementation of Permanent Ceasefire would oversee the unification of the ‘National Defence Forces of South Sudan’ and other security forces.

- Article 5 (Transitional Security Arrangements) stipulates that only Presidential Guards, Joint Integrated Police, and guards assigned to protect military barracks, bases, and warehouses were allowed to be within a 25km radius of Juba.

- Article 6 (Strategic Defence and Security Review) stipulates that a comprehensive assessment of South Sudan’s security sector will be undertaken, to include future command structures, security force functions, size, composition, budget, and DDR requirements. A Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Board would then articulate a Roadmap for Security Sector Transformation, to include the unification of the security forces, DDR, and security sector reform.

- Article 7 (Unification of Forces) stipulates that the Temporary National Architecture for the Implementation of Permanent Ceasefire would oversee the process of unifying the country’s security forces, which was to be completed within 18 months. Based on the outcome of the SDSR assessment, full DDR was to be conducted after reunification, although special cases would go through the DDR process prior to reunification.

Eight months after the ARCSS was signed, former Vice President Riek Machar returned to Juba as First Vice President in a Government of National Unity. However, just over two months later, in July 2016, fighting again broke out in Juba, prompting Machar to once again flee the capital. The following month, Machar was rescued by UN forces in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo following several weeks of pursuit by government forces through the bush. After a brief recovery in Sudan, Machar has since been a ‘guest’ of the South African government and there are allegations that his movements throughout the continent are being physically and diplomatically blocked in order to prevent him from stirring up further trouble in South Sudan.

As it appears at the moment, the events of July 2016 and the aftermath were a watershed in South Sudan’s conflict. In late July, Taban Deng Gai replaced Machar as First Vice President in the Government of National Unity. Although Deng notionally represented the SPLM-IO faction of the government, many speculated that this development was instead a palace coup to cut Machar out of the government and weaken the opposition while strengthening Deng’s own power. In addition, Machar’s flight through Equatoria prompted government forces to commence extremely violent clearing operations, opening up a new conflict front in a region that had largely been immune to the violence that had afflicted other parts of the country since December 2013. There has also been some speculation that such operations were reprisals for the Equatorians allowing, or perhaps more precisely not actively resisting Machar’s path of escape. In addition, the transitional security arrangements in the August 2015 peace agreement had encouraged the mobilisation of armed groups in the Equatorias so that they could benefit, through cantonment as SPLM-IO forces and eventual integration into the SPLA, from what was essentially perceived to be a Dinka-Nuer power-sharing pact that had excluded those residing in the southern region of the country.685 Towards the end of 2016, approximately 3,500 people were fleeing South Sudan daily amid reports of government forces razing villages throughout Equatoria. By early 2017, Bidi Bidi refugee camp in Uganda had

become the largest refugee camp in the world, with an estimated population exceeding 270,000 people as of June 2017.\textsuperscript{686}

At the same time, when compared with previous years, South Sudan has slipped from the international community’s radar, despite warnings of ethnic cleansing towards the end of 2016 and the declaration of famine in two counties in what was formerly Unity state in February 2017. One reason for this is donor fatigue with South Sudan’s political-military elite, which appears not to be genuinely interested in a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Another reason was the flurry of political transitions at the beginning of 2017, with a new United Nations Secretary General, African Union Chairperson, and presidential administration in the United States. Considering this trajectory, the ARCSS is on life support, yet this is yet to be acknowledged or accepted by the negotiators and guarantors in the international community who pushed reluctant parties to sign the agreement in the first place.

As of this writing, the armed opposition is as weak and fractured as it has ever been during the course of the civil war. This means that not only does it have little incentive to place trust in a unity government and reunified security forces, but it also lacks the negotiating power to be integrated on terms its members might find advantageous. In order to regain relative power, the opposition would have to re-establish a conduit of external support. At the outset of the conflict, this would have naturally come from the Government of Sudan, however, Sudan appears to have calculated in the latter half of 2016 that it was much more advantageous to pursue actions that would allow it to ‘come out from the cold’ after two decades of a strict sanctions regime imposed by the West in response to the country’s previous support for terrorist organizations and its campaign of genocide in Darfur. One of these such actions, according to the terms of a five-track plan\textsuperscript{687} between the Obama Administration and the Government of Sudan, includes


agreeing to cease support to South Sudanese rebel movements. This has essentially starved South Sudan’s armed opposition of support, and is one of the reasons Machar has had difficulties regrouping the opposition or using Khartoum as a platform since his escape from Juba. Sudan’s deal with the United States is likely to be upheld under the new administration, and it is equally likely that this will continue to deter the Government of Sudan from supporting the armed opposition in South Sudan. In addition, it is also possible that other regional powers such as Ethiopia, Uganda, or Egypt may eventually decide that it is in their economic or security interests to intervene to tip the balance in favour of either the government or armed opposition. As of this writing, there is speculation that Egypt may throw its support to the Government of South Sudan in order to diplomatically and militarily encircle Ethiopia as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is completed in the coming years.688 (The dam is being constructed on the Blue Nile, and Egypt believes that the filling of the dam and the evaporation of water from the reservoir will have a negative impact on downstream water flows, thereby threatening the country’s water security.) There is also speculation that Ethiopia may decide to back a new wave of Equatorian armed opposition, having become fed up with the destructive Kiir-Machar struggle for power. What appears to be increasingly likely is the potential expansion of what has long been a regional proxy war amidst a moribund peace process and a catastrophic humanitarian outlook.

Yet recent months (as of July 2017) there have been indications of limited progress. In May 2017, the Government of South Sudan declared a unilateral ceasefire and announced its intent to launch a National Dialogue with opposition groups. During the same month, President Kiir dismissed SPLA Chief of Army Staff General Paul Malong, who by his somewhat overblown reputation had been responsible for some of the most egregious decisions the government had made since his appointment in April 2014. In his place, Kiir appointed General James Ajongo, who by reputation, lacks the baggage that Malong had domestically and within the donor community.

That said, these changes appear to be a façade, and there continue to be indications that
the Government of South Sudan is not making good faith efforts towards a peaceful
resolution of the conflict. During the May 2017 SPLA reshuffle, Lieutenant General
Marial Chanuong, former commander of the Presidential Guard who was responsible for
some of the events that accelerated the crisis in December 2013, including the Juba
massacre, was promoted as head of the Ground Forces. For his previous endeavours
during the conflict, Chanuong had been sanctioned by the United States and the United
Nations Security Council. On the humanitarian front, in spite of the determination in June
2017 that parts of South Sudan were no longer experiencing famine, the number of
people facing ‘emergency’ levels of food insecurity (one level below a famine
declaration) increased from 5.5 million to 6 million people – half of South Sudan’s
population. In addition, there are now almost two million South Sudanese refugees in the
region\textsuperscript{689} and approximately a quarter of a million people seeking refuge in UNMISS
Protection of Civilians camps in Bor, Malakal, Juba UN House, Bor, Melut, and Wau.\textsuperscript{690}
Meanwhile, the Government of South Sudan continued to impede access into areas with
opposition presence and otherwise hamper the humanitarian response by charging a
$3,500 registration fee for non-governmental organizations responding to the
population’s needs.

The collapse of the peace agreement in July 2016 demonstrated one of the shortcomings
of the plan for the reunification of South Sudan’s security forces. While there were
guarantors of the ARCSS on paper, none possessed the neutrality, credibility, clout, and
the willingness to employ military force to constrain warring parties from violating the
peace agreement. This shortcoming was on full display when fighting again broke out in
Juba between government forces and those of the opposition in July 2016. The United
Nations, long viewed with suspicion in South Sudan, again failed to contain the violence;
their restricted freedom of motion was exemplified by the delayed UNMISS attempts to
secure clearance from the SPLA to medevac wounded Chinese peacekeepers to a Level 2

\textsuperscript{689} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR South Sudan Situation,”
\textsuperscript{690} “UNMISS PoC Update No. 169,” Text, \textit{ReliefWeb}, (June 20, 2017), http://reliefweb.int/report/south-
sudan/unmiss-poc-update-no-169.
hospital at the UN base a mere 15km away from where they had been injured to receive live-saving treatment. (In the end, the Chinese contingent had to leverage their bilateral relationship with the government to secure clearance, although this was not soon enough for two of the peacekeepers who bled out after 16 hours without medical assistance.)

The manner in which UNMISS forces reacted to the outbreak of violence in July – abandoning their posts along the perimeters of some of the Protection of Civilian (POC) camps – reflected previous problems that had occurred within such camps earlier that year in Malakal. One of the proposed solutions to attempt to repair the peace agreement after the outbreak of fighting in July was the deployment of a 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force (RPF) to secure Juba so that opposition forces could return and assume their positions in the Government of National Unity. However, as of this writing (July 2017), this force is minimally closer to deploying to Juba than they were when initially proposed almost a year ago. For the foreseeable future, I would expect that the government will continue to obstruct this deployment with little chance of negative ramifications. As evidence of the weak negotiating power of international guarantors to the ARCSS, paper tiger threats to impose an arms embargo on the government should it fail to sufficiently comply with the RPF deployment failed to secure sufficient votes in the UN Security Council in December 2016. The halting RPF deployment and the baggage of UNMISS failures to protect civilians in South Sudan raise the question of how credible such forces could be as guarantors of security during a future notional reunification of the security forces.

This is all to say that despite a few recent indications that the situation in South Sudan is on the rebound, it continues to be an extremely challenging context for the resolution of the conflict, and an even more challenging context for any efforts to integrate any armed opposition into the SPLA. Given the current state of affairs, and especially with the last attempt at putting South Sudan back together failing so spectacularly, I would conclude that the prospects for military integration in the near future appear to be dim. As of this writing, warring parties in South Sudan have not yet concluded that they cannot win militarily. If one were to understand South Sudan’s pathways to military integration
according to the options I laid out in this thesis, warring parties are still fixated on fighting rather than ignoring or accommodating one another. In order for this to change, the current combatants must again calculate that integration is their least bad option or one side must be defeated militarily.

Yet, even if combatants were to pursue a military integration arrangement, they would face several impediments. Not only is there a serious deficit in trust that would undermine any future attempts at integration, but donor nations are also becoming increasingly sceptical of further non-humanitarian investment in South Sudan given the unfavourable prospects for peace. I do not foresee many countries determining that South Sudan warrants sufficient geostrategic importance to warrant significant logistical, financial, or technical support to a future integration process. Likewise, considering the escalating violence in many parts of the country, I would not think it likely that donor nations would risk making their personnel guarantors of security in order to compensate for the trust deficit between government forces, SPLM-IO forces, and other armed movements that may or may not have been party to the August 2015 peace deal.

In addition, as I mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, there are some in South Sudan’s national security apparatus who adhere to the hardline view that accommodation through military integration caused the current conflict. To a less extreme extent, there are those who believe that the government’s emphasis on ‘buying peace’ ultimately failed, and they have not pursued the line of inquiry as to what went wrong in order to understand what the government and the security forces could do to avoid repeating past mistakes if integration, amalgamation, or reunification were to be attempted again. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain whether third party actors have themselves learned the lessons from South Sudan’s previous experience with integration and have accordingly made integration and concurrent demobilization mechanisms the primary foundations of future security sector reform efforts. Consequently, I am not optimistic that South Sudan is in a position to implement integration in a way that could decrease the threat posed by non-SPLA groups in the near future.
Appendix A: CPA Protocol on Security Arrangements

Whereas the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (the Parties) have been conducting negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya, since 2nd September, 2003 under the auspices of the IGAD Peace Process; and

Whereas the Parties reiterated their commitment to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the Sudan Conflict within the Unity of Sudan as set forth in the Machakos Protocol of 20th July 2002; and

Now Record That within the above context, the Parties have reached specific agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, the initialed text of which is annexed hereto and which will be subsequently incorporated into the final Peace Agreement; and

It Is Agreed And Confirmed That the Parties shall immediately resume negotiations on the remaining outstanding issues and subsequently negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire agreement in order to achieve a final, comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan.

Hon. Idris Mohamed Abdelgadir
For: The Government of the Sudan

Cdr. Pa'gan Amum Oklech
For: The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

Witnessed By:
Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiwywo (Rtd)
Special Envoy
IGAD Sudan Peace Process and
On behalf of the IGAD Envoys

Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period Between The Government of the Sudan (GOS) and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA)

1. Status of the Two Armed Forces:
   1. In the context of a united Sudan, and should the result of the referendum on self-determination confirm unity, the Parties (the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army) agree to the formation of the future army of Sudan that shall be composed from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).
2. As part of a peace agreement and in order to end the war, the Parties agree that the two forces, the SAF and the SPLA shall remain separate during the Interim Period, and further agree that both forces shall be considered and treated equally as Sudan's National Armed Forces during the Interim Period taking into consideration 1 (c) below.

3. The parties agree to the principles of proportional downsizing of the forces on both sides, at a suitable time, following the completion of the comprehensive ceasefire arrangements.

4. The national Armed Forces shall have no internal law and order mandate except in constitutionally specified emergencies.

2. Ceasefire:
The parties agree to an internationally monitored ceasefire which shall come into effect from the date of signature of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Details of the Ceasefire Agreement shall be worked out by the two parties together with the IGAD mediators and international experts.

3. Redeployment:
   1. The two forces shall be disengaged, separated, encamped and redeployed as will be detailed in the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement.
   2. Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of the forces of SAF currently deployed in the South shall be redeployed North of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 under international monitoring and assistance within and up to two and one half years (2 1/2) from the beginning of the pre-Interim Period.
   3. Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of the SPLA forces currently deployed in Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile shall be redeployed South of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 as soon as the Joint/Integrated Units are formed and deployed under international monitoring and assistance.
   4. The SPLM/A undertakes that the demobilized Southern Sudanese from those currently serving in SAF in Southern Sudan shall be absorbed into various institutions of the Government of Southern Sudan along with demobilized SPLA soldiers.
   5. The parties agree to implement with the assistance of the international community DDR programmes for the benefit of all those who will be affected by the reduction, demobilization and downsizing of the forces as agreed in 1(c), 3(d) and 7(b).

4. Joint/Integrated Units:
There shall be formed Joint/Integrated Units consisting of equal numbers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) during the Interim Period. The Joint/Integrated Units shall constitute a nucleus of a post referendum army of Sudan, should the result of the referendum confirm unity, otherwise they would be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces.

   4.1 Elaboration On Joint/Integrated Units:
a. Their Character:
   They should have a new character based on a common doctrine.
b. Their Functions:
   i. They will be a symbol of national unity during the Interim Period.
   ii. They will be a symbol of sovereignty during the Interim Period.
   iii. They will participate in the defense of the country together with the two forces.
   iv. They will provide a nucleus of a post Interim Period future army of the Sudan should the vote of referendum confirm unity.
   v. They shall be involved in the reconstruction of the country.
c. Size and Deployment:
   The size and deployment of the Joint/Integrated Units throughout the Interim Period shall be as indicated below:-
   1. Southern Sudan: twenty four thousands (24,000)
   2. Nuba Mountains: six thousands (6,000)
   3. Southern Blue Nile: six thousands (6,000)
   4. Khartoum: three thousands (3,000)
   5. Eastern Sudan:
      a. The redeployment of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan to South of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 shall be completed within one (1) year from the beginning of the pre-Interim period.
      b. The parties shall discuss the issue of establishing Joint/Integrated Units.

5. Command and Control of the Two Forces:
   1. The Parties agree to establish a Joint Defence Board (JDB) under the Presidency, and shall be comprised of the chiefs of staff of the two forces, their deputies and any number of senior officers to be agreed to by the parties. It shall take its decisions by consensus and it shall be chaired alternately by the respective Chiefs of Staff.
   2. Functions of JDB: The JDB shall perform the following functions:
      a. Co-ordination between the two forces.
      b. Command of the Joint Integrated Units.

6. Common Military Doctrine:
   The parties shall develop a common military doctrine as a basis for the Joint/Integrated Units as well as a basis for a post Interim Period army of the Sudan, if the referendum vote is in favour of unity. The parties shall develop this common doctrine within one year from the beginning of the Interim Period. During the Interim Period, the training of the SPLA (in the South), the SAF (in the North) and the joint units (in both North and South) will be based on this common doctrine.

7. Status of Other Armed Groups In the Country:
   1. No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces.
2. The Parties agree that those mentioned in 7(a) who have the desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either Party (Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.

3. The parties agree to address the status of other armed groups in the country with the view of achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country and to realize full inclusiveness in the transition process.

8. National Security Organs and Police forces:
Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the Police, and National Security Organs shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing arrangements, and tied where is necessary to the appropriate level of the executive.

Done at Lake Naivasha Simba Lodge Date: Thursday, September 25th, 2003
Appendix B: Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defence Forces

8 January 2006

PREAMBLE

The SPLA and SSDF having met in Juba between the 6th and 8th January, 2006 and fully aware of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) regarding the status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG’s).

• Committed to upholding and defending the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its full implementation;
• Motivated by their desire for peace, reconciliation and unity among the people of Southern Sudan;
• Determined to end all forms of conflict and hostilities among themselves, so as to usher a new era of hope, stability and sustainable development in Southern Sudan;
• Further determined to build trust and confidence among themselves and to avoid past mistakes that have led to divisions and internecine conflict between themselves and among the people of Southern Sudan in general;
• Cognizant of the fact that the SPLM led Government has already included members of the SSDF in the institutions of Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States to ensure SSDF participation;
• Acknowledging that the people of Southern Sudan have one indivisible destiny;
• Inspired by the struggle and the immense sacrifices and suffering of our people in defence of their land, freedom, dignity, culture identity and common history; and
• Remembering our fallen heroes, heroines and martyrs who paid the ultimate price for the freedom of our people and to ensure that these sacrifices are not in vain;

Do hereby make the following Declaration to be known as the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration:

• Complete and unconditional unity between the SPLA and SSDF.
• Agree to immediately integrate their two forces to form one unified, non-partisan Army under the name of SPLA as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
• Immediate and total cessation of all forms of hostilities and to ensure that all their forces and persons under their control observe and comply with this declaration.
• Guarantee freedom of movement of people, goods and services in all areas in Southern Sudan.
• Declaration of general amnesty covering any criminal acts committed during the past period of hostilities between the two forces.
• Appeal to any armed persons or groups outside the two forces to join the process of unity and reconciliation in order to promote peace, stability and development throughout Southern Sudan.
• The unified Movement shall mobilize the people of Southern Sudan behind this agreement and to support its implementation.

IMPLEMENTATION

In implementation of this declaration the two parties agree to form the following committees:

1. High Political Committee

There shall be a High Political Committee to oversee the overall implementation of this unity agreement. It shall be established by the Chairman of the SPLM and C- in - C of SPLA in consultation with Major- General Paulino Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the SSDF.

2. Military Technical Committee

There shall be established a Military Technical Committee consisting of equal numbers to implement the terms of this declaration. It shall be established by the Chairman of the SPLM and C- in - C of SPLA in consultation with Major General Paulino Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the SSDF. The Joint Military Technical Committee shall report to the High Political Committee and handle inter alia the following issues:

• Integration of SSDF into the SPLA and its command structures and all its component units including the Joint Integration Units.
• Harmonisation of ranks and deployment of forces and to report to the principals.
• Handle issues of demobilisation and downsizing of forces in accordance with the provisions of the CPA.
• Report to the High Political Committee on all matters relating to this Unity Declaration.

3. Administrative and Civil Service Committee

This committee shall deal with the integration of non military personnel of SSDF into the Civil Service of the Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States.

Call on the National Congress Party and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) calls upon its partner the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to support this agreement which has been guided by the provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement regarding the status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG’s). The decision by the SSDF to be integrated into the SPLA is a legitimate decision which will consolidate peace and security in Southern Sudan and the Sudan at large. The two parties signatory to the agreement call on all other Sudanese political forces to support this declaration.

Appeal to the International Community

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The two parties also appeal to the international community to support this agreement as it will consolidate peace in the Sudan and bring about lasting peace among the people of Southern Sudan.

- H.E Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, 1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan, Chief of Staff of Southern Sudan, Chairman of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of SPLA.
- Major General Paulino Matip Nhial President of the Government of South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF)

**Witnessed by**

Mr. Aaron R. Tuikong S.S. Chief Executive, Moi Africa Institute (MAIN)
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