Internationalized Regimes:
A Second Dimension of Regime Hybridity

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Abstract

Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with reference to domestic-level political factors. However, many current and historical political regimes have entailed a major role for international actors, and in some cases the external influence has been so great that regimes have become internationalized. This article explores the concept of ‘internationalized regimes’ and argues that they should be seen as a distinct form of hybrid regime type that demonstrates a distinct dimension of hybridity. Until now, regime hybridity has been conceived along a single dimension of domestic politics: the level of competitiveness. Yet, some regimes are characterized by a different type of hybridity, in which domestic and international authority are found together within a single political system. The article explores the dynamics of internationalized regimes within three settings, those of international occupation, international administration and informal empire.

Keywords: regime type, hybrid regimes, occupation, state-building, internationalization

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Domestic politics is rarely entirely domestic. Few political systems are entirely independent of their international surroundings, and international actors and environments frequently influence national political debates and developments. In recent years, the international dimensions of democratization have received extensive attention, and a wide variety of external influences have been identified. However, there has been less attention in the literature on regime change to the role that international actors can play in post-transition politics. In many cases, international actors do not just influence the timing or direction of regime change, they also find ways to insert themselves into the political process over prolonged periods of time. For example, US officials exercised considerable political authority in Iraq after 2003, while multilateral interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor in the 1990s were followed in each case by prolonged and intrusive efforts at external governance. These cases echo earlier experiences in countries such as Germany and Japan where outside powers exercised extensive political authority over many years.

Cases such as these do not fit easily into existing typologies of political regimes. Traditionally, democracies have been distinguished from non-democratic regimes with reference to the rules governing access to power and political decision-making. More recently, the focus on hybrid regimes has highlighted the blurred boundaries that exist between democratic and authoritarian regimes, as countries exhibit democratic institutions and characteristics even as leaders seek to subvert democracy and limit political rights and freedoms. These efforts at conceptualizing political regimes have had in common a focus on the manner in which national governments govern society, and have focused exclusively on domestic actors and institutions. However, many political regimes are distinctive not because of the nature of domestic governance, but because of the international identity of those doing the governing. When external actors assume positions of authority at the domestic level and insert themselves into the heart of the
political system in comprehensive and intrusive ways, the political regime that emerges ceases to be purely domestic. This article is concerned with identifying this separate class of ‘internationalized regimes’, in which international actors play a direct role in the political system. These internationalized regimes exhibit a different form of hybridity from that which has been the subject of so much recent research, as they combine elements of domestic and international authority that existing typologies of political regimes have largely assumed to be separate.

The identification of a category of internationalized regimes has both conceptual and theoretical benefits. Conceptually, it addresses a gap in existing treatments of regime type by going beyond the use of domestic criteria of concept formation and using a combination of domestic and international factors. In doing so, it facilitates the classification of a range of cases that do not fit easily into existing typologies of regime type. Theoretically, it enables the development of new theory concerning the impact of regime type on other aspects of political development. Existing approaches have shown how the nature of regime type has implications for regime duration and regime transition. Some regimes, for example, contain within them incentive and organisational structures that make them more or less likely to endure, and more or less likely to be followed by democracy. While this article is primarily concerned with identifying and exploring the concept of internationalized regimes, it concludes by pointing to possible ways in which the concept may be useful in developing new theory about regime duration and transition.

**Defining internationalized regimes**

Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with reference to domestic-level political factors. The characteristics that vary between them
and that are used to differentiate between subtypes are usually domestic characteristics such as rules concerning leadership succession and decision-making procedures, as well as levels of political openness. Although there is no consensus regarding the definition of a political regime, Gerardo Munck has identified a common set of attributes found in the literature that suggest political regimes are understood to entail the core rules and procedures that determine three key political features:

1) the number and type of actors who are allowed to gain access to government power,

2) the methods of access to such positions, and,

3) the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions.\(^4\)

Around this core set of elements, several different typologies of political regimes have emerged that identify a wide range of potential regime types, with the classic categories of democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarianism being supplemented by an extensive list of alternatives.\(^5\)

An influential approach in recent regime analysis, however, seeks to question the boundaries between regime categories rather than add to them. Moving away from traditional distinctions between democratic and non-democratic regime types, recent work has identified a range of new ‘hybrid regimes’ that straddle the conventional divides and combine elements of democratic and non-democratic political systems. Levitsky and Way, for example, have highlighted how ‘competitive authoritarianism’ combines the existence of formal institutions of democracy with a level of incumbent abuse of power that prevents the realisation of full democratic standards. Diamond identifies a broader category of ‘pseudo-democracies’ and distinguishes between competitive authoritarian regimes and ‘hegemonic’ regimes, where competitiveness is low but some political opposition is permitted as long as there is no serious challenge to the incumbent
authorities. Other hybrid regimes identified in the literature include electoral authoritarian regimes, illiberal democracies, and defective democracies.

Yet all these recent approaches share a common pattern of defining hybrid regimes with reference to their domestic characteristics. Hybridity is conceived along a single dimension concerning the domestic features of the regime, so that a regime is a hybrid one if it combines democratic and non-democratic elements at the national level. This article, however, argues that regime type can also be evaluated along a second dimension of hybridity, in which the hybrid nature of the political system derives from the combination of domestic and international features. In these settings, domestic and international actors interact in a sustained fashion that fundamentally shapes the nature of domestic politics, and leads to distinctive forms of political regime type.

The effort to identify this distinctive set of regimes builds on a well-established tradition of examining the international dimensions of regime change. The literature on regime change has included extensive consideration of the role of international factors, including democracy assistance, conditionality, international diffusion and international intervention. Most recently, Levitsky and Way have reignited debates about the role of international influences on regime change by distinguishing between two core categories of external variables, namely international ‘leverage and linkage’. However, much of this attention has focused on the international influence on regime change, and there is much less attention to the ways in which international factors can shape and help constitute regime type. This article seeks to elaborate on this latter form of influence, and addresses particular regime types that do not rest purely on domestic political characteristics, but that are shaped in significant part by their international features.

Internationalized regimes are thus defined here as political systems in which the core elements of the regime – the rules and control over access to power and political
decision-making – are constituted in significant part by international as well as domestic actors. In these regimes, international actors directly control key functions of government and have the ability to wield legislative and executive authority. Consequently, international actors co-exist with domestic actors in positions of political authority and play an integral role in determining the nature of the regime. These are not regimes that are simply vulnerable to international influence, but are rather regimes that entail sustained and intrusive involvement of international actors within the political system itself. Examples of internationalized regimes include recent cases of international occupation and administration such as Iraq and Bosnia, in which states or international organizations assume a direct governing role in domestic politics, as well as cases of informal empire such as the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War, where outside powers exercise control over domestic authority from a distance.

Many forms of international influence and linkage to domestic politics exist, and internationalized regimes can also be contrasted with other forms of international influence in order to draw out their distinctiveness. They differ from cases of government or regime overthrow, which also include intensive international intervention, but do not include a sustained role for international actors in regulating regime politics over time. They differ from cases of annexation, in which pre-existing regimes cease to have any continuing role and are subsumed into the political regime of a separate state. They can also be distinguished from cases in which a government is ‘propped up’ by outside powers, through some form of military or economic support. Such cases clearly entail a crucial political role for outside actors, but such actors do not directly control the domestic political regime, and do not shape its core features.

These cases can also be contrasted to situations in which international forces such as globalisation and international liberalisation shape domestic politics. Keohane and Milner have written about ‘internationalization and domestic politics’, and specifically the ways
in which international structures associated with the world economy have implications for national economies in terms of actor preferences and economic policies. Such processes of economic internationalization are often associated with patterns of international capitalism that have indirect influences on domestic politics (e.g. trade flows and exchange rate fluctuations), in that they do not reflect active and conscious efforts to increase international control over domestic politics, and they are thus distinct from the dynamics present in the internationalized regimes discussed here, which entail active and intentional intervention in domestic affairs by international actors.

Even when some aspects of economic internationalization do include active and intentional intervention in domestic politics, these dynamics remain distinct from the processes taking place in internationalized regimes. For example, international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Central Bank sometimes pursue intentional and intrusive economic policies that lead to the exercise of international authority at the domestic level, for example through the use of policy conditionality in the context of financial loads, or international economic monitoring in the wake of economic bailouts seen in European countries such as Greece and Ireland in 2010/11. Yet, while such intervention can be highly intrusive and can have implications for national sovereignty, it falls short of the internationalization of the entire political regime. National policy may be constrained, and indeed entire policy areas may effectively be internationalized, but the core elements of the political regime in terms of the rules governing access to power and political decision-making remain in domestic hands.

There are many forms of international influence in domestic politics, many of them highly intrusive. Despite the assumptions of some influential theories of international politics, the world clearly displays patterns of ‘hierarchy’ across many issue areas and in many relationships among different types of international actors. Internationalized
regimes reflect one dimension of such patterns, relating to the internationalization of the political regime rather than a given policy area. In these settings, international actors control the central elements of the full domestic political regime, and thus internationalize the political system in ways not seen in other settings.

Furthermore, the combination of domestic and international authority in these settings suggests that they are best viewed as a form of hybrid regime, although they differ in nature from the types of hybrid regimes that have been the subject of recent scholarship. The conventional hybrid regimes that have proliferated since the end of the Cold War are hybrid due to their combination of traditionally separate political attributes – democratic and authoritarian political rule. This type of hybridity is essentially about the nature of domestic politics and levels of political freedom and competition at the national level, or what I call ‘domestic hybridity’. Internationalized regimes, on the other hand, are hybrid for a separate reason. Their distinctiveness rests on a second dimension of hybridity, along which they combine usually separate elements of domestic and international politics, rather than combining usually separate elements of domestic politics alone. I call this form of interaction ‘international hybridity’.

Table 1 compares the two forms of hybridity and highlights the ways in which they can interact. The top row distinguishes between domestic hybridity and two pure forms of domestic regime type – democracy and authoritarianism. The left-hand column distinguishes between international hybridity and the pure alternative of a fully domestic regime. When a regime is purely domestic, the regime options are the traditional mix of democratic, authoritarian and (domestic) hybrid. As seen in the bottom row of Table 1, however, when a regime is internationalized there are a range of relatively unexplored regime options.
Table 1: The Two Dimensions of Hybridity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Hybridity</th>
<th>Domestic Hybridity</th>
<th>Pure Democracy</th>
<th>Pure Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Democratic/Authoritarian Hybrid</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pure Domestic Regime</td>
<td>Conventional democracy</td>
<td>Conventional authoritarianism</td>
<td>Conventional hybrid regime</td>
<td>E.g. Levitsky and Way’s competitive authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/International Hybrid</td>
<td>Unlikely to exist</td>
<td>Authoritarian internationalized regime</td>
<td>Competitive internationalized regime</td>
<td>E.g. Germany, Japan, Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, Iraq</td>
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First, it is clear that it is difficult to combine international hybridity with democracy – once a regime is internationalized, the channels of representation and accountability that link citizens to rulers break down, and democracy becomes challenging to attain. Unless international actors subject themselves to the key mechanisms of democratic accountability – especially elections – democratic government will be almost impossible. Internationalized regimes are, thus, very unlikely to be democratic, and in practice international interveners in cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq have not allowed themselves to be voted out of office by the domestic populations over which they have assumed authority.

It is perfectly possible, however, for an internationalized regime to be fully authoritarian. If the international authorities restrict political contestation and participation, and preclude democratic accountability even for domestic actors, then the regime will simply be an ‘authoritarian internationalized regime’. This pattern was clearly seen after World War II, when the Soviet Union controlled its satellite states in Central
and Eastern Europe and actively restricted the expression of democratic politics in favour of repressive single party rule.

The final category is arguably the most interesting, where both forms of hybridity are simultaneously present. In these settings, regimes combine elements of domestic and international politics on one hand, while on the other hand exhibiting elements of democratic and authoritarian politics. The result is a double-hybrid – an internationalized regime that is neither purely democratic nor authoritarian. I call these cases ‘competitive internationalized regimes’. These regime types are most common when the international actors are seeking to promote democratic government, with the result that their presence is combined with democratic institutions and policies. There are many examples of such political regimes in recent history, not least because of the rise of the democracy promotion agenda and increasing levels of international interventionism. One of clearest contemporary examples is Bosnia, which since the Dayton Agreement of 1995, has been subject to a highly authoritative international presence, in the form of the Office of the High Representative, while also enjoying robust levels of political competition and participation. While Bosnia has had several free and fair elections in the post-Dayton period, with alteration in domestic governments, the continued international presence precludes the attainment of pure democracy. Other examples include United Nations administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, and the international occupation of Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan also combined unelected international rule with efforts to promote political pluralism and liberal values.

Internationalized regimes can, thus, vary in their levels of democratic quality, often corresponding to the democratic credentials of the intervening powers. Some interveners, especially western states and international organizations, have an explicit democracy promotion agenda and therefore seek to implement and encourage
democratic practices even as they pursue non-democratic methods of international governance. Other forms of internationalized regime, however, involve the intervention of external actors who have no interests in democratic government and are rather more concerned with restricting rather than opening up democratic politics. One of the common features of these cases is thus that the objectives of the interveners are fundamentally political in nature – international authorities usually seek to shape the nature of domestic politics according to their specific interests and priorities.

One further consideration regarding the classification of internationalized regimes concerns their duration over time. Many cases of internationalized regimes are internationalized for a relatively short amount of time, while others endure over very long periods. This variation raises the question of whether temporary arrangements in which international authorities constitute the domestic regime before withdrawing should even be considered a regime type, rather than a transitional period between regime types. In a recent treatment of hybrid regimes, Leonardo Morlino takes a relatively strict approach, and only categorizes as regime types those cases that have had over 10 years of stable regime politics. Those political systems lasting less than 10 years old are categorized as transitional cases. However, this approach is too restrictive, as it precludes analysis of distinct regime types that have emerged and leads to so much being categorized as ‘transitional’ that it stretches the very concept of regime transition.

Furthermore, excluding such short-lived cases from regime classifications risks undermining efforts at theory development regarding the impact and trajectory of varying regime types. A recent and influential analysis of regime types and their influence provides a systematic analysis of the duration of different regime types, highlighting that while some regime types tend to last for long periods (monarchies are the most durable, lasting on average 25 years) others tend to be much more short lived (non-dominant limited multiparty regimes last on average just 5.8 years). Achieving this comparative
knowledge is only possible when regime types of very short durations are included, such as the military regime in Bangladesh that existed only from 1975-77, and a one-party regime that did not last beyond a year in Azerbaijan in 1991. This article adopts a similar approach, and seeks to include even very short-term cases of internationalization as cases of distinctive regime types so as to contribute to our understanding of regime type variations and their implications.

The key point here is that in many cases of regime change new political arrangements emerge that ultimately do not consolidate into long-term conventional political regimes, but that are nonetheless quite stable while they last and in and of themselves represent distinct forms of regime politics. As long as they last, they regulate politics as all regimes do: by governing who gets into power and what they can do once in power. Classifying such political systems as transitional arrangements ignores the fact that some internationalized regimes have lasted many years, and consigns too much politics from more short-lived cases to a residual category that washes away the distinctiveness of political rule in these settings and limits our potential for understanding this class of common cases. If we include only regimes that achieve some form of stability, we may miss the fact that certain regime types are inherently unstable, and our theoretical knowledge of regime politics will be weaker as a result.

The settings of internationalized regimes

According to the rules of sovereign statehood, each state has the right to determine its own affairs and remain free from intervention from other states. However, the rules associated with sovereignty have routinely been breached throughout international history, and states have frequently intervened in each other’s domestic political affairs. The forms of such international intervention range widely in their nature and levels of
intrusiveness. Some involve international involvement through arrangements that are voluntarily entered into by domestic political elites. Others are the result of coercive international actions and are carried out in the face of domestic resistance. Some international interventions involve a relatively minor external role that does not fundamentally change the nature of domestic politics, while others are of such magnitude that the nature of the domestic political regime is altered and becomes internationalized.

Internationalized regimes are, thus, not simply regimes that are subject to international pressure, or that are vulnerable to outside influence. They are regimes that are in part constituted by the actions and influence of international actors. Consequently, they emerge only in circumstances where the role of international actors is highly intrusive and where international actors are unusually interventionist. In such settings, the external role extends beyond conventional channels of international influence and entails some form of control over the nature of domestic political institutions and decision-making. Once international actors begin to exercise formal or informal executive authority at the domestic level, the political regime is not simply influenced by external actors, but fundamentally changes in nature and becomes internationalized. In these settings, international actors can play direct and influential roles in domestic regime politics, using a range of powerful political mechanisms that are unavailable in more conventional settings. Five mechanisms of influence in particular facilitate the internationalization of political regimes in such settings:

- *agenda-setting powers*, which can enable international actors to influence which issues are subject to discussion;

- *veto powers*, which can include the ability to strike down laws that are proposed by domestic actors;
- *drafting powers*, where international actors can involve themselves in drafting basic legislation or more significant institutional provisions;

- *imposition authority*, which enables external authorities to bypass domestic actors entirely and enforce measures they deem necessary;

- *leadership selection*, where international powers can remove domestic leaders from their positions of authority or veto potential leaders.

This extent of international intervention in regime politics, however, only emerges under certain conditions. I identify three particular settings in which the level of international intervention is so great that a previously domestic regime becomes a hybrid internationalized regime. In the context of international occupation, of international administration, and of informal empire, the level of external involvement and control over domestic affairs is sufficient to systematically shape the nature of domestic politics and domestic political structures. These three forms of international intervention each provide external actors with powers that enable them to be equal or dominate the power of domestic political elites.

**International occupation**

International occupation entails ‘the temporary control of a territory by a state (or group of allied states) that makes no claims to permanent sovereignty over that territory’. Occupation often, but not always, follows the military victory of the occupying power over the occupied state, and also tends to involve a sustained effort to ensure that the occupied state ceases to represent a threat to the occupier and complies with its political demands. These demands can themselves involve a major transformation of domestic political institutions and policies – in essence, a change of regime. Once the occupier is in
place, however, the political regime becomes a distinctive one – while a period of occupation often coincides with a period of attempted regime change, it also itself represents the emergence of a new, internationalized regime that is distinct from what has come before and what will follow. International and domestic actors interact and the nature of domestic politics is systematically different from a conventional domestic political system.

The international law of occupation holds that occupiers must respect the sovereignty of the occupied power and must make minimal changes to its political structures – the primary legal responsibility of international occupiers is to ensure political order at the national level while respecting domestic institutional and legal structures. In practice, however, this legal responsibility has often been abandoned in favour of a transformative agenda, in which the occupier seeks to make major alterations to domestic structures and often wields executive authority toward these ends. In doing so, international occupiers often play a major role in governing the territory they are occupying, and thus internationalize the previously domestic political regime.

The US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, for example, exercised extensive governing authority and advanced an ambitious transformative agenda to alter the nature of Iraq’s economic and political systems. Its involvement went far beyond efforts to provide political order and instead concentrated on systematically changing Iraq’s political structures. The establishment of the CPA under the lead of a US Administrator introduced a new governing agent in Iraq that took precedence over pre-existing domestic political authorities. The CPA enjoyed full executive and legislative authority, and involved itself in all major aspects of domestic politics. It used a broad range of mechanisms to influence the political process, and among other things the US political authorities chose their domestic interlocutors selectively, led the way in
institutions building and involved themselves heavily in electoral issues, including the design of the electoral system.⁶

Arguably the clearest examples of internationalized regimes in the context of international occupation can be found in the post-war cases of Germany and Japan, both of which experienced several years of external rule. In Japan, the US took the lead in the post-war occupation, and appointed General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. As Supreme Commander from 1945 to 1951, MacArthur exercised a monopoly over both power and policy, and played a major individual role as the head of the occupation force that distinguished the US-led experience in Japan from the more collaborative and less personalized Allied occupation of Germany.⁷ The US objectives for the occupation were ambitious and highly political. They sought to bring about demilitarization and deindustrialization, while also purging the ruling class and establishing a peaceful and democratic government.⁸ Throughout the occupation, US officials made an extensive array of executive decisions and introduced wide-ranging political, economic and social reforms. These included the expansion of the franchise to women, the break-up of large industrial monopolies, the reform of the education and judicial systems and the imposition of a new, US-drafted constitution. Although many of these policies were implemented by the pre-existing Japanese bureaucracy, the executive decisions were made by the international occupiers rather than by any autonomous Japanese authorities.⁹ Consequently, the occupation period in Japan was much more than a transitional moment between domestic regime types, and instead represented a distinct system of international governance. For several years, the political system in Japan was led by international rather than domestic authorities, and executive decisions were taken by US rather than Japanese officials. The regime does not fit easily into existing typologies of regime type, and is best seen as a form of internationalized regime.
The international occupation of Germany also lasted several years, from 1945-49, and entailed the internationalization of a previously autonomous regime. The initial Allied presence in Germany from 1945 involved the division of Germany into separate zones, each headed by one of the Allied powers (the UK, the US, the Soviet Union and France). The separate zones were in turn overseen by the Allied Control Council, which was in charge of a range of inter-zone affairs, such as transport, finance, industry and trade. The initial goals of the occupation included military elements, especially demilitarization, as well as economic and political objectives such as, denazification, democratization and decartelization. Consequently, the occupying powers involved themselves heavily in the governance of Germany, intervening in local elections, establishing new political and economic institutions, and moulding the contours of Germany’s new domestic political landscape. Although divisions between the Allies soon led to the division of Germany, each set of occupiers exercised extensive political authority in their own areas of control. As Juan Linz has written of the Allied presence in the western zones, ‘the Allied high command in the western sectors implemented a controlled process of redemocratization defining the rules of the game, the timing of the process, excluding some potential political forces by limiting the number of parties, the Lizenparteien, and giving them a series of advantages which would assure the future strengths of some of them, at the same time that they exercised considerable influence on the constitutional framework, imposing their version of federalism and supporting a particular model of social economic organisation.’ The cumulative effect of such actions in the western zones was to internationalize the political regime, creating a political system in which the core elements of the regime – its personnel, institutions and policies – were constituted in significant part by international as well as domestic actors.
**International administration**

The second form of international intervention is that of international administration, which involves international organizations assuming extensive and intrusive governing roles at the domestic level. In cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, international organizations have sought to address profound domestic challenges by assuming some or all governmental powers in a period of international state-building. International administration is similar to, but distinct from, state-led occupation of territory. While the two forms of intervention share significant commonalities, not least the direct involvement of international actors in domestic political and economic administration, they differ in relation to the nature of the international presence. While military occupation missions are generally state-led, and involve a single state or coalition of states occupying and administering a territory for a period time, international administration operations differ through the involvement and oversight of multilateral international organizations. These missions are not based purely on state action, but are both authorized and overseen by international bodies. This in turn can provide a greater level of accountability and legitimacy to international administrators, although this is not always the case. The UN in particular plays a key role here in establishing, supervising and directing international administration missions, but other international bodies are also involved, such as the Peace Implementation Council that has overseen the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia since 1995. This type of international intervention is not unique to the post-Cold War period, but it experienced a revival in the 1990s and represents one of the most robust forms of intervention by the international community.

The level of international intervention entailed in international administration results in a profound penetration of domestic politics by external actors, and the domestic regimes in which these administration missions take place become heavily

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internationalized. In the three principal cases of international administration in the post-Cold War period – Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor - international administrators took a leading role in political governance and heavily structured the nature of the political regimes.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in order to prepare for East Timor’s independence after nearly twenty-five years of Indonesian occupation, and provide security and humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of widespread violence surrounding the independence referendum in 1999. Authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNTAET was empowered with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and the exercise of all legislative and executive authority, and was mandated to deal with a wide range of security, political and economic issues. Among other long-term goals, Security Council Resolution 1272 mandated the UN administration to ‘support capacity-building for self-government’ and consult and cooperate with the East Timorese people on the ‘development of local democratic institutions’.47 The UNTAET administration acted as East Timor’s government for nearly two years and undertook a wide range of executive decisions in the political sphere, establishing new political institutions, introducing new policies and setting the political agenda. Even after elections in 2001 led to the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution, the UN authorities continued to play a direct role in the governance of East Timor until full independence was achieved and UNTAET was withdrawn in May 2002. The UN administration always acted closely with domestic interlocutors and rarely imposed its decisions against domestic opposition, but it nonetheless wielded extensive political authority and fundamentally shaped the Timorese political system during its tenure.48

Similarly, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was mandated to address a wide range of issues, including some core post-conflict aims
such as troop withdrawal and demilitarization along with a number of explicitly political responsibilities such as promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government.\textsuperscript{49} The position of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) was given particularly strong powers, including full legislative and executive authority within Kosovo.\textsuperscript{50} As the highest civilian official within the UNMIK structure, the SRSG enjoyed full civilian executive authority, and could ‘change, repeal or suspend existing laws’, and had the ‘authority to appoint any person to perform functions in the interim civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, and to remove such persons if their service is found to be incompatible with the mandate and the purposes of the interim civil administration’.\textsuperscript{51} The UNMIK mission, thus, enjoyed extensive authority within Kosovo, and became a key part of its political regime. Although UNMIK established new domestic institutions of self-government, they nonetheless remained subordinate to the UN political structures. The political agenda was carefully limited, and contentious issues such as calls for an independence referendum and a full constitution for Kosovo were rebuffed. Conditionality was used also extensively to extract political concessions from the Kosovo Albanian political leadership and to ensure political development according to UN standards and benchmarks of progress.\textsuperscript{52}

While the operation in Bosnia was not a UN operation, it too entailed extensive executive international authority. The international presence in Bosnia was established on the basis of the Dayton Agreement, a comprehensive peace agreement that covered a wide range of political and military issues. Along with provisions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the return of refugees and economic matters, the agreement included provisions for the establishment of an Office of the High Representative of the international community who would oversee the implementation of the civilian elements of the Dayton agreement.\textsuperscript{53} The lack of progress within Bosnia in the immediate post-Dayton period prompted the international community to reinforce the powers of the
High Representative, giving the holder greater authority to take action in cases of violation of the agreement, or of resistance to international agenda. The new so-called ‘Bonn Powers’ included the authority to enact legislation unilaterally and to appoint or dismiss public officials (including elected representatives), thus enshrining a strong international dimension to Bosnia’s political regime. In subsequent years the Bonn Powers were used extensively and Bosnia’s legislation, institutions and government personnel were all heavily shaped by international officials. Laws and institutions were at times imposed unilaterally by the High Representative, elected and unelected officials were vetted for office and at times dismissed from office, and the political agenda was heavily determined by international rather than domestic priorities.54

In all three cases, the international missions used their powers extensively, and domestic actors were unable to pursue their political objectives without the involvement and oversight of external authorities. Consequently, international actors were in a position to set the political agenda, guide political development and structure the political choices available to national political actors. International veto power was used extensively in Bosnia and Kosovo in relation to legislative proposals by domestic actors, as well as in relation to ministerial appointments in Bosnia. Furthermore, all three cases highlighted the role that international administrators can play in drafting, and at times imposing, critical legislation and key political institutions. In each case, the outcome of such international intervention was the internationalization of the political regime itself.

**Informal empire**

The third setting of internationalized regimes is that of informal empire, where a state becomes subordinate to a major power and cedes much of its domestic authority. David A. Lake has identified two key features that distinguish informal empires from formal empires, in which a state is essentially annexed into a wider imperial power. The first is
that in the case of informal empire, the subordinate state retains its nominal sovereign status – it retains its international legal personality and is still recognized as an independent state in the international system. The second difference is that the subordinate state also retains a nominally independent government, so that some form of political regime remains even if it is dominated, and partially constituted, by an outside power. The clearest recent example of an informal empire is the Soviet control over Eastern European countries during the Cold War, in which Moscow deeply penetrated a range of regimes and strictly controlled their political agendas. The states in Central and Eastern Europe retained their legal sovereign status and their nominally independent domestic governments, but it was ultimately Soviet authority that dominated the political processes within many of their political regimes.

Soviet control of its Eastern European satellite states was exercised through a number of levers, although the use and threat of force were factors common to all cases throughout the period of informal empire. Whatever the wishes of the western Allied powers might have been at the end of the war, not to mention the Eastern Europe states themselves, the presence of the Red Army gave the Soviet Union a de facto authority in the region that trumped any wartime Allied agreements or any considerations of popular consent. This military advantage was complemented with the use of other strategies, some of which were initially pioneered by Stalin within the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. The historian Seton-Watson has identified three stages by which Communist control was established in Eastern Europe. First, anti-Fascist coalitions emerged including both Communist and non-Communist parties, although Soviet authorities helped ensure that Communists attained key positions of power in government. Second, the Communists would begin to target their coalition partners and work to oust them from government, often using the police and judiciary to intimidate, arrest and imprison
key political leaders. Finally, the consolidation of a single party was achieved through political purges and the increasing use of coercive repression.  

By the late 1940s, Soviet-backed governments were established throughout most of Central and Eastern Europe, and the political models of the region came to resemble almost precisely the model that existed in the Soviet Union. New constitutions were based on the Soviet Constitution, where government was dominated by the leading role of the Communist party, which in each country took its cue from the Moscow leadership. Economic planning was centralized and successive Five Year Plans were introduced to align the European economies to the Soviet model of collectivisation and heavy industrial output. Finally, each state developed an intelligence and police service comparable to, and subordinate to, the Soviet security apparatus. In the following years until Stalin’s death in 1953, Central and Eastern Europe was subject to a wave of Stalinist terror that included political purges, show trials, judicial executions and the wholesale transfer of a generation of politicians and intellectuals to prison, exile or forced labour camps. Although the political trajectory in each case was influenced by national particularities, there was an over-arching Moscow-driven strategic objective of Sovietisation that entailed institutional and ideological transfer, cultural regimentation, domestic terror, and foreign policy convergence. During this time, the political regimes within the Soviet Bloc existed in an uneasy state of hybridity, as domestic communist rulers enacted policies in a way that suggested meaningful domestic authority, but did so in a manner that was driven and circumscribed by Soviet authorities based in Moscow (or posted directly to Central and Eastern European capitals) that these political regimes were anything but domestically autonomous.

Even after Stalin’s death, the relaxation of some of the harsher methods of repression did not translate into any meaningful political liberalisation. Once established, the Soviet informal empire in Central and Eastern Europe was maintained through a
range of mechanisms. The threat and use of force was arguably the most important leverage that Moscow exercised in the region, and the early role for the Red Army in the immediate post-war period was supplemented later by the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968 respectively, which both confirmed the continued grip that Moscow held and also helped ensure continued acquiescence throughout the Soviet Bloc. Although political leaders within the satellite states enjoyed greater autonomy from Moscow in domestic affairs, these interventions demonstrated that there was no scope for political development within these regimes that deviated in any meaningful way from the single-party system espoused by Soviet authorities.61 The states of Central and Eastern Europe that had once been fully compliant satellite states were no longer so fully subordinate, but they were not fully autonomous states either, and the Soviet Union continued to set clear boundaries on their political affairs.62

The informal empire in Central and Eastern Europe, thus, gave rise to a set of internationalized regimes that retained sovereign status and national governments, yet were deeply penetrated by Soviet authorities in key areas of domestic politics. Political elites, political rules and political policies were all contingent on Moscow’s approval, and while each of these regimes enjoyed some level of autonomy in governing daily life in their territories, they enjoyed it only at the discretion of a foreign power. These Soviet satellite states were legally independent, but politically subservient, and their political regimes, thus, deviated from conventional type (in this case, totalitarianism) by virtue of their hybrid nature. Politics in these countries was not domestically determined, and as a result they cannot be considered as conventional domestic political regimes.

The arenas of internationalization
In all of these settings, international actors have exercised levels of political authority that go beyond conventional international influence on domestic affairs – in these settings, international actors have partially *constituted* the national level political regime. Political regimes have traditionally been defined with reference to three key domestic factors: the number and type of actors who are allowed to gain access to government power, the methods of access to such positions, and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions.\(^63\) In internationalized regimes, each of these elements of the regime is shaped in important ways by the international presence.

First, the number and type of actors is distinct in internationalized regimes. Alongside the pre-existing set of domestic elites, a new set of international elites is added that increases the ranks of the political landscape. More important than the number of elites, however, is the identity of these elites. International actors are inherently different from domestic actors, even if carrying out apparently similar functions. As Killick has highlighted with reference to international aid provision, international and domestic authorities retain separate identities and interests for several reasons. First, they have different histories and political origins, which can lead outside actors to apply ahistorical models without regard to important domestic historical legacies. Second, the constituencies they need to satisfy are also separate, with domestic actors having to address the demands of local electorates, while international authorities are often accountable to their own constituents, or in the case of international organisations, to individual member states that in turn have their own domestic electorates to consider. Finally, international actors do not have to live with the long-term consequences of their actions, and thus frequently have different views regarding the risk and desirability of political change.\(^64\) These considerations suggest that the nature of political leadership is quite distinct in the context of internationalized regimes than it is from conventional regime types.
The second distinct element of internationalized regimes concerns the methods used for accessing political power. In conventional domestic regimes, these methods depend on the openness of the political system. In democracies, power is accessed through free and fair elections, and there is direct public involvement in the selection and replacement of political elites. In non-democracies, leaders are generally chosen by the military or a single ruling party and in some cases by hereditary secession rather than by considered selection.

**Table 2: Types of Political Regime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Types</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number and Type of Actors Allowed Access to Power</th>
<th>Methods of Access to Power</th>
<th>Rules for Making Publicly Binding Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Many Actors: Leaders of multiple political parties</td>
<td>Regular free and fair elections</td>
<td>Checks and Balances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Few Actors: Leaders of military and business elite</td>
<td>Decisions within military</td>
<td>Bounded arbitrariness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>One Actor: leader of single party</td>
<td>Decisions within single party</td>
<td>Unbounded arbitrariness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalized</td>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic and international actors</td>
<td>Decisions of foreign states or international organizations</td>
<td>Bounded arbitrariness: Some legal restrictions but not always followed. Few checks and balance on international power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of internationalized regimes, however, a significant element of domestic power is held by those who are selected by non-national bodies. A critical feature of most internationalized regimes is that executive authority is held by elites who are international appointees – they are usually non-nationals, selected and deployed by
foreign states or international organizations rather than being elected or selected by domestic constituencies. In cases of international occupation, occupying states usually appoint one of their own senior officials to act as an authority figure at the domestic level. For example, the US appointed General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in post-war Japan, and appointed Ambassador Paul Bremer as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2003. In the case of international administration of territory, the most senior international appointees are usually distinguished diplomats from countries other than the administered territory. For example, the UN has appointed senior civil administrators in both East Timor and Kosovo in the role of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. Other international organizations have played similar roles in appointing influential international officials. The European Union has deployed authoritative international actors in Kosovo through its EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and the powerful High Representative in Bosnia is appointed by the Peace Implementation Council, an ad hoc international body created after the Dayton Agreement was signed in 1995. Only in the setting of informal empire is direct appointment of non-nationals eschewed in favour of outside control over an indigenous and subservient government. In such contexts, the intervening power relies instead on compliance and collaboration from proxy authorities. The government in the subordinate regime may be legally independent, but the reality of political control from outside ensures that its decisions are not entirely its own and that the regime is internationalized rather than truly domestic.66

Finally, the third element of a regime that is distinctive in these settings is the body of rules that govern the making of publicly binding decisions. Here, the conventional distinction in the literature has concerned the balance between the arbitrary use of power and the establishment of constitutional restraints on political decision-making.67 In democratic regimes, a system of checks and balances exists to ensure that decision-
making is routinized and takes place within certain constraints. Executives are accountable to legislatures, decisions are often subject to some form of judicial review, and political leaders are, thus, restricted in the extent to which they can use their power for their own ends. In contrast, non-democratic regimes usually involve much lower levels of constitutional restraint, and political leaders are much freer to use their authority as they see fit. This can range from quite routine and stable decision-making in some forms of authoritarian rule such as military regimes to highly arbitrary forms of decision-making in totalitarian or personalistic regimes.

In internationalized regimes, external actors are sometimes subject to certain restraints but they are also often able to make binding decisions in ways usually not available in most democratic regimes. In settings of informal empire, international actors are usually free from significant restrictions on their actions as their authority is based on their surplus of power over the subordinate state. In settings of occupation and administration, restraints exist that are designed to curb international behaviour, but that frequently fail to do so. These restraints include the role of international law in the case of international occupation, as well as authorizing mandates in the case of international administration. Under international law, occupying powers are restricted from significantly altering domestic conditions and are obliged to maintain the status quo rather than undertake wholesale changes in political structures and government. International administration missions are also usually established through a mandate that has legal force and that identifies their legal authority and political objectives. These mandates, thus, set out what the international officials can and cannot do, and range from being relatively restrictive to being robust in their allocation of wide-ranging powers to external administrators.

In theory, therefore, international officials in these settings have clearly demarcated roles and are subjected to fixed limits on their decision-making abilities. In practice,
however, there is often a high degree of flexibility in their use of power, and these external elites can often act without significant constraints. Many occupation missions have simply ignored their legal obligations and pursued explicit and ambitious transformative agendas. Occupations in Germany, Japan and Iraq have had explicit and ambitious political goals that entailed major alterations to domestic political systems. Similarly, some international administration missions have assumed powers that have not been expressly granted to them. The clearest example is the High Representative in Bosnia, which was a post initially, established in 1995 to co-ordinate the international civilian missions created in the Dayton Accords. However, in the early post-Dayton years political progress lagged badly behind international expectations, and the High Representative gained approval from the Peace Implementation Council for a re-interpretation of its authority to include the power to enact legislation and dismiss local elected and administrative officials. The resulting ‘Bonn Powers’ fundamentally changed the nature of the international mission, and provided it with a level of authority that had not been approved by any of the national political parties. Subsequent High Representatives used these assumed powers regularly, enacting large volumes of legislation and dismissing several high profile elected politicians.

In internationalized regimes, therefore, the rules for making publicly binding decisions are either entirely lacking, or are limited in their restrictive powers. Where such rules exist, they are easily bypassed and international elites rarely subject themselves to the kinds of checks and balances usually associated with democratic political systems. Politics in these settings is, thus, different from politics in conventional domestic contexts. International and domestic actors coexist, and political outcomes are the results of their interaction on the national stage. These regimes can vary in their degree of political competitiveness and openness, and also in the degree to which political outcomes are determined by outside actors. But they all share the feature that
international actors play such a central role in domestic politics that they cease to be purely democratic regimes – external actors help constitute the political system in each of its core arenas, and these regimes are internationalized as a result.

**Conclusion: The implications of internationalization**

Scholarship to date has used domestic criteria to distinguish between different forms of domestic political regime.\(^7\) This is hardly a surprise, as the very concept of a political regime has been widely understood to refer to a domestic-level political system. Yet while the resulting regime typologies cover most cases in the world, they do not cover all. Recent events in places as geographically and politically diverse as Iraq, Bosnia and East Timor show how international forces can alter the nature of national regimes and in the process internationalize them into new forms. Such internationalized regimes are distinct because they reflect a dimension of hybridity that has so far been overlooked. The hybrid regimes identified in recent research are hybrid due to their combination of domestic elements usually found in distinct regime types – they share aspects of democratic and non-democratic politics. Internationalized regimes, however, reflect a separate dimension of hybridity that entails the combination of usually distinct national and international level politics. In these settings, international actors play such an extensive role in national politics that the regime essentially ceases to be purely domestic.

Internationalized regimes are not widespread, but they are important cases and deserve focused attention. They have emerged at regular intervals, and recent years have seen a spike in international efforts to shape the domestic affairs of others through intrusive and prolonged intervention. Such efforts not only influence the lives of those who live within these political systems, but also tell us about the potential for, and
implications of, international influence over domestic politics. The utility of identifying and exploring a set of internationalized regimes, thus, derives not just from the ability to amend existing typologies and classify cases accordingly, but also from the potential it provides for theory building. Typologies of regime types have been helpful for advancing theory as well as developing concepts and classifying cases, and regime type has been associated with a number of political outcomes. Brownlee, for example, has pointed to the independent explanatory power of regime types, and especially hybrid regimes, in accounting for the likelihood of successful democratization. Hadenius and Teorell have also highlighted the relationship between regime type on one hand and regime duration and transition on the other. In particular, they demonstrate that different regimes are associated with different patterns of regime duration, and that different types of authoritarian regime are also likely to give rise to different regime transition outcomes.

The separate implications of different regime types are the result of their distinct characteristics, such as their organizational structures, the extent of their experience of elections, and the incentives they entail for political leaders. In particular, much of the explanatory power ascribed to regime types concerns the nature of political leadership within the regime and the incentives that these leaders have to retain, or possibly relinquish, political power. The relatively short duration of military regimes, for example, is seen to be the result of the military’s ability to secure a role for itself after leaving power – militaries have different incentives about the maintenance of power from the leaders of one-party regimes and personalist dictatorships, who view regime change as a much greater existential threat.

It follows, therefore, that the incentive structures within internationalized regimes will also have implications for the duration and trajectory of these political systems. Moreover, as the political elites in these systems include international as well as domestic actors, it also follows that the set of incentives and leadership dynamics in
internationalized regimes will be distinct from those in more conventional cases, and may therefore have different implications for regime outcomes. In order to understand these separate dynamics, it is necessary to take the incentives structures and organizational structures of international regimes into account, and to consider the different roles that both states and international organization play in shaping regime development. In these settings, both regime duration and transition trajectories will partly be a function of the identity, ideological outlook and organizational structure of the international authority that has internationalized the regime in question. Consequently, some internationalized regimes may have quite different future prospects than other more conventional cases due to the international presence. In the same way that militaries have different incentives from dominant political parties, so too might states have different incentives from international organizations, and democracy promoting interveners have different incentives from democracy suppressing interveners. The Soviet interference in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, was significantly motivated by a view in Moscow that liberalization in the Soviet Bloc would be a political threat to one party rule within the Soviet Union itself. The incentives within Moscow therefore led to policies that ensured a lengthy internationalization of the satellite states, in contrast with far shorter periods of internationalization in cases where the international interveners have been democratic states which have not had the same kind of incentive to resist the emergence of autonomous and democratic political regimes. Further research is required to establish and test the full range of implications of internationalization of political regimes, and in particular their effects on regime duration and transition prospects. The concept of internationalized regimes may not only help in conceptualizing and classifying the disparate array of political systems in the world, but may also have use in theorizing about the crucial relationship between regime type and regime trajectories.
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ESI. ‘Reshaping International Priorities In Bosnia And Herzegovina - Part II: International Power In Bosnia’, March 1, 2000


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11 Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*; Burnell *Democracy Assistance*.
13 Starr ‘Democratic Dominoes’.
16 Exploring the international dimensions of domestic regime types is not entirely novel. For example, David Collier and Steven Levitsky identify some diminished subtypes where the weakened element of democracy derives from a breach of national sovereignty by international actors. Yet to date, there has been no systematic analysis of such regimes as a distinct form of regime type. See Collier and Levitsky, *Democracy With Adjectives*.
18 Fazal, *State Death*.
19 Keohane and Milner, *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*.
21 Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*.
22 For the sake of simplicity, the table only considers the dichotomy of democratic or authoritarian domestic regimes. In theory, this table could include a fourth row to take into account ‘pure international’ political regimes. However, if a domestic political regime becomes
entirely internationalized, it is tantamount to annexation and the regime essentially ceases to exist. Consequently, the category has been omitted.

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25 Morlino, ‘Are There Hybrid Regimes?’

26 Hadenius and Teorell, ‘Pathways to Democracy’. A similar approach is taken in Geddes, ‘What Do We Know About Democratization’.

27 For the data used by Hadenius and Teorell to achieve their findings, see the longer unpublished version of their article, ‘Authoritarian Regimes’.

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42 While the political system in the western zones would later become the basis for the independent and autonomous Federal Republic of Germany, the zone occupied by the Soviet Union transformed into a separate form of internationalized regime under different type of control from Moscow. This type of ‘informal empire’ is discussed separately.

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70 Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation.
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73 See ESI, ‘Reshaping International Priorities’; Tansey, Regime-Building, Chapter 5.
74 See footnotes 4 and 5.
75 Geddes, ‘What Do We Know About Democratization?’
76 Brownlee, ‘Portents of pluralism’.
77 Hadenius and Teorell, ‘Pathways to Democracy’.
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