The Gemini News Service

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Abstract

This thesis explores the role of ‘alternative’ international journalism – broadly conceived – in geopolitics. Theoretically anchored in the typically poststructuralist and discourse-focussed subdiscipline of critical geopolitics, and drawing on literature from journalism and media studies, it is concerned with journalistic constructions of the Global South during the latter half of the twentieth century.

Its central case study is the Gemini News Service, an ‘alternative’ news features agency, active 1967-2002, which focussed on providing news coverage of and for the Global South and, crucially, having journalists in the Global South report about the places they were from. The agency was opposed to the superficial, conflict-laden ‘parachute’ reporting of the hegemonic, Western-controlled global media and sought to utilise its large network of freelance journalists to provide more, ‘better’, ‘fuller’ and ‘richer’ accounts of the newly-postcolonial world. It supplied analytical, long-form articles to more than 100 subscribing newspapers; combining the readership of these titles, Gemini advertised that it had a daily audience of ‘millions’ for its journalistic content.

This thesis will argue that these dispatches were, in many senses, an alternative to the geopolitical renderings of the hegemonic global news media. Gemini’s popular geopolitical discourses actively rejected the notion of a world characterised by a binary superpower rivalry, insisting, instead, that it was the attainment of independence and the fights for more equitable and just forms of global governance by scores of states, new on the international scene, that defined the geopolitics of this era.

The thesis asks questions of Gemini’s alterity and concludes that while the agency may have been considered ‘radical’ in many traditional journalistic circles, there were numerous practical, conceptual and cultural constraints that prevented it from producing a popular journalistic geopolitics that was counterhegemonic or decolonising.

This thesis, then, considers Gemini’s articles to be significant producers, for a wide international readership, of geopolitical ‘knowledge’ about the decolonising and newly-postcolonial world. It contends that critical engagement with popular geopolitics has largely ignored such ostensibly ‘alternative’ ways of
‘knowing’ and representing the world and seeks, therefore, to unearth and highlight these overlooked means by which a large number of people – predominantly in the Global South – gained a mediated experience of geopolitics and an understanding of their place within it.

It contends, though, that in thinking about the (de)colonisation of popular journalistic ‘knowledge’ it is crucial to also consider the subject of journalism itself, as a practice, ideology, profession and set of texts with distinct philological characteristics. It argues that Gemini, alongside a host of other actors who have sought to intervene on this issue, have thought about the decolonisation of the popular news media solely in terms of representation: the felicitous representation of (formerly) colonised peoples in the pages of newspapers and the representation of people of colour on the staff of journalistic outlets. In addressing the colonisation of journalism, we also need to consider how the international journalistic field is characterised by professional ideologies, norms and practices particular to Western historical, political and social contexts, yet widely assumed to be universally applicable. We need to consider the particular (racialised, classed and gendered) cultures, hierarchies and political economies of journalism, all of which significantly influence the nature of journalistic ‘knowledge’ production.

In addition, then, to textual analysis of Gemini’s popular journalistic material, the thesis investigates the extent to which ostensibly ‘alternative’, Global South-oriented journalistic institutions engaged in alternative journalistic practices and adopted alternative ways of ‘knowing’ and representing global space and global politics. This helps us to understand not only how – by various discursive and rhetorical means – these outlets constructed geopolitical space, but also why they produced geopolitics as they did; in Gemini’s case, constructing a sparsely-populated, masculinist vision of global politics, in which all but the state and the state’s political elite were rendered invisible and denied any meaningful agency.

It is hoped that this focus on how the decolonisation of journalism has been constrained by widespread notions of Western epistemological supremacy in the journalistic field, common journalistic conventions, and the culture of professional journalism will prove useful for ongoing, and much needed, attempts to decolonise the news media.
This thesis also demonstrates the fruitfulness for critical geopolitics of considering carefully the (material, cultural, practical and ideological) historical geographies of popular media production. It makes the case for the importance of engaging, in tandem, with journalistic geopolitics – the discursive construction of global political space by the professional news media – and with the geopolitics of journalism – the spatio-political factors that shape journalistic production and consumption – and proposes that a distinct, and methodologically and conceptually pluralistic, stream of scholarship within critical geopolitics, formed to further such research, could bear fruit.
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1. **Introduction: Motivations and Contextualisation**

1.1. **Motivations**

This thesis explores the role of journalistic texts, journalists and journalism more broadly in the construction of popular geopolitical knowledge during the latter half of the twentieth century. My engagement with this subject originated around 2011 when I was busy putting together an application for what sounded, to me, like just about the most exciting MA course offered by a British university. Bournemouth University’s MA in International Journalism promised “a rich learning experience of international appeal” and the opportunity to “acquire a solid grounding in news reporting (including a professional placement in a news organisation) as well as a deep understanding of the issues confronting journalism in different local, national and international domains” (Bournemouth University, 2012). Happily, I was accepted. My classmates came from all over Europe, Africa and Asia and we were all enthused by the prospect of being able to pursue a career witnessing, investigating and reporting on the events shaping our world.

We undertook modules on ‘reporting skills’, in which we learned how to find a story, how to track down sources, how to assess newsworthiness, how to write using the ‘inverted pyramid’ structure, and how to abide by journalism’s governing principles of detached, impartial and objective reporting. In ‘Convergence Journalism’, we learned about working in international, online environments, reporting for a global audience. We took a module on ‘Environment, Conflict and Crisis News’, which provided “insights into the ways in which journalists report such news, the constraints they work under, and the potential influence their reportage could have on the crisis concerned” (Bournemouth University, 2012). This included a ‘hostile environment training’ weekend, in which the Somerset levels doubled for a distant warzone. This simulated conflict area was complete with mine fields, smoke grenades and
balaclava-wearing men in land rovers who attempted to ‘kidnap’ us as we met with our journalistic ‘sources’.

We had, then, through these kinds of activities, as well as more conventional instruction, impressed upon us notions of the nobility, bravery and gravitas of the journalistic profession. We were reminded of the importance of the journalist-intermediary role, of our responsibilities in writing a ‘first draft of history’, and of the part that our writing – ‘objective’, truthful and factual – would play in helping audiences make sense of the world and, crucially, their place within it.

While most of my colleagues opted to undertake a final, practical journalism project – inspired by the exploits of the many distinguished reporters who came to speak to us – I chose to write a dissertation looking at the reportage and reporting conventions employed during the then contemporaneous ‘Arab spring’ uprisings. It was the subject of journalism with which I was becoming increasingly interested, and the impacts of its application in the wider world.

I witnessed many of those impacts as my classmates took the journalistic principals, ideals and rules that they had learned on the south coast of England and applied them in the Indian daily papers, the Turkish broadcasters and the various international magazines with whom they found employment. That high-tech newsroom/classroom in Bournemouth, and countless others like it around the world, seemed, to me, to be a crucial part of the world’s popular sense-making infrastructure. The ‘whys’, ‘hows’ and ‘what-fors’ of professional journalism that were learned in that room were actively shaping the type and nature of the accounts of our world that were being read, watched or listened to in a whole range of geographically disparate locations.

I felt that I had witnessed two important phenomena. First, it seemed that the very existence of this MA in international journalism was a manifestation of a globalised journalism profession. Wherever in the world its students were from, this model of ‘objective’, ‘watchdog’, ‘fourth estate’ journalism was taught as the ideal. It was intrinsically linked to the functioning of ‘modern’, liberal democracy and, as such, was ostensibly a stalwart against tyranny and a preserver of individual liberties. I became curious about how and why these ideas came to occupy this exalted position.
The second phenomena that I seemed to be witnessing, was this long-standing journalistic paradigm at the point of precipice. The world of journalism academia was concerning itself with the potentially imminent disintegration or displacing of this largely assumed-to-be-universally-applicable journalistic paradigm. We were asked to critically consider the ramifications of declining print sales, fracturing broadcast markets, and the rise of social media and the ‘citizen journalist’. What happens when news editors are no longer able to curate the most newsworthy topics for their readers? What happens when everyone gets their news from untrained peers? How are governments to be properly held to account when news organisations do not have the resources for investigative journalism? How are citizens to make informed democratic decisions without the provision of ‘quality’ news?

My engagement with journalism appeared to be occurring around or near to the closing of a particular journalistic epoch. Wherever we decide, ultimately, to locate that end date, it seems that we will likely be able to look back at a relatively distinct period of history characterised in no small part by the dominance of a hierarchical, centrally-produced, professionalised, and largely globalised mass media. This period saw a still relatively small band of professional journalists and journalistic outlets put into a highly privileged position; what they wrote was distributed to a wide, often global, audience and was typically amongst only a handful of competing information sources. The significance of this position was impressed upon us as students; the impacts, at a global and geopolitical level, of those in that influential position, and of their work, surely, I thought, deserved further investigation.

This, in part, is what I hoped to explore when I settled on pursuing further postgraduate study. In addition, and perhaps more saliently, I hoped to investigate journalism as a historically distinct phenomenon, as a globalised professional practice, as a particular culture, and as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1975). It was the discourses and culture in which I was ensconced, while I was in that training room, that came to interest me the most. How was the subject of ‘journalism’ constructed? How was the role of the journalist, and the journalist’s responsibilities and duties, represented? What were the personal attributes that were prioritised? And how was a ‘liberal’ normative model of journalism produced as a universally-applicable paradigm?
The question I became increasingly interested in, though, was ‘what about all the stuff that happens before a journalist puts pen to paper?’ In the era of centralised, hierarchical mass media, in which only a handful of sources dominated the global dissemination of popular factual information about our world, what were the key practical, cultural, ideological and discursive factors that shaped how, for what purpose, and by whom those peoples and places were popularly constructed?

1.2. The Information Revolution

Media historian Irving Fang (1997) locates the emergence of this era of globalised mass media at the mid-point of the twentieth century. Fang (ibid) argues that a collection of largely concurrent technological and social developments led to an ‘information revolution’. A central facet of this information revolution was the creation of what he calls “the Communication Toolshed Home” (ibid). This mid-twentieth century occurrence “transform[ed] the home into the central location for receiving information and entertainment, thanks to the telephone, broadcasting, recording, improvements in print technologies, and cheap, universal mail services” (ibid, p.xvii). This means, according to Fang (ibid), that we now live in a word in which “the media of communication have become inseparable from our lives.” While the image conjured of a mid-to-late-twentieth century home packed with telephones, televisions and VCR devices is not necessarily representative of broader experience outside of Western contexts, it would be incorrect to assume that the revolutions that took place in both production and delivery of media content were not of global relevance.

As has recently been focussed upon by scholars of critical geopolitics, radio, during this period, particularly in the Global South, became an increasingly important part of the global media ecology (see Pinkerton, 2007, 2013a; Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009). Boosts to the power of radio transmitters and the use, principally by transnational broadcasters, of relay stations meant that radio content could reach ever-growing audiences (Wood, 2000). The size of this potential audience was also aided, in no small part, by the transistor radio. In 1954, the first commercially available transistor radio, powered by just
one small battery, became available. Over the course of the subsequent decades, an estimated seven billion of these little radios were manufactured worldwide (Skrabec, 2012, p.197), becoming a near-ubiquitous presence in many parts of the Global South (see Ziegler and Kete Asante, 1992).

In the print media, the decades after the Second World War saw modernised printing equipment become more readily available to newspapers in both the Global North and South. Cheaper, simpler and more efficient offset lithography replaced letterpress printing with moveable type (Fang, 1997). A 1962 UNESCO study explored some of the results of this, and other developments, by looking at the consumption of newsprint – the thin paper on which newspapers are printed – per capita. Between 1950 and 1961 most ‘developing’ countries saw an increase in consumption; in India the increase was 200%; Nigeria’s increase was 300%; in Ghana it was 400%; and the figure in Burma was 500% (cited in Schramm, 1964, p.109). Global newsprint consumption rose from 7.5 million tonnes in 1948 (Schramm, 1964, p.108) to 32.5 million tonnes in 1988 (Lintu, 1991). In filling these extra pages, journalists were aided by leaps in communications technology, meaning they could get more news about more places more quickly than ever before (see Fang, 1997). New roads, aviation and railways meant that newspapers could be distributed to far more places and to far more people (ibid). Furthermore, potential readership increased hugely as a result of big rises in global literacy levels; OECD figures put the worldwide literacy rate at 36% in 1950 and 81% in 2000 (van Zanden et al., 2014).

In this period, more news of global events – as well as commentary, analysis and interpretation of those events – was brought into the lives of more people than ever before. Many would argue that this mid-to-late-twentieth century journalistic paradigm either has now been replaced or is in the process of being replaced by the subsequent information revolutions of democratised communications and citizen media (see Allan and Thorsen, 2009).

1.3. The Geopolitical Revolution

This age of the professionalised and centralised (as opposed to user-produced) mass media also coincided with a period of major international reordering. The
UN estimates that at its birth in 1945, 750 million people, just under one third of the world’s population, lived under various forms of colonialism (Baehr and Gordenker, 2016). In 1990, after Namibia gained its independence, that figure had reduced massively to two million people, spread across 18 territories (ibid); with the substantial increase in the global population, that number represents just a fraction of one per cent of the world’s population. Within the United Nations, member states who had formerly been colonised became the majority (ibid).

With this monumental reformulation of the international landscape, these countries, new on the global and diplomatic scene, began to fight for often radical forms of more equitable political and economic global governance (see Prashad, 2007). Ruth Craggs (2014, p.39) has recently called for political geographers to “look more carefully” at precisely this period. For many, this is an era of unbridled disappointment in which concerted pushes for radical geopolitical reorganisation were eclipsed by the prevailing march of neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism (see Cooper, 2012; Fahnbulleh, 2006). Craggs (2014, p.40), however, asks us to keep in mind that this was a time in which, “a whole range of practices” aimed at producing a radically restructured, fairer and more just international system “were invested with substantial value… and still have legacies in the present”.

A key example of these practices can be seen in the diplomatic sphere and the work of institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 and UNCTAD. Prashad (2007, p.276) argues that in the decades following decolonisation, such interventions helped to transform “The hope of the anticolonial era… into an agenda”. This agenda operationalised “Popular demands for land, bread, and peace” (ibid, p.xvii); “the Third World agenda bore these beliefs from localities to national capitals and onward to the world stage. The institutions of the Third World amassed these ideas and nailed them to the doors of powerful buildings” (ibid).

Visibility, primarily through the global media, was an essential component of these organisations’ work. When Jawaharlal Nehru was asked what the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung was likely to actually ‘do’, he replied that the divergent policies and outlooks of the participants made that difficult to say, although, “the mere fact of its meeting is important… [a]s the
sign and symbol of… the emergence of Asia” (cited in Dinkel, 2014, p.208). The New York Times’ correspondent at the 1961 Non-Aligned leaders’ conference in Belgrade described the event as “a paradise for cameramen” (Hofmann, 1961), such was the abundance of pageantry, staging and photo opportunities. At such conferences in subsequent decades, organisers went to great lengths to attract the world’s press, to accommodate them and to provide them with the resources they required in order to report on the event (see Dinkel, 2014; Sanger, 1979).

These meetings were displays of independence, sovereignty and legitimacy intended for both international and domestic media audiences. Outside of meetings and conferences, the media remained a significant part of the ‘Third World agenda’. From the early 1970s, actors within the NAM and UNESCO began to campaign for the media to be decolonised (see Frau-Meigs et al., 2012). Their chief complaint was that the international news media was dominated by just a handful of very large press agencies – Reuters, AP and AFP – based in Britain and the USA, who reported on the world from a particular Western perspective; this perspective either ignored the Global South or produced accounts that were ill-informed and often characterised the South using tropes and stereotypes of incivility, backwardness, tribal aggression and helplessness (Frau-Meigs et al., 2012; ICSCP, 1980).

In 1981, UNESCO’s International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems published a report calling for the transfer of socio-technological capacity in media production and dissemination from North to South (ICSCP, 1980). Even though the proposals were significantly watered down before they were published (Alleyne, 1995), they were enough to push the US into leaving UNESCO, citing what it saw as “hostility toward the… free press” (cited in the New York Times, 1983).

What we see, then, in these two concurrent revolutions – informational and geopolitical – is the former becoming increasingly entwined in and integral to the latter. We see what some call ‘media logics’ (see Hjarvard, 2008) becoming embedded in the practical application of geopolitics; being seen and being seen in the right light on the world stage provided by the mass media became arguably as important for some international leaders as the diplomacy conducted behind closed doors. We also see that as the significance of media
representations and messages became increasingly apparent, many actors in the Global South mounted campaigns intended to increase their influence and control over global media content. Many in the Global North were very much opposed to any such relocation of mass media production and worked to counter it.

1.4. Researching ‘Alternative’ News Media in the Immediate Postcolonial Era

Given the confluence of these two revolutions – in both the world’s geopolitical structuring and our means of representing and ‘knowing’ the world – this thesis contends that it is important to do more to reflect this convergence in our conceptualisation of the period and its geopolitics. The thesis looks at ostensibly ‘alternative’ international journalism, utilising a case study of the Gemini News Service. Gemini was established explicitly to challenge the perspective of the hegemonic international press agencies and to counter their deficiencies, as perceived by its proprietor. The perception of Gemini, particularly amongst journalism professionals in London, was that it existed outside of the journalistic ‘mainstream’ (see Keeble, 1998). This view was reinforced by Gemini’s signature, and often trumpeted, policy of, whenever possible, having ‘local’ journalists write about the places they were from (see Gemini, 2001; Ingram, 1965, 1971a, 1983, 1999; Keeble, 1998; Pulford, 1983a, 1983b).

Focussing on such an outlet enables this thesis to make three primary contributions to our understanding of the global news media in relation to decolonisation and postcolonial geopolitics. Firstly, emanating from media studies, international organisations and international advocacy groups, there exist copious amounts of literature dealing with the content of the handful of big, mainstream, hegemonic press agencies – AP, AFP and Reuters – who dominated the global print media ecology during this period (see Wilke, 1987). On the whole, these reports criticise the agencies for ignoring the Global South and for the low quality of reporting exhibited on the occasions when they did focus their attention there (ibid). While none of these studies claimed to have surveyed the entirety of the global media, the sheer volume of this critique
painted a picture of a global news media which was singular in nature. This thesis, by focussing on ostensibly ‘alternative’ actors, seeks to undo any notions of a monolithic international media during the latter half of the twentieth century. It is, then, in part, an archaeological project, seeking to unearth overlooked and potentially ‘alternative’ popular journalistic constructions of geopolitics and global space.

Secondly, these ‘alternative’ outlets were sites of similarly overlooked and poorly conceptualised forms of geopolitical agency. As Alasdair Pinkerton (2013b, p.446) has recently noted, journalists, in a geopolitical context, often “defy[ ] straightforward and discrete definition”. Pinkerton (ibid) cites many examples of journalists who have been able to meander through and often operate within the seats of (traditionally conceived) geopolitical power, which, he suggests, is “suggestive of a latent journalistic agency”. In the immediate postcolonial era, many of the new leaders of independent countries had studied at elite Western universities, giving them opportunities to meet the young men (overwhelmingly) who would go on to staff the institutions of the global media (Perraton, 2014). Their anticolonial struggles also often brought them into collaboration with journalists working on ‘radical’ and ‘alternative’ publications opposed to colonialism (see Barton, 1969, 1979; Worsley, 1989). When in power, many of these leaders were keen to court the media, particularly the sympathetic parts of the media. ‘Alternative’ Western journalists, then, often had close personal friendships and working relationships with the new figures on the international scene; they would dine and travel together, share advice and correspond on personal and policy matters, and work in partnership on certain projects (see Grundy, 2008; Ingram, 2009, 1960a; Sanger, 1979). This thesis, using the Gemini case study, moves us beyond representation, considering, also, journalists – key producers of popular geopolitical representations – as fleshy, embodied presences around, and informal participants in, the practical business of statecraft.

The more quotidian and everyday activities within news agencies make up the third primary contribution of this thesis. With the majority of their journalistic attention focussing on the Global South, although operationally located in the Global North (London in Gemini’s case), Gemini, its peers and competitors were key sites of postcolonial interaction and encounter at multiple
scales. Amongst the matrix of interactions there were those between journalists in the Global South and in the Global North, between fellow journalists in the South, between journalists and the people on whom they were reporting, and, ultimately, the interaction between reader and writer. This thesis focuses on these locations as settings in which new postcolonial political identities were formulated, practiced, performed and, ultimately, transposed onto the page. It demonstrates that the inner workings of these institutions – their hierarchies, gendered and racialised professional cultures and practices – are an important part of understanding the construction of popular postcolonial journalistic imaginaries of geopolitics, particularly in regard to many ‘alternative’ news outlets’ limited ability to produce counterhegemonic and decolonising journalism,

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to bring journalism – the profession, professional culture, practice, ideology and distinct set of historically, geographically and politically contingent representational conventions – as an object of inquiry to the attention of critical geopolitics, and to ask questions about the extent to which we can consider geopolitical events and developments, since the mid-twentieth-century information revolution, independently of the nature of their popular journalistic mediation.

The thesis engages with multiple distinct aspects of journalism and journalistic production, taking each aspect in turn. It is, therefore, structured thematically rather than chronologically. The empirical section begins with a quantitative analysis of the sort that has been commonplace within media and journalism studies for more than 50 years but has never been embraced by critical geopolitics; it then moves on to the sort of discursive analysis that has long been a staple of critical geopolitics, before turning to look at elements that are increasingly being recognised as important facets of critical geopolitics – the material and the ‘non-representative’ – in this case, the fleshy, embodied and practical elements of international journalistic production. It explores the practices by which journalistic representations of geopolitics came into being, and the social, cultural and interpersonal contexts of their creation. Each of the empirical chapters (Chapters 4-7), is introduced and contextualised in the next chapter, which outlines pertinent methodological and conceptual developments within an overview of relevant literature.
2. Journalism and Popular Geopolitical ‘Knowledge’ Production: Theoretical and Empirical Insights

2.1. Introduction

Journalism is the sense-making practice of modernity (the condition) and populariser of modernism (the ideology); it is a product and promoter of modern life, and is unknown in traditional societies... [C]ontemporary politics is unthinkable without it, as is contemporary consumer society, to such an extent that in the end it is difficult to decide whether journalism is a product of modernity, or modernity a product of journalism.

(Hartley, 1996, pp.33-34, original emphasis)

Journalism is a distinct historical phenomenon. The suggestion, however, that the development of journalism literally ushered in the era of modernity, as culture and media scholar John Hartley (ibid) proposes might be the case, is a position which could prove difficult to sustain empirically. Nonetheless, as a rhetorical tactic intended to foster greater critical engagement with the subject of journalism – as a profession, practice, ideology or set of texts with distinct characteristics – as well as its substantial historical, political, social and cultural significance, it has clear utility.

The sizeable impact of journalism and journalistic technologies on public and political life has, of course, been explored by noted scholars such as Jürgen Habermas (1989) and Benedict Anderson (1991). Habermas (1989) charts the transformation of monarchical and feudal cultures into bourgeois, liberal, constitutional societies that distinguished between public and private spheres. The key facet of this new ‘public sphere’ was that it engaged in rational and critical political debate, giving rise to the phenomenon of ‘public opinion’ (ibid). This transformation, according to Habermas (ibid), was enabled, in large part, by seventeenth and eighteenth century developments in journalistic technologies and practices in Europe that saw increasing newspaper production, dissemination and readership.
Benedict Anderson (1991) views these developments, and in particular the commercialisation of journalistic enterprises, as key, not necessarily to the formation of a field of critical, rational debate, but to the coalescence of thought around the notion of nations and the nation state. A nation, according to Anderson (ibid, pp.6-7), “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” By the end of the eighteenth century, newspapers, although still read mainly by educated elites, had “made it possible for growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways”, imagining themselves and numerous unknown others as members of a distinct national ‘community’ (ibid, p.36).

Such thinking, of course, has profound implications for the study of political geography and geopolitics. It prioritises thought, discourse, imagination and language in the politics of global space above what were previously assumed to be the a priori material ‘facts’ of a realist international system and global order. This chapter, then, in the first of two distinct sections, starts by exploring the literature of critical geopolitics, a discipline that has sought to engage with these questions of how language, discourse and representations influence or shape ‘knowledge’ of global space and, in turn, the effect that this has upon the administration and governance of that space. It charts the development of a discipline that has, in large part, turned away from the elite texts of geopolitics and towards popular culture, popular texts and, sporadically, popular journalistic texts, to further aid its understanding of how global politics is ‘known’ and ‘understood’.

In doing so, it proposes that the platform constructed by scholars working in this area could be usefully built upon by expanding our focus beyond the discursive construction of geopolitical space in a given text by rhetorical and representational means, to also consider the professional, cultural, practical, ideological and interpersonal contexts of that text’s creation, dissemination or reception. It charts the contributions to the critical study of geopolitics from feminist and postcolonial theorists, as well as adherents of non-representational theory, that can help us widen this often all too narrow scope of enquiry by reconsidering which sources are deemed to be relevant
containers of geopolitical ‘knowledge’ and by examining the gendered, racialized and imperial, as well as the practical, nature of popular geopolitical ‘knowledge’ production and experience.

The second of this chapter’s two sections moves on to consider critical geopolitics’ engagement with journalism and the establishment of journalism as a legitimate subject of inquiry within the academy. It argues that this engagement with journalism has been somewhat nebulous and intermittent; as arguably the premier means by which we gain ‘knowledge’ and understanding of our world and its politics, this is problematic. It reviews pertinent literature from journalism and media studies, which provides useful theoretical and empirical insights for critical geopolitics’ engagement in this area. It warns, though, that a great deal of journalism scholarship, since the establishment of the field in the US after the Second World War, has persisted with universalising assumptions about the ‘modernising’, ‘liberating’ and ‘emancipatory’ capacity of ‘free’ journalistic practice. Some in media and journalism studies have, recently, made attempts to ‘de-Westernize’ their discipline (see Park and Curran, 2000), although there has been little in the way of moves towards decolonisation of the field and the eradication of universalistic and supremacist notions of how journalism ought to be practiced.

In investigating how journalistic technologies, practices, ideals and professional cultures influence, enable and constrain journalism’s spatialization of our globe and global politics, critical geopolitics can, this chapter concludes, also make useful interdisciplinary contributions. It can assist journalism and media studies in considering the constitutive properties of their own ‘knowledge’ in the production and governance of the journalistic profession. In critical geopolitics, a distinct stream of scholarship focussing on journalistic geopolitics – the discursive rendering of global political space by the professional news media – and the geopolitics of journalism – the spatio-political factors that shape journalistic production and consumption – would also enrich this discipline. I propose that such a stream should be methodologically and conceptually pluralistic, incorporating research methods and approaches from critical geopolitics and from the branches of the social sciences and humanities that have a longer track record of engaging explicitly with journalism and the news media. At the chapter’s end, precisely how this
methodological flexibility and plurality will be operationalised in this thesis is outlined by providing overviews of the five subsequent empirical chapters.

2.2. Critical Geopolitics

2.2.1. The Emergence of Critical Geopolitics

It is critical geopolitics that has been responsible for a great deal of geography’s foray into territory that would have once been considered the preserve of media and cultural studies scholars. The subdiscipline, in its earliest formulations, is most closely associated with academics such as Gearóid Ó Tuathail, John Agnew and Simon Dalby. Flint (2012) characterises the critical geopolitics endorsed by the above scholars as largely oppositional. It is opposed to the positivist and realist classical geopolitics of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and their continuing pervasive influence in the form of neoclassicism, that, with claims of ‘objective’ ‘scientific’ observation, applied the labels of ‘barbarism’ and ‘savagery’ to great swathes of the map, making the case that these areas were in need of the ‘civilising’ influence of colonial control (see Ashworth, 2011; Dodds and Atkinson, 2000; Dodds and Sidaway, 2004; Heffernan, 2000; Megoran, 2010). This is an era that Driver (2001) characterises as that of the ‘geography militant’, in which romanticised ideas of the heroic explorer figures, such as David Livingstone, were key enforcers of the notion of European science’s missionary duty.

Ó Tuathail (1996a) argues that the ability of the geographer/explorer and the geopolitical scholar of this era to authoritatively ‘spatialize’ the globe and global politics (usually in a manner that supported, legitimised or, either intellectually or practically, facilitated European colonialism) was aided by the ‘institutionalization’ of geography as a ‘scientific’ discipline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Within this context, a ‘stratum of organic intellectuals of empire’ (ibid, p.16) emerged, whose pronouncements were afforded the status of “self evident, natural, foundational and eminently knowable realities” (ibid, p.68).

Halford Mackinder, often considered to be among the ‘founding fathers’ of the classical geopolitics that emerged during this period (see Ó Tuathail, 1996a), has since become something of a focal point for many critical
geopoliticians. In particular, his address to the Royal Geographical Society of January 1904, entitled ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, has remained an important text for the critical, and the not-so-critical, scholar of geopolitics (see Dodds and Sidaway, 2004). In his talk, Mackinder (1904, p.422) argued that the world map had been ‘completed’ and that ‘intensive survey’ and ‘philosophic synthesis’ were now possible on a global scale, allowing scholars to “seek a formula which shall express certain aspects… of geographical causation in universal history.”

Mackinder took this opportunity to understand ‘geographical causation in universal history’ in the outlining of his ‘heartland theory’, which divided the world into sectors according to their supposed geostrategic and military importance. Mackinder’s geopolitics, then, was statist, imperialist and practical in its approach; the main aim of his research was to address questions such as “How can the state be reformed so that its empire can be strengthened?” (Dalby and Ó Tuathail, 1998, p.6). The objective of his 1904 talk was to advance the notion of the growing importance of land power in global dominance, and to convince the British government to react and reform appropriately (Ó Tuathail, 1996a).

Despite these deeply entangled roots in European colonial expansion and imperialism, it was not until there emerged a general perception of geopolitics’ complicity in the formulation of the ethnically-based expansionist ideology of the Nazi regime that, en masse, scholars sought to distance themselves from the discipline (Dodds and Atkinson, 2000). This association was, understandably, enough for the discipline to be tainted for decades following the Second World War. In 1954, the geographer Richard Hartshorne captured the general sentiment of much of academic geography by declaring geopolitics to be an ‘intellectual poison’ (Hartshorne, 1954). For Hartshorne and many of his peers, geopolitics was nothing more than ‘pseudo-science’ and a source of shame for geography scholars (ibid).

While Hepple (1986) has helpfully drawn attention to the geopolitical work that bucked this trend, and warned against assuming the universality of Anglophone experience in this regard, the period of the Cold War can be characterised as a period in which, in academic settings at least, geopolitics was chastised, ignored and generally avoided. In 1969, Brian Berry declared
political geography to be a ‘moribund backwater’; in 2000, Dodds and Atkinson (p.4) concurred with his analysis of that period, adding, “geopolitics was surely the most stagnant reach of this lifeless subdiscipline.”

It was the end of the Cold War that reignited interest in political geography and the spatiality of power (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Kuus, 2009). The collapse of the Soviet Union “served to undermine much of the conventional wisdom at the heart of the modern geopolitical imagination” (Agnew, 2003, p.2) and was, therefore, problematic for the analyses of the previous decades that were predicated on the assumption of state-based bipolarity and superpower rivalry. It did not take long for this challenge to conventional geopolitical wisdom to result in geographic work that focused explicitly on geopolitical thought and ideas.

This work was part of a broader poststructuralist reconsideration of ‘power’ in the social sciences, drawing, in large part, from widespread interest in, and adoption of, Foucauldian genealogy (Agnew, 2013; Kuus, 2009). Processes of subject-formation are key to work broadly categorised as Foucauldian; as such, this new work concentrated on the discursive construction of political space and the enabling role played by ostensibly ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ geographic ‘knowledge’. Within critical geopolitics, it was Edward Said’s (1978) critical reading of classic literary texts showing how these works discursively produced the Orient as culturally inferior, irrational and intellectually undeveloped that most influenced the intellectual direction of travel (see Ó Tuathail, 1999; Todorova, 1997).

Initially, this new critical geopolitics was largely a reflection on the discipline of geography itself. Instead of seeking to rehabilitate or continue the geopolitics of the likes of Mackinder, Ratzel or Haushofer, it sought to investigate, unravel and expose the gendered, imperialist and racist history of the discipline. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992), in a paper that has come to be thought of as foundational (Agnew, 2013), argue that geography is a social and historical discourse, always intimately connected with questions of politics and ideology. In essence, critical geopolitics can be seen as the practice of identifying the power relationships within geopolitical statements; it sought to identify the discourses that permitted or excused, for instance, the colonial control of territories and the extraction and exploitation of resources (see
Critical geopolitics forced a reappraisal of geopolitics as a discipline, particularly the notion that it was, or could ever be, politically neutral or objective.

In their 1992 article, ‘Geopolitics and discourse’, Ó Tuathail and Agnew set out their early vision for the direction of critical geopolitics:

Geopolitics, we wish to suggest, should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft “spatialize” international politics in such a way as to represent it as a "world" characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas. In our understanding, the study of geopolitics is the study of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states.

(Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p.192)

In the 1990s, many historical geographers, although not always situating themselves within critical geopolitics, utilised similar ideas in their explorations of geographic institutions, thought and traditions. Derek Gregory’s (1994) *Geographical Imaginations*, for example, details the European ‘visual regime’, which rendered the world as representation, showing how, with universalist claims of scientific ‘knowledge’, land, nature and people were produced as simple objects for settlement and exploitation. Heffernan’s (2007) *The European Geographical Imagination* charts the history of European geographic thought, examining its legacies on contemporary debates around the formation of a distinct European political culture. The most influential of these histories was David Livingstone’s (1992) *The Geographical Tradition* (see Driver, 2004; Mayhew, 2004), which chronicled 500 years of North American and European geographical ‘knowledge’, detailing the influence of philosophical and scientific ideas on its development. According to one reviewer, Livingstone “destroyed the notion… of smooth progress towards an ideal, objective truth” (Spedding, 2008, p.153).

Within critical geopolitics, many scholars set about investigating the territorial and geographic pronouncements of diplomatic and foreign policy elites that had informed the conduct of the Cold War (see Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Dalby, 1990; Ó Tuathail, 1996a). Simon Dalby’s (1990) *Creating the Second Cold War*, for instance, investigates the discourses of various US ‘intellectuals of statecraft’, as well as political leaders, lobbyists and diplomats who were arguing against détente and nuclear arms controls, and for
renewed superpower rivalry. Its stated aim was to “draw attention to the intellectual processes whereby the world is specified in particular ways which enable political actors to behave in specific manners with certain political consequences” (ibid, p.x).

2.2.2. Popular Geopolitics

It was arguably Jo Sharp’s (1993) analysis of a seemingly innocuous source, Reader’s Digest magazine, that did more than any other single contribution to broaden the focus of critical geopolitics since the subdiscipline first embraced the discursive turn in the social sciences. Sharp (ibid, p.493) – investigating the same time period and similar (geo)political phenomena as Simon Dalby (1990) – argued explicitly that “a more equal weighting between an analysis of elite texts and more popular sources of geopolitical information, primarily education and the media, would be fruitful.” It is not the case, Sharp (ibid) reasoned, that geopolitics simply ‘trickles down’ from elite to popular texts; concentrating solely on one end of this spectrum is, therefore, necessarily limiting. In addition, overlooking popular sites of geopolitical ‘knowledge’, such as schools and the mass media, excludes texts whose (geo)political encoding is typically subtler and received with less suspicion of motive than those produced by individuals or institutions involved in the practical business of statecraft.

Key to understanding popular culture’s role in creating, maintaining or contesting popular geopolitical identities and narratives is, according to Sharp (1993), Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. Gramsci’s hegemony referred to “the mechanisms of bourgeois rule over the working class in a stabilized capitalist society” (Anderson, 1977, p.20). Gramsci envisaged this society as consisting of two overlapping spheres: civil society, which comprises institutions such as the educational establishment, organised religion, family and the mass media and political society/the state, which consists of apparatus such as the military, police and judiciary. The main function of civil society is bringing about ‘spontaneous’ consent via shaping ideology and worldviews; the coercive power of political society/the state is brought to bear if this ‘spontaneous’ consent cannot be achieved (see Ransome, 1992).

Outside of Marxist theory, Gramsci’s broader impact has been to force a re-evaluation of the nature and location of ‘power’. According to Jackson Lears
(1985), the result of Gramsci’s intervention was to ‘deepen’ the ‘banal’ question of “who has power?”:

The "who" includes parents, preachers, teachers, journalists, literati, "experts" of all sorts, as well as advertising executives, entertainment promoters, popular musicians, sports figures, and "celebrities" – all of whom are involved (albeit often unwittingly) in shaping the values and attitudes of a society. The "power" includes cultural as well as economic and political power – the power to help define the boundaries of common-sense "reality" either by ignoring views outside those boundaries or by labelling deviant opinions "tasteless" or "irresponsible."

(Jackson Lears, 1985, p.572)

Sharp (1993, p.493) states that the media should be understood as part of a Gramscian hegemony that “explains, legitimates and at times challenges the dominant understanding by pulling it through the lens of popular discourses”:

[H]egemony is constructed not only through political ideologies but also, more immediately, through detailed scripting of some of the most ordinary and mundane aspects of everyday life. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony posits a significant place for popular culture in any attempt to understand the workings of society because of the very everydayness and apparently nonconflictual nature of such productions. Any political analysis of the operation of dominance must take full account of the role of institutions of popular culture in the complex milieu that ensures the reproduction of cultural (and thus political) norms.

(Sharp, 2000a, p.31)

Sharp (2000a, p.31) concludes that “following the logic of hegemony entails studying the institutions of knowledge production and the exchange of meaning and legitimation that flows between such institutions.” In her analysis of Reader’s Digest, one such ‘institution of knowledge production’, Sharp (1993, 2000a) found a consistent set of themes running through all stories about the Soviet Union. This unswerving characterisation allowed the magazine to create a credible geopolitics. Reader’s Digest’s coverage contributed to the discursive structuring of the USA and USSR as polar opposites: a structure centred on irresolvable difference. Articles that represented the Russian Revolution, Stalin, or Soviet people favourably often did so by showing supposed progression in terms of the Soviets becoming more like ‘us’, with ‘us’ presented as the natural system.
Sharp’s study of *The Reader’s Digest* inexorably linked critical geopolitics with the study of popular texts. Her investigation highlighted the interconnectedness of the simplistic Cold War geopolitics espoused by the political elite (see Dalby, 1990; Dalby and Ó Tuathail, 1998) and the popular texts that help to grant certain discourses hegemonic social acceptance. It also highlighted a primary means by which geopolitics is experienced by the majority of the population. Sharp’s work has been highly influential and continues to be widely cited by those studying popular culture’s role in understanding geopolitics (see Dittmer, 2005; Dodds, 1996; McFarlane and Hay, 2003; Myers et al., 1996). Since Sharp implored critical scholars of geopolitics to consider popular culture as a principle location for the production, reinforcement and contestation of prevailing geopolitical imaginaries, the discipline has seen much interest in pop culture artefacts and a slew of new literature which sought to uncover the geopolitical encoding of certain films, TV shows, publications and cartoons.

Klaus Dodds (1996, 1998, 2007), for example, has, on many occasions, explored the geopolitical representations within the work of *Guardian* satirical cartoonist Steve Bell. In his analysis of Bell’s Falklands War ‘If’ cartoons, Dodds (1996, p.589) concludes that they disrupted “Thatcherite narratives of intelligibility about the Falklands War”. Jason Dittmer (2005) has looked at the nationalist superhero character Captain America, showing, predominantly through textual analysis, how this hero figure constructed, for many readers, popular conceptions of geopolitical ‘realities’ and the ‘righteous’ use of military force.

Although much of the work in popular geopolitics since Sharp’s (1993) intervention has turned to works of fiction, such as satirical cartoons, comic strips, film and television (see Dittmer, 2005, 2010; Dodds, 2003, 2005, 2006; Kennedy and Lukinbeal, 1997; Lukinbeal and Zimmermann, 2006), journalistic texts have also been subjected to some sporadic scrutiny (see Falah et al., 2006; Mawdsley, 2008; Mcfarlane and Hay, 2003; Myers et al., 1996). Myers et al. (1996), for instance, utilised various content study methods to compare the US newspaper coverage of the Bosnian and Rwandan conflicts of the 1990s. The authors argue that, in the articles they surveyed, the Rwandan civil war is represented through the veil of ‘tribal’ conflict and African ‘otherness’, whereas
the European conflict is portrayed as a more calculated and sophisticated form of warfare.

2.2.3. Critiques of a Textual Focus

2.2.3.1. Historicism and Materiality

In attempting to dissect and unravel the various linguistic, rhetorical and discursive devices employed by classical geopoliticians such as Mackinder and Ratzel, the modern-day geopolitical elite and the popular media in their ‘spatializing’ of global politics, scholars of critical and popular geopolitics have drawn criticism for employing an overly-textual focus. John Agnew (2013), one of the co-authors of the now-considered foundational article ‘Geopolitics and Discourse’ (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992), has expressed unease with the extent to which this paper seemingly set the subdiscipline on such a discursive path:

[T]here was a tension inherent in it [the article] between the constitutive role of discourse in geopolitics, as adumbrated in its more Foucauldian moments, and the framing in terms of a class of agents embedded in a modern world-system… that saw historically and geographically sedimented social practices as having an existence outside any sort of practical discourse of geopolitics… To a degree this tension represented the different backgrounds and theoretical predilections of the co-authors. If one (Ó Tuathail) was suspicious of radical social ontologies and took the linguistic turn in the social sciences very seriously indeed, the other (Agnew) had trouble ditching ontology not least because of the need to account for the material basis of who got to write the scripts of global geopolitics during any specific era. In other words, from this viewpoint, the powers of representation do not account for the power to engage in what become dominant geopolitical representations.

(Agnew, 2013, p.24)

Agnew (2013, p.24) praises Ó Tuathail, his former co-author, for avoiding the Derridean edict, ‘there is nothing outside the text’, adopting, instead, a “‘messy history’ conception of historical-geographical context”. Nonetheless, Agnew appears to remain apprehensive about the extent of critical geopolitics’ Foucauldian underpinnings:

In my own case, I valued many of Foucault’s insights about power but remained in thrall to a historicist rendering of geopolitics that was uncomfortable with the idea that international danger, for example, was
simply invented for cultural purposes rather than having at least some sort of actual materiality to it… In other words, geopolitics was not simply made up. (Agnew, 2013, p.25)

Agnew (ibid) raises important issues of agency and materiality, particularly with regard to the question of who got/gets to ‘write the scripts of global geopolitics’. In attempting to address this issue, Merje Kuus (2007, 2008), in her discussion of ‘intellectuals of statecraft’, has argued for the importance of the backgrounds, identities and experiences of geopolitical ‘knowledge producers’ to be explored. The term ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ can be used to refer to a very broad range of figures, ranging from Halford Mackinder and Rudolf Kjellen who were prominent in late nineteenth/early twentieth century geopolitics, to intellectuals of the Cold War such as Edmund Walsh and George Kennan, and more recent writers, possibly with more popular appeal, such as Robert Kaplan and Samuel Huntington. These men, it is argued, are not necessarily the best informed or the most agile of thinkers, but have the ability, afforded them by their cultural, social and economic status, to “assume and project intellectual authority through the specialized language of international relations and international law” (Kuus, 2008, p.2064).

For Kuus (2008), uncovering the linguistic and discursive techniques by which these writers authoritatively ‘spatialize’ global politics, projecting ‘common sense’ notions of a world made up of particular types of places and particular types of people, represents only part of the picture:

Context here includes the personal backgrounds, interests and identities of the individuals who actually articulate geopolitical claims… For example, we cannot understand American geopolitics of the Cold War era without considering the personal anti-communism of some of the leading writers… Their tendency to evoke Greek myths to illustrate their claims has been linked to their educational backgrounds in Classics… We likewise cannot comprehend the cultural and identity-based arguments in Central European geopolitics without considering the arts and humanities backgrounds of many of the region’s leading politicians[.]

(Kuus, 2008, p.2067)

Kuus’s (2007, p.84) examination of the ‘cultured geopoliticians’ of post-Soviet Central Europe is a concerted attempt to provide a “more ‘peopled’ account of the production of geopolitics and the function of human agency in this process.”
Kuus (ibid, p.86) points out that during this period the region’s political parties, legislatures and ministries were “packed by PhDs, reputed scholars, and university graduates”. She demonstrates how this group of ‘cultured politicians’ effectively made use of “philosophical ruminations and evocative language, mixing references to high culture and scholarly works” in order to advance arguments about geopolitical ‘truths’ and ‘realities’ and the ‘national interest’ (ibid, p.88).

Kuus (2007, p.89) details the specific post-Soviet social, cultural and economic circumstances of Central Europe during the period that gave the ‘cultured politicians’ the “ability as formerly dissident intellectuals to truthfully articulate the identities and interests of the Central European countries.” Kuus’s contributions are particularly important for this thesis, recognising, as they do, that there are innumerable factors that shape the production of, in this case, hegemonic formal geopolitics, although this rationale applies equally for the people and institutions producing geopolitical ‘knowledge’ for popular consumption.

2.2.3.2. Practices and Non-Representational Theory

Agnew (2013) and Kuus (2007, 2008), both place geopolitical ‘knowledge’ centrally in their work, exploring the social, political and cultural contexts of that ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowledge’ producers. There is a growing school of thought, however, that is sceptical about critical geopolitics’ foregrounding of ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’, preferring, instead, to focus on the precognitive, affective, practical and performative aspects of geopolitical experience. This development can, in large part, be traced back to Nigel Thrift’s (1997, 2000, 2004, 2008) influential work on non-representational theory (NRT). Thrift has been critical of the tendency to focus on discourse in the study of geopolitics and, instead, advocates a focus on what he calls the ‘little things’:

Nowadays, geopolitics tends to be constructed as a discourse which can be understood discursively… I want to suggest that those working in geopolitics have, perhaps, taken this definition a little too literally, producing the world as discursive construction in a way which has problematic consequences for understanding how (and therefore why) geopower is actually practised. In particular, I want to suggest that this exercise in literal transcription leaves out a lot of the ‘little things’ –
‘mundane’ objects like files, ‘mundane’ people like clerks and mundane words like ‘the’ – which are crucial to how the geopolitical is translated into being.

(Thrift, 2000, p.380)

A fixation in geopolitics on discourses, then, ignores the importance of the people, practices and objects that bring it into being. Non-representational theory is, instead, about acknowledging the fleshy, embodied and corporeal realities of day-to-day life. According to Anderson and Harrison (2010), this shift in focus raises some profound questions for geographical and geopolitical scholars:

[I]f much of everyday life is unreflexive and not necessarily amenable to introspection, if… the meaning of things comes less from their place in a structuring symbolic order and more from their enactment in contingent practical contexts, then quite what we mean by terms such as ‘place’, ‘the subject’, ‘the social’ and ‘the cultural’, and quite how ‘space’, ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ actually operate and take-place, are all in question.

(Anderson and Harrison, 2010, p.7)

In attempting to address these concerns, adherents of NRT are not concerned with “seeing the supposedly true nature of what something is contemplatively,” but rather with “attempting to articulate how, moment by moment, we in fact conduct our practical everyday affairs – something we usually leave unacknowledged in the background to our lives” (Shotter, 1996, p.2). According to Thrift (1997, pp.126-127), rather than representation and meaning, it is important to analyse “presentations, showings and manifestations of everyday life”. In a geopolitical context, then, legitimate subjects of non-representational enquiry might include the work of clerical staff and translators or the location and use of communication technology in settings such as foreign ministries and NGOs (see Neumann, 2007).

Hayden Lorimer (2005) has acknowledged that with increasing engagement and research in the field of non-representational theory, the definition of the term itself has become increasingly difficult to pin down. Lorimer (ibid, p.83) suggests that it has become a catchall ‘umbrella term’ that encompasses a broad range of diverse work that “seeks better to cope with our self-evidently more-than-human, more-than-textual, multisensual worlds.” Lorimer (ibid) acknowledges the difficulties that the ‘non-’ of ‘non-
representational theory’ has, understandably, caused, preferring instead the term ‘more-than representational theory’. Being ‘more-than’ representational need not mean abandoning representation. Simon Rycroft (2007, p.629) has pointed out that representations can excite “a range of sensory, experiential and subconscious responses in their consumers and performers, creating decidedly nonrepresentational representational moments.” Instead of occupying a position of epistemological primacy, then, it may, as McCormack (2005, p.122) suggests, be more useful to reconceptualise representations as “active and affective interventions in a world of relations and movements.”

This would seem to open up the possibility for scholars of critical geopolitics to keep discourses and representations relatively central to their work while also considering the more-than representational world around the text. We might, for instance, take heed of the precognitive and affective reactions provoked by certain popular geopolitical representations, thus attaining better understanding of the embodied nature of mediated geopolitical experience. On the other side of the text, and of particular importance to this thesis, are the non-representational factors that influence the contents of those geopolitical representations. In a journalistic context these might include the communications technology used to write and file stories, the excitement, fear or adrenaline felt while pursuing stories in a potentially dangerous environment, or, perhaps even the alcohol imbibed which so often fuels journalistic escapades.

2.2.3.3. Feminist Geopolitics

While non-representational or more-than representational work does seem to offer exciting prospects for exploring both the non-human and the very human, i.e. the corporeal and the embodied, in geopolitics, there is, as Catherine Nash (2000) has identified, significant cause to be wary about travelling too far down the non-representational path. Nash (2000, p.662) warns against assuming that any supposedly precognitive practice or performance is “just a singular act”. What we might, in fact, be witnessing is the “reiteration of a norm or set of norms that have assumed this status through their repetition, and that become known in myriad ways, including their representation” (ibid). Perhaps even the most mundane interaction, with the most banal object, by the ‘littlest’ person is
an often-repeated corporeal manifestation of certain discourses governing how one ought to comport themselves in specific settings conventionally conceived to be of geopolitical importance. Nash’s (ibid) broader concern, though, is that a move towards the non-representational is problematic for peoples who are actually fighting for more, better, or fairer representation: “What happens to the project of ‘giving voice’ to the marginalized if the concern is with what cannot be expressed rather than what can?”

It might be argued that when NRT adherents call for “the embodied geopolitical practices of clerks (usually women), files and archives that permit the practical governance of space” (Dodds and Atkinson, 2000, p.19) to be examined, they are making a contribution to a broadly-conceived feminist understanding of geopolitics. Such a line of enquiry would, after all, likely shed light on the crucial, yet typically overlooked, labour of women in the state’s foreign policy institutions. Although, as the “(usually women)”, contained in parentheses in the previous quote, would seem to illustrate, the womanhood of the women in question seems to be somewhat incidental. There is a substantial risk, here, that bodily practices are considered not as enactments of an identity differentiated by gender, class or race, but as entirely “depoliticized[,] phenomenological… [and] unconscious”, a conceptualisation that would seem to move us “towards a more generic… notion of the embodied nature of human existence” (Nash, 2000, p.655).

Such a universalising and totalising gaze has long been a staple of the male-dominated classical geopolitics. Joanne Sharp (2000b) in her critique of Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s (1996a) influential Critical Geopolitics contends that this critical author also exhibits much of the masculinist panopticism of the classical scholars that he seeks to criticise:

Just as the geopoliticians that come under Ó Tuathail’s scrutiny present themselves as all-knowing observers of the world and predictors of its political future, so too does he stand apart, detached and all seeing of their works. His is as much a production of theatre as Mackinder’s presentation to the Royal Geographical Society, providing his own heroic narration, not of world domination or prediction, but of unmasking powerful statesmen and their advisors.

(Sharp, 2000b, p.362)
As in classical geopolitics, Ó Tuathail’s (1996a) critical approach still renders all but the most powerful of statesmen invisible. This was particularly the case in Ó Tuathail’s engagement with the Balkans conflicts of the 1990s, in which, according to Sharp (2000b, p.362), he offered only a “detached presentation of the different ‘scripts’ used by the Clinton administration, and their displacement by the ‘anti-geopolitical eye’ of journalist Maggie O’Kane”. This produced, then, a still tacitly masculinist vision of the geopolitics of the Balkans, a vision which was not entirely distinct from those utilised by formal geopoliticians, “in which narratives of national territories were spun mainly along ethnic lines, thus excluding alternative ways of imagining nations” (Müller and Reuber, 2008, p.461). Dowler and Sharp (2001) address this masculinist gaze in a special issue of Space and Polity on feminist geopolitics, one of the first instances of the term’s usage in print. They argue:

Women’s places in international politics tend not to be those of decision makers, but of international labourers and migrants, as images in international advertising and as ‘victims’ to be protected by international peacekeepers. However… this does not mean that women have no role in the recreation of international orders, simply that their agency is hidden from the traditional gaze of geopolitics. How different would international geo-politics be without these images of womanhood, and the international flows of workers and refugees?

(Dowler and Sharp, 2001, p.168)

Feminist geopolitics, then, aims to (re)populate the field by engaging with actors and locations outside the formal sphere of the state and practical geopolitics (see Hyndman, 2001). Anna Secor’s (2001) work, for example, which examined the activities of Islamist women in informal urban political spaces in Istanbul, showed how these women were actively involved in the quotidian formulation, maintenance and contestation of Islamist political ideology and activity. Secor (ibid) contends that it is, in large part, the inability of the dichotomising masculinist gaze to consider domestic space as political that has, particularly in much Western discourse, rendered these women as politically inert.

The masculinist, typically gender-blind, gaze that feminist scholars are so critical of is, of course, not confined to academic or formal productions of geopolitics. Ó Tuathail (1996b, p.175) argues that the “organizing mythology” of
the “modern practice of highbrow journalism” is very similar to the classical geopolitics of Halford Mackinder and Rudolf Kjellen; both, he contends, were “significantly shaped by the hegemony of Cartesian perspectivalism in Western culture”.

‘Cartesian perspectivalism’ describes a monocular view of space underpinned by linear perspective, allowing for three-dimensional space to be rendered ‘accurately’ on a two-dimensional surface (Jay, 1988). Donna Haraway (1988, p.581) refers to this as the ‘God trick’, allowing the observer to see “everything from nowhere”. The alternatives to this view from nowhere, Haraway (ibid) suggests, are ‘views from somewhere’; “Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges.” (original emphasis):

We seek not the knowledges ruled by phallogocentrism (nostalgia for the presence of the one true Word) and disembodied vision. We seek those ruled by partial sight and limited voice – not partiality for its own sake but, rather, for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible… The only way to find a larger vision is to be somewhere in particular.  

(Haraway, 1988, p.590)

Haraway was writing in 1988; with the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, several elements of the journalism establishment and journalism academia also began to engage with these sorts of questions, particularly around journalists’ situatedness in the places on which they were reporting (see Bell, 1998; Franklin et al., 2005, pp.125-127). When Ó Tuathail (1996b) wrote about Guardian journalist Maggie O’Kane’s reports from Bosnia in the mid 1990s, it was precisely because she was not employing this ‘God trick’ – not claiming to be able to see and ‘know’ Bosnia from some abstract vantage point – that her work, and that of others who were beginning to challenge longstanding journalistic conventions, was so noteworthy (see Hirst and Guerke, 1996; Hammond, 2002; Hanitzsch, 2007). Instead of providing a macro-level, geo-strategic overview of the conflict, O’Kane provided a situated and embodied account of her experience and space for “a bearing witness by marginalized and subaltern groups” (Ó Tuathail, 1996b, p.179). O’Kane’s ‘feminist objectivity’ was manifested on the page in the form of personal, honest and visceral eye-witness reports, and a commitment to multiplying
perspectives, often allowing those caught up in the conflict to write directly on the page (ibid). Ó Tuathail (1994, p.270) has spoken of the ‘intriguing possibility’ of beginning to think of geopolitical sightings, academic and popular, that, unlike O’Kane, do use the Cartesian perspectivalist ‘god trick’ as “cases of pornographic voyeurism” motivated by “an obscene will to see everything”.

It was precisely such apparent abandonment of “an obscene will to see [and to understand] everything” that, for Edward Holland (2012), distinguished Joe Sacco’s journalistic dispatches from Palestine from most of the other popular geopolitical constructions of the region. Sacco has produced several ‘graphic narratives’ (book-length comic strips) chronicling the lives of marginalised people living in conflict zones; Palestine (2001), his most celebrated work, includes a foreword by Edward Said, entitled ‘Homage to Joe Sacco’, in which Said appears to concur with Holland’s analysis:

In Joe Sacco’s world there are no smooth-talking announcers and presenters, no unctuous narrative of Israeli triumphs, democracy, achievements, no assumed and re-confirmed representations... of Palestinians as rock-throwing, rejectionist, and fundamentalist villains... What we get instead is seen through the eyes and persona of a modest-looking ubiquitous crew-cut young American man who appears to have wandered into an unfamiliar, inhospitable world of military occupation, arbitrary arrest, harrowing experiences of houses demolished and land expropriated, torture... and sheer brute force... With the exception of one or two novelists and poets, no one has ever rendered this terrible state of affairs better than Joe Sacco.

(Said, 2001, p.iii)

Holland (2014, p.111) praises Sacco’s ‘grounded perspective’, which, he says, “can be contrasted with Cartesian perspectivalism, a worldview that distinguishes the observer from the observed and leads to untenable claims of objectivity and neutrality”. This ‘grounded’ perspective is common in much of Sacco’s work; in his telling of the story of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Palestine, for example, the narrative does not begin with the Balfour declaration and then chart the hostilities between the parties, rather, it starts with Sacco’s arrival at Ben Gurion Airport and follows his attempts to find contacts and interviewees to relay their lived, embodied, gendered experiences of the occupation. Sacco often ruminates on the journalistic profession and is
generally disparaging of the idea that journalism should/can ever be truly objective and dispassionate (see Holland, 2014).

Jennifer Hyndman (2001) argues that a feminist geopolitics should concentrate on issues of inequality and include an array of marginalised peoples. The ultimate aim is to adjust the scale of geopolitical focus from the traditional scale of the state and state-actors, to a much smaller scale of the body and households (ibid). We might, then, conclude that much of Sacco’s work answers this call. This is a point that Holland (2014, p.118) touches upon briefly in his discussion of Sacco’s Bosnian conflict reportage: “Sacco’s focus… shifts away from Karadžić as political leader of a desired state to a finer scale of analysis, that of the home”. This ‘fine scale’ is common to much of Sacco’s work; In Palestine, for example, the story of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is told primarily through oral history type interviews with Palestinians recalling their day-to-day experiences of life under occupation. Generally, when politicians and their actions are referred to it is via a portrayal of ‘ordinary’ people watching them on TV news, with Sacco’s narrative focussing on the discussions going on around the TV set.

Holland’s (2014) work on Joe Sacco offers a slight glimpse of the deeper engagement with popular culture that feminist thought might facilitate. Instead of analyses of what adjectives are used to describe certain places and events and what kind of narratives are constructed, we can start to also think about the gendered, as well as racialized and classed, perspectives, reporting conventions and representational norms of popular culture producers. Much of this can be done through analyses of the texts themselves, although methodologies such as interviews, ethnography and archival work can help us to understand, particularly in the case of journalism, the masculinist professional cultures, practices and hierarchies of places like newspaper offices and, in doing so, better understand why popular geopolitics are constructed as they are.

2.2.3.4. Postcolonial and Subaltern Geopolitics

The call for a readjustment of the focus of geopolitical analysis is also made by those who seek to highlight, and to address, the largely elite Western prism through which scholars have sought to understand and conceptualise the
earth’s spatial politics. Notably, Mohammed Ayoob (2002, p.40) has argued for attention to be focused on those “largely ignored by the elitist historiography popularized by both neorealists and neoliberals as a result of their concentration on, respectively, the dynamics of interaction among the great powers and the affluent, industrialized states of the global North.” Ayoob (ibid, p.33) cites the “preoccupations with the bipolarity that emerged in the wake of World War II” as an important symptom of this misplaced attention. For Ayoob (ibid, p.34), bipolarity and mutually assured destruction were ‘second-order changes’; from a historical perspective, bipolarity was simply a shift in “the balance of power mechanism that had helped order great power relations in the international system for some four hundred years” and the development of nuclear weapons, “part of the continuing saga of the revolutions in military affairs”. The far more significant, but far less critically examined, development, Ayoob (ibid) argues, was the rapid attainment of independence by a large number of states and their attempts to replicate and function within the Westphalian state model.

Ayoob (ibid, p.41) refers to his alternative approach as ‘subaltern realism’; it is premised upon what he refers to as the three ‘fundamental elements’ of ‘essential realism’: statism, survival, and self-help. This approach holds that “states should still form the primary unit of analysis in International Relations” as “Third World states, rather than subaltern classes, form the quintessential subaltern element within… the contemporary international system[… which] is essentially a system of states” (ibid, p.41). Ayoob (ibid, p.31) argues that any perspective claiming “to provide an intellectually satisfactory explanation in the field of IR… must be able to explain why the majority of conflicts occur when and where they do.” Mainstream IR scholarship has failed to do this, he contends, “because they pay insufficient attention to the preeminent transformation arising from the numerical expansion” of independent states in the international system due to decolonisation (ibid, p.31).

It would be difficult to argue, however, that Ayoob (ibid, p.33) has met this self-imposed “criterion for successful theorizing in International Relations”. If Western IR’s failure is due simply to its inability to explain why, when and where the majority of conflicts occur, Ayoob’s subaltern realism, as Michael
Barnett (2002) highlights, cannot necessarily claim any greater degree of success. In a straightforward critique, Barnett (ibid) points out that the ‘large majority’ of conflicts are not, in fact, interstate but rather intrastate. Why, then, Barnett (ibid) asks, should we ‘cling’ to such a state-centric conception that, even by Ayoob’s (2002) own metric, seems to provide little in the way of illumination of the workings of the international system?

A second major critique of Ayoob’s work is raised by Keith Krause (1998, p.129) who argues that he “privileges the state without even raising the question whether or not it should be the proper subject of security” (original emphasis). As Robert Jackson (1987, 1993) points out, the biggest threats to human security, particularly in the ‘Third World’, have often not emanated externally from the state, but from within it. Jackson (1987, p.528) cited West Africa as an example, arguing that governments in the region “represent[ed] in themselves the single greatest threat to their citizens, treat[ed] the rule of law with contempt, and multipl[ied] hasty public schemes designed principally for their own private and collective enrichment.”

Ayoob is certainly to be applauded for his insistence that a discipline seeking to understand global politics cannot reasonably make authoritative claims of ‘knowledge’ in this area while failing to take into account entire hemispheres in their analyses and models. His work offers an explicit rebuttal to any theorist, in IR or geopolitics, who might seek to understand global politics only though the actions of ‘great’ states. He is naïve, however, in assuming that these overlooked regions can simply be retrofitted into an intellectual framework that has historically concerned itself only with the actions of elite Western states. His use of the term ‘subaltern’ conflates the interests of the postcolonial state/regime and the postcolonial citizen when it is actually likely that the former may pose a significant threat to the security of the latter.

This failure of realist (as well as critical) schools of thought to distinguish between states and the people living under the authority of those states, particularly in the Global South, is a key conceptual deficit that a distinct stream of scholarship, explicitly locating itself within critical geopolitics, has sought to address. ‘Anti-geopolitics’ is, broadly speaking, concerned with productions of geopolitics from outside of the state, typically by civil society actors seeking to resist coercive and hegemonic geopolitical imaginaries and practices. The
concept was first defined explicitly by Paul Routledge (1998) in the first edition of the O Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge edited *Geopolitics Reader*.

According to Routledge (ibid, pp.236-237), anti-geopolitics is “an ethical, political, and cultural force within civil society… that challenges the notion that the interests of the state’s political class are identical to the community’s interests. Anti-geopolitics represents an assertion of permanent independence from the state *whomever is in power*” (original emphasis). This resistance can take two forms: representational, challenging hegemonic constructions of geopolitics, and material, resisting the state’s institutions of power (Oslender, 2009; Routledge, 1998).

Although Routledge (1998) does not define anti-geopolitics exclusively in terms of the Global South, and others have used it in relation to European states (see Aalto and Berg, 2002; Boria, 2006; Dodds, 2007), in his definitional chapter, except for one section on resistance movements in Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union, all of the cited examples of anti-geopolitical movements are from the Global South. The critique here is certainly not that these scholars and this vein of scholarship have focussed *too much* on the Global South. Routledge’s (2010) work with the Jana Andolan democracy movement in Nepal, as well as Oslender’s (2016) anti-geopolitics work with communities of colour on Colombia’s Pacific coast who are fighting government violations of their territorial rights, for example, have greatly enriched critical geopolitics’ literature and helped us to think about how we conceptualise geopolitical agency, particularly in the Global South and particularly from outside of government. What could be problematic, however, is if anti-geopolitics were to become the primary analytical framework through which we sought to view the Global South.

Paul Routledge’s (1998) chapter defining anti-geopolitics charts the changing currents of anti-geopolitical movements worldwide; he identifies three distinct periods: colonial anti-geopolitics, Cold War anti-geopolitics and new world order anti-geopolitics. During the first period, national liberation movements fought European colonisers; during the Cold War, various groups resisted direct military incursions, surrogate troops and clandestine destabilising operations deployed, primarily by the US, under the guise of ‘anti-communism’; under the New World Order, revolutionaries such as the
Zapatistas sought to oppose new forms of economic imperialism. The danger is that we could see a more than century-long history of the Global South being written wherein the South is defined solely by its opposition to repression by the North. The Global South, and places in the Global South, then, become conceptual entities that can only be ‘understood’ in reference to the Global North.

How one ‘knows’ postcolonial societies has long been a central issue for scholars seeking to do precisely that. Much deeper than the issue of whether we understand postcolonial or Global South states merely as a kind of photo negative or antagonist to states in the Global North are the epistemological questions that reach into almost every aspect of ‘knowledge’. This concern has, most notably, been articulated by Gayatri Spivak (1988) in her seminal essay ‘Can the subaltern speak?’. Spivak (ibid, p.27) argued that scholars of post-colonial politics and post-colonial societies were unwittingly complicit – “because of the violence of imperialist epistemic, social, and disciplinary inscription,” which teaches how to research, survey, ‘understand’ and ‘know’ one’s subject – in perpetrating the same kind of colonial domination that they so frequently criticise.

Spivak (ibid) uses the term 'epistemic violence' to refer to violence carried out on the ways of ‘knowing’ and ‘understanding’ of non-Western, indigenous peoples. She argues that Western ways of ‘knowing’ have been held up as the way of knowing, whereas other forms of knowledge have been dismissed as less valid, myth, folklore or simply wrong. She contends that to be heard the subaltern must adopt Western thought, reasoning and language and that even when apparently expressing their own view, the subaltern is not able to express her true self. This is because in order to be taken seriously, the life world of the subaltern has to be translated into the disciplinary language of science, development or philosophy, dominated by Western concepts and Western languages. Spivak (ibid) argues that in attempting to push back, or to reclaim a collective cultural identity, all the subaltern will achieve will be to reaffirm their subordinate status, mirroring the essentialising gaze of Western scholars who failed to take into account the immense heterogeneity of colonised and formerly colonised peoples.
Spivak (2012, p.2) has articulated an ‘Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet’. She has argued that “in their current decrepitude the subaltern cultures need to be known in such a way that we can suture their reactivated cultural axiomatics into the principles of the Enlightenment” (ibid, p.538). Knowledge of subaltern and ‘other’ epistemes is not, then, part of process of reverting to or reviving romanticised visions of pre-capitalist and pre-colonial cultures or returning to an earlier period on a “sequential evolutionary model” (ibid, p.344). It is, to use a phrase that Spivak herself has become fond of, about “learning to learn from below” and Imaginative alterity (see Guardiola-Rivera, 2009).

A notable contribution to geopolitics literature that would seem to embody these values comes from Sara Koopman’s (2011) work with grassroots activist groups. Koopman (ibid, p.274) argues that outside of academia, “geopolitics is widely imagined as (depending on your generation) chess, the board game Risk, or the Total War video games. Big men moving big guns across a big playing field.” Anti-geopolitics “is a pawn, or many pawns, protesting being moved around” (ibid, p.282). Koopman (ibid, p.276), however, objects, “I do not simply want to resist being moved by those playing the Great Game, I want to play a different game!” Koopman, then, centres alterity in the approach that she calls ‘alter-geopolitics’. The ethos behind it is relatively straightforward: “Another world is possible, and everyone seems to have different ideas about what it can look like. I want to hear more about them” (ibid, p.277). This approach, then, does not focus on the state or hegemonic geopolitics, nor is it concerned with those seeking to become, petition or resist the state and its hegemony; it is interested in groups that are creating and nurturing their own creative, imaginative and new forms of collective security, “coming together on their own, non-violently, for safety” (ibid). Koopman cites several groups and movements that researchers might be interested in:

In Colombia it may be… [those] living and working together in rural areas, being part of the alternative land registry, or running an independent school so that children will not be recruited into armed groups. In the Democratic Republic of Congo women walk remote areas searching for rape victims left to die and take them in and nurse them back to health… In Uganda shelters gather child ‘night commuters’ resisting recruitment… In Palestine, Israeli women stand watch at checkpoints.

(Koopman, 2011, p.277)
While Koopman’s (ibid) research focusses on groups which are working towards explicit (geo)political objectives, other work in subaltern geopolitics (Koopman does not use this term herself, although the paper appears in a special ‘Subaltern Geopolitics’ issue of *Geoforum* and shares many of the same concerns) has sought to “foreground more prosaic practices of dealing with… or simply ‘getting by’” (Harker, 2011, p.307). Harker’s (ibid) research, for instance, focuses on families living in the West Bank of Palestine; he uses terms like ‘getting by’ to describe the practices of these families which do not explicitly resist the Israeli occupation, but are lost in typical discourses of violent subjugation and resistance. As Sharp’s (2011a) discussion of Harker’s (2011) paper concludes, this work has helped to ‘give voice’ to Palestinian people, rendering them as ‘more than’ either the victim of or resistance to the occupation.

This commitment to exploring ‘in between’ has also been notably exhibited by Joanne Sharp (2011b, 2013) in two articles focussing on Tanzania. One of the two seeks to highlight the geopolitical thought of Tanzanian independence leader and statesman Julius Nyerere (Sharp, 2013). As Sharp (ibid) argues, Nyerere recognised that many of Africa’s political boundaries, drawn by European colonialists, were both nonsensical and a potential source of future conflict. Nyerere argued that these problematic national borders could lead to African countries “making ‘claims’ on each other’s territory”, and possibly to “the tragic absurdity of spending money on armaments while our people die for want of medical attention or starve for want of knowledge” (Nyerere, 1963, cited in Sharp, 2013, p.24). Nyerere’s response was to chart a course that was somewhere between the exclusionary ‘modern’ nationalisms of the Cold War era and a geopolitics based solely on indigenous African society (Sharp, 2013). Nyerere’s geopolitics utilised the tool of nationalism to bring together disparate ethnic and tribal groups; it also emphasised Pan-Africanism, ‘Third World’ solidarity, shared precarity and subaltern subjectivity (ibid). This, then, was a decidedly ‘Third world’ path to ‘modernity’ and one which “consciously reject[ed] the totality of either the Soviet or US projections of modern futures” (ibid, p.27).
Sharp (ibid, p.21) argues that the Western-centrism of academic disciplines concerned with international politics and statecraft has made them “complicit in hiding the myriad ways in which international politics is made and remade.” Engaging with subaltern ways of thinking, ‘knowing’ and doing geopolitics – such as that of Julius Nyerere – is an essential part of challenging the primacy of Western and European ontologies in geopolitical theory (ibid).

This is also the case when engaging with sources of popular understandings of geopolitics. In Sharp’s (2011b) other article focussing on Tanzania, she turns to the country’s newspapers. Sharp (ibid) analysed contemporary Tanzanian news media representations of ‘the war on terror’. She argues that Tanzania itself cannot be placed on either side of the “US-‘terrorist other’” dichotomy and that the newspaper articles investigated “show a politics of recognition between ‘the wretched of the earth’ and an attempt to persuade global political leaders to learn and forgive, rather than to rush to war” (Sharp, 2011a, p.272). They present a “Tanzanian, African and even Third World vision of what is happening”, which simultaneously “resists the boundaries of state and civilisational difference” and present a narrative of a unified Tanzanian state leading Africa “towards what is presented as a more enlightened path” (Sharp, 2011b, p.304). This engagement with texts that cannot be positioned within a binary conceptualisation of geopolitics helps us to “recognise[ ] the possibility that political identities can be established through geographical representations that are neither fully ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’” (Sharp, 2011a, pp.271-272), of the state or of hegemonic geopolitical discourses.

More broadly, this work on subaltern geopolitics, demonstrating an attentiveness to both the feminist ideals of shifting analytical scales and challenging hegemonic conceptions of agency, combined with a Spivakian-inspired commitment to postcolonial alterity, has provided geopolitics researchers, who may wish to write about places and people in the Global South, with a relatively clear path forward in terms of practice. In the main, travelling this path requires the researcher to be attentive to the original definition of the term ‘subaltern’, which described a lower military rank, “neither the commander, nor outside of the ranks” (Sharp, 2011a, p.272). In focussing our ‘critical’ gaze outside of the Global North it is imperative that we remain cognisant of the multiple unequal relationships of power, including
representational power, in the international arena, as well as the complex and often entangled ways in which many different actors in different locations, and at different scales, maintain, contest and reformulate geopolitical orders.

2.2.4. A Broad Critical Church

This continuing methodological adaptation, flexibility and ingenuity is one of the key factors in the success of critical geopolitics as an academic project and as a dynamic and vibrant discipline. Its roots are grounded in poststructuralism and Foucauldian discourse analysis; this moved the study of geopolitics away from all-encompassing theorising of the precise mechanics governing spatial politics and towards deconstruction of reified geopolitical assumptions and narratives. Jennifer Hyndman (2001, p.213) reasons, however, that this approach “does not put Humpty Dumpty back together again… Nor does it question why Humpty is always falling off the wall.” The discipline would likely have quickly stagnated had it persisted solely with repeatedly taking apart the ‘big men’ of classical geopolitics and their theories, leaving us, still, with only a tacitly masculinist framework with which to understand the globe and its politics.

Fortunately, work from popular geopolitics has broadened the scope of enquiry, shifting focus away from exclusively studying elite texts. Feminist scholars have shown us the importance of going beyond purely textual analysis and, instead, trying to achieve a more embodied and situated perspective. Likewise, those who advocate a greater emphasis on practice, as well as those who focus on historical and material factors, have urged the discipline to look outside of the text, and to take into account human agency, institutions and the ‘little things’, as well as the social, economic and cultural factors, which are crucial in the creation of geopolitics. Postcolonial and subaltern thinkers have reminded us that all of the above is all too often done from a narrow, Western and Euro-centric perspective and, if critical geopolitics is to make any claims of ‘knowledge’, it cannot continue to ignore the lived experiences of the majority of the world.

Although the emergence of critical geopolitics is bound up with the discursive turn in the social sciences, and a great deal of the field still draws fruitfully upon that heritage, there is also a large amount of critical scholarship that, in furnishing the discipline with rich accounts of space and power,
addresses economic and social structures, practices and the pre-cognitive, and issues around understanding what it means to be a particular person in a particular geopolitical context. Critical geopolitics is now established as a core part of the geographic academe and it is likely that this heterogeneity played a key role in that success. Such has the impact of critical approaches to geopolitical study been, that, according to Kuus (2009, p.697), “To study geopolitics within the discipline of geography today is to study it critically.”

On the whole, then, critical scholars of geopolitics are not concerned with writing Mackinder-esque treatise defining the precise systems governing all of global space. Instead, the literature of critical geopolitics is an assemblage of understandings of various aspects of geopolitics – ranging from its discursive construction in popular culture products (e.g. Dittmer, 2013; Sharp, 1993) to its performance and practice in places such as hotels (Craggs, 2012), and to those outside of formal power structures working to bring about radical alternatives (e.g. Koopman, 2011; Routledge, 2010) – which, taken as a whole, represents a broad and messy, but also rich and nuanced account of the politics of global space. It is for this reason that this thesis seeks to locate itself explicitly within critical geopolitics; it insists that understanding the news media, not solely as text but also as a distinct professional, practical, institutional and cultural entity, should be an important part of that assemblage.

2.3. Researching Journalism in Critical Geopolitics

2.3.1. Reaching Across Disciplinary Boundaries

The overview of pertinent literature above has included a small number of works that have sought to engage with geopolitics and the news media (Holland, 2012, 2014; Mawdsley, 2008; Myers et al., 1996; O Tuathail, 1996b; Sharp, 1993, 2011b). Much of this engagement has been somewhat sporadic and there has been little in the way of moves to investigate the extratextual facets of journalism and geopolitics; journalism, particularly journalism in a postcolonial context, as a practice, culture, profession, or set of norms, rules and philological conventions is not a subject that has been explored. Journalistic texts, in critical geopolitics, are typically considered as part of broad
categorisation of ‘popular’ cultural products, which encompasses media from pop music to novels and, in practice, can be used to refer to any non-academic work.

We can, of course, turn to journalism and media studies scholarship for useful insight into some of the non-textual aspects of journalism, much of which is particularly useful for informing our understanding of journalism’s entanglement with geopolitics. Studies of ‘news values’, for instance, tell us about how professional journalists assess newsworthiness, what norms and values inform editorial decisions and practices, and how professional ideals have coalesced within the news business (see Kliesch, 1991; Wu and Hamilton, 2004). The findings of such studies are instructive in our attempts to understand how and why particular types of popular geopolitical discourses are formed and prevail.

Similarly instructive are studies of organisational structures and professional cultures within news media outlets. A whole range of investigations in this area have revealed the extent of professional journalism’s male dominance (see Burks and Stone, 1993; De Bruin, 1994; Gallagher and Von Euler, 1995; Gallagher and Quindoza-Santiago, 1994; Jimenez-David, 1996; Mills, 1997; Robinson and Saint-Jean, 1998; Weaver, 1997; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1996), including studies of the exclusion of women from decision-making processes (Joseph 1982; Robinson, 2008), and the ‘macho’, masculinist culture of newsrooms (see Gill, 2007). Again, this scholarship can offer crucial insights into how popular ‘knowledge’ of geopolitics is encoded with masculinist logic (see Chapter 7).

Critical geographers have, in recent years, attempted to recognise the distinct ways in which space is both constitutive of, and produced through, mediums such as cinema (see Gámir and Valdés, 2007; Kennedy and Lukinbeal, 1997; Lukinbeal and Zimmermann, 2006), comics (see Dittmer, 2014) and books (see Keighren, 2006, 2010, 2013; Keighren et al., 2015; Ogborn and Withers, 2010; Withers, 2010) and, in particular, to take into account the unique characteristics, traditions, ideologies and practices of these mediums. Distinct streams of scholarship centred on film geographies, comic book geographies and literary geographies now exist or are emerging; these contributions have greatly enriched our understanding of how distinct sections
of the popular media produce particular popular geographic and geopolitical ‘knowledges’. With journalism arguably occupying a position as the premier means by which we ‘know’ the world outside of our most immediate vicinity, there must surely be an imperative to do the same for this highly institutionalised, norm and tradition-driven medium.

This thesis, then, seeks to foster such a development and insists that in doing so we must be interdisciplinary in our approach; we must seek to build upon, incorporate and spatialize the expertise that exists in university journalism departments, and we must look to the literature that is published in media and journalism titles. There is a vast corpus of relevant research that it would be foolish to ignore. The subsequent section introduces some of the institutional contexts for journalism studies’ engagement with its subject and highlights some of the conceptual deficiencies in the discipline’s literature,

2.3.2 Looking Towards Media and Journalism Studies

2.3.2.1. Journalism Studies’ Political Origins

Journalism studies, as a distinct discipline in a university setting, was established in the US at the end of the Second World War. Those who were involved in the establishment of the new discipline were mostly social scientists who were brought together by the US “propaganda and ‘psychological warfare’ bureaucracy set up in World War II” (Pooley, 2008, p.48). A number of contemporary researchers have started to explore this early history of journalism studies and its legacy on the first half a century of journalism scholarship (see Buxton, 1996; Gary, 1996; Glander, 1996, 2000; Pooley, 2008; Sproule, 1987). Invariably, they have tended to conclude that the hallmarks of journalism studies’ development in the US during the early Cold War, spearheaded by many ‘zealous cold warriors’ (Pooley, 2012, p.210), remain visible today (Buxton, 1996; Gary, 1996; Glander, 1996, 2000; Sproule, 1987).

Wilbur Schramm, considered by many to be the founder of journalism studies (see Chaffee, 1974) has become a particular focus (see Simpson, 1994). His foundational textbooks, such as The Process and Effects of Mass Communication (1954), Mass Communications (1960), and The Science of...
Human Communication (1963), were all prepared originally as training manuals for the US Information Agency's psychological warfare programmes (ibid).

The book with the most enduring legacy is Four Theories of the Press (1956), co-authored with Frederick Siebert and Theodore Peterson (see Nerone, 2002). The book has just four chapters, each devoted to one of the ‘four theories’. Those four theories being: libertarian, social responsibility, authoritarian and Soviet-communist. Several commentators, however, have noted that ‘theories’ may not be a wholly accurate term for what is actually contained within the book (see Christians, 2009; Flor, 1992; Khiabany, 2010; Nerone, 1995). The ‘theories’ being discussed should be thought of more as ‘types’ in a typology of press systems or models (Flor, 1992). Rather than a detailed and nuanced examination of press systems in a range of geographic and geopolitical settings, the book relies upon simplistic and dichotomous characterisations of ‘our’ system versus ‘theirs’, with ‘them' being the repressive and authoritarian Cold War enemy. The book’s introduction explains, “We bend over backward to make sure that information and ideas will compete. They bend over backwards to make sure that only the line decided upon will flow through the Soviet channels” (Siebert et al., 1956, p.6, emphasis added).

The founding principles of the United States, particularly their enshrining in law in the constitution, are portrayed as central to the general acceptance of the libertarian press model, both in North America and Western Europe. This system, then, was borne of the same ‘enlightened’ ideals that gave birth to the ‘free’ and ‘democratic’ United States of America.

Schramm was responsible for the chapter detailing the Soviet-communist model. The chapter is a simplistic analysis of the ‘undemocratic’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘foreign’ Cold War ‘other’, and the completely alien principles and ideologies that inform the operations and content of the Soviet press.

Perhaps the greatest indication of Four Theories’ continuing legacy in journalism and communication studies are the repeated attempts to revise or to ‘kill off’ the ‘theories’ contained within this enduring little book. It was not until after the fall of the Soviet Union that the call came from a number of scholars to ‘bury’ this particular paradigm. An edited book released in 1995 discussing Four Theories was entitled Last Rites, reflecting the views of its contributors that the text had somewhat overstayed its welcome; in 2004, Hallin and Mancini
(2004, p.10) reflected that “Four Theories of the Press has stalked the landscape of media studies like a horror-movie zombie for decades beyond its natural lifetime. We think it is time to give it a decent burial and move on”.

The heightened political atmosphere of the Cold War was likely key to readers’ willingness to accept the blatant ‘othering’ of the Soviet ‘enemy’ and their press, and the inherent exceptionalism of ‘our’ way of doing things. Today, this legacy remains important, though. The foundations of journalism studies were laid in the context of the fight against fascism during the Second World War and the fight against authoritarianism during the Cold War. Crucially, ‘we’ – from the perspective of journalism academia – won in both these instances. Journalism scholarship, then, has been able to persist in something of a triumphalist fashion, preaching the values of a ‘free’ press and the perils of one that is ‘unfree’ (see Nerone, 2004).

Jean Chalaby (1996) is a leading proponent of the notion of modern ‘objective’ ‘professional’ journalism as an American discursive construction. He argues that the somewhat crusading history of journalism scholarship – positioning itself as an advocate of journalism’s democratic and liberating mission – has led to a failure to critically interrogate the ostensibly commonsensical assumptions surround the subject of journalism. Chalaby (ibid) contends that there has been a failure to ask questions about the historical, political and geographic origins of these homogenised notions of what journalism is, does and how it should operate. Instead, an idealised, ‘libertarian’ model of ‘objective’, autonomous journalistic practice is widely thought of as a ‘universal discursive form’ with no particular cultural, historical or geographical origins (ibid). In short, one very particular model has come to be considered the ‘natural’ way of disseminating stories of the world around us to a mass audience, an almost innate and universal form of cultural expression. Much journalism scholarship has, then, persisted with inspiring myths about their profession at the expense of radical critique of its governing norms and paradigms.

Journalism studies had the misfortune of the orthodoxy of their discipline being established during a period in which much of the academy was seriously compromised by the onset of McCarthyism (See Byrne, 1989; Holmes, 1989; Schrecker, 1986). During this period, hundreds of academics lost their jobs due
to their ‘communist’ or ‘anti-American’ views, while many thousands more presum-ably self-censored and eschewed dissidence or controversy. For the majority of journalism studies’ history, much of its literature has been infused with simplistic bipolar Cold War ideology that worked to discursively construct the established rules and norms of journalistic practice taught to prospective journalists as the way to do journalism, as akin to the apex of liberal democratic progression and antithetical to the tyrannical Cold War other. These foundations served as the basis for journalism studies as it spread to universities across the West (see Bierhoff et al., 2000; Bierhoff and Schmidt, 1997; Fröhlich and Holtz-Bacha, 2003; Gaunt, 1992).

This is not to suggest that journalism scholarship in the West has been entirely devoid of critique and radicalism. The works of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988), Robert McChesney (1993; 1997; 1999) and John Nicols (with McChesney, 2010) have, since the late 1980s, railed against the vast corporate entities that control the American and global media, and have formed an important part of journalism students’ reading lists (Barsky, 2007). The vast majority of this critique, however, is pursued from a political economy perspective, and exhibits a general reluctance to radically reconsider journalism’s normative ideals, how and why these ideals reached such an exalted position, and whether they are appropriate for the contexts in which they are being applied. Even the so-called radical Robert McChesney (1999, p.51) fails to travel any real distance from Siebert et al.’s (1956) view of an ideal libertarian ‘free press’ when he laments the passing of the period immediately following the Second World War, which he portrays as a kind of golden age, where “the calibre of professional journalism prospered and developed a certain amount of autonomy from the dictates of owners and advertisers, and from the corporate sector as a whole”. Instead of being under threat from Marxist authoritarianism, then, the idealised professional libertarian press is now threatened by a kind of corporatist authoritarianism.

While discussions of the political economy of the news media have brought about concern over and condemnation of mass media monopolies, the orthodox professional ideal of what journalism should be and do remains just as revered, and critically-minded questioning of that ideal, its discursive production, inculcation and applicability, just as elusive.
2.3.2.2. ‘De-Westernizing’ Media and Journalism Studies

This failure to critically consider how it was that the absolute notions of what journalism is and is for came to be, and how they persist, is particularly noticeable in much of journalism study’s engagement with the news media outside of the West. Hugo de Burgh (2005, p.2), in the introduction to his edited collection *Making Journalists*, has commented that books written about journalism usually discuss it “as if there were only Anglophone journalism and underdeveloped attempts at it”. The book looks at the work of journalists in a variety of Western and non-Western contexts and de Burgh (ibid) states as his aim, the ‘exorcism’ of ‘homogenised’ Anglo-centric scholarship from the field, with the ultimate goal being to ‘de-Westernise’ and ‘internationalise’ the study of journalism (see also Park and Curran, 2000). Of course, moving any field of study beyond a kind of national or cultural myopia is, almost without exception, a welcome move; there remains a great deal to be researched and written about journalistic practices and the societal role of journalism in regions outside of the Anglophone North. In pursuing this worthwhile and admiral goal, however, researchers should be aware that if they approach journalism worldwide as if it is some sort of naturally occurring phenomenon within a Whig conception of history, they risk simply casting the largely uncritical and ineffectual gaze common to the first 50 years of journalism scholarship across a wider geographical region.

The contributions to de Burgh’s (2005) edited collection do largely fail to move beyond a Whiggish conceptualisation of history. Brian McNair’s (2005) chapter, entitled ‘What is Journalism?’, charts the journalism industry’s adoption of ‘objectivity’ in the mid-nineteenth century, although he provides no geographical context in which this move occurred:

> Inspired by the successful application of positivist epistemology in natural science, objectivity allowed media organisations to brand their output with a universally accepted standard of excellence which could be bought into by all, regardless of their ideological and political biases.
> (McNair, 2005, p.32)

McNair, then, completely overlooks the racist, gendered and colonialist history of the supposedly ‘objective’ and ‘universally accepted’ scientific ‘knowledge’
on which journalistic ‘knowledge’ was to be based (see Driver, 1992). He presents a linear conception of historical ‘progress’, with the ‘scientific’ and ‘rational’ societies of the West presumed to be the desired endpoint.

Helge Rønning’s (2005, p.178) chapter on African journalism asserts that: “Human dignity is dependent on principles that are intrinsic to true democracy.” The majority of the chapter is spent lamenting that the “core of a democratic society”, independent journalistic scrutiny of those in power, is lacking in Africa because “When journalists really uphold their watchdog role, they may be in real danger” (ibid, p.168). Rønning is not wrong to express concern for the journalists who do face violence and intimidation in the course of their work. This concern, however, is presented in the context of an uncomplicated, universalistic and Eurocentric conception of how society ought to function and the role that journalism ought to play in that society.

These scholars’ engagements with journalism in non-Western contexts is, in large part, underpinned by the same supremacist assumptions that structured investigations of media in the ‘Third World’ in the 1950s. In one of the first communication studies research articles focussing on African media, Leonard Doob (1957, p.17) conducted an experiment to determine how the mass media could be utilised to instil “the ideas and values of western civilization… to people in underdeveloped areas”. The experiment consisted of asking Zulu participants “What should make you decide which foods you eat whenever you have a choice of foods?” (ibid, p.18). The participants were then read media statements pertaining to “the need for people to have a proper diet” prepared by “European health officers” (ibid). Then, the participants were asked the original question again in order to gauge the effect of the statement. Although the results were mixed, Doob (ibid, p.25) concluded that mass media could be “employed to help transmit aspects of [Western] civilization to people like the… Zulus”.

In both the 1950s and the early 2000s, much of journalism and communications studies has held that supposedly ‘backwards’ and ‘primitive’ societies could be helped to transform into ‘civilised’, ‘rational’ societies with the help of the mass media, particularly factual media presented in a ‘detached’ and ‘objective’ manner. It has clung to Western-centric visions of modernity and reproduced paternalistic colonial discourses of ‘progress’ and ‘advancement’.
Attempts to ‘de-Westernise’ academic engagement with journalism have largely casts their gaze outside of Europe and North America only to condemn and deride the ‘un-free’ journalism of the ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ worlds. They treat the subject of journalism as if it were a completely natural, universally applicable means of ‘knowing’ and dispersing ‘knowledge’ of the world around us: a point on the singular line of human progress charting our march towards ‘free’, ‘democratic’, ‘rational’ societies. In this regard, it barely departs from the Cold War propagandising that was Four Theories of the Press. What is needed, instead, is academic engagement with journalism that is attentive to both the Global South and the Global North. That scholarship should take into account the geographically, historically, socially, culturally and politically specific conditions of modern journalism’s existence and the means by which it was discursively inculcated as the ‘natural’ way for stories of our shared existence are told. To overlook these fundamental aspects of journalism would be to ignore the substantial role of colonial and neo-colonial experience in the shaping of journalistic practice, norms and ideals in much of the Global South.

2.3.3. The Multifaceted Historical Geographies of Popular Journalistic Production

This thesis contends that a postcolonial, Spivakian (see Spivak, 1988) understanding of ‘epistemic violence’ – the violence carried out on the ways of knowing and understanding of non-Western, indigenous peoples – must be applied to journalistic ‘knowledge’. Such critique has problematized academic, scientific and philosophical ‘knowledge’ as well as highlighting the constraints on artistic expression brought about by the assumption of supremacy of European creative forms and conventions. Journalism – neither an academic nor artistic pursuit – has not been subjected, to anywhere near the same extent, to critique informed by postcolonial or subaltern theory. Journalism theorists persist, largely unchallenged, with a universalised Habermasian conception of their profession as providing a rational-critical public sphere with ‘objective’, factual information that is used to make social, economic and cultural ‘advances’, and with the Euro-centric assumption that this kind of journalism is an essential component of any society’s ‘development’, ‘progress’, or ‘modernization’.
For scholars of critical and popular geopolitics, concerned with the popular spatialization of our globe and global politics, this chapter highlights the need not just to look at the discursive, rhetorical and descriptive rendering of geopolitical space, but also to be attentive to the underlying practices, norms cultures, ideologies and discourses that shape and govern how and what kinds of popular knowledge are produced and distributed. Just as language and texts are never neutral, the forms of popular expression (e.g. journalism, poetry, film, popular music) are imbued with culture-bound textual practices and principles, which provide a framework for producers of popular texts in their creation of geopolitical ‘knowledge’.

This thesis, then, seeks to problematize the notion that academic and practical understanding of media and journalism, in a whole range of contexts, simply needs to be ‘de-Westernized’ (see Park and Curran, 2000). Just looking at journalism being practiced, or at journalistic texts, in non-Western contexts without taking into account the historically, geographically, culturally and politically specific contexts of journalism’s practices, culture, norms and conventions is inherently problematic. Our engagement with journalism needs not just to be de-Westernized but to be decolonised. We need an understanding of how physical, material and epistemic colonialism, in a range of settings, shape journalistic practice and representations.

The discursive power of journalistic works is too great, its role in constructing ‘knowledge’ and understanding of geopolitics (as well as innumerable other fields) too substantial for critical scholars to simply wait in hope that a critical, decolonising engagement with journalism emerges from elsewhere in the academy. There is a clear benefit for critical geopolitics to be derived from adopting such an undertaking; in doing so it would be able to achieve a better understanding of the epistemological mechanics that work to determine the nature of popular geopolitical knowledge production. Critical Geopolitics, with its historical focus on discourses and the social construction of geopolitical ‘knowledge’, is particularly well positioned for such an undertaking.

Alasdair Pinkerton (2013b) has recently argued that journalists should, in fact, be afforded much more attention in geopolitical scholarship. He suggests that as critical geopolitics has been forged through its desire to ask fundamental questions of how power works and might be challenged, there is
considerable argument for the investigation of the role of journalists in this regard. Pinkerton (ibid) proposes that in examining so called ‘professionals of geopolitics’, an elite group, composed of academics, policy consultants and pundits who regularly participate in and comment on international affairs, and who possess the institutional and cultural resources to project particular geopolitical arguments as informed and authoritative, has been created, and that this group should be expanded to incorporate journalists.

Pinkerton (2013b) cites Kuus (2008, p.2062) who argues that if geopolitics is to be understood as “the study of the geographical assumptions and designations that enter into the making of world politics… we need to examine carefully those who make and popularize these designations and assumptions”. Pinkerton (2013b, p.441) suggests that in order to understand these actors and interactions there are three crucial aspects of the journalistic profession that need to be investigated: “(i) the institutions and traditions of journalism, (ii) contemporary journalistic practices and (iii) the experiences of individual journalists.” These three features could, however, be usefully expanded from a framework for studying journalists in a geopolitical context to one for studying journalism in a geopolitical context. In order to do so, this thesis will, in addition to the factors suggested by Pinkerton (ibid), seek to explore, in the context of its case study, four additional factors: (i) journalistic texts, (ii) Journalistic professional culture, (iii) journalistic norms and ideals, and (iv) diversity and inclusion in journalistic institutions and products.

This thesis takes advantage of the methodological and conceptual flexibility and plurality offered by critical geopolitics as a discipline. While critical geopolitics’ initial focus on elite texts and discourse has been critiqued, on the whole, the discipline remains indebted to the insights offered by those early dissections of Victorian and Edwardian geographic discourses. The methodological discussions that have since taken place within the discipline have mostly sought not to proscribe, but to revise, tweak and add to (by incorporating feminist and post-colonial theory, for example) the methodological toolkit available to scholars of critical geopolitics.

Although several strands of critical geopolitical scholarship have called for a turn away from, or have at least questioned the usefulness of studying geopolitics via discourse, advocating, instead, a greater emphasis on
historicism, materiality, practice or performance (see Agnew, 2013; Kuus, 2007; Thrift, 2000), this thesis maintains that popular geopolitical discourses remain a crucial component of such a fine and nuanced investigation of journalism and geopolitics. This thesis remains indebted to Gearóid Ó Tuathail's (1996a) conceptualisation of geopolitics as a process of ‘writing global space’. Ó Tuathail (ibid) argues:

Geography was not something already possessed by the earth but an active writing of the earth by an expanding, centralizing imperial state. It was not a noun but a verb, a geo-graphing, an earth-writing, by ambitious endocolonizing and exocolonizing states who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and material interests.

(Ó Tuathail, 1996a, p.2, original emphasis)

While this thesis does keep texts and discourses central, Ó Tuathail's (1996a) definition of ‘geo-graphing’ as a verb, as an act, practice or process of ‘earth-writing’ raises new questions. If we are to understand geo-graphing as a process, there are, of course, many important factors that influence the nature of that process and, thus, the nature of the final product. This thesis seeks to act as an advocate for increased study of the historical geographies of popular media production. It contends that in considering journalism and geopolitics it is crucial to uncover the social, cultural, practical and institutional factors that affect this production, as well as the historical, geographical and cultural contingencies on which so much of the news media’s constructions of geopolitics rest.

It is important to recognise that any journalistic intervention in geopolitics will almost certainly be comprised of a multitude of different elements. In the simplest of terms, this means being mindful of the fact that any journalistic construction of geopolitics was produced and then read/watched/listened to. We should not make universalising assumptions about the nature of any of these processes, nor should we assume that they are unpolitical, straightforward or devoid of social and cultural contexts.

2.4. Thesis Structure
In exploring the multiple aspects of Gemini’s journalistic productions of popular geopolitics, each of the empirical chapters uses a distinct method appropriate for the object of its inquiry. These methods come from within critical geopolitics, as well as media and journalism scholarship. The thesis is, then, structured thematically rather than chronologically.

The next chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in the thesis. It critically examines mixed methods methodology and outlines how this thesis combines multiple methods in order to produce an epistemologically and ontologically coherent piece of research. In addition, it considers the positionality and subjectivity of the researcher in relation to the research.

The empirical section of the thesis begins, in Chapter 4, with an institutional overview and history of the Gemini News Service and the broader contexts in which it operated, intended to acquaint the reader with this thesis’s central case study. Gemini was a small, ‘alternative’ news features agency, active 1967-2002, which sought to provide news and analysis for, of and from the Global South and, by doing so, to help combat the inadequacies and inequalities inherent in the global news media and information systems of the time. The chapter outlines the raison d’être of the individuals who founded the agency, the ideals and principles of those people, the working practices of the organisation, and the change that occurred within and around Gemini during its existence. It also seeks to show that news features agencies – a concept that may be unfamiliar to many contemporary readers – were, during the period of decolonisation and the Cold War, through their wide dissemination of interpretative, analytical, long form and often editorialising journalistic content, considered to be influential shapers of ‘global public opinion’.

Chapter 5 moves on to assess Gemini’s ‘success’ using the criteria that it prioritised and the methods considered relevant by media scholars, media activist and international legislators concerned with media imbalances at the time. It presents the findings of a ‘news flow’ study – a quantitative content analysis – of 30 years’ worth (approximately 4,000 articles) of Gemini content. This quantitative method is not only a key means by which, historically, the global news media has been conceptualised and understood but, inside and outside of academia, has shaped much of the debate surrounding the deficiencies and inequalities in international news and communications.
Chapter 5 begins by considering the significance of ‘news flows’ as a methodology and a concept that has, historically, framed much of the debate surrounding the decolonisation of the news media. It goes on to examine which places were being written about by Gemini, who, in terms of nationality, was doing this writing and how this changed over time. It provides a macro-level, cartographic overview of Gemini’s journalism in order to gain an understanding of the extent and nature of its decolonisation of news and news production.

Chapter 6 takes the form of a close textual and discourse analysis of a smaller sample of Gemini’s material found in print in subscribing newspapers across the world. Using the broad definition of anti-geopolitics discussed previously, in which any representational challenge to established geopolitical imaginaries from ‘below’ the state might be labelled as such, it explores the extent to which Gemini, based on the discursive production of global space and global politics within its published articles, might fit this rubric; It considers the limitations implicit in being merely anti-geopolitical, simply fighting against or trying to counter a hegemonic discourse; and it concludes that while Gemini was an ‘alternative’ in a number of regards and in particular contexts, much of its construction of popular geopolitics was underpinned by hegemonic masculinist and colonial discourses.

Chapter 7 moves on to explore the social, cultural and practical factors that influenced or shaped Gemini’s geopolitical representations explored in Chapter 6, as well as exploring Gemini’s cultures and practices of ‘alternative’ news production in their own right. The chapter makes the point that a single news article, even if it bears the by-line of a particular journalist, has not come into being simply by that one reporter recounting what they have witnessed or experienced. The piece may be written by multiple journalists, named or unnamed; it will likely be edited or rewritten at the request of various senior figures; subeditors will substantially reorganise, amend and remove sections; another colleague will write the headline, choose appropriate photographs and illustrations and write their captions. This work takes place within a particular, often male-dominated and macho, professional culture. All of these elements, to some extent, influence the content that ultimately reaches readers, viewers and listeners. The chapter considers the effects of these practices, structures and cultures on the representations of global space.
It also seeks to examine the professional and philological conventions, ideals and norms of journalistic practice and the journalistic form, considering their geopolitical implications. It contextualises journalism as an historically, geographically, socially and politically contingent professional practice and philological form which, through various means, has been discursively inculcated as a ‘natural’ and universally applicable method for sharing stories about the world around us. It asks to what extent any organisation can be considered to be ‘decolonising’ news and journalism if it remains wedded to the notion of an historically and geographically contingent set of norms and ideals as universally applicable.

Finally, Chapter 8 reviews the central findings of the preceding five, concluding that Gemini was constrained, by various conceptual, practical and institutional structures, in its ability to make a contribution to the international media that could be considered as ‘decolonising’. The conclusion reiterates the call for critical geopolitics to engage not just with journalistic texts, but with the broader world of journalistic practice, culture and ideology. It argues that understanding journalism and the news media represents a key piece in the puzzle of understanding the geopolitics of the latter half of the twentieth century.
3. **Research Approach**

3.1. **Introduction**

In seeking to explore some of the multifaceted entanglements of journalism – as a set of texts, profession, professional culture, professional ideology, and philological form – and geopolitics, this thesis employs a mixed methods approach. It utilises content analysis methods in order to gain a quantitative, macro-level overview of the cartography of Gemini’s journalistic network and its journalism; it uses discourse analysis in order to investigate Gemini’s ostensibly ‘alternative’ geo-graphing of the world and its politics; and it employs historical methods – archival research and semi-structured interviews – to shed light on the practices, cultures, and epistemologies within the news agency.

Practical details of the implementation of each of these methodologies – how samples of textual material were collected, how data was quantified, etc. – are outlined within the empirical chapters where they are relevant. This is to avoid needless repetition and to give the reader these details closest to where they are most pertinent.

This chapter serves two primary purposes. First, the chapter seeks to outline how the multiple methods utilised in this thesis can be used in conjunction to produce an ontologically coherent piece of research. It examines the potential pitfalls of such ‘epistemological pluralism’ and draws on recent research in feminist geography that can serve as a guide to conducting mixed methods research.

Second, the chapter reflects on the subjectivity and positionality of the researcher and the historical sources consulted. In particular, it considers, in relation to the research being conducted, my position of privilege as a white male researcher from the Global North working in an elite institution. It details my approach to reading, and assessing for meaning and representations, popular historical texts – texts which were not written with me as the intended or imagined readership – as well as my approach to conducting interviews and archival research in a reflexive manner.
3.2. Social Constructionism and Mixed Methods Research

3.2.1. Can we Mix Methods Responsibly?

My own methodological and epistemological position and, consequently, that of this thesis is social constructionism. Constructionism rejects claims that one ‘true’, ‘objective’ ‘reality’ can be determined with reference to universal causal laws or principles (see Bryman, 2007). Instead, constructionism asserts that multiple, often coalescing, subjective social ‘realities’ coexist:

We [constructionists] do not believe that criteria for judging either "reality" or validity are absolutist… but rather are derived from community consensus regarding what is "real," what is useful, and what has meaning (especially meaning for action and further steps). We believe that a goodly portion of social phenomena consists of the meaning-making activities of groups and individuals around those phenomena. The meaning-making activities themselves are of central interest to social constructionists/constructivists, simply because it is the meaning-making/sense-making/attributional activities that shape action (or inaction).

(Lincoln et al., 2011, p.116)

This thesis, then, is centrally concerned with geopolitical ‘meaning-making’ and ‘meaning-making activities’ in and around popular journalism. Central to its methodological underpinnings are the insights offered by Donna Haraway (1988) in her discussions of ‘situated knowledges’. Haraway’s (ibid) contributions on the topic of partial and situated knowledges have had a major influence on methodological debates within critical geopolitics and geography more broadly (see McDowell, 1999; Moss, 2002; Nightingale, 2003a). ‘Situated Knowledges’ (Haraway, 1988) emphasises the impossibility of a detached, disinterested and objective observer in any form of inquiry. All ‘knowledge’, then, is emphatically linked to, and a product of, the contexts of its creation.

Haraway (1988, 1989; and others, see Collins, 1990; Smith, 1990) demonstrated that the production of knowledge could never be ‘neutral’ and was bound, intimately, with societal power and oppression. Her insights have irrevocably problematized positivist forms of inquiry, often conducted using quantitative methods, within the social sciences. Understandably, for many of those who accept the situated and partial nature of all ‘knowledge’, the mixing
of qualitative methods typically used to enable us to understand multiple, subjective, embodied meanings with methods imagined as producers of empirical, 'objective', 'total' comprehension may be troubling.

Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p.8), for instance, contend that the “mixed methods movement takes qualitative methods out of their natural home, which is within the critical interpretive framework... It divides inquiry into dichotomous categories, explanation versus confirmation. Qualitative work is assigned to the first category, quantitative research to the second”. For Denzin and Lincoln, qualitative research is used all too often to set the terms of reference, with the ‘actual’ research being conducted in the form of quantitative, largely positivist, inquiry (see also Howe, 2004; Teddie and Tashakkori, 2003).

In an article entitled “Mixed-methods Research: Positivism Dressed in Drag?”, Giddings (2006, p.195) argues that ‘naïve’ researchers often assume that by mixing quantitative and qualitative methods they are utilising the ‘best of both worlds’ and, therefore, can avoid exploring their ‘theoretical methodological positioning’. Giddings (ibid, p.200) believes that in many pieces of mixed methods research, “traditional positivist research language is used with a dusting of words from other paradigms... A qualitative aspect of the study is often ‘fitted in’.” While for some, the prioritising of positivist ‘thinking’ in mixed methods research might be primarily attributable to researcher ‘naivety’ (ibid), others have characterised the frequent elevating of quantitative methods in mixed methods inquiry as a ‘conservative challenge’ to the qualitative research movement (Denzin and Giardina, 2006).

Alongside these critiques of the implementation of much mixed methods research, some prominent methodologies thinkers have also questioned the extent to which it ‘makes sense’, on a conceptual and paradigmatic level, to combine multiple methods. Notably, in 1987, Egon Guba argued “The one precludes the other just as surely as belief in a round world precludes belief in a flat one” (Guba, 1987, p.31).

More than 20 years later, Yvonna Lincoln et al. (2011), while acknowledging that not all quantitative research is necessarily positivist, still contend that the majority of mixed methods research is paradigmatically unsound. They use tables to illustrate the discrete nature of certain paradigmatic positions and their attendant approaches to systematic inquiry.
They argue that positivist methods hinge on the ability to ‘prove’ or ‘disprove’ ‘facts’ in a ‘valid’ and replicable manner. Constructivists, on the other hand, seek to ‘reconstruct’ individual understanding, believing that multiple realities coexist in a social world (ibid; see also Gray, 2013; Phillips, 1987). Crucially, constructivists also acknowledge the subjectivity and positionality of the researcher as a formative aspect of the research process (Lincoln et al., 2011). These two research paradigms, Lincoln et al., (2011, p.174) argue, are “contradictory and mutually exclusive” (see also Guba, 1987; Guba and Lincoln, 1989, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). When it comes to designing research and choosing a method, Egon Guba (1987, p.31) summarised his position as, “Ya pays yer money and ya takes yer cherce!”

3.2.2. Epistemological Pluralism: A Way Forward Demonstrated by Feminist Geographers

In conducting this research, I have sought to remain mindful of the conceptual dangers, outlined above, that are often present in mixed methods research. Most notably, that the superficial ease with which qualitative and quantitative methods can, practically, be used in conjunction – with one ostensibly ‘filling in the gaps’ not covered by the other – can often obscure, or lead to poorly defined, theoretical underpinnings of the research (see Giddings, 2006). I find, though, the notion that a researcher must ‘pay their money and take their choice’ deeply unsatisfactory. To do so would be to assume that, in the case of this thesis, the (de)colonisation of journalism is one thing that can be researched, conceptualised and understood in one particular way. Such an assumption would seem to represent the very antithesis of the notion of partial, situated and limited knowledges.

Instead, this thesis employs the concept of ‘epistemological pluralism’ as articulated by Andrea Nightingale (2016), a concept which is being utilised in a number of areas of critical geographic investigation (see Popke, 2016). Nightingale (2003a, p.78) argues that “many feminist geographers have squandered opportunities to challenge ‘scientific knowledge’ by completely eschewing quantitative and other ‘hard science’ methods.” Her work looks at community forestry in Nepal, assessing changing land usages and the impact of climate change. It employs quantitative methods such as aerial photography
interpretation and vegetation inventories, as well as qualitative methods such as oral histories and participant observation (ibid). Nightingale’s aim was not to use the data from one method to ‘triangulate’ or validate the data obtained from the other, to check that the view from the ground was the same as the view from the sky. Rather, Nightingale (2016, p.42) went into the research with the expectation “that the results will not match.”

Using the two forms of inquiry, Nightingale was able to demonstrate the situatedness and partiality of ‘knowledge’ in a particular context. This approach also allowed her to challenge “‘dominant’ representations of forest change – in this case aerial photo interpretation – not by rejecting them outright, but by demonstrating explicitly how they provide only one part of the story of forest change” (Nightingale, 2003a, p.80).

Nightingale (2003a, 2016) stresses that it is important, in conducting such research, for each method to be robust on its own internal, paradigmatic terms. The aim should not be for the findings to disprove or confirm one another, rather “the silences and discrepancies between the results [should] be usefully assessed” (Nightingale, 2003a, p.81):

> When different kinds of knowledges are taken seriously and all are critically interrogated, richer results are generated, new interpretations emerge and the supremacy of any one kind of knowledge is challenged. (Nightingale, 2003a, p.81)

Nightingale’s (2003a, 2016) approach to mixed methods research provides a forceful rebuttal to the ‘incompatibilists’ who argue that quantitative and qualitative research should not be mixed due to the lack of commensurability between their attendant paradigms. By focussing on disparities, silences and conflicts, Nightingale makes the point that if one truly believes in the socially constructed, situated and partial nature of all ‘knowledge’, commensurability and compatibility should not be a priority.

In geographical research, epistemological pluralism has been used primarily in investigations of nature-science relationships, with particular focus on the multidimensional human impacts of climate change (see Goldman et al., 2016; Nightingale, 2003b; Popke, 2016; Yeh, 2016). Climate change can be understood abstractly, chemically, socially and politically. Investigating all of these multiple dimensions using epistemologically appropriate research design
in each instance is, Andrea Nightingale (2016, p.46) argues, “more likely to produce ecologically and politically robust solutions.”

In a similar vein, the colonisation of news and journalism is multidimensional; in different places, by different people, and at different times there have been varying attempts to address this issue, based on particular understandings of the problem (see Fuchs, 2010; Nordenstreng, 2013; Sparks, 2012). We might view the problem as one of exclusion and omission, a quantitative imbalance in who ‘gets’ to write the news and which places are written about. We might see it in terms of structural imperialism, with concentrating media power used to reinforce relations of dominance and oppression. We might conceptualise the issue as primarily representational, with popular journalistic material producing and reinforcing colonialist, orientalist and supremacist discourses. Epistemic violence might be the primary lens through which the subject is approached, with the notion of how one ‘knows’, records and represents ‘truth’ in journalistic form having been implanted by colonising forces. We might view the problem in a way that is more localised, to the workplace or the body, with certain cultures and practices privileging certain people and certain modes of operation. As Nigtingale (2016) observes in the context of climate change, all of these dimensions are ‘real’, though all are inherently partial, situated and limited.

To reiterate, I am not, in this thesis, attempting to construct any kind of totalising, ‘complete’ account of my subject by compiling multiple partial insights into something considered to be a ‘whole’. Areas of overlap, complementarity and consistency are certainly of interest, as are the gaps, discrepancies and conflicts. The subject of decolonisation of the media is multidimensional, understandable and understood in many different ways. I employ some of those approaches with appreciation of their partiality.

3.3. Sources, Subjectivity and Reflexivity

The sources used to inform this research have been retrieved, primarily, from archival collections of institutional and personal records, as well as repositories of published journalistic material (see Appendix 1 for details of all archives and repositories consulted). This has been supplemented with eight oral history
interviews conducted with individuals who worked for, with or contributed to the Gemini News Service (see Appendix 2 for details of interviewees and topics discussed).

Here, I detail my approach to extracting meaning from these various sources, taking three different types of sources – Interviewees, popular journalistic texts, and institutional archives – in turn. All of these sources have partial, situated, subjective and socially constructed insights to offer into the subject matter. I also detail how I believe my own position, societal status and privileges influenced the conduct of this research and the analysis of the various materials. I outline my attempts to remain cognisant of these influences and to conduct research and analysis in a reflexive manner.

3.3.1. Interviews

The interviews that I conducted were semi-structured and were tailored to the professional knowledge and experiences of each interviewee. In conducting the interviews, my journalistic training and experience was of considerable benefit in fostering detailed conversation. First of all, I was able to inform my interviewees of my journalism background, which, in my judgement, tended to allow for a more productive relationship than might otherwise have been the case. I sensed that several of my interviewees appreciated that I was not approaching the subject of journalism only from an academic perspective.

More importantly, my familiarity with journalistic jargon, processes, norms, culture and products greatly enhanced my ability to ask detailed and relevant questions and get detailed and relevant answers. The sorts of barriers to comprehension that can exist when two people are talking about the same thing using different nomenclature were, for the most part, absent. This allowed me to maximise my use of the time that my interviewees were able to give for discussion.

The main focus of the interviews were the aspects of Gemini’s production of popular journalistic geopolitics that were not or could not be preserved in an archive or in the journalistic texts themselves. I sought to learn, as well as my interviewees’ thoughts and feelings towards the institution, about the processes of writing, commissioning and editing articles for the service; the copyediting principles and techniques that were employed; Gemini’s editorial
ideals and ethos; the structures, hierarchies, practices and culture of the Gemini offices; and the management of and communication within Gemini’s large network of freelance writers.

In extracting these accounts, Ritchie’s (2002) advice to use a mixture of broad, open-ended questions and more specifically focussed questions was followed. Ritchie (ibid, p.81) calls this ‘funnel interviewing’; the interviewer “begins with general questions and then constantly narrows”, asking for more specific details about the subjects which the interviewee raises. Mischler (1986) has suggested that giving interviewees this leeway to influence the direction of the discussion can ‘empower’ them to produce their own narrative accounts. In the context of this research, though, this could, in some senses, be seen as problematic. All of the interviewees are or were senior journalism professionals and at least three were, at the time of the interview, teachers of journalism in a university setting. Most, then, had already formulated a narrative or theoretical framework for their work and may have attempted to impose this framework on the research being conducted. This temptation to try to guide my analysis of the case study may have been furthered by the significant distance in age between myself and the majority of my interviewees.

It was, of course, important to remain cognisant of these processes by which recollections of experiences are subsequently edited into narratives; however, ‘pure’, unvarnished ‘objective’ accounts were not the ultimate aim of these interviews. The interviews provided personal, subjective and fragmentary recitals of professional lives and helped to furnish understanding of how the interviewees understood, envisioned and ‘knew’ their roles (see Yow, 1997).

3.3.2. Historical Journalistic Texts

How individuals came to ‘know’ and understand their role, in a much broader sense, is also the focus of the part of the thesis concerned with Gemini’s popular geopolitical discourses. These discourses, ultimately appearing in the pages of subscribing newspapers, provided the information which readers use to construct an understanding of their ‘role’ in a geopolitical world. Chapter 6 of this thesis is concerned with whether/the extent to which Gemini’s journalistic discourses provided alternative, counter-hegemonic understandings of geopolitics.
In such work there is, of course, always the question of how to ascertain the meanings that readers actually extracted from popular texts. This question is made all the more difficult when those readers are historical and there exists little to no evidence of the nature of their engagements or interaction with the text. I am the one reading and assessing these texts for meaning; I am not, though, the intended or imagined audience for these texts. In large part this is because these texts were intended to be read contemporaneously – journalistic texts are typically not envisioned as pieces of writing with a long ‘shelf life’ – and my engagement with them occurred, in some cases, half a century after their production.

In addition to this issue of historical distance, there is the issue that the audiences who read Gemini’s material undoubtedly engaged in a whole range of meaning-making activities around the text. In Stuart Hall’s (1993) seminal paper ‘Encoding/Decoding’, he dispatches with the notion that there is one monolithic audience for any popular text. Instead, he suggests that there are three positions that readers of popular texts may take in their decoding of the material: a dominant-hegemonic position involves a reader decoding the text in its ‘intended’ format; a negotiated position occurs when a reader acknowledges the dominant message but is unwilling to completely accept it; and readers who take an oppositional position recognise the dominant meaning but reject it (ibid).

Susan Douglas (2008, p.69) argues that, following the work of Hall and others, in the 1980s and 1990s, media and cultural studies scholars were “urged to see polysemic ruptures everywhere, a thousand appropriations and oppositional readings blooming.” As a result, textual analysis diminished (ibid). To the notion that individual readers take different meanings from texts based on what they bring to it, Douglas responds:

Well, Amen… [T]his is particularly relevant when considering one individual media text on its own. But in this reverential attitude towards, and, at times, over-mystification of the hermeneutic process of others, we are supposed to demote, even devalue, our own hermeneutic skills. (Douglas, 2008, p.69)

In defence of textual analysis, Douglas continues:
If multiple media texts, from the same or different media outlets, represent certain kinds of narratives, heroes and villains repeatedly, favor and even magnify certain media frames over and over, there is likely to be some correspondence between these media representations and many peoples’ attitudes and beliefs.

(Douglas, 2008, p.69)

Douglas’s (ibid) spirited defence of textual analysis methods is particularly useful, here. To be valid, such analysis must concern itself with patterns, themes and tropes across and throughout media content. Douglas (ibid) suggests that when reading media texts historically, it is “very dangerous and historically irresponsible to do ‘a’ reading of one media text in isolation”. Instead, she suggests researchers must track the repetition and ubiquity of images, metaphors and narratives; “without finding such repetition, making certain claims about preferred readings are very difficult” (ibid).

In order to track the ubiquity and repetition of certain, tropes, themes and narratives in Gemini content, Chapter 6 of this thesis analyses a sample of 233 Gemini articles collected from 19 geographically dispersed subscribing newspapers published between 1969 and 2002.¹ A sample of this size was collected as it was judged to be small enough to allow, practically, for multiple close readings of the source material to be conducted, but also large enough to allow for reasonable conclusions to be drawn about the nature of Gemini’s production of geopolitics. A textual analysis of this scale allows us insight into the structures, systems and elements that are constructed by Gemini, most consistently, as ‘objectively’ extant facets of geopolitics.

As Douglas (ibid) suggests, textual analysis of this sort can rarely allow for substantive inferences beyond the ‘preferred reading’ of a source to be made. Particularly in the case of Gemini, which had such a broad and varied readership, it would not be feasible or realistic to determine what the huge array of negotiated or oppositional readings of the content might have looked like. The sheer range of historical, cultural and intertextual factors shaping potential readings are immense, as are the range of meanings that were ultimately extracted from the texts.

¹ An overview of the nature of this sample and the practical considerations that shaped it is provided in Chapter 6.
In its investigation of Gemini’s popular journalistic geopolitics, it is the preferred meaning – the dominant-hegemonic meaning – with which this thesis is interested. It follows Sharp’s (2000, p.26) suggestion that “geopolitical discourse[s]… provid[e] a series of scripts for those operating within the international realm”. Popular geopolitical discourses provide individuals who are not part of the geopolitical elite, who are not involved in the practical business of statecraft, with a ‘series of scripts’ that enable them to understand their role or position in a geopolitical world. Many will likely formulate a unique and nuanced understanding of that position based on negotiation with or opposition to those scripts. The scripts, though, provide an important broad popular framework, within and around which understanding is formed.

The effect of my distance from the historical settings in which these popular meaning-making processes occurred is, to some extent, lessened by the very nature of Gemini’s content. This content was intended to be read by an incredibly broad global audience and was heavily copyedited in an attempt to ensure maximum comprehension amongst a heterogeneous readership. The copyeditors took great care to ensure that local references in articles were explained and that sufficient context was provided, assuming little prior knowledge on the part of the reader in regard to stories with a specific local focus (see Chapter 7).

In fact, it is this ease of comprehension that presents, potentially, the biggest pitfall in the reading and interpreting of these historical media texts. The concise, clear and uncomplicated language used in the final, copyedited Gemini articles could, in some senses, mask their historic nature. Linguistically and stylistically, these articles are similar to contemporary pieces in mid-market publications. Sara Lennox (2006, p.297) argues that textual analyses that fail to acknowledge the ‘pastness of the past’ produce readings that are entirely ‘presentist’: “readers find in the text what is familiar but not what is strange or genuinely historical or different from the present.”

Lennox (ibid, p.298) acknowledges that there is some tension here; all analyses of historical texts are necessarily “readings informed by the historical situations in which we are embedded”. We should not be so naïve as to assume that we can completely comprehend the context in which an historical text was produced or received. At the same time, though, successful textual
analyses of historical sources, “will always only be the outcome of a great effort to understand the historical situation from which they derive and to which they respond” (ibid).

‘Understanding’ the historical ‘situation’ in which Gemini was working, in which its material was being read, and about which it was writing is, in many ways, a considerable undertaking. Gemini’s operations span 1967 to 2002; the apparent brevity of this mere 35-year period belies the magnitude of the global (geo)political, social and cultural changes that took place within it. In writing about this period, Geir Lundestad (2004) argues that many historians do so in a largely presentist fashion; they fail to acknowledge the lack of inevitability in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of a post-Cold War, unipolar international order. Such accounts can often fail to do justice to the fraught nature of Cold War international conduct and to the fear engendered on both sides by the prospect of the other gaining an advantage or ‘winning’. Cold War interventions played a significant role in shaping national and international political developments in the Global South over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century (see Westad, 2007); Keeping this context in mind, particularly the tendency for Western scholars to verge towards triumphalism and presentism, has been imperative.

More importantly, though, for this thesis, has been cultivating an understanding of the experiences of formal decolonisation for those involved with Gemini and those about whom Gemini wrote. As discussed in previous chapters, for many looking back at decolonisation today, it is thought of as an inevitably slight reformulation of the status quo. Colonialism morphed into neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism and unjust and unequal global power relations remained as they ever were (see Craggs, 2014). The extent to which this is a fair characterisation of the course of formal decolonisation is a debate for elsewhere. What is clear, though, is that for many involved in decolonisation the world in which we now live was not what was envisaged. For many hopeful and idealistic individuals, a more just and equal world was possible; the goals that they pursued were judged to be eminently achievable (ibid; see also Prashad, 2007). Attempting to place oneself in the context of this hopeful, optimistic movement has been key to doing justice to the historical situation in which Gemini operated.
In addition to acknowledging the ‘pastness of the past’ in this general sense, it has also been important to acknowledge the ‘pastness’ of the past media environment in which Gemini worked. Douglas (2008, p.71) suggests that we must “examine the media context: how was the media landscape changing during the period under study? What was new, and emergent, what was residual?” Gemini was operating in dozens of regional, national and subnational ‘media landscapes’, mostly in the Global South. As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, for the majority of the period in which Gemini operated the media environment in much of the Global South was characterised by burgeoning print production and a wide adoption of radio-listening. Gemini’s content, when it appeared in a newspaper in the Global South, was typically one of just a handful of competing information sources.

Chapter 4 of this thesis, which introduces the reader to Gemini and the context in which it worked, provides much of the basis for my reading of Gemini’s content. It outlines the extent to which news features agencies such as Gemini ‘mattered’ during the latter half of the twentieth century and the beliefs that many held about their ability to significantly influence global public opinion. It seeks to describe the place of Gemini’s material in the news media landscape.

Recognising the significance, role and positioning of certain types of material is a key aspect of reading news media texts historically. An article in a newspaper in 2018 and an article in a newspaper in 1968, although superficially similar, are two almost entirely different artefacts in terms of their ability to influence and construct popular meaning. Chapter 6, therefore, before dealing with Gemini’s content, begins by examining the nature of Gemini’s physical inclusion in the pages of its subscribing newspapers as a means to assess its meaning-making capacity and to present the material in a fuller context.

This appreciation of historical context must not, though, blind us to the contradictions and nuances in the media texts we are reading:

[W]e must pay careful attention to the contradictions within or against dominant representations. We may want or expect to see one thing from past media texts – unremitting racism or sexism, for example – but the
record may not always be that neat and clean, even when racism and sexism were widely accepted in society and obviously present in texts. (Douglas, 2008, p.71)

In essence, we must be attentive to the messiness of history; no period, organisation or movement is likely to have been without contradiction or complexity. In reading Gemini’s articles, I have sought to avoid ‘neat and clean’ characterisations of the nature and content of those articles. Just as ‘dominant representations’ do not always conform to our contemporary expectations of a period, ‘alternative’ journalistic constructions can encompass a wide range of positions and perspectives. In previous attempts, by those who were involved with the agency, to tell the story of Gemini, something of a ‘neat and clean’ narrative surrounding this ‘committed’, ‘progressive’, ‘alternative’ agency was formulated (see Bourne, 1995). Any useful reading of historical media texts must, though, abandon any temptation, conscious or subconscious, to ‘pick out’ and curate the parts that conform to preconceived notions about a particular period or a particular source. In exploring Gemini and its peers, this thesis seeks not to present a ‘clean’ summation of Gemini’s journalism, but to add complexity, intricacy and nuance to our understanding of the popular geopolitical discourses of this period. It seeks to produce an account that does justice to the messy, entangled and at times contradictory nature of the popular construction of geopolitics.

3.3.3. The Archive

3.3.3.1. Constituting an Archive

The most utilised archival collection has been that of the Gemini News Service, currently held by the Guardian newspaper. The Gemini company was owned by the Guardian group between 1973 and 1982; when Gemini ceased operations in 2002, Derek Ingram, the founder and owner of Gemini, donated its records to the Guardian News and Media archive to “ensure their long-term preservation and to provide access to researchers” (GNM, 2010). The 185 boxes of records, covering the entire period of its operations, include all of the articles produced by Gemini as well as original graphic material, management records, annual reports, accounts, minutes of board meetings and correspondence between the Gemini office, subscribing newspapers and correspondents (ibid).
I have also made use of the personal archive of the late Richard Hall, kindly made available by his family. Hall was an early investor in Gemini, edited the magazine *African Development* while it was owned by the Gemini company, and was a long-time contributor to the main syndicated service. His archive is in the process of being prepared, by his family, for donation to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The archive contains correspondence, journalistic writing and materials produced in preparation for that writing.

Archives are inherently partial and situated social constructs (see Craggs, 2016). The Gemini archive was never conceived of as an archive. It is not like a governmental archive, in which there exists a legal requirement to preserve artefacts. The Gemini archive is simply an organised collection of documents that were kept. This collection of kept documents was curated over the decades of Gemini’s operations by day-to-day decisions over which pieces of paper to discard and which to file away in the bottom of a drawer. Searching through the archive, copies of Gemini’s United Nations media peace prize certificate of merit and letters of congratulations from figures such as Malcolm Fraser and Commonwealth Secretary General Shridath Ramphal are easy to find. Critical material is far less abundant.

This issue is compounded by the idealistic nature of the enterprise in question. The agency was founded with the intention that it would be a force for good in the international media. There is an observable tendency in both contemporaneous and subsequent accounts of Gemini by those who were involved with it, to narrate the agency in a manner that accentuates its capacity for and record in countering the inequalities inherent in the global media system. In essence, much of the retained archival material presents what appear to be rose-tinted views of the agency.

Gray (2017) highlights this issue of a lack of ‘objectivity’ in the contents of archives curated by the companies which they document. He suggests that to overcome this ‘problem’, ‘cross-checking’ and, where possible, ‘methodological triangulation’ should be used to “check[ ] sources by using an alternative strategy” (ibid, p.559). As outlined in this chapter, ‘triangulation’ and ‘validation’ are not typically the priority of epistemologically pluralistic research. As such, that archival sources do not provide an ‘objective’ account is not especially problematic in and of itself. Rather than ‘cross-checking’ with other
sources to see if the accounts in archival material are ‘true’, the thesis compares and contrasts accounts, sometimes using differing methodologies, in order to examine the multiple, situated understandings of the same phenomenon. In Chapter 6, for instance, the thesis looks at how Gemini was presented to readers in the pages of its subscribing newspapers. This allows us to contrast the insights found in archival documents and offered by interviewees into Gemini’s own understanding and articulation of what it was for and what its place in the international media was, with the version of Gemini presented to its end readers.

The Gemini archive represents a very particular perspective; it was constructed, in large part, by the senior men of the agency as they curated a particular record of their organisation. It is, then, largely their perspective that is recorded in the archive; I remained cognisant of this fact throughout my investigation of archival material.

Gemini had a small editorial office in London, with the bulk of its writing being done by its large, geographically dispersed network of freelancers. The Gemini archive was constructed from the records retained in this office and must, as a result, be thought of as primarily an archive of this portion of the operation. The written perspectives of the freelancers ‘in the field’ are much less prevalent that those in the office. If such perspectives are present, it is, for the most part, only those that have passed through the filter of the London office staff that remain.

It is only relatively recently that critical historical scholars have been able to chip away at largely unspoken notions of archives as ‘complete’ and ‘objective’ repositories of historical ‘facts’ (see Brown and Davis-Brown, 1998; Hall, 2001; Schwartz and Cook, 2002). Within its epistemologically pluralistic methodology, archival collections used in this thesis are understood as inherently subjective and situated. They offer a useful, but limited, perspective on the issues and phenomena with which we are interested. While dealing with archival sources, I engaged in continuous self-dialogue and critical questioning of how and why sources came to be included in the archive, what is missing, and for what purpose were certain sources retained. The conclusions reached in relation to specific sources are reflected upon, where relevant, throughout the thesis.
3.3.3.2. Reading the Archive

Alongside the need to critically consider the numerous factors influencing the constitution of archives, there appears to be, within historical geography, a move towards increased interrogation of the often habitual and unexamined practices associated with actually doing archival research (see Bailey et al., 2009; Gagen et al., 2007; Mills, 2012). The act of doing archival work, like archives themselves, can never be devoid of social, cultural, political and personal contexts, all of which ultimately shape, to varying degrees, the research being conducted.

As Antoinette Burton (2005, p.10) argues, “the material spaces of archives exert tremendous and largely unspoken influences on their users, producing knowledge and insights which in turn impact the narratives they craft and the histories they write”. Burton’s (2005) edited collection Archive Stories offers several particularly instructive accounts of these ‘unspoken influences’ upon archival research. Durba Ghosh’s (2005, p.28) contribution to the collection reflects on the ‘fraught’ nature of conducting research in archives “in which we are ‘foreign’ (in one way or another)”. Similarly, Jeff Sahadeo’s (2005) contribution defines archives as “contact zones” in which ‘indigenous’ and ‘non-indigenous’ researchers and archivists can find themselves in conflict over ‘what counts’ as history. Both detail the suspicion and hostility that researchers who are not part of society’s hegemonic groups can feel as they navigate the security and bureaucracy of various archives. Archives are often places in which you are very closely watched and monitored. In societies stratified by class, race and gender, the nature and impact of this surveillance is unlikely to be uniform across all groups.

As a white, male researcher, suspicion and hostility were not what greeted me at the archives I visited. All of the formal archives I utilised required visitors to submit to a bag check on entry and exit and at the National Archives security guards wave a hand-held metal detector over every entrant. Never, though, were these checks, as I experienced them, anything more than performative and perfunctory. On multiple occasions I was permitted to flout rules that required researchers to sign in and out every time they entered or exited the reading room or that prohibited readers from returning to their lockers.
while material was still checked out. In multiple conversations with the archivists responsible for the collections I was consulting, I was told how pleased they were that someone was making use of these resources and that they felt it was a shame that the story of Gemini, and other ‘alternative’ news agencies of this period, was not known more widely.

In other words, I was mostly trusted and accepted and often conferred with a kind of socio-cultural ‘insider’ status. I was trusted not to ‘make trouble’ in the facilities, and seemingly not to ‘make trouble’ in my writing about Gemini and its peers. This stands in contrast to the experiences described by Durba Ghosh (2005) who, as a woman of colour researching colonial and postcolonial histories, recounts the sense that her motives seemed to be under suspicion from fellow researchers and staff members who suspected that her interest in certain materials was led by a desire to write a kind of disputatious history with which they did not approve.

Sitting, being made comfortable and welcome, in the oak-panelled archive reading rooms of the grand, art deco Senate House library, or the hushed spaces of the British Library, or the small archive facilities in the middle of the Guardian’s newsrooms – the epicentre of the UK’s ‘liberal’ media establishment – could, and likely did, have certain unconscious impacts on my reading and interpretation of the archive materials. Within the Guardian, I was surrounded by the reproductions of celebrated front pages which adorn the walls, portraying the newspaper’s ‘liberal’, democratic campaigning ideals. Knowing that Gemini was once part of the Guardian organisation, and that it cared to ensure that Gemini’s records were preserved upon its closure, this setting in which I engaged with Gemini’s records could certainly have fostered something of a celebratory interpretation of the organisation.

In many ways I may have also been predisposed to such an interpretation. I was particularly attracted to Gemini as a case study because of its liberalism, idealism and media activism. Over the course of my studies in media and journalism, and brief dalliance with a journalism career, I have been particularly interested in and concerned with inequalities and injustices in the international news media. Derek Ingram, Daniel Nelson and the other figures at the helm of the Gemini News Service were demonstrably interested in and passionate about these very same areas. My automatic and enduring feelings
towards these figures are of admiration. The thesis attempts to consider their work in a critical manner, particularly with regard to the limits and deficiencies in their attempts to aide in the decolonisation of news and media, and the potentially patrician nature of aspects of the Gemini News Service. My own positionality and biases are, though, necessarily a formative aspect of the conclusions drawn.

I viewed, and still view, the figureheads and journalists of Gemini as laudable individuals. Many of them gave up secure, well-paying and prestigious jobs in Fleet Street to pursue a much riskier and less lucrative, but well-intentioned, enterprise. Their broad aims, to assist in the provision of space for journalists in the Global South in the difficult-to penetrate international media, I view as worthwhile and necessary. That my instinct was and is to identify with the men at the helm of Gemini (masculinities in journalism and geopolitics are discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7) is instructive. The individuals in senior positions with the news agency were mostly white men from the Global North working in London. I am also a white man from the Global North working in London. It seems very likely, then, that a researcher who did not share some or all of the substantial privileges that I have, would not so instinctively have identified with Derek Ingram et al. Some researchers might have identified more with some of the journalists in the Global South, with the managers of Gemini representing powerful, potentially intimidating, and possibly hubristic, professional gatekeepers. Others might have seen themselves more in the subjects of certain journalistic discourses, with very little power over their representation.

When working with archival material, then, it is imperative to denaturalise the processes of reading and interpreting the ‘knowledge’ contained within such material. It is crucial to develop a critical reflexive practice, to allow one, as much as is possible, to become aware of one’s own subjectivities, positionality, experiences and privileges and their effects.

Bolton (2010, p. 14) describes reflexive practice as, “making aspects of the self strange”:

The reflexive thinker has to stand back from belief and value systems, habitual ways of thinking and relating to others, structures of
understanding themselves and their relationship to the world, and their assumptions about the way that the world impinges upon them.

(Bolton, 2010, p.14)

This is the approach I have attempted to take in all of my archival research. In practice, though, this process is not quite a straightforward as the above quote seems to suggest. I have found the notion of ‘standing back’ to be a helpful one, although it is important to keep in mind that the act of ‘standing back’ involves attempting to critically assess a lifetime’s worth of conditioning, learning and experiences in relation to their effects in particular settings and on particular processes. There exists no simple practical guide – because it is not a simple practical operation – on how to become a reflexive researcher and how to conduct research in a reflexive manner. Most commentaries suggest that reflexivity includes mindfulness, self-awareness, critical self-reflection and self-evaluation, discussion and a commitment to continuous personal development (see Bolton, 2010). In short, I have attempted to gain and utilise an understanding of how I am perceived, treated and experienced by others, how I perceive, treat and experience others, both in person and in reading their archived testimonies, and how these interactions are shaped and influenced by relations of class, race, gender and privilege.

I note the importance of how I am/was treated in the course of conducting archival research. This is an under-scrutinised area in archival research, a practice which is often conceived of only in terms of the relationship between researcher and the archival material (see Ghosh, 2005). In practice, of course, doing archival research involves interaction and negotiation with gatekeepers, dealing with numerous security procedures and protocols, and existing and working in a very particular environment with a particular atmosphere and particular norms and expectations. It is important for the reader to be aware of the factors outlined above. As Preissle (2008) argues, we must detail such factors:

to help researchers identify how their personal features, experiences, beliefs, feelings, cultural standpoints, and professional predispositions may affect their research and to convey this material to other scholars for their consideration of the study’s credibility, authenticity, and overall quality or validity.

(Preissle, 2008 p.844)
The factors outlined above – identification with the aims of Gemini, a socio-cultural ‘insider’ status, and the relatively stress-free manner in which I am permitted to engage with relevant source material – seem primed to produce a largely celebratory account of the Gemini News Service and its work. I have attempted to employ a critical reflexive practice in my research, guided by Gayatri Spivak’s (Gunew, 1990, p. 63) advice that researchers must develop “a historical critique of [their] position as the investigating person”. I have attempted to ‘stand back’ and observe and reflect upon the numerous ways in which my interpretations and actions are shaped by socio-cultural context. I am confident that I have been able to do so in a manner that has allowed me to gain a critical perspective on my own positionality and conduct the research in a manner that has allowed me to produce a valid and robust analysis. It would be foolish and problematic for me, or any other researcher, to try to claim, though, that they had been able to ‘step back’ so sufficiently that they were in a position to offer an assessment of their subject that was not formed, in some way, by their own positionality.

My aim, then, is not to produce a complete or definitive account of the subject, but a critical interrogation that might have some utility. In 2018, decolonisation – most often discussed in terms of representation – of the popular media appears to be an issue that is at the forefront of many public discourses. The area that has attracted the most attention, in terms of broad public engagement, has been Hollywood. Speeches, protests, commentaries and various other forms of public activism have given more visibility than ever to the paucity of film and television roles for actors of colour, the exclusion of black and brown people from writing and production positions, and the racist tropes, narratives and stereotypes that have characterised Western cinema for more than a century.

In journalism, the issues of continued colonisation of the news media – at both the domestic and international level – has not, for a variety of reasons, captured comparable levels of broad public engagement. Activist groups in the west, though, continue to highlight and campaign against the journalistic profession’s dominance by elites and the injustices which are perpetrated in much of the mainstream press’s reportage of marginalised peoples and
communities. In much of the Global South, activists, journalism professionals and academics continue to attempt to unpick, practically and conceptually, the imposition of colonial press systems and cultures, and to consider the best ways of providing for the informational needs of their diverse societies (see Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, 2005; Schiwy, 2008).

The thesis aims to present a critical analysis, interrogation and commentary which is situated and partial. It sees the leaders of Gemini and other associated organisations as well-intentioned; it supports the broad aims that Gemini expressed and asserts that there is still as much need as ever for continuing work in the areas in which it was engaged. It is because it supports these broad aims that it seeks to interrogate the means employed in pursuance of these aims in as critical a manner as possible.

It is hoped that this critical account of these historical movements aimed at decolonising news and journalism can provide useful insights for contemporary and future fights for the decolonisation of popular geopolitical representations and representational practices. I hope to achieve this by uncovering and highlighting some of the substantial, but largely ignored, historical drives for fairness and justice in the international media that were invested with substantial value in the past and have continuing legacies in the present. I see, in part, the value of this work as that it might provide rough templates for successful contemporary action. More important, though, are the critical insights offered into the practical and conceptual deficiencies and failings of these organisations, which, again, might prove instructive for contemporary movements. In taking a stance which advocates for the decolonisation of the international news media, it seeks to play a role in informing productive inter-generational connections between media activists. This is the basis on which I assert the validity of the research presented in this thesis.
4. The Gemini News Service and News Features Agencies in the Era of Decolonisation and the Cold War

Gemini’s posted despatches as they arrived to subscribers twice a week. Source: Information Research Department: Registered Files, The National Archives (Carruthers, 1971a).

4.1. Introduction

The Gemini News Service was a news features agency, active 1967-2002. Emerging in the context of rapid decolonisation, Gemini’s reporting focused on “Issues that were directly related to the [Global] South” (Interview, Daya Thussu); it challenged the ‘parachute’ reporting of ‘developing’ countries by Western correspondents, relying instead, where possible, on reporters resident in the countries about which they were writing. The project was devised by idealistic British journalist, Derek Ingram, who was concerned that existing international press agencies and syndication services produced little in the way of coverage of the Global South, and that what was produced was of poor quality, lacked depth and focussed mainly on war, famine and disasters (Ingram, 1965, 1971, 1983, 1998; NewsConcern, 1984a). Ingram was
convinced that this should not and need not be the case; the agency that he founded was conceived of as a means to set about addressing these issues.

Throughout its 35-year history, Gemini had a straightforward as well as a consistently articulated rationale (see Gemini, ca. 2000; Ingram, 1965a, 1971a, 1980, 1983, 1998; Keeble, 1998; Pulford, 1983b). Its concern was that international journalism remained colonised in the topics and regions that it covered and the perspective from which this coverage was written. Telling the story of the agency that he created, for an article in the trade publication The Media Reporter, Ingram (1980) presents his appreciation of the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape as a key factor Gemini’s ‘success’:

Gemini was early to recognise the changing needs of the developing countries and was able to go some way towards meeting them. Gemini had begun to play a role in what is now called the “decolonisation” of news long before the great debate began about imbalances of news flow.

The theory behind Gemini was simply this. By the mid-sixties the colonial age was dead, and in the new age of non-alignment and the desire to re-create separate national identities many newspapers no longer wanted the kind of material that had been flowing to them from the big agencies and from the syndicated services of the western, mainly British and American, newspapers. For one thing, most of this copy was written for western readers.

The world of Andy Capp was not relevant in Zambia or Sarawak or Guyana. And subjects that were of burning interest in Fleet Street meant nothing in Madras or Dar es Salaam. Furthermore, why should copy written about those countries always be written by British and/or American journalists?

How would the British like it if everything that was written about their country was by Indian or African journalists? However conscientiously individual western journalists might try to see events through Asian or African eyes, they could not hope to do that any more than an Indian could see events in Britain through British eyes.

(Ingram, 1980, p.25)

Gemini, then, positioned itself publicly as an organisation that was consciously attempting to adapt to and serve a purpose in a new, exciting decolonising world. It sent out its first articles, to subscribing newspapers mainly in the Global South, from its offices on Fleet Street in January 1967. Although practically unheard of in the UK, and in the West and Global North more generally, in parts of the South, particularly countries of Southern and Eastern Africa and the small islands of the Pacific, Gemini, during this crucial period of
transition and global reconfiguration, was an influential part of the news media landscape (Bourne, 1995).

Derek Ingram believed passionately in decolonisation and was hopeful about the prospects of the newly-independent countries, especially places such as Zambia and Tanzania, in which he had a particular interest, emerging onto the international scene (Ingram, 1960b, 1965b, 1985). From Ingram’s (1962; 1965b; 1969; 1977a) books, one certainly gets the sense that he was unshakable in his conviction that a better, fairer and more equitable world lay just around the corner. Ingram was a prolific writer on such matters with a large international readership. From our vantage point today, however, Gemini and Ingram are typically overlooked. It is perhaps a perceived lack of level-headed, realist foresight that has contributed to the reluctance of contemporary scholars and researchers to examine Gemini, Ingram and their work. Nuclear-fuelled bipolarity has dominated much scholarship concerned with the period in which Ingram worked (see Ayoob, 2002); with a viewpoint that sees East-West confrontation as the defining characteristic of this era, Ingram’s’ area of interest can be dismissed as niche or even eccentric. This is coupled with the fact that his vision of the future has largely failed to materialise.

The fact that so many of the concentrated and determined efforts at global reconfiguration that so many people believed in largely failed to come to fruition in any meaningful sense should not, though, make this period, and those people, organisations and movements who were invested in this period, any less intriguing for historians and historical geographers. That belief, hope and optimism was, after all, very much real. The movements that Gemini was involved with and championed still have legacies in the present, even if those legacies are not exactly what were imagined or hoped for at the time. This thesis, by studying Gemini, aims to bring attention to these optimists, disrupting notions of this period as one in which colonial practices and ideology – in multiple settings and at multiple scales – simply continued uncontested.

Gemini, with its closeness to and belief in so many of these hopeful movements aimed at reformulating global politics, frequently found itself at the intersection of several dynamic geopolitical, political, social, journalistic and ideological currents. Subsequent chapters take several of these currents in turn; here, the reader is introduced to Gemini the institution and the individuals
within it. First it provides a macro-level institutional overview of the agency, its founding, its history, and its (geo)political and journalistic ethos. Second, it explores Gemini’s place and significance, as well as that of other news features agencies, in the ecology of the international news media during at the time. It argues that international news features agencies were a far more significant part of this ecology than their overlooking by media and journalism academia might suggest. This is evidenced, in this chapter, by the fact that British and American intelligence agencies, as part of their Cold War propaganda operations, were expending so much effort in attempts to manipulate and control the contents of features agencies. The chapter details the work of the British Foreign Office’s Information Research Department (IRD), which was influencing the content of multiple international syndication services, as well as the attempt made by the IRD to bring Gemini into its operations. It also looks at Forum World Features, which had an operating model that was very similar to Gemini’s, was, for a time, Gemini’s most significant commercial competitor, and was later revealed to be a CIA propaganda operation.

4.2. The Gemini News Service

4.2.1. Gemini History and Ethos

Gemini sent out its first packet of six feature articles in the first week of January 1967. As a news features agency, it provided subscribing newspapers with long-form, interpretative and analytical material, essays, interviews and comment pieces. These were typically 1,000-1,500 word articles that had more of a ‘shelf life’ than straightforward news stories. Derek Ingram (1994) always had an ambivalent relationship with the label ‘features agency’, explaining to his successor as editor in 1994, that he called it the Gemini News Service and not Gemini Features Service because, “‘Features’ is a slow word”. News may garner more respect than features in the journalistic world, however, an interview with the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Ghandi, by prominent Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar in the agency’s first set of articles signified Gemini’s determination to become a prominent feature on the landscape of the
international news media. Despite its small size – its permanent staff never exceeded ten people – Gemini operated for more than 30 years and provided content for around 100 newspapers and news organisations worldwide. Promotional material sent out by Gemini in 1970, just three years after its launch, boasted, “Forty million readers in 44 countries are seeing Gemini News Service” (Gemini, 1970a) (see Figure 1). Exactly how this figure was calculated is unclear; while advertising hyperbole should almost certainly be met with some scepticism, Gemini did have a substantial (if almost impossible to accurately quantify) presence in much of the press of the Global South.

Figure 1: Gemini promotional brochure produced in 1970. Reverse reads, “What’s so special about Thursday July 23rd, 1970? Nothing. It was just a day we picked at random to show off some of our cuttings.” Source: Gemini archive (Gemini, 1970a).

In the areas in which Gemini had a large presence, particularly southern and eastern Africa, Gemini’s name, and even more so the name of its founder and director, Derek Ingram, is still fondly remembered in certain news and journalism circles. When asked, in 2011, if he recognised the name Derek Ingram, veteran Zambian journalist Jones Kaumba, who has been a reporter since the early 1970s, responded:

Although securing this interview was a big ‘scoop’, Ingram was not impressed by Nayar’s copy. One week later, Ingram wrote to his friend Richard Hall: “Nayar asked all the wrong questions and got all the wrong answers to those he did ask. I was in a spot. I couldn’t suppress it, although it was hardly worth putting out” (Ingram, 1967a).
You can’t talk about journalism without talking about Ingram… I have a lot of respect. Not only me, virtually all Zambian journalists have a lot of respect for that gentleman… For me, you see, once in a while you come across journalists like that who take their responsibility a bit further, and I think that’s what Ingram has done.

(Jones Kaumba interviewed by Ruth Craggs in 2011; see Appendix 3)

In 2015, when Ingram turned 90, The Zimbabwean (2015), an independent tabloid, ran a celebratory piece extolling his achievements, noting, “Derek was… the founder and first editor in 1967 of a news and feature agency – Gemini – that helped change the way the largely Western industrialised world saw and related to the so-called Third World.”

Partly due to the small size of the organisation, but also largely due to his force of character and strong convictions about what the news service should be and do, it is difficult to separate Gemini as an entity from Ingram as an individual. Even after his formal retirement he remained something of an omnipotent presence in Gemini; Ingram continued to write articles for the service, travel to and report on events such as Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs), and was regularly brought back into the fold to steer Gemini through various crises.

Ingram, who, prior to setting up Gemini, was deputy editor of the Daily Mail, has cited several experiences that convinced him of the need for such a service to exist. Firstly, while holidaying in Cyprus during the summer of 1954, Ingram became particularly anxious about growing support among Greek Cypriots for Enosis (union with Greece) and the potential for inter-communal violence (Bourne, 1995). In particular, Ingram was concerned that the British colonial authorities seemed to be so unaware of and uninterested in the extent to which pressures were building among the communities of the island (see Ingram, 1960b, pp.30-31). Ingram (ibid) wrote in his journal at the time: “If you did not ask you could stay in Cyprus a month and never hear a sound about the political problems; scratch the top and the feeling is all there, wherever you go.”

Just months after Ingram left, on December 18, 1954, three young Cypriot men were shot, two fatally, by British troops while protesting the decision of the United Nations General Assembly not to consider Cyprus’s status (see Crawshaw, 1978; Holland, 1998). The tragedy arose from Britain’s
decision to “use a strong hand to break Cypriot morale” (Simpson, 2004, p. 930). For Ingram the bloodshed was both needless and preventable; he noted: “Good information services over the last few years could have prevented all this trouble… The shots on Saturday were an admission of failure” (Ingram, 1960b, p.33). There had been, in Ingram’s mind, a failure of British newspapers to investigate and report on the situation, which may have prompted the British government to act; there was a failure by the colonial authorities to fully investigate and understand the tension and anger that was building and, in addition, a failure by those same authorities to address the situation by promoting the advantages of a peaceful transition to independence, rather than a union with Greece (ibid). For Ingram, this episode demonstrated that decolonisation, of which he was a firm supporter, could go horribly, violently wrong. The shooting was a precursor to the armed conflict of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959) and convinced Ingram that effective communication and mutual understanding, both between countries and amongst communities, would be a necessary tool in preventing and combating the emergence of similar situations in the future.

This interest in the politics of decolonisation was further piqued by a visit, in 1958, to his friend and former colleague Richard Hall in Northern Rhodesia. Hall was preparing to launch the African Mail, a newspaper that would champion Zambian independence. This trip brought Ingram into contact with both Zambian independence leaders and colonial administrators. This marked the beginning of Ingram’s passionate engagement with anti-racist and anti-apartheid movements.

On his return, Ingram wrote several open letters in the Daily Mail to British and African politicians urging them to work more decidedly towards African majority rule (see Ingram, 1959, 1960a). He followed this dialogue on Rhodesia with several idealistic books dealing with issues of race and the Commonwealth. Partners in Adventure in 1960 and Commonwealth for a Colour-Blind World in 1965 extolled the virtues of the Commonwealth as a multi-racial organisation with voluntary membership based around principles of equality. Ingram wrote:
Two problems above all others torture our minds in this second half of the 20th century... The first is the atomic threat to our civilisation, the second the relationship between the black man and the white. The greatest single, significant factor about the Commonwealth is that it transcends all racial barriers.

(Ingram, 1960b, p.43)

Such concerns put Ingram out of step with the Daily Mail's conservative editorial line and the political views of its owner (see Bourne, 1995). The presence of two moderately liberal editors at the paper, William Hardcastle and Mike Randall, had previously protected Ingram from the newspaper's conservative proprietor (ibid). Even before Randall's exit in 1966, Ingram felt that his position at the right-wing paper was not sustainable. In April 1965, Ingram wrote to Richard Hall telling him, “I think the crunch is near”:

There is now a move to put me into a new post in which I would be in overall control of the hiring of editorial staff for the whole group – Mail, News and Sketch… It is, as you will see, a kind of admin-cum-managerial job… It is also a... way of getting me out of the Mail editorial.

(Ingram, 1965c)

It seems likely that Ingram could have gone on to any number of jobs in Fleet Street, as he himself speculates in this letter to Hall. He also had the option of pursuing an executive position at the Mail but, instead, seems to have had little interest in taking this more conventional and more secure career path:

I might even [in the proposed position at the Daily Mail] work my way into managerial circles so successfully that a directorship loomed on the horizon. In addition, the job would take me away from the daily grind of producing a newspaper... On the other hand, I object very strongly to being squeezed out of the editorial hierarchy, for that is what is happening. I do not want to spend the rest of my life acting as a personnel officer. I am first and foremost a journalist and this I wish to remain... I am in no doubt that the time has come to do other things, and you know that I have felt this for a long time... The choice facing me is this: either I accept a safe job, very comfortable life and remain with [Associated] Newspapers perhaps for the rest of my working life or I... take a gamble... I am still as sold as ever on the Commonwealth agency idea... If I don’t have a go at it I shall always reproach myself for not doing it.

(Ingram, 1965c, original emphasis)
That Gemini was something of a passion project for Ingram was clear from the outset. The name was chosen as, in addition to being Ingram’s star sign, Geminis are supposedly famed for their curiosity and communication skills. The logo, which remained the same for the duration of Gemini’s operations, was intended to reflect Ingram’s, and by extension Gemini’s, commitment to racial harmony, with the ‘M’ designed to depict a black figure and a white figure shaking hands (see Figure 2).

![Gemini Logo](image)

**Figure 2**: Logo for the Gemini News Service. Designed in 1966 and in use for the duration of Gemini’s operations. Source: Gemini archive (Gemini, 1966b).

It was Richard Hall who introduced Ingram to his eventual business partner in Gemini, Oliver Carruthers. Few concrete details are recorded about Carruthers other than that he served as a District Officer in the Colonial Service in Northern Rhodesia during the administration of the final British governor, Evelyn Hone (Bourne, 1995, p.12). Historian Bizeck Jube Phiri (1991, p.65) suggests that colonial officials during the tail end of British rule in Northern Rhodesia were often ‘conservative liberals’ who were typically “sympathetic to African interests in a paternalistic manner”. From the little known about Carruthers, it seems that this may be a label that could be applied. Richard Hughes’ (2003, p.102) history of the Capricorn Africa Society notes that Carruthers worked for the organisation in Northern Rhodesia in 1958 as an executive officer. Capricorn Africa was a mostly European-run ‘pressure group’ working throughout Southern and Eastern Africa. The society advocated for a society where an individual’s standing should “be determined by his personal qualities and not by the color of his skin” (Phiri, 1991, p.75). It did, though, maintain troublingly hierarchical conceptions of humanity, campaigning on the principle of "equal rights for all civilised men" (ibid, emphasis added), and for a qualified franchise in Northern Rhodesia, based on statutory qualifications. On his return to the UK in the late 1960s, Carruthers continued to be involved with
Capricorn, chairing committees that worked to support African and Asian students undertaking their studies in the UK (Hughes, 2003).

Ingram and Carruthers became equal partners in Gemini (Gemini, 1966a), although Carruthers was to provide much of the capital needed to launch the service from his personal fortune (Bourne, 1995). The two did not know each other particularly well and the partnership was something of a marriage of convenience; Ingram was looking to start his agency and Carruthers, who had a great deal of inherited wealth, was looking for a project that would bring him back to the UK (ibid). Richard Bourne (1995) depicts a tense period during the earliest years of Gemini, with frequent disagreements between Ingram and Carruthers. An obvious source of tension was the financial side of the operation, which proved difficult for either Ingram or Carruthers to manage (Bourne, 1995). This was reflected upon by Richard Bourne’s (1995) history of Gemini, News on a Knife-edge, which recalls the organisation’s near-constant fiscal insecurity and the difficulty it faced in trying to make news of the Global South financially viable. In a report sent to investors and shareholders in 1969, Ingram (1969) made clear that after almost three years of operating the main focus of the company was still ‘reputation building’ and, therefore, “it [Gemini] cannot… under any pretext be considered a fast, money-spinning operation”.

That Gemini should not have been considered a ‘money-spinning operation’ was, perhaps, something of an understatement. Daniel Nelson, who joined Gemini in 1981 as Ingram’s deputy, eventually taking over as editor of the service upon Ingram’s retirement, talked of the financial ineptitude of the entire organisation:

The thing is, Gemini was run by journalists. Except for Oliver Carruthers, the co-founder, all of us were utterly incompetent at business. Derek Ingram was hopeless, absolutely hopeless. I’m hopeless. I think if you looked at the other people, even subsequent editors, we were all really poor... We all had so little business sense. Some of the stories: The Tanzania Standard didn’t pay us for seven years! Nobody wanted to cut them off because we loved Tanzania and we liked the Standard. Eventually they said ‘ok, we’ve finally managed to get the money through from the Bank of Tanzania. They’ve given us approval for foreign exchange.’ One year later, Derek said ‘we still haven’t been paid!’ Then they sent a message saying that the Bank of Tanzania has burnt down and we’ve lost all of the paperwork. We often
went on providing the service to people who weren’t going to pay just because we liked them and they were good and they needed support. But it was not business-like.

(Interview, Daniel Nelson)

Further evidence of Derek Ingram’s lack of a hard-nosed approach to business can be seen in the correspondence between Ingram and his creditors, who were often concerned about newspapers failing to pay their subscription fees. In one exchange, Ingram (1976) wrote that he was “anxious that we should not offend people” by chasing payment too aggressively, adding, “papers and countries in many areas where we are dealing have their ups and downs” and that they simply needed to wait “until things come better again”. It seems clear that Gemini’s perennially perilous finances were, in large part, down to the lack of business experience and acumen possessed by its senior staff, alongside the fact that the agency was attempting to sell its content to newspapers with very limited financial means.

It also seems likely that the business side of the operation was an area with which Ingram and his senior partners had little interest; the primary aims of Gemini were journalistic. While Gemini may have lacked a clear sense of business direction, the ethos of the organisation and its raison d’être, on the other hand, were clearly defined from the beginning. In outlining a proposal for the formation of a Commonwealth news service in 1965, Ingram stated that such an organisation should aim to:

(i) Enlist the best local journalists to write commentaries on local affairs, emphasising where necessary the Commonwealth aspect. (ii) To supply these commentaries to both newspapers and radio stations. The aim would be to obtain really high quality material written by people thoroughly qualified to tackle their subject… This service would make Commonwealth countries better informed on each other’s prejudices and inclinations… Thus Indian newspapers would be kept better abreast of events in Pakistan or Malta.

(Ingram, 1965a)

Ingram’s proposal was met with a lukewarm response; the information secretary at the British High Commission in Canada concluded: “[N]ewspapers have to sell and make money, and this they do by cramming themselves full of local news and local advertisements… I cannot imagine an editor in Alberta or
Saskatchewan giving two glances to an article on Sierra Leone or even New Zealand” (Baxter, 1965). Gemini, the organisation that was eventually borne of those proposals, opted to forgo any formal links with the Commonwealth, favouring instead a number of informal ties and strong support for the principles of the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth as an organisation. The key principle of, whenever possible, using a journalist resident in the country about which they were writing was retained and was at the core of Gemini’s expressed identity and ‘mission’ until its closure in 2002 (Bourne, 1995).

As well as attempting to offer ‘local’ perspectives on important events, Gemini expressed its intention to report on the places and stories that did not typically get much attention. At an event celebrating the 25th anniversary of Gemini, Ingram (1992) recalled, in the years prior to the establishment of Gemini, receiving copies of newspapers from Commonwealth countries in Asia and Africa, in which he read articles about Aberystwyth, Truro and Kincardine, syndicated from London newspapers such as The Sun and Daily Express. Kelly McParland, an assistant editor for Gemini during the mid-1980s, developed this point further, arguing that what Gemini was attempting was not only to report on underreported places, but also to change the nature of that reporting:

[While] ‘disaster reporting’ is the meat and potatoes of most international news services, it forms only a moderate part of Gemini’s coverage. This is because such events form only a small part of what is newsworthy in the countries Gemini covers. Britain, France, Canada, the USA, Japan, Australia – none of these countries has had a military coup to speak of in recent memory, none has endured a famine costing millions of lives, none is at war. Yet all manage the daily feat of filling the pages of their newspapers with domestic news. Should it be considered surprising that the Third World, with many times their combined populations, likewise comes up with the occasional bit of news on other fronts?

At the very heart of Gemini’s philosophy is the belief that this should not and need not be the case. (McParland, 1986, p.397)

4.2.2. Gemini The Institution

For its first five years, Gemini operated from small offices on Fleet Street, quickly establishing a production and publication pattern that remained relatively constant for the duration of the enterprise. Subscribers would receive
two packets of articles a week, sent by post from London on Tuesdays and Fridays, each containing six articles (see Figure 3). Alan Rake, a British journalist who had spent much of his professional life working in Africa and who joined Gemini in 1968, recalled in an interview with Richard Bourne (1995) the ‘haphazard atmosphere’ of the agency’s early years. He described a situation ‘weak on contractual arrangements’ where one could never quite tell who was a full-time employee and who was just visiting (Bourne, 1995, p.13).

A Typical Gemini Article

The cover page (Left) usually containing a headline and illustration, often of one of the key figures in the story. Page 2 (above) usually contained a map, diagram or further illustrations. The story pages (below) contained the text of the article, a summary and a short piece of biographical information about the author. Articles tended to run to 3 – 4 sides of A4 paper and were generally 1,000 – 1,500 words long.

Figure 3: A typical Gemini feature from 1988. Figure compiled by author. Source: Gemini archive (Ingram, 1988).
This lack of formal structure is something that persisted in Gemini. In a formal report to stakeholders in 1973, Ingram (1973a) could only give the vaguest of statements about job roles and employment; he reported: “[T]he number of people who devote more than 75 per cent of their time to the news service is probably around half a dozen.”

This is not to say that Gemini was badly managed; it was simply an organisation that, for its editorial staff at least, largely eschewed formally prescribed job roles and strict delineation of duties. With a small team, in which it was not uncommon for members to be out of the country either reporting or trying to forge contacts and sell subscriptions, it was necessary for the staff to be able to take on a range of tasks whenever necessary.

The figures that dominated the first decade of Gemini were Ingram and two other journalists: Dickie Walters and Oliver Carruthers. Walters came with Ingram from the Daily Mail and served as his deputy; he had been a subeditor at the Mail and became responsible for ‘subbing’ much of the Gemini copy (Bourne, 1995). Carruthers’ focus was more towards the financial and marketing side of the operation, although all three men also periodically wrote for the service. This editorial team, which at various points expanded and contracted as employees came and went, was assisted by three to four full and part time typists, secretaries and administrative assistants (ibid).

The work of these, almost exclusively female, office staff is, perhaps predictably, largely absent from both contemporaneous and subsequent accounts of the Gemini institution (the gendered nature of Gemini’s professional practice is explored in detail in Chapter 7). From the fragmentary pieces of evidence that do survive, it is clear how crucial their labour was to the operation. In a 1973 report to stakeholders, Derek Ingram (1973a) made it clear that it was ‘essential’ for him to have a secretary of “Pamela calibre”, Pamela being a previous secretary. In addition to secretarial staff, there were the production assistants. These assistants would have to type out the often hand-written original articles submitted by contributors, and then re-type multiple subsequent drafts as members of the editorial staff marked up their edits on the page (Interview, Allan Thompson; Keeble, 1998).

Once the editorial process was complete, production of the copies to be sent out to subscribers began. Until the late 1980s, when Gemini switched to
simpler photocopying technology, this required elements to be cut out and stuck on a page with heat and pressure then applied to produce each duplicate (Bourne, 1995). In an example of the ‘all hands on deck’ approach that this part of the process seemed to inspire, Brana Radovic, who joined Gemini to work as a graphic artist in the late 1970s, remembers being brought into the office by his father (who also worked at Gemini) as a 12-year old in order to operate the Letraset press printing machine so that a particularly tight postal deadline could be met (ibid).

For the most part, articles were written by freelancers around the world. In the initial months of the agency, Ingram and Carruthers used their extensive network of contacts to recruit journalists to write for the service. Once Gemini became established, such outreach was no longer necessary as the agency found itself constantly inundated with much more content than it could publish, sent from writers well aware of the sort of international exposure Gemini could give their work. For articles that Gemini did use, there was a strict policy of paying the same rate to an author regardless of where in the world they were from; this, of course, made writing for Gemini a much more lucrative proposition in some parts of the world than others.

For permanent employees in London, the rates of pay that Gemini could afford were often much lower than those on offer for comparable roles in other parts of the press. When Gemini was recruiting for a development editor in 1991, the advert placed in The Guardian (1991, p.13) read: “You need knowledge of Third World and Development/Environmental matters allied to good professional skills in reporting and subbing. Small salaries but scope for real responsibility with this internationally respected news-features service.”

The opportunities and responsibilities offered by Gemini, in spite of the less-than-generous salaries on offer, seemed to attract a dedicated and idealistic group of journalists to work as editors and directors of the service. While it is arguable that Gemini might have benefited from some more business-minded personnel it is, again, likely that it was Gemini’s size that prevented this. In a small team where everybody was required to contribute in all areas, it was much easier for a journalist to learn how to interpret a balance sheet than it was to try to teach an accountant the necessary journalistic skills and intuition to a level that would have met Ingram’s exacting standards.
On the graphics side of the operation, Gemini did not fare so well in terms of staff retention. Ironically, the distinctive illustrations, maps, cartoons and diagrams became something of a trademark for Gemini, with many believing that it was these high-quality graphics (see Figures 4 and 5) that made Gemini attractive to editors in the Global South, for whom the cost of good graphic material would often have been prohibitive (NewsConcern, 1987; Pulford, 1983a; Sanger, 1998). Cliff Hopkinson, Gemini’s first graphic artist, believed passionately in the project (Bourne, 1995). Every item he produced included the ‘M’ from the Gemini logo, a symbol he believed encapsulated Gemini’s commitment to communication and mutual understanding (ibid).

Apart from Hopkinson – who remained with Gemini and its affiliated companies until the mid 1980s – retaining artists was something that Gemini struggled with. Brana Radovic joined Gemini in 1975 as an artist straight from college. Radovic learned much of his trade through the informal training he received at Gemini. After four years at the agency, however, he was offered a position at the *Financial Times* that paid more than double the salary he earned at Gemini. Ingram was said to be very upset by Radovic’s departure (Bourne,
This ‘poaching’ of Gemini’s artistic talent became a recurring phenomenon. While Ingram often showed great pride (in both the professional achievements of junior colleagues and the fact that like-minded people were finding an outlet) when journalists who had worked for Gemini advanced their careers in more mainstream publications, the difficulty of retaining skilled technical staff who were integral to the agency’s operations often caused difficulties for Gemini (see Bourne, 1995; Ingram, 2007). Young graphic artists, who often received substantial on-the-job training at Gemini, went on to work for organisations such as Reuters, The Guardian and the Press Association.

Figure 5: Example of one of the Gemini-produced maps that would typically accompany stories. Accompanying 1968 article ‘Kaunda Brings with Him a New Authority’. Source: Gemini archive (Ingram, 1968a).
Although staff came and went, the mode of operation remained relatively consistent throughout Gemini’s lifespan. While simple this model was never profitable; Western news outlets would not pay a high price for the service and its main customers, newspapers in the South, could not afford to.

Just one year into its operations, in order to sustain the news service, Gemini had to diversify its operations. It created a satellite firm called GeminiScan, a graphic design company headed by original Gemini graphic artist Cliff Hopkinson. GeminiScan received commissions for its graphic design, including, in 1973, producing the Commonwealth ‘C’ logo, which is still used by the organisation today (McIntyre, 2001, p.58). It also produced its own educational materials, which it sold to schools and direct to the public.

Its most successful product was an Apollo 11 kit that included information and cardboard models of the spacecraft. In 1971, in partnership with the Zambian education ministry, GeminiScan began producing *Orbit*, a monthly educational magazine for Zambian school children that was intended to serve a similar aim to the main Gemini service. Government officials responsible for the publication felt that there was a need for material that Zambian children would be able to relate to, and that this need was not being served by the predominantly European titles that they could import (Bond, 2014, pp.186-187).

As well as being profitable, GeminiScan served Gemini News by employing the artists producing the graphics for the service, an expense that would otherwise have been an unsustainable drain on the loss-making news business. In a move similarly designed to encourage symbiotic relationships, Gemini acquired *African Development* magazine in 1968. The publication was profitable and enjoyed some financial success under Gemini’s stewardship, although the volatility of printing costs made it financially unpredictable (see Rake, 1992). The acquisition also allowed for a considerable sharing of resources, which represented significant savings for Gemini News. Richard Hall, who had recently returned to the UK from Zambia, became editor of *African Development*. The magazine was run from offices adjacent to those of the news service, which gave Gemini the advantage of having another seasoned newspaper editor, with an exhaustive address book, close by (Bourne, 1995; Rake, 1992).
There has been little-to-no scholarship investigating the content of *African Development*, so it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Gemini and the magazine were editorially aligned. Alan Rake (1992), who worked under Richard Hall and succeeded him as editor, has reported that the overall focus of the magazine was on economics, and that the title suggested an overly-specialised publication, which was not, in fact, the case. In 1978 the magazine dropped ‘development’ from its title to become the *New African*. Rake (ibid, p.14) has emphasised the effect that Gemini had on the ethos of *African Development*, recalling that at the time of Gemini’s purchase, the magazine was “a slim volume produced mainly for British exporters to Africa. The two editors at that time had never travelled to Africa… No African was associated with the magazine”. Under Hall and Rake, the magazine worked to include a majority of African voices (although the top positions remained occupied by Brits) and provide content that they hoped was “thoroughly in touch with African affairs” and written for an African audience (ibid).

Despite transforming itself into something of a mini media conglomerate, by 1972 it became clear that even the two profit-making enterprises could not sufficiently subsidise the news service. Gemini began making approaches to potential investors and was close to setting up a deal with the *Sunday Times* before the board of the *Times* ultimately decided not to go ahead with the joint enterprise. The search for an investor carried on until Gemini was bought in June 1973 by The Manchester Guardian and Evening News Ltd.

The *Guardian* was only interested in the news service; GeminiScan and *African Development* continued as separate entities. The rationale for this was primarily financial (see Guardian Newspapers Limited, 1972). The Gemini News Service had around 100 customers, with whom they had good relationships and long-term contracts. The fixed amount Gemini paid for each article and the relatively consistent, although still insufficient, income from subscribers meant that, apart from currency fluctuations, there was very little variability in Gemini’s incomings and outgoings (Carruthers, 1972; Gemini, 1972). The news service made a consistent and, from the *Guardian’s* perspective, entirely manageable loss (Carruthers, 1972; Gemini, 1972; Guardian Newspapers Limited, 1972). The other businesses, although they had been profitable in the past, had the uncertainty of relying on commissions,
selling direct to consumers, often unreliable distributions networks, and the volatility of the print production and advertising markets.

The decision to take Gemini on was reached by James Markwick, a senior manager within the Guardian's parent company. Richard Bourne (1995, p.19) has argued that the purchase was “an act largely of altruism” inspired in part by Markwick and others’ admiration for Ingram’s commitment to pursuing a worthwhile enterprise rather than taking one of Fleet Street’s comfortable top jobs (see also Knight, 1981). There is likely a degree of accuracy in this assessment. The acquisition of Gemini can also be seen, though, in the broader context of the Guardian company in the late 1960s and 1970s.

During this period, the Guardian group was expanding and diversifying at a substantial pace (see Grant, 2003; Taylor, 1993); it acquired stakes in various regional newspaper groups, the Anglia Television company and a number of radio stations (ibid). The Guardian newspaper, though, had only been based in London since 1964 and was still keen, in the 1960s and 1970s, to cement its position on the national media landscape (Taylor, 1993). Ingram was well known and well liked in many ‘liberal’ journalistic circles and many of those who admired him – including Ingram and Markwick’s mutual friend, Africa journalist, Clyde Sanger and the editor of the Guardian, Alastair Hetherington – urged Markwick to step in to save Gemini (Bourne, 1995). Lord Barneston, at that time the managing director of United Newspapers, chairman of the Observer, and a former chairman of the Commonwealth Press Union, also reportedly advised Markwick to make the acquisition, telling him: “If you put in the right infrastructure you won’t lose much, and people will think well of you” (Bourne, 1995, p.19).

The costs involved in purchasing Gemini were small in comparison to the investments that the Guardian company was making elsewhere and although it was not likely to be profitable, it might buy the Guardian a lot of good will on Fleet Street. There is also some suggestion that the board of the Guardian agreed to purchase Gemini as it could be used to reduce the holding company’s tax bill (Bourne, 1995).

As a respected liberal paper that was active in opposing apartheid, the Guardian could be seen as a natural bedfellow for Gemini. In reality, Ingram was generally disappointed by what he saw as a lack of support from the new
parent company (Ingram, 1974a). The paper itself made very limited use of Gemini content, perhaps due to anxieties in the international section about ceding too much influence to Ingram and his informal network of freelance correspondents. Ingram was also disappointed that so few *Guardian* resources were utilised in order to sell and promote the service (Ibid).

By the early 1980s, the *Guardian* was struggling financially; the newspaper was losing money at a faster rate than it had during the previous decade and was unable to keep pace with the wage rises recommended by the Newspaper Publishers Association, leading to pressures from the journalists’ and printers’ unions (Bourne, 1995; Taylor, 1993). In addition, reorganisation of the company had placed Gemini in the *Guardian* Publications division; the implementation of new profit targets for each division amongst a worsening financial performance brought Gemini’s lack of income into the spotlight (Bourne, 1995).

In 1981, Gerald Knight, who worked for the *Guardian* company and was responsible for overseeing its partnership with Gemini, wrote an abrupt and straightforward letter to Ingram announcing that the relationship between the two organisations was to come to an end:

> It has always been my fear that one day events in the company as a whole would focus attention on Gemini and the true position be revealed. This has happened. The group will lose over a million this year, and every area of activity has been examined as a consequence. Gemini loses money. Gemini can never be made profitable therefore Gemini must go. It is the end of the road for Gemini as far as *The Guardian* connection is concerned... I am sorry to be so cut and dried but the facts have to be faced... No possible savings on staff or operating costs could produce the money needed to make it [the partnership] viable.

*(Knight, 1981)*

In addition to these financial rationalisations for the *Guardian*’s decision to dispense with Gemini, there appear to have been a number of practical, organisational and interpersonal factors which meant that the symbiosis imagined by both sides of the partnership at the outset failed to materialise (Bourne, 1995). Furthermore, 1973, the year that the *Guardian* brought Gemini, was also the year in which Britain entered the European Economic Community; for many in the *Guardian*, Gemini’s persistent editorial orientation towards
Britain’s former colonies, rather than the continent, was evidence of the mismatched nature of the two organisations (ibid).

On receipt of Knight’s (1981) letter, Ingram took the decision to announce a suspension of the service to its subscribers, rather than an end to the agency. It took almost a year before Gemini was ready to announce its resumption, settling back into the familiar pattern of mailing packets of articles twice a week. The business model that was adopted was not too dissimilar to that of the Scott Trust, which owned and controlled The Guardian. The trust that was formed was named ‘NewsConcern International’, and had on its board, among others, former Commonwealth Secretary-General Arnold Smith, Nigerian author Chinua Achebe and ITV newsreader Trevor MacDonald (Gemini, 1983). The objective of NewsConcern was to raise money for Gemini and to ensure its editorial independence; as such, nobody involved in the day-to-day running of the news service was permitted to sit on its board (NewsConcern, 1982).

The board solicited donations from organisations such as the international development agencies of Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF, all with varying rationalisations for granting money to the foundation. Before the relaunch, NewsConcern had managed to raise just under £80,000, almost enough to cover two year’s losses (Gemini, 1984a).

Of this £80,000, £53,000 (100,000 Canadian dollars) came from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (Gemini, 1984a). This was reported as a minor scandal in the Toronto Star, which ran a front-page headline exclaiming “Ottawa gives U.K.-based news agency $100,000 grant” (Vienneau, 1983, p.A1), and quoted a Conservative member of the Canadian parliament who argued that the grant was “a waste of money” (ibid, p.A4). The only rationalisation offered for the donation, in the press, by CIDA was that it was intended to ensure that “more Third World news gets into the western news” and that “CIDA awarded the agency $100,000 to help it bridge the gap between North and South” (ibid).

The Toronto Star reported that the CIDA grant “was the result of an 11th-hour rescue operation” and that Ingram “asked Canada for funds using contacts in Ottawa. He met with CIDA officials there last September, and the
grant was approved two months later” (ibid). Attempts to identify more precise reasoning as to why CIDA decided to provide this funding, or how this fitted into Canada’s broader aid priorities, have proved difficult. This is an observation made by other researchers who have noted that a “fragmentized structure” within CIDA and other Canadian aid institutions contributes to the “oftentimes contradictory nature of aid objectives and policies” (Caouette et al., 2011, p.185).

Another £10,000 out of the initial £80,000 came from the UNDP, a grant which had much more of a precedent (Gemini, 1984a). The money was attached to an arrangement for Gemini to provide training courses and produce educational materials for journalists and aspiring journalists in the Global South (ibid). As well as earning Gemini a fee, such arrangements often also produced copy that could be used in the main service and provided valuable opportunities for networking with journalists and editors in the South (see Gemini, ca.1990). The UNDP engaged in similar activities with outlets such as the Pan African News Agency, Inter-Press Service, Women’s Feature Service, Depthnews, the Zimbabwe Inter-African News Agency, and the Caribbean News Agency (UN, 1994; UNDP, 1999). The training courses, which became a consistent source of income for Gemini throughout the remainder of its operations, would include sessions on development, development processes and, specifically, the work of the UNDP. The aim of the UNDP, in undertaking such partnerships, was, in part, that by instilling journalists with new knowledge about how the UNDP operates and what it does, it would have the effect of “encourage[ing] journalists of private media organizations to write articles about the work of UNDP and thereby help to increase understanding of what UNDP does and help to generate financial and political support” (UNDP, 1999, p.9).

Ingram was clearly concerned that the new arrangements might suggest a loss of journalistic independence. Among the first articles sent out following the resumption of the service was an interview with Ingram in which he attempted to dismiss notions of a loss of editorial independence by explaining the details of the new funding arrangements:

The foundation funds the company but both “have lives of their own,” as he puts it. The foundation’s terms of reference would even allow it in the future to support other media activities in line with its remit to provide
“reliable, objective and balanced” material about developing countries… As far as possible Gemini will live off its revenue from subscriptions… The foundation will be able to give cash aid as needed, but Ingram is quick to point out that the news service’s editorial independence is guaranteed. According to the foundation’s terms of reference “the governors shall not attempt to give any direction or exert any influence which would be in derogation of the directors’ right to editorial independence (which the governors are to recognise and respect).”

(Pulford, 1983b)

Figure 6: The photograph of a triumphant Derek Ingram that was sent to subscribers on the resumption of the service in 1983, alongside an article by Cedric Pulford entitled, ‘How Gemini was Saved’. Source: Gemini archive (Pulford, 1983a).

An anxiety that these new sources of funding could cause a precipitous erosion of Gemini’s credibility in the journalistic world persisted on the part of Ingram, who exercised something of a cautious approach to funders throughout the remainder of his involvement with Gemini (see Gemini, 2002; Ingram, 1998). This anxiety seems, though, to have been largely unfounded; Ingram appears to have miscalculated the extent to which the rest of the journalism world was concerned (in practice) with rigid notions of journalistic integrity (see Section 3.3). In actuality, Gemini retained all but a handful of its customers (Gemini, 1984a) and managed to increase their subscription fees (Bourne, 1995). This
increase in revenue, along with the donations acquired by the foundation, provided a degree of relative security for more than 15 years, the longest period of stability in Gemini’s history. The new additional foundation-funded activities such as training and seminars also brought a flurry of new activity to Gemini and a host of new people into the office.

The grants that most obviously changed the nature of the Gemini editorial team in London were the fellowships. From 1983, Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) provided an annual fellowship for young Canadian journalists, paying them 20,000 Canadian dollars to work for Gemini for 12 months. The fellowships were a response to a Canadian national enquiry on the media in 1981, which emphasised the need for the Canadian public “to be able to view the world ‘through Canadian eyes’” (Gruer, 1997, p.86), as opposed to the ‘eyes’ of US journalists who were judged to be under insurmountable “pressure to relate events [in the Global South] to a superpower’s national interest” (ibid). Gemini was judged to be an appropriate training ground for young journalists to gain experience of producing ‘better’, ‘fuller’ accounts of the Global South. From Gemini’s perspective, extra personnel were always welcome.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the Regina School of Journalism in Saskatchewan established a similar scheme that saw one of their trainee journalists work for Gemini for three months of the year. There were also some UNESCO fellowships that paid for young African journalists to work at Gemini in London; however, the funding for these was much less consistent. The 1980s and 1990s, then, saw the Gemini offices become livelier and fuller, with multiple young journalists from outside of Gemini’s most immediate circle of contacts passing through the doors.

Several of the young Canadian journalists stayed with Gemini after their fellowship. Kelly McParland, one of the early recipients of the IDRC award, had intended to return to Canada at the end of his placement, but was offered a permanent position by Ingram and stayed at Gemini for over a decade (Ingram, 1997). The Gemini office was not only filling with ever-younger personnel but was also becoming far more international. It was not uncommon for there to be three Canadians in the office: McParland and two visiting on fellowships. In addition, there was Bethel Njoku, a Nigerian newspaper manager who joined in
1988 and a Swede, Elizabeth Pritchard, who worked as Gemini’s business manager for much of the 1980s.

Pritchard’s appointment marks a subtle change in emphasis for Gemini; she was not a journalist or someone with a background in newspapers, attributes that had always been something of a prerequisite for anyone seeking employment at Gemini. Pritchard came from the world of NGOs, having previously worked for UNICEF and been involved in campaigns to promote breastfeeding and limit the advertising of formula milk in ‘developing’ countries. The selection of Pritchard is also illustrative of Gemini’s increasing engagement with ‘journalism for development’, as opposed to its previous approach of journalism about development and ‘developing’ countries. Ingram had always believed that news and journalism were important for development, but that it was important for news organisations to remain detached from the process. It was the job of journalists to scrutinise and report accurately, not to participate in or advocate a particular set of policies, projects or approaches (Gemini, 2002; Ingram, 1998). This approach was not necessarily one shared by Ingram’s younger colleagues. By working for Gemini they were receiving lower salaries than their peers in traditional media companies, a route they had chosen at least partly due to the belief that they were working for a worthwhile enterprise that was doing good work. Given these factors, many of the younger staff saw no obvious incongruities with engaging further in ‘journalism for development’ type projects.

4.2.3. Gemini’s Journalism: News of Development or News for Development?

Issues such as a lack of quality journalism in and of many ‘developing’ countries and conflict-laden, superficial reporting of the Global South have recently been targeted by a number of charitable organisations working in a broadly similar fashion to Gemini. The model that most closely resembled Gemini’s was that of Panos Features; part of the Panos Institute NGO, the non-profit features agency, launched in 1987, provided newspapers worldwide with stories about the Global South, with the expressed aim of ‘raising awareness’ of environmental and development issues (Gemini-Panos, 1989; Panos Network, 2015). Panos started as a charity principally concerned with providing
education on HIV and AIDS, and with reducing the stigma and discrimination associated with the conditions; this heritage was often reflected in the content of the feature articles it syndicated (ibid).

Unlike Panos, Gemini was not conceived of as a charitable organisation. While its ethos and values were clearly defined, its principle purpose was to provide a product that was lacking in the international media market: In-depth reporting of/relevant to the Global South, written by journalists of the South and geared towards a mass readership across the ‘developing’ world. For Ingram especially, being seen as a ‘news service’, as opposed to an ‘information service’ or a niche agency concerned with development communication, was key. In a lengthy document sent by Ingram to Daniel Nelson in 1994, after Nelson had taken over as editor, Ingram (1994) explained: “[M]y firm conviction from the outset [was] that Gemini should be considered a mainstream source of copy. I wanted it to be seen by the big boys (Toronto Star, Melbourne Herald, Straits Times etc.) as a bona fide news agency, small of course, but nevertheless a competitor to the big agencies.”

In the late 1990s, Gemini was again facing financial difficulties; this, in Ingram’s eyes at least, did force it to consider compromising its status as a ‘bona fide’ news agency. In 1999, Gemini was taken over by Panos Features in order to ensure its continuation; the Panos-run Gemini lasted for a little over two years before its eventual closure. Ten years earlier, Gemini moved into premises owned by Panos and began to cooperate on a small number of projects. A year before the takeover, Ingram circulated a memo expressing concerns about the two organisations becoming too closely linked:

The reality is that Panos has much more to gain from being associated with Gemini as a name than Gemini has from association with the Panos name. Our main business is with newspapers and there is no advantage to us telling them that we are tied to Panos – in fact, it could be, if anything, a disadvantage because one or two editors might wonder why Gemini is associating with what, as one senior journalist put to me, is basically a propaganda organisation “albeit working in a very good cause.”

The central question for Gemini is whether the tie-up is going to impede the independence and integrity of the news service that is so respected and without which it would not long survive (and without which I would certainly not want to be associated with it)… I would rather see it shut down than turn into something else.
When the Panos take-over eventually happened in 1999, the press release featured a quotation from Ingram:

> The Founder of Gemini News Service, Derek Ingram, is delighted agreement has been reached with Panos. “We have had a long and cordial relationship with Panos,” said Mr Ingram, “and we are convinced that the quality and values of Gemini will be maintained by Panos, which as a prize-winning information organisation dedicated to media pluralism, is in an excellent position to take the service forward and develop it in exciting new directions.”

Despite these supportive words in the official literature, a year earlier Ingram had been sceptical about the deal’s implications for the Gemini News Service:

> My position on Gemini and Panos remains as it has always been. The two organisations are very different… [Panos] is basically a lobbying organisation and its work is admirable… There are opportunities for Gemini-Panos collaboration, but there is no way the two organisations could merge because they are basically two quite different animals and Gemini would simply no longer be regarded as an acceptable news organisation.

This episode towards the end of Gemini’s life emphasises the extent of Derek Ingram’s personal investment in the agency, and the importance he placed on being, and being seen to be, simply a credible, independent news service. The reservations about merging with Panos were not shared by everyone at Gemini; ITV newsreader Trevor MacDonald, for example, who had been on the board of NewsConcern, the body tasked with ensuring Gemini’s editorial independence, felt that Gemini was already largely perceived as a development news service, and saw ‘no obvious incompatibility’ between it and the development and environment charity (Bourne, 1995, p.34).

For Ingram, journalistic integrity and independence were key factors that influenced how the agency was perceived; a close relationship with a credible news organisation like The Guardian posed no risk and may have even been a benefit in this regard. Panos’s approach was less clear-cut; former Panos employee, James Deane, explains:
The boundaries between pure journalism, advocacy journalism, media development and communication for development can be blurred… Panos… clearly had an agenda to place environment and development issues to the forefront of public and policy opinion… The work, funded largely by development agencies, had a clear development purpose. The tool used to achieve that purpose was journalism. (Deane, 2014, pp.232-233)

At the time of the Gemini-Panos merger, Panos was producing around 150 articles a year, a great deal of which focused on health issues, and were mainly given away to newspapers in the South. In contrast, Gemini was producing 700 features a year, on a wide variety of topics, which were sold on a subscription basis to newspapers across the world, many of whom paid premiums to ensure exclusivity in the region that they operated. The Gemini-Panos partnership eventually collapsed in 2002 (for a variety of reasons, not least of all the huge changes occurring in the international media market and communication technology), forcing the final closure of the Gemini News Service (Panos continued operations).

4.3. Gemini’s Competition and the Significance of News Features Agencies

Richard Bourne (1995, p.34) described the period of disagreements over the future direction of the agency during the 1990s as “a strange episode”, which “reflected… the altered image of the agency. If in the late 1960s it had been seen as a Commonwealth news features agency, by the late 1980s it was regarded more as a journalistic service about development”. In many ways the disagreements within Gemini about partnering with Panos were generational; Ingram, who founded the agency in 1967 and had been with it ever since, had a difference of opinion with his younger workforce, who had joined throughout the 1980s and 1990s, about the importance of absolute independence in journalism and the consequences of outside funding.

That professional ethics and ideas about how journalism is best practiced tend to shift subtly over time, and that different generations of journalists have different opinion about what is acceptable/advisable in their field, is to be expected. However, to write this episode off as simply an instance
of an older proprietor, due to stubbornness or intransigence, failing to come around to his younger employees’ way of thinking would be a superficial reading of the situation. To better understand Ingram’s reluctance to partner with or accept funding from any and all outside sources we need to understand the somewhat ‘cloak and dagger’ Cold War atmosphere that Gemini, and other international features agencies, were operating in throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

In information-rich 2017, an organisation whose main operation was posting out a dozen feature articles a week seems almost laughably inconsequential. Towards the tail-end of Gemini’s existence, with the rise of the Internet, the subsequent decline of print journalism and the fragmentation of media markets, it must also have been increasingly apparent that time was running out for this particular modus operandi. One might also assume from the almost complete lack of scholarly attention paid to news features agencies and syndicators that they were, and always have been, regarded as being of little significance. Jeremy Tunstall’s (1977) influential The Media are American – a title that chronicled Anglo-American dominance of the international news media over the twentieth century and worked to define media imperialism and media dependency in terms of flow and contraflow, the extent to which pages, airwaves and screens around the world were filled with Anglo-American content – dedicates just one paragraph to features agencies:

‘Feature’ coverage is one of those many words in journalism which has no satisfactory definition except in terms of yet other sorts of journalism. Features are non-hard news; features are not tied rigidly to a point in time. The larger American newspapers developed feature writing to fill out the hard news and to fill up the paper on days which were short of disasters and other instant events. These services were sold by the New York and Chicago press across the American continent by mail and in the form of ‘stereotypes’ ready for printing. They are the origin of the present-day newspaper international news services.

(Tunstall, 1977, p.33)

Tunstall’s scant attention paid to news features agencies is surprising given the extent to which their operations would seem to confirm his central thesis. Forum World Features, active from 1965 to 1975, operated from London and, similarly to Gemini, sent two packets of feature articles a week to roughly 130
subscribing newspapers, largely in Asia (Blum, 2003; Foerstel, 2001). Compass Features, which probably represented the most direct challenge to Gemini in that it had a Global South focus, was established in 1984 and sent out its packets from Luxembourg (see New York Times, 1984). This is not to mention the myriad of British and American news magazines and Sunday newspapers that syndicated their content; titles such as the Observer, Time and the Economist ran services allowing subscribing newspapers, often in the Global South, to publish a selection of their feature articles originally written for a domestic British or US audience.

Oliver Boyd-Barrett, a media scholar who has spent most of his career researching and writing about agency journalism (see Boyd-Barrett, 1978; 1980; 1982; 1989; 2000; 2003; 2008; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen, 2000; Boyd-Barrett and Thussu, 1992), perhaps the foremost authority on the subject, has also largely ignored features agencies. The introduction to Boyd-Barrett’s (1980, p.14) detailed The International News Agencies argues: “Differences between news agencies can be conceptualized as representing different points on a continuum, which itself is made up of several dimensions.” In subsequent paragraphs, Boyd-Barrett (ibid) switches from using ‘continuum’ to ‘hierarchy’. At the top of this hierarchy are what he calls the ‘world agencies’ or ‘the big four’: the American Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI), the French Agence France Presse (AFP), and the British Reuters. These agencies supplied newspapers all over the world with what Tunstall (1977) describes as ‘hard news’, the time-sensitive reporting of disasters, elections, deaths, war and peace, between which features ‘fill space’. Below the ‘big four’ were the national agencies, supplying the global news media with news of Germany or Japan, and the ‘international intermediate’ agencies, such as CANA, the Caribbean news agency, or the Non-Aligned News Agency Pool, which covered a specific geographic or political block. And finally:

At the bottom of the hierarchy or continuum is a wide variety of generally smaller organizations which may specialize in certain kinds of news, such as economics, photo, sports or news features, or in certain geographic regions of a country, or in certain kinds of client. A few of these, like the syndicated services of some of the large US newspaper dailies, serve sizeable international markets.

(Boyd-Barrett, 1980, p.15)
In journalism, then, the front page is king. The further from the front page your work appears, the lower down the journalistic pecking order you are positioned. This also seems to have been the logic that has been applied in much journalism scholarship; the journalists producing the biggest ‘scoops’ and headline-grabbing front page stories have tended to command the most attention. The journalists writing lengthy, ‘slow’ interpretive and analytical pieces, usually several pages deep in the newspaper, have received short shrift.

One particular sector that did recognise the potential significance of feature writers and features agencies, however, was that of government propagandists in both the UK and US. Lashmar and Oliver (1998, p.19), two investigative journalists who have researched government intelligence agencies’ infiltration of their own profession during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, argue that the biggest lesson that allied propaganda forces learned during the Second World War was, “that propaganda was most effective if it was based on accurate factual information… [I]f outright disinformation was to be used it was most effective when used sparingly, dropped into otherwise accurate and reliable information sources”. Black propaganda – fabricating information – was too likely to be discovered; determining how information was interpreted, which information was deemed important, and how it was ‘spun’, was a much more effective way of influencing global public opinion. The journalists and journalistic organisations that dealt in breaking news of events – elections, disasters, war, ceasefires – as glamorous and high octane as their jobs may have been, were, therefore, of comparatively little use to the propagandists. Far more significant were the journalists in positions to interpret, analyse, downplay, and exaggerate, in short, to tell a large global audience what they should think about these events. Features agencies also had one more attribute that made them particularly attractive to propagandists: in the main, their headquarters were in London, from where their content was distributed to a wide international audience. This important hub for global opinion-forming analysis and interpretation allowed government propagandists to focus their efforts.
In July 1975, it was revealed that Forum World Features, one of Gemini’s biggest commercial competitors, was established, wholly owned and operated by the CIA (see Nossiter, 1975). The features service had been closed by the intelligence agency four months earlier for fear that dissident ex-CIA officials were about to ‘blow its cover’ (ibid). *The New York Times*, in 1977, reported that Forum had been, “Perhaps the most widely circulated of the CIA-owned news services” (Crewdson, 1977, p.37). Forum was ostensibly owned by John Hay Whitney, former US Ambassador to the United Kingdom and publisher of the *New York Herald Tribune*. *The New York Times* (ibid) reported: “According to C.I.A. sources, Mr. Whitney was ‘witting’ of the agency’s true role.” Forum’s headquarters were based in Sardinia House just off of Fleet Street in London, now part of the London School of Economics. For most of Forum’s life, conservative British journalist and *bête noire* of the British left Brian Crozier served as the service’s ‘director general’. Russell Warren Howe, who was a regular writer for Forum, wrote of its boss:

> [T]he choice of Crozier to run a news service oriented toward the third world seemed strange all along. His views of dark-complexioned people varied from Kiplingesque at best to South African at worst, and he saw the world in the most simplistic of cold war terms.
>
> (Howe, 1978, p.23)

After Forum had been exposed, Howe (ibid) wrote of his experience as an ‘unwitting CIA asset’. Howe was convinced that his writing, most often on African politics, would have been of little propaganda value and so speculated as to why he had been so frequently employed by Forum:

> It could be that I was included, with my [Washington] Post credentials and free-spirit, liberal, but non-Marxist analyses of African affairs, to give balance and credibility to a service whose basic aim, presumably, was to counter communist propaganda.
>
> (Howe, 1978, p.22)

Whether or not this assessment is accurate, Howe is clear about the betrayal he felt by his journalist colleagues who wittingly collaborated with the CIA:

> What was totally unethical about Forum World Features was that the agency duped both Forum’s clients and correspondents, and did it by
prostituting a few professional journalists who consented to dupe their colleagues.

(Howe, 1978, p.27)

Brian Crozier’s 1993 autobiography makes no secret of his awareness that Forum was a CIA front; in fact, as something of an arch cold warrior his contact with the CIA, MI5 and MI6 appears to have been a matter of pride. Nor does he address the deception of fellow journalists; he does, however, appear to attempt to justify his actions on the grounds that what Forum was doing wasn’t really propaganda. Crozier describes a meeting with ‘a senior CIA man in London’ prior to taking on the appointment:

I was anxious for a precise explanation of the apparent reluctance to sell the proposed service to Western newspapers, and to the American press in particular. The CIA man, whom I shall call James Craig, was ready with an answer which I found cryptic: ‘We can't sell Forum in the US,' he said, 'because we are not allowed to propagandise the American people.' … In line with the 'propagandising’ ban, the main target for FWF was indeed the Third World, which was being inundated with Soviet propaganda. It was not a question of disseminating counter-propaganda from the Western side, but of providing first-class background coverage to pre-empt space that might otherwise go to Communist disinformation. There was no ban on selling the service in Western countries, apart from America, but this was not the main point of the exercise.

(Crozier, 1993, pp.67-68)

The extent to which Forum content really was a mere strategic blocking exercise – an attempt to pre-empt Soviet efforts to fill newspaper pages in the Global South with propaganda – as Crozier (ibid) suggests, would need to be borne out by a great deal of further research. The 16 Forum articles available on Google’s historical newspaper archive (this small number of articles made available by Google should not be taken as an indication that Forum content rarely made its way into print, rather that the focus of Google’s newspaper archiving effort is in North America and Europe, regions that were not Forum’s primary markets), originally published between 1968 and 1975, however, do lend some credence to this assertion. This small sample is mostly made up of innocuous, non-political articles about, for instance, the decline of hand-woven tweed (Trevor, 1975) and a profile of Madame Tussauds’ head wax sculptor (Rogers, 1974).
Two articles in this sample, however, do contrast quite starkly with the mostly inconsequential fare. Russell Warren Howe (1978, p.27) wrote that he suspected, “In its articles supporting Nixon and the Vietnam war… Forum may well have published planted, untrue material, with or without the writer’s knowledge”. In February 1969, Forum published an article arguing:

[T]he balance and the pattern of the war has shifted appreciably in the past 12 months in a steady, unspectacular fashion that has partly escaped the headlines of the world’s press. The United States and its allies have made such progress… that today top American military men claim: “we should declare victory.”

(MacKenzie, 1969)

At the time of publication, the Viet Cong were attempting to repeat their surprise attacks against US military bases throughout South Vietnam of one year earlier. Although nowhere near as successful as the Tet Offensive of 1968, they did demonstrate that North Vietnamese forces were still able to mount attacks at will (Spector, 1993). 1968 was also the year that Walter Cronkite, ‘the most trusted man in America’, declared on the CBS evening news that the Vietnam War was unwinnable (see Oberdorfer, 1971). So out of touch, then, with the conventional wisdom of the time was this piece, that it seems entirely plausible that it might have been a part of a CIA propaganda campaign to convince the world that the Vietnam war was going much better than was actually the case. Similarly, in the other article archived by Google dealing with the Vietnam war, ‘Japan may help keep peace’, Albert Axelbank discusses the possible economic and military role for Japan following a presumed US victory. Axelbank (1969) reports: “Several American leaders have already raised the possibility of the participation of Japanese military units in a post-war peacekeeping force in Vietnam.” While there are no obvious fabrications in the article, it does strongly imply that US victory is inevitable and overplays the extent of the international support for the war, ignoring completely the large disapproval within Japan for its support of American actions (see Shiraishi, 1990).

It is likely, then, that subtlety and refraining from overt anti-communist sentiment was part of the operating procedure at Forum. This strategy appeared largely successful in preventing suspicion around Forum’s funding
and purpose. Forum did charge newspapers that could afford to pay for its service in order to keep up the pretence that it was a legitimate commercial enterprise; for papers that could not pay, it sent its material free-of-charge or at a nominal rate (Crozier, 1993; Lashmar and Oliver, 1998). In a letter to Richard Hall in 1966, while Ingram was preparing to launch Gemini, he seemed to be relatively certain that Forum was a legitimate independent agency:

**OBFNS** [The Observer Foreign News Service] and Forum will be our main rivals. The money [for Forum] is John Hay Whitney’s so it still is a wicked American organisation and we shall make this as well known as possible! Oliver [Carruthers] has been spying all the time on their operation – even to the extent of writing a piece for them so as to get into their office and see what they have got.

(Ingram, 1966a)

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**Figure 7**: A Gemini article from 1968 and a Forum article from 1966. Figure illustrates the practical similarities between Gemini’s and Forum’s products. Each produced a dozen 1,000–1,500 word stories posted from London every week to subscribing newspapers, printed on branded A4 paper. Sources: Gemini archive and Richard Hall personal collection (Ingram 1968b; Hall, 1966).

In another letter to Hall in 1966, Ingram appears to be preparing to conduct a relatively good-natured commercial rivalry with Forum and to have been unwitting of the fact that they would not be competing on a level playing field, given Forum’s CIA funding:
I was shocked to open a Ceylon newspaper and find a giant piece by Richard Hall on Zambia and the C'Wealth [sic] – Forum Features. I told several people that if Gemini had been in operation that piece would have appeared under our credit. How much do they pay? Forum are the bane of my existence.

(Ingram, 1966b)

Much of the British government effort to manipulate features and opinion journalism, in contrast to Forum, was, at least amongst Fleet Street insiders, much more of an open secret. The primary component of the British effort in this area was the Information Research Department (IRD), part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which worked to produce and distribute unattributable briefing papers and analytical articles to ‘opinion moulding’ journalists in the UK and abroad (Crowe, 1976). In 2013, it was revealed that the Foreign Office had unlawfully retained over a million historic records – 15 miles’ worth of ceiling-height shelving – at Hanslope Park, an FCO and MI6 facility in the Buckinghamshire countryside (Cobain, 2013). Amongst this haul are records of the Information Research Department (Cobain, 2013; Engelhart, 2014). Rectification of this breach of the Public Records Act will be a painstaking process with each document being assessed by a ‘senior sensitivity reviewer’ before being made publically available (Engelhart, 2014).

In the meantime, however, we do have access to an incomplete archive of IRD material. From the papers that are available we can see the degree of collusion between the IRD and much of the British journalism establishment. Available papers show, for instance, that in 1976, Sir Michael Palliser, the Foreign Office’s Permanent Under Secretary ordered Sir Colin Crowe, a senior civil servant, to undertake a review of IRD’s activities. Crowe described how IRD material was distributed to journalists and others considered to have influence over public opinion:

Recipients are required to indicate that they would like to receive them and will respect the conditions under which they are received, i.e. that they will not disclose their origin, though of course the material itself is for public use. In the UK this undertaking is given in writing. In certain circles the papers are so well known by now that the veil of confidentiality is pretty thin.

(Crowe, 1976, p.6)
The IRD was established in 1948 to counteract communist propaganda. Denis Greenhill, in 1971, in his role as head of the diplomatic service, defined IRD as, “a flexible auxiliary in a position to receive, adapt and use all available types of information and specialising in the influencing of opinion” (cited in Crowe, 1976, p.2). When Crowe conducted his review in 1976, influencing opinion around the Soviet Union and communism remained the biggest part of IRD’s operation:

[S]ince the major threats to the UK’s security, to its stability at home and to its interests abroad is posed by the USSR and international Communism of all kinds, the greater part of IRD’s efforts are concentrated on monitoring and exposing what the Soviet Union and the Communist states, Communist front organisations and communist or communisant individuals are up to.  

(Crowe, 1976, p.4, original emphasis)

In 1971, the IRD had eight overseas posts: Delhi, New York, Caracas, Singapore, two in Hong Kong, and two in Beirut (Crowe, 1976). It had an annual budget of one million pounds, approximately half of which was ‘on the secret vote’, meaning that it came from the Foreign Office’s allocation of secret services funding (ibid). In addition, it had operating expenses of around £300,000 a year, which also came from the ‘secret vote’ (ibid). The IRD distributed a monthly publication entitled ‘The Interpreter’; it also disseminated regionally focussed material such as ‘Asian Analysis’, ‘African Review’, ‘Middle East and Maghreb Topics’ and ‘China Topics’. None of the papers contained markers identifying the British government as the source of the material.

While recipients of these papers outside of the UK would often not be made aware of their true origin, the operation in the UK did require that British journalists collude with the IRD. Crowe (1976, p.8) explains that there were also “more sensitive and secret activities” undertaken by the Information Research Department:

These come largely under the Special Editorial Unit. This unit subsidizes certain feature agencies in this country and abroad which are ostensibly commercial and independent who provide a regular feature service to newspapers, etc. in various parts of the world through which intelligence material can be surfaced in the international press, notably in Asia and Africa. These are deniable.

(Crowe, 1976, p.8)
Notably the IRD had arrangements with the syndication services of British news magazine the *Economist* and the Observer Foreign News Service (OFNS), the syndication wing of the Observer newspaper. This arrangement, reached in the late 1960s, allowed the IRD to provide a special limited subscription of *Economist* and OFNS material to newspapers in the Global South that could not otherwise afford to purchase such content (Crook, 1969). The IRD selected three *Economist* and OFNS articles a week to send to these newspapers who were portrayed as beneficiaries of a charitable scheme (ibid). This scheme was sold to the *Economist* and the OFNS on the basis that it was intended to support the dissemination of ‘responsible British journalism’ abroad (ibid). The two publications were attractive to the IRD due to the extent to which the content of the unattributable briefings was regularly making its way into the publications’ reporting (Tucker, 1968). Exactly how aware of IRD’s operations the owners and editors of the *Economist* and *Observer* were is unclear as the briefings and papers were passed directly to journalist rather than to their news organisations; materials were sent to journalists’ home addresses in plain envelopes marked ‘personal’ (Leigh, 1978).

Whatever the case, the IRD and its Special Editorial Unit had quite a neat setup, removing the need for a front organisation as was the case with Forum. The IRD would give dossiers of unattributable information, analysis and interpretation – the ‘line’ best suited to meeting Britain’s foreign policy objectives – to trusted journalists. It would then wait for journalists at, in this case, the *Economist* or the *Observer* to reproduce that ‘line’ in their copy. When they did so, the ostensibly charitable arrangement the IRD had with numerous newspapers meant that that copy could then be selected and distributed around the world. Those articles came with the legitimacy and trustworthiness of having been produced by respected journalistic outfits; in the case of the *Observer*, a liberal Sunday newspaper.

In 1969, the Special Editorial Unit was supplying its truncated *Economist* and OFNS services to newspapers in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Kuwait, Jordan, Libya, Guyana, Afghanistan, Nepal, South Korea, Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Congo-Kinshasa, Burma, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia (Peck, 1969). In 1973, Derek
Ingram wrote to Norman Reddaway, Assistant Undersecretary of State in the FCO’s Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, to complain that this ostensibly charitable practice of providing resource-poor newspapers in the Global South with ‘responsible British journalism’ was undermining Gemini’s business activities:

[M]ore than once we have been asked by papers: “Why should we pay for your service when we get the Observer service for nothing?”

Whether it is so now, we have in the past been told that in Kathmandu, Kabul and Blantyre to name but three. Naturally, I have found this disappointing since the Observer is a business rival. I do not seek special advantage for Gemini, only that it should not find itself at unfair advantage anywhere.

In the case of Kabul, I remember that the paper started using a lot of our material but when we pressed for payment they said we should ask the British Embassy to pay out bill. I refused to do this, so we had to drop the service.

(Ingram, 1973b)

The IRD kept a file on Gemini and, two years earlier, was considering attempting to extend the Economist and OFNS arrangement to include Gemini (Fabian, 1971; Tucker, 1971). Oliver Carruthers, joint owner of Gemini until June 1973 when the Guardian brought the company, first made contact with IRD field operatives in Lusaka during his time as the editor of a Zambian financial paper (Fabian, 1971). In early 1971, with a thaw in Sino-American relations and President Nixon’s ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’, Gemini launched a series entitled ‘China Watching’, providing analysis of China and its place in the world. This, it seems, is what piqued the IRD’s interest, with one operative (Fabian, 1971) noting: “This has obvious possibilities where IRD are concerned.” When the London headquarters wrote to their Beirut post asking of what use Gemini content would be to operations in the region, the letter noted, “we are able to brief Oliver Carruthers, and he is a regular customer for IRD material” (Thomas, 1971).

When approached by the IRD, Carruthers was apparently open to the suggestion of an Economist or OFNS style arrangement; he sent the IRD a packet of promotional material, a sample of articles and, “on a strictly personal and confidential basis” (Fabian, 1971), a handwritten copy of Gemini’s complete customer list (Carruthers, 1971b). The IRD decided not to go ahead
with a syndication arrangement with Gemini on the basis that Gemini was already close to saturation in Anglophone Africa and so there was little ground to be gained by providing a subsidised service (Joy, 1971). In the IRD’s other main region of interest, the Middle East, it was determined that Gemini’s content was too Africa-dominated to be of use to editors there, and that there was a “stigma that would inevitably be attached to any Arabic newspaper ‘sharing’ content with the Jerusalem Post”, one of Gemini’s existing subscribers (ibid)

The documents regarding a possible arrangement suggest that, within Gemini, it was only Carruthers who had contact with the IRD (Fabian, 1971; Joy, 1971; Thomas, 1971; Tucker, 1971). As a writer for Gemini, albeit an infrequent one, it is possible, or perhaps even likely, that Carruthers was making use of IRD material in his dispatches for the Service; the point of the IRD, after all, was that its propaganda was ultimately for public consumption. In October 1973, the IRD’s Hong Kong office sent a request to the London headquarters for information on Gemini; the response from the IRD in London noted that Gemini was “a purely commercial service” and that, “we do not brief Gemini” (Draycott, 1973). This was four months after Carruthers left Gemini, which would seem to suggest that he was the only person within the agency who was a ‘customer for IRD material’. What remains unknown, however, is how many of Gemini’s hundreds, over the years, of freelance correspondents were IRD ‘customers’; unless the documents trickling out of Hanslope Park contain master lists of the journalists signed up to receive material in secret (and assuming that such documents make their way into the public record unredacted) this may be something that remains almost impossible to determine.

In 1977, the new Labour Foreign Secretary, David Owen, shut down the IRD due to revelations about its close collaboration with right wing journalists, most notably Brian Crozier, and concern that its activities close to home – briefing against Irish republicans and Western European socialist and communist parties – had the potential to be exposed and cause major embarrassment (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998; Leigh, 1978). This was the period in which Gemini was stagnating somewhat under the Guardian’s ownership. It was also a period in which Cold War-obsessed intelligence agencies were
retreating from their attempts to manipulate and control feature coverage in much of the world’s press. In a few short years, Western international development agencies would move into this space, sensing, as the intelligence agencies had, the potential for this kind of analytical and interpretive reporting to mould public opinion and advance certain agendas. The movement of international development organisations onto this turf ultimately saved Gemini, with grants from foundations and government sources providing it with its most sustained period of stability, although Ingram remained wary of such sources.

It does seem, though, that Derek Ingram overestimated the extent to which everyone around him cared about these issues of absolute independence; swathes of the British journalism establishment were more than willing to sign agreements allowing them to receive and distribute unattributable government propaganda. Similarly, newspapers across the Global South were willing, eager even, for British embassies to pay for and send them content. Ingram’s assertion that, “papers will not accept free copy on any scale because of suspicion that a particular policy line is being peddled” (Gemini, 2002) seems to have been largely incorrect, perhaps borne of a mistaken belief that his idealism was the norm in the industry in which he worked.

4.4. Conclusions: Gemini’s Reach and Reputation

The eventual closure of Gemini in 2002 had very little to do with any sudden collapse of credibility the agency may have suffered due to associations with third parties who might be, or might be seen to be, pushing a certain agenda. Gemini’s operations were always firmly planted in the world of print journalism; with new technology making it harder for newspapers to make a profit, Gemini found it increasingly difficult to find buyers for its product. While Gemini may have been generally well regarded in the newspaper industry, with budgets being cut non-essential expenses had to be dispensed with and the product that Gemini provided was often thought of, by those in control of newspapers’ finances, in those terms. Editors struggled to convince managers of the benefits of continuing to purchase the service.
A few years before Gemini hit insurmountable financial difficulties, Journalism Professor Richard Keeble (1998, p. 20) profiled the agency for his newspaper handbook, concluding: “in many Third World countries Gemini is more famous than such giants as Reuters and Agence France Presse.” This notoriety, particularly in parts of Africa and Asia, is something that several people have testified to. In 1992, John Ogen, a reporter for Uganda’s Weekly Topic, wrote an article for the service reflecting on his experience of travelling to London for a pilot UNESCO fellowship at Gemini. He spoke of the perception of Gemini amongst fellow journalists and readers:

Gemini remains such a small organisation, even by African standards. Yet in the eyes of many Third World readers, it is a real ‘giant’ from London.

It is hard to forget one guy who walked into the Weekly Topic offices in Kampala, Impressed by Gemini’s coverage of the Commonwealth Summit from Harare.

“You people, how do you get Gemini and what is their place like?” I tried to answer him in the best way possible. “Gemini is the BIG name of a very tiny, but wonderful news service,” I said.

He thought I was kidding, like all my colleagues once did.

(Ogen, 1992)

There is likely an element of hyperbole in this report, designed by a grateful visitor to flatter his host. Nonetheless, it is true that Gemini was appearing, as well as in the Weekly Topic, in many prominent, influential national titles. Newspapers that subscribed to Gemini included Malaysia’s New Straits Times, the China Daily, the Hong Kong Standard, the Dawn in Pakistan, India’s Deccan Herald, The Jerusalem Post, The Herald in Zimbabwe, Tanzania’s Daily News and Kenya’s East African Standard. Marking Gemini’s 25th anniversary, Ingram recalled an anecdote in which the first correspondent from Beijing’s The People’s Daily to be stationed in southern Africa instantly declared himself to be familiar with Gemini on seeing a Gemini feature in the Harare Herald, stating that he had been reading Gemini for years in the English-language China Daily (Gemini, 1992a).

For many of the smaller titles that subscribed, particularly newspapers on small Pacific islands, Gemini was often the only international press agency service they could afford (Thussu, 2000). According to Gemini correspondent-turned-journalism scholar, Daya Thussu, Gemini’s content was crucial to the
formation of the news media in the South Pacific during the 1970s and ‘80s (ibid).

New Zealand journalist, David Robie (who has also become a journalism academic), provided Gemini with much of its content on the South Pacific. He explained, in a letter to Richard Bourne, that he thought that Gemini’s influence was greatest in the smallest, poorest and most isolated countries:

There are many loyal Gemini Subscribers in the Pacific – among them the daily PNG [Papua New Guinea] Post Courier (Rupert Murdoch-owned) published in Port Moresby, which with a circulation of 41,000 is by far the biggest newspaper in the Pacific. It uses Gemini articles almost daily, plus two or three in the paper’s Weekend Magazine. Gemini articles have played an important role in informing and educating Papua New Guineans about their region and the world around them. (cited in Bourne, 1995, p.67)

Wendy Cook, editor of the Cook Islands News, was clearly of a similar opinion to Robie about the important role played by Gemini in small, ‘developing’ island states. In 1994, Ingram’s annual end-of-year review of international events ran to 5,000 words; Cook wrote a letter to Gemini thanking them for the piece and explaining how useful it had been to her readership. She explained that the only other sources of international information were the islands’ two libraries and a handful of expensive imported magazines (Nelson, 1994). The Cook Islands News produced just eight pages a day, meaning that Ingram’s article had to be split into sections and run across a whole week (ibid). According to Cook, the paper sold just fewer than 2,000 copies a day; with the population of the main island at around 10,000 this was close to saturation point (ibid).

Even where this was not the case, Gemini frequently received letters of thanks and appreciation from journalists, subscribers and, on occasion, those who featured in its articles. In 1995, the sponsors of Glosa, an invented language similar to Esperanto, wrote to Gemini to inform them that since featuring in an article there had been a ‘huge increase’ in interest in the language (Nelson, 1995). The letter added “we now have many more contacts around the world, especially in Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana. Several people who read your article are now starting to form study groups in their area” (ibid).

These quirky anecdotes are clearly preserved in the archives because they paint a positive picture of Gemini’s global reputation. It is certainly true,
nonetheless, that Gemini earned itself a lot of admirers. This was evidenced when it became a non-profit organisation in 1983 and attracted a number of luminary figures to its board of governors; Chinua Achebe, Rex Nettleford, Trevor McDonald and Arnold Smith all gave up their time to fundraise for and support the agency. When Gemini was approaching its twentieth anniversary world leaders such as Australia’s Malcolm Fraser (1986), New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange (1986), Commonwealth Secretary General Shridath Ramphal (1986), and Claude Cheysson (1986), former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, all wrote testimonials praising Gemini’s contribution to global journalism.

Any quantitative sense of that contribution, however, was elusive even to Gemini itself. It had no means of monitoring how much of its content subscribing newspapers were using. In order to get the vaguest sense of how and how much it was being featured, the agency had to rely on its large network of freelancers and friends to report sightings of Gemini material and send clippings back to the office in London. While not a definitive quantitative measure – the inconsistent and often poor archiving of many newspapers in the Global South makes attaining such a measure very difficult – Chapter 6 of this thesis investigates which newspapers were printing Gemini material, how much they were using and how that material was being presented to readers. Using surviving archival sources, it argues that Gemini had a reach and reputation that significantly surpassed what might have been expected from such a small organisation and that the manner of Gemini’s inclusion in the pages of many subscribing titles endowed the agency with a substantial degree of discursive capacity.

This chapter has made the point that British and American intelligence agencies certainly seemed convinced that the kind of interpretative and analytical features journalism that Gemini traded in was very influential indeed. It is, of course, entirely possible that they were wrong; it would be foolish to blithely assume that intelligence agencies are supremely intelligent when it comes to these matters. Nonetheless, given the amount of time, resources, money and effort that was expended in controlling, manipulating and influencing this kind of journalism, as a supposedly sure-fire means of moulding
‘global public opinion’, the lack of scholarly attention it has received is somewhat puzzling.

As discussed in Chapter 2, critical geopolitics has largely embraced the rationale presented by Joanne Sharp (1993, p.493), that “Geopolitics does not simply ‘trickle down’ from elite texts to popular ones” and so we need, therefore, to focus attention on popular sources of geopolitical ‘knowledge’. It has also accepted Kuus’s (2008, p.2064) call for consideration of the individuals able to “assume and project intellectual authority” on matters related to international relations and international law.

This chapter has sought to demonstrate that during the latter half of the twentieth century, there existed a cadre of journalism professionals whose job was the interpretation and analysis of geopolitical trends and developments, who, due to the structures of the international media, whether they had originally written with a domestic Western readership in mind or had tailored their writing for a broad global audience, often had their work distributed widely across the Global South. This was a period of intense competition for acceptance between grand overarching geopolitical themes, narratives and ideologies; whether it was attempts to cast the world in terms of ‘them and us’ Cold War rivalries, or to present a narrative of the neo-colonial North and its fostering of dependent relationships in the South, there were many vested interests attempting to assure that the ‘correct’ interpretation prevailed. For a school of critical geopolitics concerned with popular geopolitical discourses and their creators, these journalists, who were not in the business of breaking news about elections, disasters or trade deals, but telling the world what these events meant, must surely be considered prime candidates for further investigation.


5.1. Introduction

This chapter, first of all, explores the largely quantitatively-focussed academic and political context in which Gemini and individuals and organisations similarly concerned with the injustices and inequalities of the international news media were working. Second, it seeks to analyse Gemini using, primarily, the methodology and frames of reference of the time. The preceding chapter sought to highlight the existence, following formal decolonisation, of a band of journalism professionals who, with a wide global audience, were in a significant position to interpret, analyse and ascribe meaning to the events of this crucial
period, characterised by competition between various all-encompassing geopolitical themes, narratives and ideologies. It also detailed how Gemini – a part of this influential cadre – criticised the focus and nature of the majority of media reporting and expressed its aims to facilitate coverage of places that were typically overlooked by people who were not typically given a voice in the international media. This chapter, then, is an empirical test of the extent to which Gemini achieved these aims.

The inequalities in the amount of news coverage that certain places and certain stories received was an issue that animated Derek Ingram throughout Gemini’s lifespan. In 1977, Ingram wrote a piece for the trade publication *UK Press Gazette* expressing his dismay that so much of the international press were dedicating inordinate amounts of their coverage to reports that Margaret Trudeau had been spotted partying with Mick Jagger of the ‘Rolling Stones’:

> I would guess that the amount of time, energy and expense used by the big agencies in chasing Mrs. Trudeau and the Rolling Stones in the last week alone has far exceeded the amount they spend covering developments in some Third World countries over a period of several months… The Trudeau story fills the pages of Western newspapers for days on end – more space, much more, than is devoted to coverage of a country such as Zambia in a whole year… The Third World has an unarguable moral case when it says that there is an imbalance in the system of world news dissemination as it exists today, and that its countries are the sufferers.

(Ingram, 1977b, p.3)

A straightforward, numerical sense of geographical balance or even-handedness, it appears, was central to Ingram’s and Gemini’s conception of how they could help in addressing the issues inherent in the global media. Fewer stories of the Canadian Prime Minister’s marriage and more covering events in Zambia would, presumably, constitute a degree of rectification of the general ‘imbalance’ that Ingram describes. This can be seen in some of Gemini’s marketing materials; Figure 8, for instance, shows a promotional postcard, produced in 1971, highlighting the geographic ‘balance’ of Gemini’s journalism. The presentation of the data is not particularly clear, but it seems that by ‘came from’ it is referring to the location from which the correspondent filed the story, rather than their nationality.
Figure 8: Gemini promotional postcard produced in 1971 highlighting geographical ‘balance’. Source: Gemini archive (Gemini, 1971a).

The postcard appears to have been designed to portray a focus on Africa and Asia and relatively little interest in Europe. If accurate, this would suggest that Gemini’s work was doing something to counter the Northern and Western focus of the hegemonic press. The accuracy, methodology, and terms used in this survey produced by Gemini are, however, all unclear; phrases such as “not many of the writers seem to be British” are particularly vague and potentially obfuscatory. In addition, it only accounts for one year of Gemini’s operations. This chapter, then, produces a more rigorous and larger scale quantitative analysis of Gemini’s material. It examines how Gemini’s journalistic focus was geographically distributed, how Gemini’s network of reporters was geographically distributed, and the extent to which Gemini used local journalists to report news from/of their own countries/regions.

The results of this analysis advance our empirical understanding of Gemini in two important ways. Firstly, they help us measure the ‘success’ of the Gemini News Service using the terms that were explicitly prioritised by the agency. Secondly, they produce a macro-level cartography of Gemini’s geographic focus and journalistic networks. This provides us with a broad
visualisation of the nature of Gemini’s geopolitical imaginary – with certain countries and regions looming much larger than others, surely indicative of the degree of importance with which they were imbued – and of the geography of Gemini’s professional network. For subsequent chapters concerned with the nature of Gemini’s journalistic rendering of geopolitical space, and with the practicalities of the production of those renderings, this quantitative analysis serves as an invaluable empirical bedrock.

This is, then, in essence, a ‘news flow’ study of the sort that has been commonplace in journalism and media academia since the 1950s. This chapter, therefore, begins with a brief historiography of the ‘news flow’ phenomenon and its wider implications. It argues that the mass of such studies produced since the 1950s were largely preoccupied with ‘flows’ along a North-South axis; Invariably these studies either focused on how much news of the Global South reached Northern audiences, or they analysed the content of one of the big press agencies to determine the extent to which they were saturated with news of the North. Neither of these approaches would have brought researchers into contact with Gemini articles, appearing, as they mostly did, in the newspapers of the Global South. Conducting a ‘news flow’ study of Gemini’s content presents an opportunity to retrospectively fill this lacuna, and to consider the extent to which Gemini was facilitating largely overlooked South-South ‘news flows’ by allowing journalist from the Global South to write in the pages of each other’s newspapers.

5.2. ‘News flows’ and the New International Information Order

‘News flows’ emerged as a topic of research in the 1950s; with the explosion of media content that occurred in the mid-twentieth century many within communication studies set about measuring and quantifying the nature of that content (see Chang, 1998; Clausen, 2009). One of the earliest of such studies, conducted in 1953, looked at flows of news to and from the USA and between India and the West. The content analysis investigated the international section of 117 newspapers and five wire agencies. The report concluded that foreign
coverage was generally limited to just a handful of ‘powerful countries’ and was critical of the ‘deplorable’ lack of coverage of ‘poor’ countries (IPI, 1953).

Since this initial study, interest in ‘news flows’ and empirical investigations into exactly what regions of the world are being represented in the international press has grown substantially. Wilke (1987) reported that up to 1959 only 20 such studies of foreign news coverage and international news flow had been published; between 1960 and 1969 there were 40 and close to 80 during the 1970s, with the figure continuing to increase during the 1980s.

One such study, looking at the presence of the ‘big four’ press agencies (Reuters, Associated Press, Agence France-Presse and United Press International) in the international coverage of African and Central and South American newspapers, found that, in 1984 and 1985, 70% of the international coverage in the African newspapers sampled came from one of the ‘big four’; in the Central and South American titles the figure was 56% (Meyer, 1989). A similar study was conducted by Schramm and Atwood (1981), who found that 76% of international reportage in Asian newspapers came from the same ‘big four’ press agencies.

These early ‘news flow’ studies, then, tended to look at the big international news agencies, finding that news from and about the Global North was abundant and tended to flow south, whereas little news was produced about or in the Global South and what was produced rarely reached newspapers in the North (see Hester, 1971; IPI, 1953; Markham, 1961). These ‘news flow’ studies have remained a consistent part of international news and journalism scholarship (see Chang, 1998; Tsang et al., 1988; Wu, 1998); in the early 1980s, mass communications scholar Kymoon Hur (1982, p.531) declared that the literature dealing with ‘news flows’ had reached “almost landslide proportions”.

The proliferation of these sorts of studies was highly influential in UNESCO’s push for a New International Information Order (NIIO) in the late 1970s and early ‘80s (see Mowlana, 1985). The commission, headed by Irish politician Seán MacBride, published an influential report in 1980 entitled Many Voices One World, often referred to as the ‘MacBride Report’; it argued:
The controversy about the imbalance first sharpened over the question of international news flows and the predominance of the major transnational agencies in the collection and dissemination of news. Their massive world-wide operations give them a near monopoly in the international dissemination of news; thus the world receives some 80 per cent of its news through London, Paris and New York. The imbalance in the circulation of news is above all else the difference between the quantity of news dispatched by the industrialized towards countries in the developing world and the amount of news flowing in the opposite direction.

(ICSCP, 1980, p.145)

The commission claimed, “most responsible newspapers in developed countries have taken serious cognizance of the problem in recent years and made efforts to remedy the imbalance” (ibid, p.146). Despite this welcome progress, the commission concluded that this progress was “not sufficient to remedy the present situation without corrective action in the developed countries as well” (Ibid, p.147). The ‘corrective action’ that was proposed was a push for a New International Information Order (NIIO), which involved steps designed to curtail the dominance of the handful of international press agencies that controlled so much of the global media. This campaign, launched by the MacBride Report, was an attempt to produce a radically alternative mode of operation for the international press, securing more equitable flows of news and information to, from and amongst ‘developing’ countries of the South (see Frau-Meigs et al., 2012).

The Tunisian Secretary of State for Information, Musthpha Masmoudi, who played a large role in the deliberations of the committee, proposed an information and communication institute; the institute, with a UN mandate, would monitor international media corporations and, among other powers, have a role in ensuring that corrections were published where necessary. The North, led mainly by the US, opposed such measures on the basis of the freedom of the press.

Robert Savio (2012, p.236), former director of the Inter Press Service, argues that the disagreements over a NIIO were essentially down to a ‘clash of mythologies’. Savio argues that for the North freedom of the press was taken to mean that the state should not interfere with media ownership; the fact that the majority of European TV and radio stations were, at the time, public entities
was conveniently ignored. Why, asks Savio (2012, p.236) “was the BBC legitimate while Radio Tanzania was not?” The argument from many in the South was that state media, due to the insufficient market for independent media in the South, was needed in order to foster a sense of national identity, and was crucial to issues of culture, education and development (see Savio, 2012).

The institution that was eventually formed was the International Programme for Development of Communication (IPDC), which operated on a consensus principle under the UNESCO umbrella and focussed on equipment and media training and had no jurisdiction over media content or behaviour. According to Pendakur (1983, p.398): “The Western initiative thus reduced the whole problem of inequities, imbalances in information flow, news distortion, and ideological manipulation in information regarding the Third World nations, leaders and peoples to one of transfer of technology and know-how.”

Opposition to the NIIO was strengthened by an amendment passed by the US Senate by 99 to one in June 1981, which stated that the United States should withhold the portion of its UNESCO contribution that would be spent on what it called the “misguided New World Information Order” (cited in Yadava, 1984). This critical approach to UNESCO and the NIIO was shared by the newly elected US President, Ronald Reagan, and his Vice President George Bush who, according to Pendakur (1983, p.407), suggested at a United Nations Association event that UNESCO would be well advised to cease its “efforts to set guidelines for the press” and that ‘international censorship’ was something that Ronald Reagan was very strongly opposed to.

In 1984, the US eventually withdrew from UNESCO, with a State Department statement explaining:

The decision to withdraw was made by President Reagan, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. That recommendation is based upon our experience that Unesco:

- Has extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with;
- Has exhibited a hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press[.]

The UK exited UNESCO soon after. While other issues, largely around the New International Economic Order, were also important factors in the decisions of the US and UK to leave, this episode does highlight the importance of the geopolitics of communication and information in the period following decolonisation.

Gemini, with its focus on providing high quality writing about and from the Global South, was working in precisely the area that was causing such geopolitical consternation inside and out of the UNESCO chambers in the 1970s and 1980s. This small agency was, despite its size, having success in providing many influential newspapers in the Global South with an affordable and accessible alternative to content from the big Western news agencies.

Despite these factors, no study looking into journalism from a communication, media or journalism studies, development or geopolitics perspective has included the Gemini News Service as part of its analysis. Similarly, none of the ‘news flow’ studies that were informing the UNESCO NIIO debate considered Gemini’s contribution. Arnold de Beer (2010, p.601), a journalism professor at South Africa’s Stellenbosch University, has argued that “very little research on news flow in and even about Africa is undertaken on the continent itself” and that many researchers are unfamiliar with the media of the South. This may go some way in explaining the absence of scholarly engagement with the work of the Gemini News Service. In addition, communications and journalism scholarship, during the height of ‘news flow’ investigations and today, have, perplexingly, shown very little interest in features journalism or interpretative and analytical writing in the popular press.

Quantitative investigation into the extent to which Gemini was facilitating South-South news and information flows on a large scale, and the impact that this had, provides the opportunity to disrupt and complicate the conventional wisdom that has held for decades around the unidirectional, North-South, nature of ‘news flows’, and to gain macro level overview of the geography of Gemini’s journalists and journalistic focus. It is acknowledged that a ‘news flow’ approach is necessarily limited and lacking nuance. It simply quantifies where is being reported on and by whom, typically not looking any closer than a national level. The articles and people that form the basis of the analysis are reduced to, for example, an article about Tanzania by a Tanzanian reporter.
The genders, classes, races, sexualities, privileges and mobilities of the people doing the reporting and the people being reported on, as well as the nature of the reporting, are all removed from the equation. The chapter proceeds in the knowledge that the results of this quantitative study, like all methods of investigation, can only ever provide us with partial and scale-specific insights. This macro-scale geography of Gemini’s journalistic focus and journalistic network is, though, an important, if limited, part of assessing Gemini’s capacity to contribute to the decolonisation of international journalism. It is the aspect of the decolonisation of the news media that Gemini prioritised. In this epistemologically pluralistic piece of research, it provides an important point of comparison for this thesis’s subsequent explorations of the other aspects of journalism’s (de)colonisation that were not necessarily consider as crucial or considered at all at the time.

5.3. Quantifying Gemini’s Journalism

As a means of addressing the simple questions of which countries/regions were being written about, what nationalities of reporter were doing the reporting, and the extent to which ‘local’ reporters were reporting ‘local’ stories, Gemini’s original story ledgers were turned to. They record all of the stories that were sent to subscribers between 3 May 1968 and 10 June 1997, although the records for the majority of 1987 are incomplete. The red books, as Gemini staff referred to the ledgers, are A4 sized notebooks, in which each published story’s headline and author would be recorded, alongside the date that it was sent out, a unique reference number, its subject category (e.g. news, economics, culture etc.) and, in most cases, the country/region that the story focussed on.

Gemini published 12 stories a week, every week of the year. These red books contain records of approximately 16,850 stories. For the purposes of this analysis, every fourth story was included in the sample. Judging by the handwriting in the books, the same person did not always make the entries; the entries, therefore, do not always use the same format and sometimes omit

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certain pieces of information. In total, 3,917 articles made up the sample that was analysed: 23% of the stories recorded in the ‘red books’.

![Figure 9](image)

Figure 9: A page from one of Gemini’s ‘red books’ detailing articles sent to subscribers on 1 October 1993. Each entry lists the article’s code, headline, author and country of focus. Source: Gemini archive (Gemini, 1992-1994).

In order to assess Gemini’s success in using local journalists it was necessary to ascertain the nationality of the reporters who wrote the stories. In the main this was done using the short pieces of biographical information that would accompany a reporter’s by-line. The journalists’ ‘bio’ would generally use

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4 The most commonly omitted element was the country that the story focussed on; often this was because the story had a global focus, for example, a 1978 special report on the global arms trade (Madedley, 1978). Where information about the country that the story was about was not recorded it was usually possible to discern this from the story’s headline, for example “Sugar slump pushes Belize into big-time drug business” (Walker, 1985) and “A seat or two will decide Malta’s election” (Scicluna, 1976). When it was not possible to discern the information in this way, the story was omitted from the sample in favour of the entry immediately below it in the ledger.
the following format: “Jan Sinclair is a New Zealand freelancer who specialises in environmental issues” (Sinclair, 1989). This short description was put together from information submitted by the correspondents themselves.

When there were no biographical notes for a reporter, usually because the journalist in question was an infrequent contributor to Gemini, other sources were turned to. For correspondents who wrote for Gemini in its early days, newspaper obituaries proved particularly useful in this regard. In cases where the journalist worked for Gemini towards the end of its life, biographical information about them often appears on the websites of newspapers, media organisations or NGOs that they have since gone on to work for. Former Gemini Journalist Edem Djokotoe, for example, now works for an organisation that promotes African investigative journalism. The information required for this analysis was gleaned from his profile on their website:

Edem Djokotoe… has worked as UN Information Officer in Lusaka, as a correspondent for Gemini News Service, as Training Editor for Post Newspapers Limited, and has extensive experience working in the SADC region as a trainer and media consultant.

(Investigative Journalism Manual)

The 3,917 articles that make up the sample were written by 679 journalists. Of these journalists it was possible to identify the nationality of 498 of them using the biographical notes contained in the Gemini archive. The nationalities of 112 were identified using methods described above; it was not possible to identify the nationality of 69 of the journalists. These 69 journalists were responsible for just 195 of the articles in the sample; these articles were excluded from analysis regarding authorship.

5.4. Results

5.4.1. Article Focus

The analysis reveals a clear Commonwealth focus, with 63% of articles concentrating on a Commonwealth country;\(^5\) of the 20 countries that feature most frequently in Gemini content (see Table 1) only three (the USA, China and

\(^5\) For the purposes of this analysis, any nation or territory that was a member of the Commonwealth at any point between 1968 and 1997 is considered a Commonwealth country.
Israel) are non-Commonwealth members. Also evident is the high number of articles that focus on India; the 363 articles about India make up over nine per cent of all articles published during the period in question, more than twice as many as those on South Africa, which is in second place with 178 articles (4.5% of the total content).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of articles published</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>9.27%</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>3.09%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2.91%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2.68%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2.43%</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1.86%</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.56%</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>1.51%</td>
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<td>Jamaica</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>53</td>
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Table 1: 20 countries featuring most frequently as a focus of Gemini articles (1968 – 1997).

Although a clear Commonwealth preoccupation is evident, this analysis suggests that those who thought of Gemini as solely a Commonwealth news service were mistaken. The sample revealed 1,433 articles about countries that were not members of the Commonwealth. Figure 10 shows a wide geographic distribution of article focus, with countries such as Japan (44 articles), Mexico (41 articles), The Philippines (39 articles) and Argentina (38 articles) featuring relatively regularly. In total, the number of countries that featured as a focus of a Gemini article in this analysis was 174.
Figure 10: Cartogram showing the geographic distribution of Gemini's Journalistic focus (1968-1997).
Although few studies have been conducted looking at the geographic distribution of journalistic focus of a news organisation over such a long period of time, there are a number that allow us to make some comparisons. One study conducted by Peterson (1980) looked at the geographic focus of stories published by the big news agencies in January and February of 1975; another, by Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996), coordinated researchers from 38 countries to analyse the content of a range of international print and broadcast news, over two weeks in September 1991. It should be noted that although all of the continents were represented in the Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996) study, media in Europe and North America received more attention than elsewhere.

A comparison of the ten countries that were found to feature most regularly in these two studies and the ten countries that receive the majority of Gemini’s attention (see Table 2), seems to suggest that Gemini was providing quite a different service to that of the dominant global press agencies. Although the studies used for comparison, due to the relatively short time period being analysed, will have been affected by news events occurring at the time, they do seem to illustrate a tendency of the majority of the news media of the time to focus on issues of Europe, the Middle East, the USA and Russia/the USSR.

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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Countries featured most regularly in articles produced by the Gemini News Service, Reuters and UPI according to Peterson (1980) and in content across a wide range of international media according to Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996). Highlighted cells represent countries that appear only in the Gemini ‘top ten’.

Gemini, in contrast, had a much higher tendency to focus on India and countries in Africa; four of the countries in Gemini’s 1975 ‘top ten’, and three in 1991, are in Africa, whereas African countries do not feature at all in the results.
of the other studies. Similarly, while Reuters, UPI and the media analysed as part of the Sreberny-Mohammadi study seem to focus quite heavily on European countries such as France, Germany and Italy, these countries appear to have been of relatively little interest to Gemini. In fact, there were fewer articles written about European nations such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark than there were about the tiny Pacific island nations of Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The agencies used for comparison were, though, serving a different function to that of Gemini, providing time-sensitive ‘breaking’ news, rather than long-form interpretation and analysis. Such comparisons, then, are far from perfect, but do serve to highlight the differences between the geographic focus of Gemini’s journalism and that of the predominating global press.

While Derek Ingram might have liked his agency to be considered in the same vein as Reuters and UPI, in terms of its working practices and content – long form, not particularly time-sensitive analytical articles – Gemini was much more similar to the handful of other features agencies such as Forum World Features and Compass (discussed in Chapter 4), and to the syndication services of news magazines such as *Time* and the *Economist*. In 1982, Hamid Mowlana (1985, p.26) conducted a study that concluded, “magazines such as *The Economist* and *Business Week* are extremely important to the international flow of information,” however, “no systematic or comprehensive studies are available on their contents, operations and utilization”. Comparisons, then, with the organisations and agencies that can most reasonably be considered Gemini’s peers and competitors are difficult to make. One study, however, conducted by Charles Elliott in 2000, analysed archived editions of *Time* magazine, allowing for some degree of comparison between Gemini and a competitor.

Founded in 1961, Time-LIFE was the company responsible for the worldwide syndication of articles from the weekly US news magazines *Time* and *LIFE* (Time-LIFE). A 1972 *LIFE* profile of the head of Time-LIFE’s syndication service described the process of selling stories from the publications to newspapers around the world; as the two magazines were being prepared in New York, previews of the articles in each edition would be telexed to 14 agents in ‘the major countries of the world’ who would then attempt to sell
them to newspaper editors in their assigned region (Graves, 1972). The profile states that the cumulative efforts of these salespeople typically amounted to 250 articles sold each week (ibid). Elliott’s (2000) study looks only at the content of *Time* magazine itself, so does not tell us anything about the content that was eventually syndicated. If we think, however, of Gemini’s primary customers as newspaper editors, a comparison of *Time* and Gemini content does provide an opportunity to gain a sense of how distinctive of a proposition Gemini’s service would have been to this customer base.

Elliott’s (ibid) study analysed all editions of *Time* published in 1975, 1985 and 1995, categorising the geographic focus of each article on a continental level. The analysis excluded only the *Time* essays and *Time* people sections of the magazine. Table 3 presents the findings from this content analysis for those three years alongside Elliott’s (ibid) findings. While the proportion of *Time* articles focusing on Africa was never above 3.2%, for Gemini, Africa made up around one third of its coverage. Similarly, Gemini was providing significantly more coverage of Asia and South America and significantly less coverage of North America (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Focus</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Gemini</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Elliott’s sample included 538 articles in 1975, 469 in 1985, and 269 in 1995. In none of these three years did *Time*, in the sections outside of ‘essays’ and ‘people’, produce more than 15 articles with an African focus. Gemini – based on a publication schedule of sending out 12 stories a week – would have

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6 Table uses Elliott’s (2000) geographic classifications. Elliott (ibid) does not indicate the source of his geographic classifications. For the purpose of assigning Gemini content to a continent, the United Nations Statistics Division’s (2013) definitions were used; ‘South America’ was taken to include all countries of ‘Latin America and the Caribbean’ as defined by the UN.
Figure 11: Chart showing geographic distribution of Gemini article focus by continent and continental sub-region. Categories defined by the United Nations Statistics Division (2013).
produced roughly 624 articles a year, this figure was often higher due to special reports and series. In 1975, Gemini produced 643 articles; 34% of the articles in the sample for that year focussed on Africa, which would represent a total of 212 articles. Similarly, the most Asian-focussed stories that Elliott’s (ibid) study unearthed was 78 in 1985; in 1995, 42% of Gemini’s 672 articles were about Asia, which would represent more than 280 stories about the continent being made available to subscribing newspapers. As is evident from these calculations and Table 3, newspaper editors looking to provide their readers with feature articles about the Global South, particularly Africa and Asia, would have been much better served by a Gemini subscription than a syndication service offering content from Time magazine.

![Figure 12: Chart showing geographic distribution of Gemini article focus by continent over time. Lines are polynomial trendlines. Categories defined by the UN Statistics Division (2013).](image)

Table 3 also shows some degree of fluctuation over time in Gemini’s geographic focus, with its predominant interests, nonetheless, remaining in Africa and Asia throughout the three decades sampled. Figure 12 reveals that in the initial years of Gemini, stories about Asian countries made up a little over a quarter of all articles published. By 1996 this number had risen to 40%, with a relatively steady incline over the intervening years. Stories about Africa made up 38% of Gemini’s articles in 1969 and 39% in 1997. Over the 1970s there seems to have been a steady decrease in interest in African stories; by 1981
articles about African countries had fallen to 28%. This number recovered with a relatively steep increase in the 1990s.

As Gemini usually sent out a fixed number of articles to its subscribers (12 per week), an increase in the number of articles focusing on one particular region necessitates a decrease elsewhere. In the case of an increasing number of articles about Africa and Asia in the 1990s, this increase seems to come at the expense of articles about the Americas. In 1988, stories about countries in the Americas made up just over 20% of Gemini content; by 1997 this number had fallen to 7%. This decrease was fairly uniform across all of the regions of the Americas. The reasons for the increase in African stories are likely to include the end of apartheid in South Africa, but could be indicative of an attempt, during a difficult financial period for Gemini, to appeal more to a core Commonwealth market, or to focus more explicitly on ‘development’ issues.

Although Gemini resisted the label of a ‘development news’ agency, it is clear that the countries in the ‘developing world’ were its primary concern. The predominance of African and Asian countries in Gemini’s journalism would seem to testify to this. While the United Nations Statistics Divisions (2013) states that there is ‘no established convention’ for the designation of ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries, it does make clear that in ‘common practice’ the countries considered to be developed are Japan, Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand and all of Europe. This definition is similar to the one drawn up by the influential Brandt Commission in 1980 (Brandt, 1980). The analysis revealed, using this definition of developed/developing countries, that 79% of the articles that made up this sample focussed on a ‘developing’ country.

5.4.2. Article Authorship

In terms of article authorship, the Commonwealth link is even clearer. Of the 613 journalists whose nationality was identified as part of this analysis, 82% were from a Commonwealth country.

The top 20 countries (see Table 4), in terms of both the number of journalists who wrote for Gemini and number of articles produced, contains just two non-Commonwealth nations: the USA and Ireland. The 503
Commonwealth journalists were responsible for 85% of the articles in this analysis.

It seems that the informal and personal links provided by the Commonwealth were most influential in Africa (this is best highlighted by Figure 13). Of the 155 African journalists that were identified as part of the analysis, only four were from non-Commonwealth countries: three Sudanese and one Somali. Together these four journalists produced just eight of the articles that made up the sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Journalists</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Articles Written</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Top 20 countries in terms of number of journalists who wrote for Gemini and number of articles written by journalists from each country.

With Gemini heavily involved, though never formerly linked, with many Commonwealth organisations, it seems that this informal network played a large part in ‘sourcing’ journalists to write for the service. Another area where this seems particularly evident is South America; The Commonwealth’s only presence in this region is Guyana and the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. As such, Gemini only managed to recruit ten journalists from South America, seven of
Gemini News Service: Articles by Author Nationality (1968 - 1997)


Figure 13: Cartogram showing number of articles produced by author nationality.
whom were from Guyana; the other three were from Argentina, Chile and Colombia.

We can also see here the importance of English to almost all aspects of Gemini’s operations. Figure 13, particularly South an Central America and the Caribbean illustrate this particularly well. We can see Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, all countries with English as their official language, significantly enlarged on the map; the majority of the non-English-speaking countries in the region are not present.

All of Gemini’s articles were written in English and published by English-language newspapers. While we might reasonably conclude that Gemini was an agency with a Global South, ‘Third World’ or ‘developing nations’ focus and network of reporters, it is important to remain cognisant of the fact that it was primarily the Anglophone Global South with which Gemini was concerned.

Aside from the Commonwealth and English Language presence, the other obvious factor, in terms of article authorship, is the amount of stories produced by UK journalists (see Table 4 and Figure 13). Journalists from the UK were responsible for 26% of the articles that make up this sample. Furthermore, using the previously cited North/south categorisation, we find that journalists in the Global North wrote 52% of the articles sent to Gemini subscribers. Given that only 21% of Gemini stories were about the North, this does seem to suggest that Gemini was not altogether successful in avoiding the use of non-local reporters.

As illustrated by Table 5 and Figure 14, however, Gemini’s success in using local journalists to report stories from their country varied greatly from nation to nation. While ‘developed’ nations, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK, do feature on the list of countries where the most success was achieved in terms of utilising local journalists (Table 5), ‘less developed’ countries are also present. Most notably, India and Sri Lanka, two countries that featured heavily in Gemini’s output, were successful over 90% of the time in utilizing local journalists. Other countries, such as Guyana, Jamaica and Ghana, which were staples of Gemini’s output, also achieved relatively high levels of success.
Figure 14: Cartogram showing number of articles focusing on each country and success in using local journalists by country. A local journalist is defined as a journalist from within the same continental sub-region as the article focus. Geographical regions defined by the United Nations Statistics Division (2013).
In total, ‘local’ journalists, i.e. journalists that were from the country that the article focussed on, wrote 45% of the articles in the sample. However, if we broaden the scope to focus on a regional level, e.g. East African journalists writing about a country within East Africa, we find that that figure increases to 52%. Similarly, at a continental level, e.g. Asian journalists writing about a country in Asia, the figure is 67%.

As demonstrated by Figure 15, Gemini’s success rate, in terms of using local journalists, at country, regional and continental level, remained relatively consistent throughout the period in question. The dip, observable throughout the 1970s, can be largely attributed to the number of articles written by European and North American journalists, such as Alan Rake, William Forrest, Chris Mullin and Derek Ingram, who were regularly writing on African and Asian issues during this time.

Ingram has spoken of receiving numerous unsolicited submissions of articles from all over the world (of varying quality); far more than they were able
to use (Bourne, 1995; see also Ingram, 1967a). It seems, however, in the first decade of Gemini’s existence they persisted in using a number of Western journalists who worked as *de facto* correspondents for various countries and regions. The reason for the increasing use of ‘local’ journalists over the 1980s could be the previously discussed (in Chapter 4) internationalisation of the Gemini office during this period; with several additions to the Gemini team with contacts on various African and Asian newspapers, the agency became less reliant on Ingram’s contacts from his time at the *Daily Mail*. This was also the period in which the MacBride Commission was reporting its findings, bringing issues of ‘the right to communicate’ and the importance of journalism to the fore. The upwards curve we see over the 1980s could, to some extent, be attributed to a subsequent emboldening and reinvigoration of journalism, as well as various technical assistance programmes designed to aid the practice of journalism (see Chapter 7), in the Global South.

![Figure 15: Chart showing success rate in use of local journalists over time at country, region and continent level. ‘Success’ measured by percentage of articles where the article focus and journalist’s home country/region/continent. Lines are polynomial trendlines.](image)

When Gemini was not able to recruit local journalists to write a story it seems that a journalist from the Global North was more likely to be turned to than a journalist from the South (see Table 6 and Figure 16). Journalists from Northern Europe and Northern America wrote about countries outside of their region in the majority of instances; journalists from Australia and New Zealand
wrote non-local stories 50% of the time. In contrast, journalists from Southern Asia and Eastern Africa, regions that featured heavily in Gemini content, were afforded the opportunity to give their perspective on non-local issues less than 20% of the time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journalist Location</th>
<th>No. of Local Stories Produced</th>
<th>No. of Non-Local Stories Produced</th>
<th>% of Stories That Were Non-Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Africa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>72.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanesia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Number of local/non-local stories written by region. A local story is an article that was written by a journalist from within the same region as the article’s focus. A non-local story is an article written by a journalist not from a country within the same region as the article’s focus.

The Northern European/British influence is particularly clear in Africa, with just under a third of all articles about Africa being written by a journalist from Northern Europe. There is also a clear variation within Africa; articles about Western, Eastern and Southern Africa were written by a local journalist more than 50% of the time, however, in Middle and Northern Africa that figure was less than 12%. This is possibly, to some extent, attributable to the Commonwealth factor; until 1995, when Cameroon joined, there was no Commonwealth presence in either of these regions, perhaps making it difficult

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7 As there were only 38 stories written by journalists from Northern European countries other than the UK, the red on the map (Figure 16) can be largely interpreted as the British influence.
Figure 16: Map showing article authorship by region.
for Gemini to establish a sufficient enough ‘network’ in these regions to source local journalists. As was the case in South America, though, it seems that the English language was a very significant factor. The journalists from countries of Eastern, Southern and Western Africa where English is an official language, or is widely used, wrote far more stories, both about their own countries and other places, than journalists from Middle or Northern Africa, where the French and Arabic languages are of more importance.

As well as the British presence in parts of Africa, there are other regions where what we might call ‘spheres of influence’ seem to exist. Most obviously Australia and New Zealand seem to dominate the Pacific island nations of Oceania. As well as writing 87% of the stories about Australia and New Zealand, journalists from this region were also responsible for over two thirds of the stories about Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia. We can also see a similar phenomenon in the Americas: North American journalists wrote 80% of the articles about North America, 60% of the articles about Central America and had a significant presence (22%) in South America. The region that recorded the highest success rate was Southern Asia, with 89% of the articles published about that region being written by local journalists.

5.5. Conclusion

This analysis has served to provide an essential quantitative geographical overview of Gemini’s journalism. It revealed that close to 80% of the articles that Gemini produced focused on ‘developing’ countries; most coverage concentrated on Africa and Asia, particularly the Commonwealth countries in those regions, but there was also a significant interest in South and Central America, a region that has always been the least visible in the international news media (see Markham, 1961; Segev, 2014). Although making any direct comparisons is difficult, it is likely that this 80% figure made Gemini quite a distinctive option for newspaper editors considering where to source material. Although clearly very small in comparison to the likes of AP and Reuters, and even to the news magazines that were offering similar services, this analysis suggests that for editors in search of a more South-centric service Gemini represented a credible alternative to many of the other available sources.
On a practical note, the number of countries that Gemini managed to produce stories about is impressive. This survey of just under a quarter of its published material found articles on 174 different nations, making it likely that Gemini achieved, or came very close to achieving, at least one article on every country of the world. For a team of around half a dozen permanent staff who were persistently on the brink of financial collapse, over-worked and under-paid and reliant on the post to communicate internationally, this is a noteworthy accomplishment that reveals a great deal about the commitment of the people at the helm. In Ingram’s original conception of the agency, ‘communication’ and ‘mutual understanding’ were the two most prominent ideas; these results seem to illustrate a continued and constant commitment to applying these principles as broadly as possible. Even when it might have been more financially prudent to write headline-grabbing stories about superpower rivalries, Gemini appears to have been steadfast in its belief that the stories of people in places like Guyana, Malawi and Papua New Guinea were just as interesting and needed to be told.

While those involved in Gemini would no doubt be proud of the figures relating to their journalistic focus, their record on using local journalists appears, at least comparatively, less impressive. Ingram and others spoke frequently about the raison d’être of Gemini being to challenge the logic of ‘parachute’ journalism and of journalistic accounts of countries in the South coming almost solely from Western reporters. It was a conscious attempt to ‘decolonise’ news; the figure showing that 52% of the articles were written by journalists from the Global North and 55% of the time journalists writing the article were not from the country being reported on may have caused some degree of disappointment. Although some of the instances of non-local reporting will be due to journalists from the South writing about other regions of the world – journalists from southern Africa, for example, wrote about countries outside of that region almost a quarter of the time – in the majority of instances it was European, North American, Australian or New Zealander journalists who were offered the opportunity to interpret, ascribe meaning to and describe events occurring in other parts of the world. We should certainly keep in mind that even a 50% success rate represents a large number of articles that, given the limited number of interested international outlets at the time, would likely have
never seen such a wide distribution. Nonetheless, for all of Gemini’s good intentions and commitment, it appears that, as an institution of ‘knowledge production’, it was not able to avoid at least some degree of domination by the Global North over the representation, storytelling and interpretation of lived experience of the South and the people of the South.

This analysis is invaluable in providing an overview of Gemini’s content and its network of journalists. This simple, mathematical attention to representation – of places in journalistic reports and of people in the production of those reports – is a crucial component of the decolonisation of the news media. It is important that journalists from the Global South are able to write about peoples and places in Global South. It is only one aspect of journalism’s (de)colonisation, though, and claiming ‘success’ or ‘failure’ on these grounds alone would be to overlook the complexity and multifaceted nature of the issue. It is crucial to compare and contrast the insights gained from this method of inquiry with those gleaned from investigation of Gemini’s journalistic discourses, professional ideology, culture and practices.

While the roughly 50% success rate in using local journalists may seem somewhat underwhelming, given that commitment in this area was something that the agency built its reputation on, Gemini would likely point to the attributes of its non-local reporters that set them apart from those of its competitors. It might point to the journalist-travellers on its books such as Andrew Lycett and Christabel King who, instead of assuming a kind of all-seeing objectivity, wrote about the everyday experiences of their travels in Africa and Asia (Bourne, 1995). In contrast to the ‘parachute’ journalists of other agencies who might have jetted into a country to report on war or famine, the British journalist Richard Hall, who regularly wrote for Gemini, spent much of his life in Zambia working for the campaigning Zambian press, with this intimate knowledge of the country and its politicians securing him several exclusives (see Chapters 4 and 7).

Perhaps the most striking result of this analysis, and the one that poses the most questions, is the disparity between the various countries and regions in terms of the success rate in using local journalists. Stories about the Indian subcontinent were written by local journalists more than 90% of the time, whereas in Western and Eastern Asia, the figure is roughly 20%. Similar
differences appear in Africa, with Western, Eastern and Southern Africa recording substantially higher ‘success rates’ than the other two regions, Middle and Northern Africa (see Figure 14). As discussed earlier, in obtaining stories and recruiting journalists to write for the service in these regions, Gemini seems to have been greatly aided by its Commonwealth connections. Gemini’s experience, however, may also be illustrative of broader differences between formerly colonised countries in terms of their ‘journalism cultures’. While the workings of the British imperial and colonial press system are relatively well documented (see Potter, 2003, 2012) the legacies of colonial press structures in countries of the South remains largely un-researched. These particularly intriguing results serve to illustrate how useful Gemini is as a case study for providing illumination on postcolonial geographies of journalism culture.

More broadly, this analysis complicates narratives presented by decades of ‘news flow’ studies that have invariably focussed on either representation of the Global South in the Northern press, or on flows of news along North-South axes. Gemini was serving a mainly Southern subscription base, and was evidently providing a service that can be regarded as something of a radical alternative, at least in terms of geographical regions covered, when compared to the globally dominant ‘big four’ press agencies and the syndication services, such as that of Time magazine. Gemini was providing news and connections along South-South axes during a crucial period of nation building and identity-forming in the South, and a time when issues of communications imbalance and the importance of news and journalism in a geopolitical context were igniting contentious debate amongst the world’s governments. The scale of Gemini's journalistic reach revealed by this analysis, both in terms of where it wrote about and who did the writing, serves to make the case not only for studying the agency as a means to explore wider issues surrounding decolonisation and the press, but also for Gemini as an influential and noteworthy institution, the significance of which has been overlooked in both academia and further afield.

Gemini cartoon by Paddy Allen caricaturing the ‘characters’ in Gemini’s ‘world’ for Derek Ingram’s 1986 year in review article. Source: Gemini archive (Allen, 1987).

6.1. Introduction

The 12 stories a week that Gemini sent its subscribers, every week (excluding two hiatuses) for more than 30 years, represents a key resource for investigating Gemini’s geo-graphing of the globe and global politics. This chapter uses a sample of Gemini material in print in a range of subscribing newspapers to investigate Gemini’s discursive production of geopolitical space. It looks not just at what places were present in Gemini’s renderings of geopolitics, as in the preceding chapter, but moves on to look at the nature and detail of those places. The chapter is primarily concerned with how Gemini constructed meaning and ‘knowledge’ of the places, people and events that it covered for its end readers.

The first crucial step in understanding this is analysing how Gemini material, in the pages of the newspapers that subscribed to its service, was presented to these readers. In the first of two distinct sections, this chapter looks at Gemini’s ‘presence’ within the pages of the newspapers that paid a subscription in order to be able to make use of its articles. This analysis of
‘presence’ is critical to an investigation of historical media texts and to the broader focus of this chapter. As discussed in Chapter 3, communications scholar Susan J. Douglas (2008, p.71) has argued that for any textual analysis of an historical media source to be ‘legitimate’, it must, first, seek to “examine the media context”. Put simply, a newspaper article produced and syndicated in 2018 is hardly comparable at all to one produced in 1968. We must, then, attempt to understand the significance of the texts we are examining. What was their place in the media and informational ecosystem of the time? An understanding of how a certain subject was discursively constructed in the articles of a particular news agency represents, in and of itself, a fairly limited insight. We first need to know about the significance of the source. In what kinds of newspapers was it appearing? What were the readerships of those newspapers? Did the material appear on the front page or on page 20? In short, we need to gain some appreciation of the capacity of the source to construct popular understanding of the subjects in question.

The first section of this chapter examines who was printing Gemini articles and how much of this material they were using. It looks at how often, in which sections, and how Gemini’s subscribers were making use of the content which they were being sent. It concludes that there was a large degree of variation in terms of what kinds of newspapers – government owned/corporate owned, regional/national – were taking Gemini, and in terms of how much use of the material sent to them they were making, ranging from titles that printed practically every article to papers that published a Gemini story once a week or every other week.

Despite this variation in types of subscribing newspapers and the frequency with which they made use of Gemini material, there was a remarkable degree of consistency in how Gemini material was being presented and utilised. The chapter demonstrates that Gemini content was regularly given prominent positioning, included recognisable branding and occupied large amounts of space on the pages of its subscribing newspapers. The chapter argues that these ‘surface elements’ of Gemini’s inclusion within its subscribing newspapers put the agency in an exalted position with a significant degree of capacity to discursively produce the decolonising and newly postcolonial world.
It contends that these factors made Gemini a distinctive editorial ‘voice’ in a number of papers across the world.

Such a privileged position provides extra imperative for investigating the nature of Gemini’s production of geopolitical space. Having demonstrated that Gemini articles were significant features in the pages of its subscribing newspapers, the second of the two distinct sections investigates the nature of Gemini’s discursive production of a popular geopolitics. It considers the structures, systems and elements that are constructed by Gemini as ‘objectively’ extant facets of geopolitics. In examining Gemini’s material, it attempts to go some way in addressing what Dodds et al. (2013, p.8) highlight as a central critique of critical geopolitics, namely that is has been overly focussed on “the geo-graphs of US political elites and popular culture”.

The chapter focusses on popular journalistic material that was appearing mostly in the press of the Global South and was written, in large part, by writers from the Global South (and mediated through journalistic elites in the Global North). In doing so, it unearths a popular journalistic construction of the world and its (geo)politics primarily defined by the relationships between Global North and Global South, (former) coloniser and (formerly) colonised. Within this construction, the trajectories of newly-independent, postcolonial states are of key importance; unjust international arrangements, typically of a financial or commercial nature, are cited as the biggest impediment to the ‘progress’ of the Global South; and it is this ‘progress’ which is clearly identifiable as the defining factor of success in Gemini’s analysis of global affairs.

A news outlet, then, that prioritises ‘progress’, justice and parity for states in the Global South – particularly in the context of the militaristic ‘security’ and binary economic discourses which pervaded much of the ‘mainstream’ culture at the time (see Pietz, 1988; Sharp, 2003) – would certainly appear, albeit superficially, to bear the hallmarks of a distinct and ‘alternative’ producer of popular geopolitics.

In analysing these ‘alternative’ popular discourses, though, this chapter concludes that Gemini’s ‘alternative’ popular discourse did little to displace or disrupt hegemonic constructions of power and agency. It did not empower or, on the whole, include non-elite or marginalised actors and it replicated many paternalistic tropes of earlier colonial discourses. Its modes of reporting were
almost exclusively those of Cartesian perspectivalist-based, state-centric and typically masculinist conventional journalism.

The nature of alterity, and how we conceptualise alterity, in popular geopolitical discourse is, then, a key aspect of this chapter. ‘Anti-geopolitics’ has, for several years now, been a primary vehicle through which critical geopolitics scholars have sought to understand oppositional voices and movements (see Dodds, 2007; Drulák, 2006; Oslender, 2009; Routledge, 1998, 2003, 2010). Paul Routledge (2003, p.245) has defined ‘anti-geopolitics’ as something that “challenges the representations imposed by political elites upon the world and its different peoples that are deployed to serve their geopolitical interests. Routledge (ibid) insists that anti-geopolitical actors “are neither part of the processes of material production in the economy, nor part of state-funded or state-controlled organisations”. Petr Drulák (2006, p.422), on the other hand, cites Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ as “a nice example of state-sponsored anti-geopolitics”. Drulák (ibid) even suggests that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s ‘political discourse’ was anti-geopolitical as it rejected geographical determinism (see also Nijman, 1998). To maintain that anti-geopolitical voices or actors must always be ‘below’ or ‘outside’ of the state seems to dismiss the possibility of challenges to powerful organisations or representations coming from states themselves, as in the cases of the Non-Aligned Movement or the group of 77, and to deny the possibility of subordinate relationships amongst states. Yet to include state actors reduces the usefulness of the term by making it almost impossibly broad.

For Sara Koopman (2011, p.276) herein lies the nub of the issue with the term ‘anti-geopolitics’; it has the potential to be simultaneously “too broad (including all sorts of challenges, even violent ones) and too specific (depending on how one defines ‘from below’)”. If we persist, nonetheless, with this somewhat nebulous conception, encompassing anyone who might generally be considered to be ‘pushing back’, there arises a bigger problem, not with conceptualising ‘anti-geopolitics’, but with doing anti-geopolitics and with being anti-geopolitical.

The problem for journalism that might be assigned the moniker ‘anti-geopolitical’ – Gemini, possibly, in its critiques of the unjust subordination of states in the Global South – and for anti-geopolitical voices, actors, movements
and journalists more generally is that the game is still the game; traditional hegemonic geopolitics is still the veil through which the politics of global space are conceptualised. The only real difference is a shift in focus from those conducting hegemonic geopolitics to those opposing it. The scale of popular journalistic geopolitics remains at the state level and those deemed to have geopolitical agency are still, almost exclusively, the state’s political elite.

This chapter, then, asks important questions of what it means to be an ‘alternative’ to hegemonic geopolitics in the news media. If anti-geopolitical journalism is largely confined to protesting about those being moved by states and calling upon states to act differently, what are the prospects for a sort of alter-geopolitical journalism, a journalism that is a situated participant in the processes of people moving themselves and building their own alternatives?

6.1.1. Gathering the Material

In collecting a sample of Gemini articles to be used to analyse how the agency was constructing geopolitics for its geographically dispersed audiences, practical considerations associated with accessing historical newspapers from across the Global South were key. These considerations were significant in determining both the content and the nature of the sample. Utilising lists of subscribers from the Gemini archives (Gemini, n.d.1, n.d.2) to search digital databases such as ProQuest Historical Newspapers, Lexis Nexis, the Google newspaper archive and the British Library’s physical and microfilm holdings, it was apparent that there were very few cases where a full, or even nearly full, archive of the titles, during the period in question, was available. Archival copies of many titles simply could not be located; for those that could, the record was mostly partial. Copies of Gemini subscribers the Sowetan and South China Morning Post, for example, retrieved from the Factiva digital database were only available from 1985 onwards; the British Library holds physical copies of the Fiji Times, but only up to 1982; similarly, only sporadic records of Sierra Leone’s Daily Mail are available, archived in order to preserve popular records of the civil war. Within these holdings, it was common to find individual editions and often weeks and months missing from the records.

The surviving records of Gemini content in print in subscribing publications is, then, something of a patchwork. The task became to piece this
patchwork together in order to produce a sample that could represent the three decades of Gemini’s operations and the geographic spread of its subscribers. The solution arrived at was to choose one title, according to when the record for that title is the fullest, to represent one year of Gemini’s output. Material covering 24 of the 33 years that Gemini was operational was located. In order to keep the sample to a manageable size, the first ten available Gemini articles that the selected newspaper published in that year were selected. Table 7 shows where the articles in the sample were taken from.

A number of alternative approaches to collecting a sample were initially explored. The first approach explored was to identify five or six of Gemini’s most consistent customer newspapers, representing different regions in which Gemini had subscribers, and to conduct a longitudinal study of Gemini’s content within those titles over the course of its operations. This would have allowed for analysis of the changing or evolving nature of Gemini’s geopolitical representations in several specific contexts. Investigation into the feasibility of this approach, though, quickly highlighted its lack of viability; this was not necessarily surprising given the often-inconsistent archiving of newspapers from the Global South (see Teygeler et al., 2001).

The approach ultimately settled upon has the advantage of being able to analyse Gemini’s construction of geopolitics over a relatively long period of time, and for the multiple regions to which Gemini was supplying material to be included. Care has been taken to ensure that the sample has a good geographic ‘spread’ of subscribing newspapers and that geographically close newspapers have been ‘spaced out’. The sample taken from the East African newspapers, for example, are not close together in terms of their publication date.

An obviously underrepresented region in the below table is West Africa, with copies of Sierra Leone’s Daily Mail from 1992 being the only representative for this region. Although Gemini had several good customers in West Africa, searches of West African subscribing papers found little evidence of them utilising Gemini content.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td><em>Times of Zambia</em></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td><em>Amrita Bazar Patrika</em></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td><em>PNG Post Courier</em></td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td><em>Kinabalu Sabah Times</em></td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td><em>The Montreal Gazette</em></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td><em>East African standard</em></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td><em>Advocate News</em></td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td><em>The Fiji Times</em></td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td><em>Bangkok Post</em></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td><em>Tanzania Daily News</em></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td><em>Chandigarh Tribune</em></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td><em>Daily News</em></td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td><em>The Herald</em></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td><em>New Straits Times</em></td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td><em>Tanzania Daily News</em></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td><em>The Toronto Star</em></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td><em>Chandigarh Tribune</em></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td><em>Daily Mail</em></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Western Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td><em>Times of Zambia</em></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td><em>Bangkok Post</em></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td><em>The Stabroek News</em></td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td><em>The Sowetan</em></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td><em>South China Morning Post</em></td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Newspapers providing Gemini content for analysis

Another geographic omission is Europe; while British newspapers such as the *Sunday Times*, the London *Evening Standard*, *The Guardian* and even *The Sun* were subscribers, there is little evidence of any of these papers making much use of the content they received. This leaves the Canadian titles as the only representative of the Global North in the sample. Although this chapter is primarily concerned with the under-researched popular geopolitical representations within Global South media, two Canadian newspapers have been included in this sample. In part, this is because Canada was very important to Gemini; several Canadian newspapers subscribed to it and without assistance from Canada’s development agencies, Gemini would not have survived the 1970s (see Chapter 4). When the Canadian International Development Agency was asked to publicly justify their financial assistance to Gemini, they responded that the Canadian public would benefit by being able to
read Gemini’s ‘high quality’ reporting of the ‘Third World’ (Vienneau, 1983). On a simpler and more practical note, Canadian newspapers are also better preserved than their counterparts in the Global South. The articles from Canadian titles, then, have helped to fill gaps in the record for periods in which content from Global South newspapers could not be located. This helps us attain a fuller account of the nature of Gemini’s geopolitical representations. Crucially, these articles were also available to Gemini’s approximately 100 subscribers, the majority of which were in the Global South.

In total, the sample is made up of 233 articles from 24 years of Gemini’s operations; a list of all 233 articles is contained in Appendix 4.

6.2. Gemini’s Presence

6.2.1. The Newspapers

With a subscriber base mainly in the Global South, Gemini, as Ingram’s successor as editor Daniel Nelson confirmed, was very much aware that the printed press in many of the countries that they sold to could not reasonably be considered a popular mass medium:

There was no mass readership because there was no mass literacy… Certainly in the print media… it [Gemini] went to the elite… Who can read? Who can read English? In many African countries, even literacy in local languages wasn’t great.

(Interview, Daniel Nelson)

The available circulation data for some of Gemini’s subscribing newspapers appear to support these assumptions that Gemini was writing for a relatively narrow, elite readership. The *East African Standard*, for example, in 1964, had an average circulation of 28,000 copies (Soja, 1968, p.42); this made it the biggest selling daily newspaper in the country. At the time, Kenya’s population was approximately 9.2 million (World Bank), meaning that roughly 0.3% of the population were buying a copy. Even if we were to assume that each copy was read by multiple people, this would still represent a small proportion of the population. Historian Macharia Munene (2015) has confirmed that such figures

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8 In order to give as much detail as possible, articles that are directly quoted or referenced in this chapter are also included in a bibliography at the end of the thesis.
The coming of independence created a kind of elitism with Africans who acquired new positions of power and wealth, not available to them before. A kind of snobbery developed in which those aspiring to be elites or to be hired would feign to read the *East African Standard*.

(Munene, 2015, p.149)

Another Gemini stalwart in this sample, the *Times of Zambia*, had similar origins, having been established as *The Copperbelt Times*, a newspaper aimed at a European readership with mining interests. A 2006 report found that, despite significant growth in the newspaper industry over the previous 20 years, the *Times of Zambia*, the country’s second biggest selling newspaper, was bought by just 0.26% of the literate population (Banda, 2006). Such figures indicate that the *Times of Zambia* was not a publication with a large popular readership; this was something reflected in the character of the newspaper, which, during the 1970s, would regularly print “pieces such as recipes to be prepared in modern English kitchens” (Bourgault, 1995, pp.162-163).

Particularly in Gemini’s ‘core markets’ of Eastern and Southern Africa – regions in which the newspaper industry was originally established in service of European settlers – it could be relatively certain of a narrow urban readership made up largely of the post-colonial elite. It was not, of course, always quite so clear-cut for all of the newspapers that Gemini served. The two Indian newspapers in the sample, the *Chandigarh Tribune* and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, were not national titles. The *Tribune* served the northern states of Punjab and Haryana and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* was printed in Kolkata and distributed in West Bengal. Despite their lack of national prominence, in 1973, each title had an average circulation of a little over 100,000 (Bhaskar, 2005, p.32), well exceeding that of some of the national African titles Gemini served. While the extent to which these publications could be considered to have a ‘popular’ readership is debateable, given that they were published in English, they do seem to have been closer to that end of the spectrum than some of their African counterparts. The *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, for instance, was founded in 1868 as a nationalist title under British rule. In its earliest days, it was characterised by “violent denunciation of the European planters and the
government” (Basu, 2013, p.14). It became one of the most influential publications in West Bengal, spawning several imitators (ibid). Following independence, the title retained a populist stance, consistently focusing on issues affecting poor, marginalised communities, such as land reform and the closure of industries (ibid).

Although these Indian papers may have been fiercely independent, many of the newspapers in the Global South that took the service were government-owned titles. Titles in this sample that fell under this category include the *Times of Zambia* (after 1975), *The Tanzania Daily News*, Botswana’s *Daily News*, *The Herald* in Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone’s *Daily Mail*. In theory, Gemini’s setup allowed for its correspondents to circumvent, to some degree, the restrictions of a tightly controlled press. The story ledgers, or ‘red books’ used in Chapter 5, kept a record of all Gemini content and frequently included notes not to send certain stories to newspapers in the country that the article was about (see Figure 17). This was not necessarily always a measure designed to protect journalists; the article about Malaysian elections in Figure 17, for instance, was presumably not sent to Malaysia as this would have been a topic already covered extensively by the local press.

![Gemini ledger page](image)

**Figure 17:** Bottom half of story leger page for 4th May, 1990, detailing articles that were not to be sent to the subscribing newspapers in the countries that the stories were about. Source: Gemini archive (Gemini, 1990-1992).

However, Andrew Graham-Yool, who contributed to Gemini from Buenos Aires in the 1970s, wrote, in his autobiography, of the degree of freedom that this arrangement afforded him:
The military regime was not getting friendlier – in fact I had already been under arrest once, and the telephone threats had begun to be a nuisance – and I needed that outlet. Gemini News Service, and *Index on Censorship* magazine became my two life-lines... Gemini and *Index on Censorship* gave a breathing space I could find nowhere else. (Graham-Yool, 1995, p.24)

A journalist, then, could report on failures, violence or corruption within their country; the story could be omitted from the packages sent to subscribing newspapers within that county. It could, though, still be published in the rest of the world, providing a critical journalist with an outlet, some income for their work, and a degree of minimisation to the personal risk faced. Articles written by Graham-Yool (1969, 1974) in the sample, show him, in print, accusing Argentina’s military dictatorship of posturing over their ambition to take control of the Falklands/Malvinas in order to divert attention from a poor economic situation and exposing the violent factionalism of the Peronist left and right.

Other subscribing titles that might be seen as editorially compromised are those that were owned by large commercial entities. The *East African Standard*, for instance, a longstanding subscriber to Gemini and included in this sample, was brought, in 1967, by a subsidiary of the London-registered Lonrho: The London-Rhodesia mining corporation. Lonrho had mining interests all over Africa, particularly in Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa (Stock, 2012). It seems, though, that Lonrho’s intentions in purchasing the *Standard* may not have been to use it as a tool to generate widespread pro-big business, pro-Rhodesian, pro-South African sentiment amongst the general population. Lonrho had a reputation for cultivating close relationships with African leaders. Eric Marsden, the *Standard*’s editor following the purchase by Lonrho, told an interviewer that he believed the acquisition to be part of that relationship-building process: “The talk about Lonrho was that Tiny Rowland [Lonrho’s chief executive] said to Kenyatta, ‘The paper is yours to do what you like with, just say the word.’ I believe that’s true” (Loughran, 2010, p.92). The 1975 sample of Gemini articles appearing in the *East African Standard* contains at least two stories that seem very unlikely to have been aligned with Lonrho’s business interests, but would not necessarily have been out of step with the public pronouncements of Kenya’s political leadership. One describes the ‘liberation’
of Papua New Guinea from a “colonial-type financial contract with one of the world’s biggest mining companies” (Wilson, 1975), the other contains detailed and graphic testimony of the torture suffered by a Namibian liberation leader at the hands of South African authorities (Raynor, 1975).

Gemini’s subscriber base did also include newspapers whose ownership – in that they were not owned by governments or big corporations with morally dubious commercial interests – certainly seems to make them appear far less editorially compromised. Titles in Asia and the Americas, such as the Amrita Bazar Patrika, the Chandigarh Tribune, the Advocate News, the New Straits Times and the Stabroek News, might be considered to fall under this rubric.

In the main, though, Gemini’s journalism was not characterised by investigative exposés of specified corrupt or violent politicians or businesspeople (see Section 6.3). Instead, its main ‘targets’ were unjust international systems and exploitative commercial practices, typically broadly defined (ibid). While a government-owned title would have been very unlikely to publish overt criticism of that government, the nature of Gemini’s content and its operations meant that the opportunity to do so was not commonly presented to them.

6.2.2. Frequency of Use: A Rival to the Big Agencies?

More than a newspaper’s political or commercial interests, it appears from this sample that it was a paper’s access to resources that largely determined how, and how much, they used Gemini. One country where this was particularly apparent was Tanzania. The Tanzania Daily News often struggled to pay even Gemini’s relatively modest subscription fees; a sense of charitability led Gemini to continue providing the paper with content even when this was the case (interview, Daniel Nelson). Figure 18 shows the inside page of a typical edition of Tanzania’s Sunday News from 1988; apart from advertisements, it consists entirely of three Gemini articles with the distinctive accompanying graphics. Editions of the Tanzania Daily News and Sunday News from 1980 were also examined; in those papers it was also common for the international pages, where you would usually expect to find dispatches from AP and Reuters, to be exclusively composed of Gemini content.
In an interview, Ingram told Richard Bourne (1995) that he believed there were points in Gemini’s history when it was the Daily News’ sole source of international content, with wire agencies like Reuters and AP proving prohibitively expensive for the paper. While this analysis found no evidence of the paper subscribing to one of the big agencies’ services, they were printing
material from DepthNews (a Manila-based ‘alternative’ news agency focussing on development) and PANA (the Pan-African News Agency). Nonetheless, for 30 years following Tanzania’s independence, the Daily News (known prior to 1972 as the Tanzania Standard) was the country’s only English-language daily newspaper (Robins, 2001). This, coupled with its frequent use and prominent placement of Gemini content, suggests that, in Tanzania at least, Gemini was a prominent voice in the national press. It seems likely that cost and a lax attitude towards outstanding debts were at least as relevant in putting Gemini in this position as any political or commercial biases.

It was not just Tanzania where Gemini was a consistent voice in the national press. Based on this sample, in 1977 the average amount of time between Gemini articles appearing in The Fiji Times was just 1.5 days; in Malaysia’s Kinabalu Sabah Times in 1973 it was two days; in the Bangkok Post in 1994 a Gemini story was being published every 2.5 days. Others did use the service less frequently; The Stabroek News, in 1995, for instance, was publishing a Gemini story, on average, every ten days, whereas for the Montreal Gazette in 1974 it was once every twenty days. The fact that in many countries Gemini articles were appearing almost daily or every other day in major newspapers does add credence to Richard Keeble’s (1998) assessment that, in some places, Gemini was ‘more famous’ than the ‘giants’ of the international news world.

6.2.3. Placement Within the Newspapers

Alongside the question of whether stories were printed, there are key issues of how stories were presented to their readers. As Carvalho (2008, p.167) points out, “Surface’ elements of the newspaper and of the text itself, such as the section in which the article was published, the page number, the size of the article, and whether it was accompanied by visual elements… say something about the valuation and categorization of the issue by a given news outlet”. We can assume that a newspaper considers the story it features on the front page to be of greater importance than those contained fifteen or twenty pages deep. Consideration of such ‘surface elements’ is also invaluable for gaining insight, not only into how a newspaper values subject matter, but also how the contributor of that subject matter is regarded. Analysis of the physical
placement of Gemini’s content in the pages of its subscribing papers, then, tells us a great deal about how Gemini was used, how it was considered by newspaper editors, and what function it was fulfilling. This analysis of the visual ‘surface elements’ of Gemini’s presentation uses a slightly reduced sample of 198 articles taken from 15 newspapers between 1969 and 1996.9

While Tanzania’s Daily News may have often relied on the Gemini service for the bulk of its international news section, this was not, it seems, how the majority of subscribing newspapers presented Gemini articles to its readers. Of the 198 articles in this survey, only 23 (12%) were featured in international news sections. The Papua New Guinea Post-Courier and the Bangkok Post were frequent users of Gemini in their weekend magazines, 19 articles (10%) were found there. The Stabroek News mostly used Gemini in a section labelled ‘Features’. This section, it appears, was created specifically as a place to use Gemini content; on the days when no Gemini articles were published the section was absent. It was the editorial pages, though, where the vast majority, 140 (71%), of Gemini’s articles were to be found within its subscribing newspapers (see Table 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Section</th>
<th>No. of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Editorial page</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposite Editorial Page</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Gemini article placement

9 The original sample contains 233 articles from 19 newspapers. Articles from the South China Morning Post (in 2002), The Sowetan (in 2001), and the Toronto Star (in 1990) were obtained from text-only digital databases. They were, therefore, discarded from this part of the analysis. The Gemini articles published in 1984 by the Botswana Daily News were also excluded from this part of the analysis. The Daily News often contained just four pages, a single sheet of A2 paper folded in half. As such, it was considered that there would be little to be gleaned from an analysis of the placement of Gemini articles in this context. This left the sample of 198 articles.
This placement in the editorial pages, as opposed to the ‘news’ pages, tells us a great deal about how Gemini was perceived by editors, how it was presented to readers and, more importantly, the function it fulfilled in the pages of subscribing newspapers. Figure 19 shows the editorial pages of Malaysia’s *New Straits Times* from 3 April 1987, which contains a Gemini article entitled ‘The drug menace spreads to Africa’. The *New Straits Times*, in common with the 14 other papers in this analysis, spreads its editorial content across two pages, the main editorial page on the left and the op-ed (opposite the editorial) page on the right. All of the papers feature the day’s editorial (usually written by the editor) in a thin vertical box along the left-hand edge of the page. The remaining space on the two pages is typically configured differently day-to-day, containing a mixture of letters to the editor, opinion pieces, ‘expert’ analysis, interpretative or analytical articles written by staffers or external agencies, transcripts of speeches by politicians, and editorial cartoons.

![New Straits Times editorial pages, 3rd April, 1987, pp.8-9, featuring Gemini article 'The drug menace spreads to Africa' on page 8.](image)

Typically, the editorial section is contained on pages six and seven or eight and nine. Figure 20, using the *Fiji Times* from 6 January 1977 as an example, displays the editorial pages in the broader context of the first seven
pages of the newspaper. The formats of the other 14 papers were all remarkably similar; all followed the same basic organisational structure, particularly in their separation of ‘news’ and ‘opinion’ by using clearly delineated editorial sections. Pages one to three deal with domestic news, in this case concerning Fijian party politics; page four contains a full-page advertisement and page five is international news, provided by Reuters and the Australian Associated Press (AAP) wire agencies. The editorial pages feature two stories from Gemini, one of which has been allocated the entirety of page seven, the other fills a sizeable proportion of page six. This devotion of large amounts of page space to Gemini content was not uncommon; eight of the ten articles taken from the Fiji Times occupied an entire page.

It is worth, here, briefly comparing the main story on page five, ‘Crowds mark anniversary of Chou’s death’ from AAP (1977), with the Gemini story, ‘Nimeri has sweet taste of success’ (Raphael, 1977), on page seven. Both report events – the marking of the anniversary of Chinese Premiere Chou En-Lai’s death and the opening of a sugar refinery in Sudan – but the AAP report, unlike Gemini’s, offers no explicit interpretation or analysis. It reports the size and location of the crowds, their reasons for gathering, and the slogans they chanted. While the use of language in this article, in particular the use of ‘radicals’ and ‘mocking youths’ to describe some sections of the crowd, might be interpreted as illustrative of bias or subjectivity, it does not attempt to explain the wider relevance or significance of the events being described. Gemini, on the other hand, tells us that the sugar refinery is “symbolic of the new order in the Sudan and President Nimeri’s conversion to a mixed economy” and that its opening “provided Nimeri with a heaven-sent opportunity to demonstrate the totality of his development plans”.

While material from Gemini frequently appeared in the same newspapers as that of Reuters, AP and AFP, from its placement it seems that its role within those pages was quite distinct from that of the big organisations Derek Ingram considered to be its competitors. Fahy (2009, p.50) has argued that there is a ‘lacuna’ in our understanding of what he calls ‘opinion journalism’, and that this area “has received so little sustained critical attention that it has become something of a ‘black box’. If scholarly engagement with the
editorial pages of newspapers in the Global North is sparse, attention to these pages in the press of the Global South is virtually non-existent.

Figure 20: Pages one to seven of the Fiji Times, 6th January, 1977, featuring Gemini stories on pages 6 and 7. Figure compiled by the author.

Conventional wisdom relating to the function of newspaper editorial pages generally places them somewhere between a “forum in the marketplace of ideas” (Day and Golan, 2005, p.61) and the means by which “the press take
the lead in establishing the dominant interpretative frameworks within which ongoing political events are made sense of” (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2008, p.67). However we conceptualise editorial content using this spectrum, which ranges from talking shop to engine room of ‘public opinion’, the material printed on these pages exists, when compared to the standard ‘news’ pages, in an altogether more interpretative, analytical, and openly subjective space. Figures 21 to 23 show Gemini articles placed prominently on the editorial pages of a range of subscribing newspapers.

Figure 21: Page 8 of the Chandigarh Tribune, 21st January, 1991, featuring Gemini article ‘Fallout from the Gulf’.
Figure 22: Page 4 of Zimbabwe’s Herald, 8th January, 1985, featuring Gemini article ‘25 years on—and no one goes hungry in Cuba any more’. 
Learning to help victims of violence

A 5 UNICEF struggles with a series of challenges. —

By Daniel Maclean, London

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is working hard to help victims of violence. The organization has been active in various regions, including East Africa and South Asia, to provide emergency assistance and support to affected communities.

UNICEF's work is focused on several key areas, including:

1. Providing immediate relief and assistance: UNICEF has provided emergency supplies such as water, sanitation, and hygiene kits, as well as food and clothing to affected areas.

2. Supporting health services: UNICEF is working to ensure that children and women receive essential health services, including vaccination and treatment for diseases.

3. Education: UNICEF is working to ensure that children have access to education, including through distance learning and remote education programs.

4. Protection: UNICEF is working to protect children from violence, including through advocacy and educating communities on the importance of protecting children.

UNICEF's efforts in East Africa have been particularly focused on helping victims of conflict in Somalia and South Sudan.

In South Sudan, UNICEF has been working to provide emergency assistance to children affected by conflict. The organization has provided food, water, and medical care, as well as supporting schools and health facilities.

In Somalia, UNICEF has been working to support communities affected by drought and conflict. The organization has provided emergency supplies, as well as supporting education and health services.

UNICEF's work in these regions is part of its broader mission to ensure that children have access to the best possible start in life and to realize their rights.

By A. M. Zapp

UNICEF's commitment to providing assistance to vulnerable children is exemplary. The organization is committed to ensuring that every child has the opportunity to live a healthy and happy life.

BBC goes to Somalia events

During the filming of the television series in Somalia, the BBC team encountered a range of challenges. The weather was often harsh, with intense heat and humidity, which made filming difficult.

The team faced other challenges as well, including limited access to certain areas, as well as语言障碍. Despite these challenges, the team was able to complete the filming and produce a compelling series.

The series, titled "The Untold Story," was aired on BBC News and received widespread acclaim. The series highlighted the struggles faced by children and families in Somalia and helped raise awareness of the situation.

The success of the series led to further productions, including a documentary on the role of education in Somalia.

6.2.4. The Graphics

In this side-by-side comparison (Figures 21-23) of Gemini material in print we see a range of presentational elements. In the Chindaghi Tribune we see a page densely packed with text and long articles. In contrast, the East African

Figure 24: Page 6 of the East African Standard, 3rd January, 1996, Featuring Gemini Article 'Learning to help victims of violence'.
Standard uses large, bold headlines, relatively short articles and lots of images. Van Dijk (1993, pp.105-106) points out that such ‘visual information’ – the ratio of text to images, the nature of the images, the size of the headlines can be “a compelling means for the interpretation of texts, and hence for the formation of (biased) models of the events the texts are about”. For this reason, this section details the character, range, (dis)continuity and prevalence of Gemini’s visual material in the pages of its subscribing newspapers. In subsequent sections concerned with Gemini’s geopolitical representations, the discursive properties of Gemini’s graphical content are discussed, with the requisite context of their accompanying text.

![Figure 24: Typical Gemini 'newsmaps'. Figure compiled by the author.](image)

The most prominent and stylistically consistent element of Gemini’s visual content was its maps (see Figure 24). Of the 198 articles in this sample, 115 (58%) contained a graphic; 58 of those (50% of the graphics) were maps. This consistent character remained largely unaltered through Gemini’s history. As in the examples, the maps generally served to simply highlight the location of the story.
In the second most prevalent class of graphics, the charts and tables, we can see evidence of Gemini’s editorialising character (see Figure 25). We see a juxtaposing of military and aid spending in the graphic entitled ‘The cost of war’, which is clearly intended to advance the argument that government spending is inappropriately prioritised. We can also see elements of moral and political criticism in the graphic highlighting the top ten sellers of harmful chemical
pesticides – including a skull and crossbones in the design – and the graphic showing countries whose firms were violating sanctions imposed on apartheid South Africa. Similarly, in the graphic ‘Main causes of child death’, the inclusion of a sketch of a malnourished child has the effect of heightening the emotional resonance of the data being presented. It does so, though, by reproducing a depersonalised image of generic, impoverished ‘other’ from the Global South, arguably naturalising the paternalistic principles of colonial discourses (see Maxwell, 2000). The paternalism of Gemini’s journalistic discourses in discussed further in section 6.3.1.

Figure 26: The front page of Tanzania’s Daily News, 24th January, 1980, with a Gemini map.

In addition, Gemini’s distinctive, branded visual materials, particularly its maps, were also frequently employed elsewhere in the papers alongside non-Gemini content. Figure 26, for instance, shows a Gemini map used on the front page of the Tanzania Daily News alongside an article written by a staff reporter.

6.2.5. A feature on the news landscape of the Global South

Ingram and others at Gemini wished for their content to be seen as comparable to that of AP and Reuters; in practice, the role fulfilled by Gemini in the pages of its subscribing newspapers was very different. If we were to focus on a single edition of a newspaper printing both Gemini and agency copy, given the size,
prominent positioning, recognisable branding, illustrations and consistent highlighting of the Gemini name, we might reasonably conclude that the discursive capacity of the two were comparable, if not tipped slightly in Gemini’s favour. Gemini was used consistently by its subscribers in the Global South; its distinctive visual qualities, outlined in this section, made it a recognisable editorial and editorialising brand within the pages of a reader’s chosen newspaper. All of this put the Gemini News Service in something of an exalted position.

In Joanne Sharp's (1993, 2000) study of *The Reader's Digest* during the 1980s, she argues that the magazine’s 16 million North American readers made it an important producer/reinforcer of ‘common-sensical’ understandings of the world. In advertising material produced in 1970, Gemini claimed to have 40 million readers (Gemini, 1970a); this figure seems to have been calculated using the largest possible estimates of the circulations of all of Gemini’s subscribers combined and should, therefore, be met with some degree of scepticism. Nonetheless, given a sizeable (if impossible to accurately measure) potential readership and privileged presentation to those readers within the pages of their daily newspapers, we can confidently conclude that Gemini had a significant capacity to discursively produce global space and global politics.

**The subsequent section of this chapter explores what Gemini did with this capacity.**

6.3. **Gemini’s Discursive Production of Geopolitics**

6.3.1. Subjects and Themes

Table 9 outlines the breakdown of categories and themes present in Gemini’s discursive production of a popular geopolitics, identified in the sample. Each article in the sample was assigned to a subject category and up to three themes were identified within each article.

The most immediately noticeable facet of Gemini’s material is the sheer breadth of subjects and topics covered by Gemini’s writers. This should not necessarily be surprising. Gemini was a features agency and features is a category of journalism that has typically encompassed a very broad spectrum
of material. As noted previously, Jeremy Tunstall (1983) has argued that a feature can be any newspaper article that is not ‘spot’ news.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category/Themes/subthemes</th>
<th>No. of instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Trade of Commodities, Goods and Services</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of trade favour of countries in the Global North</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country in Global South increasing its likelihood of prosperity by</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increasing exports/production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of mobilising peasant/traditional workforce</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity exporters in the Global South in a powerful position</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of Global South by Global North</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS states have made errors/miscalculations in their trade policies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postcolonial Nation Building</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcolonial leader(s) skilled/highly capable/ intelligent/ educated</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troubling antidemocratic moves occurring in postcolonial state</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcolonial nation making promising democratic steps</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcolonial state threatened by factionalism</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader(s) mismanaging postcolonial states</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcolonial state threatened by tribalism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persisting Formal Colonisation</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence is overdue</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inertia in process of formal decolonisation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Due to improvidence of coloniser</em></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Due to intransigence of coloniser</em></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Due to complexity of decolonisation</em></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of formal colonisation celebrated</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence imminent for particular colony</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous groups split on questions of independence</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Development</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global North should contribute more towards international development budgets</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>As their wealth is comparatively much greater</em></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>To alleviate extreme poverty</em></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global North misinformed about development spending</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International development programmes mismanaged</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance used cynically for geopolitical aims</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid not a permanent solution, structural change required</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme poverty in the Global South causing a health crisis</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients in the Global South are victims of unscrupulous practices by Western pharmaceutical companies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous knowledge in the Global South may hold key to treating chronic illnesses</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Inequality stemming from colonial legacies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global South governments must cooperate to prevent drug use</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Conflict</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of arrogance/unilateralism/hawkish nature of US actions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criticism of South African actions against its neighbours 4
Immorality of nuclear weapons 2
Criticism of unjust Soviet actions 2
Citizens in the Global South bearing brunt of the Cold War 1

**Migration/Refugees** 12
Refuges living in appalling conditions 4
Industrialisation driving population shifts 4
Countries in the Global North treat migrants from the South unfairly 4
Scale of refugee issues not recognised internationally 3
Countries in the Global South doing the most to shelter refugees 3
Squandered potential of refugees 2

**Miscellaneous**
Environment 10
Media 10
Party Politics 9
Culture 8
South-South Diplomacy 6
Personal Success Story 5
Crime 4
Inequality 4
Year in Review 2

Table 9: Categorisation and themes in the sample of 233 articles.

Ken Metzler (1986, p.190), though, in his journalism textbook *Newswriting Exercises*, suggests that the function of features journalism is “to make a point”. In Table 9 we see the ‘points’ that Gemini articles commonly pursued: 21 articles, for instance, included arguments that terms of international trade are stacked in favour of countries in the Global North; 15 argue that particular leaders of postcolonial nations are showing particular skill in the stewardship of their newly-independent country.

The subsequent sections of this chapter explore the most prevalent subject categories in turn.

**6.3.1.1. International Trade of Commodities, Goods and Services**

The most prevalent subject category, with a total of 41 (18%) articles in the sample focusing on this area, was the international trade of commodities, goods and services. Approximately half (21) of the articles argue that the terms of global trade are stacked in favour of the Global North and disadvantage the Global South. In these articles, we see a world primarily ordered around connections and interactions between Global North and Global south. We see a world divided between powerful and weak, rich and poor; the existence of
imbalances and inequality within the systems and structures of international trade is never debated, rather their effects are explored. This inequity is a taken-for-granted feature of the international system. As an example, when, in 1969, the potential for large-scale extraction of minerals from the ocean floor was being explored, Gemini contributor Arvid Pardo (1969) expressed in an article for the service his view that it was ‘unthinkable’ that such a move could lead to anything other than a widening of the gulf between rich and poor nations:

The process [of extraction] has already started and will lead to a scramble for sovereign rights over the land underlying the world’s seas and oceans, surpassing in magnitude and in its implications last century’s colonial scramble for territory in Asia and Africa. The consequences will be... intolerable injustice that would reserve the plurality of the world’s resources for the exclusive benefit of less than a handful of nations. The strong would get stronger, the rich richer, and among the rich themselves there would arise an increasing and insuperable differentiation between two or three and the remainder.

(Pardo, 1969)

Within these 21 articles, one argues that Western oil companies have an “unacceptable stranglehold over the distribution and marketing of oil” (Laishley, 1980). Another article from the same year argues that industries in ‘developing nations’ were “crippled by a dependency on Western technology” and that their counterparts in the North showed “no signs of being willing to assist in transfers of technology from north to south” (Harrison, 1980). In a condemnation of the ‘strong hand’ ‘wielded’ by the ‘protectionist’ European Economic Community (EEC), Shada Islam’s (1984) Gemini article argues that “the community’s preoccupation with putting its own affairs in order means a tougher time for the Third World countries with which it is thrashing out a new trade agreement.” In an economic overview of the 1970s for the agency, Madely (1980) argues “some developing countries made enormous efforts. But a hostile international trading system proved a severe obstacle.”

These articles typically portray an international system that is unjust, unequal or unfair. On eight occasions, the Gemini articles in the sample go further than suggesting that countries in the Global North are in a position to reap greater rewards from international trade than their counterparts in the
South. In these instances, countries or economic actors in the Global North are depicted as exploiting the Global South (see Table 9), as facilitating the transfer of wealth from South to North. One article, for instance, argues that Papua New Guinea was ‘trapped’ in a contract with an Anglo-Australian corporation described as “one of the most egregious ever extracted by a mining company anywhere” (Wilson, 1975). The arrangement allowed the foreign mine owners to pay very little tax to the Papua New Guinea government, which the article’s author argued was ‘depriving’ the country of “cash much needed for development” (ibid).

There is, then, in the sample, a relatively small number of articles that cast international trade in terms of exploitation rather than just unfair advantage. In these eight articles, we see the more common binary categorisations of the world as consisting of powerful and weak displaced by a characterisation that presents the position of powerful and wealthy states as one that they enjoy due to their immoral exploitation of the poorer and less powerful states. In a 1974 article by Barry Wilson (1974), written as OPEC price rises were hitting, we see the most strident criticism of the Global North’s trade dealings with the South. Wilson (1974) decries what he calls the lack of ‘humanitarianism’ in ‘rich’ nations’ commercial engagement with the South:

The rich and powerful nations of the world can hardly expect much international sympathy for the oil shortages they are suffering… when they are, at least in part, responsible for the real starvation of some of the poorest countries in the world… The U.S. this season had a record grain crop of 240 million metric tons… The Soviet Union’s yield of a record 220 million tons… is well above the previous 10-year average of just over 150 million tons… So why are prices still soaring?… [T]he main reason for the reduced stocks is that the rest of the world, and mainly the poorer section, harvested very poor grain crops this season and they are having to buy: and by and large they are having to buy from the affluent… Three years ago the big exporters scuppered the international grains arrangement because they could not get their high-priced demands written into the agreements. They have got their high prices anyway.

Talks to restore grain trading to fair and equitable arrangements through the auspices of the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) have all but collapsed because of lack of interest by the world’s major exporters who are keeping their fingers crossed that present shortages go on for ever.

It’s hardly a prescription for fair and reasonable – and humanitarian – dealing.
While there has been little systematic research into popular media discourses around the 1973 ‘oil crisis’, or of global North-South relations during this period, Natasha Zaretsky’s (2010) characterisation of the US media’s reaction to oil price rises and embargoes suggests that Gemini was significantly out of step with much of the mainstream Western press. Far from suggesting that OPEC price rises were analogous to the US and the West’s own high prices charged to poorer countries for basic commodities, Zaretsky (ibid, p.80) concludes that most of the coverage contained a “sense that a foreign enemy had inappropriately gained the upper hand and was wielding power against the United States in ways that were not simply unfair, but immoral and sadistic”. Newspaper cartoons, Zaretsky (ibid) argues, typically portrayed the oil producing nations as racialised criminals, with the US as victim. Although this is a limited piece of evidence, it does suggest that Gemini’s production of a popular global cartography of trade and commerce was providing something of a counterpoint to more ‘mainstream’ global news producers.

None of the Gemini articles dealing with international trade, though, advocate or discuss measures such as trade barriers, restrictions on the operations of trans-national corporations, or countries focussing primarily on local production as possibilities. These were all measures advocated by dependency theorists in the 1970s (see Baran, 1957; Frank, 1966); had Gemini been attempting to align itself with some of these international thinkers – considered radical at the time – these are some of the measures we might have expected to have been advocated. Instead, countries in the Global South are encouraged to continue contributing to the global economy. In the sample, we see 13 instances of increased (or potentially increasing) exports of raw materials or manufactured goods by countries in the Global South being celebrated as a means of attaining ‘development’ (see Table 9).

Reporting on the possibility of an oil field being found in Tonga, for instance, a Gemini article surmised:

The prospect of oil is a tantalising one… There is some reason for thinking that the dreams of the Tongans might come true… There may
be natural gas which could be the basis for industries which could develop the country.

(Russell, 1969)

In a similar endorsement of ‘progress’, in a 1977 article about the opening of a Landrover production plant in Nairobi – 65% owned by British companies and 35% owned by the Kenyan government – its author, Alan Rake (1977), celebrates that the “new plant has brought 350 new well-paid jobs to the area” and heralds the facility as a “model for the Third World” and as “show[ing] the way”.

In this sample, how the two most consistent facets of Gemini’s production of the global trading environment – that this environment fundamentally favours the already wealthy and that countries in the Global South must increase their activity in this environment in order to attain prosperity (see Table 9) – are to be reconciled, at least conceptually, is not something that the agency or its writers sought to explore.

Without exception, the 41 articles in the sample that are about some aspect of international trade are premised on an assumption that economic growth must be the ultimate goal for any society. They are anti-protectionist and rooted in the belief that if only countries in the Global south were allowed fair access to international trade increased exports and increased production would result in prosperity and success for those countries. While some of its articles might have been considered more ‘left wing’ – in that they were critical of exploitation and extraction of wealth by powerful economic actors – all are underpinned by the basic assumptions of modernisation theory and the linear notions of global history common to both the left and the right.

There are eight instances in which the productivity or export potential of countries in the Global South are discussed in relation to mobilising ‘peasant’ or ‘traditional’ communities (see Table 9). In 1972, for instance, Christopher Parker reported:

The Anglo-American mining conglomerate has launched [Zambia’s] biggest ever farming venture by buying up a 100-square-mile block of farms… He [Kenneth Kaunda] needs a much better mobilisation of the country’s poorly-deployed man power if it is to be a success.

(Parker, 1972)
In celebrating the “Remarkable success of Algeria’s two national plans” and the subsequent “staggering increases in exports across multiple sectors”, David Robie (1974) praised ‘sensible’ land reforms which “enabled peasants to participate in more lucrative forms of farming.” In a similarly celebratory piece, the expansion of Sudan’s sugar trade is described as “demonstrat[ing] the totality of his [President Nimeri’s] development plans” (Raphael, 1977). Raphael argues that opening of new sugar refineries “was not a question of easing unemployment” as, previously, “employment had simply not existed” (ibid). The article covers a speech that Sudan’s President Nimeri gave to local people at the ribbon-cutting ceremony of a new plant:

Nimeri appealed for a fundamental change of attitude among his traditionalist audience, reminding them that development brought social and cultural as well as material advantages. If the response may have been a trifle muted, there is little doubt that the message went home.

(Raphael, 1977)

The ‘advantages’ of engaging in ‘modern’ industrial or commercial agricultural production, then, are taken for granted. ‘Traditionalist’ audiences are ‘reminded’ of the ‘facts’ of these ‘advantages’. Similar assumptions can be seen in references to potential extraction of sodium carbonate in Chad, Gemini Reports: “Chad is still a country with few large towns of good roads, no railways, and almost no sources of income apart from cattle and cotton” (Wilson, 1976, emphasis added). The path which Chad must take in order to become ‘modern’ and ‘industrialised’ is very much taken for granted.

In the above example and across all of the 41 articles dealing with international trade, all pursue arguments that countries in the Global South are catching up with the Global North in terms of their industries, being held back or having their progress impeded. This, either tacit or implicit, placing of Global South and Global North countries at different stages of an industrialisation or developmental continuum contributes to what Johannes Fabien (1983) has termed ‘temporal distancing’ and the ‘denial of coavelness’. As Anne Mcclintock (1995, p. 30) contends, this construction of asynchronicity between Global North and South, coloniser and (formerly) colonised, means that subaltern peoples “do not inhabit history proper but exist in a permanently anterior time within the geographic space of the modern empire as anachronistic humans,
atavistic, irrational, bereft of human agency – the living embodiment of the
archaic ‘primitive’.” In suggesting that countries in the Global South ‘need’ to or
are ‘sensible’ to ‘mobilise’ their populace in ‘modern’ industrial or commercial
agricultural production – echoing Rostow’s (1960) stages of economic growth in
which societies move from ‘traditional’ to ‘mature’ states – Gemini was
reproducing Orientalist ideology that constructed Western societies as dynamic
and innovative against a static, primitive, non-Western other (Said, 1979). The
‘temporal distancing’ in which Gemini engaged, assumed that the West’s was a
model of ‘progress’ to which countries in the South must naturally aspire.

In this regard, whether Gemini advocated free trade *laissez-faire*
economics, as it mostly did, or engaged in critique of exploitative capitalist
modes of production, as it occasionally did, is somewhat immaterial. In both
t Editorial guises, Gemini essentialises societies in the Global South as places
characteristic of early or primitive stages in an assumed-to-be-universally-
applicable linear model of human history.

‘Development’ is the taken-for-granted natural aim of moving along this
line. As outlined above, when Gemini argues that states are not being properly
rewarded for their material output, they are being denied capital much needed
for ‘development’; when new natural resources are discovered or exploited for
the first time this is a potential new income to be used for ‘development’.

### 6.3.1.2. International Development

‘Development’, or more specifically ‘international development’ was a perennial
subject in Gemini’s content. A total of 20 articles in the sample were about
‘international development’, making it the fourth most common topic. The
articles in this category all focus on ‘development’ programmes or ‘development
assistance’ administered at an international scale, for instance development aid
given by the UK’s international development agencies to countries in the Global
South, or the work of agencies such as UNIDO or the UNDP.

The majority of these articles deal with aid or assistance being provided
by the Global North to the Global South (see Table 9), here we see, again, a
world primarily defined by its longitudinal lines of connections.

The most prevalent theme in these articles is that countries in the Global
North should contribute more towards international development budgets; more
than half of the articles in this category pursue this argument (see Table 9). The case for increased development spending by the North is most commonly made by juxtaposing Western countries' development spending with their spending elsewhere. Derek Ingram, in 1984, for instance, contrasts spending on weaponry in the West with development contributions:

As new weapons were deployed and the US announced its biggest ever defence budget, the developing countries of the world could ponder helplessly at how their own poverty and economic problems could so easily be alleviated if hundreds of billions of dollars and roubles were not being spent on nuclear overkill.

(Ingram, 1984b)

In another article by Ingram (1979), published five years earlier, he points out that the British government spends “20 times more” on education than it does on development and that “the country gives less in aid than it spends on bedtime drinks”. Yet another piece by Ingram on the topic, in 1995, describes British development aid as “providing excellent opportunities for people in some of the world’s poorest regions”. He is critical, though, of what he calls the “far from impressive” sum that Britain spends annually (Ingram, 1995). Ingram accuses British foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind of using ‘weasel words’ to justify cuts to an already unsatisfactory development budget; he also contrasts the needs of the “poorest countries” with the “middle-class [British] voters”, who the Thatcher government has decided to “put a little more money in the pocket of” (ibid).

Such comparisons are also presented in graphical form, as shown in Figures 27 and 28. Here we see, again, the sums spent on military equipment by Western powers or on luxury goods being compared with costs for items such as seeds and agricultural tools for the Global South.

The key rationale given in these articles for continuing or increased financial assistance for ‘developing’ countries is, typically, their extreme levels of poverty (see table 9). The articles calling for more spending discuss instances of drought (Derrick and Allen, 1974; Obadina 1988), famine (Manning, 1974), crop failure (Landau, 1971) and disease (Nelson, 1988; Zamman, 1993) as examples of why more aid is needed. Wealthy countries in the North are implored to give more on ‘humanitarian’ grounds (Manning, 1974;
Rowley, 1976), as a ‘moral duty’ (Morgan, 1977) or out of ‘compassion’ (Ingram, 1995).

Figure 27: Gemini graphic accompanying 1991 article ‘South paying true cost of war’
This consistent support for the concept of international development aid and its expansion would have marked Gemini out, when compared to many of the other media outlets also situated on London’s Fleet Street, as distinct (see Biko et al., 2000; Fair, 1992; Wall, 1997a, 1997b). As Heather Brookes (1995, p. 478) demonstrated, in a discourse analysis of both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ British newspapers’ representations of Africa in the early 1990s, ‘resistance’ to Britain’s role as a donor to Africa is commonplace, “based on the intimation that western efforts in Africa are fruitless and a drain on western resources.” Brookes (ibid, p.478) concludes that ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ newspaper alike produce a world in which the West’s role in Africa was “one of positive agency” (ibid, p.478):

Western participants are predominantly actors and sayers involving actions, decisions and pronouncements regarding aid... The roles of African participants, on the other hand, suggests... parasitic dependency on the West and their general helplessness and impotency... The West is the senior partner or parent who shoulders the burden of responsibility for the helpless, savage, self-destructive and child-like African. (Brookes, 1995, p.478)

Although supporting rather than opposing Western international development spending might, on the surface, seem like a substantial distinction, the only real
point of deviation between Gemini and the media that Brookes (ibid) scrutinised is the construction of the ‘responsible’, parent-like West. In the more mainstream domestic British press we see the West as being unduly burdened with responsibilities for the Global South. In Gemini’s world, though, the West is more of an irresponsible parent figure, shirking its ‘moral duty’ (Morgan, 1977) to provide appropriate levels of assistance and guidance to the Global South.

It is in the articles that deal with the specifics of development projects that we see most clearly paternalistic sentiment and metaphors being employed. In an article about Israel’s development projects in East Africa, for example, David Landau (1971) is complementary about Israeli efforts. Echoing the ‘temporal distancing’ exhibited in the articles about international trade, Landau contributes to the production of a world in which it is the responsibility of the ‘developed’ countries to assist ‘developing’ countries in leaving behind their antiquated subsistence traditions and to become ‘productive’ by following the tutelage of the Global North:

If Israeli experts succeed in making a productive person out of a subsistence farmer when other people have failed – this in itself is an impressive demonstration of Israel’s ability.

(Landau, 1971)

An article by John Crocker (1976) uses the child-parent metaphor more explicitly in its discussion of aid given to the US Virgin Islands. The article entitled “U.S. Virgins starting to grow up” reports on what it calls a ‘minority’ of ‘anti-development militants’ opposed to plans to ‘develop’ the island of St John, with US assistance, for international tourism:

Plans are afoot to convert part of this sanctuary, now recognised as one of the most imaginative and progressive projects in the whole Caribbean, into a permanent holiday camp with all the appendages (such as ice-cream and Coca-Cola stands) which this implies. It is also intended to convert some of the woodland trails, which now accommodate nothing larger than a donkey, into paved roads for busses and taxis.

“Over my dead body!” said one militant woman inhabitant of St. John’s little “capital”, Cruz Bay, which had five registered motor vehicles and 750 inhabitants in 1956 against more than 100 rental cars alone and an annual influx of more than 750,000 visitors today.

(Crocker, 1976)
Crocker celebrates that this attitude is, apparently, becoming less prevalent thanks to ‘growing awareness’ of the development grants that the islands receive, and that “scarcely anybody, except a few on the lunatic fringe of the political scene, wants to sever completely the umbilical cord” (ibid). Countries in the south are said to be ‘growing up’ when they accept the, to the author, obvious advantages of more cars and more tourist visitors and infrastructure. Crocker’s (ibid) birthing analogy sees the coloniser country as mother to the colonised, assisting it to maturity through international development aid contributions.

6.3.1.3. Persisting formal colonialism

In the articles dealing with persisting formal colonialism – the third most prevalent category in the sample – we see again these themes of growth, maturity, responsibility and timeliness coming to the fore. Gemini was founded in 1967; by this point, in terms of British colonial territories at least, the biggest and most significant waves of decolonization had passed. Nonetheless, a focus on lingering colonialism and belated moves towards independence is present in much of the sample. Throughout Gemini’s initial years, small island independence movements and decolonisation appear to have been a favourite topic.

The most persistent theme in these articles is that countries still under colonial rule (including settler colonialism) are overdue their independence (see Table 9). These articles portray the still colonised parts of the world as trailing behind the zeitgeist, typically making reference to previous waves of decolonization and the anomalous nature of those places still under some form of formal colonial governance. Derek Ingram, in a 1972 Gemini article, for instance, describes the “people of Mozambique” as having a ‘desire’ for the independence “enjoyed by many other African countries”. Elsewhere in the sample, colonies are described as “ready for the wind of change to blow through” (Walton, 1972) and as “feeling that the time is right” (Marquis, 1969). It is not, then, the injustice or immorality of continued colonial rule that is cited as the primary reason that colonised places should become independent, rather timeliness is the predominating idea.
This is replicated in the instances in which we see celebration of the attainment of independence by formerly colonised counties or a forecast that independence is imminent in a particular colony. In an article dealing with South African rule in Namibia, Roger Murray (1984) argues “many observers are of the view that the time has come [for South Africa] to make an exit from Namibia”. Murray (ibid) argues that the “financial burden of South Africa’s military and administrative presence in Namibia” will likely “prove decisive in convincing Pretoria to finally pursue a settlement”.

It is the coloniser, then, that is firmly in the driving seat when it comes to issues of decolonisation. We can see this in the rest of the articles on this subject; as shown by Table 9, the primary reasons for what Gemini sees as delays to independence were a lack of planning and foresight by the colonisers or the reluctance of the coloniser country to grant independence. Independence movements in colonised countries are not discussed as key determinants or agents in processes of decolonisation. Instead, it is the colonisers who make decisions, stand to be convinced, and determine timetables for independence.

6.3.1.4. Postcolonial Nation Building

This notion of newly-independent states making their way in the world having been ‘granted’ their independence by their former colonisers is also prevalent in this sample’s second most common category of article, ‘Postcolonial Nation Building’ (see Table 9). Each article is about a specific postcolonial country, with the majority of the content of the article giving a broad overview of developments in that country since independence. The defining characteristics of this category are threefold: firstly, all articles mention the amount of time that has passed since independence; second, they discuss more than one topic – e.g. a country’s political situation and its industrialisation strategy; third, they all discuss the country in question in terms of going ‘backwards’ or ‘forwards’.

These articles read, then, like profile pieces about particular countries or like progress reports. They are not, however, typically presented as thus; most have a ‘news hook’, around which the story is ‘pinned’. A ‘news hook’ is what gives a feature story some degree of topicality or contemporaneousness (Garrison, 2014). A country profile, then, providing an overview of several decades of political developments, might be ‘pegged’ to events such as an
election, a significant vote or anniversary. In many ways, these kinds of ‘backgrounders’ and ‘profile pieces’ are a staple of news features agencies (Aamidor, 2014).

The most common theme in this category of articles is the praise and celebration of postcolonial leaders’ capability and intelligence (see Table 9). This can be seen most clearly in a piece by Derek Ingram (1981), reviewing the political, economic and industrial record of Robert Mugabe on the one-year anniversary of Zimbabwe’s independence:

What the Europeans came quite quickly to recognise was that Zimbabwe had been lucky to land itself with one of the most able leaders Africa has yet produced and a cabinet that, far from being the gang of terrorists they had expected, was man-for-man more capable and better educated than the white governments that had preceded it.

(Ingram, 1981)

Kenneth Kaunda is, in these articles, also frequently praised as a ‘skilled statesman’ (Kausemi, 1975), a ‘towering figure’ and a ‘steady hand’ (Ngoma and Chibuta, 1981); Julius Nyerere’s ‘stewardship’ of Tanzania was described as ‘a model for African leaders’ (Ingram, 1985); Lee Kuan Yew is heralded as a ‘wise’ ‘pragmatist’ who was “turning a vision into a reality” (Gemini News, 1985); Jomo Kenyatta, a ‘scholar’ who had a “firm grip on economics” (Worrall, 1979); Michael Manley, a ‘skilled’ and ‘effective’ politician who was setting ‘realistic targets’ (Lindo, 1977); and Tunku Abdul Rahman was ‘self-effacing’ and an ‘inspired diplomat’ (Duggal, 1969).

Looking at the previously discussed articles dealing with ‘development’ and those charting the journeys of post-colonial nations in their independence, we might be tempted to conclude that there is a large degree of editorial incongruity here. The ‘development’ articles, after all, construct a world in which the Global South is very much in need of the tutelage of ‘advanced’ Western nations, whereas in these articles we see leaders of newly-independent countries as, in the main, capable, wise and educated stewards of their nations. It is likely that we are seeing some of Derek Ingram’s editorial influence here. Ingram was on personal terms with many postcolonial leaders in the Global South and was a great admirer of many of the figures who led their countries to and into independence (see Chapter 4). He was also regarded by many as ‘Mr
Commonwealth’ (see The Zimbabwean, 2015), having been closely involved with many of its institutions (see Chapter 4) and using the Commonwealth’s networks to forge many of his relationships with high-profile individuals.

It is worth, here, briefly exploring some of the most prevalent Commonwealth discourses, as it is in some of these articles dealing with postcolonial nation building that we see most clearly echoes of those discourses informing the agency’s journalistic constructions.

As Patricia Noxolo (2006) has argued, the idea of the Commonwealth itself is premised on the notion of a multiracial ‘family’ of equals. This is a discourse that we can see reproduced in Gemini; its logo, for instance, a black figure and a white figure shaking hands is intended to communicate a message of multiracial partnership and equality (see Chapter 4). In the Commonwealth context, Noxolo (ibid) contends that a language of familial relations combines “gendered and generational metaphors, giving the impression of a voluntary union for mutual good, but at the same time maintaining the notion of hierarchy within a dynamic of institutional development which placed white nations in a parental role in relation to black nations” (Noxolo, 2006, p.259). Noxolo (ibid), along with others (see Power, 2009; Rich, 1990) has argued that paternalistic discourses have been a key facet of the Commonwealth since its inception. Lionel Curtis, whose works were influential in popularizing the concept of a ‘commonwealth’ and in shaping the organisation that was to emerge (see Lavin, 1995), wrote in The Commonwealth of Nations (1918) that English ‘superiority’ was exemplified by “replacing the personal authority of rulers by laws based on the experience of those who obeyed them and subject to revision in the light of future experiences” (Ibid, pp. 210-211). Tutelage in Britain’s colonies about the importance and workings of these institutions should, therefore, be at the forefront of the Commonwealth’s mission (ibid).

Paul Rich (1990) contends that this argument had the important effect of shifting the emphasis of imperial discourses from the Victorian preoccupation with racial superiority/inferiority, to a discourse predominantly concerned with institutions. Curtis, thus, ‘fortified’ the notions of the “inherent beneficence of English institutions” (Rich, 1980, p. 62). He also employs generational metaphors to suggest that Britain cannot continue to ‘look after’ its non-white colonies indefinitely.
Britain was, therefore, according to Noxolo (2006, p.258), able to accept Indian independence and its admission to the Commonwealth because of “recognition of the fact that a large western-educated Indian elite was capable of initiating a coherent full-scale nationalist movement.” This recognition “effectively maintained pre-existing hierarchies between white and black people but simply adjusted their points of absolute difference” (ibid). These discourses effectively push actual equality indefinitely into the future (see Noxolo, 2006; Power 2009).

Ruth Craggs (2018, p.2) has helpfully highlighted that such Commonwealth discourses are contested and that, in practice, the Commonwealth, including in very recent history, has often been a valuable forum for “holding the UK to account over various legacies of empire.” As Noxolo (2006) and Power (2009) both highlight, though, in their examinations of contemporary British aid policy, these generational, ‘family of nations’ discourses have persisted and continue to be influential into the twenty-first century. They continue to emphasise the need for ‘well-educated’, capable, intelligent, democratically-inclined and generally exemplary leaders of postcolonial states to manage and shepherd a populace still defined by orientalist tropes of incivility and irrationality.

Gemini regularly portrayed postcolonial leaders as educated and capable, which might have struck some readers, particularly in Britain or the Global North more generally, as particularly ‘progressive’ or ‘alternative’. Craggs (2014, p.46) has argued that mainstream British media reportage of postcolonial leaders at Commonwealth conferences during the 1960s and 1970s was typically characterised by “[v]iolent and visceral language and imagery”. That Gemini did not do this, though, does not necessarily mark it out as a radical or counterhegemonic postcolonial media outlet. This can only really be thought of as a different style of paternalism, a style that believes that the children are starting to grow up and should be afforded a degree of responsibility. The articles charting the ‘progress’ of newly independent countries are typically characterised by the belief that a sufficiently capable class of leaders had emerged and that they had the ability to marshal their countries towards closing the ‘temporal distance’ that existed between North and South.
Noxolo (2006, p.259) points out that in Commonwealth-empire discourses of ‘progress’, “democratic institutions rather than despotism” becomes the main defining point of differentiation between coloniser and (former) colony. As shown in Table 9, by the prevalence of themes relating to ‘troubling’ antidemocratic moves or ‘promising’ democratic steps in newly-independent countries, it was the health of newly instituted democratic institutions in the Global South with which Gemini articles updating readers about the trajectories of postcolonial countries were primarily concerned. In roughly equal number, these articles celebrate democratic advances or sound the alarm over troubling anti-democratic steps (see Table 9).

That Gemini had a long-term interest in tracking the ‘democratic progress’ of postcolonial nations, particularly in Africa, can be seen in some of its graphics. The same graphic, mapping the democratic status of all of the countries in Africa, was found twice in the sample (see Figure 29). The map shows which countries have ‘military rule’, ‘multi-party’ or ‘one-party’ democracy. The map first appears, in this sample in 1972 and then again, in updated form, twelve years later in 1984.

In the 1984 article that used this graphic, Cameron Duodu discusses Nigeria’s fluctuation between democratically elected and military governments. Duodu (1984) suggests that the lesson of the December 1983 coup, for the rest of Africa, is the need for leaders to be mindful of ‘psychological factors’:
The real reasons [for the coup] might be psychological, however, and anyone who seeks power in Africa would be well advised always to keep psychological factors to the forefront in assessing the political situation. However annoying it may be for an elected government to keep looking over its shoulder to see how the soldiers might react, it seems to me essential that this should be the case, if there is to be stability… African soldiers tend to detest hauteur of any sort, even from among their own ranks, and civilian arrogance is quick to cut them to the bone (Duodu, 1984)

Duodu (ibid) continues that corruption is ‘inevitable’ in the new military government and that military district governors will likely become “tin gods in their areas of administration.” Whether it is amongst soldiers – who, in the above article, are portrayed as acting not in a rational, thoughtful manner, but according to psychological factors – or the general populace, a lack of sophistication is typically present in Gemini’s constructions of the populace of the Global South, particularly in Africa. ‘Tribalism’, as a threat to a postcolonial state is mentioned on seven instances in the sample (see Table 9). In one article discussing Zambia’s ‘tribal rifts’, Kenneth Kaunda is, again, heralded for his political skill and described as the “only man for the job” (Parker, 1971):

when all strata of society are deeply riven by tribal rivalries President Kaunda continues to hold immense prestige. He is the only leader capable of commanding support from people of all tribes. (Parker, 1971)

In a 1973 article, Trevor Grundy directly contrasts Kaunda’s skilful tutelage of tribal peoples with the ‘sloganeering’ of Idi Amin in Uganda. Grundy (1973) argues that Amin’s populism is ‘attractive’ to “the ordinary run-of-the-mill man in East Africa” because “the wananchi does not understand economics”. Grundy continues:

It is true that Amin is an “uneducated” man by Western standards. But he is not playing to the royal box: he goes straight after the pits. His grass roots popularity in Uganda is enormous. He does not understand the ABC of economics, has never heard of Lord Keynes. Neither has the average cotton-picking peasant farmer in Uganda. (Grundy, 1973)
Of Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, Grundy (ibid) remarks that “Of course, these countries’ leaders are more politically aware than Amin”:

they would not say they want rid of their Asian communities and economic power to be placed into the hands of the people… [I]f Big Daddy can win his so-called economic war he will have let loose a tide that will sweep independent Africa… Idi Amin and his ilk are the alternative, go-getters who hardly count the cost of their actions but who are moving in a direction that makes sense to the voter and the politician who gained an education by listening to the radio and doing his homework through a correspondence school.

(Grundy, 1973)

Gemini’s production of the non-elite populace, the subaltern, in the Global South, particularly in Africa, largely conforms, then, to the orientalist discursive tradition. The non-elite population of countries in the Global South are typically defined by characteristics of backwardness, simplicity, lack of education, and a weddedness to ‘primitive’ forms of production. These characterisations are sometimes articulated explicitly, as in the examples discussed immediately above, or are tacitly present in Gemini’s dispatches, which assume that developmental assistance from the Global North, skilful tutelage by ‘educated’, democratically-inclined leaders, and the provision of ‘modern’, ‘productive’ jobs by benevolent industrialisers are all necessary to ‘advance’ a somewhat amorphous group, temporally distanced from the global elite, who are placed in a position of parental responsibility.

6.3.2. Actors

6.3.2.1. A State-Centric Focus

Who Gemini chose to accord the ability to act in its production of the world and its (geo)politics is a key part of assessing the agency’s alterity. In the field of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) the grammatical construction of subjecthood in is an important means of gaining an empirical understanding discursive construction of agency (see van Leeuwen, 2008). The necessity of a verb and a subject to form a grammatically complete sentence in the English language means that in any linguistic expression someone or something must be acting upon someone or something else. As Theo van Leeuwen (ibid, p. 28) points out, writers make ‘representational choices’ which allow them to “include or
exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended.”

As argued by Tony Trew’s (1979) seminal investigation of agency in news media discourses, while a range of people, organisations and social and political entities may be present in a news article, referenced explicitly or tacitly, it is possible, common even, for only some of them to be attributed any degree of agency. More simply, analyses of agency attribution in news media discourses also allow for insight into newsworthiness – which sorts of actors and acts are determined to be of significance – and the scale at which news outlets render the world and its geopolitics: ‘global’ events and elite actors versus ‘local’ events and ‘ordinary’ people.

In order to determine to whom Gemini chose to attribute agency in its articles, every instance of a person, organisation or entity featuring as the subject in at least one active voice sentence in an article was recorded. Categories of actors were created using iterative inductive coding (see Thomas, 2006). In total, 1,303 instances of agency being attributed to a distinct actor, an average of 5.6 per article, were identified in the sample. Table X shows the number of occasions that the most commonly featured actors (those attributed agency on ten or more occasions) appear in the sample. Categories of actors were created using iterative inductive coding (see Thomas, 2006). In total, 1,303 instances of agency being attributed to a distinct actor, an average of 5.6 per article, were identified in the sample. Table X shows the number of occasions that the most commonly featured actors (those attributed agency on ten or more occasions) appear in the sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>No. of occurrences</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nation States</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country in the Global South</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country in the Global North</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governments, Governmental Organisations and Government Representatives</strong></td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of government in the Global South</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government of a country in the Global North or a governmental body/agency/Department</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global South government minister or official</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government of a country in the Global South or a governmental body/agency/Department</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of government in the Global North</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown by the most commonly occurring class of actor in Table 10, it is nation states that are most often attributed with agency in Gemini’s articles. Countries from the Global South are ascribed the ability to act on 164 occasions, countries from the Global North on 152 (ibid). The collective Global South, described using terms such as ‘the Third World’ or the ‘developing countries’ is also attributed with agency on 55 occasions, making it the sixth most common actor in the sample. Gemini’s ‘world’, then, had a definite state-centric orientation; We can see something of this orientation in some of the
headlines contained within the sample: ‘Canada Setting Controls Lead’ 
(Sanger, 1972), ‘Jamaica Goes Ahead with Socialism Plan’ (Lindo, 1977),
‘Kenya Tightens its Belt as Boom Vanishes’ (Worrall, 1979), ‘New Zealand 
Dangles a Tax Carrot’ (Robie, 1988) and ‘Kenya Fighting Back Against Unsafe 
Image’ (Gathurs, 1990). Beyond the headlines of these examples, we see a 
personification of nation states, with countries being ascribed the ability to act, 
think and feel. In the 1972 article ‘Canada Setting Controls Lead’, for instance, 
Clyde Sanger reports:

> Canada is vitally interested [in setting controls for sea bed mineral 
> excavation], for two reasons. It lays claim to perhaps the largest area of 
> underwater soil in the world. But it also wants to see a large proportion of 
> the riches that lie below the world’s oceans go to the development of the 
> poorer nations. 

(Sanger, 1972)

Of the 1,292 instances of agency attribution identified in the sample, in only 370 
(29%) of those instances do we see the ability to act being ascribed to an 
identified individual. In the majority of cases (55% of the time) it is an 
organisation or political entity that is described as acting in some capacity (see 
Table 10 and Appendix 5). On the occasions in which it is a specified, named 
individual who is acting, those individuals are most often heads of government, 
government ministers or officials/spokespeople for international organisations, 
or scientific or technical experts (see Table 10). Again, Gemini’s preoccupation 
with governmental leaders can be seen in some of the headlines in the sample: 
‘Kaunda goes shopping for funds’ (Chela, 1992), ‘Boumediene Counts his 
Successes’ (Robie, 1974), ‘Shrewd Mintoff Gets His Way’ (Sciclum, 1975), 
‘Yamani Gambles on Oil’ (Gemini, 1977), and ‘Nimeri Has Sweet Taste of 
Success’ (Raphael, 1977).

On the whole, then, Gemini constructed a sparsely populated world, 
mostly consisting of states, international organisations and corporations. The 
human element of this world, when it is present, is made up almost entirely of 
the big men of governance, commerce and diplomacy. Returning to Clyde 
Sanger’s (1972) article about the extraction of mineral wealth from the seabed, 
we see three individuals attributed with agency in this article: Canadian Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau, campaigner and ‘expert’ on rights to the ocean, Arvid
Pardo, and Alan Beesley, legal advisor to Canada’s external affairs department. Sanger (1972) argues that Beesley is “the brains behind” Canada’s efforts at the UN on this issue:

[H]e has worked hard, this past year, to break the circle in which the U.N. seabed committee found itself enclosed and to provide some immediate funds from offshore mineral resources for the development of the poorer nations… [H]e called on the committee to… define the maximum area of seabed which was indisputably beyond national jurisdiction[.]  

(Sanger, 1972)

Such issues, it seems, were solely matters for nation states and their talented legal minds, working to reform global financial and trading structures through the bodies of international governance. Solutions appear to exist only at the international level.

Dealing with a different aspect of hydropolitics in 1995, the article ‘Countries near longest river grapple with water shortage’ deals with rights of access to the Nile. The article focuses on disagreements over the validity of agreements signed by colonial powers: “Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda say that the agreements are no longer valid. Egypt says that they are binding until renegotiated” (Saleh, 1990). The article reports that the “population of the Nile basin is 246 million” but does not go into any detail about how shortages of water are affecting any of these 246 million people, or of any solutions or initiatives that might emerge from those closest to the situation. Instead, it concentrates on the ‘mammoth task’ of “getting all these countries to agree on a co-ordinated water policy” (ibid).

Continuing with the theme of natural resources and returning to the 1970s, the 1973 article ‘Copper Battle Could Mean Crisis for Chile’, again, focuses on questions of who owns and who has the right to extract and utilise the earth’s resources. Its introductory paragraph reads:

A legal battle between Chile and the big American Kennecott Copper Corporation over the nationalisation, without compensation, of the firm’s Chilean interests has highlighted a problem any poor Third World country might face. Chile’s economy is virtually based on the earnings of copper exports. Kennecott, in its efforts to gain redress, has succeeded temporarily in shutting off Chile’s access to some copper markets – a move which could plunge the country into a crisis.
The article cites statements from a ‘Chilean embassy official’ and ‘Kennecott lawyers’ but, apart from that, the only individual with agency, or referenced at all, in the story is Chilean president Salvador Allende; this singular reference comes in the final third of the article and states: “Allende seems likely to win sympathy for his cause.” Sara Koopman’s (2011) board game analogy, in this instance, seems particularly apposite. Koopman derides classically conceived geopolitics, in both academic and popular contexts, as:

Big men moving big guns across a big playing field. The world divided into clear sides. It’s all on the map, as little figurines. Put a fort in here, a uranium mine there. They’ve blown up the runway. Hold the port.

(Koopman, 2011, p.274)

John Weld (1973), the author of the article dealing with Chile’s copper resources, seems to offer confirmation of Koopman’s (2011) assertion that this is how geopolitics is typically understood. In Weld’s (1973) article, geopolitics was a game of grand strategy, alliance building and capturing resources:

Chile’s strongest move so far has been to get its three partners in the CIPEC group of main world copper exporters – Peru, Zambia and Zaire – to agree not to take its place in any market from which it is excluded.

(Weld, 1973, emphasis added)

In Gemini’s sparsely populated geopolitics, then, nation states, corporations and international organisations compete for or to control access to economically and strategically important resources, they forge tactical alliances, win or lose key battles – court decisions or international rulings – and ultimately, win or lose these battles.

Gemini’s popular geopolitics, like much of academic critical geopolitics (see Dowler and Sharp, 2001), largely failed to reconceptualise or rescale its vision of its subject. Within the context of professional, international journalism at the time this is not necessarily surprising. It was only in the 1990s that there emerged a real debate within journalism about journalists’ own subjectivity and the perspective from which journalists should report on events such as armed conflict (see Bell, 1998; Campbell, 2004; Hammond, 2000, 2002; Ó Tuathail,
1996b). It does, though, raise important questions about what it meant to be an ‘alternative’ journalistic actor in the particular settings in which Gemini operated.

6.3.2.2. A Masculinist Geopolitical Gaze?

Dowler and Sharp (2001) have argued that the masculinist gaze of hegemonic geopolitics, in both academic and popular guises, has, traditionally, envisioned the world as binary, divided into public and private spheres, wherein the public is regarded as political and the private as apolitical. The national and the international are rendered through recordings of the actions of the (masculine) public sphere – states, statesmen, diplomats and armies – obscuring the role played by women and other marginalised people in the (re)creation of international orders (ibid).

We can see quite clearly Gemini’s inattentiveness to these roles in the actors it chose to highlight. There are only 27 instances in the sample of agency being attributed to activists or activist groups and only 34 instances of non-elite individuals – anyone not involved in formal politics or diplomacy, national or international commerce, or a professional – being ascribed the ability to act (see Table 10 and Appendix 5). Within this already limited representation of ‘ordinary’ or non-elite people, women are noticeably absent. In the sample of 233 articles, only four could be identified that focussed explicitly on the actions of women or a woman who was not a head of state, head of government, elected politician or diplomat (Guiha, 2002; Hadji-Ristic, 1996; Ligomeka, 2001; Seneviratne, 1975). Three out of these four come from the last six years of Gemini’s operations, perhaps indicating some subtle editorial and cultural shifts within the Gemini organisation as it progressed towards the twenty-first century.

It is worth, here, comparing two of these articles. Two articles in the sample – published in 1996 and 2002 respectively – deal with female entrepreneurs taking advantage of a change in political circumstances. Petar Hadji-Ristic's (1996) article, published in the *East African Standard*, profiles an entrepreneurial East German woman who took advantage of a newly liberalised economy:
She always wears a blue and white check smock and white-collared blouse to work and her silver-grey hair is tied at the back in an old-fashioned bun. The concept of ‘power dressing’ (to impress) is completely alien to her… She has never complained of sexual discrimination because she says she has never faced difficulties as a woman.

But despite competition from the modern, macho-Female images which glare from glossy magazine advertisements, Hedwig Bollhagen has become something of a national heroine – at least in the East.

(Hadji-Ristic, 1996)

The article by Ma Guihua in the South China Morning Post in 2002, entitled ‘Giving Rural Women the Credit They Deserve’, stands in contrast to the story of six years prior. Guihua’s story does not focus on a well-known figure, does not go into superficial details about dress or appearance, nor does it gloss over the discrimination and inequalities faced by women. The article is about a group of rural women in a Chinese province, who, for the first time, have been able to acquire commercial loans:

The meetings often take place at [one of the women’s] house[s] at the end of their day’s work in the fields… On chilly winter nights, they sit around a fireplace talking and sipping the local brew… For minority rural women such as 48-year-old Ms Yuan, of Yao ethnic extraction, financial matters have always been their husband’s realm. Access to sums of up to 2,500 yuan (HK$2,360) a year was once unthinkable.

When her husband got a bank loan, the money meant little to her. “The bank does not trust us women, assuming that we are not capable of paying back the loan,” she says… Although the money is yet to arrive, Ms Yuan’s plans are ready. “I’ll use the money to plant radish and other cash-vegetables, and then buy breeding pigs,” she says… Zhang Yinfang [with the aid of a similar loan]… has increased her annual income from 600 yuan in 1996 to about 1,000 yuan today.

(Guihua, 2002)

This article is unique in this sample in that it populates geopolitical space with marginalised women, with their labour and their contribution to the (re)creation of geopolitical orders finally made visible (see Dowler and Sharp, 2001). These women are not portrayed as pawns being moved around by the big men of (geo)politics, but as actors coming together in order to have a say in determining their own futures. This article was published in 2002, Gemini’s final year of operation, which might suggest that, had Gemini continued, demographic and cultural shifts within Gemini’s network of correspondents and
the journalistic world could have helped change some of its representational practices (see Chapter 7).

Apart from this outlier, in the rest of the Gemini content that makes up this sample there is a pronounced absence of female agency. In addition to this lack of women, other marginalised people, and, more broadly anyone who was not a part of the geopolitical elite rarely features in Gemini’s output (Table 10).

6.3.2.3. Why This Perspective?

Gemini, then, was not about providing embodied accounts, situated knowledges, multiplying perspectives or anything else that might come under the rubric of ‘feminist objectivity’ (see Haraway, 1988). Gemini’s original pitch – an agency that would move away from the broad-brush geo-graphings of Western journalists writing about the Global South, and towards what might be thought of as the more intimate knowledge of journalists actually from and of the Global South – while perhaps not a wholesale embracing of the notion of ‘situated knowledges’, seems, to today’s ears, to represent something of a move in that direction. Given the orthodoxies of European, male-dominated journalistic thought and practice of the time (see Chapter 7), it seems unlikely that such a move was what Derek Ingram and his colleagues actually had in mind.

From the perspective of those who worked at and believed in Gemini (although not in terms that they would have used), the image produced by mainstream journalism had distortions, areas lacking detail and blind spots. Its reporters had contacts, access and information that could help address these defects and therefore produce an improved lens for the monocular vantage point from where (geo)politics is traditionally observed. The agency was about correcting faults in the optical instrument through which mainstream journalism viewed the world, not about repositioning the vantage point from which the world’s (geo)politics was observed or readjusting the scale of those observations. Gemini persisted with the task of ‘accurately’ and ‘objectively’ rendering a three-dimensional world on a two-dimensional surface. It sought to produce a more finely rendered panoptic view of how the world really ‘is’, its ills, structural imbalances and injustices.
Apart from the by-lines at the bottom of articles telling readers “The writer is an award-winning Nigerian reporter who works on the editorial board of *Punch* newspaper” (Gemini, 2001), for example, where the author is situated, either literally or in a more abstract sense, is almost never articulated. Only two of the 233 articles in this sample explore the author’s own subjectivity: in ‘Daily Sketch Merging with Daily Mail’ Derek Ingram (1971b) shares his regret over the loss of the *Sketch*, informed by nostalgic memories of working there during the Second World War; and in ‘Gunning for Power in Africa’ Cameron Duodu (1984) briefly recalls his own experiences of watching a military government transfer power to a civilian in Ghana, and his anxieties while witnessing a similar process in Nigeria. In all but these two instances, the short biographical by-lines are necessary as the content of the articles reveals very little of the author.

The embeddedness of Gemini’s writers, ‘on the ground’ in the places they were writing about was key to Derek Ingram’s and other senior figures’ own conceptions of the agency, and to selling the service as capable of producing a well-informed image of the world. The requirements of journalistic orthodoxy, however, demanded that they produce, in their writing, a view from an elevated vantage point, meaning that, from the evidence of this analysis, the reporters were very rarely able to be fully from, of, or in the place that they were writing about. What Gemini was attempting was not the ‘God trick’, whereby a writer would be situated both nowhere and everywhere, instead Gemini’s journalists were asked, in the articles that they submitted, to be simultaneously somewhere, nowhere and everywhere.

6.4. Conclusions

This chapter began by showing that Gemini’s articles had a considerable presence in the pages of its subscribing newspapers; its content featured significantly in numerous influential national titles, primarily across the Global South. In these newspapers, it was a distinct editorial and editorialising ‘voice’ and had a clearly identifiable visual ‘brand’. It was a prominent contributor to the sections of the newspapers often conceptualised as the place where ‘national conversations’ take place (see Day and Golan, 2005; Wahl-
Jorgensen, 2008). Appearing in the editorial pages of its subscribing newspapers afforded the agency a significant degree of discursive capacity. The provision of ‘opinion journalism’ in the majority of the national contexts in which Gemini was operating was limited; Gemini was among just a handful of competing sources for geopolitical analysis and debate.

In the small number of works which have sought to look at Gemini (Bourne, 1995; Keeble, 1998; Thussu, 2000), most have praised its commitment to ‘alternative’ reporting and producing ‘alternative’ narratives. Its actual impact, though – the extent to which its articles were actually being read and potentially shaping ‘public opinion’ – remained almost entirely theoretical. Even at the time, Gemini had very little ability to monitor usage by subscribing papers. There always remained, then, the distinct possibility that the packets of articles posted out each week never really made their way beyond the newspaper editors’ ‘in’ trays (as happened in British subscribing newspapers).

This chapter has found that this was, for the most part, not the case and, coupled with the evidence presented in Chapter 4 around intelligence agencies seeking to influence their output, has made the case that news features agencies, Gemini in particular, were significant features on the opinion-forming journalistic landscape of much of the Global South. This adds considerable extra impetus to our examination of exactly how Gemini shaped the opinions and ‘knowledge’ of its readers relating to the world, its geopolitics and their place within it.

At the heart of the matter in considering Gemini’s production of geopolitics, is the nature of the news agency’s alterity. In some senses, this exploration of Gemini’s published material has confirmed its status as a significant, ‘alternative’, anti-geopolitical journalistic actor. It has shown that Gemini expressed support explicitly for newly independent countries and their leaders, and it condemned unfair and unequal international political and financial structures. Rather than a world defined by relations on an East-West axis, it was those between North and South which structured Gemini’s geopolitics. Some of the subjects that it published material on most frequently were the financial dealings between countries in the North and countries in the South, the places in the South still colonised by the North, and the development aid provided to the South by the North.
In many ways, this popular geopolitical ‘knowledge’ that Gemini was constructing was distinct. The fact of Gemini’s professed support for the Global South – and its insistence that the Global North needed to do more to support the South rather that this ‘responsibility’ being an unfair burden – marked Gemini out as a distinctly ‘alternative’ outlet among certain journalistic circles in London (see Keeble, 1998; Thussu, 2000). There might be a case to be made that Gemini – at a time when hegemonic geopolitics, practical and popular, were primarily occupied with Mackinder-influenced concerns over containment of the Eurasian heartland – in constructing a world primarily defined by the contours along its North-South axes was articulating a form of popular anti-geopolitics.

However, ‘anti-geopolitical’, ‘anti-geopolitical’ and ‘counterhegemonic’ are not necessarily synonymous. One can resist or attempt to counter geographically deterministic constructions of geopolitics without addressing unjust societal structure or empowering non-elite or marginalised actors. To use anti-geopolitical discourse as a marker of alterity is, then, insufficient.

The most pertinent finding here is that Gemini’s construction of a popular journalistic geopolitics did little to discursively displace hegemonic political, economic or social actors from their positions of global power and influence. Similarly, it failed to empower or highlight non-elite, subaltern actors in its ‘alternative’ geopolitics. In its most prevalent topic, international trade, financial powers were urged to act more responsibly – more graciously – towards the Global South and allow states in the South a fairer share of the spoils of global commerce. In articles about postcolonial nations, the supremacy of a presumed-universal, linear historical trajectory based upon a European model is reinforced. States’ progress in moving toward this model is evaluated. The traditionalism and lack of modernity amongst the populaces of the Global South is an obstacle to be overcome by the skilful tutelage of the ‘well-educated’ postcolonial elite. In matters of development, paternalistic colonial relationships are reinscribed as actors in the Global North are urged to give help and aid the places in the world described as being at a lesser stage on a sequential evolutionary model.

In Gemini’s world, the game remained the game, the kings remained the kings and the pawns remained the pawns (see Koopman, 2011).
argued that it was time for more equitable participation in the game and for it to be played more fairly. Gemini’s alterity, then, was very much context specific; further evidence of the limits of this alterity can be seen in Gemini’s discursive construction of agency. With few exceptions, it was elites, nation states and companies that were given the ability to act in any meaningful sense in Gemini’s world. It was not, despite the potential that seems to have existed, able to readjust the scale of its popular geopolitical analysis away from an almost entirely state-centric orientation.

This particular finding may be surprising, as Gemini’s founding principle of employing journalists from the places they were reporting on to write the articles appears to have had the potential to enable a more ground-level, populated and situated form of ‘alternative’ journalism to emerge. In practice, though, Gemini’s journalistic ideology and ethos saw it remain wedded to hegemonic journalistic representational conventions and practices. It was unable to or uninterested in breaking the stranglehold of detached, God’s-eye-view Cartesian perspectivalism in professional journalism. While Gemini was aware of the value of having journalists ‘on the ground’, whose dispatches were very likely better informed than those of competing ‘parachute reporters’, this should not be misread as an endorsement of situated and embodied knowledges, feminist objectivity, or of anything close to that.

This analysis, then, has illustrated something of the stronghold of certain gendered professional norms and ideals over Gemini and journalism more generally. Even in the case of ‘alternative’ journalistic outlets, a commitment to distanced, detached, ‘objective’ – often masculinist and state-centric – reporting frequently prevails. Ó Tuathail (1996b, p.175) argues that the “practice of modern… highbrow journalism” was “significantly shaped by the hegemony of Cartesian perspectivalism in Western culture”. This, in itself, however, is not a sufficient explanation for why, for such a long time, there existed such a seemingly widespread and unyielding consensus around what journalism is, does and should be and how it should be practiced. In order to obtain a fuller understanding, we need to ask questions not only of how journalism, through various discursive means, ‘spatializes’ the world, but also crucial questions of why: Why does journalism produce, reproduce, reinforce and even contest particular spatial conceptions of our globe and global politics?
The remainder of this thesis attempts to shed some light on these questions of ‘why?’ The subsequent chapter explores the journalistic culture and practices within Gemini, highlighting, in particular, the masculinist representational norms that were instrumental in determining the ways in which Gemini spatialized the world and its politics. It also broadens the field of enquiry to look at the training activities of Gemini in the Global South, foregrounding such activity as a key means for the production of journalism as a discursive practice and rendering many of its culturally specific norms and ideals as universally applicable.
7. The Social, Cultural and Practical: Understanding Gemini’s Production of Postcolonial Geopolitics


7.1. Introduction: The Foreign Correspondent and News Agency Journalist, a Decolonising Profession?

This chapter seeks to investigate the social, cultural and practical aspects of Gemini’s production of popular geopolitics. It is guided, in large part, by Kuus’s (2008) rationale for studying the backgrounds of the individuals who produce formal geopolitical ‘knowledge’:

If we understand geopolitics as the study of the geographical assumptions and designations that enter into the making of world politics… we need to examine carefully those who make and popularize these designations and assumptions. Who are the writers of geopolitics[?]

(Kuus, 2008, pp.2062-2063)
The chapter proposes that this should be extended into the realm of popular producers of geopolitics. In the decades following decolonisation, many journalists, working for Gemini and other organisations, were in positions to discursively produce geopolitics for a wide global readership. Who were these people and how did their complex, multifaceted identities shape their construction of global space?

In addition to seeking to address questions of ‘who are the writers of geopolitics?’; this thesis recognises that journalistic representations do not come into being by one reporter simply sitting and typing out a story. The journalistic process is institutional, collaborative, hierarchically organised, and governed by a range of widely accepted norms and ideals. As well, then, as looking at who was responsible for Gemini’s production of geopolitics, this chapter investigates how those productions came into being and the institutional and ideological settings in which they were produced.

The previous chapter uncovered Gemini’s distinct rendering of geopolitical space, a rendering which focussed on newly independent countries and their place within an unjust international structure. It also investigated the nature of that geopolitical rendering, finding a sparsely populated geopolitics in which only the state and its elite were afforded any sort of agency. This chapter makes three further primary contributions to our understanding of Gemini. Firstly, it seeks to understand the factors in Gemini’s production that led it to produce such a version of geopolitics. Why were certain vantage points assumed? Why were certain actors rendered (in)visible? Second, it considers the nature of Gemini’s alterity. Gemini quite rightly appreciated that for journalism to be considered ‘decolonised’ there would need to be a shift in the sorts of subjects that were written about and the people (considered mostly in terms of nationality) who were employed to do that writing. These were Gemini’s own markers of success and, important though they are, cannot be thought of as definitive. To what extent, then, was Gemini, in its modes of journalistic practice, professional culture and organisational hierarchy, an ‘alternative’ decolonising news agency? Third, this chapter seeks to situate Gemini as a site of postcolonial interaction and encounter in which new political and cultural identities were rehearsed, practiced and performed.
More broadly, the chapter aims to demonstrate the fruitfulness, for critical geopolitics, of considering the historical geographies of popular media – particularly journalistic media – production. In comparison to the critical scholarly attention that has been heaped on journalistic texts, our knowledge of the inner workings of journalistic institutions, their continuity and change over time, is limited. This is particularly so for international press agencies.

One of the few academics to have looked inside such agencies is Oliver Boyd-Barrett. Boyd-Barrett has spent much of his career studying the big international news agencies (see Boyd-Barrett, 1980, 1982, 1997, 2000; Boyd-Barrett and Thussu, 1992); he conducted a survey of Reuters bureaus in 1980 and found that colonisation in these newsrooms extended far beyond these issues of where was being written about and whether the person doing the writing was African, Asian, European or American (Boyd-Barrett, 1980).

Boyd-Barrett (ibid) noted that these bureaux required far more than a small privileged group of Western expatriates in order to function. He found that while Reuters bureau chiefs were almost exclusively British, American, French or ‘White Commonwealth’, typically aided by two to three senior Western reporters, taking all staff into account there were three and a half times as many local people working in these bureaux as there were journalists from abroad (ibid). Locals tended to be employed as guides, drivers, interpreters and stringers, but rarely had any degree of editorial responsibility (Boyd-Barrett, 1980). In an institutional overview of Reuters at the turn of the twenty-first century, Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen (2001, p.140) conclude that the power structure of the bureau still “conforms to a colonist outpost model, which privileges expatriate command and communications between the expatriate community and the mother country, and where the whites are surrounded by compliant servants”.

Over recent years, the number of local journalists from the Global South working for such international news organisations has generally been on the increase (Bunce, 2014; Hamilton and Jenner, 2004; Kliesch, 1991; Self, 2011; Wu and Hamilton, 2004). In a survey of more than 1,700 journalists working overseas for American news outlets in the early 1990s, Kliesch (1991) found that 63 per cent of respondents were ‘traditional’ foreign correspondents: US citizens posted abroad. Little more than a decade later, Wu and Hamilton
(2004), utilising Kliesch’s same database, carried out a similar study. This survey, although achieving a lower response rate of 354 journalists, found that just 31 per cent of those who did respond were US citizens (ibid). Local journalists reporting for the big news agencies had become the norm. Far from being driven by the sort of idealistic notions that fuelled Gemini, media researchers interested in this dramatic shift seem to agree that this was a development forced by economic circumstance (Bunce, 2010, 2015; Hamilton and Jenner, 2004; Self, 2011; Wu and Hamilton, 2004). Facing falling revenues from the fragmentation of the media market, the rise of free news on the Internet and the subsequent decline of print media, the big news agencies scaled back their expensive practice of stationing North American and European foreign correspondents all over the world. Instead, they hired local journalists for a fraction of the cost.

These changing professional environments – with more journalists from the Global South being employed in editorial roles, rather than just the sort of support positions that Boyd-Barrett (1980) observed – prompted research into whether the ‘colonist outpost’ hierarchies of such organisations might be changing. Mel Bunce (2010, 2015) carried out research in Kenya in the late 2000s, observing the Reuters newsroom in Nairobi, where Kenyan and other East African editorial staff were in a small majority over the Europeans and North Americans. Bunce (ibid) was interested in hierarchies of power and professional norms; her objective was to determine the effects of these factors on the journalistic representations of East Africa that were being produced by the bureau and, crucially, whether these practices and power structures were being contested or reformulated in this newly diversified environment.

Bunce (ibid) recounts numerous instances of East African journalists challenging or influencing the journalistic conventions of their Western colleagues. Despite the presence of reciprocal practices during the day-to-day operation of the newsroom, Bunce (ibid) noted that these arrangements were hastily abandoned during periods of heightened activity caused by political and social unrest. During a period of post-election violence in 2007, Bunce (2015, p.523) observed a “profound split within the newsroom between Kenyan citizens and outside internationals regarding how the violence should be covered”. Key amongst many of the East African reporters’ complaints was
their organisation’s descriptions of the violence as ‘tribal’; many would have preferred the violence to have been described as communal rather than ethnic. They shared a sense that their reporting, at very least, ought not to inflame the situation further. The most senior position held by a Kenyan in the Nairobi bureau, however, was senior economics reporter. The Kenyans, therefore, while included in the editorial team, were easily excluded from decision-making and their complaints about the essentialising nature of the material being produced were dismissed or overlooked (Bunce, 2010, 2015). For Bunce (2010, p.527), this episode demonstrated “that the dominance of Western views and ‘traditional’ news values in the newsroom continues without major challenge” and would seem to suggest that the sort of colonialist power structure that Boyd-Barrett (1980; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen, 2001) observed remains largely intact.

By Gemini’s measures one might have concluded that the Reuters Nairobi bureau was a success story in the decolonisation of journalism; a significant number of East African journalists were writing stories about East Africa, which were being distributed to a global audience. While the recent progress that this particular newsroom seems to have made should not be overlooked, Bunce’s (2010, 2015) observations reveal aspects of the structural and practical colonisation that remains in place in international news agencies and the effect that this has on their (re)production of geopolitical space.

This chapter takes inspiration from the work of Mel Bunce (2010, 2015) and Oliver Boyd-Barrett (1980, 1982, 1997, 2000; Boyd-Barrett and Thussu, 1992). Their work has asked questions of who is in power in the newsrooms of the international press agencies and what the structural and hierarchical factors are that enable them to exercise that power. We have learned that the bureaus they observed were headed by Europeans and North Americans, with organisational structures placing ultimate editorial control in the hands of these few people. This chapter asks these same questions of Gemini; in addition, it seeks to provide a finer analysis of the nature of Gemini’s editing and subediting process, to investigate how Gemini instructed journalists in the Global South to go about their reportage, and to consider the gendered, classed and elitist nature of professional journalism’s culture and practices. It contends that understanding these factors – going beyond a simple functional
understanding of who had editorial power and how that power was exercised – provides the essential context for understanding the popular discursive production of our globe and global politics.

The gendered cultures and practices in the production of popular journalistic texts, in particular, deserve a much greater degree of attention. Neither Boyd-Barrett (1980) nor Bunce (2010) discuss gender in relation to the bureaus they were observing. From the names of the individuals they observed and the pronouns used to refer to them, however, one gets a sense that in both instances – observational studies separated by 30 years – the profession being observed was one overwhelmingly populated by and dominated by men. Many quantitative studies, over the last two to three decades have confirmed the extent to which, in the West (Burks and Stone, 1993; De Bruin and Ross, 2004; Gallagher and von Euler, 1995; Gallagher and Quindoza-Santiago, 1994; Jimenez-David, 1996; Mills, 1997; Robinson and Saint-Jean, 1998; Weaver, 1997; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1996) and outside of the West (Byerly, 2011; De Bruin, 2002), the journalistic profession is overwhelmingly male. Rosalind Gill (2007) argues that this historical gender imbalance, which remains typical today, has profoundly affected newsroom culture. Gill (ibid, p.114) characterises the professional environment of Western Anglophone newspaper newsrooms as existing within a “laddish atmosphere” and a “masculine culture of hard drinking, lewd jokes, and pornography consumption[, which] alienates and antagonizes many female recruits”. Similarly, Gallego et al. (2004), in a Western European context, concluded that ‘male socialization’ and the prevalence of ‘masculine values’ and a masculine professional culture forced reporters to suppress non-dominant or ‘feminine values’ in their work. The hierarchy of ‘news values’ privileged ‘hard’ news that is in the ‘public interest’ and relegated ‘soft’, ‘human interest’, ‘emotional’ stories to those on the lower rungs of the professional status ladder (ibid).

The gender imbalance within Gemini is, then, the first aspect of Gemini’s production of geopolitics explored by this chapter. In the first of three distinct sections, it analyses the extent of this imbalance and the effect that this had on the journalistic culture within the agency. It argues that while Gemini largely avoided the more obvious markers of machismo, masculinist notions of what journalism is and how it is practiced were significant in the agency’s production
of geopolitical space. In terms of chronology, the chapter starts towards the end of Gemini’s operations, arguing that in the 1990s there were murmurs of discontent around the agency, as some of the slightly increasing number of female journalists made the point that Gemini was unrepresentative in terms of the number of women writing for the service and the sorts of topics being written about. This approach allows us to see that even within the lifespan of the agency, amongst the ‘progressive’, ‘liberal’ personnel who clustered around Gemini, aspects of its operations were, in a fairly limited way, beginning to be seen as ‘old fashioned’ and in need of re-evaluation.

The second section travels backwards towards the inception of Gemini; it explores the foundational and sustaining influences of the agency’s journalistic culture and professional practices. It argues that Gemini was borne of and practically supported by a group of like-minded (male) postcolonial political and cultural elites and idealistic ‘white liberals’ particular to and particularly influenced by certain key postcolonial political contexts. These men were often simultaneously contributors to, customers and readers of Gemini. While Gemini may have been read by a large number of people who purchased the newspapers in which its content appeared, its core network was relatively small; this privileged group were in a position to influence Gemini’s production of the decolonising and newly postcolonial geopolitical landscape.

Finally, the third section points to the instructional aspects of Gemini’s operations. It looks at how editors in London sought to ‘improve’ and ‘correct’ the work of the reporters in the Global South through its subediting practices, a process which, save for changes in technological platforms, remained largely unchanged throughout the agency’s history. It also looks at the journalism training that Gemini offered to its reporters. The chapter argues that these activities cemented the location of both practical and conceptual control of the agency’s discursive production of the postcolonial world in the hands of the elite Western men in the London office.

7.2. **Gender and Gemini’s Professional Culture**

7.2.1. The 1990s and the Increasing Voice of Women Within Gemini
Of the 676 journalists identified in the quantitative analysis of Chapter 5 (covering Gemini’s output between 1969 and 1997), it was possible to identify the gender of 631. Gemini’s address book for its correspondents contained significantly more Johns (31, the most common name in the sample), Davids (17, second most common) and Michaels (10) than it did Janes (4, the most common female name in the sample), Barbaras (3, the second most common) or Ruths (3).

Of the 631, 501 (79%) were male and 130 (21%) were female. Furthermore, the sample contained 3,744 articles written by these 631 reporters; men wrote 3,267 (87%), whereas women wrote only 477 (13%). On average, then, each male writer was responsible for 6.5 articles in the sample, whereas for women it was 3.7. In line with those who have argued that the 1990s represented an era of modest improvement in terms of women in newsrooms (see Creedon, 1993; Ross, 2001; Smith et al., 1993), over the decades Gemini did manage some degree of improvement in its employment of female journalists. In the 1960s, just 6% of Gemini’s content was written by women; in the ’70s this figure was 10%; it rose to 13% in the ‘80s and, finally, 19% in the 1990s.

In 1992, when the number of women writing for the service was steadily increasing, Gemini and the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) co-hosted a weeklong conference at the University of Regina’s journalism school. The conference brought together several of Gemini’s frequent contributors, the young Canadian journalists who had been sent on fellowships to work at Gemini (see Chapter 4) and interested members of the Canadian press. One session, on the final day of the conference, suggested that there might have been, amongst some of the younger journalists at the periphery of Gemini, an appetite for a reappraisal of some of the orthodoxies of Gemini’s journalistic practices. The summary of the conference describes that

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10 As in Chapter 5, the archived file of author ‘bios’ – specifically the pronouns used to refer to the reporters – was turned to in order to determine the gender of Gemini’s contributors. Sources such as newspaper obituaries and online profiles were used if the ‘bio’ did not include gendered terms. It is possible that the gender of some reporters have been incorrectly assigned and that there were instances where a reporter has been determined to be either male or female when, in actual fact, they would have preferred not to have been categorised using binary definitions. In addition, cases of mistaken identity are possible. Such analysis, though, enables a broad quantification of Gemini’s gender (im)balance.
session, entitled ‘Tomorrow is Another Day’, as being made up of “Younger Canadians of feminist views [who] had a lively joust with African editors” (Gemini, 1992b, p.2).

The ‘lively joust’ occurred when long-time Gemini contributor Ernest Moloi (1993, p.190), a Botswana Guardian reporter, presented a paper arguing that “women, in their quest for liberation, should not do that at the expense of their culture… [T]he culture should be a compliment to the liberation women are asking for.” A number of tense exchanges followed. The young Nigerian journalist Ngozi Anyaegbunam countered Moloi’s point, arguing, “you jettison those things that are no longer relevant in your culture” (Spelliscy and Sperling, 1993, p.204). Several of the Gemini fellows echoed this sentiment, with one contending that the culture Moloi spoke of was “most likely if it’s similar to the cultures of my other sisters and our own… based on patriarchy” (ibid, p.203).

There was further disagreement when Mohammad Hamaludin, a veteran journalist from Guyana and Gemini’s fifteenth most frequent contributor (Chapter 5), took issue with calls for measures to increase the numbers of women in newsrooms: “you seem to be talking something along the lines of quotas. But don’t we have a problem? There will be just that number of slots available at one time. All these men are not going to die, they’re not going to just fade away” (ibid, p.201).

Tina Spencer (1993, p.189), who chaired the session, introduced herself by joking: “I work for the Ottawa Citizen, it’s one of the Western imperialist newspapers that we’ve all been bashing for a couple of days.” The preceding days of the conference were relatively uncontentious. Participants agreed that the Western media paid little attention to the Global South, that voices from the South in the global media were still rare, and that, while the end of the Cold War presented some additional challenges, structural and economic injustices continued to support the domination of the rich North over the poor South, something that was insufficiently addressed in mainstream reporting (see Spelliscy and Sperling, 1993). It was only when the younger journalists, those on educational fellowships with Gemini, and journalism students from Regina were invited to talk, that some differences of opinion became apparent.

Allan Thompson, who completed a Gemini fellowship, sponsored by the IDRC, in 1990, subsequently went on to serve on the selection panel for future
participants. Thompson recalled that this was not a process in which Gemini was involved, rather the IDRC panel selected the recipient based on “who had a good plan for how they would use the time in the field... What's their background? Are they up to the task?” (Interview). Gemini took whoever was selected by the IDRC. This is not to suggest that Gemini’s senior editors disliked or disapproved of the IDRC’s selections. Both Derek Ingram and Daniel Nelson appear to have had great affection for and to have shown great pride in the work and achievements of the IDRC fellows, and others who came on similar schemes. The ‘Friends of Gemini’ newsletter would regularly trumpet the professional accomplishments of long departed fellows and enthusiastically praise the work of those currently on the placement (see Nelson 1994, 1995). Rather, these fellowships opened up Gemini to a pool of new young reporters, not veteran reporters such as Ernest Moloi or Mohammad Hamaludin from Gemini’s usual circles, but a group that Gemini would not typically have come into contact with and whose political instincts were formed in contexts different to those of Derek Ingram and Daniel Nelson.

One of the young journalists outside of Gemini’s usual networks was Maggie Siggins. Her paper during the “Tomorrow is Another Day” session discussed the historical research she was conducting for a book about the Metis people. Siggins talked about how many influential works of history have imprinted the idea of rugged (male) French-Canadian fur traders opening up the North West Territories on the Canadian psyche. She argued that such accounts dismiss the contributions of native people, particularly women, to Canadian history:

[I]n order to survive in the northern wilderness... [European trappers] quickly formed liaisons with Indian women. The “country wives,” as they were labelled, pounded the corn for their husbands’ breakfasts, dressed the furs they collected, cut out from moose skins their moccasins, repaired their canoes. Soon their mixed blood children became a prominent feature of the fur trade and with them developed a very unique culture indeed.

(Siggins, 1993, p.172)

Siggins (ibid) argued that the lessons learned here should be applied to journalism, with a much greater degree of scepticism around narratives that include only elite male actors. Teresa Mazzitelli, a Canadian journalist who had
undertaken a Gemini fellowship sponsored by the Regina journalism school, expanded on some of these ideas. Mazzitelli argued, not necessarily in these terms, that increasing female perspectives in newsrooms helps challenge dichotomising representations that envision the world as binary – divided into public and private spheres – with the public regarded as political and the private as apolitical:

Female sensibility brings an additional perspective to the story… We end up for some reason apologizing for having a female bias. I think it would be more helpful if we recognized that we have accepted a male bias as normal… In this country [greater numbers of female journalists] has resulted in articles on rape, child sexual abuse, wife assault… I think it’s fair to say that as a result of that, family violence is now a public issue instead of a private one. I don’t know how anyone can see that as a negative development.

(Mazzitelli, 1993, pp.191-192)

While neither of these speakers reference feminist writers or theorists, these contributions seem to rest, theoretically and ideologically speaking, somewhere at the transition from second to third wave feminism. We see a focus on a structural understanding of patriarchy, with its universal social system characterised by the subordination, exploitation and abuse of women by men, typical of second wave feminist thought (see Brownmiller, 1975; Millett, 1969; Mitchell, 1974). We also appear to see, in challenging the exclusion of women from hegemonic historical narratives and masculine modes of reporting, an appreciation of the importance of representations in the discursive construction of gender, a key facet of poststructuralist-influenced third wave feminism (see Scott, 1988; Mills and Mullany, 2011).

It seems, then, that some of the young, junior and temporary members of Gemini were interested in and enthused by the debates and developments within feminist thought and the feminist movement during the 1990s. They were actively trying to incorporate such ideals into their profession and their work. When the floor of the session was opened for discussion, two Gemini Fellows found that they had had similar experiences when attempting to put these ideals into practice:

Sue Montgomery:
... The point I wanted to raise was the problem I had being in Southern Africa [as part of a Gemini fellowship] and writing articles was I was always torn between my own Western Feminist ideas and the ideas of the women in the countries about whom I was writing. I had difficulty writing about certain issues, such as female circumcision, which seemed to be culturally acceptable... Should Western feminists be putting their ideas into their stories?

Teresa [Mazzitelli]:

I had a similar experience to yours. I was in Ethiopia for Gemini and gathered a whole bunch of material around female circumcision, spoke to different women, and I think by accident I took the easy way out inasmuch as the story was never written... [O]ne of the Ethiopian women... spoke to me about the cultural, religious, social implications of it and so on, so I could quote her saying these things... [Y]ou can voice your own opinions, or you can go back to your hotel room and cry. I found that a good way to handle a lot of what I saw and heard in Ethiopia.

(Spelliscy and Sperling, 1993, pp.206-207)

The crux of this discussion may revolve around issues of cultural and moral relativism in journalistic reporting, however, these similar experiences are informative. Gemini’s story ledgers (the ‘red books’ utilised in Chapter 5) show that neither Montgomery nor Mazzitelli had a story published by the service on female genital mutilation. While this by no means suggests that Gemini’s top editorial personnel were hostile or opposed to these younger female journalists who sought to apply their feminist beliefs to their work, it might well imply that the professional environment of Gemini did not particularly, in an active sense, empower or foster their attempts to do so.

One year after the conference in Regina, Derek Ingram retired as Gemini’s editor; Daniel Nelson succeeded him, with Daya Thussu becoming the second most senior member of the editorial team. Thussu, by the time he came to work at Gemini, had gained a PhD in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University; his thesis analysed the diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic activities of African and Asian nationalist elites in their anti-colonial struggles. Thussu felt that this made him particularly suited for his role of guiding Gemini’s editorial focus:

[B]ecause of my academic background, I was in some ways better equipped to understand, if you like, the politics of it, which most
journalists probably don’t bother with. So if there were a WTO thing coming or GATT or world trade talks, I’d say, “let’s do some stories on that.”

(Interview, Daya Thussu)

Had Montgomery or Mazzitelli had questions about how best to write about GATT or WTO issues, rather than female genital mutilation, it seems that they would have been well placed to seek a great deal of advice and support.

Kanina Holmes, who completed her IDRC-sponsored fellowship in 1997, commented that the relatively high degree of journalistic attention paid to big, male-dominated international organisations was a noticeable feature of working at Gemini:

> It [Gemini] was a little bit old school. I think [the focus was] often with institutions… institutions run primarily by older white men. I don’t think there was this really conscious awareness that that’s what we were doing, but if I think about the stories that they sent me to cover it was things about the UN, various decrees or various programmes, vaccination programmes, that was all definitely institutionally-based journalism. So, yes, it was a little bit, maybe, of a narrow focus.

(interview, Kanina Holmes)

Holmes added that she “didn’t necessarily always love doing institutionally-based stories” and preferred “to do more of the human angle, those kinds of stories that reach peoples’ hearts and minds” (ibid). This experience was likely coloured by being stationed in London. The quantitative and discursive analyses of Gemini’s output in previous chapters suggest that Holmes’ experience was not necessarily representative of the broader focus of the agency. Gemini paid significant attention to institutions such as the Commonwealth and Non-Aligned Movement, neither of which, particularly the latter example, could be characterised as primarily ‘white-run’ organisations. There was, though, certainly a focus on male officialdom.

At most these kinds of criticisms seem to have been, from the perspective of those expressing them, relatively minor. Holmes (ibid) was keen to caveat even minor criticisms of Gemini with praise for its idealism and commitment to fostering journalistic talent in the global south. When Richard Keeble (1998) profiled Gemini for *The Newspaper Handbook*, Holmes was interviewed. Talking about journalism in London she commented, “Here the old
boys’ network is very noticeable. Journalism is a high-paced, heavy-drinking world. And I see lots of egos around” (Keeble, 1998, p.22). Holmes, however, felt that Gemini stood in contrast to the other news organisation in London and was more ‘mixed’ and ‘varied’:

Our office… had variety. Bethel [Nkoju, business manager] and Dupe [Owodunni, executive assistant] were both from Nigeria. There was me from Canada, Glynn [Roberts, associate editor] and Paul [Slater, graphic artist]. Glynn was in his thirties at the time, I think. It was a mix though. Dupe and Bethel definitely had a say in what happened; they were pretty integral to the office.

(interview, Kanina Holmes)

Following the 1983 relaunch of the service, it certainly seems that the Gemini offices did become more ‘varied’ in the ways that Holmes suggests. Elizabeth Pritchard, a Swede from a development background was appointed business manager. On her departure, Bethel Njoku, a Nigerian newspaper manager took over the role. In an administrative capacity, Ajaib Singh, a young Indian was hired; when Singh left Dupe Owodunni, another young Nigerian, replaced him. The IDRC and Regina fellowships meant that there were usually one or two young Canadian journalists in the office, one of whom, Kelly McParland, became a permanent member of staff. As noted above, when Daniel Nelson became editor in 1993, Daya Thussu, an Indian journalist, who had worked for the Press Trust of India, became the second most senior member of staff.

7.2.2. A Masculine Journalistic and Professional Culture?

While the Gemini offices did become more international, more ethnically diverse and had some younger faces passing through, a paucity of women persisted. Elizabeth Pritchard was the only woman to be appointed to a senior position. The only women to hold editorial positions in the Gemini office were the IDRC and Regina fellows. Typically, the women in the office held secretarial, administrative and assistive roles. When, in 1983, Gemini was organisationally reconstituted as a non-profit trust, all nine of its governors were male.

As discussed above, media researchers have pointed to this gender imbalance in the creation of a ‘laddish’ masculine culture in newsrooms (see
Joanna Coles, *Guardian* political correspondent, added some anecdotal evidence to back up such a characterisation when she wrote – at around the same time that Kanina Holmes noted the presence of an “old boys’ network” in London journalism – an account of her time covering the 1997 general election. Coles (1997, p.4) describes one routine trip on the press bus in which male colleagues were openly sharing pornography: “a photographer… was whooping with lascivious laughter and showing his lap-top to his colleagues who were begging him to call up more… As the cans of lager began to circulate, the bus took on the air of a minor stag party.”

While women in and around Gemini were certainly in the minority and, when they were present, were usually in junior positions, Gemini’s working environment did not conform to this typical macho image of the newsroom. Paddy Allen, who joined Gemini as a graphic artist in the mid 1980s, recalls that, during his time, there was never a heavy-drinking culture around Gemini:

> There was never a time while I was at Gemini where you went down to the pub and it was full of debauched journalists. That never really happened. Occasionally you would meet people in the Cheshire Cheese [pub]… but we never really did that that frequently.

*(Interview, Paddy Allen)*

Instead, he describes a close-knit, informal and supportive environment:

> It was a lovely atmosphere. It was really good for me coming out of art college to go into that, partly because you realised you could do something and it gave you a huge amount of confidence and partly because I was very interested in current affairs and politics… It was lovely, lovely working there… It was quite good because we felt like we were a little team doing something really brilliant… I just felt like I was in the team. It did feel really good actually.

*(Interview, Paddy Allen)*

Richard Bourne (1995) does, however, depict a testier environment during the earliest days of Gemini. When Gemini was first established, Derek Ingram and Oliver Carruthers were equal partners, each owning 6,000 one-pound shares in the newly formed company (Gemini, 1966a). It was based, largely, on Ingram’s ideas and contacts and Carruthers’ finances (see Chapter 4). Having these dual leaders seemed to produce something of a clash of egos. In May 1971, Ingram wrote to Carruthers saying, “When you go around wasting everyone’s...
time and tempers making preposterous and juvenile proposals you make me despair” (Bourne, 1995, p.18). Bourne (ibid) also recounts instances of tit-for-tat office wrangling that occurred amongst the men of the office during this period.

When Gemini became a subsidiary of the *Guardian* in 1973, Carruthers departed leaving Ingram to become the sole figurehead of the organisation. This left Ingram free to assume an almost totemic position amongst his employees, and for the more consensual atmosphere that Paddy Allen observed to emerge, largely united around a shared idealism as expressed by Ingram. Most of the available accounts of Gemini’s offices, particularly the more contemporary ones, describe a familial atmosphere, with Ingram inhabiting something of a paternal role. In a 1994 letter to Richard Bourne (1995, p.194), for instance, Jill Forrester, one of the Regina fellows wrote: “Allan Thompson and I laughed when we were out with Derek [Ingram] once that we felt like cousins out with ‘grandpa’.”

That Gemini, for the most part, provided a welcoming, pleasant and familial professional environment, which became increasingly ethnically and nationally diverse, is, especially when considered against the often macho, ‘laddish’ and lascivious backdrop of many other journalistic organisations working out of the same city, particularly instructive. It should not, however, obscure Gemini’s poor record of employing female journalists. While one might very reasonably argue that this lack of women within Gemini was simply a product of the wider journalistic culture that actively discourage female entrants to the profession (see Gill, 2007), it should be noted that even as murmurs of discontent emerged – as evidenced in the 1992 Regina conference – Gemini was not particularly responsive or proactive in this regard. The focus of the organisation remained on increasing journalistic perspectives from the Global South, without any particular imperative aimed at widening that envelope to, in this case, consider the gendered nature of those perspectives.

In addition, while Gemini seemed to have avoided the obvious elements of machismo common to journalistic environments, it does seem, throughout its 30-year existence, to have conformed to many of the masculinist ideals present within the practice of ‘foreign’ reporting, detailed and expanded upon below, that are, perhaps, less immediately apparent.
7.2.3. Emotion and Affect in Gemini’s Journalism (or the lack thereof)

The most celebrated of all of Gemini’s pieces was Richard Hall’s reporting during the fall of Biafra in January 1970. As the last Western reporter ‘on the ground’ – others had chosen to flee – Hall’s dispatches featured on front pages all over the world (see Bourne, 1995; Figure 30). As Nigerian forces retook the secessionist state, fear of what would become of those deemed to have collaborated with the Biafran administration and, on a larger scale, infrastructure collapse, caused chaos amongst the population. The report that Hall filed contains some (relatively limited in terms of the length of the article) accounts of the human suffering that was occurring on a massive scale:

Biafra is dying bloodily and terror stricken… All normal human behaviour is collapsing. Women are abandoning their babies. Soldiers are going berserk… In the coming catastrophe hundreds of thousands will die of mass starvation… Almost everybody in Biafra is in some stage of starvation and it is likely that unless the speediest help is organised the country will be littered with the dead by the month’s end.

(Hall, 1970a)

Simpson and Boggs (1999, p.1), based on survey evidence, described the ‘unwritten code’ that has long existed among journalists; that code “holds that no assignment, no matter how brutal, can defy one’s capacity to take a photograph, gather facts, and produce a story.” In addition, “it is part of the code that the journalist then proceeds to the next assignment without acknowledging or treating the emotional toll of the tragic event. (ibid). The authors conclude that there is nothing particular to journalists that make them resistant to psychological trauma. They note that fire fighters and police officers routinely undergo counselling, however, “the culture of daily newspaper journalism resists such attention… reporters and photographers routinely pick up the next assignment without so much as a nod to the lingering and accumulating costs of their work” (ibid, p.17).

While Simpson and Boggs (ibid) largely take that journalistic culture as a given – their focus was not on investigating how such a culture was formed and how/why it persists – others have been more forthright in attributing such phenomena to the supremacy of masculine values within journalism. Gallego et al. (2004), who observed various newsrooms in Spain during the 1990s,
concluded that 'male socialization' creates a space in which the suffering or trauma, endured as a result of journalistic work, is not, or cannot, be discussed or even admitted (see also Fields, 1999; Griffin, 2015).

There is no evidence to suggest that any Gemini correspondent suffered serious psychological trauma as a result of an assignment. However, if we return to Richard Hall's reporting from Biafra, his account of his time covering the fall of Biafra made it clear that he did face dangerous and potentially upsetting situations. He describes finally being allowed to board a flight from Uli airport to São Tomé:

[H]ad I taken [the official] instruction to wait around for the [exit] permit, I should never have escaped from Biafra. With a Zambian passport, and Zambia having recognised Biafra, my predicament might have been severe when the Nigerians caught up with me… I bade my friends… farewell, not knowing if they would survive what lay ahead. Many of them had made it plain they were reconciled to being eliminated.

(Hall, 1970b)

Richard Hall died in 1997 and never spoke or wrote in public about any personal or emotional effects that his experiences in Biafra may have caused.
Emotion and affect have, in recent years, become seen as an increasingly important part of political geography (Lorimer, 2005, 2008; Thrift, 2008). Nigel Thrift (2004) makes use of literary theorist Lee Spinks’ (2001, p.23) argument that our notion of ‘the political’ must expand to incorporate “the way that political attitudes and statements are partly conditioned by intense autonomic bodily reactions that do not simply reproduce the trace of a political intention and cannot be wholly recuperated within an ideological regime of truth”. Thrift (2004) cites ‘the media’ as a primary vehicle for the transmission of such affective reactions:

We live in societies which are enveloped in and saturated by the media… [T]he technical form of modern media tends to foreground emotion, both in its concentration on key affective sites such as the face or voice and its magnification of the small details of the body that so often signify emotion.

(Thrift, 2004, p.65)

While many would see the claim that “modern media tends to foreground emotion” (ibid) as an accurate, commonsensical characterisation of the media in the twenty-first century, the vast majority of Gemini’s content analysed in Chapter 6 would seem to suggest that this has not always been the case. These accounts of global politics tended to give relatively perfunctory accounts of the human tragedy, dislocation and despair that they covered, preferring, instead, to focus on the ‘big picture’, ‘public interest’ geopolitics of the issues and events in question.

Richard Hall’s dispatches from Biafra in 1970, although they followed the unwritten rules of journalistic conduct in that Hall’s own emotions were kept private, were atypical of much of Gemini’s content. Hall’s (1970b) accounts contain affective descriptions of ‘the great exodus’: “The lines were endless, moving with a queer, dreamlike slowness… Now and then dazed soldiers stumbled among the civilians, helping one another.” Even as part of this unusually, for Gemini, affecting assignment, Hall was quick, in his subsequent journalistic engagements with the conflict, to return to the ‘proper’ analytical vantage point. Hall reasoned that the conflict:

Gave a confidence to the [African] continent… It had been… the first time that two African armies had faced one another and fought with
modern weapons in a tolerably organized fashion – in a way, that is a cause for some sort of pride. Then even its keenest enemies in Africa could scarcely hide their admiration for the courage and skill with which a black state, totally surrounded and against huge odds, managed to survive so long[.]

(Hall, 1971)

While our emotions may be autonomic and pre-cognitive there are cultural factors that work to regulate the nature in which potentially affective images and content are presented to a mass audience. The journalistic culture and journalistic orthodoxy of the time, which governed the nature of the sort of long-form analytical articles that Gemini provided, required that when Richard Hall came to producing a popular understanding of the Biafran conflict he did so using classical and realist frames of reference such as state survival, state power and military capacity.

The news media is a key method by which large numbers of people ‘know’, in a cognitive sense, and gain a mediated affective experience – through text, photographs, video, and various media production techniques of geopolitics. That such news content has, for decades, been constructed in a ‘real men don’t cry’ professional culture has had a profound effect on the nature of that experience. In the case of Gemini, as detailed in Chapter 6, ‘ordinary’ people with whom readers, if given the chance, may have had an instinctual reaction of sympathy, empathy or solidarity were largely absent, instead, the audience had little option but to ‘understand’ geopolitics through the cognitive veil of economics and realist international relations.

7.2.4. The Iron-willed, Intrepid and Unshakeable Reporter

As well as enforcing this ‘hard’ news versus ‘soft’ news dichotomy, the masculine professional culture in which so much of popular geopolitics is produced has also taught those responsible for that production to think of their jobs in particular ways. According to Fields (1999, p.16), the masculine socialisation that has long occurred within newsrooms tells reporters to “cling to images of valiant reporters unscathed by endless horrors and catastrophes” and valorises the “iron-willed stereotypes” of their profession (see also Simpson and Cote, 2006).
Richard Hall’s original reason for visiting Biafra was to write about Irish Catholic missionaries who were attempting to deliver aid to victims in the ongoing civil war (Hall, 1970b). One can only speculate as to whether he had on his mind an expedition by another daring journalist a century earlier. Five years after his trip to Biafra, Hall published a celebrated biography of the Victorian journalist-cum-explorer Henry Morton Stanley (see Casada, 1977). In 1871, James Gordon Bennett, publisher of the New York Herald, financed an expedition by Stanley to central Africa to find the missionary and explorer David Livingstone, who had not made contact with the ‘outside world’ for six years (Hall, 1975a). Stanley led a successful expedition of more than 100 men on a 700-mile trek in search of Livingstone and a huge journalistic ‘scoop’ (ibid). Hall’s (ibid) biography of Stanley often reads like a classic adventure story and, in his rendering of the journalist-explorer, he created a suitably engaging hero figure. Hall (ibid) described the moments of high drama in Stanley’s expedition:

As they were crossing a flooded river one man fell up to his neck in a deep hole. On his head he was holding a box containing all of Livingstone’s journals and letters. Taking out his revolver, Stanley shouted in Swahili: ‘Look out! Drop that box and I’ll shoot you.’… It was to become a celebrated, or possibly notorious, incident… It well fitted the image of Stanley as a man who stopped at nothing, the product of the new ‘blood-and-thunder’ American journalism[…]

(Hall, 1975a, p.204)

While Hall (ibid) is not uncritical of his subject’s callous treatment of his African servants, the aim of the book seems to be to force a reappraisal of Stanley. In the view of at least one reviewer, Hall was successful in this regard. James Casada (1977, p.75), for the African Studies Association Review of Books, wrote that Stanley was typically considered to be “too brash” and that “his journalistic enterprise made him suspect as a ‘pure’ explorer”. In Hall’s (1975a) biography, however, “he emerges as a great explorer – arguably Africa’s greatest” (Casada, 1977, p.76).

John Beynon (2002, p.31) has argued that the popular narratives of explorers such as Livingstone and Stanley, and fictional accounts of similarly intrepid explorers, produced the empire as “the site of ‘masculinist imaginings’ in which men could enjoy homosocial comradeship in physically challenging, arduous circumstances far from what they perceived to be the damaging
influence of ‘the feminine”. In such narratives, ‘real masculinity’ was the product of colonial adventure (ibid; see also Philips, 1997; Tosh, 1991). The archetypical colonial adventurer, according to Beynon (2002, p.35), was both strong and a ‘gentleman’; his “manhood is constituted in a specific adventure setting far from civilized society. In this setting he acquires, proves and displays his masculinity through ‘roughing it’… This is opposed to the cancerous ‘easy life’ they have chosen to forsake”.

Although ‘imperial man’ was long dead by the time that Gemini and Richard Hall were operating professionally, films such as Lawrence of Arabia (1962) and Zulu (1964) kept him in the popular cultural imagination (see Claydon, 2005); Beynon (2002, p.50) contends that “his masculinity lives on in the stories of past colonial endeavour… and a continuing fascination with at least some of the great heroes of Empire”. We might not, instinctively, have expected that to have been the case for the groups of liberals, Africanists and anti-racists who were passionate supporters of independence movements and economic liberation for new, post-colonial countries, and who were involved in an enterprise designed to give attention to the Global South and a voice to its journalists. In Richard Hall’s writings (alongside his book on Stanley, he wrote three others about colonial explorers; see Hall, 1970c, 1975b, 1980), however, we see a great deal of this ‘continuing fascination’ and, in his journalistic work, we see a degree of emulation of the daring escapades of Livingstone, Stanley, et al.

Captivation with the romanticised idea of exploration and adventure, and a rejection of the ‘easy’ domestic life that might otherwise have been its alternative, is observable in a number of the other key figures in Gemini. Daniel Nelson, for instance, was, in the early 1960s, working for a local London newspaper, when a sense of adventure led him to seek out employment in Africa:

I had always wanted to go to Africa. I have no idea why. I just had Africa in my head. I must have seen a picture in an encyclopaedia. I got married. I thought ‘I don’t want to be married on The North London Press, living in a flat in north London only to eventually get a job on the Ilford Recorder or something’. I wrote… letters to people all over Africa, to every paper I could find. I got two back… I plumped for Uganda… It’s a colonial boy’s story really; young white boy goes off and learns at the
expense of the host country. You could still do that then. I just slipped in under the radar and got a job.

(Interview, Daniel Nelson)

Derek Ingram was in a not too dissimilar position at the Daily Mail (see Chapter 4); he had an offer of a managerial position, with the possibility of a directorship but, instead, chose to “take a gamble” and start Gemini (Ingram, 1965c). Ingram (ibid) wrote to Hall that the agency “would give me all the opportunities – once it has got under way – of writing more and traveling more”. Ingram’s and Nelson’s adventures and experience seems to have been a key facet in inspiring the admiration and respect that many of their colleagues and employees had for them. Allan Thompson (interview) remembered fondly tales of Ingram’s exploits: “He has all of these hilarious stories of personally collecting backlogged subscription fees from kings and presidents and, you know, people who would just show up in hotel rooms with suitcases of money.” Paddy Allen (interview) described how beneficial he found it to work alongside such figures: “These guys, between Derek and Danny, they’ve been all over the world and had such interesting stories and such interesting insights into all sorts of things. It was a real education for me.”

The notion of the intrepid gentleman traveller – someone who shuns a cosy, (perhaps ‘overly feminised’) domestic life in favour of a life of adventure, exploring ‘exotic’ places and meeting interesting and powerful people – as a figure worthy of great admiration and respect seems, then, not to have been confined to the era of Livingstone and Stanley. Indeed, amongst the idealistic group of journalists who congregated in London around Ingram, and later Daniel Nelson, it appears to be an idea that had currency even into the twenty-first century.

7.3. Close Relationships With a New Political and Cultural Elite

7.3.1. Support for and Closeness to New Political and Cultural Luminaries

None of this is to suggest that Ingram’s or Gemini’s primary interest was merely self-promotion. Nor is it to suggest that Ingram and Hall were nostalgic colonialists; while a curiosity with the exploits of figures from a bygone imperial
age lingered, their interest and passions seemed to lie with the (mostly) men who were leading their countries into a new and exciting post-colonial world. The extent to which Ingram was personally and emotionally invested in these politicians and their movements is perhaps best illustrated by a poignant interview with Trevor Grundy, a long-time friend of Ingram’s, conducted with him in 2008:

In his London home, Ingram shook his head sadly… “I cannot believe Mugabe has turned out the way he has. We were wrong, weren’t we? We were wrong.”

Ingram mentioned a catalogue of Zimbabwean men who were seen by western liberals as shining beacons of hope, during the long struggle against white rule… Among those he singled out [was] Didymus Mutasa… Mutasa is today Mugabe’s Minister of Security and spy chief, who… recently vowed, "I will rid the country of remaining whites."

(Grundy, 2008)

Paddy Allen has also attested to the obviousness of Ingram’s deep passion for the independence movements and new governments and cultural elites who, for Ingram, held such promise:

Derek [Ingram] was obviously really fond of that whole post-independence generation. He really looked up to so many of those guys. There was this writer, Cameron [Duodu, celebrated Ghanaian novelist]… Really interesting guy and a great writer and Derek was obviously so proud to be putting out stuff by people like him. He clearly admired so many of those independence guys. People like Nyerere in Tanzania – and I think quite a few people probably thought like this at the time – he didn’t admire him just because he was the first president of the country or whatever, he genuinely believed that he could build something different and better.

(Interview, Paddy Allen)

That admiration was not based on watching events from afar. In 2009, for a publication celebrating Julius Nyerere, Ingram contributed a short passage recalling his informal relationship with the Tanzanian leader:

The first thought that comes to mind when I think about Julius Nyerere is that he was always such fun to meet. I talked with him many times during the hectic days of decolonisation in Africa. An early encounter came when Nyerere was visiting Lagos within months of Nigeria’s independence… [W]hen I called he asked me in to lunch.
A day or so later we sat together on a plane to Accra. He said that when we arrived in Ghana it would be quite different – all pomp and ceremony and a busy schedule. How right he was… I watched from the plane window and the film I shot lies in a tin somewhere at home unopened to this day.

(Ingram, 2009, p.39)

Ingram was also on friendly terms with Kenneth Kaunda. In 1961, he wrote an open letter to the British Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, extolling the virtues of his friend Kaunda and urging Macleod to work with him to reach a settlement Kaunda could take back to his supporters:

You know Kaunda well. So do I. You will agree with me that he is a man of fine qualities… Continually Kaunda has preached to his followers: “Be non-violent in thought word and deed.”… He is a rare figure. I am sure you don’t want to see him sacrificed.

(Ingram, 1960a)

Five years later, after Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Kaunda’s commitment to nonviolence appeared to waver; he told a press conference in May 1966 that “Military action – in block letters”, was necessary and that “Blood has got to be spilled. It is the foundation of any freedom movement that is successful” (Washington Post, 1966, p.25). Ingram (1966c) was in Jamaica at the time of Kaunda’s comments – selling subscriptions for Gemini – and, in a letter to Richard Hall, wrote: “Jamaicans are amazed when I express no surprise and point out that this has always been KK’s line… [T]hey are quite shocked at my defence of him. It’s a funny old world.”

Ingram’s support for the armed struggle by Zimbabwean nationalists was not confined to private exchanges with close confidantes. During the 1979 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Lusaka, which was dominated by the issue of Rhodesia, Ingram was vocal in his criticism of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, particularly the language she used to describe the armed liberation movements. Ingram wrote an open letter to Thatcher in the Times of Zambia, timed to coincide with the opening of conference proceedings:

[Joshua] Nkomo [leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)] was locked up for 11 years, most of them spent sitting about in barren, basking, fly-blown Gonakudzingwa.
I don’t think many people in our country quite grasp the fact that Nkomo, Mugabe and many other able and intelligent men who should have started running Zimbabwe long ago were instead held in prison or detention, often in appalling conditions for a decade or more... [Y]ou deeply upset Africans by using the word “terrorist”.

I do not seem to remember that in World War Two we called our British, Yugoslav and French guerrillas who fought for so long in occupied Europe “terrorists.”

Yet the parallel is exact. The African guerrillas are fighting for their freedom too.

(Ingram, 1979)

In the UK, Ingram would have been far from receiving universal support for such statements. The right-wing *Daily Express*, a day before Ingram’s open letter was published, ran a large front-page story calling Nkomo a “notorious killer terrorist... whose ‘boys’ terrorise the Zimbabwe Rhodesia border from Zambia” (Ellison, 1979, p.1). Ingram’s radicalism, then, could hardly be characterised as a kind of British, middleclass ‘wet liberalism’, which could only endorse the most pious of post-colonial political figures. There was an outspoken resoluteness to Ingram’s political views and the manner in which he publicly expressed them. We also see, again, something of the masculine geopolitical imaginary of Ingram and Gemini in these pronouncements, advocating, as they do, robust, muscular and decisive action by the handful of powerful elites on the world stage.

It was not just Kaunda and Nyerere that Ingram knew well. During the 1979 CHOGM, Clyde Sanger (1979), director of information for the Commonwealth Secretariat and a friend of Ingram’s, kept a journal, in which he records that Ingram had a meeting with Joshua Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU, and also met informally with, among others, Uganda’s newly instated President Godfrey Binaisa, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley, and Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore.

When Gemini became a non-profit trust in 1982, Ingram’s extensive address book – which contained not just the post-colonial political elite but so many of the artistic and cultural luminaries of this period – was called upon to furnish the reformulated organisation with a board of trustees. The figures recruited included Professor Rex Nettleford, who was the principle choreographer and a dancer in the National Dance Theatre Company of
Jamaica, and chairman of the Commonwealth Arts Organisation (NewsConcern, 1984b). Previously he had been cultural advisor to Jamaica’s Prime Minister Michael Manley (Bain-Burnett, 2010; NewsConcern, 1984b). The board also contained Trevor McDonald, the Trinidadian broadcast journalist, who had recently been made ITN’s diplomatic correspondent after working for the BBC’s Caribbean service (NewsConcern, 1984b). Alongside him also sat the writer so often hailed as the ‘father of modern African literature’, Chinua Achebe.

Many of the correspondents that Ingram and others recruited to write for Gemini also had similarly impressive credentials. Fred Mpanga, for instance – Gemini’s nineteenth most frequent contributor (Chapter 5) – was, in the early 1960s, the Attorney General for the semi-autonomous Ugandan kingdom of Buganda. Cameron Duodu was the thirteenth most regular contributor. An accomplished Ghanaian novelist, poet and journalist, by the time Gemini launched in 1967, Duodu had written a novel, *The Gab Boys*, which still receives scholarly attention today (see Owusu, 2013, p.182). Another contributor with a literary pedigree, the fourteenth most regular correspondent, was Cedric Lindo. Lindo, a Jamaican, worked for the BBC Overseas Service in Kingston between 1941 and 1962. Amongst Lindo’s responsibilities was curating content for the influential *Caribbean Voices* programme. In this role Lindo has been described as the literary ‘gatekeeper’ of the Caribbean (Brown, 2013). These men were part of an elite with whom Derek Ingram and Gemini had many close connections. Members of this new post-colonial political and cultural elite wrote regularly for Gemini or gave up their time to support the agency in other ways.

### 7.3.2. An Industry Based on Personal Contact and Relations

Cultivating all of these contacts and close connections to so many politically and culturally influential figures seemingly took up a great deal of Ingram’s time. The purpose of this, however, was not always solely journalistic – meeting sources, conducting interviews, gathering information – but often served more of a business function. In 1974, Ingram wrote to Roger Rix and Jim Markwick, managers at *The Guardian*, Gemini’s parent company at this point, asking for assistance with this aspect of the operation:
Personal contact is of the essence… [N]othing works better than representatives of Gemini turning up on a paper’s doorstep… [I]f Peter Gibbings [The Guardian’s chairman] or someone equally high-powered could occasionally do a Gemini sales pitch with a newspaper proprietor on the old boy network we might pull off one or two major deals that would just tip everything our way. One deal in America with a newspaper group could make us solvent.

(Ingram, 1974a, pp.1-2)

This ability to get meetings with elite international figures, to get a foot in the door at newspaper offices, was clearly something of a desirable attribute for working at Gemini. Again, that ‘one or two’ meetings on the ‘old boy’s network’ could have been enough to significantly transform Gemini’s business prospects demonstrates just how gendered the desired personnel requirements for working at Gemini, and in the journalistic profession more broadly, were.

Keith Somerville, a journalist specialising in Southern Africa who worked for almost 30 years at the BBC World Service from the early 1980s, as well as writing frequently for Gemini, explained how these influential social and professional networks of journalists were interwoven with networks of postcolonial writers, activists, politicians and academics. With London acting as a hub, Ingram’s ability to utilise these networks enabled him to hear about interesting reporters with interesting stories and to easily be put in contact with them, and for those journalists to get such stories in the first place:

[Ingram] was very much in touch with whole groups of journalists covering particular areas… I think Derek must have gotten in touch with me in about 1983 when there was a crisis in Malawi when three cabinet ministers were basically murdered on Banda’s orders. These were three people that I actually knew… I went to all kinds of functions where there were Malawian diplomats and politicians, so I knew these three cabinet ministers… [Banda] had them murdered and their bodies put in a car and pushed off a cliff… Except, because I had contacts out there in the High Commission, I got in touch with someone and said, “Was it a car accident?” He said, “well, they were found dead in a car, but they had bullet holes in their foreheads.”… I think, then, Derek got in touch and said, “will you write it up for me?” That created a relationship. He got on to that through this network. You gradually get this network of specialists who meet up in all sorts of places, whether it’s at conferences, press conferences, or a lot of us used to meet up at what’s now just called Chatham House, we knew it as the Royal Institute of International Affairs. They had a Southern African study group… I was a member of that study group and there were very, very prominent academics and
journalists and diplomats who’d go to every meeting and we’d exchange information under, as they say, ‘Chatham House rules’.  

(Interview, Keith Somerville)

7.3.3. The Influence of These Networks

Former Gemini associate editor Daya Thussu (interview) described how the format of the service meant that they could be selective when it came to utilising these networks for content: “Gemini developed a network of people who knew exactly what kind of copy gets accepted in London… We had the choice because we had only 12 stories a week and there was a network of 100 plus correspondents around the world.” Thussu describes a great deal of forward planning; there were ‘commissions’, whereby a ‘Gemini regular’ would be asked, based on their area of specialisation, to write a piece about an upcoming event. This piece would then be reserved a slot in an upcoming packet. There were also the unsolicited contributions, whereby journalists, usually known to Gemini but often not, would speculatively send an article for consideration. Thussu estimated that, during his time at the agency, the average packet was usually half unsolicited material and half commissions (Interview).

The exact ratio of material received to material published, however, as well as an indication of what sort of articles were being rejected remains elusive. For the vast majority of Gemini copy it is only the final, edited articles, not the original submissions, that are retained in the Gemini archives. In a letter that Ingram (1967b) wrote to Hall at the end of Gemini’s first week of operations, he asks Hall to help him enlist more Zambian correspondents, adding that they should be able to write for the service whatever their political views: “We must let Africans have their say – that’s the whole idea – and if we don’t agree with it, well, we must lump it.”

While, theoretically, Gemini was to be a home to all political opinions and perspectives, from a wide range of writers and reporters, the evidence of Chapter 6 suggests that in practice that was not commonly the case. That discourse analysis of more than 200 articles found a consistently articulated world-view and consistently articulated diagnoses of the root of the world’s (geo)political and structural ills. This conclusion was likely influenced by the
scale of the analysis; in looking at a large number of articles over a long time-period, inevitably it is the broader overarching themes that come to the fore, with disagreements over the merits of, for instance, certain individual political leaders or policies seeming less consequential in a historical context. While it seems likely that Gemini would have published articles with contrasting views on such subjects, no examples of this could be located within the sample.

Daniel Nelson reflected that while theoretically all views were welcome, in practice the political character of Gemini material did largely reflect the views and ideals of the senior editors:

I hate when journalists say 'I'm not biased'. Everyone's biased. There's no doubt that there was a general bias [in Gemini] towards liberals and lefties... For a while I was very anti-World Bank. I would always encourage or look favourably on anti-corporate or anti-World Bank things. Call it pro-people or whatever. Environmental activists, I liked them; that's where my sympathies are... Those things are definitely there, but they weren't discussed. They're the unconscious biases that are in every journalist and every media organisation. We were all so wonderfully liberal, though, that I know that if something came in and was a great piece of journalism, even if it was very right-wing, I'd run it, because I would think 'cracking story!'

(interview, Daniel Nelson)

Nelson’s testimony paints Gemini as a grouping who may often have been geographically disparate but, nonetheless, coalesced around a largely unspoken shared understanding of what they believed good journalism to be and do and what they believed the biggest issues facing the world to be. This unspoken understanding was referenced in the document that Derek Ingram prepared for Nelson when he took over the editorship:

Even today I find it quite difficult to describe in a few words to people the exact nature of Gemini’s coverage, although you and I and others in the office know instinctively what is (or what ought to be) a Gemini story.

(Ingram, 1994)

The group of like-minded individuals who shared the journalistic and geopolitical ‘instinct’ that Ingram spoke of seemed to extend beyond the members of the Gemini office and its reporters. According to Daniel Nelson, both the contributors and customers were typically of similar opinions regarding what made good journalism and what was a good story:
Gemini’s readers are editors... We knew exactly who they were. There were a hundred or so editors around the world [who took Gemini]... So basically we only had a hundred readers and they had to make the judgment that it would be of interest to their readers. As any journalist will tell you, you know the stories, wherever they appear, where people are going to say ‘wow look at that!’ and the ones where you just think ‘oh God, that’s so dull, no one is going to like it’... That shared culture of news values is real, even in countries of very, very different political outlook... Derek [Ingram] knew editors and I know journalists all over the world; one or two of them get into positions of power on the paper, they become the news editor or something, and you can deal with them. They know what journalism is.

(Interview, Daniel Nelson)

Not only did Gemini know most of their subscribers, but often the distinction between subscriber and contributor was non-existent. Mohamed Hamaludin, for instance, alongside being Gemini’s fifteenth most frequent contributor (Chapter 5), in the 1990s, after moving from Guyana, was the editor of The Miami Times, a subscribing paper (Bourne, 1995). Similarly, Gamini Navaratne, Gemini’s seventh most frequent correspondent, edited customer newspaper The Saturday Review in Sri Lanka (Kantha, 2013). David Robie, third most regular, wrote for Gemini consistently throughout the 1970s and ‘80s; during this time, he held posts as the Rand Daily Mail’s Night editor, the Daily Nation’s features editor, and the foreign news editor on the Auckland Star (Robie, 2007).

Despite boasting of a wide influence and of the ‘millions’ of people who read its content in their daily newspaper (see Chapter 4), Gemini’s practical and professional circles were often relatively small. The twenty most frequent Gemini contributors, several of whom are noted above, were responsible for 34% of Gemini’s content (see Appendix 6). Only one – Abby Tan – of that twenty was female. Just 49 writers (44 men and 5 women) were responsible for half of the Gemini content in that sample (see Appendix 7). It had little to no contact with its final readers – the people who bought a daily newspaper – and it relied on a relatively small cadre of journalists to produce most of its content; in many cases these were the same people, or very close to the people, who were buying the service or providing it with support and assistance in a variety of ways. This relatively close circle, then, was in a position of influence over popular ‘alternative’ – or anti-geopolitical – representations of the decolonising
and newly postcolonial world. These frequent contributors were mostly veteran ‘newspapermen’, well versed in the ‘international standards’ and conventions of the kind of journalism which Gemini Practiced. For younger and more junior correspondents, Gemini’s operations frequently included elements of instruction or ‘improvement’ designed to bring them and their work up to this ‘international standard’. The next section considers this important aspect of the production of journalistic accounts of geopolitics.

7.4. Journalistic Instruction and Meeting International ‘Standards’

7.4.1. Sub-editing

Sub-editing – or ‘subbing’ – was always a large part of the day-to-day work in the Gemini offices. Richard Bourne (1995, pp.62-63) reported that “It was not at all the case that what a correspondent wrote emerged from London in the same form” and that often the difference “could be quite drastic where Gemini homed in on material which the correspondent had buried in the story”. Gemini took its sub-editing cues, in large part, from Ingram’s former newspaper the Daily Mail (ibid). The Mail has, traditionally, been thought of as a ‘sub-editor’s paper’, with articles passing through multiple rounds of editing by numerous editors in able to ensure stylistic consistency (Örnebring, 2016). This was replicated within Gemini, and it was often the Canadian interns who took on much of the sub-editing responsibilities. It was for this reason that the interns were so helpful to the organisation (Bourne, 1995; interviews, Paddy Allen, Allan Thomson, Kanina Holmes).

Allan Thomson, who completed his internship at Gemini in 1992 while on leave from the Toronto Star, discussed how the subediting process took place mostly in isolation from the original reporter:

There was a lot of subediting, a lot of fixing copy from correspondents whose reporting was probably decent, but often the writing needed a lot of massaging… This was all pre-email, practically pre-fax, so our contact with the correspondents – their stuff came in by mail – it would not be a routine thing for us to be in contact with them by phone to talk about their story. Often, we would just do the editing and the story would go out. If there was something that needed clarification, needed follow-up,
we could phone them but that was obviously expensive and wasn’t done on a routine basis.

(Interview, Allan Thomson)

Daniel Girard, who completed his stint three years after Thomson, was of the opinion that more communication with reporters would have been preferable and, during his time at Gemini, took it upon himself to write to one of the correspondents working on the ‘Views from the Village’ programme whose work he had edited (see Girard, 1995a). In an evaluation for the IDRC, Girard wrote that he believed such practices should become commonplace:

As part of the editing process on the stories from Sierra Leone, I wrote to the reporter about the changes I made to her copy and why I made them… [W]e were both convinced that communicating about the changes made to the stories was a great education for both of us.

I mention this experience because I think it provides a very valuable lesson for Gemini.

(Girard, 1995b, p.2)

The few instances where original submissions and final articles are available are from material produced for Gemini’s innovative rural reporting project ‘Views from the Village’ programme (discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section). Comparing the original and the final product using modern word processing software illustrates the degree to which Gemini subs altered the copy (see Figure 31).

From this small piece of evidence, then, it seems that there were large amounts of stylistic and grammatical changes, with the language often simplified and elements of the article rearranged. The ‘Views from the Village’ series was not typical of most of Gemini’s journalism. The example below, however, does illustrate that those responsible for subediting copy at Gemini were willing, if they felt it was necessary, to quite substantially rewrite articles submitted by their correspondents.
They are young girls aged eight or nine. “Abana ba ng’wena”, translated into English, “Crocodile babies” is what these girls are called. The local villagers call them “crocodile babies.” They are already married, and living with their husbands. They will have children of their own as soon as nature allows.

The Bisa villagers who live on the islands on Lake Bangweulu in Zambia’s most remote island of Fube also Known as Luangwa Island northern district of Chilubi see nothing wrong with the practice of making brides of children barely out of the cradle themselves. But they are sensitive enough to resent being asked about it by outsiders.

To the Bisa villagers living on Fube Island, an average of 16 hours of puddling with 100,000 crocodiles in the narrative is not a derogatory term. Nor is it to the other Bisa at Chilubi, Nsumbu, Kaansa and Chicille islands. But one from an age-old tradition — a tradition that derives its weight and authority from the way crocodiles rear their young.

Though it is not a derogatory term it is common for the villagers to get cholera when questioned about the tradition that says a girl is nubile at a tender age of eight or nine. Twice I was harassed and almost physically assaulted at Fube and Kasansa islands when interviewing threatened with physical violence while questioning villagers about the tradition. One villager shouted: “Why should you worry about other people’s traditions? Leave us to respect our culture.” One villager, with a receding forehead and gray hair and creased face.

The term “crocodile baby” comes from an old Bisa adage: “Umwana wa ng’wena akullika kwitete,” the Bisa adage from which the tradition has its origins stands in full. The adage, translated, It means: “A crocodile’s offspring grows by holding onto a (coarse) reed.” The Bisa believe their eight-year-old brides are helped to maturity by marrying adult men.

Crocodiles, Explained a ferry-man at Fube, George Machina, are never afraid that their offspring would be injured by reeds: They grow stronger with each prick.

Jackie Chibale is one such “Crocodile a crocodile baby.” Her age, aged nine, Last year she was doing in grade two at Fube Primary School. Fube is the remotest island in Lake Bangweulu, a 16-hour paddle from the main island of Chilubi, which is in turn accessible only by air. When she Jackie Chibale was to proceed promoted to grade three this year she was hastily married off to 18-year-old Ten Tambo.

Ten Tambo had just passed the highly competitive secondary entrance examinations. that would gain him entry to secondary school. He was one of the very few selected. nation-wide only 20 per cent are accepted for secondary education: nationwide only 20 per cent are selected every year. But his father, a popular local brewer, said fishing and marrying was were what Ten was going to do — not pursue secondary education. His father prevailed upon him won and like he did with his older brother Peter, 24, who Ten was denied the money to go to senior secondary school he needed.

Figure 31: Comparison of the first page of the original and final version of the article ‘Zambia’s Crocodile Babies’ by Francis Mwanza (1986). Figure compiled by author.

The practice of editing text has recently been examined by scholars of literary geographies. Withers and Keighran (2011), for instance, examined the relationship between author and editor in nineteenth century travel writing.

They found that in the narratives produced, “the printed book may not recount
things as or when they happened, and that it was not alone the work of the author as practitioner” (ibid, p.569). Instead, editors would alter works to make them seem more adventurous, more rigorously scientific, or to fit the perceived tastes of particular readerships (ibid). Robert Mayhew (2010, p.161) has argued that a focus on such areas “can deepen the move from a concern with the history of the book to the historical geography of the book by showing how spatiality differentiated editorial practice was” (original emphasis).

This ‘spatial differentiation of editorial practice’ is something that becomes apparent upon examination of Gemini’s professional practices. We see something of the shortcomings in Gemini’s notion of what ‘decolonisation’ of the news media might actually mean in practice. What appears, on paper, like an enterprise designed to empower journalists in the Global South to render their lived experience in print for a broad international audience, often, in practice, did not live up to that ideal. The journalists from the South were regularly excluded from many of the processes involved in committing their experience, knowledge and understanding to the page, and were often relegated to a sort of ‘fact gatherer’ position with journalists in the London office then given the responsibility of translating the dispatches of their Southern colleagues into acceptable journalistic language.

Gemini’s office staff, on the whole, however, appeared not to have seen this as problematic. Kanina Holmes explained that a large part of her role as subeditor was to supplement the incoming content with material that would not have been available to many of Gemini’s correspondents:

[T]here was a huge connectivity issue with most of our correspondents; they just didn’t have access [to the internet] at all or very limited access… They were limited in their ability to do their research, whereas if we were trying to check some statistics we had it not necessarily at our fingertips but we had better access to it, whether that was through a library or through the internet – so some of the work was adding context, adding to the actual matter, the meat of it. We relied on them to bring us quotes and to get us the perspective of someone who was there in the country or city at the time. The subbing was to supplement the research and to improve the research.

(Interview, Kanina Holmes)

Allan Thompson, who was similarly relaxed about Gemini’s subbing, paints a picture of journalism that, at its core, is not about writing – journalists are not
poets or prose writers – but about the practice of finding stories, securing sources and uncovering the truth. He points out that extensive subbing happens in newspaper offices all over the world:

I think some people probably required a lot of editing. But I don’t see that that was a problem… I knew that from working at the Toronto Star; there were award-winning journalists who couldn’t write their way out of a wet paper bag. But they won awards because very good copy editors would polish their work. As long as it’s done with some integrity, it’s not a problem to me in the journalistic process. The reporting is what’s essential: sources are good, reliable, the stories are good. If work needs copyediting, to me that’s just part of the system… I think, part of what Gemini could contribute was that there was this hub in London that could bring these contributions from correspondents up to an international standard.

(Interview, Allan Thompson)

This point about Gemini’s final product being of a very high standard is an important practical element to consider. Cedric Pulford (interview), a journalism trainer and sometime Gemini contributor, noted that Gemini copy had a reputation for being “very tightly edited”. This meant that editors “could just put it into type without worrying about any legal issues, grammatical issues” (ibid). As well as needing editors to have confidence in the legality of the copy, Gemini content had to be appropriate for publication in the Toronto Star, Stabroek News, The East African Standard, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, the Bangkok Post and many more. To make the content accessible for such a wide range of newspapers and such a wide range of readerships necessarily meant removing some of the stylistic nuances and localisms of the original material. Producing copy to these extremely specific requirements was a very specialised skill; expecting correspondents to be able to write to these specifications would, arguably, have been unrealistic. A large degree of copyediting was, then, simply a necessary part of the operation.

One could, of course, also mount the defence that Gemini was a small organisation that had very little option but to work within the constraints of the international media system, as it was then constituted. The language, context and emphasis of many of the articles that Gemini sent out, which were ultimately printed in newspapers around the world, may have been altered
substantially, the alternative, though, may have been that these articles just would not have appeared anywhere.

7.4.2. Journalism Training

These same tensions exist when we examine Gemini’s training of journalists in the Global South. After a six-month period of hiatus in 1984 due to financial troubles, Gemini began to look for additional sources of income, having concluded that it could not sustain itself on a purely commercial basis. It was aided by a shift in developmental thinking which, in the 1980s saw many developmental agencies embrace neo-liberal ideology and focus increasingly on empowering entrepreneurs, the use of private capital and of ‘enabling’ individuals in a process of ‘self-help’ (see Wilkins and Enghel, 2013).

An emphasis on the ‘educational’ potential of media in the Global South by mainstream development agencies was instrumental in saving the Gemini News Service from financial collapse. When Gemini reformulated as a charitable foundation, it accepted grants from a range of organisations including the UN development programme, UNESCO, CIDA and SIDA (the Canadian and Swedish international development agencies) in order to run journalism training programmes for Global South journalists. As Daniel Nelson explained, “everybody was training” (interview):

You could get good money; someone would pay you the money to run the course… that’s why it was done. It wasn’t to spread the word about anything in particular… I sometimes think that a lot of training is rubbish; it’s really poor. People do it because they get good money for it from the European Union or whoever. They go and run the courses; some are good some are bad. I do think some of them are really ill conceived and not very well done.

(interview, Daniel Nelson)

Gemini, then, would receive a fee for facilitating training conferences and seminars; they also provided opportunities for senior Gemini figures to travel and build contacts, programmes would often produce content which could be used in the Gemini service, and various scholarship programmes provided the agency with much appreciated free labour (Bourne, 1995). Around the time that Gemini was entering the Global South journalism training market, we start to see a small current of opposition t
training programmes in journals such as *Africa Media Review* (see Domatob and Hall, 1983; Mukasa and Becker, 1992; Murphy and Scotton, 1987; Traber, 1987) Writing in the journal in 1987, Murphy and Scotton (1987) concluded that there had been:

> remarkably little effort to change journalism education programs in Africa which are largely patterned directly on those in Europe and the United States. Some of Africa's journalism programs could be moved to the United States, for example, without changing texts, curriculum, or instructors.

(Murphy and Scotton, 1987, p.12)

Several African media scholars objected to the ‘modernizing’ and culturally supremacist journalism training programmes that many aid agencies ran in the Global South (see Domatob and Hall, 1983; Mukasa and Becker, 1992; Murphy and Scotton, 1987). This critique is also observable in the 1985 textbook *Reporting Africa* (Rowlands and Lewin, 1985), which claimed to be the first journalism text book produced specifically for Africa and attempted to articulate more indigenized forms of journalistic practice.

Michael Traber’s (1987) chapter in *Reporting Africa* describes ‘traditional’ Western ‘news values’ of ‘timeliness’, ‘prominence’, ‘proximity’ and ‘conflict’. Adherence to such values, Traber (ibid, p.4) argues, have “very little to do with the real world we live in”. Post-independence Africa, he argued, faces so many economic, social and political challenges that a new form of ‘advocacy journalism’ is required (ibid). This new model would “make explicit what it really means and stands for” and would, therefore, be “far less manipulative than a press which presents its contents as objective reality” (ibid, p.6). While Traber (ibid) suggest that such a model might be built around ‘news values’ such as ‘empathy and affinity’, ‘alternative language’, an ‘alternative framework for time’ (processes not events) and ‘alternative social actors’.

In many ways, Gemini’s first foray into journalism training, after its 1984 re-launch, was part of this small movement for ‘alternative’, experimental and non-universalised journalistic education. The first training initiative launched by the remodelled Gemini was its ‘Views from the Village’ programme. Like the organisation itself, ‘Views from the Village’ was envisaged partly as a means to address a quantitative imbalance in global news reporting. The majority of the
population in the Global South is rural, Gemini reasoned, yet newspapers rarely deal with matters prescient to rural people, favouring instead the politics, business and matters of state conducted in urban centres.

The programme paid for experienced reporters in the Global South to take a three-month leave of absence from their regular employment (most were either newspaper reporters, journalists for national news agencies or freelancers) in order to live in, and write stories about, a rural community in their country. Instructions to the participating journalists were clear; they were not to simply pay visits to the villages that they selected, but to live in and immerse themselves as much as possible in the rural community.

In total, 20 journalists completed the assignment in 14 countries across Southern Asia and Africa. The participating reporters were required to write three feature articles, between 1,500 and 2,000 words, on different aspects of village life. The articles were sent out as ‘special reports’ to Gemini subscribers. These articles were not, however, the main object of the programme; the experience while researching the articles was key:

The purpose of the rural programme is to provide journalists with a new perspective. By living for an extended period in a rural area, it is hoped they will learn to appreciate that the concerns of villagers are frequently at odds with those of city-dwellers. In many cases, rural dwellers may be completely unaware, or oblivious, to issues the urban population consider vital.

(McParland, 1984)

Proposal and guidance documents also make it clear that this project was about adjusting the ‘scale’ of their journalistic focus. Leaders, politicians and ‘experts’ were not to be the source or the content of the stories that were to be produced. Instead, the aim was to elicit the ‘views from the village’, i.e. the stories, experiences and concerns of the ‘ordinary’ people in the village. Guidance sent to participating journalists stated:

The aim is… to break away from journalistic reliance on ‘leaders’ – people who head organisations or groups, whether political economic, social or cultural. The convention is that people with a title are legitimate sources of information; those with no ‘official’ position are ‘unrepresentative’ and not worth quoting.

It is vital to avoid the trap of relying on people who claim to speak on behalf of others: the husband who tells you what his wife wants; the
mother who tells you what her children think; the rich farmer who tells you what the needs of the village are. It is journalistically easier to obtain information from such ‘authorities’ because they are more accessible (which saves trouble), more articulate (which saves time) or – most insidiously dangerous of all – apparently more sensible, which usually means their views agree with yours.

(Gemini, 1984b)

Although there were some reasonably strict ‘ground rules’, the project was essentially experimental and collaborative. The programme culminated, in 1987, with a conference in New Delhi, bringing together the participating journalists to discuss their experiences, the issues of rural reporting, and to devise strategies for addressing these issues in the future (McParland, 1987).

The conference report makes clear that the experience led to the journalists examining their own subjectivity, and revising their conceptions of what rural life entailed:

It became extremely evident that even highly-experienced journalists in many developing countries have virtually no idea of life as it goes on outside their city base. Such issues as environmental degradation, traditional medicine, rural unemployment and land starvation may be familiar to them as topics for conferences… but their first-hand experience is next to nil. As a result, their understanding of the reality is second-hand, and the impact correspondingly muted. The effect is somewhat akin to the difference between reading a story about a starving child, and actually holding one in your arms.

(McParland, 1987)

Shehabuddin Ahmed, a senior reporter on Bangladesh’s New Nation newspaper was one of the participants. Ahmed was unusual in that he had been born in a small village; it was this village that he returned to for his assignment. Ahmed (1986a) described his parents’ village of Rayed, which he had not visited for twenty years, as ‘unrecognisable’ (Ahmed, 1986a). Through his assistant in Dhaka, Ahmed passed on a message from Rayed to the Gemini editors in London:

Last visited village of parents 20 years ago: remembers it as lush area of ample woodlands, where he hunted rabbits and jackal in the forests, fished and swam in the ponds. Fishermen then caught abundant carp and other national varieties, also lobster (?) and huge prawns. Now woodlands have dwindled almost to nothing and those remaining are fast disappearing; the ponds have been drained and gone stagnant…
Fishermen catch only a few handfuls of fingerlings for a long day’s work... All of this has had a profound effect on the village population, which shows the clear effects of malnourishment.  

(Ahmed, 1986a)

One of Ahmed’s (1986b) articles evokes Frantz Fanon (1961) with the headline ‘An Hour or Two with the Wretched of the Earth’. This article recounts the days Ahmed spent accompanying the women of the village as they went about their work. Ahmed saw that fishing was no longer a sustainable livelihood, and that the women had been forced into hard manual labour, mostly digging and breaking rocks for road construction.

In a similar tale of hardship, Benjamin Pimentel visited Carolina village in the Philippines and described how villagers had been forced to sell their smallholdings and work on a sugar plantation for less than one US dollar a day. Pimentel’s (1987) article details the life of ‘peasant’ farmer Danilo Panambo: “Two of Panambo’s four children are dead, one of bronchitis, the other during childbirth. The family inhabits a dilapidated one-room shack, while Danilo rises at 5 am and works in the fields until 5 pm”. Thomas Abraham (1986) reported on a ‘small victory’ for the villagers of Silyara in the Himalayan foothills. His article, ‘Ever Try Feeding Pine Leaves to a Cow?’, reported on the acts of civil disobedience that villagers had resorted to after forestry companies cut down native trees, crucial to their livelihoods, in order to plant pines for use in the manufacture of tennis rackets.

At the conference for the participating journalists, the delegates noted that the format of the reporting trip had brought about a more ‘empathetic’ and ‘issue-driven’ form of journalism, as opposed to their usual ‘event-oriented’ style (McParland, 1987). As the conference report makes clear, the societal benefits of journalists highlighting these kinds of slowly unfurling systemic issues became obvious to the participants:

Desertification was happening in the countryside long before it affected the city’s food supply... the dwindling supply of land and the subsequent loss of jobs was evident in the countryside a generation before it sparked an exodus that is the cause of swollen populations, burgeoning slums and rising crime rates in the cities.  

(McParland, 1987)
Despite this, delegates decided, the attitudes of journalists and editors prevented the uptake of this kind of process-focused rural journalism. An extension of the programme would, then, help to adjust these attitudes, deeply ingrained, as they were, in press cultures around the world, and to develop further this form of journalism, which is “distinct in style and approach from conventional daily journalism” (ibid).

The Swedish International Development Agency provided the funds for this first phase of the programme; however, they declined an application from Gemini to extend the scheme into a second phase. In 2000, Gemini applied to the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) to restart the project, but was rejected. The rejection letter explained, “The stated objective of the project is to address rights of access for CSOs [civil society organisations] to information for decision-making through increased media coverage of poverty-related issues. Yet there is no direct link or targeting of media coverage” and, “Outputs should be clearly related to their direct impact on poverty reduction and poverty issues. What impact evaluation indicators would the project employ, and who would conduct regular monitoring?” (Hynes, 2000).

As Gareth Locksley (2009) points out, DFID do have a track record of investing in rural media projects. These have generally centred on providing health information – e.g. using radio programming to advise how to avoid contracting HIV/AIDS – or creating and distributing content that encourages “beneficial changes in the behaviors of individuals, groups, and organisations” (ibid, p.5), for example programming that “encourages young men to respect their partners” and “to avoid using violence against women” (ibid, p.9). In short, DFID has funded projects aimed at getting information into villages, rather than out of them.

Following the cessation of the ‘Views from the Village’ programme, Gemini turned towards more conventional (and more lucrative) training courses. These courses were largely indistinguishable from those teaching ‘objective’ ‘fourth estate’ journalism that were eliciting consternation amongst many of the critical scholars writing in Africa Media Review (Domatob and Hall, 1983; Mukasa and Becker, 1992; Murphy and Scotton, 1987; Traber, 1987). Developmental agencies were, then, seemingly reluctant to fund experimental and collaborative journalism training programmes in the Global South aimed at
fostering new forms of more culturally and practically attuned journalistic practices. Instead, Gemini found itself entering the global journalism training sector around the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Without the continued support of the Soviet Union, countries across the Global South liberalised their media systems (Higgins, 2014) and, in this triumphalist atmosphere, even more money from Western agencies for ‘media assistance’ projects poured in in order to establish “a building block for the future stable set of democratic institutions” (Price, 2002, p.51).

There was an abundance of funding for agencies prepared to teach the victorious model of ‘free’, detached, ‘liberal’ journalism (ibid). As such, Gemini regularly secured grants of tens of thousands of US dollars from UNESCO, SIDA, CIDA and UNICEF to run short courses for journalists. A 1991 pitch for a two-week UNESCO-funded programme for 25 journalists in Namibia, for example, proposed:

The aim would be to review with participants the role of the media in newly-independent African countries and determine and define professionalism in the media and the contribution that journalism and the journalists can and should make to the development process.

The importance of the media achieving and maintaining the fourth estate in the political ethos of developing countries will be examined. By examining the need for a media that is professional and politically independent the workshop will attempt to persuade participants to see this as a worthy objective.

(Gemini, 1991, p.4)

Another pitch document from 1991 proposed a course that would contribute to:

A real (and now urgent need) to orientate them [journalists in the Global South] away from partisan news coverage so they can make professional meaningful contributions to development. To do this, we should… inculcate the skills needed by the practitioners to operate.

(Njoku, 1991)

UNESCO paid Gemini 75,000 USD to run the course the following year. Three CIDA sponsored workshops in 1994 had a similar objective:

To reaffirm that political sensitivity should not compromise the independence of the media because its credibility for playing a constructive role in nation building depends on non-partisan and non-biased reporting of issues and events.
Chalaby (1996) has argued that these kinds of activities constitute a form of ‘cultural hegemony’, involving the widespread export of professional norms, paradigms and practices. Western journalism training in the Global South, and the vast majority of Gemini’s contributions in this area, have largely been able to cling to a ‘modernization’ paradigm and continued with assumptions of universal applicability without being called upon to defend or even to consider some of the highly problematic notions inherent within this approach. Chief among these problems must be the lack of reciprocity built into these training programmes alongside the lack of appreciation for, or even outright dismissal of, ‘traditional’ and pre-colonial communication customs and cultures.

In assessing Gemini’s capacity to produce alternative geographies of news knowledge, it is important, therefore, to keep in mind the parameters often imposed upon them by their own frequent inability to operate outside of the discursive practices of ‘Western’ libertarian journalism. We should not accept that the measures used by Gemini and others to assess their own success were exhaustive. The extent to which their activities helped to counter assumptions of the universality of the dominant journalistic paradigm should also be thought of as key indicators of success in this area.

Projects such as ‘Views from the Village’ demonstrate that at certain points, and with the assistance of certain members of the editorial staff, Gemini had the capacity to engage in creative, counter-hegemonic journalism projects. Apart from some notable exceptions, though, an inability to conceive of alternative models, or to consider the limitations or inappropriateness of the professional paradigm to which they ascribed, in the specific field of journalism training at least, made them unwitting contributors to issues that they wished to address.

In examining both the training and the subediting practices of Gemini, we see that the agency was constrained considerably by the media and financial systems within which it had little choice but to work. Gemini’s articles had to adhere to certain hegemonic conventions and had to conform to certain ‘standards’; had it not done so, the most likely outcome would have been that its material simply would not have been published. In its journalism training,
Gemini attempted an approach that did attempt to find alternatives to a number of hegemonic journalistic conventions. Gemini found, though, that the funders of journalism training programmes in the Global south had little to no enthusiasm for such initiatives and, in order to preserve a vital financial lifeline, persisted with training that emphasised a universalised Habermasian conception of journalism. Journalism, in these classes was conceptualised as providing a rational-critical public sphere with ‘objective’, factual information key to any society’s ‘development’, ‘progress’, or ‘modernization’.

Constraints existed in both instances; however, this research has found no evidence to suggest that either was considered especially problematic. In the case of the sub-editing, it was deemed appropriate for content to be brought up to a culturally specific ‘international standard’ and for editors in London to essentially rewrite copy produced in the Global South, contextualising it with the research and background information they considered most relevant with almost no consultation with the original author. Gemini also continued, for more than a decade, to provide numerous identikit training courses that preached culturally-specific ideals regardless of context.

Yes, Gemini was constrained by the structures in which it operated. It was also constrained by its own conceptions of what the issues with those structures were. If it could succeed in getting articles about the Global South with by-lines in the Global South published, it could, in the view of its senior editorial team, declare ‘mission accomplished’. The gendered and culturally specific practices, ideology, customs and ‘rules’ of journalistic production were not things that those within Gemini spent a great deal of time thinking about or considered particularly troublesome.

### 7.5. Conclusions

This chapter has examined some of the institutional, cultural and practical contexts for Gemini’s popular (re)production of geopolitical space. Firstly, it sought to investigate the gender imbalance in Gemini and the effect on the journalistic and newsroom culture that that produced. Secondly, it looked at the social and cultural influences of Gemini’s key figures and the (very much gendered) networks of like-minded individuals that enabled Gemini to function.
Thirdly, it examined conceptual and ideological aspects of Gemini’s practices, which determined the norms, ‘standards’ and ideals to which the agency ascribed.

In doing so, it has sought to demonstrate the value of considering the (conceptual and material) historical geographies of media production within critical geopolitics. While many of the early approaches of critical geopolitics may have sought solely to investigate the discursive production of geopolitical space in texts deemed to be of relevance (e.g. Campbell, 1998; Dijkink, 1996) – treating these texts almost as disembodied entities divorced from the social, cultural, institutional and practical contexts of their creation – several more recent contributions have questioned the wisdom of such an approach. Klaus Dodds (2006), for instance, has demonstrated the importance of not just investigating media texts, but also the engagement with those texts by their audience. Nigel Thrift (2008) has called for affective, precognitive reactions to modern media to be examined. Both represent useful contributions. Like most of critical geopolitics’ engagement with popular media texts, however, they have failed to consider the myriad of factors that influence the production of these texts. By taking such factors into consideration we are able to further complicate simple cause and effect notions of the discursive construction of geopolitical space. The chapter has examined the complex interplay between representations and the material, practical, social, interpersonal, cultural and conceptual contexts of their creation. In doing so it has provided insights into questions of how and why particular geopolitical discourses, and particular forms of geopolitical discourse, were granted popular articulation.

The first such insight provided by this chapter is the gendered professional culture in which and the gendered practices by which ‘alternative’ and ‘anti-geopolitical’ journalistic representations of the postcolonial political landscape were produced. Felix Driver (1992) has suggested that the masculine culture in which writers of imperial geography – academic and popular – were immersed were key to the ways in which they moulded the geographic imaginary:

The heroes of the colonial landscape – the explorer, the hunter, the soldier, the missionary, the administrator, the gentleman – were all gendered in particular ways, providing moral models for a generation of
empire builders... Geographical knowledge, in the broadest sense, was inevitably shaped by and through such figures... Contemporary writings on ‘geography’ were infused with assumptions about gender, as well as empire; to ignore the former is necessarily to misinterpret the latter.

(Driver, 1992, pp.27-28)

From the analysis of this chapter we see vestiges of the influence of these ‘heroes’; in the writings of the ‘liberal’, anti-colonial, anti-racist cadre of journalists who formed Gemini’s network; the explorer, the missionary, the gentlemen still had a role to play in how this group experienced and thought of the postcolonial landscape of which they wrote. Perhaps more interestingly, however, we see something of similar phenomenon occurring. The ‘heroes’ of Gemini’s postcolonial landscape were the independence leader, the principled national figurehead, the campaigning diplomat, the fearless writer prepared to face incarceration as a result of their work (see Duodu, 1968), and the intrepid journalist, willing to put themselves in harm’s way in pursuit of a ‘scoop’. Again, all figures that are gendered in particular ways.

As discussed in Chapter 6, Gemini produced consistently and relatively unambiguously a geopolitical landscape, upon which only the biggest of postcolonial political and cultural elites, governments, international organisations and corporations were visible. If ‘ordinary’ people were present at all, particularly women and other marginalised people, it was as a vague amorphous mass, typically suffering (in a somewhat generic fashion) as a result of an injustice perpetrated by one of these towering figures. Looking at the backgrounds of the people who were responsible for the majority of Gemini’s output – almost all men with a long track record within the masculinist environment of professional journalism – that the ‘big men’ of geopolitics were the focus of most of Gemini’s work comes as no surprise.

This chapter has also shown that amongst the relatively close, fairly small group of journalists that formed Gemini’s core network – often as both contributors and customers – there was, as Daniel Nelson (interview) expressed it, a “shared culture of news values”. These news values were mostly unarticulated, rarely discussed, and even more rarely contested. These values informed a sense of what news was and, more importantly, who and what was newsworthy. These values, acquired/reinforced in the newspaper
newsrooms in which most of Gemini’s close circle spent much of their professional lives, seemed to enforce the dichotomy of public and private spheres. When, during the 1990s, there were a few voices close to Gemini who argued for a disintegration of the distinction between public and private spheres, it seems that their protestations were able to gain very little traction; the unspoken orthodoxy of the professional journalism culture proving to be firmly in place. By 1997, Kanina Holmes (interview) still felt that what she was being asked to cover was “institutions run primarily by older white men”.

It appears, though, that it was not just this shared, nearly uniform set of professional values that determined the nature of Gemini’s geopolitical representations. The practical networks that sustained Gemini seem to have been just as important in determining the constitution of Gemini’s world. As this thesis has shown, the conceptual origins of Gemini were closely linked to Southern Africa, particularly Zambia; Gemini was particularly adept at using its professional networks and connections throughout Southern and Eastern Africa to find reporters and stories for the service. These reporters often had access to figures such as Kenneth Kaunda, Joshua Nkomo and Julius Nyerere as well as elite governmental and non-governmental sources, which could be used to inform their writing. Journalism is reliant on sources, access to information, and a variety of perspectives on that information; the practicalities and logistics of accessing those sources and that information were likely as significant factors in determining Gemini’s representation of the world as any pre-existing geopolitical ideologies held by Ingram or Nelson. Furthermore, it seems improbable that the two factors were entirely independent, with Ingram and Nelson coming to their views and opinions about the world and its geopolitics completely separately from the people, institutions and networks that Gemini was close to or embedded in. Gemini was a part of these networks and it seems likely that there was a complex interplay at work here in terms of who was informing whom.

One area in which the direction of travel seems less ambiguous is the subediting and final preparation of copy. This was done exclusively in the London office, most often with no input or involvement from the original authors in the Global South. While Bunce (2010, 2015), in her investigation of the Reuters Nairobi bureau, recounts instances of mutual learning, and of critiques
by local correspondents leading to ‘better’, more grounded, more situated copy, such reciprocal interactions were rare within Gemini. In large part this was due to practical constraints; telephoning or communicating via mail or telex was an expensive and time-consuming affair and, if engaged in at length, might conceivably have impeded Gemini’s ability to punctually and reliably produce the service each week.

A similar lack of reciprocity occurred in Gemini’s journalism training activities; for the most part, Gemini taught one culturally specific model of journalism as the way to practice journalism, regardless of context. While practical factors certainly played a role in shaping these activities, it appears that their effects were not considered especially problematic, or even considered at all.

More broadly, the contribution of this chapter is to widen and deepen the discussion around cultural colonisation and the need for decolonisation of news and journalism. While the MacBride commission, UNESCO, Gemini and other well-meaning interested parties typically understood journalism’s colonialism in terms of journalistic focus, authorship and the economic interests controlling the journalism business, this chapter has sought to shift attention onto journalistic practices, professional cultures, networks, gatekeepers and ideologies. The colonisation of the press, then, has typically been understood in superficial terms, with the subject of journalism – as a profession, professional culture, philological form, practice or set of conventions – itself rarely placed in the critical spotlight. Even amongst agencies concerned that the Global South should receive its fair share of representation in the global press, we see the masculinist gaze of Western journalism, control by elite networks of journalistic gatekeepers, and metropole-dominated editing and subediting practices, all continuing without any degree of consideration of their problematic nature.

Rachel Leow (2016, p.260) has recently argued that “it is in the realm of culture that the claims of the colonised most frequently gained traction… in a bid for ‘postcolonial’ autonomy”. Rob Waters (2016) has examined such a bid by looking at the influential BBC radio literature programme ‘Caribbean Voices’ (on which Gemini contributor Cedric Lindo was an influential editor) and the Caribbean Arts Movement (CAM) group. Waters (ibid) argues:
The ‘communication circuit’ of ['Caribbean Voices’ and other such]… networks in the production and consumption of literary cultural artefacts that generate symbolic social value – was tied to end-of-empire liberal-imperial designs to foster new Commonwealth literary cultures modelled along metropolitan lines. It was precisely the structuring of this ‘communication circuit’ that came under attack in the late 1960s, as the relations of production and consumption of cultural artefacts for a decolonising culture were rethought.

(Waters, 2016, p.68)

The ‘attacks’ mounted by these Caribbean artists and activists sought to address the elite and elitist networks that held influence over the art world, the often rarefied and exclusionary cultures of artistic circles, and the location and nature of creative and editorial control in artistic institutions, which, typically from a Euro-centric position, had a great amount of say in deciding what constituted ‘legitimate’ forms of creative expression (ibid; see also Breiner, 2003; Griffith, 2016). As this chapter has outlined, all of these issues had their parallels in the world of journalism, yet they were not met with the same kind or degree of resistance; certainly not from within the journalism world.

In the 1950s and ‘60s, there was a concerted effort by jazz musicians to “restore to jazz its valid separation from, and anarchic disregard of, Western popular forms” (Jones, 1963, p.137). In 1966, Okot p’Bitek’s epic poem Song of Lawino was published in East Africa. Its impact was to focus on poetry “as a song – a public performance – and by drawing on the forms of Acholi oral tradition, such as song, dance and metaphor… [it] freed East African poetry from the grip of the [British administered and influential] Makerere School of English and its alignment with high modernism” (Gikandi and Mwangi, 2007, p.33). In the theatre, critics such as Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa Jemie and Ihechukwu Madubuike have castigated Nigerian productions for their adoption of ‘Euromodernist’ aesthetics, for ignoring more ‘traditional’ and ‘folkloric’ contributions to African culture, and for writing for a Western-educated postcolonial elite (Chinweizu, 1988; see also Chinweizu et al., 1983). These, and numerous other, interventions aimed at decolonising the arts involved concerted critical engagement with the cultures, practices, gatekeeping elites
and guiding principles of the institutions of creative production: the publishing houses, music venues and producers, theatres and literary agents. Their effect was not just to problematize art that excluded certain peoples from their representations, or that represented those people using pejorative terms, it was to irreversibly problematize the Euro-normative rules, hierarchies and creative cultures that governed artistic production. As we have seen in this chapter’s engagement with Gemini, and can be seen much further afield in the journalistic world, such problematization of journalism has not occurred to anywhere near the same extent.

For scholars of critical and popular geopolitics, concerned with the popular spatialization of our globe and global politics, this chapter has highlighted the need not just to look at the discursive, rhetorical and descriptive rendering of geopolitical space, but also to be attentive to the multifaceted nature of their production. Just as language and texts are never neutral, the context of their creation and the forms of popular expression are imbued with culture-bound material and textual practices, which provide the basis for popular texts’ creation of geopolitical ‘knowledge’.
8. Conclusions

8.1. Introduction

This thesis has explored ostensibly ‘alternative’, Global South-oriented journalistic institutions, flows, texts, practices, cultures and ideologies during the immediate postcolonial era. With an epistemologically pluralistic approach, the thesis has investigated these multiple aspects in regard to the Gemini News Service and its ability to contribute to the decolonisation of the international news media. This thesis argues that critical geopolitics, in seeking to understand geopolitical meaning-making, must engage with the multifaceted subject of journalism, arguably the premier means by which most people come to ‘know’ and understand the wider world and their place within it. It argues that critical geopolitics needs to understand journalism as a popular episteme, a historically, geographically and culturally specific set of norms, ideals and conventions, a profession with a distinct culture, a distinct philological form, and a distinct set of practices. Understanding these aspects of journalism is key to furnishing our broader knowledge of how and why the world and its geopolitics are popularly constructed as they are. This thesis has sought to make three key conceptual and practical contributions that might instruct effective future engagement with the subject of journalism in the field of critical geopolitics. This chapter will briefly expand upon each of these three contributions before moving to the thesis’s broader findings regarding its case study and the admirable, but ultimately limited and constrained, historical efforts to decolonise aspects of the international news media.

8.2. Exploring Journalism in Critical Geopolitics

In exploring the subject of journalism and its production of and engagement with geopolitics, this thesis contends that we need to take a pluralistic approach, considering journalism’s texts, practices, epistemologies, traditions, institutions and cultures. First, this thesis argues for the envelope of journalistic texts considered as producers of popular geopolitical ‘knowledge’ to be widened. In studying journalism in critical geopolitics, we need to take into account the plurality of the international news media, with particular attention
being paid to the typically overlooked media produced and consumed in the Global South. Second, it seeks to make the case for investigation of the historical geographies of popular news media production, in order to understand the social, cultural, racialised, gendered and practical factors that determine the nature of particular journalistic geopolitical discourses. Third, it urges critical scholars to deconstruct journalism as an episteme so that we might better understand, and be able to critique, the processes and mechanics of popular journalistic meaning-making. Each of these will be addressed in turn in the sections below.

8.2.1. Widening the Envelope

In seeking to understand various forms of Western hegemony in the international news media – from popular geopolitics’ consideration of discursive hegemony in journalistic texts (e.g. Ó Tuathail, 1996b) to media and journalism studies’ quantification of Western dominance in the world of ‘spot news’ (see Chang, 1998; Clausen, 2009) – scholarly engagement with the subject has typically overlooked the diversity of journalistic content worldwide. The large number of ‘news flow’ studies conducted since the 1950s and the subsequent investigations by UNESCO and other international organisations repeatedly sought to examine the inequalities inherent in the international news media. With near unanimity, these inquiries found, as prominent MacBride Commission-member Mustapha Masmoudi (1979, p.172) summarised, that there existed “A flagrant quantitative imbalance between North and South” constituting a form of “cultural colonialism” (ibid, p.173).

For many in the Global South, “the entire information and communication order was a part of and in turn propped up international inequality that created and sustained mechanisms of neo-colonialism” (ibid). While none of these studies or inquiries claimed to have surveyed the entirety of the global news media, the volume of work drawing broadly the same conclusion – the Global South is deluged by a slew of media content of questionable relevance from the North with almost no reciprocal traffic – created the sense of one coherent global news media that was somewhat singular in both its nature and structure. To some extent this may be down to much of the debate being framed around socio-technological imbalances (see Masmoudi, 1979); the focus, therefore,
became the resource-dependent (both human and technological) world of ‘spot news’. A handful of large, Western agencies were able to dominate this sector, which relied on being able to quickly and reliably distribute news of wars, coups and elections all over the world. Had these researchers turned their attention to the slightly higher numbered pages of newspapers actually in the Global South – the sections containing less time sensitive, interpretative, analytical, editorialising, long-form content – they would often have found the geographic focus to have been much more varied and that there were, in fact, far more of the desirable horizontal (South-South) connections than had previously been assumed. Furthermore, as this content was not confined to simply informing readers about the latest election or trade deal, but was responsible for describing the potential implications of such developments and their meaning in a world of certain geopolitical structures, we might reasonably argue that its discursive influence and its ability to shape geopolitical imaginaries was quite significant.

None of this is to suggest that concerns about imbalances and inequalities in the global ‘flow’ of news and information were unfounded, rather it is to make the case that in continuing to concentrate on the problematic discourses produced by Western outlets for Western readers or the slews of Western content ultimately making their way to the Global South, researchers run the risk of further contributing to the issue of cultural hegemony. To overlook the contributions of journalists writing in, about and for the Global South is to deny these journalists agency in the construction of popular geopolitical ‘knowledge’. This thesis has shown that there did exist, during the latter half of the twentieth century, in the pages of many prominent newspapers of the Global South, alternatives to the content of the Associated Press or Reuters. Much of this content, published by Gemini, was about the Global South, written by journalists in and of the South (albeit edited and packaged in London) and was distinct in a number of ways.

These writers produced a world whose primary feature was a North-South axis; the countries at either end of this axis were entrenched in neo-colonial power relations, with the Global North continuing to control and exploit the natural resources of the South. The main focus was often on the ‘progress’ of newly-independent states in this unequal world.
The period in which these journalists were working is one that, Mohammed Ayoob (2002) argues, historians and theorists, particularly in the West, need to reconceptualise, not as marked by Cold War bipolarity, but as defined by the ascent to independence of a vast swathe of new countries and their travails in navigating a Westphalian system of states. The findings of this thesis suggest, however, that this may be less of a process of reimagining or reconceiving than it is about unearthing. The large number of journalists who wrote articles for Gemini, which appeared prominently positioned in national newspapers across the Global South, typically articulated a popular version of geopolitics very close to that which, in retrospect, Ayoob (ibid) insists should be considered correct. This ‘world’ was, though, complete with state centrism and Western-centric epistemological underpinnings, also characteristic of much of Ayoob’s work (see Barnett, 2002).

This should serve as a cautionary example of what can be overlooked if we assume that we can talk, in any meaningful sense, of ‘the media’ as a singular entity. By assuming that it was sufficient to investigate only the handful of large press agencies, scholars and researchers failed to take account of an important strand of popular geographic and geopolitical ‘knowledge’ from the Global South. In its engagement with news media, critical geopolitics has typically sought to understand the discursive construction of a specific aspect of spatial politics by a specific news media outlet, Reader’s Digest magazine (Sharp, 1993) or the work of Steve Bell (Dodds, 1996, 1998, 2007) and Maggie O’Kane (Ó Tuathail, 1996b) for example, rather than ‘the media’ as monolith. There is still a great deal of work required, however, in order to ensure that this particular envelope is widened in order to better take into account media in and of the Global South and ostensibly ‘alternative’ journalistic actors. It is not sufficient to only seek to understand the formation of hegemonic popular geopolitics; we must also investigate, and critique, attempts to contest, reformulate and reimagine these discourses in all sorts of locations and at all sorts of scales.

We need to be vigilant against descriptions such as ‘popular geopolitical imaginary’, when these are all too often insufficiently qualified; what is typically being discussed is a particular form of ‘Western popular geopolitical imaginary’. A focus on the hegemonic media almost inevitably pushes to the periphery
radical, alternative and counter-cultural media, as well as news content produced in the Global South and by subaltern peoples. As demonstrated in this thesis’s investigation of Gemini, though, we must also approach media outlets which claim some degree of alterity critically. We should not accept common professional makers of alterity as definitive. We need also to remain cognisant of the means by which hegemonic discourses are inscribed as commonsensical and of the inability/reluctance of many producers of popular news media to construct a world outside of the structures produced by these discourses.

8.2.2. Historical Geographies of Popular News Media Production

This thesis has not only asked researchers to look at ostensibly ‘alternative’ media texts, but also to think about how we conceptualise the place of those texts. It has kept popular texts relatively central to its investigations but has also made the case that we need to be attentive to the material things, human actions, cultures, practices and historical-geographical legacies that circle, intersect and interact with texts in a variety of complex ways. In examining some of these interactions, this thesis turned to the role of cultural, social and practical factors in shaping popular texts and as markers of alterity in their own right, exploring the historical geographies of Gemini’s popular news media production.

Unsurprisingly, this research has shown that the senior figures within Gemini, and the ‘alternative’ international news media more generally, were almost exclusively male. For most of its time in operation, the only female presence in the Gemini offices were the secretarial and administrative staff. While the Gemini offices were typically devoid of the more obvious elements of machismo – heavy drinking and confrontation – there was often a very masculinist notion of journalistic mission informing Gemini’s work, with images of the brave, headstrong reporter striving valiantly towards danger in order to single-handedly uncover the truth, seemingly never far from the fore. This exploration of the social, cultural and gendered contexts of Gemini’s popular journalistic production, as well as the practical elements – the location and exercise of editorial control, for instance – provides us with a great deal of understanding of why they produced geopolitical space as they did.
Gemini, like most news media, produced a masculinist geopolitical imaginary, sparsely populated with states and their political leaders as almost the only visible (geo)political agents. We also saw frequent valorisation, and faith placed in, leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda, with their concerns about, for instance, the international copper market often produced as the key, defining geopolitical issues. The findings of this thesis, then, shed light on a particular, influential, band of ostensibly ‘alternative’, ‘liberal’ and Global South-oriented news producers and the reasons why they discursively produced the world as they did. In the 50 years since the mid-twentieth century ‘information revolution’, this group had a large degree of power to shape the production of geopolitics for a wide global audience. While not always practically doing the writing of influential popular journalistic texts, the professional cultures, practices and ideals for which they were responsible determined many crucial aspects of geopolitics’ popular journalistic articulation.

Looking at these figures, their backgrounds, social circles, professional ideologies, practices and the professional cultures in which they worked has served to highlight the need for critical geopolitics to look at the production of popular, particularly journalistic, texts. Doing so builds upon the recent moves made to explore around popular texts, looking at audience interaction and engagement (see Dodds, 2006; Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009), by insisting that a similar level of attention needs to be paid to these texts in the period before they reach the reader/viewer/listener. This serves to undermine and complicate simple linear notions of the discursive inculcation of geopolitical ‘knowledge’ by foregrounding the social, cultural, historical, geographical and political factors that determine the nature of popular geopolitical discourses. This thesis has contended that the processes by which popular geopolitical representations come into being – as well as those by which they are consumed – are not unpolitical, straightforward or devoid of social and cultural contexts. Any attempt to explain how geopolitics is popularly ‘known’ must, therefore, remain cognisant of the myriad extratexual factors that shape this ‘knowledge’.

8.2.3. Deconstructing Journalism

In considering the extratexual factors that influence geopolitical ‘knowledge’ production, alongside taking account of the material, cultural and social aspects
of journalism, we need to understand journalism as a distinctive field of
discursive practice. A key part of such an engagement must involve examining
how the subject of journalism has been constructed and inculcated. How have
questions of ‘What is Journalism?’, ‘What is it for?’ and ‘How should it be
practiced?’ been answered by those in the profession and further afield? These
questions are intimately linked to issues of why certain media outlets produce
geopolitical space as they do. As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, a
distinct journalistic epistemology, a distinct journalistic philological form, and
distinct journalistic norms and ideals all exist.

Practically every newspaper that could be located that subscribed to
Gemini – Thai broadsheets, Fijian tabloids and Zimbabwean mid-market titles –
was organised using the same format; two to three pages of domestic news,
followed by two to three pages of international news, followed again by the
editorial pages, all containing an editorial comment in a thin vertical strip on the
left-hand side. More than just superficial and organisational unanimity, this was
a manifestation – particularly the ‘church and state’-style separation of news
and comment – of longstanding journalistic orthodoxy and ideology.

In another example of this global professional unanimity we saw the one-
size-fits-all approach to journalism training that was propagated throughout the
world, with particular attention paid to ‘Third World’ countries by Western
development agencies, during the latter half of the twentieth century. These
agencies, by whom Gemini was regularly contracted, taught near-identical
versions of the journalistic ideal: report with detached, impartial, impersonal
‘objectivity’. We can also think of Gemini and its ability to operate for more than
thirty years as a testament to the existence of some sort of shared journalistic
ideology. The survey of approximately one quarter of Gemini’s published output
(Chapter 5) identified more than 600 individual journalists from 174 countries
who had work featured by Gemini. Those articles went on to be printed,
typically with little to no editing by the subscribers, by more than 100
newspapers across the world. In terms of simple practicality, some form of
shared understanding of the ‘rules’ or ideals of journalism must have been
necessary in order for such an enterprise to function.

This thesis has examined the discursive, structural and institutional
means by which journalism, as we currently understand it, attained its place as
the right and proper way for stories of our shared existence to be told; it utilised feminist thought in order to understand how masculinist ‘ways of knowing’ have been inculcated as the proper way for journalists to ‘see’, ‘know’ and represent the world; and it applied postcolonial theory to understand the epistemic violence that saw a geographically, historically, politically and culturally specific professional practice being deemed universally applicable, with deviations from its ‘rules’ and ideals serving as a basis to castigate entire societies. It concludes that the institutions, traditions, cultures and practices of journalism have been produced and inculcated through colonial, supremacist and masculinist geopolitical processes, yet commonplace notions of how, and for what purpose, factual, timely information about the world around us is communicated to a popular audience are routinely held up as neutral and universally desirable.

In exploring some of these geopolitical processes, this thesis explored how the Cold War ideological dichotomy enabled a simplistic categorisation of the right and wrong way to do journalism; how formal decolonisation meant newspapers increasingly moving out of direct European editorial control, thus creating a playing field for Cold War ideological rivalries; how in international forums such as UNESCO, the transfer of journalistic socio-technological capital from Global North to South was encouraged; and, how at the end of the Cold War, there existed a triumphalist sense that one particular journalistic paradigm had been proven to be right.

Critical Geopolitics is particularly well positioned to produce insights into how these processes constructed, globally, a particular discourse of journalism and particular journalistic practices and cultures. This thesis has demonstrated the potential fruitfulness for critical geopolitics of engaging with the fundamentals of journalism, journalistic texts and the multifaceted historical geographies of popular news media production. In doing so it has laid some of the groundwork for the establishment of a distinct stream of scholarship focussed on journalistic geopolitics and the geopolitics of journalism.

This thesis has also sought to highlight for critical geopolitics the value of engaging with fundamental questions of what journalism is does and is for. It contends that journalism remains in the position that it has occupied for at least the past half a century as the premier means for popular geopolitical sense-making. It is, therefore, imperative that critical geopolitics, a discipline still
largely focussed on sense-making, attains a better understanding of the multifaceted nature of journalism and journalistic practice in order to more fully comprehend the, still largely colonised, practical, cultural and epistemological mechanics that work to determine the nature of popular geopolitical knowledge production.

8.3. Constraints on the Decolonisation of the News

In examining multiple aspects of the Gemini News Service’s popular geopolitical knowledge production, this thesis has shed light on the issues of the (de)colonisation of the international news media more broadly. It concludes that Gemini, an organisation which sought to affect decolonisation in the international news media, was constrained in its ability to decolonise its journalistic representations and its journalistic practices. In large part these (discursive, practical, cultural, ideological and institutional) constraints were a product of the institutional structures of international journalism, within which Gemini had few options but to operate. As significantly, Gemini was also substantially constrained by the commonplace conceptual limitations regarding journalism’s decolonisation and what a decolonised journalism might look like.

Along with the majority of other actors similarly concerned with the inequalities of the international news media at the time, Gemini prioritised simple quantitative markers of who was writing stories and where was being written about. By replicating the sort of quantitative approach that was common to how organisations such as Gemini measured their own ‘success’, this thesis has shown that the agency was producing considerable coverage of the parts of the world that were typically rendered invisible by the hegemonic news agencies. It was producing alternative ‘flows’ of news by facilitating the dissemination of a large number of articles about the Global South by journalists in the Global South to newspapers in the Global South. These metrics are certainly important, although they are insufficient in isolation. Such markers of ‘success’ are consistent with discourses of formal political decolonisation that saw the process merely as replacing departing European governors and officials with personnel from the Global South, ignoring the
myriad discursive, cultural, epistemological, practical and material aspects and legacies of colonialism (see Suttner, 2010).

In investigating Gemini’s journalistic production of the world and its (geo)politics, this thesis has shown that such a limited conception of decolonisation was also prevalent in the discourses it produced for popular consumption. Gemini articles were consistently and unapologetically pro-decolonisation and pro-Global South; in many professional journalistic circles on London’s Fleet street, this marked Gemini out as an ‘alternative’ outlet. In practice, this pro-decolonisation stance simply meant producing articles that supported new, post-independence governments and that criticised unjust international structures that disadvantaged countries in the Global South in matters of trade and diplomacy. Even in these supportive articles, Gemini’s journalism continued to reproduce the paternalistic ‘liberal’ discourses of the time, emphasising ‘progress’, ‘development’ and ‘modernisation’ and embodying a kind of temporal distancing which encouraged the ‘advanced’ nations to help those ‘less advanced’ to ‘catch up’.

The production of these discourses, as this thesis has argued, was influenced substantially by journalism’s typically masculinist professional cultures; the ability of a relatively small network of ‘liberal’ postcolonial elites, and their views, to dominate the journalistic articulation of Gemini’s geopolitical narratives; and the culturally-bound technical-professional norms and standards that defined the boundaries of the agency’s journalistic expression.

In examining these limits to Gemini’s decolonisation, this thesis has asked questions of how we conceptualise alterity in popular geopolitics. The thesis considered not only Gemini’s discursive production of geopolitical space, but also the social, cultural, practical, institutional and ideological aspects of Gemini’s journalistic practice. It suggests that an ‘alternative’ news agency cannot reasonably be considered to be decolonising news and journalism if it fails to address the Euro-normative rules, hierarchies and creative cultures that govern the journalistic profession. It outlined the failure of Gemini and many other influential journalist institutions to ask fundamental questions of what journalism is, does and is for and the culturally-bound nature of the assumptions widely held in this regard.
These insights are particularly relevant today. Whilst Gemini’s interest in decolonising the news was a minority interest in the 1960s, today, the felicitous popular representation of marginalised and subaltern peoples, and felicitous representational forms, are often prioritised as key aspects of fights for social justice (see Coryat, 2008; Foster, 2008; Rodriguez, 2001). The analysis in this thesis highlights the limitations of historical attempts at decolonising the news. Gemini believed journalism could be decolonised if only it could rectify quantitative imbalances in who was reporting and where was reported on or if it could represent in a more positive light ‘skilled’ and ‘capable’ postcolonial political leaders. However, the preceding chapters have shown that decolonisation of the news, just as many have argued for the process more broadly, requires more than the replacement of one set of people with another. It also requires the reimagining, reconsidering and reformulating of cultures, institutions and practices in multiple sites and at multiple scales. It requires journalists and journalistic organisations to engage in a critical, reflexive practice and to consider the taken-for-granted norms and ideals of their profession. Crucially, the journalistic field must dispense with its currently unacknowledged notions of colonial benevolence: the commonplace idea that the Western journalistic tradition is a gift to be bestowed upon the countries and peoples of the Global South to enable them to ‘develop’ and ‘progress’ and for their societies to ‘develop’.

That Gemini did not take these aspects of journalism’s (de)colonisation into consideration was a substantial source of its limited capacity to enact a decolonising mode of journalistic practice.

Today, there does exist a small number of indigenous media groups that are prioritising the ‘reactivation’ or the ‘integration’ of denigrated indigenous cultural axiomatics in journalistic practice and are problematizing the exclusivity of Euro-normative rules, hierarchies and creative cultures that govern modes of journalistic expression (see Schiwy, 2008; Todorova, 2016). Many of these groups provide excellent instruction in regard to addressing some of the conceptual limitations relating to the decolonisation of journalism that hamstrung Gemini and its peers.

There has been surprisingly little academic engagement with the construction and dissemination of hegemonic journalistic cultures in the
twentieth century, nor with attempts to dismantle them in the twenty-first century. It is hoped that this thesis may serve to highlight to journalism’s intellectual gatekeepers the extent to which problematic, dominant notions of journalism and its deficiencies have remained static and unchallenged over the past half century and to suggest some of the questions which need to be asked in the future. In decolonising the news media, we must challenge the unjust and unequal power structures that enabled the inculcation of certain ostensibly commonsensical rules, norms, practices and structures as somehow neutral and universally applicable. This thesis suggests that future attempts to decolonise journalism will, like Gemini, be limited if they aim only for a kind of quantitative rebalancing within colonially constructed structures and paradigms.

Rather, a much more radical reworking of the news media is required, one which is cognisant of the multifaceted and multiscalar nature of colonial hegemony and is committed to creative alterity in the production of more felicitous forms of timely, factual storytelling.
Appendices

Appendix 1 - Archives

This appendix provides details of the archival repositories utilised to inform the content of this thesis. A full list of archival materials referenced in the thesis is provided in section two of the bibliography.

Records of the Gemini News Service

Covers 1966-2008. Includes original articles and graphics; promotional materials; management and editorial records; financial records; lists and details of correspondents; project files and correspondence with subscribers and contributors.

Location: GNM Archives, Kings Place, 90 York Way, Kings Cross, London N1 9GU.

Website:

Commonwealth Press Union

Covers 1909-c2008. Includes institutional records and publications of the Empire Press Union, later called the Commonwealth Press Union; conference papers and reports; albums of news cuttings; fellowship Scheme leaflets; papers relating to the Sir Harry Brittain fellowship and papers on the history of the organisation.

Location: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Senate House library, University of London, Malet St, Bloomsbury, London WC1E 7HU

Website:
**Commonwealth Journalists’ Association**

Covers 1979-2003. Includes papers relating to training courses and workshops run by the CJA for journalists in Africa, the Pacific, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malta, Malaysia, Cyprus, Belize, Hong Kong and the Caribbean; correspondence with organisations including the Commonwealth Secretariat, The Commonwealth Relations Trust, The Commonwealth Foundation, The Thomson Foundation, the University of Western Ontario and the Commonwealth Press; conference papers and copies of the CJA newsletter.

**Location:** Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Senate House library, University of London, Malet St, Bloomsbury, London WC1E 7HU

**Website:**
http://archives.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/dispatcher.aspx?action=search&database=ChoiceArchive&search=prref=110046772

**Sir Tom Hopkinson Collection**

Covers 1958-1991. Part of Cardiff University Library’s ‘Popular newspaper journalism archives (20th C.)’. Material donated to library by Hopkinson’s family after his death. Includes diaries, correspondence, press clippings and reports from his time working for the international Press Institute.

**Location:** Cardiff university Library, Bute Building, 1st floor, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3NB

**Website:** Collection no longer listed on Cardiff Library’s website. Archived listing available at: https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20160610070819/http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/insrv/libraries/scolar/special/journalism.html#Hopkinson

**The National Archives – Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Information Research Department: Registered Files**

Covers 1966-1977. Includes, registered files of the Information Research Department (IRD) concerning the provision of anti-Communist information via British overseas missions and posts and other outlets.

**Location:** The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU
Richard Hall – Personal Collection

Covers c1940-c1995. The personal papers of the late Richard Hall. Access was very kindly facilitated by Hall’s family. Collection includes correspondence, research materials for journalistic and literary projects, diaries, notebooks and press clippings. Hall’s family are in the process of preparing the collection for donation to Senate House Library’s Institute of Commonwealth Studies.

Website: Hall’s family maintain a website about him and his work. Available at: http://www.richardhall.info/index.html
Appendix 2 - Interviews

This appendix provides details of the people interviewed in the course of conducting research for this thesis and the subjects discussed in those interviews. These individuals worked for, with, or alongside Gemini in a range of capacities at various points in Gemini’s history. As such, the topics discussed were tailored to each interviewee’s specific personal and professional experiences. The interviews were semi-structured, allowing the conversation to follow interesting tangents as they were raised. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.

Paddy Allen


Allen worked for Gemini c1984-1995 as its head graphic artist. Subjects discussed include, the production process, professional development at Gemini, the workplace culture, his recollections of Derek Ingram and Daniel Nelson, and Gemini’s ethos and idealism.

Kanina Holmes

12th July, 2016, via Skype, 1 hour.

Holmes completed a one-year International Development Research Centre fellowship, working in Gemini’s London office and completing an assignment in East Africa in 1997. Subjects discussed include, motivation for applying for the fellowship, Gemini’s professional culture, editorial procedures, gendered practices, safety and support while on assignment, and Gemini’s ideals.

Daniel Nelson

13th February, 2015, private residence, 2 hours.

Nelson joined Gemini in 1982 as deputy editor and, on the retirement of Derek Ingram in 1994, became its editor. Subjects discussed include, Nelson’s start in journalism, editing newspapers in Uganda before joining Gemini, journalism
ideals, journalism training, development journalism, editorial practice, and the end of Gemini.

**Cedric Pulford**

*26th May, 2015, King’s College, London, Strand Campus, 1 hour.*

Pulford joined the Thomson Foundation as a journalism trainer in 1972 and spent 30 years in the field of journalism education, mostly focusing on journalism in the Global South. He also contributed to Gemini. Subjects discussed include, experience of Gemini as a contributor and as a reader, journalism training at Thomson, training as an independent provider, training ethos, journalistic ideals, and journalism as a tool of development/modernization.

**Patsy Robertson**

*19th February, 2015, King’s College, London, Strand Campus, 1 hour 30 minutes.*

Robertson worked as the Director of Information at the Commonwealth Secretariat and Official Spokesperson for the Commonwealth between 1965 and 1994. Subjects discussed include, the Commonwealth’s links to and support of Gemini, the Commonwealth Secretariat’s view of Gemini, Robertson’s interaction with Gemini as a press spokesperson, Gemini’s and the Commonwealth’s campaigning against apartheid, and Robertson’s experience as a journalist in Jamaica.

**Keith Somerville**

*19th February, 2015, King’s College, London, Strand Campus, 1 hour 30 minutes.*

Somerville worked as a reporter and producer at the BBC World Service from 1988 to 2005, specialising in southern Africa. Subjects discussed include, journalistic network in Southern Africa, Somerville’s contributions to Gemini, Somerville’s perceptions of Gemini, and the culture of the ‘foreign’ correspondent.
Allan Thompson

9th February, 2016, via Skype, 1 hour.

Thompson completed a one-year International Development Research Centre fellowship, working in the Gemini’s London office and completing an assignment in North Africa in 1990. Subjects discussed include, motivation for applying for the fellowship, Gemini’s professional culture, editorial procedures, division of responsibilities in the Gemini offices, journalistic ideals, and Thompson’s perceptions of Gemini and its senior staff.

Daya Thussu

8th February, 2016, Westminster University, London, Regent Campus, 1 hour.

Thussu worked as Gemini’s associate editor between 1991 and 1995. Subjects discussed include, Thussu’s work in India as a journalist, Gemini’s professional culture, day-to-day editorial practice, editorial decision making, Gemini’s network of correspondents, requirements of a Gemini article, and Gemini’s contribution to the decolonization of the news media.
Appendix 3 – Extract of an interview with
Jones Kaumba conducted by Ruth Craggs

The transcript of an interview with Zambian Journalist Jones Kaumba was kindly provided by Ruth Craggs and quoted with her permission. It was conducted in the offices of Zamcom in Lusaka on 27 July 2011. The majority of the interview focussed on the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka in 1979 (see Craggs, 2014). The relevant extract is presented below.

**Ruth Craggs:** I’ve been reading lots of press reports both in Britain and in Zambia about —

**Jones Kaumba:** Did you get some press cuttings?

**RC:** I have some from the national archives, and also from — I don’t know, do you know Derek Ingram?

**JK:** Yeah, fantastic man! Fantastic man.

**RC:** He has a big box of press clippings.

**JK:** Oh, Ingram. I mean, you can’t talk about journalism without talking about Ingram. That’s a man who has done a lot, I think, in the field of journalism. I have a lot of respect. Not only me, virtually all Zambian journalists have a lot of respect for that gentleman.

**RC:** I think he’s one person who has tried to get a more non-western perspective into western newspapers.

**JK:** Exactly.

**RC:** Through Gemini and —

**JK:** Oh, that is a fantastic set up. For me, you see, once in a while you come across journalists like that who take their responsibility a bit further, and I think that’s what Ingram has done. I hope that he has been honoured in one way or
another and probably that’s one thing we need to do because for me, that’s a man who has been very consistent in whatever he set out to do. He has helped a lot of us understand the profession. He has also tried to make people understand that Africa is not about famines and wars and all these other things; there is a lot more to Africa than that, and I think that has been the cry of most Africans…
# Appendix 4 – Article Sample for the Discourse Analysis of Chapter 6

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
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<td><em>Times of Zambia</em></td>
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<td>The Little Prime Minister</td>
<td>22 January 1969</td>
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<td><em>Times of Zambia</em></td>
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<td>10 February 1969</td>
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<td><em>Times of Zambia</em></td>
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<td>A Mouse That Roared</td>
<td>05 March 1969</td>
<td><em>Times of Zambia</em></td>
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<td>UK levy plan Upsets its Food Suppliers</td>
<td>17 February 1971</td>
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<td>Israel Does Not Say Where it Wants Borders to be</td>
<td>04 March 1971</td>
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<td>21 January 1990, The Toronto Star</td>
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<td>17 February 1990, The Toronto Star</td>
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<td>04 March 1990, The Toronto Star</td>
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<td>The Dream of Canada Turns to Nightmare for Gulf Emigrants</td>
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<td>04 January 1991, The Chandigarh Tribune</td>
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<td>05 January 1991, The Chandigarh Tribune</td>
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<td>07 February 1991</td>
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<td>11 November 1992</td>
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<td>14 November 1992</td>
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<td>Chair-Bound Malinga Keeps on Running</td>
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<td>East African Standard</td>
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<td>05 July 2001</td>
<td>The Sowetan</td>
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<td>Fears Over Youth Call Up</td>
<td>05 July 2001</td>
<td>The Sowetan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reaching Out Over a River of Hope</td>
<td>20 July 2001</td>
<td>The Sowetan</td>
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<td>Economic Colonialism</td>
<td>24 July 2001</td>
<td>The Sowetan</td>
<td>***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi’s Women are Victims of Silence</td>
<td>25 July 2001</td>
<td>The Sowetan</td>
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<td>How Osama Changed the Face of Politics</td>
<td>17 October 2001</td>
<td>The Sowetan</td>
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<td>On the Market is a Job That no Swazi Wants to Apply for</td>
<td>20 December 2001</td>
<td>The Sowetan</td>
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<td>A City Which Holds no Joy for Chinese</td>
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<td>Hi tech Dream Yields Toxic Nightmare</td>
<td>22 March 2002</td>
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<td>Myanmar Seeks Help in Phony War on Drugs</td>
<td>29 March 2002</td>
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<td>Quest for Cultural Purity Unites Once Bitter Foes</td>
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<td>Giving Rural Women the Credit They Deserve</td>
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<td>New Aid Plans Leave Developing Nation no Closer to Pot of Gold</td>
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</table>

* From a Sunday magazine section with pagination separate from the rest of the newspaper.

** From a sports supplement with pagination separate from the rest of the newspaper.

Appendix 5 – Categories of actor that occur on fewer than 10 occasions in the sample, attributed, grammatically, with agency.

This table displays the 25 categories of actors – individuals, organisations or entities – that were attributed, grammatically, with the ability to act in the sample of 233 articles analysed for the discourse analysis of Chapter 6. These actors were not included in Table 10 on p.214 in order to keep the table to a manageable size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
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<tr>
<td>Students in the Global South</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specified industry (e.g. “the copper industry…”)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper in the Global South</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid/Relief workers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist in the Global South</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical professional in the Global South</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>The author of the article</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business person in the Global North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business person in the Global South</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National military in the Global North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political party in the Global North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activist in the Global South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activist Group in the Global North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Businessperson in the Global North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guerrilla leader in the Global South</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal professional in the Global South</td>
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<td>European Monarch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artist in the Global North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artist in the Global South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious institution in the Global South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aristocrat in the Global North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journalist in the Global North</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Tribal’ leader in the Global South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Union in the Global South</td>
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Appendix 6 – The 20 Most Frequent Gemini Contributors

This table displays the 20 most frequent Gemini contributors, as per the analysis of 3,917 Gemini articles published between 1968 and 1997, detailed in Chapter 5. The ‘top 20’ are listed alongside their gender, the number of articles authored by them identified in the analysis and the percentage of the sample that this number represents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributor</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No. of Articles</th>
<th>%age of Sample</th>
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<tr>
<td>Derek Ingram</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D K Joshi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Robie</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Forest</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A J Singh</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clyde Sanger</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamini Navaratne</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamini Seneviratne</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Rake</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe Scicluna</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>55</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abby Tan</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
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<td>K. K. Duggal</td>
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<td>Cameron Duodu</td>
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<td>Cedric Lindo</td>
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<td>Mohamed Hamaludin</td>
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<td>Christopher Parker</td>
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<td>John Worrall</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fred Mpanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francis Mwanza</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
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</table>
Appendix 7 – The Gemini Contributors

Responsible for 50% of its Content

This table displays the 49 most frequent Gemini contributors, as per the analysis of 3,917 Gemini articles published between 1968 and 1997, detailed in Chapter 5. They are listed alongside their gender, the number of articles authored by them identified in the analysis and the percentage of the sample that this number represents. The analysis identified 676 individual contributors. Together, though, these 49 contributors were responsible for half the sample of articles.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Contributor</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No. of Articles</th>
<th>%age of sample</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derek Ingram</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>D K Joshi</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Forest</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>A J Singh</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clyde Sanger</td>
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<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joe Scicluna</td>
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**TOTAL**               | M44 / F5 | 1996 | 50.0%     |
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