A Post Make-Believe Definition of Fiction

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Report on Corrections

Parts before Chapter 1: Examiners provided no specific instructions. I changed the tone and wording to match subsequent changes in the dissertation. I have also modified the introductions and conclusions of every chapter that contain corrections.

Chapter 1: The author needs to clarify the relationship between belief and make-belief. He attributes the view that belief and make-belief are inconsistent to a number of authors (Currie, Walton), but it is implausible that they hold this view. The author also seems to accept the view, but he provides little argument for it, nor does he address arguments (presented by Nichols and others) that it is possible to simultaneously imagine that p and believe that p.

Me: I removed the incorrect views on Currie and Walton, and indicated that Nichols and Stich’s view will be addressed in Chapter 2 since it indeed provides a somewhat plausible defence that leads to a deeper understanding of the so-called problems of make-believe theories proposed by Friend.

The author needs to reconsider the argument against Lamarque and Olsen on the top of page 33. (It is hard to see why the rejection of assertions in fictional works presents a difficulty for making sense of learning from fiction.)

Me: I have cancelled this point.

The author needs to reconsider his claim that Walton would exclude In Cold Blood and Schindler’s Ark from the category of fiction. This is inconsistent with standard interpretations of Walton and, hence, should be dropped or defended in much greater detail.

Me: I have cancelled this view, and adopted the mainstream view that Walton’s account is too inclusive since it includes nonfiction made with intentional fabrications In Cold Blood as a work of fiction.

Chapter 2: The author needs to clarify the Currie/Ravenscroft claim that imagination ‘mimics’ belief in virtue of sharing an inferential pattern. The material on p. 53 seems to show a misunderstanding of the view (the inferential pattern for imagining is meant to be ‘within’ imagination as it were), and the later arguments against C&R seem to infer from the fact that there are inferential differences that there are not similarities.

Me: I cancelled my criticisms of Currie and Ravenscroft, and added the account of Nichols and Stich to explain how pretence/make-believe imagination resembles belief. As a result, I changed my initial rejection of imagination-based theories, now believing that they have not explained the functional role of make-believe when comprehending works of fiction. Nichols’s examples of pretence all have their specific functional roles, so, comparatively, it is unclear about what the functional role of make-believe imagination in fiction is. It does not mean that make-believe theories are to be rejected. I only maintain that they are not sufficiently substantiated. I then made the point that my account will explain as much in a later part of my pro-
ject, even though it has the cost of undermining the relation between fiction and make-believe.

Chapter 3: This chapter is the most problematic section of the dissertation and requires a thorough reworking. The reworking might either sketch Friend’s view and note that Friend is not strictly speaking offering a definition of fiction but then argue that this is too pessimistic for the author will produce a workable definition later. Or it might defend the claims made against Walton and Friend. The author needs to reconsider his interpretation of both Walton and Friend. The claim that Walton cannot recognize impressionist paintings as paintings (p. 83) is implausible. If this is true, the author needs to do much more to establish it. (And it would be worthy of a paper on its own.) There are three major issues with the interpretation of Friend: (1) the author criticizes Friend for presenting an unsuccessful definition of fiction, but Friend does not appear to offer a definition of fiction, (2) it is entirely unclear why Friend cannot accept the existence of cross-media genres (whether or not Walton allows for them). It is worth remembering that Friend’s account of genre is not precisely the same as Walton’s account of categories since she is not focused on ‘perceptual categories’; (3) the author runs together the standard features with the intentional-historical features in Friend’s definition.

Me: I cancelled my criticisms against Walton, and thus rendered the part on Walton purely descriptive. For (1), I maintain that, even as a signpost for further research, Friend is not addressing the problem addressed by make-believe theories, and added an argument followed from my revision in Chapter 2 that there is no good reason to abandon the clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction proposed by imagination-based theories to buy into her approach. I pointed out that the foundation of Friend’s genre theory is the failure of make-believe in her eyes. However, my revised version of chapter 2 shows that her criticisms can indeed be addressed by make-believe theories, given some deep understanding of the similarity between imagination and belief. I cancelled (2) and (3).

Chapter 4: The ingenious argument against Deutsch’s account of fiction needs to be fleshed out in more detail. In particular, the assumptions that are required to make the argument should be made more explicit and a consideration of potential replies by Deutsch should be included.

Me: I cancelled my application of Russell’s Paradox when discussing P2. I added how Deutsch may respond to my argument against his P1 and have added other problematic cases, in which P1 and P2 together lead to at least one very undesirable consequence if Deutsch’s account is to be accepted.

Chapter 5: No change needed.

Me: No changes made.

Chapter 6&7: The discussion of interior properties is a bit quick. Is it obvious that characterization, for example, is an interior/intrinsic property of a fiction? The nature of a fictional character often depends on things that are true in other fictions (e.g., consider the nature of a vampire). There are similar concerns
about style of writing (which may depend on an author’s corpus). The examiners would like to see these issues discussed.

Me: I added the relevant discussion on how the focus on interior properties in my preliminary idea of fiction is not affected by the discussions of characterisation and writing style by maintaining that (1) the interior properties are an always important focus but not the only focus; and (2) the interior properties of a work of fiction are still necessary when discussing characterisation and writing style of a particular work of fiction.
A Post Make-Believe Definition of Fiction

Felix Ka Shun Chan

PhD Philosophy
Abstract

The question of what exactly constitutes a work of fiction has been contested for decades, with no clear conclusion. While there are several factions of philosophers, each with their preferred definitions, none are widely accepted definitions. Most, when used, often include some works of nonfiction as works of fiction, or exclude some works that are clearly works of fiction. In this thesis, I will use an interdisciplinary methodology to provide a new definition of fiction that avoids these pitfalls.

In Chapters 1 and 2, I show that it is implausible to take propositional imagination as a necessary component of a definition of fiction without any further clarification of the role of make-believe imagination in fiction and that a plausible definition of fiction should not include the role of the audience.

In Chapter 3, I evaluate Stacie Friend’s genre approach, as probably the most popular non-make-believe approach.

In Chapter 4, I cover Harry Deutsch’s often-ignored approach, discuss its problems, and outline its contributions.

In Chapter 5, I reject Matravers’s scepticism by showing that there is a meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction using the findings from social science experiments.
In Chapter 6, I construct my own definition of fiction by interpreting the findings from in Chapter 5 along with the concepts of interior properties, phenomenal concept, and end value. I then address the issue of assertions in fiction, why it is such a problem for many existing definitions, and how it can be overcome by my definition.

In Chapter 7, I discuss miscellaneous issues that arise in defining fiction, address them using my definition, and how my account complements an iconic theory in a related debate.

In Chapter 8, I conclude the work with an overview of what I have argued, my definition of fiction, and how I have contributed to several philosophical debates.
Acknowledgements

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I am also grateful to a number of other people for providing significant help and inspiration for my work. I thank Peter Lamarque and Paisley Livingston for their generosity in sharing their insights on several issues in the current project. I also thank both of them, together with Stein Olsen and Neven Sesardic, for their inspirational teaching.
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Introduction

The definition of fiction has been a hotly contested question in the world of philosophy since the early 1990s. In my thesis, I will contribute to this discussion by first demonstrating that the most widely accepted theories of fiction are not sufficiently well-argued for, then showing that fiction is distinct from nonfiction in a meaningful way, then providing a new definition of fiction free from any of the defects found in the currently available theories.

I have arranged my project to start with an overview of the dominant theories of fiction, beginning with those that contain imagination as a necessary component. After demonstrating that they are implausible, I will introduce an alternative: a genre approach to explaining the idea of fiction, which still contains imagination as a component, albeit an optional one. Although this approach may not be a fully worked-out definition of fiction, I will still argue that the plausibility of adopting such approach is questionable. Having evaluated those theories containing imagination, I will address and evaluate Deutsch’s poetic license theory.

After showing that the dominant theories of fiction are implausible, I will then address the sceptical argument, which argues that a definition of fiction is unnecessary because there is no meaningful distinction between fiction and non-fiction. I will show how this scepticism is founded on a misunderstanding of certain findings from the field of social science.
Having now cleared the field, I will introduce my own definition of fiction, and demonstrate its plausibility in the face of issues that cannot be satisfactorily and comprehensively resolved by other definitions of fiction.

**Project Overview**

In Chapters 1 and 2, I show that it is not sufficiently plausible to take propositional imagination as a necessary condition of fiction without further clarifying the functional role of imagination when one is either creating or comprehending a work of fiction and that a plausible definition of fiction should not presume any role of the audience.

In Chapter 3, I question the plausibility of Friend’s genre approach, even without taking it as a fully worked out theory of fiction, like those make-believe theories.

In Chapter 4, I cover Deutsch’s often-ignored approach. Although it is implausible as a definition of fiction, it does show that fiction can be defined without imagination and in a way that does not require the role audience.

In Chapter 5, I reject Matravers’s scepticism by showing that there is a meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction, particularly in the normative aspect, using the findings from social science experiments.
In Chapter 6, I construct my own definition of fiction by interpreting the findings mentioned in chapter 5 along with the concepts of interior properties, phenomenal concepts, and end value. I then address the issue of assertions in fiction, showing why it is such a problem for many existing definitions of fiction, and how my definition can accommodate it.

In Chapter 7, I discuss miscellaneous issues that arise in defining fiction, including those that challenge general definitions of fiction as well as my own, such as the question of whether myths are fiction. I finish by using my definition to resolve these issues.

The Significance of This Project

My project differs from all other research on the topic in several key ways. First, I produce a new definition of fiction that does not explain fiction in terms of imagination and is thus free of the problems associated with the dominant, imagination-based approach. While Deutsch’s account is also non-imagination-based, it leads to undesirable results, as I will demonstrate.

Second, my project uses a unique methodology that involves making use of both social science findings and philosophical theories. This demonstrates the interdisciplinary significance of research about fiction, and how the strengths of social science research (regulated data gathering and objective verification of findings, particularly when it comes to intuition tests) and philosophy (conceptual
analysis, evaluation of arguments, and well-structured argumentation) can complement each other and enhance both fields.

Finally, my project makes use of valuable philosophical ideas that have yet to be used for defining fiction. While most philosophers in this debate work with a similar set of ideas, such as imagination and intention, I show how other ideas, including phenomenal concept, interior properties, and end value, are also very useful.
Chapter 1

Imagination-Based Theories of Fiction

I will begin by addressing the dominant theories of fiction, which I call “imagination-based theories”. These types of theories take imagination to be a necessary condition of any work of representation to be works of fiction, and they usually emphasise on authorial intention. In this chapter, I will discuss the implausibility of imagination-based theories and show that despite the implausibility of these theories generally, the emphasis on authorial intention is plausible.

There are two types of imagination-based theories: the first is the bottom up approach, in which fiction is defined in terms of fictive utterances. This includes theories by Gregory Currie and David Davies. The second is the top down approach, in which fiction is defined as a whole. This includes those theories that treat all utterances in a work of fiction as fictive utterances, including assertions and factual statements, such as that of Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen.

It is important to address these two types of theories separately, because rejecting one does not necessarily entail rejecting the other. By the end of this chapter, I will show that the bottom up approach faces a significant difficulty in the relationship between utterances in fiction and a work of fiction as a whole. I will also show that the top down approach is implausible, but the method of defining a work of fiction as a whole is useful and preferable.
I will begin this chapter by presenting the iconic imagination-based theory of Currie to familiarise readers with the typical facets of an imagination-based theory and to clearly define the terms of use.

**Getting a Sense of the Field and Terminology with Currie’s Approach**

I’ll begin by addressing Currie’s (1990) definition of fiction. This is a particularly suitable theory to start with, as it is one of the earliest theories to introduce imagination and the intention of the author as necessary components of a definition of fiction. While there have been many attempts to improve on his theory, those two necessary conditions have remained unchanged throughout subsequent imagination-based theories. Finally, Currie’s approach faces an issue common to all imagination-based theories: the difficulty to place the role of assertions in fiction.

Imagination-based theories are built on a comparison of fiction and nonfiction to make-belief and belief. In these theories, imagination is make-believe. According to Currie (1990), the attitude of make-believe is different from the attitude of belief. This difference defines the difference between fiction and nonfiction,

“What distinguishes the reading of fiction from the reading of nonfiction is not the activity of the imagination but the attitude we adopt towards the

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1 While imagination plays a central role in this dominant approach, I will not here define or evaluate definitions of imagination because I will address this in the next chapter, and because some of the theories in this debate do not involve a definition of imagination at all. Therefore, as I evaluate imagination-based theories in this chapter, I will do so with the presumption that what the author of the theory says about imagination is plausible. I will instead focus on whether imagination-based theories themselves are plausible.
content of what we read: make-belief in the one case, belief in the other” (p. 21).

Although this quote does not define what make-believe or imagination is, it makes some basic but important points. First, Currie relates fiction to imagination or make-believe; and relates non-fiction to belief. Second, Currie states that make-believe imagination is an attitude distinct from belief. Currie and other philosophers like Shaun Nichols did produce some expositions of the similarities and differences between imagination and belief, but I shall discuss them in chapter 2 since this chapter, chapter 1, is more like of a critical literature review of several dominant theories of fiction.

Before going further into Currie’s definition, it is important to clarify several issues of terminology. In the above quote, “make-believe” and “imagination” are used interchangeably. Currie (1990) thinks “make-believe” is a more specific term compared to “imagination” because it does not include visualisation and only includes certain particular attitude towards propositions in fiction (p. 21), though he also recognises this interchangeability in terms:

“What the author of fiction does intend is that the reader take a certain attitude toward the propositions uttered in the course of his performance. This is the attitude we often describe, rather vaguely, in terms of ‘imaginative involvement’ or (better) ‘make-believe’. We are intended by the author to make believe that the story as uttered is true” (p. 18).

The wording of Currie’s theory is not controversial in the debate on the definition of fiction. Thus, I will accept the interchangeability amongst “propositions”, “statements”, and “verbal utterances” in this debate. Nevertheless, I will only use
the term “utterance” in my project, because I will only discuss the different types of utterances in the context of the words found in works of fiction. Therefore, I only focus on utterances and am not interested in any particular theory of propositions or statements.

The second terminology issue is that of the word “author”. I recognise the complexity and subtlety of the debate about authorship, as delineated by Paisley Livingston (2005) in his book *Art and Intention*. Thus, by this “author”, I only mean the person who produces a work of fiction, nonfiction, or a work of representation. I do not to take any stance in the debate on authorship.

Finally, when I use the phrase “apprehending a work” in this project, I am referring to the process of a person having a first-hand experience of a work of representation. Apprehension, in the way used in this project, includes reading, listening, watching, and any other sense in which a work of representation can be experienced.

**The Bottom up Approach: Discussing Currie’s Account and Its Problems**

Currie (1990) begins his account of fiction by clarifying the aim of his definition: he is attempting to define what makes a work of representation a work of fiction (p. 2). His first premise is that one cannot differentiate fiction from nonfiction solely by the difference in their respective texts, which includes both the syntactic and semantic properties of any language. He claims that there is no linguistic or
semantic feature (such as containing an untrue utterance) that is necessarily shared by all works of fiction, but cannot be found in any nonfiction.

Consequently, fiction must not be defined by text alone. Currie’s (1990) solution is that fiction must be defined by the context of its creation, which includes the author’s intention. For him, fiction is set of utterances produced with a fictive intention by an act of communication (p. 11).

I shall grant Currie’s first premise in the entire project for the sake of evaluating this argument; however, it is important to note that his second premise is not developed from it. Like many of the make-believe theorists after him, Currie (1990) applies the theories of utterance meaning by H.P. Grice because he treats fiction as an act of communication:²

“The author who produces a work of fiction is engaged in a communicative act, an act that involves having a certain kind of intention: the intention that the audience shall make believe the content of the story that is told” (p. 24).

Therefore, the idea of fictive intent is produced by treating the creation of fiction as an act of communication, and by the application of the Gricean theory of communication.

² Gricean theory, as presented by Currie, states that the purpose of linguistic communication is defined by the intention of the utterer, the audience’s recognition of the intention in question, and the inferences that can be drawn about the speaker’s intention from the utterance, including the speaker’s behaviour. Currie (1990) outlines it thus: “For communicative purposes it is important, therefore, not only that I intend you to believe what I say; it is also important that you recognize this intention. And usually it will be easy for you to infer that this is my intention because that is the only reasonable hypothesis that makes sense of my behaviour” (p. 25).
The Idea of a Work

It is important here to clarify that Currie does not consider a set of utterances to be a collection of texts, but rather as a work of fiction. The definition of what constitutes a work is important when coming up with a definition of fiction; however, the definition of work is a largely unsettled debate. Thus, a plausible definition of a work of fiction should presume no definition of work and must be consistent with any definition that can reasonably be used for work. Even more importantly, a plausible definition of a work of fiction is not a definition of a fictional text.³

Currie’s Fictive Utterance Theory

Currie (1990) argues that fiction must be differentiated from nonfiction by the intention with which its author makes a set of utterances, as well as the use of imagination:

“(D0) U’s statement of S is fictive if and only if (iff) U utters S intending that the audience will

1) Recognize that S means P;
2) Recognize that S is intended by U to mean P;
3) Recognize that U intends them (the audience) to make-believe that P;
4) Make-believe that P.

³ For a further delineation of the distinction between work and text, see Chapter 7.
And further intending that

5) (2) will be a reason for (3);

6) (3) will be a reason for (4)” (p. 31).

(Although Currie uses the term “statement” in the quote, I treat it as an utterance to avoid complications in defining a statement.) I agree with the emphasis on authorial intention, but I disagree with Currie’s way of using it, which involves the presupposition that the author intends to have the work of fiction experienced by at least one audience member. I also disagree with his emphasis on imagination.

Fiction Created for No One: Without an Audience, The Author’s Intention for an Audience is Irrelevant

One of the main problems with Currie’s theory is that it cannot stand in situations where fiction is created without the author intending for at least one other person to experience it. Currie (1990) addresses this problem and tries to overcome it by saying that an author can write a fiction and intend for no one else to read it. To accomplish this, he must burn the text that he creates immediately after it is finished. In this case, he does not intend to communicate with anyone, and so there is no audience.

Currie understands this case as though the author has no particular audience in mind when writing the narrative (pp. 31-4). To include this possible case in his theory, he supplements his theory with the following points:
“(D2) U’s statement of S is fiction iff there is a φ and there is an X such that U utters S intending that anyone who has X would

1) Recognize that S has φ;
2) Recognize that S is intended by U to have φ;
3) Recognize that U intends them (the possessors of X) to make-believe that P, for some proposition P” (p. 33).

However, this account fails to address Currie’s own aforementioned hypothetical case of burning fiction. First, this account takes the form of a subjunctive conditional, i.e. if X & Y, it would be Z. Yet, this case rules out one of the constituent propositions of the conjunction in the antecedent; namely, it denies that U utters S with the intention of having certain people recognise U’s intention for uttering S. While to evaluate the truth value of a subjunctive conditional is to evaluate whether the consequence will be true (obtain) in the possible worlds in which the antecedent is obtained⁴, the burning fiction case does not happen in those worlds in which the author intends the work to have an audience. Thus, this account is not applicable to this case; Currie’s own analysis cannot explain why a private fiction is a fiction.

The Case of Mental Fiction

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⁴ For more on subjunctive conditionals, see Bennett (2003).
If Currie’s burning fiction thought experiment is modified, it shows that fiction can exist only in a person’s mind and removes the need for an audience. I call this type of fiction “mental fiction”. I will now provide a thought experiment for this point by modifying Currie’s burning writing thought experiment. Suppose that a person is typing a narrative on a computer that is programmed to automatically delete every word that he types. If we regard an author as the audience of his own work, then according to Currie’s theory, I consider him to be reading his own writing, because he controls and recognises what he is typing. This is because he knows the content of the fiction and recognises that the content is to be imagined as true. Therefore, what he types can still be regarded as fiction according to Currie’s account, although it is immediately deleted — the author is the audience.

Nevertheless, this person does not intend anyone to read his fiction. If the author is the audience in this case, then no one can make a work of fiction and intend it to have no audience, because it is very difficult to cease to be the audience of one’s own work. Instead of making this point himself, Currie tries to work around the case with subjunctive conditionals. Therefore, it is unclear whether he accepts that the author in the case of mental fiction is the audience or not.

Indeed, with the case of mental fiction, I argue that what the author expects a member of an audience besides himself to do should not be a necessary condition of a plausible definition of fiction, and therefore the role of the author as audience and the role of other people as the audience should be kept separate.

If the creation of fiction can be completed in the mind of the author without writing down, filming, drawing, or speaking anything, then the role of the audi-
ence should not be included in a definition of fiction. As shown in the case of the typist in my thought experiment, if an author can be the audience of his work, then including the role of the author’s intention for the audience is redundant, because the author’s intention and the actions he takes to create the fiction are sufficient to render his work of representation a work of fiction. If the audience of a work includes the author, then in the case of mental fiction, the role of the audience will become another role of the author. In other words, it will be the author intending for him to do something. Thus, the case of mental fiction reduces the role of the audience as described in Currie’s theory to another action of the author, thus, the idea of having an audience is not necessary. This means that the author alone is sufficient as an audience, and an audience is unnecessary for a work.

To separate the role of the author as audience and the role of other people as audience, we must consider the authority of the author and the agency he has created and changed his work. If the audience of others cannot enjoy the same authority as what the author as the audience has, then Currie’s theory cannot explain why mental fiction is fiction.

**Currie on Declarative Utterances in Fiction**

So far, Currie has provided an account for the fictive utterances that are not about actual historical facts. He has explained what is essential for the production and apprehension of imaginative utterances in fictions. But what are his explana-
tions of the true utterances in fiction? Indeed, it is highly unlikely that a fiction could exist that does not contain even one true utterance. Even those fictions with completely made-up worlds have simple truths, such as the existence of the Sun or gravity. Therefore, Currie stresses that,

“a work is fiction iff (a) it is the product of a fictive intent and (b) if the work is true, then it is at most accidentally true” (p. 46).

Condition (a), namely the product of a fictive intent, is defined by D0 and D2. Similarly, with an example of a reliable newspaper running a story that contains many utterances that are intended to be true, Currie distinguishes accidental truth from intentional truth by considering whether the content of a narrative would change. In Currie’s (1990) words, one needs to consider whether the narrative “display[s] counterfactual dependence on the facts”:

1) “If different events had occurred, the paper’s report [narrative content] would have been correspondingly different.

2) Were those events, in otherwise changed circumstances, to have occurred as they did, the paper [narrative] would have reported them” (p. 47).

Currie claims that an intentionally true utterance should satisfy both of these counterfactual conditions. These subjunctive conditionals are true when applied to these utterances (p. 47). Therefore, the true utterances in a fiction must fail to satisfy at least one of the counterfactual conditions to qualify themselves as accidentally true utterances.

In my view, Currie’s conditions for accidental truth exclude works that seem intuitively to be works of fiction. A historical fiction, like Leo Tolstoy’s *War and
*Peace*, satisfies both of these conditions. This is because Tolstoy did attempt historical accuracy in a good part of his work of fiction. If the facts changed as he was writing it, he would change the corresponding factual part of his book. For instance, if the facts about Napoleon’s invasion had been different, some of the utterances in *War and Peace* would have been different. If the facts did not change as he was creating his work, he would keep writing about them as he had. Therefore, a good part of his fiction is intentionally true. Therefore, while some parts of *War and Peace* satisfy the condition of fictive intent; many other parts fail to satisfy the condition of accidental truth, because they are intentionally true. Therefore, *War and Peace* could not be considered to be fiction, according to Currie’s account.

**Friend’s First Challenge to Currie’s Account**

Currie could reply that *War and Peace* is an atypical work of fiction, and his definition of fiction focuses more on typical fictions, which contain mostly fabricated parts.

Unfortunately, even if it is plausible to dismiss the issue of *War and Peace*, Currie’s definition of fiction still has a fundamental problem with fictions containing utterances the author believes to be true. For these sentences, the author and audience probably (not always) ought not to imagine them as true since they believe them as true. If this is the case, then factual fictions like *War and Peace* or
Romance of the Three Kingdoms are not odd cases to be dismissed, but are instead two paradigmatic cases of a fundamental flaw in Currie’s account.

Friend (2012) makes this argument as well:

“First, many works of fiction contain non-accidentally true statements. Elizabeth Gaskell’s Mary Barton opens with this sentence: ‘There are some fields near Manchester, well known to the inhabitants as “Green Heys Fields”, through which runs a public footpath to a little village about two miles distant’ (1987, p. 1). This statement is not only true, it was intended to be true and any informed reader of Gaskell will believe it. It meets all the standard requirements on sincere assertion. Denying that it is an assertion because it occurs within a work of fiction would just be begging the question (p. 184).

Her first example focuses on intentionally true sentences. It shows that some fictional utterances are not imagined to be true or accidentally true. The author of the fiction in question believes and expects them to be true; and he also expects the readers to believe that they are true. Therefore, Friend thinks that these utterances should not be considered to be imaginary. For Currie to respond to Friend’s case, he would have to either give up his bottom up stance and go for a top down imagination-based definition of fiction, or work out the relationship between fictive utterances and fiction.

Currie (1990) did foresee this possibility, and attempted to avoid it by defining the relationship between fictive utterances and fiction:

“A work of fiction is a patchwork of truth and falsity, reliability and unreliability [accidentally and non-accidentally true utterances]. We can say that a work as a whole is fiction if it contains statements that satisfy the conditions of fictionality I have presented, conditions we can sum up briefly by saying that a utterance is fiction if and only if it is the product of an act of fiction-making (as defined in Section 1.8) and is no more than accidentally true” (p. 49).
This quote contains two points that are difficult to understand. First, Currie thinks that a work is a fiction if it contains fictive utterances. Does this mean that two sentences of fictive utterances are sufficient to render a piece of writing fictional? I do not think so. I do not think that Currie thinks so either, because this point would be much too inclusive to be plausible. Second, why does he mention that a sentence alone can be fiction? Does he want to claim that a work of fiction is indeed a complex that consists of many one sentence fictions? I do not know. Even if this is the case, this point still does not answer why the complex of one sentence fictions is regarded as fiction despite also containing many one sentence nonfictions.

In any case, Currie (1990) does not think that factual utterances in fiction do any harm to his definition. Right after the aforementioned quote, he moves on to dismiss the question of the required proportion of fictive utterances to render a work fictional as a bad question:

“Is a work fictional if even one of its statements is fictional in this sense? Must the greater proportion of the whole be fiction? These are bad questions. One might as well ask how many grains of sand make a heap. If we wanted to, we could define a numerical degree of fictionality, but it would be artificial and unilluminating. What is illuminating is a precise account of the fictionality of statements. For in some perhaps irremediably vague way, the fictionality of works is going to depend upon the fictionality of the statements they contain. As long as we are clear about what water molecules are, it hardly matters for purposes of definition that most things we call “water” actually contain much else besides (p. 49).”

He thinks that defining a numerical degree of fictionality is not necessary for an account of fiction, though he maintains that such an account of proportions
can be provided. He goes further to postulate that his fictive utterance account is necessary and sufficient to define fiction using an analogy between his definition and a water molecule. The chemical formula of a water molecule is the necessary and sufficient condition for defining water. Therefore, Currie implies that his account has provided all the necessary and sufficient conditions for defining fiction. According to this analogy, those intentionally true assertions in fiction are only accidental impurities in the fiction, like having a minor amount of salt in water.

I reject this defence. While the presence of some other substances in water does not disqualify a solution from being water, some do. For example, tea is a solution formed by water and the material infused into it by tea leaves. However, a cup of tea is not a cup of water with impurities. There are many differences between the two. For instance, their cost is typically radically different, their health benefits are different, and their cultural value is different as well. Thus, even if Currie’s analogy of fiction and water works, it does not show that assertions in fiction can be treated as impurities and then ignored. Thus, it is not a plausible defence against Friend’s criticism.

Worse, if Currie’s analogy between water and fiction does work, then the proportion of fictive utterances in a work of fiction becomes a genuine issue. This analogy actually falsifies his claim that the proportion problem should be ignored. For example, I find it hard to call a container of chemically saturated potassium sulphate solution “water” even though water is the solvent in it. But it may be possible to label a container of water that has a little bit of potassium sulphate in it as
water. This thought experiment demonstrates the intuition that impurity is connected to proportionality.

Therefore, Currie must either give up on his dismissal of the idea of the proportion of fictive utterances or give up on his analogy between his definition of fiction and the molecular definition of water. If he chooses the former option, then he has to answer the question of proportion. I see no way he could do it. If he chooses the latter option, then he has no argument to defend his theory and thus cannot include factual utterances in fiction.

**Friend’s Second Challenge**

Even if Currie’s analogy between his definition of fiction and the molecular definition of water works, it cannot defend his account from a further fundamental challenge by Friend. Friend (2012) argues instead that many works of fiction contain many utterances that fail to satisfy Currie’s definition, and there is at least one work of nonfiction that contains a significant amount of utterances that do satisfy Currie’s definition. Thus, instead of pinpointing the means of categorising works as fiction or nonfiction, Currie’s account is simultaneously too inclusive and too exclusive; it includes some works of nonfiction as fiction, and it fails to include some works of fiction as fiction.

Friend argues against Currie’s proposal of using fictive utterances to differentiate fiction from nonfiction. She begins her argument with a case of nonfiction
that satisfies Currie’s definition. According to Friend (2012), Truman Capote’s *In Cold Blood* (2009) satisfies the Currie’s criteria, because the fabricated parts of this work can only be true accidentally, and so satisfy Currie’s conditions for true fictive utterances. These fabricated parts include certain imagined events, as well as minor changes to actual sequences of events. Yet, Capote’s book is considered to be journalism, not fiction (pp. 184-6). Currie should have excluded this work, but he cannot.

Approaching the issue from the opposite perspective, Friend (2012) provides another example of fiction that is composed mainly of facts, which Currie should include, but is unable to do so using his own definition:

At the same time, many works of fiction take the truth to constitute a constraint on the ordering of events. The point of the seven novels in Gore Vidal’s ‘Narratives of Empire’ series (1967–2000) is to introduce readers to American history according to Vidal’s interpretation. Although the members of two fictional families show up in every novel—though barely at all in *Lincoln* (1984)—they are there primarily to provide perspectives on the real events that drive the plots forward (p. 184).

The books in *The Narratives of Empire* series contain many genuinely true assertions. They are not accidentally true, and they are not fictive utterances; but the works are still considered to be fictional. Therefore, it is hard to still claim that a work of fiction is a narrative primarily composed of fictive utterances.

While Currie could attempt to fall back on proportionality, there are many different ratios of facts to fiction in Capote’s and Vidal’s books. Indeed, the difference between the proportions of facts to fiction must be significant and standard-
ised to prevent the idea of proportionality from becoming arbitrary. This clearly demonstrates that proportionality cannot save Currie from Friend’s criticisms.

Finally, while Currie may attempt to step back from defining fictional works to simply defining fictional utterances, Although Currie and other imagination-based theorists can resolve this undesirable situation by working out the relationship between the fictive utterance and fiction, such an account has not yet been provided.

Davies’s Attempt to Defend Bottom up Approach

Friend does not confine her criticisms strictly to Currie’s theories; her criticisms are applicable to the bottom up approach in general. Davies (1996) tries to save the bottom up approach by replacing Currie’s point on accidental truth with an idea he calls the fidelity constraint in an attempt to differentiate fiction from nonfiction and indirectly answer Friend’s challenges, particularly regarding the relationship between utterances and fiction.

Davies does not attempt to work out the relationship between fictive utterances and fiction. Rather, he focuses on the factual utterances in fiction. He argues that fiction is a combination of fictive utterances and abnormal factual utterances, saying that a work of fiction must fail to satisfy the fidelity constraint, which is the “correspondence with the manner in which events actually transpired was taken,
by the utterer, to be a constraint that the ordering of events in [the text] must satisfy” [(p. 52); cited in Friend (2012), p. 184].

According to Davies (2001), the accurate description of the actual sequence of events is just a means to an end. The author may describe the events in their actual chronological order, but he must not do so for the sake of conveying the knowledge of that chronological order of the relevant events [(p. 266); cited in Friend (2012), p. 184].

Davies’s approach is implausible. There is no reason why an author cannot write a work that aims both to be historically accurate and entertaining, educational, etc. Schindler’s Ark is a fine example. While it aims for historical accuracy, it does not aim for historical accuracy alone. Thomas Keneally aimed to present a sequence of events in his book, and therefore satisfies Davies’s fidelity constraint; thus, Davies’s theory has the same problem as Currie’s — if he follows his own definition, there are works of representation that he should include as works of fiction but cannot.

Davies also faces Currie’s problem of including nonfiction as fiction. Capote is not aiming to present an exact chronology of events in In Cold Blood, since he knew that there were many fabricated parts and false descriptions. Therefore, it fails to meet the fidelity constraint, and thus should be regarded as fiction by Davies. Just like Currie, Davies’s approach is simultaneously too exclusive and too inclusive.
Thus, either bottom up theorists must work out the relationship between utterances in fiction and works of fiction, or the entire approach must be rejected. In light of Friend’s challenges to the approach, it becomes clear that bottom up theories fail to produce any plausible explanation of this relationship. Thus, we can reject the bottom up approaches.

A Top Down Imagination-Based Approach: Lamarque and Olsen’s Account

Having shown that the bottom up approach is implausible, I will now turn to the top down approach, in which a work of fiction is defined as a whole, rather than by singling out any type of utterance. While I agree with the method of defining a work of fiction as a whole rather than in terms of some of its utterances, I do not agree with how this approach is used by other theorists in conjunction with the concept of imagination. I will begin with an introduction to this type of theory by discussing the foundational top down theory of Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen (1994), and whether it can stand up to Friend’s criticisms and thus save imagination-based theories.

While some may categorise Lamarque and Olsen’s theory as bottom up because they mention the idea of fictive utterances, I take their approach as top down. Their definition of fictive utterances includes any utterance in a work of fiction, including those that are intended to be true.

I begin my evaluation of their theory by introducing their account:
“So far, then, there are the main features of fictive statement:

1. A Gricean intention that an audience make-believe (or imagine or pretend) that it is being told (or questions or advised or warned) about particular people, objects, incidents, or events, regardless of whether there are (or are believed to be) such people, objects incidents, or events;

2. The reliance, at least in part, of the successful fulfilment of the intention in (1) on mutual knowledge of the practice of story-telling;

3. A disengagement from certain standard speech act commitments, blocking inferences from a fictive statement back to the speaker or writer, in particular inferences about beliefs” (pp. 45-6).

To clarify before I begin my discussion of their theory, it is important to note that in the second criterion, Lamarque and Olsen (1994) follow the definition of practice proposed by Noël Carroll (1988) (p. 33). Also, I take the third criterion as stating that the production of a fictive utterance is distinct from any non-fictive speech act, like an assertion, or an imperative statement.

I begin by my overview with Lamarque and Olsen’s first criterion. As noted before, accidental truth is an implausible way to account for true sentences in fiction, since many true sentences in fiction are intentionally true. Lamarque and Olsen (1994) provide certain hints for solving Friend’s challenges (because their theory is top down, they can deal with both challenges simultaneously):

“What sets the fictive storyteller apart are the conditions governing the way the descriptions are presented, the purposes they seek to fulfil, the responses they elicit, and so one; in other words the practice within which they play their part. So we are back to fictive statement (p. 41”).

I shall set aside whether Carroll’s idea of practice can be applied to define fiction. This is because I want to establish whether this account is of any help regarding Friend’s challenges. Also, evaluating the applicability of the notion of practice is not the purpose of this paper.
First, Lamarque and Olsen do not specify what type of utterances can be fictive in this quote; neither do they do so in the above description of their account. Therefore, their account leaves room for intentionally true sentences to be fictive utterances. In comparison, Currie’s constraint on accidentally true utterances makes such a move impossible with his theory.

Also, Lamarque and Olsen focus on the purpose or use of the utterance, rather than its truth value. This leaves a possibility for their theory to regard intentionally true sentences as fictive utterances because they serve a different purpose when they appear in a fiction. This point can also be drawn from their third criterion.

**Evaluating Lamarque and Olsen’s Account**

If one takes Lamarque and Olsen’s theory to be true, then Friend’s criticisms should not even be raised. While Friend says that there are intentionally true utterances in fiction that are expressions of the author’s belief (assertions⁶), and therefore cannot be imaginative utterances, Lamarque and Olsen say that there are no such assertions in fiction, and that all utterances in a work of fiction are intended to elicit imagination, and belief does not enter into it.

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⁶ I take assertions as expressions of belief for now. I will discuss this further in Chapter 2.
Lamarque and Olsen need to stand by this denial of assertions to avoid falling into the same traps as Currie and Davies and being unable to account for intentionally true utterances. However, they present no argument allowing them to plausibly deny that intentionally true utterances are assertions, and no explanation as to why these utterances are there for imagination and not as assertions.

Second, if Lamarque and Olsen deny the existence of assertions in fiction altogether, then their theory fails to explain certain difficult cases. Authors who write historically accurate works intend to include assertions about the events of the time period in the book. Tolstoy in particular did extensive research on the Russian court and attempted to present certain information about the historical events that occurred in the Russian court accurately. Thus, these intentionally true utterances are assertions just like those found in history textbooks.

If Lamarque and Olsen insist on denying that these utterances are assertions, they will have to resort to an error theory. They will have to claim that although the author and audience think that certain utterances in fiction are assertions; these utterances are indeed not assertions. It is very difficult to agree with this theory though. If the author has the authority to decide that his work is a fiction (an authority that Lamarque and Olsen themselves grant), it is very hard to accept that he does not have the authority to decide that the speech-act of producing certain utterances in his work is producing assertions.

In response, Lamarque and Olsen might support their error theory by claiming that no sentence can be taken as assertion when it is in a fiction, because utterances in a fiction are made for different purpose than those in nonfiction. This
reasoning is implausible too. One can learn a great deal of history from Schindler’s Ark; and Keneally wanted his audience to do so. These two facts do not affect the work’s status as an award winning work of fiction. Tolstoy also told a great deal of history in War and Peace. Therefore, simply having assertions cannot render a work of representation to be a work of nonfiction, and assertions do not cease to be assertions simply by being placed in a fiction. Thus, it is implausible to exclude assertions from fiction using an error theory.

Finally, it is difficult to deny the existence of assertions in fiction because fictional works can be criticised for having factually incorrect descriptions or for ignorance on the part of the author. Authors cannot deny these criticisms as irrelevant by saying that there are no assertions in fiction. Just imagine: if Tolstoy were to write a story about the life of an Indian guru and claimed that it was based on a true story, but did not do any research, then the story would likely be very inaccurate due to his ignorance. It would be implausible for him to reject the criticism by claiming that his work was fictional, and therefore had no requirement to reflect reality.

Because of these difficulties, Lamarque and Olsen’s account must be rejected. In particular, I deny their third criterion, which says that utterances in fiction cannot be connected to the author’s beliefs. I also deny that the first condition can be applied to all utterances in fiction. Therefore, it fails to be a plausible approach.

Thus, I share Friend’s intuition that the intentionally true utterances in her example are genuine assertions, so I also agree with her that not all utterances in
fiction are made in order to invite the audience to make believe something. I agree with her that many utterances in fiction are produced to be believed.

After reviewing the implausibility of Lamarque and Olsen’s account, we can see that one must not take all utterances in a fiction as fictive utterances. A plausible account of fiction must acknowledge that there are assertions in fiction and provide an account of their role. This goes back to an important question — why does the presence of assertions in a work not make it necessarily a work of nonfiction? This is an issue that must be addressed with immense subtlety, so I will return to it after presenting my own definition of fiction, which I will use to address the issue.

**Walton’s Make-Believe Theory**

So far, I have yet to find any imagination-based theory that can stand up to Friend’s criticisms. But what if we go back even further than Currie, to the theory of representational works that his theory was founded on, that of Kendall Walton? I will provide a brief overview of this theory, and then demonstrate its weaknesses as a theory of fiction.

In *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, Walton (1990) states that make-believe is a type of imagination:

> “Any work with the function of serving as a prop in games of make-believe, however minor or peripheral or instrumental this function might be, qualifies as “fiction”; only what lacks this function entirely will be called nonfiction” (p. 72).
This theory has served as the foundation for Currie’s theory, and thus for imagination-based theories after him. According to Walton, a work of fiction is a prop in a game of make-believe, and make-believe is a type of imagination. Walton (1990) says “games of make-believe are one species of imaginative activity; specifically, they are exercises of the imagination involving props” (p. 12).

He also specifically connects fiction and imagination, as can be seen in the above quote. He says that make-believe is imagination with props; and fiction is a prop in the process of apprehension. The type of imagination involved in apprehending fiction is propositional imagination, defined by Walton (1990) thus: “imagining (propositional imagining), like (propositional) believing or desiring, is doing something with a proposition one has in mind” (p. 20).

The person doing this imagining takes utterances in fiction as true, but only in the context of apprehending a fiction:

“‘Let’s say that stumps are bears’, Eric proposes. Gregory agrees, and a game of make-believe is begun, one in which stumps—all stumps, not just one or a specified few—‘count as’ bears. Part of what they imagine is that there is bear at a certain spot—the spot actually occupied by the stump. ‘Hey, there’s a bear over there!’ Gregory yells to Eric. Susan, who is not in on the game but overhears, is alarmed. So Eric reassures her that it is only ‘in the game’ that there is a bear at the place indicated. The proposition that there is a bear there is fictional in the game”. (p. 37)

According to this analogy, make-believing a proposition in a work of fiction as a true proposition entails that the belief that the proposition in question is true is confined to a specific fictional context. Or to be put in another way, if one make-
believes that p solely because of what he reads in a work of fiction, it is likely that one ought not to believe that p in factual context. If a person accepts an utterance in fiction as being true beyond the context of the fiction, he is making a mistake. As pointed out by David Velleman and Nishi Shah (2005), belief is a type of acceptance of a proposition, though not all instances of acceptance are cases of belief (pp. 498-9). If a person does not accept an utterance as a true proposition, he does not believe it. Thus, according to Walton’s theory, audience do not believe that those utterances are actually true solely because they appear in a work of fiction. This carries over into any imagination-based theory that does not specifically provide another definition of imagination, including that of Lamarque and Olsen (though not Currie, as he published his own definition of imagination with Ian Ravenscroft (2002), an issue which I will discuss in chapter 2.)

Finally, Walton’s make-believe theory differs from other definitions of imagination, as it states that a work of fiction is intended to prescribe what the audience imagines:

“If p is fictional, then should one be forced to choose between imagining p and imagination not-p, one is to do the former [“this construal will not do for the special cases in which p and not-p are both fictional” quoted from bookmark no. 28 inserted right after this sentence]. When I speak of prescription to imagine in what follows [i.e. what follows in the later parts of his book, my note], I will take them to be so qualified” (p. 40).

The Implausibility of Walton’s Definition
Walton’s theory of fiction is a convenient foundation for imagination-based theories, as it provides a concise definition of imagination and defines the type of imagination used in defining fiction as propositional imagination.

Nevertheless, Friend (2012) rightly notices that Walton does not try to define fiction in the ordinary sense. Instead, he is focused on providing a definition for representational arts in general (i.e. works of fiction, documentaries, memoirs, plays etc.), not just fiction (p. 182). In Walton’s (1990) own words, “we could use ‘representation’ and ‘work of fiction’ interchangeably” (p. 72). Therefore, Walton is not in fact defining fiction; he is defining representation.

Even so, I shall evaluate Walton’s theory as a theory of fiction because it has been taken as a foundation of imagination-based theories since Currie (1990) applied this idea in defining fiction specifically, saying, “it was the work of Kendall Walton that first suggested to me an explanatory connection between fiction and make-believe” (p. 18). Since then, imagination-based theorists have used Walton’s idea that imagination is a necessary condition for defining fiction.

Unfortunately, Walton’s theory is not plausible. There are at least two substantial problems. First, Walton says that an audience is necessary for defining fiction, as can be seen in his analogy between games of make-believe and fictions, in which the audience of fiction is analogous to the participants of games of make-believe. Yet, I have already rejected this necessary condition in an earlier part of this chapter with the case of mental fiction and Currie’s own failure in addressing his own case of burning fiction.
Nevertheless, one may claim that an author may set up a game of make-believe for his own entertainment. The author in this case is also the audience of this work of fiction. As shown in the case of the typist in my thought experiment, if an author can be the audience of his work, then including the role of the author’s intention for the audience to do certain things is redundant, because the author’s intention and the actions he takes to create the fiction are sufficient to render his work of representation a work of fiction.

Second, while Walton’s theory of fiction has the advantage of including fiction made for telling facts like Schindler’s Ark as a work of fiction, because it states that fiction is any work that has the function to serve as a prop in a game of make-believe, the very same characteristic becomes a disadvantage, namely being too inclusive, when categorising nonfiction made with intentional fabrications, like In Cold Blood. Unless there is an argument that In Cold Blood cannot have the function of being a prop in a game of make-believe, Walton’s theory is too inclusive since it includes non-fiction made with intentional fabrications as works of fiction. Indeed, it is likely that In Cold Blood is a prop in a game of make-believe, in which the audience are prescribed to imagine crime scenes, historical events, and the psychology of those involved in them. If so, this book has the function of being the prop in a game of make-believe, and is thus a work of fiction according to Walton’s theory, which means his theory is too inclusive, and thus implausible as a theory of fiction.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have addressed the dominant theories for defining fiction, imagination-based theories. I began by exploring and evaluating the paradigmatic bottom up imagination-based theory of Currie, and demonstrating that it, as well as the theories developed from it, are simultaneously too inclusive and too exclusive. In doing so, I provided both my own criticisms, and demonstrated how bottom up theories fail to stand up to Friend’s criticisms.

From there, I went on to evaluate the top down approach of Lamarque and Olsen, demonstrating that it is also unable to stand up to the criticisms of Friend, and is also both too inclusive and exclusive.

Finally, I went back beyond Currie to the foundation on which his theory is based, Walton’s theory of fiction. I demonstrated how Walton’s theory is in fact not a theory of fiction, but a theory of representational arts, and is also implausible.

While all the theories thus far have been shown to be implausible, the top down one has one good aspect: it demonstrates that it is possible to define the relationship between utterances in fiction and a work of fiction as a whole as opposed to the relationship between a work of fiction and the fictive utterances in it. However, there may be a need for a different approach, which is what I will do in my definition.
Chapter 2

Imagination-Based Accounts and Imagination: How Well do Different Ideas of Imagination in Fiction Defend Imagination-Based Theories

Having now discussed Friend’s criticisms on imagination-based theories, particularly that (1) they are both too inclusive and too exclusive, and (2) they show that imagination-based theories cannot account for assertions in fiction, I will now argue that assertions in fiction form a significant problem for imagination-based accounts, and that these accounts cannot deal with the problem by redefining imagination. I will demonstrate this second point by reviewing Currie and Ravenscroft’s definition of imagination, as well as Kathleen Stock’s expositions on imagination.

Clarifying the Problem: Assertions in Fiction as Expressions of Belief in Works of Fiction

Both Friend and Derek Matravers are sceptical about imagination-based definitions of fiction, in part because of the problem of assertions in fiction. They use different language [Friend (2012) uses the term “assertion” (p. 182)], Matravers
Matravers (2014) states his criticism thus:

“The consensus view [imagination-based accounts, my note] defines a fictional proposition as something a reader is mandated to imagine, where imagination is contrasted with belief. It then has the problem of moving from the definition of fictional proposition to the definition of fictional works, as such works contain many propositions we are mandated to believe” (pp. 100-1).8

Like Friend, he focuses on the move from fictive utterances to works of fiction; and his criticisms also state that the role of assertions in fiction must be clarified.

Proponents of imagination-based accounts have two options: (1) they accept that there are assertions in fiction and produce an account of the

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7 MacFarlane (2011) says, an “assertion is sometimes said to be the overt expression of belief” (p. 80). Although he agrees that making an assertion is an expression of belief, he does not think that assertions are the only speech-acts to make such expressions. For instance, event invitations can express a speaker’s beliefs. Nevertheless, according to MacFarlane, it is not controversial to claim that making an assertion is an act of expressing belief (pp. 80). Thus, in my view, Friend and Matravers are making the same point, because of their claim that imagination-based theories of fiction fail to include how fiction contains verbal expressions of the genuine beliefs of authors. This failure is what I mean when mentioning the problem of assertions in fiction from now on.

8 To complement my argument against imagination-based theories, I will mention some material by Matravers (2014) in Fiction and Narrative. In his book, he mentions the problem of assertions in fiction (pp. 100-1) and rejects the two remedial definitions of imagination by Currie and Ravenscroft, and Stock, which I will discuss later in this chapter (pp. 21-44). These two points are two of his three reasons for his scepticism against the meaningfulness of the fiction/nonfiction distinction. Matravers’s third point is to show that there is no difference in the reading experience of reading nonfiction and fiction. I leave this point aside for another chapter for several reasons. First, it is not directed against imagination-based accounts in particular. Second, although I will comment on the material by Matravers in this chapter, I do not dedicate this chapter to his scepticism; I will cover that in Chapter 5. Even though I am making two points that are similar to the points made by Matravers, there are still the differences in our reasoning.
relationship between assertions in works of fiction and works of fiction; or (2) they can deny that there are any genuine assertions in works of fiction.

Friend (2012) says “denying that [an utterance] is an assertion because it occurs within a work of fiction would just be begging the question” (p. 184). I agree with her, and I have provided my argument for this point in the previous chapter. Therefore, the option (1) is the only remaining option for imagination-based theorists.

**Carroll’s Relationship between Assertions and Fiction**

Nöel Carroll attempts to provide an explanation of the relationship between assertions and fiction. Carroll (2016) says that imagination-based theorists like Currie and Davies may claim that “suppositional imagining is the default propositional attitude when it comes to fiction” (p. 367). He further states that “fiction is defined in terms of an authorial intention to imagine p, unless there is a defeasible reason to suspect that belief is intended” (p. 367) and, “suppositional imagining is the default propositional attitude when it comes to fiction” (p. 367).

Although Carroll uses the term “suppositional imagining”, it is reasonable to understand his idea as propositional imagining. This is because he is referring to propositions when he talks about labelling the idea of imagination in imagination-based accounts. More importantly, he retains the core idea of imagination that I mention in the last chapter — make-believe. Carroll (2016) says,
“To believe x is to hold it in the mind as asserted. To believe that the earth is round is to hold in mind as asserted the proposition content “that the earth is round”. To suppositionally imagine, on the other hand, is to entertain a certain propositional content as asserted—to hold it before the mind as unasserted” (p. 364).

Although imagination-based theorists may not agree that propositional imagination is just entertaining a proposition, Carroll’s understanding of imagination shares the core of imagination-based theories — defining fiction in terms of make-believe.

This approach can resolve Friend’s (2012) example of assertions in fiction: “Elizabeth Gaskell’s Mary Barton opens with this sentence: ‘There are some fields near Manchester, well known to the inhabitants as “Green Heys Fields”, through which runs a public footpath to a little village about two miles distant’ (1987, p. 1)” (p. 184).

According to Carroll’s account, the audience imagines the sentence in question without believing it because they take the attitude of imagination towards the sentence by default. According to Walton’s standard definition of imagination, they would merely accept the sentence as true in the context of the novel. However, Carroll can account for the role of assertions in fiction by arguing that readers’ extra knowledge about Manchester and the surrounding areas makes it possible for them to believe that the sentence quoted by Friend in the last paragraph is an expression of the author’s beliefs about the real world. Thus, Carroll’s account supports the imagination-based theorists’ argument that the audience may believe utterances in a fiction because they believe that the author
wants them to do so. If this were to be the case, then imagination-based theorists would be free from the problem of assertions in fiction.

The Failure of Carroll’s Defence

Unfortunately, Carroll’s account only works for those works of fiction that are not made for telling facts. It is made for assertions in fiction that are used for setting the scene or providing background information for the plots of a work. However, there are works of fiction that are made for telling facts — they contain many assertions that are made to express beliefs about the actual world. In cases like these, Carroll cannot plausibly claim that the audience needs a reason to change from imagining that the content is true to believing that the content is true, because fictions made for telling facts are there to be believed, at least a good part of their content is. These works are the opposite of those Carroll talks about; they are meant to be primarily believed, unless there is a reason for the audience to think that they contain fabrications.

Keneally’s (2007) Schindler’s Ark is a prime example. The author declares his intention for the work to tell facts publicly, writing in the introduction that he intends for the audience to believe the content of the work to be true, except when it comes to the dialogue and inner feelings of the historical figures in it, which he declares are made up (p. 4). Therefore, when reading this book, the audience needs a reason to imagine certain plots as true, but they do not need any further
reason to believe that its contents are true. Thus, the audience of the book does not take an attitude of imagination towards the content by default, and so an important part of Carroll’s account fails.

**The Importance of the Context of Assertions in Fiction**

I have now shown that Carroll’s account can work for fiction with assertions that are not made for telling facts, but cannot work for fiction with assertions that are made for telling facts. The failure of his account highlights a fundamental flaw in imagination-based theories: that imagination is not a necessary component of a definition of fiction.

Carroll emphasises that fictions are created to be imagined as true, not believed to be true, and that fiction should be connected with imagination barring a good reason for doing otherwise — imagination should be the default attitude. However, this account cannot work with fictions that are created for telling facts. The default attitude of the audience towards these works is belief, not imagination. Thus, the connection between fiction and imagination as the core of imagination-based theories fails, which is a significant problem for these theories. To resolve it,

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9 Although I may be the first one to distinguish fictions that contain some assertions from fictions that are made for telling facts, I am not the only one who recognises the existence of this type of fiction. Friend (2012) also provides Gore Vidal’s *Narratives of Empire* series to be her examples of fictions made for telling facts (p. 184), though she does not distinguish the severity of this case from the case of the opening sentence in *Mary Barton*. 
they would have to substitute another idea for imagination, which would make it impossible for them to still be imagination-based theories.

Carroll’s Possible Response

Carroll could counter argue that audiences ought to take the default imagination approach towards a work before they know the author’s intentions. This can work for accounts in which the author’s intentions are unclear, or are simply irrelevant to the truth value of the assertions. However, it still does not work for works like Schindler’s Ark.

In addition to their emphasis on imagination, many imagination-based accounts stress the importance of authorial intention in determining the fictional status of a work. I agree with this part of their theories. Following from this point, if the author’s intention is well-documented, then the editors and audience cannot decide whether a work is fictional or not without considering them. Thus, as long as one agrees that author’s intention matters, it is implausible for anyone to decide whether Schindler’s Ark is a work of fiction without consulting the author’s intention.

Having done that, audience ought to believe that most of the assertions in this work are true. In this way, they will have to go into an attitude of belief by default rather than imagination by default. Thus, Carroll’s possible defence is
implausible, and does not even work in terms of the emphasis on authorial intention found in many imagination-based theories.

In one final defence, Carroll and imagination-based theorists could claim that their definitions do not apply to fictions made for telling facts, that these are a special type of fiction that should be considered separately. But I do not agree that fictions made for telling facts should be excluded because they are relatively uncommon, as the degree of commonality with which such works are published could change at any time. Besides, such works need to be considered differently only because of a failure of imagination-based accounts. There is no plausible reason for imagination-based theorists to blame their failure on a particular type of fiction, because even if they exclude fictions made for telling facts, there are still serious problems with their theories.

The Seemingly Fundamental Flaws of Imagination-Based Accounts

In addition to Imagination-based accounts have several other problems in addition to the issue of fiction made for telling facts, imagination-based accounts struggle with fictions made without the intention of having any audience; in light of these two issues, the core component of the author intending the audience to imagine a work as true clearly does not work.

This leaves imagination-based theorists with the sole option of creating a definition of imagination that is useful for defining fiction. Indeed, both Currie and
Kathleen Stock, being imagination-based theorists, have produced their own expositions of imagination in fiction. I will begin with the one by Currie and Ravenscroft, and then move on to the one by Stock.

**How can Imagination-Based Theorists Weaken Friend’s Argument?**

Friend’s argument states that: (1) make-believe theories fail to explain the role of assertions in fiction (as I delineated in Chapter 1, see also Friend (2012), p. 184); and (2) make-believe theories mistakenly include fabricated parts of works of nonfiction as fictive utterances. She (2012) uses the fabricated parts of *In Cold Blood* as her example (pp. 184-6).

Make-believe theorists could defend their theories by arguing that Friend is mistaken about what make-believe imagination in fiction is. As a possible defence of the make-believe view, Friend mistakenly thinks that one does not make-believe a proposition that one believes in as true, like an assertion. However, one can, because make-believe imagination and belief may share the same content and even the same cognitive mechanism, so one can make-believe and believe that a proposition is true. Afterwards, make-believe theorists may argue that one make-believes that the assertions in fiction are true because the author and readers of work of fiction process these assertions according to a cognitive mechanism that is different from that for belief. These assertions in fiction are there to be make-believed because they are used within the representational contents that are
processed by the cognitive mechanism of make-believe. Therefore, in the cases of fiction made for telling facts, Friend just shows that fiction prescribes the audience to imagine a lot of propositions that they already believe as true propositions. Therefore, she has only shown that the content of fiction and nonfiction may overlap significantly, nothing more.

**Currie and Ravenscroft’s Definition of Imagination**

The core of my possible defence for the make-believe view is to show that it is plausible to accept that a person may imagine or make-believe (whichever is more exclusive) some propositions that are already part of her belief as true propositions. A dominant method of making this point is to show that make-believe imagination and belief are very similar. Currie, being a make-believe theorist, seemed to see the benefit of arguing for the similarity between make-believe imagination and belief, at least for his own theory of fiction. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) define the type of imagination used in defining fiction as “recreative imagination,” by which they mean the mental “capacity of perspective shifting” (pp. 1-2, 10, 13-14).

Using Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) terminology, a person has a shift in perspective if and only if he places himself in a situation other than his own, i.e. one that differs from what is currently happening to him in the actual world. They clarify this idea in discussing how it helps with creativity:
“It is probably true of human beings that their capacity for creative imagining depends in good measure on their capacity for perspective-shifting; if we can place ourselves, in imagination, in situations other than our own, current situation, our capacity to engage with what is merely possible—and hence to make the possible actual—is greatly enhanced” (p. 9).

Therefore, if Currie insists that imagination in fiction is recreative imagination, he thinks that it is necessary for the audience and/or author of a fiction to place themselves in a situation other than their own. Additionally, this type of perspective shifting is also a case of belief-like imagination — during a shift in perspective; a person shifts from a state of not-believing that \( p \) to a state of believing that \( p \), without actually believing that \( p \). Currie and Ravenscroft’s definition of recreative imagination in the following quote:

“So what is the recreative imagination? Here is our central hypothesis. Imagination projection involves the capacity to have, and in good measure to control the having of, states that are not perceptions or beliefs or decisions or experiences of movements of one’s body, but which are in various way’s like those states—like them in ways that enable the states possessed through imagination to mimic and, relative to certain purpose, to substitute for perceptions, beliefs decisions and experiences of movements. These are what we are calling states of recreative imagination” (p. 11).

There is an important point to be drawn from this quote: recreative imagination is not belief, perception, or a decision, despite the similarity of recreative imagination and belief. In this point, they agree with Walton’s account

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10 It may be strange that they apply their idea of perspective shifting to define imagination in defining fiction. Nevertheless, I do not see any need to quibble over whether imagination in imagination-based accounts means perspective shifting. First, they provide a definition of what their idea of perspective shifting or recreative imagination means. In the context of my current project, I only need to evaluate whether this idea of imagination rescues imagination-based accounts from Friend’s challenges.

11 \( P \) is any given proposition or sentence.
that the audience does not genuinely accept utterances as true. However, they differ from his account in that they do not believe in context-specific acceptance — instead, they say that audiences are in a state that mimics genuine acceptance. Thus, instead of accepting an utterance as a true proposition in a context specific way, author and audience propositionally imagine that p if they place themselves in the situation of someone who believes that p, you can try the belief out without actually believing that p.  

Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) state that imagination that mimics belief (i.e. belief-like imagination) shares the “inferential pattern” with actual beliefs (pp. 12-3). While they have not specified what they mean by an “inferential pattern”, in their discussion of what happens in fiction, they maintain that inferences related to imagination and inferences related to actual belief operate in the same way. They demonstrate the similarity between the two with their understanding of Ramsey’s test, which they cite:

“given an overall state of belief G, you should accept the conditional ‘If P then Q’ if you should accept Q in the overall state G*P” (p. 12 - 13).

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12 As a side note, I take this definition of recreative imagination as a refinement of Currie’s account. Currie published this work with Ravenscroft in 2002, which was over decade after publishing his definition of fiction in 1990. As mentioned in the last chapter, Currie (1990) declares that the idea of make-believe is from Walton when making his original definition (pp. 18-9). Because of the different interpretation of the idea of imagination in his own definition of fiction, I take this move as a change in how he interprets his own definition. He seems to be trying to improve his definition by interpreting what imagination means in his definition. Having addressed Currie and Ravenscroft’s definition, I will evaluate its plausibility as a definition of propositional imagination in the definition of fiction. I am not concerned about whether their definition of imagination is a plausible one on its own. My project is on definition of fiction, not on definition of imagination. Even if this definition of imagination is flawed, I can still use this idea for defining fiction if it works. Similarly, even if this definition is a plausible one, I cannot apply it to define imagination in definitions of fiction if the application leads to implausible result.
This test is an evaluation of indicative conditionals (i.e. if p, q). According to Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) reading of Ramsey’s test, when a person evaluates an indicative conditional, he imagines the antecedent as true, and then decides whether to accept the consequent as true:

“How do I apply the Ramsey test? If I could add P to my beliefs and settle into a new overall state of belief, I could then just see whether Q seemed reasonable or not. But I can’t add to the stock of my beliefs at will. Anyway, I do not wish to take on beliefs irrespective of their truth values just to evaluate conditionals. The idea is that instead of adding P as a belief I can add it ‘in imagination’, and since imagination preserves the inferential patterns of (p.13) belief, I can then see whether a new imagining, Q, emerges as reasonable in light of this. If it does, I have reason to think that adding P to the stock of my beliefs would lead me to add Q as well, and so I can add the conditional ‘if P then Q’ to my beliefs (pp. 12-3)”.

Therefore, they think that belief-like imagination is to make-believe the antecedent of an indicative conditional. In particular, they motivate the idea that there is belief-like imagining by appealing to the Ramsey Test. Currie and Ravenscroft take the proposition p in the antecedent of an indicative conditional (if p, q) to be an instance of belief-like imagination, i.e. supposing a proposition as true and then considering what to believe as a result.

This technique of supposition and consideration as derived from Currie and Ravenscroft’s understanding of Ramsey’s test can be applied to perspective shifting,

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13 An indicative conditional is “if p, it is the case that q”, not “if p, it would be the case that q”. The latter one is called subjunctive conditional; and is not relevant to the Ramsey’s test. Jonathan Bennett (2003) has produced an introduction to this distinction. The emphasis on indicative condition shows in the wording of the Ramsey’s test.

14 I do not dispute whether belief-like imagination follows this inferential pattern, as it is irrelevant to defining the idea of imagination in fiction. I am only concerned about whether this definition of belief-like imagination is a plausible way to define imagination in definitions of fiction.
in which a person imagines what it is like to be in a perspective beyond his own one, and see what he thinks or feels. The cognitive process of perspective shifting may include both supposition (the if-clause or antecedent) and consideration (the main clause or the consequent), so the cognitive process of perspective shifting becomes a two-step process. The first step is belief-like imagination, because Currie and Ravenscroft, as mentioned in the last paragraph, take the antecedent to be an instance of belief-like imagination.

Nevertheless, make-believe imagination in fiction comprehension and creation seems to include more than the belief-like imagination in the process of perspective shifting. Not only do the readers and authors make-believe that they are in another perspective or that something that is not actually true is true within the story, make-believe in fiction seems to include also what can be inferred from accepting certain belief-like imagination, at least intuitively. Indeed, Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) do stress that imagination in some cases mimics the inferential pattern of belief. Therefore, to further clarify the idea of make-believe imagination in fiction, there is a need to explore how make-believe imagination mimics belief. Also, given that make-believe only mimics belief instead of being reduced to belief, it is important to delineate the difference between make-believe and belief after delineating the similarities between them.

Digging Deeper into the Similarities between Belief and Make-Believe
More can be said about the similarity and difference regarding the comparison between make-believe and belief. Nichols (2004) produced a very clear explication of how imagination mimics belief through his account of pretence (Stephen Stich shares the same account since he co-authored a paper on this subject with Nichols, see Nichols and Stich (2000)). Nichols (2004) says “the single code hypothesis provides a unified explanation for a wide range of similarities between imagination and belief” (p. 129). While this theory explains pretence, Nichols also means it to explain the role of imagination in fiction, “the single-code hypothesis provides a surprisingly powerful account of one aspect of the imagination” (p. 129). The core claim of the single-code hypothesis is that the content of pretence and the content of belief are often processed in the same way, “a [cognitive] mechanism that takes pretence representations as input will process those representations much as it would process isomorphic belief representations” (p. 131).

Therefore, the meaningful similarity between imagination and belief lies in how a cognitive mechanism processes belief and pretence representation in the same way, at least in many cases. Nichols and Stich (2000) further explain this by detailing how the content of imagination/pretence is actually processed, saying:

“Like the Belief Box and the Desire Box, the Possible World Box contains representation tokens. However, the functional role of these tokens, their pattern of interaction with other components of the mind, is quite different from the functional role of either beliefs or desires. Their job is not to represent the world as it is or as we'd like it to be, but rather to represent what the world would be like given some set of assumptions that we may neither believe to be true nor want to be true. The PWB is a work space in which our cognitive system builds and temporarily stores representations of one or another possible world. We are inclined to think that the mind uses the PWB for a variety of tasks including mindreading, strategy testing, and
empathy. Although we think that the PWB is implicated in all these capacities, we suspect that the original evolutionary function of the PWB was rather to facilitate reasoning about hypothetical situations (see Currie, 1995b for a contrasting view)” (p. 122).

“One important part of the story, on our theory, is that the inference mechanism, the very same one that is used in the formation of real beliefs, can work on representations in the PWB in much the same way that it can work on representations in the Belief Box” (p. 122).

These two quotes show that make-believe imagination and belief operate in a similar way at least when it comes to inference, especially in terms of how they interact with other components of mind, though with different functional roles. While belief is about the events in the actual world, make-believe imagination is about the events in the certain possible world. If they share the same mechanism, they should be able to have the same content. Nichols (2004) confirms this point by further noting that belief and make-believe imagination often have the same representational content (p. 129).

Make-Believe Imagination and the Debate about Defining Fiction

As a result, make-believe theorists may respond to Friend by arguing that make-believe imagination and belief are very similar cognitive mechanisms, which process two very similar sets of representational content in two very similar ways. Therefore, Friend’s criticism regarding fiction made for telling facts only confirms this point. As such, make-believe theories accommodate the utterances in works like Schindler’s Ark, War and Peace, or Vidal’s Empire series. In the perspective of
make-believe theorists, these works or their assertions are there to be make-believed or imagined as true propositions.

Although I have been mentioning the similarity between belief and make-believe for the sake of argument, these two cognitive mechanisms are not the same. Propositions that are make-believed as true are processed in a way similar to how they are processed when they are believed, but for a different purpose or functional role. This is because Nichols and Stich (2000) use the functional role of the cognitive mechanism to distinguish pretence/imagination from belief, “the functional role of these tokens, their pattern of interaction with other components of the mind, is quite different from the functional role of either beliefs or desires” (p. 122). Thus, make-believe theorists may respond to Friend by arguing that she pays too little attention to how to differentiate imagination in fiction from belief, namely the difference in their functional roles. Although make-believe theorists may not be able to pinpoint the exact difference in the functional roles of assertions in fiction and assertions, it is not a fatal error for them. It is nothing more than an area that needs to be explored in order to render their theories sufficiently convincing and plausible, even though this exploration may be a challenging one.

Although I have shown that Friend is not necessarily right about what she says regarding assertions in fiction and their problems for make-believe theories, I think this result only shows that there is a clash of intuition between make-believe theorists and Friend. Friend may claim that all she needs is the difference between believing and imagining is a sufficiently strong foundation for her argument. For the
sake of argument, I have shown that make-believe theorists may claim that assertions in fiction are also instances of make-believe because they are processed by the mechanism of make-believe in the context of creating and comprehending a work of fiction. Nevertheless, Friend and her followers may not agree that assertions in fiction should be understood in this way. She may argue that simply claiming that assertions in fiction have a different functional role from assertions in nonfiction is insufficient to explain the role of assertions in fiction, especially there is no clear idea of what the functional role of make-believe imagination is in the context of fiction creation and comprehension. Therefore, the debate between Friend and make-believe theorists still continues, especially in the area of assertions in fiction. All I want to show by delineating the ideas of make-believe is that the debate between Friend and make-believe theorists is far from settled.

If make-believe theorists want to win this debate against Friend by deploying my hypothetical argument, they have to resolve a key issue: if make-believe theories are to be accepted: what is the functional role of imagination in fiction? In both cases of strategic thinking and mind-reading (functional roles of certain types of imagination mentioned by Nichols and Stich), there are clear functional roles of imagination as a powerful tool for fulfilling these two goals. Therefore, what is the one functional role or the set of functional roles of imagination in fiction? It seems that make-believe theorists leave this question unanswered. Certainly, this is no fatal attack to make-believe theories. However, if this line of defence is going to be effective, a plausible theory of fiction, especially a
make-believe one, should explain the functional role of make-believe imagination in the tasks of comprehending and creating works of fiction.

So far, in my hypothetical defence for make-believe theories, I have been leaving out Friend’s another criticism: nonfiction made with intentional fabrications. I do so just for developing the hypothetical defence in a linear way, instead of developing two arguments at once. Further, the line of argument for fiction made for telling facts can be applied to this case, just in a twisted way. Make-believe theorists may accept that nonfiction made with intentional fabrications includes fictive utterances (make-believe theorists have to accept that nonfiction made with intentional fabrications includes fictive utterance, since the authors of these works certainly do not believe that these utterances are true), while maintaining that these fictive utterances serve different functional roles from those fictive utterances in fiction. Fictive utterances in fiction serve the functional role of contributing to the overall make-believe induced by reading fiction, while fictive utterances in nonfiction serve the functional role of inviting the audience to form certain beliefs about the thematic, psychological, or other aspects certain historical events. Therefore, make-believe theorists can explain the fictive utterances in *In Cold Blood* away by claiming that these utterances are there to lure the audience to form certain beliefs about the psychology of certain historical figures or about how certain historical events happened.

As can be seen from applying the idea about the similarity between make-believe imagination and belief, although make-believe theorists have not yet provided an answer regarding the functional role of make-believe when creating
and comprehending a work of fiction as a whole, they may successfully respond to Friend’s criticism by appealing to the similarities and differences between make-believe and belief. Therefore, instead of being rejected, as Friend argues, make-believe theories are just incomplete or not plausible enough. The result of the debate between Friend and make-believe theorists is neither settled nor conclusive.

**Kathleen Stock’s Exposition of Imagination**

While the expositions of imagination by Currie and Ravenscroft and Nichols and Stich defend make-believe theories to a great extent, they still cannot fully remedy make-believe theories. Kathleen Stock’s definition of fictive utterances can be taken as an alternative defence for imagination-based theories, in which she substitutes her own exposition of imagination for make-believe imagination. I shall evaluate her alternative non-make-believe imagination-based approach.

Stock’s (2011) goal in producing her exposition of imagination is to provide imagination-based accounts with a way to include fact telling expressions or expressions of belief in the content of fiction. She argues that for an utterance to be fictive, it is necessary and sufficient that it is “intended to produce imagining” (p. 145). Although she does not claim to produce a definition of a work of fiction, her account of fictive utterances serves as an attempted defence for imagination-based
Stock’s Argument

Stock (2011) argues for her account by delineating the idea of imagination in fiction, which she calls propositional imagination, with three conditions, starting with her first condition:

“Necessarily, a thinker T who imagines that p thinks of p as being the case. This is just a consequence of a point made earlier: that, like belief, propositional imagining involves thinking of a state of affairs as antecedently established rather than as something to be done” (p. 151).

This necessary condition does not mean that imagining that p means believing or thinking that it is the case that p in the actual world. Rather, it only states a similarity between imagining and belief. While the subject thinks that p is the case in both cognitive mechanisms, imagining that p often (not always) means thinking that p is true only in certain non-actual contexts. To make this point in her exposition of imagination, Stock (2011) states that, when a person imagines that p, she is indeed connecting the content of her thought that p to certain other propositions that she does not believe to be true. This point is to be delineated in

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15I did not discuss Stock’s definition of fictive utterances in the last chapter for several reasons. First, it does not define what a work of fiction is. Therefore, it is not exactly a definition of fiction. Second, I find it more suitable to discuss Stock’s theory after mentioning Friend’s arguments in the last chapter. While Friend makes her argument against imagination-based definitions by assertions in fiction, Stock’s theory attempts to include assertions in fiction as fictive utterances. Thus, her argument is a direct response to Friend’s arguments against other imagination-based theories. Third, this account defends imagination-based theories against their criticisms by defining imagination, so it fits the theme of the later part of this chapter, which is to defend imagination-based theories by re-defining imagination.
her two further conditions of her exposition of imagination. She calls them “connect 1” and “connect 2”:

“CONNECT 1: Necessarily, a thinker T who imagines that p is disposed to connect her thought that p is the case with other propositional thoughts about what is the case” (p. 151).

“CONNECT 2: Necessarily, where a thinker T imagines that p at time t, either T does not believe that p or T is disposed to connect her thought that p is the case to some further proposition(s) about what is the case, whose content is not replicated by any belief of hers at t” (p. 153).

Connect 2 is connect 1 with a time constraint, meaning that it is possible for a person to imagine p to be true at one time, then believe it to be true at another time.

Stock (2011) also wants to use connect 2 to differentiate belief from imagination. She says when one imagines that p, either he does not believe that p or p is connected to other propositions that he does not believe as true (p. 153). Because of this refinement, I shall leave connect 1 aside and only take connect 2 to be Stock’s official view on propositional imagination.

Connection and Disposition

There are two ideas that need to be explained in connect 2, namely connection and disposition. Stock (2011) explains connection thus:

“By ‘connect’ I mean attempt to conjoin, or otherwise treat as premises in the same argument, to think of as true with respect to the same world.
(This is obviously supposed to be different from merely having several thoughts consecutively.) Propositional imagining is never only the act of engaging with a single proposition (p. 151).”

There are four important considerations here. The most straightforward way for a sentence to connect to another sentence is to be a premise in an argument with that sentence. Nevertheless, fiction is not a collection of arguments. Thus, I propose to understand the idea of a premise in a more inclusive way. For p connecting to q, instead of saying p, therefore, q, I propose to treat it as p, so q. In this way, imagination in fiction may include facts that serve as a reason for fabricated events that occur later in the same work.

Also, being connected can also be understood as being true in the same world. For the term “world”, while Stock does not clarify whether she means the actual world, possible worlds, or some combination of the two, I take it to mean the content of the same work of representation.\(^{16}\)

Additionally, the idea of conjoining is puzzling, because conjoining is simply a synonym of connecting. While it is unclear what Stock means, I take conjoining to mean considering a sentence together with many other sentences in the content of the same work of representation.

\(^{16}\) I find it particularly implausible that Stock is talking about possible worlds. First, the content of a fiction is not a possible world, or time travel stories could not exit. An example of a time travel story is Back to the Future. I will provide more details about the issues related to time traveling in chapter 4. Second, the content of a fiction is hardly about any one possible world, because there is not enough detail to pick just one possible world. For example, there is no specification about how many bow ties Hercule Poirot has in Murder on the Orient Express. Therefore, both a world in which Poirot has 10 bow ties and a world in which he has 12 bow ties will fit into the story. Nevertheless, Stock states literally “the same world” in the quote, so I find it more sensible to regard it as being in the content of the same work of fiction.
Finally, it is important to note that Stock joins these three explanations of “connect” by the word “or”. This means that any one of these three is sufficient to count as “connection”.

Stock (2011) defines the idea of disposition as a potential to behave in a certain way:

“Note that CONNECT 1 cites a disposition to make such connections; it does not say that it must be actualized. Its commitments are therefore pretty weak.

That imagining is potentially connected to other propositional thoughts in this way is a commonplace” (p. 152).

The explanation of disposition mentioned in connect 1 also applies to the idea of disposition mentioned in connect 2, because connect 2 is a development of connect 1. The idea of disposition mentioned in connects 1 and connect 2 means the potential to connect. An imagined proposition has the potential to connect to other propositions in one or any combination of the three ways delineated before, though it does not necessarily do so.\(^{17}\)

This allows her to define fictive utterances thus:

“So, putting NIP and CONNECT 2 together: on the assumption that the reader of a fictional work is supposed to be disposed to conjoin together all or most of the utterances contained therein, even a work significantly constituted of utterances intended to be believed may also prescribe imagining overall, as long as it contains some utterances which are not intended to be believed” (p. 154).

\(^{17}\) In the following discussion, I shall mention some examples of sentences that actually connect when I comment on Stock’s exposition, to avoid any disagreement on intuitions about whether a sentence actually has any unrealised potential to connect.
“Let NIP be the claim that necessarily, a fictive utterance prescribes imagining” (p. 146).

In summary, connect 2 is her answer to how imagination-based accounts include assertions in fiction. It is important to note that the wording of connect 2 and NIP do not suggest a jointly sufficient condition, so these claims are not a definition of imagination in a strict sense. However, these expositions of imagination may be able to resolve the connection between fictive utterances and fiction.

**Evaluating Stock’s Account**

I argue that although Stock’s exposition of imagination is more plausible than that of Walton or Currie and Ravenscroft, it still cannot save imagination-based theories. To begin with, it is too inclusive.

In the case of fictions created for telling facts, Stock’s account can solve some problems that others cannot, including why works like *Schindler’s Ark* should be considered to be fiction. She does so by pointing out that works like *Schindler’s Ark* satisfy her criteria for NIP and connect 2: a person can both believe and imagine a sentence to be true, as long as it is connected to a sentence that he does not believe to be true. This allows imagination-based accounts to include factual utterances in fiction as fictive utterances, and to say that factual utterances in fictions created for telling facts are instances of imagination. This would allow
imagination-based theories to include works of fiction created for telling facts, like *Schindler’s Ark*, as fictions. But this inclusivity goes too far. While it allows fictions created for telling facts to be categorised as fiction, it does not exclude works of nonfiction like *In Cold Blood*.

Stock says that a written work is a work of fiction, so long as it includes some utterances that are not intended to be believed. This is certainly the case with *In Cold Blood*, as Capote knowingly inserted some untrue utterances into it. According to Stock’s account, this work must still be considered fictional.

To resolve this issue, Stock may extend the application of the idea of thinker in connect 2 to audience to exclude *In Cold Blood*. In her account, if the author emphasises that his work is telling facts and is written after extensive research for its factual accuracy, then it is not a work of fiction. The emphasis on research and factual accuracy shows that the author intends to convince his audience to deny that his work satisfies NIP and connect 2, so the work in question is nonfiction. *In Cold Blood* is a case of this.

Stock (2011) does actually make a similar attempt. She argues that *In Cold Blood* is nonfiction because of its emphasis on research and because Capote claims to be telling facts. In fact, this book was advertised as being written after extensive research and the majority of sentences in it are expressions of belief. For the same reason, Stock claims that Vidal’s *Lincoln* is a work of nonfiction because of Vidal’s motive to tell facts in it (pp. 158-9).
If Stock categorises *In Cold Blood* as nonfiction because the author wants his audience to believe the content of his book as telling facts, then she must categorise *Schindler’s Ark* as nonfiction for the same reason, because the author of *Schindler’s Ark* believed that his book was telling facts, and like Capote, he wanted the audience to believe the same thing. Therefore, Stock’s account fails to categorise *Schindler’s Ark* as fiction while categorising *In Cold Blood* as nonfiction, with an alternative interpretation. Her exposition still cannot help imagination-based accounts to differentiate fiction created for telling facts from nonfiction made with fabricated parts.

Even if what Stock says about *In Cold Blood* and *Lincoln* is accepted, the consequence is still undesirable for her. *Schindler’s Ark* satisfies both of her aforementioned rationales for being a work of nonfiction, but it won the Booker Prize for fiction in 1982, confirming that it is not only a work of fiction, but widely recognised as such. Applying this idea to imagination-based theories, authors intend their audience to carry out imagining when reading their work in the way specified in connect 2. This can exclude *In Cold Blood* from being fiction, as the claim of being a true account is specified in the title of the book, *In Cold Blood: A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences*. Thus, Capote wants his audience to believe, not imagine, that the content of his writing is true.

Further, trying to expand the “thinker” in connect 2 to “audience” does not work. It is implausible to claim that an author of a work of fiction always intends his audience to do something to his work, because the case of mental fiction shows that the author of a work of fiction may intend no one to read his work, as I
showed in the last chapter. If Stock’s exposition defends imagination-based accounts by regarding all utterances in fiction as fictive, *In Cold Blood* shows that Stock’s idea of imagination is still too inclusive. Alternatively, if connect 2 and NIP serve as an exposition on the relationship between utterances in fiction and works of fiction, Stock’s account still does not show the difference in the relationship between utterances and works in the case of fiction made for telling facts and the same relationship in the case of nonfiction with many intentionally fabricated parts.

**What about the Difference between Fiction and Lies?**

A single case like *In Cold Blood* may not be sufficient to reject Stock’s idea of imagination as a plausible defence for imagination-based theories. However, if imagination-based accounts fail to distinguish many lies from fiction even with Stock’s account of fictive utterances, they have a significant problem.

I have argued that the one (sometimes only) party that does the imagining in imagination-based accounts is the author of a work of fiction, as one may produce a work of fiction with the intention of not having it read or apprehended. Thus, applying connect 2, Stock’s idea of fictive utterances includes all utterances invented by any author. This will include many lies.

Consider the case of perjury. A witness or suspect in a court case may give a false account of what they were doing when a crime was happening by saying something that they do not believe to be true. Consequently, their other
expressions of belief are connected to these make-believe expressions, because they are part of the same narrative, and may even have a causal relationship. Using Stock’s account, all these utterances in all these lies must be fictive. This problem can be blocked by the idea of the author intending to have an audience imagine, because lies of this sort are made to be believed, not imagined. However, given my rejection of the idea of intending the audience to imagine, Stock’s fictive utterance account cannot even differentiate lies from fiction; much less defend imagination-based accounts.18

**Insights into the Components of a Plausible Definition of Fiction**

Though Currie and Ravenscroft’s and Stock’s accounts have failed in their defence of imagination-based theories, they have highlighted some important components and considerations for a plausible definition of fiction, namely that a plausible definition of fiction must be able to differentiate works like *Schindler’s Ark* from works like *In Cold Blood*. This is because there are many works of fiction that contain facts, including *War and Peace*, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, and even the TV show *Rome*. Works like these form a category, namely works of fiction made

18 Although Stock’s account ultimately fails as a defence, it has a few important merits. Stock tries to defend imagination-based theories by undermining the sharp contrast between imagination and belief; and she achieves this by refusing to identify make-believe as imagination in fiction. Instead, she explains her idea of imagination by the connection between different utterances. As a result, the content of imagination can be an utterance that the author of a work of fiction believes to be true, though it is connected to some make-believe content when being imagined as true in fiction. Nevertheless, this contrast alone still fails to distinguish fictions made for telling facts from nonfiction with intentional fabrications, so it fails to rescue imagination-based accounts.
works of fiction made for telling facts are not just some rare cases or exceptions.

Second, it is very implausible mix these types of works up with works like *In Cold Blood*, because the fabricated parts in *In Cold Blood* are controversial; and the fabricated parts in those works are not. Indeed, some dramatizations of history in some works of fiction are even considered praiseworthy, as shown by *Schindler’s Ark* winning the Booker Prize.

Further, it is also unacceptable for journalists to claim that they were writing fiction when it comes to light that they have fabricated pieces of reporting. For example, Stephen Glass knowingly wrote factually inaccurate pieces for *The New Republic*. He could not free himself from the scandal by claiming that he was writing works of fiction.

Unfortunately, imagination-based theories, even with Stock’s expositions, still fail to distinguish nonfiction made with fabricated parts from fiction made for telling facts. This is a substantial issue, as this is not only an issue for aesthetics and philosophy of language, but also for media ethics (like the case of Stephen Glass). Therefore, a plausible theory of fiction must be able to differentiate fiction made for telling facts from nonfiction with fabricated parts.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed my argument from Chapter 1, namely, that a plausible account of fiction cannot include the idea of the author’s intention for the audience to do something with a work, and that imagination-based accounts fail to include expressions of belief (assertions) in fiction. As a result, these accounts exclude some works of fiction from being fiction and include some works of nonfiction as fiction.

I began this chapter by showing that assertions in fiction form a problem that imagination-based theories cannot resolve, because they define imagination as make-belief. There are at least two types of assertions to consider: those for setting the scene, and those that are for telling facts.

The author of a work of fiction that is made to be believed may not believe that its content is true, while the author of a work of fiction that is made for telling facts believes that the content of his work is true, at least in terms of the sequence of events. I have shown that imagination-based theorists can defend themselves against assertions made for setting the scene because of an argument from Carroll, but not against assertions made for telling facts in a work of fiction made for telling facts.

In light of this, I then considered different explanations of imagination as a possible defence for imagination-based theories, beginning with Currie and Ravenscroft’s account of belief-like recreative imagination, then supplementing it with that of Nichols and Stich. These theories explain how make-believe theories include fiction made for telling facts as fiction and exclude nonfiction made with intentional fabrications from being nonfiction, and so defend make-believe theories.
against criticisms from Friend. Nichols and Stich’s approach indeed leads to another question: what is the functional role of make-believe imagination in fiction? Unlike imagination or pretence in mind reading or strategic thinking, there is not one specific role of make-believe imagination in fiction comprehension. Make-believe theories have yet to provide an answer. This is not a fatal attack, but it shows that make-believe theories are incomplete or are not convincing enough. I then considered Stock’s exposition of imagination. This account explains imagination as either make-belief or a connection to make-belief. It has the advantage of being able to include utterances that authors of fiction believe to be true as fictive utterances, and thus can include scene-setting assertions in fiction.

However, it still fails to defend imagination-based approaches. It either includes works of fiction made for telling facts (e.g. Schindler’s Ark) but fails to exclude works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated parts (e.g. In Cold Blood), or it excludes works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated parts from being works of fiction, but also excludes works of fiction made for telling facts.

This is a significant problem, because there are many works of fiction made for telling facts and some works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated parts. Additionally, the failure to distinguish works of fiction made for telling facts from works of nonfiction with intentionally fabricated details leads to a problem in media ethics, because the former type of works is not blameworthy but the latter very much so.

To conclude, Chapters 1 and 2 together show that, at best, make-believe theories of fiction are incomplete, because they fail to answer the functional role of
make-believe imagination in fiction comprehension and creation, which is the key for addressing Friend’s seemingly fatal criticisms. In the later part of my project, I will produce my own interpretation of the purpose of creating a work of fiction which explains the functional role of make-believe imagination in fiction comprehension and creation. My explanation, however, will weaken the direct relation between fiction and make-believe imagination. I shall not move on to my own proposal now, since I first need to address some theories that are alternative to the dominant imagination-based approach.
Chapter 3

Imagination as a Non-Necessary Condition: Friend on Fiction as a Genre

Having shown the inadequacies of those accounts, I shall set them aside for now and evaluate some alternative definitions. These theories either include imagination as a non-necessary component for defining fiction, or reject the idea of imagination in defining fiction altogether. I will now go through both options, beginning with Friend’s approach of imagination as a non-necessary component in this chapter, before moving on to the second option with Deutsch’s theory in the next chapter.

This chapter is dedicated to Friend’s approach for several reasons. First, it is a highly regarded theory of fiction among many philosophers who are looking for a non-imagination-based theory. Second, its components are not radically different from imagination-based theories, and it still includes imagination as a component, albeit with a different role.

Chapter Overview

I shall begin by delineating and evaluating Friend’s account or expositions of fiction, together with Walton’s idea of categories of art, of which it is an application. I will then go on to show that Friend’s account may have said nothing about what constitutes a work of fiction, so her account misses the point of the debate.
Instead, her account only mentions how to identify works of fiction taking some stereotypical properties of them as standard features. In a more charitable reading, Friend’s definition is at best incomplete, because she presumes that there are no properties that render a work of representation fictional. Even if the more charitable reading is accepted, then there must be something external to the work responsible for its categorisation, such as a genre. However, she has not argued for this point. Thus, I will not regard her account as a plausible account of fiction, and I will also set it aside after this chapter.

Given the complexities of evaluating Friend’s theory of fiction, I will separate this chapter into three parts. The first part is a purely descriptive delineation of Friend’s definition of fiction. The second part is to delineate the philosophical foundation of Friend’s theory, including the characteristics of Walton’s theory of categories of art and how it affects the plausibility of Friend’s definition, as well as the evaluation of how useful Walton’s theory of categories of art is for defining fiction in general. The third part is an evaluation of Friend’s theory.

Part 1

Friend’s Definition of Fiction

Friend (2012) believes that the failure of imagination-based definitions of fiction shows that imagination is neither necessary nor sufficient for defining fiction. She calls her alternative approach the genre approach:
“At the same time, my proposal that fiction and nonfiction be construed as genres does justice to the intuitive links between fiction on the one hand, and imagining, story-telling and making things up on the other—the links that motivate the fictive utterance theory [my note: imagination-based accounts in my wording]. I claim, however, that rather than constituting necessary and sufficient conditions, these links indicate standard features of the genre of fiction; as such, they count towards classification, but only in combination with other criteria. To understand this claim we must put it in the context of an account of genre” (p. 187).

In this quote, Friend thinks that imagination-based theorists make a mistake in taking imagination to be a necessary component for defining fiction. She also thinks that imagination is only a standard feature of fiction, saying,

“What other theorists propose as defining properties of fictionality—such as containing utterances whose contents we are to imagine—I see as standard features of works in the fiction genre” (p. 188).

In her account, the conditions in the definitions of Currie, Davies, and Lamarque and Olsen become the standard features of fiction as a genre. I will explore the idea of standard features shortly, meanwhile, I will take it as being certain common features among works of fiction. In Friend’s account, imagination-based definitions are right in many (but not all) cases because they specify the features that are commonly found in fiction, though these standard features do not necessarily render a work of representation to be a work of fiction.

In Friend’s (2012) genre theory of fiction there are three types of features that determine whether a work is a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction: standard features, contra-standard features, and variable features (a notion which she borrows from Walton):
“Classification as fiction or nonfiction, like classification in other genres or categories of art, influences the way we experience, understand and evaluate a work by specifying a contrast class against which the work’s properties stand out as being standard, contra-standard or variable” (p. 188).

“A feature of a work is standard if possession of that feature places or tends to place the work in a particular category: flatness is standard for painting; an obvious-but-innocent suspect is standard for whodunits. A feature is contra-standard if possession of that feature excludes or tends to exclude the work from a category. Heavy drumbeats are contra-standard for minuets; stream-of-consciousness narration is contra-standard for science textbooks. Variable features are those that can differ between works in a category without bearing on classification. Colour and composition are variable for painting; the degree of detail in describing characters is variable for the novel” (p. 188).

These features are considered in the context of the work’s categorisation. Standard features of a genre tend to place a work that possesses them in that genre. Contra-standard features of a genre tend to exclude a work possessing them from the genre. Variable features are those that vary among the works in the same genre and have no effect on the classification of the genre of a work (p. 188).

Friend (2012) does not specify the standard, contra-standard, and variable features of works of fiction exhaustively, because she believes that the standard features of works of fiction change with different periods of time (p. 193). This will, in turn, affect what the contra-standard features are, as well as the variable features. Nevertheless, she specifies some of the standard features of fiction, and includes imagination as one of them:

“If we take a text to be fiction, for example, we will expect it to engage us imaginatively through narrative; to deploy certain literary devices; to include invented elements, such as descriptions of what has never happened and names that fail to refer; to make claims that are not assertions by the author; and so on” (p. 189).
If the standard features do not necessarily categorise a work as fiction, then how does that work? Friend (2012) delineates her mechanism in this quote:

“We can safely say that a work that lacks any standard features of a category, whether manifest or non-manifest, will be excluded from that category. Furthermore, a work that has many standard features of a category (and few contra-standard features) is likely to belong in that category, and a work that has few standard features of a category (and many contra-standard features) is unlikely to belong” (p. 193).

I call this mechanism Friend’s mechanism. Friend’s mechanism says that having standard features makes a work of representation more likely to be classified as fiction. However, she does not explain how her definition works in non-paradigmatic cases, like that of Schindler’s Ark. In my understanding, her account regards works like these as borderline cases. This is not a shortcoming, because this novel and works similar to it contain many standard and contra-standard features of fiction.

Further, Friend (2012) argues that her definition of fiction is significant in that it explains why readers react differently to fiction and nonfiction, stating that this happens because a genre is also a category that guides the reader’s interpretation and understanding of a work (pp. 195, 199-200). She mentions some findings from an experiment by Deborah Hendersen and Herb Clark that show that readers remember more details of a narrative and can recite more parts of a work if a book is labelled as fiction. Friend explains this result as the guidance for understanding embedded in the categorisation of fiction, saying that readers recall more of the narratives and of the texts of a work of fiction because they expect the work to be more enjoyable to read. In contrast, readers of works of nonfiction expect to learn
certain facts when reading the works. Therefore, they cease to focus on the detailed parts of the narrative and the text and start focusing on learning (p. 200).

Part 2

Friend’s Genres and Walton’s Categories of Art

The idea of genre in Friend’s (2012) account is developed from Walton’s idea of categories of art. She says “genres are essentially what Kendall Walton (1970) calls ‘categories of art’” (p. 187). By which, she means “ways of classifying representations that guide appreciation, so that knowledge of the classification plays a role in a work’s correct interpretation and evaluation” (p. 195).

According to Walton (1970), the standard features, contra-standard features, and variable features all play a significant role in evaluating and categorising works of art. While standard features are normally those that do not contribute to the evaluation of the artistic merit, like the properties of having paint or being created on canvas, they still play a significant role in evaluating the artistic merit of a work when considered together with the variables (pp. 343-9).

Walton (1970) provides an example of music. The standard features are the material and mechanics used to build the piano. These features lead to another standard feature, which is that the sound of a piano cannot sound as continuous or linear as string instruments. However, the sound of a piano can still vary, according to a pianist’s technique and style, or the requirements written on a score, or the
use of tools such as a pedal, all of which are variables. Walton’s point is that the standard features are the constraints on the range of possibility of a category of art, while the various possibilities within these constraints are the variables (pp. 349-50).

According to Walton (1970), standard features are not only the physical constraints of a category of art, but also some conventions, like the two-dimensionality of many paintings. Contra-standard features, therefore, include a refusal to use the material specified in that category and the breaking of certain conventions in a particular category.

However, just because something is contra-standard in one case does not mean it necessarily will be in other cases. For instance, Walton mentions a painting with a three-dimensional object glued on it, which is contra-standard to the two-dimensionality of paintings. But when there are many similar paintings, it causes ambiguity — is a work contra-standard, or the beginning of a new genre (pp. 351-3)? This example shows the possibility that one can transform an existing category of art, or make up a new category of art, or both.

**Walton’s Four Criteria for Admitting a Work into a Category of Art**

Walton (1970) provides four criteria for admitting a work into a given category of art. None are sufficient on their own, the first two are necessary, and the
third and fourth are not (p. 357, p. 361). Thus, criteria 1, 2, and 3 or 4 are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a work to be admitted into a category.

The first criterion states that a work normally has many standard features of a given category, though this criterion alone is not sufficient for categorisation, because the very same work may be taken as and evaluated in different categories in different societies (p. 357). For example, it is certainly disastrous to interpret Guo Xi’s *Early Spring* (1072\textsuperscript{19}) as abstract painting like those by Jackson Pollock, because to do so is to ignore all the embedded expression of Chinese philosophy and the painting’s literati origins. This evaluation and categorisation certainly lose a great deal of the artistic merit of this masterpiece.

The case of *Early Spring* shows that artistic merit plays a role in the categorisation of works. Walton (1970) sees the point, so his second criterion of categorisation is to categorise work in a category that maximises its artistic merit (p. 357). In terms of application, the second criterion should be considered with the assumption that the work possesses many standard features in more than one category.

As stated before, the first two criteria are insufficient. Walton (1970) thinks that it is unacceptable to accept a work that is agreed to be mediocre in a certain category of art as a masterpiece in a made up category or categories that are away from the context of the production of the work, no matter how many standard fea-

\textsuperscript{19} This date can only be taken as a reference, as many dates of ancient Chinese paintings, particularly those before Ming dynasty, cannot be taken with complete certainty due to poor documentation.
The case of Early Spring supports Walton’s emphasis on the relationship between the context of production and the categorisation of an artwork. First, this painting supports the need for an additional criterion by showing the inadequacies of the first two criteria. It calls for the consideration of the context of the production of an artwork. This piece possesses many standard features and may be a great abstract painting if taken as one, so it still satisfies the first two criteria together. Second, this example supports Walton’s emphasis on the context of production as an additional criterion. Connoisseurs may not be able to appreciate the merit of the painting without knowing the brush technique and the Chinese ideology embedded in the work, which is part of the context of how this work was produced, including the society of the artist that produced it.

Therefore, Walton (1970) provides two additional conditions for the context of the work. Neither is sufficient on their own, but a work only needs one of them to be admitted into a category of art, providing that it satisfies the criteria 1 and 2.

The third condition is the author’s opinion on which category of art his work belongs in, presuming that he knows the category well enough to judge. This criterion can prevent the association of a random category of art to any object for the sake of assigning a lot of artistic merit to it, so this criterion strengthens Walton’s account by excluding such undesirable situations.
The fourth criterion is that the category of art in question is well-established in the society or community in which the artist produces the work. This criterion is provided because an artist may be inventing a new category by making the artwork in question (for example, Schoenberg’s invention of the atonal twelve-tone system). Thus, if an artist successfully makes a work that invents a new category of art, there will be a new and well-established category associated with the work in his society or community (pp. 357-61). Duchamp’s *Fountain* is a case of making up a new category successfully, because its new category becomes well-established by being accepted as a genuine category in his art community.

The third and fourth criteria do exclude *Early Spring* from being an abstract painting. This painting fails to satisfy criterion three because Guo Xi certainly knew nothing about abstract painting. This painting also fails to satisfy the fourth criterion because his contemporary society, the Northern Song dynasty in China, had no well-established category of abstract painting when this work was produced. Thus, the disjunction formed by these two criteria successfully rejects *Early Spring* as an abstract painting.

**Exploring Friend’s Theory with Walton’s Account**

Before evaluating Friend’s exposition of fiction, I will extrapolate certain subtleties of her account, in order to clarify my target of evaluation. Friend claims that her account has no necessary and sufficient conditions. I will now review her
account with a focus on such conditions and show that it is plausible to have at least one necessary condition and at least one sufficient condition for her account. I will then restate an interpretation of Friend’s account including this sufficient condition, after which I will argue that her account is at best limited and perhaps too pessimistic.

Necessary Conditions

I will first consider whether Friend’s account contains any necessary condition. Her application of Walton’s account mainly focuses on his first criterion, the standard, contra-standard, and variable features. Although Walton did not spell out all of these features for each category, he demanded that a work within a particular category of art must possess many of the standard features of that category. Does Friend inherit this point? If so, there is a necessary condition: if a work of representation is a work of fiction, it possesses many standard features of fiction.

Friend may have to accept that her emphasis on standard features leads to any necessary conditions. Not only whether a work is a work of fiction or not depends on how many standard features it has, it seems to be the case that a work must have at least one standard feature to be a work of fiction. I revisit a quote from Friend (2012) to confirm this point,

“We can safely say that a work that lacks any standard features of a category, whether manifest or non-manifest, will be excluded from that category. A work that has many standard features of a category (and few contra-
standard features) is likely to belong in that category, and a work that has few standard features of a category (and many contra-standard features) is unlikely to belong” (p. 193).

According to this quote, having very few standard features does not render a work to be a work of nonfiction. Nevertheless, because of the first sentence of this quote, Friend’s (2012) definition does require a work of fiction to have at least some standard features. Therefore, having at least one standard feature is a necessary condition of fiction.

**Sufficient Conditions**

While Friend’s definition has necessary conditions, it may also have sufficient conditions. Having all the standard features of a work of fiction can be a sufficient condition; and having this sufficient condition makes Friend’s account more plausible. If Friend insists on not having any sufficient conditions, then she has not provided a supplementary theory to explain why having all the standard features of a work of fiction does not render a work of representation to be a work of fiction. If the standard features are there to determine whether a work of representation is a work of fiction, why is it insufficient for a work that possesses all the standard features to be a work of fiction?

If Friend somehow worked out a theory to explain this, then there is an odd consequence: no written work or work of representation can be certainly categorised as being a work of fiction. Friend’s theory categorises a work of representa-
tion as a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction based on how many standard features it possesses; and no work possesses more standard features than all of the standard features of works of fiction. Consequently, if the work that possesses the most standard features is still not necessarily a work of fiction, no work can necessarily be a work of fiction. As a result, according to Friend’s theory, there can only be works that are very likely to be works of fiction.

Nevertheless, many written works or other works of representation are surely fiction. Thus, Friend’s consequence that no work of representation is certainly a work of fiction is strongly counterintuitive. To avoid the aforementioned result, it seems that Friend should accept that all of the standard features of a work of fiction together are a sufficient condition for categorising a work of representation as a work of fiction. She is not a sceptic like Matravers (2014); she is trying to delineate her idea on what fiction is, so it is not a good idea for her to claim that no work of representation can certainly be categorised as a work of fiction. As a result, for the sake of plausibility, Friend needs to have at least one sufficient condition: to have all the standard features of a work of fiction.

In sum, Friend’s account does have a necessary condition, which is to have at least some standard features, and at least one sufficient condition, which is to have all the standard features of a work of fiction. If it does not have this sufficient condition, it cannot avoid the strongly counterintuitive result that no work of representation is certainly a work of fiction.
Part 3

Evaluating Friend’s Genre Approach

I begin this part of my evaluation by asking a significant question about Friend’s account: does her account actually answer the question that imagination-based theorists are trying to answer? Is she answering the question of what makes a work of representation a work of fiction? Even if her account is not exactly a definition of fiction but only a signpost to the right direction for researching definitions of fiction, these questions are still significant. At most, they need to be rephrased as: does Friend’s exposition lead to a plausible direction for researching the definition of fiction? Or, has Friend provided enough reasons to argue that the property of being a work of fiction cannot be defined?

Suppose Friend is right, and it is plausible to define fiction with a cluster of standard, contra-standard, and variable features. Then, what factor renders certain features to be the standard features of works of fiction in Friend’s account? If there is another internal factor that determines the standard features of works of fiction, then a plausible theory of fiction must pinpoint that internal property. This is because these internal features are what constitutes a work of fiction. Friend makes no comment about whether there are such internal features. Thus, I will evaluate her theory in two ways: first, with the assumption that there are further internal features; and second, with the assumption that there are no further internal features.
I argue that if there are further internal features that constitute what a work of fiction is, then Friend is not providing insights for solving the problem of what constitutes a work of fiction. Instead, she is only answering how one knows whether a work of representation is a work of fiction. What constitutes a work of fiction is a metaphysical question, while the one answered by Friend is an epistemological one, and indeed not the point of the debate.

To substantiate my point, I will make use of Hilary Putnam’s account for differentiating the features used for identifying a natural kind from the properties that define a natural kind. Although fiction is not a natural kind, Putnam’s point still applies. When producing his causal theory of reference for natural kinds, Putnam (1975) distinguished the properties that define a particular natural kind from what he calls stereotypes. Putnam (1975) says “a ‘stereotype’ is a conventional (frequently malicious) idea (which may be wildly inaccurate) of what an X looks like or acts like or is” (p. 249). It consists of the information about the reference of a term, which a person is required to know if he is considered to have acquired that term. While stereotypes are determined by linguistic conventions, Putnam thinks that the definition of a natural kind term depends on the physical environment rather than linguistic conventions, like the tigers in the actual world being animals and water in the actual world being H₂O. Therefore, stereotypes are not definitions of natural kinds (p. 247-51).

As examples, Putnam (1975) points out that H₂O is what constitutes water and what water means (pp. 230-1); and that having stripes is a stereotype about tigers (pp. 249-52). Although Putnam’s (1975) point is that the physical environ-
ment, not linguistic habits or the psychological state of the language users, determines the meaning of natural kinds (pp. 247-8), his point still applies to my discussion of Friend’s theory, because I am specifically focusing on his distinction between stereotypes and definitions.

While fiction is not a natural kind, Putnam’s distinction still applies, since its applicability is not confined to his very simple case of water. For example, a stereotype of Chinese people is that they normally have yellow skin and speak Mandarin/ Putonghua, however, there are Chinese people who have neither one of these properties, such as those born in certain remote parts of China or born as descendants of British families in Hong Kong, a used-to-be colony of the British Empire. Further, Putnam (1975) made a remark on his idea of stereotypes that shows that his distinction between definitions and stereotypes is applicable to the point Friend missed. He says “most stereotypes do in fact capture features possessed by paradigmatic member so the class in question” (p. 250). Putnam thinks that stereotypes capture the features of the paradigm of a natural kind. Similarly, Friend’s standard features of works of fiction are a list of features possessed by many paradigmatic works of fiction. Following this application of Putnam’s idea, Friend’s account is only delineating the stereotypes of fiction, rather than providing a definition of what a work of fiction is 20.

If there is no internal property that makes a work of representation a work of fiction, then Friend’s project is incomplete. She is not a sceptic; she has not ar-

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20 The point about the distinction between the metaphysical question and the epistemological question on fiction is from my supervisor Mark Textor, but the application of Putnam’s account is my own.
argued that a person should give up on finding what makes a work of representation a work of fiction. Arguing that the dominant imagination-based approach is wrong does not mean that nothing constitutes a work of fiction. She needs to argue that there is no property of a work of representation that renders it to be a work of fiction.

A More Fundamental Question for Friend’s Account: Is Genre Approach a Plausible Move to Begin with?

When comparing Friend’s genre approach to the dominant imagination-based approach, I notice that Friend’s approach is a more pessimistic one. This is because, different versions of imagination-based theories agree that there is a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction. Comparatively, given that there is no necessary condition in Friend’s account, it is very difficult to make a certain claim that a particular work of representation is not a work of fiction. Therefore, the move from imagination-based theories to genre-based theories is actually a drastic move that abandons a long-standing and dominant trend of searching for a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction. Abandoning the search for a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction is where the pessimism lies. Given that this search of a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction is a longstanding trend since Walton and Currie, in my view, it requires some good arguments or at least reasons for abandoning this goal.
Friend, as presented in chapter 1, seems to have her good reasons for doing so. Friend found her genre approach on her interpretation of the inadequacies of imagination-based theories. If what she says about make-believe theories is acceptable, then her genre approach may be well-founded.

Unfortunately for her, her interpretation of the inadequacies of imagination-based theories is not the only plausible one. Friend’s strongest point against make-believe theories is assertions in fiction since it is a type of utterances that constitute to the counter-example of many make-believe definitions. However, while make-believe theorists have yet to produce a plausible response, I have shown that a plausible response to Friend’s criticism is possible. As seen in the expositions of make-believe imagination by Nichols and Stich, make-believe theories may answer Friend’s criticism. They can explain the difference between fiction made for telling facts and nonfiction made with intentional fabrication, because, applying what Nichols and Stich say about pretence/imagination, these two types of work serve different functional roles even though their content is processed similarly—both contain a lot of utterances that are to be accepted as true and a lot of utterances that are fabricated. The utterances that are assertions in fiction, after all, are just certain representational content of the cognitive mechanism of make-believe imagination.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that this potential response has not yet been developed to be a complete argument against Friend’s criticisms. Nichols assumes that mental states are typed by functional roles, but so far it is unclear what the functional role of a work of fiction is. Therefore, Nichols’s work
can yet to be applied to define fiction without further development of what the functional role of make-believe imagination in fiction is.

Make-believe theories lack an answer regarding what the functional role of imagination in a work of fiction is (for example, the function for imagination in strategic thinking is to simulate certain counterfactual situations, but there is yet a clear answer like this for make-believe imagination in fiction). With this interpretation, a reasonable way to look at make-believe theories is to find an answer for the functional role of imagination in fiction, instead of abandoning the search for this answer and thus the search for a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction, which is what Friend did. At least, I have not seen any plausible argument from Friend that shows that it is impossible or unlikely to obtain an answer for the functional role of imagination in fiction. Therefore, Friend’s account gives up on providing a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction without providing any convincing reason for doing so. As a result, there is a question for her approach: why should philosophers give up on the search for a clear definition of fiction and look for a vague one, without any convincing argument for doing so?

One may think that a vague approach is more philosophically interesting because it allows more borderline cases like Vidal’s Empire and In Cold Blood and thus has more subtleties. I do not dispute this point. Indeed, I see no fatal flaw against Friend’s approach. I only have several remarks to make. First, both Friend and I provide our own separate non-imagination-based theory of fiction. Second, we take a different approach. The foundations of Friend’s account are the difficulties encountered by imagination-based theories when facing off the issue of asser-
tions in fiction and her application of Walton’s theory of art. I will not follow such approach. As I will show later, I will be building my account on some results of social science experiments. Thus, unlike Friend’s, my account has nothing to do with the failure of imagination-based theories. Fourth, when I delineate my approach of defining fiction, I will also delineate my explanation of the issues of assertions in fiction. The fifth bit is the best bit. Unlike imagination-based theories, my theory is indeed compatible with what Friend has argued for so far, because her target of criticism is imagination-based theories; and my idea will not be an imagination-based one.

An Advantage (Perhaps): Friend’s Account has a Vague Boundary between Fiction and Nonfiction

If both fiction and nonfiction are defined as two genres or two sets of genres, then some work like In Cold Blood may share a significant amount of the standard features of both works of fiction and works of nonfiction. If this is true, then there are works of representation that are works of fiction and works of nonfiction simultaneously. However, these are mutually exclusive categories. This is a criticism made by Michael Martin and Berys Gaut on different occasions [seen in Friend (2012) (p. 205)]. I argue that this issue can be worked out in a way that shows an advantage of Friend’s account, namely a vague boundary between the idea of fiction and the idea of nonfiction. However, I will argue that this advantage
is insufficient to differentiate works of fiction that are made for telling facts from works of nonfiction that are made with intentional fabrications. Friend (2012) says,

“Perhaps, though, the intuition is that once we limit ourselves to representations or texts, we should say that only one of the categories constitutes a genre, with the other as its complement. For example, were I to produce a poem that uses the rhyme scheme of a Shakespearean sonnet but had sixteen lines, one might deny that it is a sonnet without thereby claiming that it belongs to some other poetic genre. Similarly, the thought goes, if I say that a text is non-fiction I might simply be saying that it is not fiction, or vice versa. The difficulty, though, is that it is unclear which of fiction and non-fiction should be the genre and which the complement. This is because we have positive characterizations of both categories, given by standard features that cannot be interpreted merely as negations of the features of the other category” (p. 205).

In this quote, she entertains the idea that nonfiction is not a genre, but only a complement to the genre of fiction, which means that a work of nonfiction is simply something that is not a work of fiction. However, she seems to recognise that this move is implausible.

I agree that it is implausible to categorise nonfiction as a complement if fiction is a genre or a set of genres. Philosophers and film scholars define nonfiction films as a category of film genre. For example, philosopher Carroll (1997) has provided another definition of nonfiction film, as has film scholar Carl Plantinga (1997). Nonfiction is a category of art and thus a genre, at least in the medium of films. Although Friend may deny that nonfiction is not a category of works of representation, she has not yet provided an argument for that. Thus, she cannot deny that nonfiction is a genre of its own.
Alternatively, Friend can claim that there is simply a vague boundary between fiction and nonfiction, which means that she may not be derailed by works like *Schindler’s Ark* and *In Cold Blood*, which are often seen as being on the borderline between fiction and nonfiction. Friend (2012) seems to endorse this view when she discusses whether William Shakespeare’s play *Julius Caesar* is a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction, though she does not delineate how exactly she wants to categorise works like that (pp. 205-6).

In my view, it is plausible to claim that there is a vague boundary between fiction and nonfiction, if Friend’s genre approach is accepted. If Friend admits that fiction is a vague concept, with an unclear boundary between itself and nonfiction, then she can use this vagueness as an advantage, as it allows her to sidestep a serious problem for imagination-based theories: including works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated parts, like *In Cold Blood*, as works of fiction, or excluding works of fiction made for telling facts, like *Schindler’s Ark*, from being works of fiction. Friend’s approach will regard both of them as borderline cases between fiction and nonfiction.

**Friend’s Approach and the Difference between In Cold Blood and Schindler’s Ark**

Despite this potential advantage, Friend’s definition still has to differentiate between works of fiction made for telling facts and works of nonfiction with intentionally fabricated parts. The vagueness in her genre theory alone will not solve
this problem. She needs to specify the standard and contra-standard features of her theory to differentiate these two categories of work from each other. This is a particularly important specification for her to make, as she rejects imagination-based theories for failing to categorise these two types of work correctly.

Unlike imagination-based theories, her account is not troubled by failing to differentiate between works of fiction made for telling facts and works of nonfiction with intentionally fabricated parts. Her definition can resolve this issue by specifying the standard features carefully. Yet, she has not done so for any medium of representation; she has only given some examples of works of fiction made for telling facts like Vidal’s *The Narratives of Empire* series and some examples of works of nonfiction with intentionally fabricated parts. It would be difficult and controversial to specify the standard, contra-standard, and variable features of novels alone, and she has not made much progress on that task.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have addressed and evaluated Friend’s genre theory of fiction. Friend is right about the relationship between imagination and the idea of fiction — imagination is a typical and frequently occurring feature of works of fiction, but not a necessary condition. Thus, it is plausible to regard imagination as a standard feature of works of fiction.
Indeed, the idea of the standard feature is a core of Friend’s genre approach to explaining the idea of fiction. Thus, I have also addressed Walton’s account of categories of art since Friend draws her idea of genre from it.

As for her theory itself, Friend has not sufficiently argued for the plausibility of her genre approach, which takes standard features as its core. She does not provide any explanation of why a work of fiction has certain particular standard features, which is important because if there are properties that make a work of representation have certain standard features, then there are properties that constitute a work of fiction. In this case, following Putnam’s terminology, the standard features in Friend’s account are only stereotypes; they do not define fiction. As a result, Friend’s account only delineates the stereotypes of fiction, rather than what is a work of fiction and what “fiction” means.

If there is no internal property that makes a work of representation a work of fiction, then Friend’s project is incomplete. She has not argued that there are no properties that make a work of representation a work of fiction. Arguing that the dominant imagination-based approach is wrong does not mean that nothing constitutes a work of fiction. She needs to argue that there is no internal property that renders a work of representation to be a work of fiction.

Further, given that Friend’s account was founded on her interpretation of imagination-based theories of fiction, the foundation of her account will be undermined if her interpretation of the imagination-based theories is undermined. My application of Nichols and Stich’s explanation of make-believe imagination in chapter 2 produces an alternative interpretation of make-believe theories, which
shows that make-believe theories can respond to Friend’s criticism and thus rejects her interpretation of the inadequacies of make-believe theories. As a result, I have argued that her genre approach is not founded on the most plausible understanding of make-believe theories, which undermines the foundation of the pessimism in her genre approach that gives up on the search of a clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction.

Friend’s account leads to the possibility of an odd result — a work that is both fiction and nonfiction. However, I accept that this result shows that her definition is vague, yet still acceptable. Even so, the vagueness of definition alone does not differentiate works of fiction made for telling facts from works of nonfiction with intentional fabrications. Her account may be able to do so by specifying the standard, contra-standard, and variable features of textual fiction, but she has not done so. This is another incomplete aspect of her account.

Thus, Friend’s account is at best incomplete. I will not build on it, or attempt to finish it, because I am not convinced of the genre approach, for the reasons detailed in the current chapter.
I have now rejected all imagination-based accounts, as well as Friend’s account. Before moving on to discuss the scepticism surrounding whether there is a meaningful distinction between fiction and nonfiction at all in the next chapter, I will address a final definition of fiction: that of Deutsch (2000, 2013).

Deutsch’s account is often ignored. In a footnote, Friend (2012) says “Deutsch (2000) takes being made up to be both necessary and sufficient for categorization as a work of fiction, but this position is neither plausible nor popular” (p. 180).

I argue that this account still deserves some attention. First, it is the only account with a total breakaway from imagination. Though Friend’s account is not imagination-based, it still has imagination as a standard feature. In contrast, Deutsch dispenses with imagination altogether, and instead substitutes it with his idea of making something up. He defines making something up in two ways: first using the principles of poetic license to create the concept of the fictional domain, and then using this concept to define fiction. He also constructs another alternative interpretation of his definition that emphasises the author’s authority.

Deutsch’s account is also important because unlike imagination-based accounts, this does not require or indeed even mention the role of the audience. This
point matters because I have rejected the point about what the author of a work of fiction intends the audience to do in chapter 1.

In this chapter, I will argue that although Deutsch’s account has its merits in its emphasis on authorial intention and its lack of emphasis on the audience. However, I also argue that his principles of poetic license are implausible and thus making something up, which is the central concept of Deutsch’s definition, is meaningless. I also argue that Deutsch’s second definition of making something up does not contain enough plausible components to be worked out as a definition of fiction.

Deutsch’s Account

Deutsch’s (2000) definition of fiction is found in the following:

“I claim that a document or other form of communication is fiction if it is a token of a type that was made up out of whole cloth, perhaps with generous amounts of the fabric woven in as well. By ‘made up out of whole cloth’ (‘thin air’ will do as well) I mean specifically that the author of the document recorded descriptions that are to be understood (philosophically) as describing elements of the fictional domain. I assume that this domain of discourse is a plenitude in the sense given by the principles of poetic license” (p. 167).

The most important point to consider here is the idea of “making something up”. Deutsch (2000) says that making something up is to record “descriptions of aspects of the fictional plenitude” (p. 156). “Descriptions of aspects of fictional plenitude” means discourse about the fictional domain. A domain specifies which
objects or complex of objects can be designated in it by descriptions or logical formulae.

Therefore, Deutsch defines fiction as a set of descriptions about states of affairs in the fictional domain. He uses this idea to separate works of fiction from works of nonfiction. Deutsch (2000) believes that descriptions of an object in the fictional domain always correctly describe the object. In contrast, descriptions in works of nonfiction are about objects in the factual domain rather than the fictional domain. Even when they are false, they remain part of the factual domain; they do not become fictional. This domain system ensures that fiction cannot be considered to be lies, and that works of fiction are different from works of nonfiction made with intentional fabrications (p. 156).

The Principles of Poetic License

Deutsch explains the idea of fictional plenitude (and thus domains) with the principles of poetic license. He states them thus:

1. “Let C be any condition on properties. Then there is an object in the fictional plenitude FP that has, in FP, all the properties satisfying C.
2. Let C be any condition on properties. Then there is a story in which some object has all the properties satisfying C.
3. Let C’ be any condition on propositions. Then there is a story in which all of the propositions satisfying C’ are true” (p. 157).
I will begin with a brief introduction of these points to clarify a potential metaphysical problem, and then discuss the problems with them. It is important to note in these principles, Deutsch is not making arguments about fictional objects in the actual world. P1 does not assert that there are fictional characters as abstract artefacts in the actual world, as it only says objects in fiction are objects in the fictional domain. Deutsch undermines any proposed ontological commitment in his account by claiming that he is a casual Meinongian, meaning that he uses a set of discourse that resembles Meinongian objects to talk about the content of a work of fiction, without committing to Meinongian ontology on nonexistent objects. In other words, Deutsch is open to non-Meinongian interpretations of what “object” means in P1.

I assume that his point about being a casual Meinongian is acceptable, to evaluate his principles of poetic license. Otherwise, the metaphysical problems of the Meinongian approach alone render his principles implausible [for the problem of the Meinongian approach, see Sainsbury (2010) and Lewis (1983)]²¹.

The First Shortcoming of Deutsch’s Account: the Threat of Circularity

²¹ In the current project, I make this assumption to show that if his account is accepted, there will be very undesirable results. I will then reject his account because of its consequences. Because of my strategy for rejecting Deutsch’s definition, whether Deutsch can plausibly be a casual Meinongian is more important to the debate about fictional truth than it is to my project.
Deutsch defines fiction as a set of discourse that describes objects and events in the fictional domain. There is a risk of circularity in this approach, because the term being defined — “fictional” — shows up in the definition. Deutsch does not define the fictional domain, other than with his explanation of fictional plenitude, which is in turn explained by the principles of poetic license. Yet, the principles in question include the notion of fictional plenitude in P1. Therefore, if the concepts of the fictional domain and fictional plenitude can be used interchangeably, he needs to provide another definition for the fictional domain. Deutsch provides no explanation of the fictional domain that is independent of the principles of poetic license.

The Second Shortcoming of Deutsch’s Account: Russell’s paradox and the Refutation of the Principles of Poetic License

Even if the circularity in Deutsch’s account can be explained away, I argue that the core idea in his account, making something up (as defined by the principles of poetic license), is implausible. By rejecting these principles, I will reject his official interpretation of his idea of making something up. By doing this, I will show that the idea of making something up becomes meaningless, and thus his account fails.

Russell’s paradox
P1 entails a consequence that is similar to Russell's paradox, so I will reject it by applying Russell's paradox. David Papineau (2012) explains Russell's paradox thus: the paradox shows that it is inconsistent to assert that there is a set with a membership condition of not being a member of the set. Papineau labels this set as “the set R” (pp. 3-4, 9-10):

a. “Assume R is not a number of itself.

b. But then, since R contains all sets that are not members of themselves, it is a member of itself.

c. So we have contradicted our assumption (a).

d. So ‘by reduction ad absurdum’ [i.e. reduction to absurdity] we can conclude that (a) is false and R is a member of itself” (p. 11).

Therefore, (a) to (c) argues that R is a member of itself. Papineau (2012) explicates further:

a’. “Assume R is a member of itself.

b’. But then, since R contains only sets that are not members of themselves, it is not a member of itself.

c’. So we have contradicted our assumption (a’).

d’. So ‘by reductio’ we can conclude that (a’) is false and R is not a member of itself” (p. 11).

Papineau (2012) states that both (d) and (d’) are shown, so something is very wrong (p. 11).

I will briefly explain how this argument works. Both (d) and (d’) are derived by asserting that there is a set R together with two assumptions (a) and (a’), so
they are shown by the arguments a to c and a’ to c’ respectively. Rules of natural deduction allow one to put (d) and (d’) together to form a conjunction since they are in the same argument; and this conjunction is derived from assuming that there is set R. As a result, it is the case that \( R \rightarrow ((d)\&(d')) \). The proposition \((d)\&(d')\) can also be written as \((d)\&\neg(d)\), as (d) claims that R is a member of itself; and (d’) claims that R is not a member of itself. Therefore, Russell’s paradox shows that \( R \rightarrow (d)\&\neg(d) \).

There are two ways of rejecting R, given that this conditional is shown to be true. First, Russell's paradox shows that \( R \rightarrow (d)\&\neg(d) \), to avoid the contradiction in the consequent, R must be rejected. Second, the only way for a truth functional conditional to be true while with a false consequent is to have a false antecedent. R is the antecedent in this case, so it must be rejected.

Russell's paradox falsifies the doctrine that there is a set with a membership condition of not being a member of itself. It rejects the assumption that “there is a set corresponding to every condition” (see Papineau (2012), p. 13). I will not go through the details of the set theory that this paradox is responding to, as I am only focusing on its applicability to my evaluation of Deutsch’s theory. Thus, I shall now explain how this paradox challenges the principles of poetic license.

**Reducing P1 and P2 to Russell’s Paradox**
I argue that P1 adopts the assumption, “there is a set corresponding to every condition” in a specific context. Deutsch (2000) defines P1 as “let C be any condition on properties. Then there is an object in the fictional plenitude FP that has, in FP, all the properties satisfying C”. There are two important things to note: P1 claims that there is at least one object in the fictional plenitude having all the properties to satisfy any condition C on certain properties; and one object can form a set of its own.

Following from these two premises, I create what I call condition C1: condition C can be “not being a member of the set that includes all the objects in fictional plenitude”. R1 is a set of objects in fictional plenitude that satisfy the condition C1. Because of P1, R1 is not an empty set (it must have at least one member object). Therefore, the condition of being the member of R1 is to be not a member of the set formed by objects in fictional plenitude, while the members of R1 are objects in fictional plenitude according to the condition C1. In other words, P1 allows a case of Russell’s paradox. Worse, Deutsch cannot refuse to assert that there is R1, because P1 allows the set of objects in fictional plenitude that satisfies the condition C1. Therefore, P1 should be rejected since it leads to a problem highlighted by Russell’s paradox.

Deutsch may respond that fictional domain does not follow the rules of logic as strictly as how the factual domain does. For example, inconsistency in a work of fiction is not always a fault, particularly for works where a character in it did time travelling back to the past and changed how the story ended such as the movie Back to the Future. In that movie, the mother in the beginning certainly did not
fall in love with the main character (well, she was his mother; and this movie does not have an experimental theme). However, during the time travelling, she did. Therefore, the statement “Mcfly’s mother fell in love with him and it is not the case that Mcfly’s mother fell in love with him” is true in the movie. As a result, Deutsch may respond that if the fictional domain does not follow the law of non-contradiction, it does not need to be restrained by Russell’s paradox either. After all, objects in the fictional plenitude are not objects in the actual world or any possible worlds.

Even if this potential defence is accepted, P1 in Deutsch’s account is still going to be problematic. An idea behind Russell’s Paradox is that the assumption, “there is a set corresponding to every condition” must be rejected (see Papineau (2012), p. 13). Even if Deutsch can argue that Russell’s paradox does not affect his P1, it does not mean that P1, as a condition that resembles the idea rejected by Russell’s paradox, is plausible.

As a further argument of mine against P1, given that there is an object in fictional plenitude that has all the properties that satisfy C, then C can be “rendering every other object in the fictional domain to be objects in the actual world”. Although this condition is ridiculous sounding, P1 still has to allow and satisfy it in the fictional domain. Because of this condition C and P1, fiction can only be about the objects in the actual world, so in Deutsch’s terminology, fictional domain becomes factual domain. There are two ways to put the undesirable consequence for Deutsch. In the context of Deutsch’s terminology, Deutsch can no longer use the idea of a fictional domain to differentiate fiction from nonfiction, which is the
foundation of his project, because of P1. In a context of the discussion of theories of fiction, because of this condition C and P1, either there cannot be any object in the fictional domain that does not or cannot exist in the actual world, or there are certain impossible objects like Pegasus in the actual world because of the content of a work of fiction. Either result is absurd.

There is another version of C that will trouble P1 too, “an object that will render any set of descriptions about it a work of nonfiction”. Although it works a lot better when considering P1 and P2, I continue to focus on how it affects P1 meanwhile. Unless there has never been any set of description or story that describes an object that satisfies C, the object in question is going to change a work of fiction to be a work of nonfiction. In Deutsch’s terminology, an object in the fictional domain changes a set of the description of the state of affair in the fictional domain to a set of the description of the state of affair in factual domain. In other words, P1 allows for a possibility that certain work will necessarily be a work of nonfiction in virtue of certain objects included in its content. It seems very counterintuitive, because neither Friend nor imagination-based theorists, as two groups of leading theorists of fiction, argue for this point. Also, if Deutsch wants to make this claim, he is in lack of an argument to do so since there is not one yet. Therefore, P1 leads to an unsubstantiated, counterintuitive, and apparently absurd claim. Deutsch may reply that this is not an issue so long as there is no story describing this object in the fictional domain. Unfortunately for him, P2 makes this line of defence impossible, for which Deutsch (2000) says “let C be any condition on properties. Then there is a story in which some object has all the properties satisfying C”
Thus, even if there is an object in the fictional domain renders the set of description about it a work of nonfiction, there will be at least a work, which I understand in the most liberal possible sense as a set of the description of that particular object, describing that object. Following this, there will be at least a work of nonfiction being a work of nonfiction only because of an object that it describes or mentions.

Deutsch may reply to this argument that logic may not apply in the world of fiction, just like the potential reply for Russell’s paradox. Suppose he is right, he needs to argue for an account of the extent to which fictional world is free from the logical rule. In brief, if the rules of logic do not apply in the world of storytelling, then how did Hercule Poirot do his inference in most cases? Also, should one still maintain the laws of basic mathematic apply in worlds of fiction? If rules of logic do not apply at all, then it is hard to tell. Both David Lewis (1983) and Sainsbury (2010) discussed this subject in great details (pp. 69-90). Both accounts delineated the level of complicatedness and importance of this issue. While none of these arguments produces a fatal attack against the P1 and P2, they certainly show that P1 and P2 are doctrines that lead to very undesirable results.

**P3 after the Problems of P1 and P2**

I have now rejected conditions P1 and P2, leaving P3 as the only remaining component of Deutsch’s definition of the fictional domain. While P3 cannot be re-
duced to a case of Russell’s paradox, on its own, it is implausible as a definition of the fictional domain.

According to Deutsch (2000), P3 says “let C’ be any condition on propositions. Then there is a story in which all of the propositions satisfying C’ are true” (p. 157). It only says that there is at least one story in which all the propositions satisfying certain conditions are true; and the conditions can be anything. C3 allows C’ to be being factually accurate in all historical events. Descriptions for the factual domain also satisfy the condition C’ in question, and then satisfy P3 as a result. Therefore, P3 alone is insufficient for differentiating between writing about states of affairs in the fictional domains from writing about states of affairs in the nonfictional domain.

For example, P3 can be interpreted as: if a domain is fictional, there is at least one story in which all propositions about its states of affair satisfying C’ are true; and C’ can be any condition. In other words, in the fictional domain, there is a story in which any proposition satisfies any condition. It seems that the nonfictional domain cannot satisfy this condition. Yet, it may not be that easy. Anything can be true according to a lie, which at least partially aims to deceive the audience. It is only a matter of whether the lie is believed or not. Especially because a lie aims to deceive, there must be something in it that cannot be factually accurate. In this case, P3 cannot differentiate between the fictional domain and the factual domain because a lie is about the states of the affair in the factual domain — it states what actually happens, but deceptively.
Similarly, P3 cannot deal with cases of hallucinations or delusions. When a person is hallucinating or delusional, potentially anything can be accepted as being true. Thus, in this domain, there is at least one story in which all propositions satisfying certain conditions (which can be anything) are true. The conditions, in this case, include stories that are necessarily or metaphysically untrue, like stories of time travel. Anything can be true in the domain of that person’s thought, which satisfies P3. As a result, principle P3 cannot differentiate the fictional domain from the factual domain, whose scope is the thought of a delusional or hallucinating person.

Deutsch may claim that there is no difference between fiction and the complex of delusions and hallucinations. If so, then he has to explain why people are commonly treated for hallucinations and delusions, but not for producing fiction. This difference entails an intuition that these two types of events are very different.

Therefore, I reject P1 and P2, by using each to form a set with a membership condition of not being a member of the set itself, which is Russell’s paradox. This leaves P3, which is not sufficient as a definition of the fictional domain, as it cannot differentiate between the fictional domain and hallucinations, delusions, and lies. Thus, Deutsch’s principles of poetic license are not sufficient for defining the fictional domain.
The Third Shortcoming of Deutsch’s Account: Being Too Inclusive

Besides the threat of circularity and the reduction to Russell’s paradox and insufficiency, the principles of poetic license have an additional problem: they are too inclusive, and allow meaningless complexes of utterances to be about the fictional domain.

I will demonstrate this beginning with P2. Suppose the condition \( C \) is satisfied by an object being a woman, there are many works that satisfy the condition of having a woman in them. Many of these works can be sets of meaningless utterances.

For instance, if I write “Mary is purple. The number 3 is a prime number”, I satisfy the condition with a concatenation of sentences that do not produce a work of fiction. In fact, many such concatenations can be created simply by combining a (1) description of an object possessing all the properties that satisfy certain conditions (though not descriptions of what happens to the object) with (2) a phrase containing certain random doctrines of philosophy, social science, pure science, etc. Thus, there are many writings satisfy P2 without being works of fiction.

P3 can be dealt with similarly. According to Deutsch (2000), P3 says “Let \( C' \) be any condition on propositions. Then there is a story in which all of the propositions satisfying \( C' \) are true” (p. 157). While P2 is on objects is stories, P3 is on propositions in stories. Therefore, to show that P3 is too inclusive, I keep (2) and substitute (1) by (1)’: “the writing in which all propositions satisfying certain condition
are true”. My previous example, “Mary is red. The number 3 is a prime number” also satisfies step (1’), because it is associated with a truth condition. Indeed, it is a conjunction of “there is a person such that she is Mary and she is red” and “there is a number such that it is 3 and is a prime number”.

This leaves P1 as the only remaining component in the account. As there are no details in P1 that allow it to reject the type of writing produced by following steps (1), (1’), and (2), P1 cannot refuse to include these cases because it includes all the objects that one can think of. Thus, principles P1, P2, and P3 all include writings that are not works of fiction as works of fiction, making them much too inclusive.

A Potential Defence and a Final Rejection

One can attempt to defend the principles of poetic license by appealing to a different definition of the word “story” in P2 and P3. One may claim that the type of cases I used to falsify P2 and P3 are not actually stories, so they should be excluded, and thus P2 and P3 could stand. However, Deutsch does not provide any definition of a story, and to attempt to create one here prompts an abandonment of the search for the definition of fiction until a definitive definition of the story can be created.

Thus, I reject Deutsch’s official interpretation via the principles of the poetic license in three ways. I have shown that there is a threat of circularity in his defini-
tion of fictional plenitude, as he uses the principles to define fictional plenitude, but the term “fictional plenitude” appears in the principles that define it. I then showed how P2 and P3 must be rejected because they can be reduced to Russell’s paradox, and how if this is the case, the remaining P1 is too inclusive for defining the fictional domain and works of fiction. Finally, I showed that even if the other issues with the principles are rejected, they are still too inclusive, as they together include some meaningless writings as works of fiction.

An Alternative Interpretation of Deutsch’s Account

I have rejected Deutsch’s official definition of making something up, the principles of poetic license. But Deutsch also talks about his definition of making something up elsewhere with a philosophical elaboration of a definition of fiction from Virginia Woolf. As this can be taken as an alternative explanation of making something up, I will cover it here and then evaluate it.

Woolf [as cited in Deutsch (2013)] says that the difference between biography and fiction is a matter of whether the author writes with or without any restrictions on the content:

“[A] proof that they differ in the very stuff of which they are made. One [biography] is made with the help of friends, of facts; the other [fiction] is created without any restrictions, save those that the artist, for reasons that seem good to him, chooses to obey” (p. 366).
Although the lack of restriction on the author can be understood as imagination\(^\text{22}\), Deutsch (2013) focuses on the role of author.

“For Woolf, it’s a matter of authorial authority—who or what is in charge? In the case of biography, the author is subordinate to facts and friends (knowledgeable sources); in the case of fiction, the author is fully in charge” (p. 366).

Both Deutsch’s and Woolf’s accounts share the emphasis on the authority of the author when it comes to his own work of fiction. Deutsch’s account is a philosophical development of Woolf’s original distinction between biography and fiction. His account takes a core idea of Woolf’s — the emphasis on the authority of the author. This point is also implied in his official interpretation, the principles of poetic license. Although this alternative interpretation does not contain the detail found in the principles, this particular point is still there. Thus, this is the core idea of Deutsch’s definition of fiction, and he finds it in Woolf’s writing about her own view of fiction.

Although this alternative interpretation does not contain enough detail to be an interpretation of a definition of fiction, it still provides significant inspiration for the search for a definition of fiction. First, in this interpretation, Deutsch recognises that imagination often occurs in the process of creating a work of fiction (A point similar to one of Friend’s). However, he does not regard imagination as a

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\(^{22}\) The notion of restriction can also be understood in terms of imagination, which Deutsch (2013) further claims. He says the author of a fiction must to be able to use his imagination regardless of how facts actually are: “what is crucial is that the imagination is not a slave to (our epistemic access to) how things actually are” (p. 366). Of course, this emphasis on imagination in definition does not mean that the entire content of a work of fiction is made up, Deutsch (2013) only means that a work of fiction is a product of the author’s imagining. It can include works with parts that are factual, or not imagined (pp. 368-9).
necessary condition for his definition of a work of fiction, so he does not become an imagination-based theorist. All he does is to emphasise the authority of the author of a work of fiction over his content. On one hand, he has the authority to input imagination or imaginative events into the work; on the other hand, he also has the authority to input facts into his own work with or without modification. The necessary component in Deutsch’s view is the authority of the author. While the utterances produced by imagination are frequently used to demonstrate authorial authority, they are neither necessary nor the only means of doing so.

This account is certainly not perfect — it does not provide enough material to be a plausible definition of fiction. Its emphasis on authorial authority is simply not detailed enough to be a definition of fiction. Additionally, the emphasis on authority alone is too inclusive, as it can include random concatenations of words or sentences, as well as hallucinations, delusions, and lies. Further, authorial authority does not fit all types of fiction. For example, the authority of the author in historical fiction is particularly limited, as the work must be largely historically accurate. Thus, this idea cannot be applied to all types of fiction, at least without further refinement. However, this alternative explanation is still useful in pointing out some of the merits of Deutsch’s account, which I will now expand on.

The Plausible Points of Deutsch’s Account
Deutsch’s account is often unfairly ignored. Despite its many drawbacks, it has at least one great contribution, which is to emphasise the role of the author in fiction without presuming that every work of fiction has an audience. (This is particularly clear in his alternative explanation of making something up.) This makes it immune from the problem of mental fiction raised in chapter 1.

**Deutsch’s Account as Related to Assertions in Fiction**

As I have shown in the previous chapters, assertions in fiction are a significant issue for many definitions of fiction. While assertions are fatal for many definitions of fiction, they are not so for Deutsch’s account, although they do highlight its oddity and inadequacy.

Deutsch’s account could tackle the issue of assertions in fiction by claiming that assertions in fiction are about both the fictional and factual domains. Thus, they are different from assertions in the factual context, since those are about the factual domain only. However, this would work only if Deutsch has provided a plausible idea of what the fictional domain is. I have shown that this is not the case.

Alternatively, Deutsch’s account could dismiss the issue of assertions in fiction, because utterances in fiction are not about states of affairs in the factual domain, but those in the fictional domain. However, this strategy cannot explain why certain authors are blamed for incorrect descriptions. If discourse in a work of fic-
tion cannot be a description of any actual event, it also cannot contain any assertions about any actual events, and thus cannot be criticised as being inappropriate if it is false. Thus, the most plausible option for Deutsch is to claim that people taking certain inaccuracies in fiction as flaws are wrong, because they fail to respect the difference between the fictional domain and the nonfictional domain. Even if this explanation successfully dismisses the blameworthiness of factually inaccurate works of fiction, he still fails to explain the intuition that Tolstoy’s historical and biographical research for *War and Peace* is praiseworthy. He still needs a theory on the relationship between factual accuracy and good works of fiction.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, I am not convinced that Deutsch’s definition of fiction as making something up is a plausible definition of fiction, because I found that his official interpretation of his definition, namely the principles of poetic license, is not sufficiently well-argued for. I have shown them to be implausible because they contain a threat of circularity, resulting in certain undesirable yet unsubstantiated claims, and include meaningless writing as works of fiction. I also refuse to accept his alternative interpretation, since it does not provide enough material to be a plausible definition of fiction. Its emphasis on authorial authority is simply not detailed enough to be a plausible definition of fiction.
Despite its shortcomings, Deutsch’s account does have several unique contributions to the debate on defining fiction. It is a breakaway from imagination-based theories. While imagination-based theories regard make-belief expressions as a necessary condition of fiction and often include an emphasis on what the author of a work of fiction wants from his work as well as an emphasis on what the author wants his audience to do to his work, Deutsch’s definition does not take imagination as a necessary condition, and it has only the emphasis on the author’s intention about his work, not the intention about his audience.

Thus, there are at least two important contributions to the search for a plausible definition of fiction. First, Deutsch shows that the emphasis on authorial intention does not always have anything to do with the audience. Second, he uses logic to define fiction in terms of domains, rather than imagination. While his attempt is unsuccessful, it shows that fiction can be defined in terms ideas other than imagination.

This is particularly important in light of my rejection of imagination-based theories. If fiction can be defined without taking imagination as a necessary condition, it can at least avoid several issues uniquely possessed by imagination-based accounts.
Chapter 5

A Sceptic Shoots Himself in the Foot: Matravers, Social Science Results, and the Distinction between Fiction and Nonfiction

In his book *Fiction and Narrative*, Matravers (2014) proposes that there should be no distinction between fiction and nonfiction. In this chapter, I will argue against the part of his scepticism that rejects the distinction between fiction and nonfiction universally, rather than simply rejecting imagination-based accounts. I will then show how Matravers misuses findings from social science experiments to make his point, and then show how those same findings, when understood correctly, support my own definition of fiction.

Matravers (2014) makes two main points: first, that imagination-based accounts fail to show that there is any meaningful distinction between the idea of fiction and the idea of nonfiction, and second, that the experience of reading a work of fiction is very similar to the experience of reading a work of nonfiction (p. 47). I will focus only on the second point, because I have already rejected the imagination-based theories in Chapters 1 and 2, and because only the second point can be used to cast doubt on the fiction/nonfiction distinction universally.

Matravers states his second point thus:

(1) A reader’s experience of reading fiction and nonfiction is similar;

(2) Therefore, there is no meaningful distinction between the idea of fiction and nonfiction.
He then provides three sub-arguments for the first premise:

(1) There is no good definition of make-believe or propositional imagination that can be used for defining fiction, (pp. 21-44);

(2) Definitions of fiction cannot accommodate utterances that express the author’s belief particularly factual utterance (pp. 100-1).

(3) The results of experiments in social sciences are incompatible with the existence of a fiction/nonfiction distinction (pp. 90-101);

Points 1 and 2 are used for rejecting imagination-based theories. I will not focus on them here, as they have no application beyond imagination-based theories, and because I have already rejected imagination-based theories in Chapters 1 and 2. Instead, I will focus on rejecting point 3, the only one which can be worked out as a premise for a universal rejection of the fiction/nonfiction distinction.

Point 3 can be presented as:

1. The findings from social science experiments are incompatible with the existence of a fiction/nonfiction distinction (pp. 90-101);

2. Because of 1, readers’ experience of reading fiction and nonfiction is similar;

3. Therefore, there is no meaningful distinction between the ideas of fiction and nonfiction.

I will begin by addressing the plausibility of proposition 1, particularly Matravers’s use of social science experiments for defining fiction.
Matravers’s Interpretation

Matravers (2014) tries to reject the distinction between fiction and nonfiction (and thus, the need for a definition of fiction) by saying that according to social science findings, from the audience’s perspective, there is no significant difference in the experience of reading a work of fiction and a work of nonfiction (p. 47). According to his understanding of the findings, audience believes some utterances in fiction, including some that are not intended to state facts. Therefore, the experiments show that the experience of reading a work of fiction is similar to that of reading a work of nonfiction — audiences believe at least part of its content no matter whether it is a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction. Consequently, he argues that there is no meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction.

Having reviewed the experiments that Matravers cites, I particularly disagree with his interpretation of three of them. I will briefly present Matravers’s interpretation of these experiments, and then present my own.

Matravers (2014) does not spend a lot of time talking about the experiments; in fact, he does not reference any of the experiments explicitly. He simply says,

“The question is the extent to which this compartmentalised content [my note: not regarded as the content of genuine belief] of fictional narrative gets integrated into pre-existing structures of belief. Far from discovering that there is no such integration, the psychology evidence goes far in other direction” (p. 97).
Thus, all Matravers (2014) makes out of these experiments is that audiences’ beliefs are affected by the content of works of fiction. He calls this effect “integration”, and states that with it, “the reader can supplement the content of the narrative from their beliefs, and their beliefs from the content of the narrative” (p. 98). He fails to consider how and why such phenomenon happens in fiction, which is the weak point of his scepticism.

**Gerrig and Prentice’s Experiments**

Among many other experiments, Matravers (2014) mentions a set of experiments by Richard Gerrig and Deborah Prentice on how the content of works of fiction affects the beliefs of an audience (p. 97). I will discuss this set of experiments particularly because I interpret their findings completely differently from Matravers.

**Experiment 1**

In the first experiment, Gerrig and Prentice (1999) asked 29 participants in different universities to read a story about a professor from their home institute being kidnapped (p. 531). There were two versions of the story, both of which con-
tained 32 specific pieces of information, some of which were correct in the story but false in the actual world (called context details), and some of which were correct in the story and true in the actual world (called context-free assertions). Some participants were assigned a control story, which contains none of the 32 pieces of information.

Then the experiment team then asked the participants to verify utterances about the 32 topics mentioned in the story, as well as 32 topics that were not mentioned in the story. They compared the mean time participants used to answer each question, and compared that to the mean answer time of those in the control group.

If the mean time used by the experiment participants for the verification of a particular utterance was longer than the mean time used by the control group, Gerrig and Prentice treated it as a case of interference, by which they mean that the belief of the participant was affected by the story. They found that the experiment subjects took longer to verify context-free assertions than context details, and so concluded that there was evidence of interference in context-free verification. While they did not believe that the context-free information replaced the participants’ beliefs, they did find that the subjects certainly accepted information from the story as an alternative to their existing beliefs (pp. 536-7).

Nevertheless, Gerrig and Prentice (1999) emphasise that audiences do not accept all the information from works of fiction as alternative beliefs. They designed a second experiment to show that the influence of fictional content on the audience depends on the audience’s background knowledge.
In a modification of the first experiment, they changed the background of some of the stories to be the home institute of the participants. They found that students reading the story about an unfamiliar institute were seven times more likely to believe in the weak and unsupported assertions about events taking place at that institute than students reading a story about their home institute (p. 539). Thus, they found that audience does not necessarily accept weak and unsupported assertions even when processing a work that they believe to be fictional, particularly if the content contradicts other beliefs that they hold with a high degree of certainty.

Finally, Gerrig and Prentice (1999) did another experiment to show how people react differently to works they believe to be fictional than they do to works they believe to be nonfictional. In this experiment, all participants were reading stories about an institute unfamiliar to them. Some of the participants were told that they were evaluating a nonfictional description, while others were told they were reading a work of fiction. Participants in a control group read no narrative. Gerrig and Prentice found that participants who believed they were reading a work of fiction were influenced by unsupported assertions in it, but the same phenomenon did not occur in those who thought they were reading a work of nonfiction (pp. 539-40).

Gerrig and Prentice explain their findings of the three experiments thus: audiences process the content of a work non-systematically (i.e. with less of a focus on verification and logic) when they believe it to be fiction. This renders them
more likely to accept weak and unsupported information in that work as true (p. 540).

The Key for Understanding Gerrig and Prentice’s Experiments: Non-Systematic Processing

There are two questions outstanding as to why non-systematic processing makes people more likely to accept weak assertions. First, what do the audiences focus on when apprehending a work? Second, why do audiences simply tend to accept the information, if they comprehend it non-systematically? Why can they not just refrain from judgement or ignore verification altogether?

Gerrig and Prentice (1999) provide an answer to the first question. I shall quote it directly from them, since Matravers (2014) also uses it to support his claim that content of a work of fiction affects the audience’s beliefs (p. 98). According to Gerrig and Prentice (1999),

“Belief in fiction is determined not by a critical analysis of the strength of its arguments [non-systematic process], but instead by the absence of motivation or ability to perform such an analysis. As a result, the persuasiveness of fiction depends less on its substance and more on rhetorical features of the narrative context and the expectations readers bring to it [a non-systematic process]” (p. 542).

This explains why people in all three experiments tend to believe in the unsupported assertions in works they believe to be fiction. It also shows the respective significance of three aforementioned experiments. The first experiment shows
that utterances in a work believed to be fiction may become part of a reader’s beliefs, even if they are weak and unsupported. This is because of non-systematic processing — logic and evidence are not the focus. Thus, when readers comprehend and evaluate a work that they believe to be a fiction, they focus on the features of the work, not whether the utterances in it are true or not. Given that comprehension leads to acceptance (which is a point that I shall discuss using another experiment), the non-systematic processing will lead to acceptance of certain utterances that are not supported by logic and evidence. And if this is accepted, then Gerrig and Prentice’s theory as stated in their quote is sufficient to answer the first question.

**Gilbert’s Experiments on Comprehension and Acceptance**

To address the second question of why people cannot or do not simply withhold judgement when verifying an utterance they are unsure about, I will use Daniel Gilbert’s (1991) findings on how people comprehend information.

Gilbert argues for the comprehension and acceptance model of narrative comprehension. According to this model, comprehending an utterance necessarily includes accepting an utterance. In his account, rejecting an utterance is subsequent to the process of comprehension. In the case of rejecting an utterance, the subject chooses to reverse his acceptance. He (1991) states that this idea is found in Spinoza: “all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed
through the very fact of being conceived” (p. 108). To be clear, I am not stating whether his understanding of Spinoza is correct or not, I’m simply presenting what he’s saying (pp. 108-10).

**Gilbert First Case Study: The Case of Child Development**

Gilbert (1991) cites several case studies for his comprehension and acceptance model. First, he states that the ability to deny an utterance is one of the last linguistic abilities that children master. If linguistic competence reflects cognitive ability, then disbelieving an utterance is more cognitively demanding than believing an utterance. Gilbert affirms the antecedent. He further states his observation that children who are still mastering both cognitive and linguistic abilities are particularly gullible: they accept things effortlessly, but need to make effort to deny those (pp. 109-10).

**My Comment on Gilbert’s First Case**

In my view, these observations certainly show that the cognitive skill of disbelieving an utterance is harder to learn than that of believing one. Yet, it does not conclusively demonstrate that people always accept an utterance before disbelieving it. Neither does it show that acceptance is a necessary component in compre-
hension. The difference in the difficulty of mastering these two skills (i.e. belief and disbelief) does not mean that one skill is automatically used before another one. Further, it does not show that adults will always accept utterances first, because the study is done only using children. Finally, this study does not show how people behave after they have mastered both belief and disbelief.

**Gilbert’s Second Case Study: The Case of Irrelevant Stimulus**

Gilbert (1991) mentions another experiment to substantiate his point. This one shows that it takes extra effort for a person to refrain from accepting an utterance as true, and that a person is much more likely to accept an utterance as true when there are irrelevant stimuli taking up cognitive resources during the comprehension process. Gilbert found that denying an utterance took more cognitive resources than accepting one, because people who spent less of their cognitive resources on verifying an utterance were much more likely to accept it as true (p. 111).

**Commenting on Gilbert’s Second Case**

The comprehension and acceptance model states that a subject accepts an utterance while comprehending it, but this does not follow from this experiment.
While this experiment shows that it is significantly easier for people to accept an utterance as true than to deny it, it does not substantiate the point that comprehension necessarily involves acceptance. Further, it does not show that the two processes happen simultaneously, or that they happen instantly. Thus, Gilbert modifies his comprehension and acceptance model to what I’ll call the three step model: comprehension occurs first, then acceptance, then denial, if needed.

There is a subtle but important philosophical difference between these two models: in the three step model, comprehension is separated from acceptance. This can explain why people tend to accept an utterance when their cognitive resources are deprived, because according to this experiment, acceptance is less cognitively demanding than denial.

**Gilbert’s Third Case Study: Reading Additional Utterances**

Gilbert produces additional experiments to settle this issue. In one experiment, subjects only had enough cognitive resources to comprehend the content of a narrative, but not to evaluate it. (Gilbert accomplished this by only allowing the participants a short time to read the narrative, and instructing them not to assess its truth value.) When asked to evaluate the truth value of these utterances afterwards, participants tended to accept them as true (p. 115).

Gilbert uses this experiment to reject the three step model. If the three step model were right, the participants would have a tendency to refrain from
judgement, instead of tending to accept utterances as true. This did not happen, thus, the model was rejected.

In contrast, these findings support the comprehension and acceptance model. The experiment’s set up makes it improbable for participants to carry out an evaluation in addition to comprehension. Thus, it appears that there is a tendency for acceptance in the comprehension process, and partially confirms the comprehension and acceptance model.

Finally, Gilbert (1999) uses these findings to reject another model of comprehension, the acceptance or rejection model. In this model, a person first comprehends content, and then decides whether to accept it as true or to reject it as false. This idea is associated with Descartes who said, “we have power ... to give or withhold our assent at will, is so evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions that are innate in us” (cited in Gilbert (1999) p. 108) (pp. 108-9, 114).

Similarly to the three step model, if this is true, a cognitively depleted person should refrain from evaluating an utterance, because he does not have the resources to properly carry out any processes in addition to comprehension. As this is inconsistent with the findings of the experiment, the acceptance or rejection model is also rejected.

What Does Gilbert Show?
Gilbert tries to use these experiments to show that the comprehension and acceptance model is true. To do so, he must be able to show that (1) comprehending an utterance necessarily involves accepting it, and (2.1) the process of rejecting an utterance is always subsequent to comprehension, in which (2.2) a person deliberates to reverse his acceptance. I argue that his third experiment shows that the comprehension and acceptance model is true for 2.1 and 2.2, although 1 needs modification.

The comprehension and acceptance model states that comprehending an utterance entails accepting it. However, Gilbert’s third case study shows that comprehending an utterance only entails a tendency towards acceptance; it does not show that participants accept all of the additional utterances as true, which would be necessary for comprehension to entail acceptance. Thus, point (1) should be revised as (1'): comprehending an utterance necessarily includes a tendency towards accepting it.

**Audiences Genuinely Accept the Content of Fiction: Non-Systematic Processing and the Comprehension Acceptance Model**

These two sets of experiments by Prentice and Gerrig and Gilbert together explain the process of comprehending a work of fiction. Prentice and Gerrig’s experiments show that readers of works that they believe to be fictional often genuinely accept what is said in the work as true. This is because they process works
that they believe to be fictional non-systematically (without focusing on evidence or logic), which leads them to accept unsupported utterances as true.

But these experiments on their own are not enough to definitively say that non-systematic processing makes people more receptive or gullible. Thus, I need to provide either an argument or evidence to show that it is plausible to connect non-systematic processing with acceptance. I do so with Gilbert’s experiments.

Gilbert’s third experiment shows that comprehending a work entails a tendency to accept it as true. By this reasoning, audiences tend to accept the content of a work they believe to be fictional as true when they apprehend it. But this is still not enough to explain the effect of non-systematic processing on the comprehension of works believed to be fictional. Indeed, Prentice and Gerrig show that audiences usually regard the content of a work they believe to be fiction as false when it contradicts beliefs they hold with a high degree of certainty. Thus, a tendency to believe is clearly not enough to argue that audiences tend to accept the content of a work believed to be fictional as true, and it certainly cannot explain the reasoning for such a tendency.

However, there are additional details of Gilbert’s experiments that can be used to shed some light. First, the third experiment shows that comprehension entails a tendency towards acceptance; second, the first and second experiments show that this tendency towards acceptance often demonstrates itself when a person cannot or does not assign enough cognitive resources to properly evaluate the truth of the content.
Recalling the point by Gerrig and Prentice (1999), readers process the content of work non-systematically when their reading is labelled as fiction. In other words, they pay little attention to verify whether the content is true (p. 540). This gives the readers little motivation or ability (i.e. cognitive resources) to perform such an analysis (p. 542). So the non-systematic processing that occurs when apprehending a work believed to be fiction is a demonstration of the tendency to accept an utterance as true when cognitive resources are depleted.

To sum up, readers of works believed to be fiction often genuinely accept weak and unsupported utterances because of their non-systematic processing of the work. Non-systematic processing causes the deprivation of cognitive resources by shifting the focus of the readers during the process of apprehension. This demonstrates the feasibility of the modified comprehension and acceptance model, which states that comprehending a work of representation entails the tendency to accept its content as true.

**Rejecting Matravers’s Scepticism by Clarifying Social Science Findings**

Using Gilbert’s experiments, I have shown the plausibility of non-systematic processing as an explanation of why audiences tend to accept weakly supported utterances in a work of they believe to be fiction. Thus, it is plausible for Gerrig and Prentice to claim that the process of apprehending fiction is non-systematic. Using
this point, I can not only reject Matravers’s reading of Gerrig and Prentice’s findings, but also undermine his scepticism as a whole.

The structure of Matravers’s scepticism towards the fiction/nonfiction distinction is as follows: (1) a reader’s experience of reading works of fiction and works of nonfiction is similar; so (2) there is no meaningful distinction between fiction and nonfiction. He argues for the proposition (1) using an interpretation of Gerrig and Prentice’s findings.

However, I reject both points. In terms of proposition (1), setting aside the issue of whether he correctly interprets the findings (which I will later argue he does not); I argue that Matravers’s understanding of the experiments is philosophically implausible.

According to Matravers (2014), Gerrig and Prentice’s experiments show that people believe in some of the content of fiction (p. 98). I argue that Gerrig and Prentice’s findings only show that people accept the content of fiction as being true; they do not believe it. In fact, Gerrig and Prentice do not declare a definition of belief; they seem to conflate belief with acceptance. Although the definition of belief is an ongoing debate, there is a clear distinction between belief and acceptance in philosophy.

As pointed out by Velleman and Shah (2005), regarding an utterance as true means only acceptance. Belief is a sub-category of acceptance; it is not identical to acceptance (pp. 498-9). Since Gerrig and Prentice and Gilbert did not specify a philosophical definition of belief in their experiments and findings, their findings
are insufficient for any philosopher to claim that belief, as opposed to acceptance, is involved. Matravers fails to recognise this, or ignores it, and accepts the standard of belief that is not even associated with philosophical belief.

Having rejected Matravers’s reason for asserting proposition (1), I will now go on to show that (1) must be rejected because of his misinterpretation of the findings.

Matravers himself cites the quote from Gerrig and Prentice (1999) that falsifies this point:

“Belief in fiction is determined not by a critical analysis of the strength of its arguments [non-systematic process], but instead by the absence of motivation or ability to perform such an analysis. As a result, the persuasiveness of fiction depends less on its substance and more on rhetorical features of the narrative context and the expectations readers bring to it [a non-systematic process]” (p. 542)

Right after citing this passage, Matravers (2014) writes “this discussion of the integration of some of the content of representations with pre-existing structures of belief should not draw our attention away from the main point” (p. 98). What is the main point? He attempts to dismiss the meaningfulness of the fiction/nonfiction distinction altogether, in other words, the argument from point (1) to point (2).

What he fails to realise or ignores is that this passage falsifies point (1) by pointing out the difference between the experience of reading fiction and nonfiction: readers of fiction focus on the rhetorical features, the context of the work’s creation, and how the features and content of a work live up to their expectations,
while readers of nonfiction focus on verification and the strength of the arguments in its content. Further, according to this passage, readers of fiction do not motivate themselves to evaluate the evidence and the strength of arguments, while readers of nonfiction do motivate themselves to do these things, meaning that readers of fiction and nonfiction differ in their both focus and motivation. These two differences are enough to reject Matravers’s (2014) claim that “it is independently implausible to think that what goes on when we read fiction is very different from what goes on when we read nonfiction” (p. 47).

I go on to show that point (2) is false using a positive argument providing an account of the meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction in the next chapter; however, before I do that I will settle some methodological issues.

**Some Methodological Issues**

Although I have rejected Matravers’s reading of the experiments mentioned in this project, as well as his scepticism, I admit that his use of social science findings is an unusual move in the debate on the definition of fiction. Since I will be using a similar unusual methodology in constructing my own definition of fiction, I want to clarify some of the issues surrounding it before I begin. I will begin by addressing Peter Lamarque’s criticism of Matravers’s methodology, and then argue why it is implausible. Afterwards, I will delineate the merits of the use of social sci-
ence experiments to complement philosophical research, and provide the details of my own methodology.

Imagination-based theorist Peter Lamarque disagrees with Matravers’s use of social science experiments to substantiate his scepticism on the fiction/nonfiction distinction. Lamarque (2016) says,

In general Matravers should have been more sceptical of the philosophical significance of this work and more cautious in the support he draws from it. If he had attended less to the work of empirical psychologists more to that of experienced literary critics writing about novels and if he had compared this to experienced historians appraising the work of fellow historians, he would have got a quite different picture of the terrain (p. 618).

Lamarque undermines Matravers’s use of social science findings by arguing that fiction should be defined in terms of what experts do with works of fiction, and that the actions of the audiences in the experiment findings cannot be taken as the actions of experts. But this disagreement with Matravers’s methodology does not show that his argument is invalid. Matravers could simply say that a questionable methodology does not necessarily mean an invalid argument.

I reject Lamarque’s criticism because (1) it is not as destructive to Matravers’s scepticism as mine is, and (2) I see substantial merits in using social science findings in the definition of fiction.

Regarding (1), I have shown in this chapter that Matravers’s interpretation of the findings, according to his own methodology, cannot be used to reasonably support his scepticism, which is certainly a stronger criticism than Lamarque’s.
Regarding point (2), I find it more plausible to take the rigorously produced findings from social science more seriously than intuition tests about how fiction ought to be. While philosophers often do intuition tests, they are typically isolated and unregulated. Social scientists have provided us with a regulated intuition test on a group of intellectual laymen. Thus, I take the findings provided by Gerrig and Prentice and Gilbert to be useful for defining fiction.

Consequently, despite my criticism of Matravers’s methodology, and my demonstration that his interpretation of the findings was mistaken, I believe his use of experimental results as a methodology is valuable. Thus, I will also use social science findings to construct my definition of fiction.

Conclusion

Matravers argues that there is no meaningful distinction between fiction and nonfiction because he says that there is no significant difference between the experience of apprehending a work of fiction and a work of nonfiction. He argues for this reason with his interpretation of social science findings.

I disagree with his interpretation of these findings, and argue that they, in fact, support the opposite point — that there is a significant difference in the expe-
rience of apprehending fiction and nonfiction. Thus, I have undermined not only
his reading of the findings, but also his reason for scepticism.

I finished by discussing Matravers’s methodology, the criticisms against it,
and how and why I will be using a similar methodology to create my own definition
of fiction
Chapter 6

A New Definition of Fiction and a New Explanation of the Unique Role of Assertions in Fiction

Thus far I have shown that none of the existing definitions of fiction are plausible, but that a distinction between fiction and nonfiction is still necessary. I will now present my new definition of fiction, which is immune to the criticisms of previous definitions and can explain many difficult issues regarding the process of defining fiction. This chapter will be divided into two parts: in part 1, I will construct my own definition of fiction and demonstrate its plausibility, and in part 2, I will address a particularly difficult issue for definitions of fiction, namely, assertions in fiction, and show how my definition solves this problem.

I will begin the construction of my own definition of fiction by recalling which ideas can still plausibly be used for defining fiction: authorial intention and non-systematic processing. I will then modify the idea of non-systematic processing to make it more philosophically sound, using the concepts of interior properties, phenomenal concept, and end value. Having done this, I will state my definition of fiction, and then demonstrate its plausibility by using it to address several persistent problems for previous definitions of fiction, including the nonfictional status of In Cold Blood, the concept of faction, and the fictional status of Schindler’s Ark. I will then discuss why so many previous theorists thought that imagination was a necessary component of a definition of fiction and demonstrate that it is not, before addressing further issues for previous definitions of fiction, including factually correct fiction and mental fiction.
I will then shift my focus to one final, intractable problem for definitions of fiction: the role of assertions in fiction. I will use Stalnaker’s theory of secondary effects to argue that assertions in fiction are different from assertions in nonfiction because they have both an essential and a secondary effect. I will discuss why assertions cause so many problems for other theories of fiction, and then show how my theory works with a wide range of assertions in fiction.

Part 1

A New Definition of Fiction

The First Pillar of My Theory: Authorial Intention

Despite having rejected both imagination-based theories and non-imagination-based theories generally, there is one element of them that I retain, albeit with modifications: the focus on the author’s intention.

With the case of mental fiction in chapter 1, I have shown that it is implausible to presuppose that all authors of all works of fiction intend for those works of fiction to have an audience, and that those authors intend those audiences to do something specific with those works. This is because the case of mental fiction shows that an author can create a work of fiction and intend it to be read by no one, and that it is implausible to use the audience’s actions as a necessary condi-
tion when defining fiction, because it is possible for a work of fiction to have no audience.

The Second Pillar of My Theory: Non-Systematic Processing

In chapter 5, I demonstrated that despite the implausibility of all the existing definitions of fiction, a distinction between fiction and nonfiction remains, as shown by the existence of non-systematic processing.23

By shifting the audience’s focus from verification and logical processing, the non-systematic processing makes them much more likely to genuinely accept weak and unsupported utterances in works they believe to be works of fiction. When paired with Gilbert’s comprehension and acceptance model, it becomes apparent that people who believe they are reading a work of fiction dedicate fewer cognitive resources to evaluating the truth of the utterances they read in it than those who believe they are reading a work of nonfiction.

The Foundation of My Definition of Fiction

23 I would like to stress that although extremely valuable, the work of social scientists cannot be taken as a definition of fiction. Rather, as philosophers, we can use their findings to create a philosophically sound definition.
So far, I have argued that a plausible definition of fiction has two necessary components: authorial intention and non-systematic processing. Thus, I can create a preliminary definition of fiction as the following:

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be processed non-systematically.

I call this definition preliminary because non-systematic processing is not yet substantial enough to be a philosophical idea. Thus far, the concept of non-systematic processing only states that the concept of fiction tends to drive readers’ attention away from verification. There is no explicit mention of what the readers focus on instead, although Gerrig and Prentice (1999) do drop some hints:

“The persuasiveness of fiction depends less on its substance and more on rhetorical features of the narrative context and the expectations readers bring to it” (p. 542).

This quote details two foci of non-systematic processing: the rhetorical features and the readers’ expectations. The rhetorical features are the content and parts of the work that do not depend on events in the actual world. These features do not depend on other objects, states of affairs, or relationships to any set of objects in the actual world.

Gerrig and Prentice provide less information about the second focus, but I can use philosophical theories to interpret their findings and connect them to the readers’ expectations.
Gerrig and Prentice’s second point is clearly about audiences; however, this should not be taken to support theories of fiction that have an audience as a necessary component. I will now set this idea aside for four reasons.

First, if the author’s intentions for the audience determines whether a work is a work of fiction or not, then neither Kafka’s *Metamorphosis* nor *The Castle* can be fiction\(^{24}\). My case of mental fiction in chapter 1 shows the same point.

Second, despite it causing no harm to my theory, this point on the audience’s expectations may produce an issue of circularity if included into a definition. If audience’s expectations are affected by their belief about whether they are reading a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction, the idea of fiction affects their expectations of apprehending a work of representation. If works of fiction are defined in terms of the audience’s expectation, then the change in the audience’s expectation of what they are reading, which is caused by their belief about whether they are reading a work of fiction or a work of nonfiction, is explained in terms of the audience’s expectation itself. This is an instance of circular reasoning. Third, this idea of expectation is vague, and is not explained by Gerrig and Prentice in detail, so it is too unclear to be useful. Fourth, I can set this idea aside because it is consistent with a definition, in which audience plays no role. As a result, only the focus on rhetorical features is useful here.

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*Categorising Rhetorical Features: Intrinsic Properties or Interior Properties*

\(^{24}\) Franz Kafka wrote *Metamorphosis* and *The Castle* with the intention that they not be read by anyone, not even himself, according to an article by T Peterson (2010) in *The Guardian*. 
Having set aside the issue of the audience’s expectations, I will now categorise the social science idea of rhetorical features in philosophical terms. One might think that they are the intrinsic properties of a work of representation, as they are those properties of an object that are often independent of any other distinct objects or states of affairs.

Unfortunately, there are so many definitions of intrinsic properties, none of which are widely accepted, that is it impossible to reasonably use intrinsic properties in a definition of fiction. However, there is one theory of intrinsic properties that, while debatable when it comes to defining intrinsic properties, can plausibly be used to explain what type of features in a work of fiction are the focus of apprehension: that of interior properties.

Interior properties are a categorisation of properties that are used for defining intrinsic properties. As presented by Dan Marshall (2012): “[those] properties that are classified as intrinsic by (3) [are] interior properties” (§2.3).

“(3) Being F is an intrinsic property iff, necessarily, anything that is F is F in virtue of the way it itself, and nothing wholly distinct from it, is” (§2.3).”

I will borrow the interior properties method of defining intrinsic properties to define rhetorical features. According to this method, the rhetorical features of a work — its plot structure, characterisation, style of writing, etc. — are interior properties.
Despite the fact that the concept of interior properties is normally used to define intrinsic properties, I shall not call the rhetorical features intrinsic properties, because what intrinsic properties are does not concern my current project. I have merely borrowed the method of definition, and do not commit to its conclusions in the original usage. Additionally, the usefulness of the concept interior properties does not depend on whether all intrinsic properties are interior properties.

One could say that rhetorical features could be changed by the context of production, and therefore claim that rhetorical features are not really interior properties. However, I say that the context of production is part of the idea of the work, and so is not distinct from the work itself [see Lamarque (2010)], meaning that even if rhetorical features are affected in the context of production, they are affected by other interior properties of the work. Interior properties of a work of representation are the properties possessed by the work independent of any object distinct from it. Following this, because the context of production is part of the work, and so is also an interior property, being affected by the context of production does not disqualify rhetorical features from being interior properties.

Further, the relation between the rhetorical features and the context of production further strengthens the idea that a work of representation has certain rhetorical features independent of other distinct objects or events. If the context of production changes, such as in the case of the author deciding to cancel out a character, then the rhetorical features of the work change because of the cancellation of all the parts about the cancelled character. If the author of a work of repre-
sentation does not change anything about the work (and thus there is no change in the production context), then there is no change in the rhetorical features of that work no matter what happens in the actual world. Thus, rhetorical features are unlike some other non-interior properties of a work, such as being a true description or being about certain actual events. Thus, a work of representation has certain rhetorical features because of its context of production, and thus the work itself. Therefore, I categorise the rhetorical properties that audiences focus on in comprehending a work (whether in terms of the context of its production or its actual elements) non-systematically as interior properties.

**Interior Properties and Definition of Fiction**

My next step is to incorporate the idea of interior properties into my definition of fiction. We can see from the above section that audiences in Gerrig and Prentice’s findings focus on the interior properties of a fiction. (I do not claim that they focus on the interior properties exclusively, just that this is at least one of their foci.) When I explain non-systematic processing in terms of interior properties, my definition becomes,

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process, which focuses on the interior properties of the work.
For this preliminary idea, I will argue that the interior properties of a work of fiction form an important focus for understanding a work of fiction, even when the author or audience is trying to understand the components of a work of fiction that may not be amongst the interior properties of a work of fiction and address potential objections to my argument. For example, characterisation is often not an interior property of a work of fiction, because the personality of a fictional character often depends on the content in other works of fiction, such as what a vampire usually does or looks like. Further, the writing style of an author is not confined to the interior properties of a single work of fiction, because it has to do with how he writes when producing other works of the narrative.

My first step of response is to clarify my idea. Although I make interior properties as a focus of comprehending works of fiction, I have not made it the only focus. While I may not have a foolproof response to the potential criticism, I argue that the interior properties of a work of fiction are an important focus for understanding a work of fiction, even when the author or audience is trying to understand the components of a work of fiction that may not be amongst the interior properties of a work of fiction.

I will show my point by discussing the issues of characterisation and writing style separately. Thus, my second response is to show that the issue of a fictional character does not threaten my proposed emphasis on the interior properties. Although the characterisation of fictional characters depend on other works of fiction, like zombie having no conscious sensation, or such as the characterisation of Hercule Poirot depends on multiple works of fiction, it does not mean that the interior properties is not an important focus when the authors of these works were creat-
ing these works of fiction. For example, it is still reasonable to accept that Agatha Christie still wanted her audience to focus on how she writes about Poirot in *Murder in Mesopotamia*, which are the interior properties of this work of fiction, even though she expected her audience to bring in some of their beliefs about Poirot, like him being a famous Belgian detective who likes drinking Tisane, when the audience read this work of fiction. Further, even if authors of works of fiction that include zombies expects their audience to have certain belief about zombie before reading their books, it is also reasonable to accept that these authors still want the audience to focus on what they write about the zombies in their works, which are the interior properties of their works of fiction.

Third, as for writing style, although writing style can often be seen in the perspective of a collection of works of fiction, like the writing style in the plays by William Shakespeare, how the writing style developed amongst the martial art novels by Louis Cha (Jin Yong), it is still legitimate to talk about the writing style of a particular work of fiction, such as how it changed, developed, or revolutionised the writing style of a particular type or genre of works of fiction (in the categorisation sense, not in the sense proposed by Friend). When this happens, the focus is on how particular works of fiction is written, which is an instance of interior properties of a work of fiction.

Although both cases of characterisation and writing style require the audience to utilise their beliefs that are not induced by the interior properties of what they are reading. Nevertheless, what knowledge audience need to comprehend certain aspect of a work of fiction does not affect whether they always focus are always expected by the authors to focus on the interior properties of a work of fic-
tion. Indeed, it may confirm my point regarding interior properties being the focus. This is because, the audience are using their knowledge or beliefs to comprehend certain features of a work of fiction, which are the interior properties. As long as the characterisation or writing style of a particular work of fiction is concerned, the interior properties of a work of fiction form a necessary focus for discussing these issues.

Thus, as a clarification, I insert an explanatory clause into my idea,

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process, which focuses on the interior properties of the work (as a focus, not the only focus, amongst some other properties of the work).

I will not include the bracketed clause in the later part of this project, but I always mean to include this clause when I mention interior properties in my ideas of fiction.

**Using Phenomenal Concept to Reframe Fiction**

We now know that interior properties are the focus in non-systematic processing, but why is this case? And why are they not the focus in systematic processing? Both fiction and nonfiction have interior properties, so why do they only become the focus in fiction?

To answer these questions, I argue that the purpose of a fiction is to produce an experience that is valued by the audience without regarding any object distinct from the work, and that this experience is produced by the interior proper-
ties of the work of fiction. Furthermore, the initial, first-hand experience of apprehension itself is particularly important when apprehending a work of fiction. Knowing the plot points of a work of fiction is different from having apprehended it in person. Apprehending the work in person produces a phenomenal concept of the work in question that simply knowing things about it or knowing about parts of the content does not.

I shall now demonstrate how phenomenal concept applies to the experience of reading a work of fiction. Afterwards, I will argue that the application of phenomenal concept means that we can look at the idea of fiction in a completely new way, one that has not been done in any previous definition of fiction.²⁵

According to Papineau (2002), phenomenal concepts necessarily require the subject’s initial experience. If Mary has the phenomenal concept of seeing the colour red, she must have had the initial experience of perceiving red. Papineau allows two exceptions: either (i) a phenomenal concept can be derived from combining two other phenomenal concepts that the subject has already mastered; or (ii) a phenomenal concept is the intermediate of the two previously-mastered phenomenal concepts (pp. 67-9, pp. 96-7).

An example of the type (i) is the phenomenal concept of seeing a yellow cube. If one has the phenomenal concept of seeing the colour yellow and the phenomenal concept of seeing a cube, he may not need to have the initial

²⁵ Although Paisley Livingston (2005) has produced an account on version, it is on literary works in general rather than works of fiction specifically.
experience of seeing a yellow cube to have the phenomenal concept of seeing a yellow cube.

An example of type 2 (ii) is the phenomenal concept of seeing the colour pink. If one knows theoretically that the colour pink is composed of the colours white and red, and he has the initial experience of seeing the colours red and white, he may not need the initial experience of seeing the colour pink to have the phenomenal concept of the colour pink, because the colour pink is the intermediate of the colour white and the colour red.

Papineau (2002) emphasises that his version of phenomenal concept refers to the experience without any description. To show this point semantically, his phenomenal concepts take the form of an “experience operator”, which is “the experience: —”. The gap after the experience operator, denoted here by a dash, is called “perceptual filling”. The phenomenal concepts refer to a set of resembling experiences, rather than any instance of the type of experience quoted in the perceptual filling. A type of experience is a set of many similar experiences (pp. 102-3; 116-21).

The Phenomenal Concept of Apprehending a Fiction

Although the experience of apprehending a work of fiction is different from the experience of seeing colours, the phenomenal concept can still be applied when defining fiction. The experience of apprehending a work of fiction is the initial experience that is necessary for one to have the phenomenal concepts of apprehending the work in question. The phenomenal concept of apprehending a
work of fiction is a complex of many phenomenal concepts. Formally, while the phenomenal concept of seeing the colour red is “the experience: seeing red”, the phenomenal concept of apprehending a work of fiction $F$ is “the experience: reading/watching/listening to a work of fiction $F$”.

Because of the complexity of the initial experience of the phenomenal concept of fiction, it is very difficult, and likely impossible, for anyone to have a phenomenal concept of a particular fiction without any initial experience of it at all. Even Papineau’s exceptions do not apply: in terms of the first exception, the experience of reading a work of fiction is not a combination of the experience of any two other works of fiction. The second exception is not applicable because the experience of apprehending a work of fiction is irrelevant to any spectrum of experience.

One may ask whether the phenomenal concept of a new version of a work requires the readers to have a new initial experience apart from their initial experience of the old version. In my view, unless the new version is very different from the old one or there are changes in the non-descriptive properties like its rhetoric, it does not. This is because if a person has an initial experience of an old version of a work of fiction, and then apprehends a new version that is not significantly different from the old one, the experience qualifies for Papineau’s first exception: producing the initial experience from combining other phenomenal concepts.

This is because the phenomenal concept of a work of representation is a complex of different phenomenal concepts of experiences. A revision normally changes a minor part of the plot that can be experienced with an initial experience
from an old edition. Unless the new parts are very hard to visualise or the changes are in the non-narrative properties of the work, apprehending the changes together with the initial experience of an old edition can produce the experience of the new version in the mind of the readers of the old version.

**Phenomenal Concept’s Role in My Definition Thus Far**

I have been focusing on interior properties and phenomenal concept to explain the role of non-systematic processing as a component of my definition. I will further refine it here.

The interior properties of a work of fiction do not only include what happens in the work of fiction but also the interior features, such as rhetorical features, how different words sound together, iconography, or even the author’s way of describing events. The phenomenal concept of reading a fiction is a complex of phenomenal concepts of all these different properties. This is because many parts of a work are those properties that can be apprehended only via initial experience.

One may say that this is true of both fiction and nonfiction, and thus that phenomenal concept is not useful in defining fiction specifically. However, although the experience of apprehending both fiction and nonfiction produce phenomenal concepts, the acquisition of these concepts only affects the focus of the audience in cases of fiction.

**End Value and Fiction**
The significance of phenomenal concepts differs hugely between the apprehension of a work of fiction and a work of nonfiction. A history book that contains falsehoods about history is a bad history book, no matter how exciting it is to read it. In contrast, a work of fiction can be as factually inaccurate as the author wants it to be and can still be a great work of fiction because of its interior properties, such as the plot or the writing style. My own exposition of non-systematic processing of works of fiction must also explain the difference in the role of the phenomenal concept of a work of fiction in the evaluation, so that I can plausibly include it into my definition.

I argue that the non-systematic processing of works of fiction means that the subject values his experience of apprehending a work of fiction as an end. This understanding can produce a clear overall picture of non-systematic processing and set the apprehension of works of fiction apart from the apprehension of works of nonfiction.

When a person believes that he is reading or watching a work of fiction, he focuses on the interior properties of the work. This is because he determines the value of the work by valuing the initial experience that is required for acquiring the phenomenal concept of the work as an end. In contrast, a person apprehending nonfictional work values the work by its correctness in a way that he does not do with a work of fiction.

I am not claiming that audiences of works of fiction do not consider accuracy at all. My point is that a work of fiction is valued as a good work of fiction because the experience of evaluating it is valued as an end in itself. Valuing a work
of fiction as an end does not mean that all works of fiction are valuable or good as an end. Rather, I am arguing that a work of fiction is evaluated as good or bad because of how good or bad the experience of apprehending it is. In other words, the evaluation of the experience is grounded in the experience of apprehension alone. I use “grounding” and “in virtue of” interchangeably. For the logical rules regulating this notion, see Gideon Rosen (2010).

Valuing something as an end in itself is an important concept in philosophy. Shelly Kagan (1998) uses value as an end to define intrinsic value saying,

“I suggest that we reserve the term ‘intrinsic value’ for value as an end, and leave it to others to come up with a short label for the value that an object has simply by virtue of its intrinsic properties” (p. 293).26

In response to my use of end value in fiction, make-believe theorists may claim that works of fiction can serve a variety of purposes — for instance, they can shed light on social problems or provide accounts of history — and therefore, the experiences of works of fiction are often not valued as an end because they are made for some other instrumental purposes, i.e. they are valued as a means. This idea presumes that if an object is instrumentally valuable, it cannot be valued as an end in itself. Kagan (1998) rebuts this point. He says,

“No doubt most of us do value the ability to cook a gourmet mean at least in part for merely instrumental reasons. (Presumably, for example, we might value the ability as a means to fine food, and the food as a means to pleasure). But I think it is not an uncommon view to hold that such abilities are intrinsically valuable as well—that they are valuable as an end, and not merely as a means” (p. 284).

26 The definition of intrinsic value is still hotly debated. There are other theories that disagree with the Kagan’s definition of intrinsic value, notably Christine M. Korsgaard (1983). Nevertheless, my current project makes no attempt to define intrinsic value; therefore, there is no need to address the plausibility of Kagan’s argument. I mention Korsgaard’s account merely to show that there is debate around the term “intrinsic value”, though Kagan uses “intrinsic value” and “value as an end” interchangeably.
Kagan’s point is that an object can be valuable both as an end and as a means. In his example, the skill of gastronomy is valuable both in virtue of producing fine food and as a skill in and of itself.

Further, he argues that end value is not only consistent with instrumental value, but is sometimes founded on instrumental value. He argues that the value as an end of certain skills or useful objects depends on their instrumental values, i.e. how good they are at achieving the purpose,

“That is to say, it is the usefulness—the instrumental value—of culinary skill that provides part of the basis of the intrinsic value of that skill. Were culinary expertise to somehow lose its instrumental value (if we no longer needed food, and if it no longer gave us pleasure), it would lose at least some (and perhaps all) of its intrinsic value as well” (p. 285).

While Kagan argues that instrumental value sometimes leads to value as an end in the first quote, he argues that the loss of instrumental value deteriorates the value as an end. I agree with him that instrumental value sometimes leads to end value, but I am hesitant as to whether the loss of instrumental value deteriorates the end value of an object.  

Consider, before the invention of photography, painting was a common way to show and reproduce an object’s appearance in terms of a two-dimensional image. The invention of photography rendered this skill instrumentally useless. Yet, the skill of painting is still valued as an end, so there are at least some cases where the loss of instrumental value does not deteriorate the end value.

Similarly, the ability to produce a work of fiction is a skill, if not a set of skills. The skill of producing a work of fiction can serve many purposes, including

\[27\] I am only commenting on the relationship between value as an end and instrumental value. I make no comment on the definition of intrinsic value.
shedding light on social problems or providing an account of history, as mentioned above. Nevertheless, there are many other skills that serve the same purpose; a textbook can shed light on social problems or provide an account of history. While the skills of creating a work of fiction still retain their instrumental value, creating a work of fiction may not be the best or most common method for telling history, uncovering social problems, or fulfilling other instrumental purposes. As these skills are still being used for these purposes, it seems that these still-useful skills are valued as an end.

**End Value, Phenomenal Concept, and Interior Properties**

I have delineated why end value is a very suitable component for a definition of fiction. The next step is to incorporate it into my definition of fiction as a concept for explaining non-systematic processing related to fiction. My idea is the following: although both works of nonfiction and works of fiction contain interior properties and produce phenomenal concepts, only works of fiction are evaluated by valuing the experience of apprehension that is necessary for acquiring the phenomenal concept of their interior properties as an end. Thus, a revised version of my definition is the following:

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process, which focuses on the interior properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in question.28

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28 It is possible to simplify my definition of fiction to the following, “A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends that the audience values it for the experiences en-
Addressing Persistent Problems for Theories of Fiction: *In Cold Blood*

I will now use my theory to address some cases that have shown persistently problematic for many previous theories of fiction, before providing a final version of my definition.

*In Cold Blood* and *Schindler’s Ark* are both problematic for many theories of fiction. While a plausible theory of fiction has to provide at least one reason for categorising works as works of fiction or works of nonfiction, these two works are impossible to properly categorise using the previous theories of fiction.

I will first show how my definition of fiction properly categorises *In Cold Blood* as a work of nonfiction. This book produces two issues: (1) it is a work of nonfiction with many untrue utterances and (2) it is a work of intentionally well-made nonfiction.

Regarding the first issue, if Capote produced factual errors in his book unintentionally, then he was neither intending his work to cause his readers to process it non-systematically nor to cause his readers to focus on any of its interior properties. Accidentally untrue utterances are not the same as the imaginative utterances
in a work of fiction. The latter is the focus, and are meant to be comprehended regardless of truth or falsity.

In contrast, accidentally untrue utterances are supposed to be telling facts, though they fail to do so. The utterances themselves are not the focus of comprehension. The focus is on the facts they describe. The author of such utterances still wants his work to cause the readers to process it systematically, not non-systematically. Thus, Capote does not intend his work to cause the readers to focus on the interior properties of the work, nor does he intend it to cause the readers to comprehend it non-systematically, and In Cold Blood must be excluded from being a work of fiction.

Regarding the second point, Capote may intend his work to cause the audience to focus on its interior properties to fulfil his further purpose of the audience appreciating how well written the work is and not whether it is true or not. However, an important feature of non-systematic processing is that audiences do not focus on whether what they are reading is true, as they regard verification as less important in this process. I do not think this is what Capote wants, as the title of his book is “In Cold Blood: A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences”. He himself puts the focus on the verification of his work, and is thus asking the audience to process it systematically — to evaluate the work for truth. Therefore, he intends his work to cause systematic processing, though he arranges it in a way that makes it enjoyable to read.
On Faction

The label “faction” is interesting, though it is not used academically by philosophers. *In Cold Blood* is regarded as a work of faction first because it is not a work of fiction. My account agrees with this, as this work fails to satisfy the criteria for being a work of fiction. Nevertheless, the significant amount of intentionally factual errors and the writing style render it to be an unusual type of nonfiction. The writing style resembles the aesthetic aspects of fiction by making it an attractive read for audiences. Therefore, I think that the status of faction, in this case, is the resemblance to a work of fiction without being one; and the author’s intention to create a factual work, though it contains many factual errors.

Thus, my take on the idea of faction is that it is not the same as fiction, but it resembles a work of fiction by using some of the means that normally appear in works of fiction. There is a fundamental difference though: a work of fiction is intended to be apprehended non-systematically, but a work of faction is still intended to be apprehended systematically.

In light of this, Keneally’s *Schindler’s Ark* is an interesting case. It may be either a work of fiction or a work of faction. If it is a work of faction, this is the case for similar reasons as *In Cold Blood*. Keneally (2007) attests that he is reporting facts in the book (pp. 2-4). Thus, he aims to cause the audience to focus on verification and to produce systematic processing. In this interpretation, it is a work of faction.


Schindler’s Ark as a Work of Fiction

If this is the only interpretation that my account can provide, my account is still not plausible enough. After all, the book won the Booker Prize for fiction. My account can only be plausible if it can explain this categorisation, which I can do with an alternative explication of Keneally’s intentions.

Although Keneally intends his book to be a record of history, a memorial to the victims of Nazism, and a work of moral education, he does so in a way that can be achieved only by valuing the reading experience as an end in itself and by focusing on the interior features of the work. In this way, he intends the work to produce non-systematic processing, even if his ultimate goals are instrumental. This interpretation provides a prime example of a work of fiction created for instrumental purposes. Schindler’s Ark is written for both historical and moral purposes. Yet, because of the author’s intention to have the audience process it non-systematically, it should still qualify as a work of fiction.

Schindler’s Ark is a case of intentionally factually accurate fiction, similarly to Vidal’s The Narratives of Empire series. If a work is a work of nonfiction, its author wants his work to induce systematic processing on the part of the audience, which includes verification. If a work is a work of fiction, the author wants his work to induce non-systematic processing in the audience, which is to value the experience of reading as an end.
Imagination and Fiction

Unlike Schindler’s Ark, most works of fiction are clearly fictional, because the authors intentionally include a lot of utterances with the fictive intention or the intention to be imagined as true. I have previously addressed utterances of these types in my exploration of many other theories discussing the idea of fictive intention in Chapter 1 (although I do not include the idea of fictive intention in my account.) The use of these utterances indicates that they want their work to be processed non-systematically — if they want the work to cause systematic processing; they would be writing something that too inaccurate to be of any use.

This point leads to a question: why do so many theorists regard imagination as an important idea for defining fiction? Even Friend, who does not insist on regarding imagination as a necessary condition of a definition of fiction, still categorises it as a standard feature of fiction. Although my theory makes no mention of imagination, it can explain why imagination is commonly associated with fiction.

The reason is this: utterances made with the manifest intention for the audience to imagine them as true propositions is a common means by which an author indicates his intention of writing a work that is meant to be apprehended in the way that involves valuing the experience of apprehension as an end in itself, regardless of other goals served by the work in question. Further, my theory provides a reason for specifically excluding the idea of imagination when defining fic-
tion: it is not helpful in distinguishing works of fiction from works of nonfiction; and leads to many problems, as shown in Chapters 1 and 2.

Is There a Perfectly Factually Correct Fiction?

There is still a potential issue for my definition of fiction. Namely, one may produce a work with perfect factual accuracy but want his audience to take it as a work of fiction by having the intention specified in my definition. Normally, this case can be dealt with by the idea of systematic processing, as seen in my analysis of *In Cold Blood*. However, if the author wants his perfectly factually accurate work to be evaluated in the way specified in my account, then it must still be regarded as a work of fiction according to my account. Even if this case is not certainly a work of nonfiction, my account still must be refined to show that it is difficult to find a clear answer to this case. Thus, I refine it to:

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in question.

Though my definition of fiction can theoretically take a perfectly factually accurate work of representation as a work of fiction given the author’s intention
for it to be taken non-systematically, I do not know whether it is empirically possible for an author to do all the research involved in creating such a work and not want verification to be the focus of how he and his audience value the work.

**How Does My Account Include Mental Fiction?**

This modification also fixes an issue with mental fiction. My account includes an intention to produce a work to be valued in a certain way. This concept of valuation presupposes that there is someone doing the valuing, meaning that it still requires an audience. However, I put “or any other” in the wording about the audience. Therefore, I can say that if there is any audience, the author would intend them to value his work in a certain way. If there is no audience, then how he values his work matters. This point can be found in my definition above, but I restate it here for the sake of clarity. Thus, another advantage of the above revision is its ability to address the mental fictions or works of fiction created to have no audience.

**Conclusion to Part 1**

In this chapter thus far, I have constructed my definition of fiction. Schematically, the author of a work of fiction intends to create a work that causes any
audience besides himself that the work might have to focus on the interior properties of the work and value it as an end in itself.

I have shown the plausibility of my account by explaining why *In Cold Blood* is a work of nonfiction and why *Schindler’s Ark* is a work of fiction, something which imagination-based accounts always get wrong, as I have shown in Chapters 1 and 2.

I end this section of the chapter by restating my definition of fiction:

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in question.
Part 2

The Unique Role of Assertions in Fiction

I have so far shown how my definition of fiction provides a plausible answer for several persistent problems, including why *Schindler’s Ark* is considered to be a work of fiction but *In Cold Blood* is not, and the issue of works of fiction created with the intention of having no audience. I will now address the one remaining important issue: that of the role of assertions in fiction, and why they do not change a work to be a work of nonfiction. This will further demonstrate the plausibility of my account, as the issue of assertions falsifies many imagination-based theories.

I argue that assertions in fiction are different from assertions in nonfiction. While the essential effect of assertions in both works of fiction and works of nonfiction is to change a presupposition of the audience, assertions in fiction have a secondary effect: to contribute to the evaluation of the interior properties, which is to evaluate the experience of apprehending the work of fiction as an end in itself. I will show this point by establishing an analogy between assertions in negotiations and assertions in works of fiction. I will further argue that assertions in fiction do not change a work of fiction into a work of nonfiction, because the issue of whether a work is a work of fiction determines whether these assertions have the aforementioned contribution. To say otherwise risks circularity. Finally, I will explain why the issue of assertions in fiction is an insurmountable difficulty for imagination-based theories.
Stalnaker’s Secondary Effects of Assertions

Assertions in fiction are a special type of utterance. They express the author’s actual beliefs, but are included in a work of fiction. For this reason, they relate to both the actual world and the content of a work of fiction. A plausible theory of fiction must produce an explanation of this issue. My explanation is the following: both assertions made in a daily nonfictional (i.e. actual) context and assertions in fiction have the role of expressing the utterer’s belief, but assertions in fiction have another role as well: they contribute to the value of the experience of apprehending the work of fiction.

To support this, I will now address Robert Stalnaker’s arguments about assertions. Stalnaker (1999) argues that assertions have an essential effect, which is to convince people to accept their content as true, after which the assertion becomes a presupposition. In some cases though, a speaker or author can intend his assertions to have a secondary effect in addition to this essential effect (p. 86).

Stalnaker describes “secondary effects” thus:

“My suggestion about the essential effect of assertion does not imply that speakers intend to succeed in getting the addressee to accept the content of the assertion, or that they believe they will, or even might succeed. A person may make an assertion knowing it will be rejected just as Congress may pass a law knowing it will be vetoed, a labour negotiator may make a proposal knowing it will be met by a counterproposal, or a poker player may place a bet knowing it will cause all the other players to fold. Such actions need not be pointless, since they all have secondary effects, and there is no reason why achieving the secondary effects cannot be the primary intention of the agent performing the action. The essential effects will still be relevant even when it is a foregone conclusion that assertion, legislative act, proposal, or bet will be rejected, since one generally explains why the
action has the secondary effects it has partly in terms of the fact that it would have had certain essential effects had it not been rejected.” (pp. 87)

There are several important points in this quote. First, assertions do need to be made for the essential effect. Second, this secondary effect is separate from the essential effect and is made intentionally. Third, the secondary effect can vary in different cases of assertions. Finally, if a primary effect is non-existent or unrecognised, there is no secondary effect. However, the secondary effect can succeed even if the primary effect fails.

It is clear from Stalnaker’s quote that there is a huge variety of secondary effects, from provoking someone to veto a law to getting a counterproposal from an opponent in a negotiation. Nevertheless, each particular set of assertions made for a particular secondary effect can form a type of assertion, as is the case for each type of assertion mentioned by Stalnaker. For example, assertions in negotiations are not normal assertions, because they have the particular secondary effect of leading to a counterproposal.

Though it is easy to form the impression that the essential effect must fail for the secondary effect to succeed, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, essential assertions are sometimes accepted and still produce a secondary effect. For instance, in the case of assertions in a negotiation, while it is often that case that one may want his opponent to reject his assertions and create a counter-offer, this is not always the case. A negotiator may want his opponent to accept his assertions, and to add further conditions to them. For instance, a person offering to sell a batch of goods for $1,000 may want his negotiation partner to accept the offer,
and also want to see what other conditions the other person puts in the agreement, such as a deadline for delivery of the goods.

Having shown that Stalnaker’s quote is consistent with my interpretation via an example case, I will now show the same point by dissecting Stalnaker’s quote.

Stalnaker (1999) says, “My suggestion about the essential effect of the assertion does not imply that speakers intend to succeed in getting the addressee to accept the content of the assertion, or that they believe they will, or even might succeed” (p. 87). This only shows that the primary effect is not always the intention of making an assertion; it does not say that the success of secondary effects requires the failure of essential effects.

Consequently, the idea of secondary effects may be used to explain assertions in fiction, since they are compatible with Stalnaker’s motivation for creating this idea. In light of that, it is now crucial to determine whether assertions in fiction fit the aforementioned criteria of having secondary effects.

**Assertions in Fiction and Stalnaker’s Criteria of Secondary Effects**

Having delineated Stalnaker’s idea of secondary effects and his example of the secondary effect of assertions in negotiation, I will now argue that assertions in
fiction fit the criteria of secondary effects, and thus are a type of assertions made to have secondary effects.

Stalnaker’s criteria for secondary effects are as follows:

1. Assertions need not be made for their essential effect\(^{29}\).

2. Secondary effects are those effects that are separate from the essential effects and are made intentionally.

3. Secondary effects can vary in different cases of assertions.

4. If a primary effect is non-existent or unrecognised, there is no secondary effect. However, the secondary effect can succeed even if the essential effect fails.

I have previously shown that assertions in fiction are also sentences about the content of a particular work of fiction, and do not need to be made for their essential effect (which is changing the context of a communication). Thus, they satisfy the first criterion.

Assertions in fiction also meet the second criterion, because they are intended to contribute to the content of a work, which is a secondary effect. (The essential effect of assertions is to change people’s presuppositions.)

The third criterion does not exclude any particular use of assertions, and so assertions in fiction can be included.

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\(^{29}\) I will explain Stalnaker’s idea of the essential effects of assertion later in this chapter.
Finally, the fourth criterion requires the secondary effect to be explained partly in terms of the essential effect. In the case of assertions in fiction, there is always an essential effect, and so there can always be a secondary effect, and an essential effect to help explain it. If assertions in works of fiction do not possess their essential effect as assertions, (in this case, to be accepted as the true belief by the audience), it is impossible for them to achieve the secondary effect. For example, assertions in fiction achieve a secondary effect of making the background of a work of fiction to be about a particular place, like an assertion about the environment around the city of Manchester for example, partially by its essential effects of telling the readers how Manchester is like. As another example, assertions in fiction carry out their secondary effects of rendering some works of fiction containing them to be a work of fiction about certain historical events, by asserting what historical events actually happened, which is the essential effect. I will now address this point in more detail to explain the relationship between the essential and secondary effects of assertions in fiction and so demonstrate how assertions in fiction fit Stalnaker’s fourth criterion.

The Essential Effect of Assertions

The fourth criterion regards the relationship between essential and secondary effects of assertions. Stalnaker (1999) does not commit to one definition of assertions, but does state his idea of the essential effect of assertions:
“To make an assertion is to reduce the context set in a particular way, provided that there are no objections from the other participants in the conversation. The particular way in which the context set is reduced is that all of the possible situations incompatible with what is said are eliminated. To put it a slightly different way, the essential effect of an assertion is to change the presuppositions of the participants in the conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is presupposed. This effect is avoided only if the assertion is rejected.” (p. 86)

According to Stalnaker, the essential effect of assertions is to become a framework for a particular communication by reducing the possible situations that the communication can be about and become accepted into the set of presuppositions for that communication.

Stalnaker (1999) says the following about presuppositions,

“A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or believes that his addressee assumes or believes that P, and assumes or believes that his addressee recognises that he is making these assumptions, or has these beliefs” (p. 49).

Presupposition includes both beliefs and assumptions, which he describes as those propositions that the participants in a communication accept as true for the purpose of communication, though they do not always genuinely believe them (p. 84). According to Stalnaker (1999), the presupposition is not a mental attitude like belief, so it is not a propositional belief. Rather, it is a disposition of behaving in a certain way if another party in a communication has certain beliefs or assumptions (p. 52).

This is particularly important when it comes to the issue of proper names and descriptions in assertions in fiction. Stalnaker thinks that proper names and
descriptions are often uttered with a presupposition: participants are disposed to assume that a person is not uttering empty names when making an assertion. He (1999) says, “one of the facts could be stated like this: it is inappropriate to say ‘The Queen of England is bald’ (or to say ‘the Queen of England is not bald’) except in a context in which it is part of the resumed background information that England has a queen” (p. 53).

**The Essential and Secondary Effects of Assertions in Fiction**

If assertions in fiction are assertions made for their secondary effects, there must be a relationship between the essential effect and the secondary effect, as stated in Stalnaker’s fourth criterion. I will use Elizabeth Gaskell’s example of *Mary Barton* to delineate this relationship. *Mary Barton* opens with this sentence: “There are some fields near Manchester, well known to the inhabitants as ‘Green Heys Fields’, through which runs a public footpath to a little village about two miles distant” (1987, p. 1). (p. 184). I simplify this example of assertion into “Green Heys Fields is a field and is near Manchester”. I call this utterance GH1.

Assertions in fiction like GH1 are essential effects, as they change the presupposition of the reader. Readers assume that GH1 is true whether they know it to be true in the actual world or not so that they can continue to understand and read the novel.
Some readers do know GH1 to be true in the actual world, in which case GH1 does not change their presuppositions. Nevertheless, this assertion still matters to them because of its secondary effect. I have already shown that assertions containing names are often made with the presupposition that those names are not empty names, so it is reasonable to say that in the case of GH1, the author presupposes that there are both Green Heys Field and Manchester in the actual world, and that audiences will share this presupposition by either believing it or assuming it. Together with another presupposition that GH1 is in the content of a work of fiction, the audience recognises that the author of this work of fiction is writing about actual things rather than imaginary objects.

I will now show the relationship between the essential and secondary effects of an assertion, and thus show that assertions in fiction satisfy Stalnaker’s fourth criterion. The secondary effect in the case of GH1 is to include real world objects into the content of a work of fiction. This can be so because of the presuppositions associated with proper names in assertions. It is difficult for GH1 to include real world objects in fiction if it is not an assertion. Further, GH1 is changing the presuppositions of those who know nothing about the geography of Manchester, which is the essential effect. Consequently, the secondary effect is explained in terms of the essential effect. Thus, assertions in fiction fit Stalnaker’s fourth criterion.

Other Assertions in Fiction
I will explain the assertions in *Schindler’s Ark* to further substantiate my explanation of assertions in fiction as assertions made with a secondary effect. I do this for two reasons. First, the assertions in *Schindler’s Ark* have a different purpose and effect than those in *Mary Barton*. Instead of being used for setting the scene, they are used for telling a true story. The success of my explanation, in this case, will show that it can work in a variety of cases, and that it can address the longstanding problems that the assertions in fiction cause for previous theories of fiction.

Assertions in *Schindler’s Ark* meet Stalnaker’s criteria for assertions made with a secondary effect. Many assertions in this book retain their essential effect of expressing the author’s beliefs and changing the presuppositions of the audience by informing them about the states of affairs in both Germany and Poland during the Second World War.

However, these assertions also have a secondary effect: contributing to the content of a work of fiction. The essential effect of changing the presupposition shared by the author and audience is necessary to achieve the secondary effect of including real world objects and events in the plot of a work of fiction. These real world objects are embedded in the presuppositions of the assertion; it would be impossible to have the secondary effect without the essential one.
The assertions in Tolstoy’s (2005) *War and Peace* are equally, yet differently problematic for previous theories of fiction. They have a different contribution to the content of a work of fiction — rather than setting the scene or being part of the plot, they express Tolstoy’s own argument about history. For example, in part two of the epilogue, Tolstoy (2005) says, “History seems to assume that such power is universally acknowledged and can be taken for granted” (p. 1321).

The quote demonstrates both the essential and secondary effect of an assertion. The essential effect is Tolstoy expressing his view on the ideology behind many works of history. The secondary effect is to indicate that he wants to use the epic story in his book *War and Peace* as part of his argument for his view of history. The essential effect demonstrates that he wants to argue for his view of history. The secondary effect could not exist without the essential effect.

However, both works of fiction and works of nonfiction can include a made-up story to argue for a particular point, so it initially appears that this type of secondary effect is not unique to fiction. I disagree with this assessment — Tolstoy’s assertions in the quote are not only about how well his story supports his point or whether his point is right. Rather, they are also about how his story shows his point and provides material for him to argue for it. Thus, even if the content of the assertion is implausible, one can value how the author relates his point to other parts of
his work. Even if one disagrees with Tolstoy’s point in the aforementioned quote, he can still appreciate whether Tolstoy has created a good story as to argue for or make the audience feel this point.

Assertions in Fiction as a Type of Assertion

To differentiate assertions in fiction from assertions in nonfiction beyond these three examples, I propose a theory regarding the role of assertions in fiction. This theory needs to be inclusive, because, as seen in the assertions in three different works of fiction, assertions in fiction contribute to the content of a work of fiction in many different ways. I propose to explain assertions in fiction in light of my theory of fiction, because it allows me to plausibly explain the role of assertions in fiction.

My theory of fiction states:

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in question.

If fiction is defined in terms of how it is comprehended, it is reasonable to explain assertions in fiction, which are parts of fiction, in terms of how they contribute to the comprehension of a work of fiction. My explanation of assertions in fiction is the following:
Assertions in fiction are made for a secondary effect. They are never only made for their essential effects, and their secondary effects are what set them apart from assertions in nonfiction. The secondary effect of assertions in fiction is to contribute to how the author or any other audience values the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end by its relation to other parts of the work of fiction.

I do not specify how assertions in fiction contribute to how a work of fiction is valued in the explanation, because they impact evaluation in many different ways, as I have previously demonstrated with GH1, Schindler’s Ark, and War and Peace. Therefore, the exact manner of contribution should be left vague to allow for the variety of contributions assertions can make. Finally, I include the specification “by its relation to other parts of the fiction” in light of GH1 and Tolstoy’s quote, which show that assertions in fiction normally contribute to the evaluation of a work of fiction by how they relate to the other parts of that work of fiction.

Assertions in Fiction and the Categorisation of Fiction

My explanation of the role of assertions in fiction is helpful for explaining why assertions in fiction cannot affect the fictive status of the work that contains them, because it includes Stalnaker’s (1999) idea of the secondary effect. His examples of assertions made for a secondary effect show that the secondary effect of an assertion is determined by its context. Assertions in negotiations are made for a secondary effect of leading to a counterproposal, but assertions made in Congress have different secondary effects (p. 87). Therefore, the context of making an asser-
tion determines whether the assertion in question has any secondary effects and if so, what they are.

Following this, assertions in fiction cannot affect the fictive status of the work that contains them, because to do otherwise leads to circularity. Suppose that an assertion in fiction affects whether the work that contains it is a work of fiction, and recall the point that the effect of an assertion in fiction is determined by the context in which it is found in that work of fiction. Consequently, the effect of an assertion is determined by its context, and if the status of a work of fiction is determined by whether it contains assertions, then the assertions in that work of fiction will also determine whether they themselves are found in a work of fiction, which is circular.

Additionally, I argue that assertions in fiction do not change a work of fiction to be a work of nonfiction using an analogy between assertions in fiction and assertions in communication. There are many similarities between assertions in fiction and assertions in negotiation. Both cases consist of complexes of utterances. Both cases involve many different types of speech-acts, such as questions and requests. As I have demonstrated in my point on the secondary effects of assertions in fiction, both of these contexts determine whether or not the assertions have a secondary effect. Also, both of their secondary effects are not affected if their essential effects are rejected; and both of their secondary effects are explained in terms of their essential effects, as I have previously explained. Thus, if assertions in a negotiation do not change its category of communication from ne-
gotiation to something else, then assertions in fiction also do not change the category of communication of the work that contains them, from fiction to nonfiction.

Why Are Assertions in Fiction a Problem for Other Theories?

I have shown that assertions in fiction contribute to the evaluation of a work of fiction in many different ways. I have also shown that they cannot change the status of a work from being a work of fiction to being a work of nonfiction. Then why has this issue become so problematic for so many imagination-based theories? This is because they do not allow the expression of belief (i.e. assertions) to be a purpose of utterances in a work of fiction. Imagination-based theories take imagination to be a necessary condition; and if one imagines that p, he does not believe that p. Therefore, imagination-based theories do not allow a work of fiction to serve the purpose of expressing the author’s belief. Therefore, though they can dismiss the cases like GH1 as scene setting for further imagination, they cannot explain cases like Schindler’s Ark and War and Peace. This is because the expression of the author’s belief is a main (though not only) goal for these two works of fiction; and as I specified before, the roles of assertions in these works of fiction highlight the importance of the expression of the author’s belief as the main goal of these two works. Thus, assertions in fiction are not an independent issue for imagination-based accounts. Rather, assertions’ various contributions to works of fic-
tion highlight a fundamental failure of imagination-based theories in terms of their understanding of the variety of the purposes of works of fiction.

**Conclusion to Part 2**

In this section, I have argued that an assertion in a work of fiction is an assertion with a secondary effect. While it retains the essential effect possessed by other assertions, including being an expression of belief and being an attempt to change the beliefs of an audience, it also has a secondary effect of contributing to the end value of the experience of apprehending a work of fiction. This secondary effect is determined by the context of being in a work of fiction, so it cannot change a work of fiction to a work of nonfiction just by being part of it.

**Chapter Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have constructed my own theory of fiction and then demonstrated its plausibility by using it to address many major problems that other definitions of fiction cannot.

I began by delineating the two pillars of my theory: authorial intention and non-systematic processing. As non-systematic processing was originally a social
science idea and not a philosophical one, I modified it to make it philosophically sound using the well-known concepts of interior properties, phenomenal concept, and end value. I then stated my definition of fiction thus:

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in question.

I then went on to use my definition to address all the major, persistent problems that previous definitions of fiction fail to plausibly solve, including the status of *In Cold Blood*, faction, and *Schindler’s Ark*. I discussed why so many previous theorists thought that imagination was a necessary component of a definition of fiction and demonstrated that it is not and why this is the case, before going to address further issues for previous definitions of fiction, including factually correct fiction and mental fiction.

I ended by using my definition to solve the one remaining major problems for definitions of fiction: the role of assertions in fiction. Using Stalnaker’s theory of secondary effects, I showed that assertions in fiction are different from assertions in nonfiction because they have a secondary effect that other assertions do not. I created my own explanation of assertions, and stated it thus:

Assertions in fiction are made for a secondary effect. They are never only made for their essential effects, and their secondary effects are what set them apart from assertions in nonfiction. The secondary effect of assertions in fiction is to contribute to how the author or any other audience values the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end by its relation to other parts of the work of fiction.
I then discussed why assertions cause so many problems for other theories of fiction, and showed how my theory works with a wide range of assertions in fiction. In doing all of this, I have shown that my theory is not only plausible; it also solves many major problems that previous theories of fiction have been unable to satisfactorily address.
Chapter 7

Addressing Some Final Issues about Fiction and My Definition

In this chapter, I will clarify some subtleties of my account, and use my account to address some difficult issues that have not yet been properly addressed by other accounts of fiction. Addressing these issues will further delineate the plausibility of my definition of fiction. I will separate this chapter into two parts.

In the first part, I will address possible criticisms and clarify some important ideas in my definition of fiction, including what the experience of apprehending a work of fiction includes, the idea of a work, the difference between end value and aesthetic value, and the philosophical plausibility of my way of using phenomenal concept for constructing my definition.

In the second part, I will showcase the advantages of my definition. I will address several difficult cases of the categorisation of works of fiction, including myths, Roman historiographies, and Sergei Prokofiev’s composition Peter and the Wolf. Afterwards, I also argue how my account justifies an important point from Carroll about how works of narrative art serve a moral purpose. My definition provides ideas to justify his theory in the cases of works of fiction, without committing to his point. Therefore, my definition contributes to at least one debate related to fiction without being affected by the result of this debate. In this way, I also show that it is plausible for my theory to claim that works of fiction can serve a moral purpose, because it complements an important theory on the way in which a work of fiction can do so.
Part 1

Defending my Definition of Fiction from Possible Criticisms: Four Supplements of My Definition

Although I do not see any need to add any further conditions to my account of fiction, I do see the need to respond to some cases that appear to challenge my account. In responding to these cases, I will not only provide defences for my definition, but also clarify the subtleties of my account.

Supplement 1: The Case of Changing the Experience of Apprehending a Work

My definition focuses on the experience of apprehending a work of fiction (i.e. reading a novel, listening to a radio broadcast, and watching a film). One may ask whether one can produce a work of representation about certain fabricated events and intend his audience to initially believe the events to be factual, but later find out that he was intentionally fabricating the content in a way that imitates genuine works of nonfiction\(^\text{30}\). It is important to note the author has to want the audience to find out about the deception shortly after being deceived, or this case will be too similar to lies or discredited works of journalism.

Although there is no exact example of fiction for this point, there are similar cases in which the author creates a work of fiction that imitates the style of a work

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\(^{30}\) I faced this issue when I presented a preliminary edition of my definition of fiction at the Advanced Research Seminar at King’s College London. I found this issue challenging and not very well explored, so I saw the need to answer it in my project.
of nonfiction. For example, Orson Welles’s radio broadcast *The War of the Worlds* (1938) imitated the style of an actual radio news broadcast of the time, although he and his team were actually reading a work of fiction: H. G. Wells’s novel of the same name [see Campbell (2011) and Lovgen (2005)]. However, there is no evidence that Welles and his team wanted anyone to be fooled by the broadcast, though many initially were. Moreover, there is a genre of film called mockumentaries, which focuses on imitating the style of documentary films without actually creating them. For a historical introduction to this genre of film, see Thomas Doherty (2003).

This case is not difficult for my theory. The author may want the audience to experience the compelling, odd, and unsettling experience of listening to a broadcast of a work of science fiction in the style of a news broadcast. They may intend the audience to value this strange experience of listening as an end.

Nevertheless, what if Welles did want his audience to initially believe his broadcast to be genuine and then recognise it as a hoax? My theory still categorises Welles’s *The War of the Worlds* in this possible case as a work of fiction. I explain this categorisation with my first supplement: the experience of apprehending a work also includes a secondary experience. A secondary experience here means the experience of other experiences, including the change of experience in particular. In this case, the experience in my definition of fiction means the experience of changing from one experience to another experience, for example, changing from an experience in which one initially takes the content of a work as factual to an experience in which one recognises that the content is fabricated.
One may further argue that the inclusion of a secondary experience may be ad hoc. First, there is no reason to do so apart from including the possible case of Welles’s *The War of the Worlds*. Second, this approach will lead to nth level experience, which is strange.

To respond to the first argument, the reasoning for including a secondary experience of apprehending a work of fiction lies in the idea of a work of fiction. The debate on the definition of fiction focuses on defining what a work of fiction is, not what a text of fiction is. Lamarque (2010) noted that there is no clear definition of work apart from two necessities; the role of author and what is produced by the author (pp. 165-6). Therefore, the idea of work\(^\text{31}\) does not need to be confined to the text, audio, or audiovisual elements, it can include the participation of the audience.

Given this background knowledge, there are two distinct and independent ways to justify my inclusion of a secondary experience. First, the counterfactual case of Welles’s broadcast is like those works of theatre that include audience participation, though the author retains control over the plot line or at least the possible plot lines of the play. In these two cases, the author wants audiences to experience a change of their experience of what is produced by the author. Therefore, their change of experience is carefully planned by the author as a part of the work, though this part is carried out by the audience themselves, albeit under strict guid-

\(^{31}\) I stress that my project is committed to only very minimal understanding of work, namely the role of the author and what he produces. I even leave the room of interpreting these two necessities. I also am open to the inclusion of other criteria for defining work. This is unrelated to my project.
ance from the author. Thus, the experience of apprehension for cases like this is to experience a change of experience.

The second way to justify my inclusion of a secondary experience is to understand the works like the possible case of *The War of the Worlds* is to regard the experience of the change of experience as simply a more complex experience of apprehending the work of fiction. This experience consists of three parts: the intended experience of taking the work as stating facts, the experience of recognising that the content of his work is fabricated, and valuing the experience of this change of experience as an end. The prerequisite is that the experience of this change is intended by the author and is intended to be valued as an end.

**Will This Lead to Nth Level Experience?**

While I have argued for including a secondary experience into the reading of my idea of the experience of apprehending a work of fiction, I shall respond to the claim that this may lead to a case of nth level experience. I admit that it may be metaphysically possible. However, this does not threaten my definition of fiction. In both of my lines of reasoning, an important reason for including a secondary experience is that the secondary experience in question is intended by the author of fiction when he produces the work. Thus, the problem of a case of nth level of experience happens only if an author of a work of fiction plans an nth level experience for the audiences or himself when he produces the work of fiction. Such a work of fiction does not yet exist. I have not even seen a work of fiction made for eliciting a third level experience yet. I cannot imagine how any author of a work of fiction could plan to elicit a case of nth level of experience for the audience or him-
self meticulously. Furthermore, a question about some remote possibility, like the problem of nth level experience does not concern my current project because the debate about the definition of fiction is mainly about the actual world.

**Supplement 2: The Idea of Work**

I have made use of the idea of work in the last supplement. Although I claim that I make a minimal commitment to the idea of works of fiction in this project, I see the need to clarify how I understand the idea of work in the context of the current project, to clarify and strengthen my definition of fiction, as well as the last supplement.

The baseline for my understanding of work is that it includes authorial intention and the product of this intention, such as text, moving images, recorded sound etc. Lamarque (2010) emphasises that a written work is more than just a text (semantics and syntax). It also includes the conventions that govern its appreciation and production. More importantly, two identical texts are not necessarily the same work (p. 166). Thus, as part of the convention of apprehending a work of representation, audiences should sometimes also pay attention to background information about the production of the text, such as a background of the author and his intentions.

Nevertheless, Lamarque (2010) maintains that the idea of what a work is precisely is unclear, as it is not clear what background information should be included and what should not be included:
“The text/work distinction is an instance of a broader distinction running across all the arts and indeed other cultural objects, between that which possesses only physical (or ‘natural’) properties and that which is ‘practice dependent’, cultural, and intentional” (p. 165).

By “intentional”, Lamarque (2010) means something that represents an object other than itself or expresses a certain meaning (p. 165). He does not state clearly what the practice dependent, cultural, and intentional properties of an object are. This is indeed extremely difficult to specify, because there are many media of arts. There are different cultures and practices that are specific to each medium, and different cultures and practices for different traditions within each medium. Therefore, it is not realistic to specify all the properties involved in a work. Following this, it is plausible to leave the idea of work vague.

Nevertheless, Lamarque’s exposition states clearly that the idea of work includes the context of production, which certainly includes the role of the author regarding his intention about his work of fiction. Thus, the idea of work in my current project justifies the emphasis on the role of the author of a work of fiction when defining fiction; even though this point hardly needs any further justification since all definitions of fiction addressed in the current project, including mine, share this emphasis.

**Supplement 3: End Value Does Not Mean Aesthetic or Artistic Value**

Another possible criticism for my definition of fiction is that my account excludes many novels that are of very low aesthetic value, e.g. many romantic novels with cheesy plots and bad writing. In response, this criticism assumes that end val-
ue in my definition is identical to aesthetic value; and I make no such assumption when I include the idea of end value.

I get this idea from Kagan; he also does not make this assumption when speaking of end value. Kagan (1998) gives an example of end value that has nothing to do with aesthetic or artistic value:

“Consider the pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing the slaves. Clearly, this pen had considerable instrumental value—it was the actual means by which a great deal of intrinsic good was brought into the world. But it seems to me that we might want to say something more than this. It seems to me that we might want to suggest that this pen has intrinsic value, that the continued existence of this pen has value as an end. Of course, the pen’s defining instrumental moment is now long since over. But by virtue of that history, we might say, it now possesses intrinsic value: it is something we could reasonable value for its own sake” (p. 285).

In the last sentence of this quote, Kagan (1998) spells out his identification between end value and intrinsic value, but this does not concern me. What matters is that he puts end value in another way: valuing it for its own sake. This is the idea of end value that I use for categorising the experience of apprehending a work of fiction. This is also the idea that some people might mistake as identifying fiction with aesthetic value, artistic value, or literary value32.

Fortunately, Kagan’s example also rebuts this point. He writes clearly that the pen Lincoln used for signing the Emancipation Proclamation is valued for its own sake because of its history of being the pen (1) that was used by Lincoln; and (2) that was used for signing the Emancipation Proclamation. It has nothing to do

32 I faced this misunderstanding when I presented a preliminary edition of my definition of fiction at the Advanced Research Seminar at King’s College London.
with any aesthetic or artistic value the pen might have. The pen could be the most common and ugliest pen from that period of time, and can still have this intrinsic value because of its history.

This idea can be applied to my use of the experience of apprehension. Although both aesthetic value and artistic value can be end value, they are not the only types of end value. When I claim that the experience of apprehending a work of fiction ought to have end value, I do not mean it that this end value is always aesthetic or artistic value. I only mean that the work ought to be valued for its own sake: the experience of apprehension should be valued regardless of anything distinct from the experience itself.

I will now provide a more practical elaboration of my point on end value. A work of fiction is commonly evaluated by its plot. In cases like this, the end value of the experience can be how funny that plot is, how sad that plot is, or how intricate that plot is. The end value of the plot could even be how cheesy it is.

The emphasis is on how a person values the plot of a particular work of fiction. There are many funny or sad or intricate plots. Thus, how a person values the plot of a particular work of fiction matters because the author of a work of fiction intends his audience to evaluate the experience of apprehension of the features of a work of fiction, not the generalised concept of funny, sad, or intricate plots. This experience of apprehension (reading, watching, or listening etc.) is unique for each work of fiction, as there is no work of fiction that is identical as long as I count the context of production related to its author.
Supplement Four: Defending My Use of Phenomenal Concept in Constructing My Definition

My definition of fiction is founded on the experience of apprehension. I develop this idea from Papineau’s account of phenomenal concept. He argues that the initial experience of apprehension plays an irreplaceable role in acquiring a phenomenal concept. I take his idea of the phenomenal concept as one of the theoretical foundations of my definition. If Papineau is wrong, it does not mean that my definition of fiction is to be rejected. It only means that the emphasis on the experience of apprehension in my definition is produced by interpreting social science findings alone, rather than social science findings and philosophy of mind.

To defend the philosophical foundation of my emphasis on the experience of apprehension in my definition of fiction, I will rebut an argument by Derek Ball (2009). He does not think that the initial experience of apprehension is necessary for any phenomenal concept, so phenomenal concept is not a philosophical concept about subjective experience.

Derek Ball’s Attacks on the Idea of Phenomenal Concept

Ball (2009) tries to undermine a range of accounts of phenomenal concepts, including Papineau’s. He argues that a scientist, Mary, can possess the concept of what it is like to see red in the room to which she is confined that does not afford her the possibility of ever seeing any red objects. Therefore, a phenomenal concept that Mary possesses only after her release, such as that proposed by Papineau,
does not exist (p. 948) [For the background of Mary the scientist, see Jackson (1986)].

Ball’s (2009) first premise is that concepts (including phenomenal concepts) in general are deferential. By deferential, Ball means that a language user acquires the concept of a word if he interacts with a linguistic community that uses the word. Whether or not the person has accurate beliefs about the concept, he still grasps the concept (p. 944-7).

Ball (2009) substantiates his first premise with Tyler Burge’s arthritis thought experiment (p.944-7). Burge’s (1979) thought experiment is about a given person (whom I call John) who claims to have arthritis. John shares a lot of correct attitudes about arthritis with many competent users. Yet, he mistakenly thinks that

33 Mary is a figure mentioned in an argument by Frank Jackson, in which he argues that there are non-physical properties. Jackson shows his understanding of physical properties in premise 2. I summarise Jackson’s (1986) knowledge argument as the following:

1. “Mary is kept in a black room, so she only experiences the colours black and white.
2. She knows every physical fact about seeing the colour red, including the knowledge of physics, chemistry, neurophysiology, and an understanding of causal relationships
3. Mary learned what it is like to see red after she was released from the black and white environment.
4. From 3, Mary learned at least one new fact that is not included in premise 2.
5. If physicalism is true, premise 4 is false. This is because if physicalism is true, Mary would have known all the facts about the world, such that premise 4 will be false.
6. Following from premises 4 and 5, physicalism is false” (p. 291).

Papineau (2002) denies Jackson’s inference of 4 from 3. According to Papineau, Jackson assumes that the subject has the new experience of seeing the colour red if and only if she acquaints herself with at least one fact that she does not know before her release.

Papineau denies this assumption, and thus denies the inference of 4 from 3 (p. 68). Unlike Jackson, Papineau (2002) regards the change in Mary’s knowledge after her release only as Mary acquiring a new concept of seeing red. The new concept is acquired by her new experience of the colour. Yet the new concept refers to the same physical property that Mary identifies with the colour red, such as the property of red as a particular wavelength of light hitting a person’s retina. Therefore, both pre-release Mary and post-release Mary think of the same physical property identified with seeing the colour red. The before-after difference in premise 3 of the knowledge argument should be interpreted as Mary having a new way of thinking about seeing the colour red. Thus, Mary’s new experience does not acquaint her with any non-material fact. Following this reading, the knowledge argument fails to show that there are non-physical properties (p. 51).
his thigh is arthritic. Once a doctor corrects this belief, John then asks what actually is wrong with his thigh (pp. 77-9).

According to Ball’s (2009) deferential approach, John grasps the concept of arthritis by interacting with a linguistic community that uses the word. Thus, he denies that there are concepts that cannot be grasped unless the subject has an initial experience of them (pp. 946). Similarly, Mary’s phenomenal concept of seeing red can be acquired by her relation to her linguistic community, so it is not necessary for her to any initial experience to possess her concept of seeing red. As a result, the case of the acquisition of a phenomenal concept necessarily requiring an initial experience, like the one proposed by Papineau, does not exist.

Ball’s argument can be summarised into four propositions (his first premise becomes proposition 1):

1. All phenomenal concepts can be acquired deferentially.
2. If phenomenal concepts can be acquired via a subject’s connection to a linguistic community, these concepts can be acquired without the subject’s initial experience.
3. The phenomenal concept of seeing red is a phenomenal concept.
4. Therefore, following from 1 & 2 & 3, phenomenal concepts, in general, can be acquired without the subject’s initial experience.

**Rebutting Ball’s Argument**

I defend Papineau’s phenomenal concept against Ball’s argument by showing that either proposition 1 or 2 is false. If Mary acquires her phenomenal concept
of seeing red deferentially, then she must possess the initial experience to acquire this concept. Following this, either proposition 1 or 2 is false. As a result, Ball’s argument is unsound.

The foundation of Ball’s proposition 1 is his application of Burge’s arthritis thought experiment. Burge (1979, pp. 78-9) mentions a counterfactual case in which there is an exact replica of John (I call him C John). They are the same in every respect, including their phenomenal experiences, personal history, biology, and even their many correct beliefs about arthritis. Yet C John does not grasp the concept of arthritis, because all the speakers in his community have a different convention. They apply the concept of arthritis to areas outside the joints, including the thigh. In the case of John and C John, the physical environment is the same, while the social environment is different.

Mary’s case is the opposite. Her physical environment is different, but her social environment is the same in terms of the linguistic convention, so Burge’s thought experiment cannot be used to explain Mary acquiring the phenomenal concept of seeing red. Putnam’s (1975) famous twin Earth thought experiment is far more similar to Mary’s case. This thought experiment, very briefly summarised, is that H2O is the necessary and sufficient condition for anything to be regarded as water in the Earth. In contrast, water in twin Earth, where everything is identical to our world, is composed of something entirely different that is abbreviated as XYZ. Because of the difference in their environments, a person called Oscar in our Earth and his identical twin Oscar in twin Earth have very different concepts of “water” (p. 222-7).
The similarity between Mary’s and the twin Oscar’s cases is that they both use the word differently from the agreed usage in the normal earth community because of the abnormality in their empirical environments. In the case of Mary, no red object is available to her. Similarly to the twin Oscar, Mary is not in the linguistic community that has acquired the phenomenal concept of seeing red before her release because of the difference in her physical environment. I call the similarity between twin Oscar and pre-release Mary the Oscar-Mary analogy.

Following from the Oscar-Mary analogy, if Mary does not have the experience of seeing red, she is not connected to the linguistic community that uses the phenomenal concept of seeing red correctly. Therefore, if Mary is connected to the linguistic community that uses the phenomenal concept of seeing red correctly, it is necessary for her to have the initial experience of seeing red.

Following this, either the initial experience of seeing red is necessary for Mary to acquire the phenomenal concept of seeing red, or her phenomenal concept of seeing red cannot be acquired deferentially. With either result, Ball’s argument is shown to be unsound, so it must be rejected. As a result, I have defended Papineau’s phenomenal concept, and have thus defended one of my philosophical foundations for using the experience of apprehension to define fiction.

Part 2

The Advantages of My Definition As Shown by Its Ability to Resolve Difficult Cases for Definitions of Fiction in General
After defending and clarifying my definition of fiction against some potential problems, I will now further demonstrate the plausibility of my definition by using it to solve some difficult issues for definitions of fiction in general, and demonstrate how it provides a theoretical foundation for other debates related to fiction, including the moral value of works of fiction.

Myths as Fictions

For my first case, I will show how my account can explain how to categorise whether myths are works of fiction or not, while imagination-based accounts cannot. R. M. Sainsbury (2010) believes that imagination-based theories cannot explain why myths are taken as works of fiction:

“There is one category which we need to include [as fiction], but which our Currie-style account [i.e. imagination-based theories] excludes: myth. Myths are typically not propounded as myths, but start life propounded and accepted as truths. Should we regard them as fiction at that early stage? Presumably not. They are taken too seriously. Recountings of them are intended to secure or reinforce belief rather make-believe. They start to count as myths when they cease to be believed, even though they are still in some sense accepted. They are counterexamples to the claim that fictionality depends upon being produced with fictive intentions” (p. 21).

In this quote, Sainsbury is so sure that myths are works of fiction. Yet, he does not provide a lot of reasons for being so sure apart from how these works are received. Sainsbury regards myths as works of fiction solely because of the way that they are valued in the 21st century. This is not a good reason for labelling a work of representation as a work of fiction. I have rejected the role of the audience
in defining whether a work of representation is a work of fiction in Chapter 1 with the case of mental fiction. Therefore, Sainsbury's reason is insufficient. Even though I agree with Sainsbury that myths are not history, I think that whether myths are works of fiction or works of nonfiction is a very complicated issue.

First, the content and writing style of many myths is similar to many works of fiction. From their writing styles, which include some unbelievable content, such as that about gods or wizards, it is tempting to believe that the authors of the myths intended to produce a work of fiction.

Nevertheless, similarity to other works of fiction is not an important point in my definition. In my definition, the intention of the authors is a decisive factor. This is the second important point. Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence regarding the intention of authors of many myths. It is far from clear whether these authors intended these works to be comprehended non-systematically, as specified in my definition, or to be comprehended as works mainly made for telling facts. There is insufficient evidence to take myths as a case of works like Schindler's Ark, in which the author induces non-systematic processing for the audience to learn and reflect on historical facts by the experience of apprehending the work and focusing on the interior properties of the writing, like plots or characterisation.

Even so, it may be plausible to take myths as another case of Schindler's Ark and regard them as works of fiction for this reason. It is not clear whether myths are intended by their authors to be taken literally as history. For the sake of argument, I shall first suppose that they were not intended to be taken literally, then suppose that they were to demonstrate the results that occur with each supposition.
First, I suppose that the authors of myths do not want their works to be evaluated literally. This interpretation allows them to ensure that the facts and plots in their works are mostly correct, just like *Schindler’s Ark*, but also to fabricate the details, such as how different events happen, descriptions, and dialogue without any intention to be correct, but rather to enhance the experience of reading, though they want their readers to learn something by valuing their reading experience as an end and by focusing on the interior properties of the writing. If so, myths are works of fiction in my definition. I have delineated my rationale for this in Chapter 6 to explain how Keneally uses *Schindler’s Ark* to achieve his instrumental goals of telling facts without preventing his work from being a work of fiction. With this rationale and my definition, these myths are works of fiction, and they may be the earliest works of fiction.

The second interpretation supposes that the authors wanted their works to be considered to be literally true. In this interpretation, the authors of myths wrote something that is very unlikely to be telling facts from a 21st-century perspective, but they wholeheartedly believed that they were writing about the facts and wanted their audiences to take their works as telling facts. They wanted their audiences to focus on taking their writings as true and to learn from it. They might have made efforts to make it easier or more entertaining to read, but their focus was on facts and truth rather than the interior properties of the myth or apprehension experience. If this is the case, then these works are just bad histories, they are not works of fictions.

Following from this result, if the authors do want the audience to take the work literally, then Sainsbury’s intuition of regarding myths as works of fiction
needs to be explained away. In my view, audiences, especially literature experts after the Industrial Revolution, value and experience myths in such a way as if they are works of fiction, though they are not. They do so for two reasons. The first is the remarkable similarity between myths and works of fiction. Like works of fiction, myths are well-written and are often pleasurable to read. Also, many myths express moral messages, as do many works of fiction. The second is that these literary scholars are trying to maximise the value of these works in post-Industrial Revolution societies. This is because, as I have mentioned, these works are just very bad works of history (at least with my second supposition on the authors’ intention). Without re-categorisation, they are worthless. However, literary scholars find that they deserve a lot of attention because of the experience of apprehending them as well as many of their interior properties, such as excellent rhetorical features. Thus, they find that these works would be invaluable if they were works of fiction, and thus take them as works of fiction to highlight their value in this regard.

Thus, Sainsbury’s categorisation of myths is too hasty. When applying my definition of fiction, I do not see a definite answer on whether myths are works of fiction or works of nonfiction because of the lack of knowledge about the authors’ intentions. If the authors of myths did not intend their mythical works to be taken as literally true, then myths are fictions produced with an instrumental purpose, like Schindler’s Ark. If the authors of myths did intend their works to be taken as literally true, then their works are not fiction. Yet, they are still valued as if they were works of fiction, because doing so allows literary experts to find out and highlight the invaluable end values in these works, particularly their aesthetic value and entertainment value.
Roman Historiography as Nonfiction

Roman historiographies are similar to myths, because they contain many untrue utterances and fabricated events. Yet, despite the similarities, Roman historiographies are not regarded as being works of fiction. Indeed, they are works of nonfiction. While I do not intend to provide a definite answer for every work in such as the massive category of writings, I will still explain why Roman historiographies are not works of fiction.

Roman historiography becomes important in the debate about the definition of fiction when Friend (2012) uses it as a counterexample to those imagination-based accounts of fiction:

“According to the ancient Roman conception of history that had a defining influence on European historiography in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, the point of history was to provide moral and especially political instruction through examples (Nadel 1964). The choice of examples and the way they were treated constituted aesthetic and didactic decisions, not motivated primarily by fidelity to the facts” (p. 185).

This passage once again shows the difficulty of defining fiction in terms of intentionally untrue or imaginative utterances. Carroll (2016) proposes that Roman historiographies were made with the focus on telling facts, though he thinks that the fabricated details are there to make the work more vivid:

“The practice of ancient historians to invent speeches and battle details was an acknowledged convention meant to vividly put the events before the listener’s or reader’s eyes (a standard expression). It was an invitation to
mentally visualize the events, rather like the more prosaic pictorial illustrations in some of our history textbooks. It was not an invitation to entertain the occurrence of the events as unassisted” (p. 370).

I agree with Carroll that ancient history books were made for asserting certain points. Carroll’s point is that this criticism from Friend is not problematic for imagination-based accounts, as the fabricated details are only aids for the visualisation of events.

However, Carroll’s explanation can be applied to works like Schindler’s Ark and thus produce a disastrous result to imagination-based accounts. It is uncontroversial to claim that Schindler’s Ark asserts the events as they actually happened. Further, it is also uncontroversial to claim that the dialogues and descriptions in Schindler’s Ark are invitations for audiences to mentally visualise these events. Carroll regards Roman historiographies as works of nonfiction for these two reasons, so he also must regard Schindler’s Ark as a work of nonfiction for these two reasons. Further, another work of fiction, War and Peace, also satisfies these two reasons. Thus, while his explanation may save imagination-based accounts from being too inclusive, and wrongly including Roman history books as works of fiction, his explanation also commits imagination-based accounts to be too exclusive, and exclude some iconic works of fiction that are made for telling facts like Schindler’s Ark, War and Peace, and Romance of the Three Kingdoms.

The problem produced by Carroll’s defence once again shows that my account is a more preferable option compared to imagination-based theories. My definition of fiction excludes Roman historiographies from being works of fiction
without excluding works of fiction that are made for telling facts from being works of fiction.

Although my account also excludes this problematic case of Roman historiographies by focusing on author’s intention like Carroll, the focus on my account is on different aspects of the authors’ intentions. As far as I see in Friend’s (2012) elaboration, quoted before, the writers in question are not too concerned about whether the audiences focus on the interior properties of the writing like its style, neither are they concerned about how readers value their experience of reading as an end; instead, they intend readers to focus on learning in their apprehension. Thus, their intentions fail to satisfy my definition of fiction. Unlike the case of Schindler’s Ark, these writers wanted their audiences to focus on finding out and accepting certain didactic points. This difference in the intended focus prevents these works from being works of fiction in my account.

Although Friend claims that the authors are concerned about the aesthetic value of their writing, a well-written didactic work is very different from a work of fiction. A main advantage of my account, the ability to differentiate works of fiction made for telling facts from works of nonfiction made with intentional fabrications, is significant again in problematic or borderline cases like this. Making a didactic work easy to read does not mean wanting to the audience to take the interior properties and the end value of their reading experience as the foci of apprehension. I have explained the reason for this when I explain how my definition excludes In Cold Blood from being a work of fiction. Therefore, the authors’ possible goal on making their writing interesting does not render these works to be works of fiction.
The Limit of Fiction

I have gone through several complicated and commonly mentioned issues in the debate about the definition of fiction. There is also a scarcely mentioned but also complicated issue: whether there is any work of fiction in the medium of non-narrative art. By narrative, I only mean a description of a sequence of events. Indeed, one may claim that Sergei Prokofiev’s music *Peter and the Wolf* (Op. 67)\(^{34}\) is a work of fiction because it is used for telling a story, *Peter and the Wolf*, using music. Because of that lack of images and words in its medium of delivery, it is hard to claim that this work describes any sequence of events.

The central issue of whether this work is a work of fiction is whether this piece of music is a work of representation. While my account does not specify whether a work of fiction is a work of narrative, it does specify that it needs to be a work of representation. I do not know how music represents any event. This issue needs to be settled by a debate on representation. If this work alone represents at least one event, then my account allows it to be a work of fiction. This is because being a work of fine music as such, its experience of apprehension, is certainly intended for end value, and is taken in that way. Also, Prokofiev certainly intended the audience to focus on the interior properties of his music, like its composition.

Even if the debate on whether a work of music represents any event is never settled, I still have an opinion to contribute to this case. First, this is a very special case. Most works of music, like Bach’s *Sonatas and Partitas for solo violin* (BWV

\(^{34}\) Thanks to Mark Textor for bringing this point up.)
1001-1006), are not intended by the composer or author to represent any event, nor do the audiences normally take them in this way. Secondly, my most straightforward answer to this piece by Prokofiev is that it does not matter whether it is a work of fiction. It can be taken as if it is a work of a fiction because audiences usually associate a narrative to it; and because such an association is intended by the author, Prokofiev. If representation can be stretched to include this sort of prevalent and authorial intended association, then this is a work of representation and thus a work of fiction according to my account. If the notion of representation does not stretch this far, then audience takes it as if it is a work of representation because of its prevalent and intended association with a story. For this reason, audiences and critics may value this work as if it is a work of fiction without confirming it to be one.

**My Definition of Fiction and Its Contribution to the Debate about Fiction and Morality**

The advantage of my account goes beyond answering difficult cases; it also provides a foundation for other debates related to fiction, though without taking any side in these debates. While my account does not support any particular theory about how narrative art serves the purpose of moral education\(^\text{35}\), my theory of fiction justifies an important claim made in a theory by Carroll (1996) about cases

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\(^{35}\) I shall mention a plausible view on how fiction serves a moral purpose; and I will show how my account of fiction is compatible with, and even complementary to, this idea. This idea is by no means an exhaustive account of fiction serving a moral purpose. However, it is one of the more plausible and widely accepted views.
of fiction and morality. It is an advantage of my theory, because even if Carroll’s idea is rejected, it does not affect the plausibility of my definition of fiction. My definition only provides some ideas that justify an important point made by Carroll.

There are several reasons for discussing Carroll’s theory here. First, many works of fiction are works of narrative art, so complementing theories of art and moral education is an advantage of my theory. Second, my definition allows works of fiction to serve a moral purpose and tell facts simultaneously (as shown before, my definition allows instrumental goals of fiction), so I want to show that my definition does not have any tension with some iconic theories on how works of fiction achieve their moral purpose. Carroll’s theory is one of the most iconic ones and one of the most relevant to the ideas in my definition. Therefore, I choose this one and show that my theory is not only consistent with it, but also complements it.

In his theory on how art serves the purpose of moral education, Carroll (1996) argues that fiction strengthens the moral understanding of its audiences by providing examples of certain morally praiseworthy or blameworthy situations. Works of fiction do not only describe or mention series of events; they can also lead their audiences to deepen their moral understanding by their experience of apprehending the descriptions of those situations and then assign relevant sentiments to these situations (p. 230).

I now apply Carroll’s point to understand how Schindler’s Ark serves a moral purpose. Many people know how morally bad Nazism is solely by reading about the number of people killed by the Axis powers or reading some documents about how people were tortured by Nazi organisations. Nevertheless, a work of fiction provides its readers’ with the experience of how some officers felt towards their
Jewish slaves. For instance, one character might feel indifferent towards his slaves, while another might think he was totally justified in his abusive actions towards that slave. Through some fabricated dialogues, Keneally mentions that some army officers were not pleased with how the Jews were treated. This experience of apprehension allows readers to not only experience and feel the moral defects of certain officers but also the helplessness felt by some officers. Some German officers in the book were not bystanders to human rights abuses, but they could do relatively little when compared to what some higher up officials could do.

My theory of fiction justifies Carroll’s point on how works of narrative art that are also works of fiction serve a moral purpose. On one hand, a work of fiction strengthens the moral knowledge of its readers because they experience the portrayal of certain events in the work of fiction; on the other hand, this process is justified by my theory because readers ought to focus on the plots and events in a work of fiction and value the reading experience as an end. Together with the effect of non-systematic processing of fiction delineated in my comments on Gerrig and Prentice’s experiments in Chapter 5, readers of works of fiction are more susceptible to accept the content of a work that they believe to be a work of fiction as true descriptions. If this point also applies to the moral judgement of certain events embedded in the content of a work of fiction, then readers will also be more likely to adopt the moral standpoint portrayed in a work of fiction, unless they strongly disagree with it. Thus, my theory of fiction justifies Carroll’s idea of how art serves the purpose of moral education, though the plausibility of my theo-

36 In Chapter 5, I have addressed the issue of how the strong belief of a reader cancels out the effect of non-systematic processing of fiction, when elaborating my understanding of Gerrig and Prentice’s experiments.
ry is not affected by the plausibility of Carroll’s theory. As a result, I have also shown that it is plausible for my theory to claim that works of fiction may serve a moral purpose, because it complements an important theory from Carroll on how a work of fiction that is a work of narrative art can serve a moral purpose.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have addressed different issues related to my definition and to definitions of fiction in general. In part 1, I used four supplements to clarify and defend some important ideas in my definition of fiction. In part 2, I use four cases to showcase the plausibility of my definition by addressing some difficult issues and by showing how my definition of fiction complements Carroll’s theory on how works of art that are also works of fiction can serve a moral purpose.

In the first supplement in part 1, I addressed how my account handles a problematic case like works of fiction pretending to be works of nonfiction, such as Orson Welles’s broadcast of *The War of the Worlds*. Works like this are not normally mentioned in the debate about the definition of fiction. My account includes works like this by focusing on the experience of initially thinking that the work is telling facts, and then recognising that the work is not actually made for telling facts but is only pretending to do so. The end value of apprehension lies in the experience of recognition: the work is like a work of nonfiction, though it is not made for lying or telling facts. I argue that the audience take this experience as end value.
I then constructed a possible case out of Welles’s broadcast. I changed his intention of wanting the audience to believe and then recognise that the broadcast as a work of fiction shortly afterwards. I explained this case by including the experience of the change in audience’s experience of the work into the idea of the experience of apprehension in my definition of fiction. I did so in two distinct ways. First, I included this experience of change as the experience of apprehension, because it is what the author of the work intends to achieve by creating his work, and then include the change of audience’s experience as part of a work of fiction. Therefore, the experience of change is an experience of apprehending a work of fiction. Second, I simply took the experience of apprehension in this case to be a more complex experience, one which includes two initial experiences of the content of a work of fiction and an experience of the change from one experience of apprehension to another.

In the second supplement, I clarified what I mean when I use the idea of work. Although I am not committed to any particular definition of work, I agree with Lamarque that work includes the context of production. I clarified the idea of work because I mention this idea very often throughout the entire project, and have just used it to explain the difficult possible case about Welles’s broadcast *The War of the Worlds* in supplement 1.

In the third supplement in part 1, I clarified that end value does not mean aesthetic value. End value may not be aesthetic value. An audience or even an author may value a work of fiction in virtue of how funny and sad it is. He takes the funniness and sadness in the plot of the work as an end in itself, which may not mean that he thinks that the work has any aesthetic value.
In the fourth supplement of part 1, I argued that the possible weakness of phenomenal concept as a philosophical idea does not affect the overall plausibility of my definition, though the idea of phenomenal concept plays a role in constructing my definition. Nevertheless, I defended my use of the idea of phenomenal concept against a criticism by Ball, to defend the philosophical foundation of the emphasis on the experience of apprehension in my definition. I have argued that Ball’s argument is unsound, at least for the idea of phenomenal concept used in the current project, by arguing that one of his premises must be false.

Having completed my clarifications in part 1, I proceeded to part 2 to showcase the plausibility of my definition.

In the first case of part 2, I addressed whether myths are works of fiction or works of nonfiction. I argued that myths are a complicated case. The central issue is whether their authors wanted their content to be taken as literally true. If not, then myths will be works of fiction for reasons similar to my rationale for categorising Schindler’s Ark as a work of fiction. Namely, the authors want their audiences to learn some facts or ideas while focusing on the interior properties of their works and the end value of the experience of apprehension. If the authors wanted the content of their myths to be taken as literally true, I accept that myths are works of nonfiction, though they are usually appreciated and valued as if they were works of fiction. By doing so, the experience of appending them is of end value including aesthetic and artistic value. The intentions of the authors of many myths are unknown, not to mention they may vary, so I left this issue of whether myths are works of fiction with these two plausible interpretations. I believe that these two
interpretations cover a huge amount of different scenarios about myths, even if
they do not cover all of them.

In my second case in part 2, my account explains why Roman histori-
ographies should be categorised as nonfiction because they were made with the
intention to convince the audience to accept their content as facts and believe in
their didactic points, despite containing many fabricated details. Their authors did
not intend their audience to focus on the interior properties and value the experi-
ence of apprehension as an end, so my definition rejects them from being works of
fiction. I explained their status as works of nonfiction in the way that I explained
why In Cold Blood is a work of nonfiction.

In my third case in part 2, I provided my view about whether my definition
of fiction can decide whether there are any works of fiction amongst works of mu-
ic. My example is Prokofiev’s work of music Peter and the Wolf (Op. 67). My ac-
count does not provide a definite answer to this question, but I argued that the
most important issue is whether this piece of music represents any events. If not, it
cannot be a work of fiction; if it does, then it is very likely to be one.

For the last case in part 2, I have shown that my theory of fiction provides a
theoretical foundation for Carroll’s important point that fiction serves certain
moral purpose by inviting the audience to experience certain fictional events from
a certain moral perspective. My theory provides a theoretical foundation for this
account, because the audience is intended by the author to focus on the fictional
events when reading works of fiction. Therefore, my account supports Carroll’s
point by claiming that the audience is doing so because they are doing what the
author intends them to do. Following this, it is plausible for me to claim that my
definition of fiction allows works of fiction to serve a moral purpose because my definition complements an iconic theory by Carroll on how works of narrative art serve a moral purpose. It is an advantage particularly because the plausibility of my account is not affected even if Carroll’s theory is rejected.

In this chapter, I have defended the theoretical foundation of my account. Further, I have also used my definition to explain some complicated cases of fiction categorisation that have either been ignored or poorly explained. This has allowed me to further demonstrate the plausibility and value of my definition of fiction.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

The overall goal of this work has been to demonstrate that there is no plausible existing definition of fiction, and then to argue for my own, non-imagination-based definition of fiction that is free from the fundamental flaws of imagination-based approaches.

Throughout this work, I have addressed the dominant, imagination-based approaches, and then moved progressively away from them before arriving at my own definition. I began by addressing dominant theories of fiction and demonstrating their weaknesses in Chapters 1 and 2. I demonstrated three fundamental flaws in these theories:

1. No imagination-based theory in its current form can plausibly explain the role of assertions in fiction.

2. No imagination-based theory can differentiate between works of fiction created for telling facts and works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated details.

3. A plausible definition of imagination or make-believe that can be used to save imagination-based theories from points 1 and 2, but as seen in Chapter 2, imagination-based theorists appear to have no clue regarding the functional role of imagination in fiction, which is the important point that
differentiates imagination in fiction from belief. Therefore, I refuse to accept imagination-based theories as plausible theories of fiction.

With imagination-based theories off the table, I then turned to Friend’s non-imagination-based approach, which nonetheless incorporates the concept of imagination, albeit not as a necessary component. I showed how her definition is at best incomplete for the following reasons:

1. Unlike imagination-based accounts, Friend’s genre approach does not identify any features of a work that make it fictional. Instead, she only produces a list of the standard features of works of fiction, and then uses them to categorise works of representation as works of fiction. However, her set of standard features may well be stereotypes that are sometimes used to identify fiction, rather than fundamental features of fictional works, as I showed using Putnam’s distinction between definitions and stereotypes. Thus, this method of categorisation only demonstrates how fiction is conventionally classified in certain communities, rather than answering the question of what makes a work of representation a work of fiction. Though it is possible that there are no such properties, Friend does not make this argument.

2. One of the strongest reasons given by Friend for any philosopher to adopt her genre approach to define fiction is the failure of imagination-based theories that she argued for. Nevertheless, as seen in chapter 2, there are convincing alternative reading to the imagination-based theories that does not falsify them. Therefore, I have yet to find a reason to abandon
the clear-cut imagination-based approach and adopt the vague genre ap-
proach proposed by her.

After setting Friend aside, I address Deutsch’s definition, which is a total
breakaway from the imagination-based approach, as it does not involve imagina-
tion at all. I reject a fundamental part of this definition, namely how he defines
making something up via the principles of poetic license, and thus rejected his the-
ory, showing that it contains a threat of circularity, results in problems related to
Russell’s paradox, and includes meaningless writings as fiction. I also reject his al-
ternative interpretation of making something up with its emphasis on authorial
authority, since it does not provide enough material to be a plausible definition of
fiction. Its emphasis on authorial authority is simply not detailed enough to be a
definition of fiction, even though it confirms that authorial intention is a necessary
condition for defining fiction.

Having now rejected all the imagination-based theories as well as those of
Friend and Deutsch, I attacked the problem from the opposite perspective: scepti-
cism about whether there is a meaningful distinction between fiction and nonfic-
tion. I covered and undermined Matravers’s scepticism by showing that he misin-
terprets the data from the social science experiments on which his argument is
founded. While he incorrectly states that the findings from these studies show that
there is no meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction, I show how they,
in fact, support the existence of a meaningful distinction between fiction and non-
fiction, though not an imagination-based one.
This left the field clear for me to construct my own definition of fiction, which I did in Chapter 6. In doing so, I included the component of authorial intention, as it is uncontroversial and I agree with it. Second, I use findings from social science that show that works of fiction are processed non-systematically, while works of nonfiction are processed systematically.

Since the concept of non-systematic processing was not developed enough to be philosophically useful for defining fiction, I refined it for use in this debate using other philosophical ideas, including interior properties, phenomenal concept, and end value. I then stated my definition thus:

A work of representation is a work of fiction if and only if its author intends it to be comprehended using a non-systematic process both by himself or any other audience members, in such a way that focuses on the interior properties of the work and values the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end, despite any other goals served by the work in question.

I then went on to demonstrate the plausibility of my definition by using it to solve most of the major problems that other definitions of fiction have been unable to solve, including why *In Cold Blood* is a work of nonfiction and why *Schindler’s Ark* is a work of fiction. According to my account, the answer lies in the difference of what the author intends himself or the audience to focus on: only in the apprehension of fiction is the focus intended to be on the end value of the experience.

I have also addressed the persistent problem of the role of assertions in fiction, for which no theory has provided a satisfactory explanation. I argue that an assertion in fiction is an assertion with a secondary effect. While it retains the essential effect possessed by other assertions, including being an expression of belief
and an attempt to change the presuppositions of the audience, it also has a sec-
ondary effect of contributing to the end value of the experience of apprehending a
work of fiction. My explanation is inclusive of the many different types of contribu-
tions to end value that assertions in fiction can make. Consequently, I created my
own explanation of assertions, and stated it thus:

Assertions in fiction are made for a secondary effect. They are never only
made for their essential effects, and their secondary effects are what set
them apart from assertions in nonfiction. The secondary effect of assertions
in fiction is to contribute to how the author or any other audience values
the experience of apprehending the work in question as an end by its rela-
tion to other parts of the work of fiction.

Besides demonstrating the plausibility of my definition, my arguments on
assertions also showed that it is implausible to claim that there are no assertions in
fiction. Additionally, they explained why assertions in a work of fiction do not
change it to be a work of nonfiction: the secondary effect of assertions in fiction is
determined by the context of being in a work of fiction, so they cannot change a
work of fiction to a work of nonfiction just by being part of it.

In the last chapter before this overall conclusion, I addressed how my defi-
nition of fiction handles different miscellaneous issues related to fiction. I divided
this chapter into two sections: in the first one, I clarified some subtleties about my
account using four supplements. In the second one, I showcased the plausibility of
my account by addressing three difficult cases and then showing how my account
complements an iconic theory in a related debate.
In my first supplement, I argued that my account works for those works of fiction that are created to imitate works of nonfiction, since the author still intends these works to be valued by the experience of apprehending them — in this case, the end value is found in the discovery of the works’ fictional status. In the second supplement, I clarified my use of the idea of work in my project. In the third supplement, I clarified that end value is not always an aesthetic value, because experiences such as enjoying a plot can be an end value, but are not always an aesthetic one. In the fourth supplement, I defended the theoretical foundation of my emphasis on the experience of apprehending a work by defending my use of the phenomenal concept.

Then, in the first case of part 2, I argued that although my account does not have a definitive answer for the question of whether myths are works of fiction or nonfiction, it provides two plausible interpretations to cover many cases of myths: if the authors intended the myths to be taken non-literally, then myths should be categorised as fiction, for reasons similar to the categorisation of Schindler’s Ark. Alternatively, if the authors did intend the content of myth to be taken literally, then myths should be categorised as works of nonfiction, although they are still often considered as though they were works of fiction because of the end value of apprehending them. Then, in case 2 of part 2, I showed how my definition categorises Roman historiographies as works of nonfiction with fabricated parts, similarly to In Cold Blood. In case 3 of part 2, I addressed the issue of whether Prokofiev’s musical work Peter and the Wolf (Op. 67) is a work of fiction. While I did not provide a definitive answer, I showed how the central issue of this question is whether
the musical work represents an event. If so, it is a work of fiction, and if not, it cannot be one. Finally, in case 4 of part 2, I showed how my definition of fiction can serve as the theoretical foundation for one of the most iconic theories in a related debate: Carroll’s theory of how a work of narrative art can serve a moral purpose.

The Contributions of My Project

My project makes many significant contributions to the debate about the definition of fiction. First, I have provided a definition that differentiates works of fiction made for telling facts from works of nonfiction made with intentionally fabricated parts. No other definition of fiction seen in this project manages to do so. Second, I have explained a related issue: why a work of fiction can contain assertions without becoming a work of nonfiction. There is very little previous research on this question. Third, my definition of fiction explains the case of mental fiction in a plausible way, because the role of the audience is not necessary for my definition. Fourth, my definition of fiction is one of the very few that not affected by Matravers’s scepticism about whether there is a meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction. It indeed is built on the failure of his scepticism. Therefore, the fifth advantage of my project is to show that there is indeed a meaningful distinction between fiction and nonfiction. Sixth, my definition plausibly categorises difficult cases like myths and Roman historiographies. Although Friend attempted to do the same thing, I have shown that her account has no cross-media applicability and is at best incomplete. Seventh, my definition can answer whether certain
works of non-narrative art are works of fiction, like Prokofiev’s symphony *Peter and the Wolf*.

Because I have settled many issues surrounding the difficult cases related to definitions of fiction with my definition, research about fiction can enter a new stage. First, it is now more possible to answer whether there are works of fiction in the medium of non-narrative art. My project has not provided a definite answer to this issue when addressing Prokofiev’s *Peter and the Wolf*, though it has identified the central issue in this question. This provides a potential for the further development of philosophical debates about fiction. Further, as a new understanding of the idea of fiction, my definition of fiction can provide theoretical foundations for philosophers to discuss whether and how works of fiction can serve a moral purpose. Although I have shown that my theory complements Carroll’s iconic theory in this debate, my theory may serve this related debate in a different way, which is another possible development from my project.

To conclude, by rejecting all the major theories of fiction, from those of imagination-based theorists to Friend and Deutsch, as well as demonstrating that there is a meaningful difference between fiction and nonfiction and then using an unusually interdisciplinary methodology to create my own definition of fiction that is free from the flaws of previous definitions, can do many things that they cannot, and opens up several new avenues of research, I have made a significant and original contribution to the definition of fiction as well as several related philosophical debates.
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